Background

Alien smuggling is the facilitation, transportation, or attempted  transportation of a person, with his or her consent, across an international  border, in violation of one or more countries’ laws. Often, alien smuggling  is conducted in order to obtain a financial or other material benefit for the  smuggler. The alien smuggling process from Mexico into the United States  along the southwest border using the services of a smuggling organization  is generally the same regardless of entry point. For instance, when  individuals travel to populated areas in Mexico just south of the border, a  smuggler representative will market smuggling services in that populated  area, and then the individuals will be moved across the international  border in some fashion (such as crossing a desert area or the Rio Grande  river), usually with a group of other smuggled aliens. Once across the  border, the smuggled aliens typically will be moved to a “stash house”  where they arrange for payment. In general, smuggled aliens do not carry  large amounts of cash when crossing the border for fear of being robbed.  For many smuggled aliens their final destination is a city in the interior of  the United States. To pay for their crossing these smuggled aliens have  arranged in advance for a family member or friend, called a “sponsor,” in  the interior city to send the payment to the smuggler, most commonly via a  wire transfer company. Once payment is received, the aliens are moved to  their final destination by the smuggling organization. Figure 1 illustrates  how the alien smuggling process works for those aliens smuggled through  Arizona.

		Department of Homeland Security Components That Address Alien Smuggling along the Southwest Border

DHS ICE is responsible for investigating alien smuggling as well as  detaining and removing aliens who are subject to removal from the United  States. ICE focuses on enforcement of immigration and customs laws  within the United States, and its mission is to detect and prevent terrorist  and criminal acts by targeting the people, money, and materials that  support terrorists and criminal networks. OI, among other things, is  responsible for investigating alien smuggling violations at the border and  beyond. In fiscal year 2010, OI had a budget of about $1.7 billion and as of  November 2009 had a staff of about 8,600, which includes investigators  and support staff responsible for all of OI’s investigative areas nationwide.  The types of alien smuggling cases handled by OI can range from reactive  cases, resulting from a particular incident or referrals from other law  enforcement agencies, to proactive cases, resulting from intelligence  gathering or use of financial investigative techniques. According to OI  officials we interviewed, the majority of OI’s alien smuggling investigations  are reactive cases initiated based on referrals from the Border Patrol or  local law enforcement as a result of alien smuggling interdictions made by  these agencies. Responding to these referrals leaves less investigative  resources to initiate proactive investigations. In addition, investigations  can vary in their complexity. For instance, some cases do not require  extensive investigation and investigation is limited to prosecuting the alien  smuggler caught in the act of smuggling aliens. Conversely, a recent  investigation conducted by OI in El Paso led to the indictment of a hotel  owner who devised a plan to smuggle hundreds of aliens into the country  from Mexico and harbor them using his hotel and other locations until  their families or “sponsors” paid a fee, usually through a wire transfer  company such as Western Union or MoneyGram. This investigation took  over 5 years and required the assistance of various federal and state  agencies as well as private businesses.
Also within ICE, DRO is responsible for detaining aliens who are subject  to removal, including those smuggled into the country, and enforcing their  removal from the United States. DRO’s mission is to ensure the departure  of all removable aliens from the United States through enforcement of the  nation’s immigration laws. In fiscal year 2010, DRO had a budget of about  $2.6 billion and as of November 2009 had a staff of about 7,000.
With the aid of CBP’s Office of Border Patrol and ICE’s Office of  International Affairs (OIA), DRO operates and funds MIRP, which the  former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began in 1996 in  Southern California. MIRP was operated and funded by CBP in fiscal years  2004 and 2005. MIRP is a coordinated humanitarian effort between the  governments of Mexico and the United States to return removable aliens  who are citizens of Mexico further into the interior of Mexico in hopes of  deterring them from again attempting illegal entry into the United States.  As a voluntary humanitarian program with no prosecutorial consequence,  candidates for MIRP include those who are identified as “high risk” when  crossing the border illegally, such as women and children and the elderly  or infirm, as these populations are particularly vulnerable to heat or risk of  victimization by criminals operating in border regions. Aliens convicted of  violent crimes are ineligible to participate in MIRP.
Within CBP, the Border Patrol is responsible for the enforcement of  federal immigration laws between official ports of entry. CBP’s National  Border Patrol Strategy outlines two goals in regard to alien smuggling:   (1) deter illegal entries through improved enforcement and (2) detect,  apprehend, and deter smugglers of humans and drugs and other  contraband. In fiscal year 2010, the Border Patrol’s budget was about   $3.6 billion, and as of November 2009, the Border Patrol had about 20,000  agents nationwide with about 17,000 agents deployed along the southwest  border.
In order to deter aliens from repeatedly crossing the border illegally and to  deter alien smuggling, CBP implemented a number of enforcement  programs from 2004 through 2008. CBP has two prosecutorial enforcement  programs—Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security  (OASISS) and Operation Streamline. The OASISS program, implemented  in August 2005, is a bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United  States that allows CBP to transfer selected alien smugglers that a U.S.  Attorney’s office has declined to prosecute to Mexico for prosecution.  Operation Streamline, started in December 2005, prosecutes selected  aliens apprehended by the Border Patrol for illegal entry under federal  law. Those convicted face up to 180 days of incarceration.
Another enforcement program the Border Patrol operates is the Alien  Transfer Exit Program (ATEP) in which removable aliens are bused from  their original apprehension location to another Border Patrol location for  removal. ATEP is designed to disrupt the ability of alien smuggling  organizations to operate by deterring aliens from repeatedly crossing the  border illegally and from seeking the assistance of smuggling  organizations. Under ATEP, removable aliens must meet certain criteria in  order to participate in the program. For example, an alien must be a male  from the ages of 20 to 60 with no medical conditions or criminal history.  Appendix II provides additional information regarding CBP’s and DRO’s  alien smuggling-related enforcement programs.

		Other Federal Agencies Involved in Combating Alien Smuggling along the Southwest Border

Outside of DHS, Justice and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury)  play significant roles in addressing alien smuggling. In particular, Justice’s  U.S. Attorney’s offices collaborate with OI during the course of alien  smuggling investigations by obtaining grand jury subpoenas, warrants, and  wire taps. If an alien smuggling case meets certain thresholds established  by the relevant U.S. Attorney, such as a minimum number of aliens  smuggled, the U.S. Attorney is to ultimately prosecute the case. Of the 93  U.S. Attorneys stationed throughout the United States and its territories,  those in the five southwest border districts prosecuted 85 percent of all  alien smuggling cases nationwide in fiscal year 2009. Within Treasury, the  Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) serves as a central  resource for financial intelligence information and analysis that law  enforcement agencies use to conduct alien smuggling investigations.  FinCEN administers the largest financial transaction reporting system in  the world, which is based on reporting requirements mandated or  authorized under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). OI has access to BSA data  for its alien smuggling investigations through a database maintained by  FinCEN. OI investigators can use this database to trace financial  transactions associated with a suspected alien smuggler to assist in  determining the identity of other individuals involved in alien smuggling  and to locate funds that could be subject to seizure if tied to alien  smuggling.
In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act established  the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) in order to achieve  greater integration and overall effectiveness in the U.S. government’s law  enforcement efforts, and to work with other nations to address the issues  of alien smuggling and human trafficking. According to its charter, the  center’s role is supportive rather than directive in nature and consists  primarily of facilitating the dissemination of intelligence, preparing  strategic assessments, identifying issues that would benefit from enhanced  interagency coordination or attention, and coordinating or otherwise  supporting agency or interagency efforts in appropriate cases. HSTC is  guided by a steering group comprising senior representatives from DHS,  Justice, and the Department of State and relies on full-time detailees from  its participating departments to function. HSTC is housed within the  Department of State and is currently managed by ICE officials.

		Federal Laws Applied in Alien Smuggling Prosecutions

To prosecute alien smugglers, federal officials generally use section 274 of  the Immigration and Nationality Act, which is codified and most frequently  referred to by federal law enforcement as 8 U.S.C. § 1324. This statute  provides criminal penalties for several types of conduct related to alien  smuggling, including bringing an unauthorized alien into the United States  in any manner whatsoever; bringing an alien into the United States at a  place other than a port of entry, regardless of whether the alien has  received prior authorization to enter the country; domestic transport of an  alien who has entered or remains in the United States in violation of law,  in furtherance of such violation; concealing or harboring such an alien;  and encouraging or inducing an alien to enter or reside in the United  States in violation of law. To convict a defendant under 8 U.S.C. § 1324,  there generally must be proof that the defendant knew or recklessly  disregarded that the alien had not received prior authorization to enter the  United States or had entered or remained in the country illegally.
Other federal statutes used to prosecute alien smuggling cases are 8 U.S.C.  § 1325, which provides penalties for, among other things, entering or  attempting to enter the United States illegally, and 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which  penalizes reentry into the United States after a denial of admission,  removal, or departure while subject to an order of removal. Additional  federal statutes that can be used in alien smuggling-related cases are  outlined in table 1.
The maximum penalties outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324 generally include a   1-, 5-, or 10-year prison sentence for each alien in regard to whom a  violation occurred and depend on the nature of the offense. The 1-year  statutory maximum only applies to cases where the defendant’s purpose in  bringing an unauthorized alien to the United States was not for  commercial advantage or private financial gain and the unauthorized alien  was immediately presented to an immigration officer at a port of entry  after being brought into the country. Otherwise, there is a mandatory  minimum penalty of 3 years per alien under certain circumstances and a  maximum penalty of 10 years per unauthorized alien brought into the  country. Domestic transportation, harboring, encouraging or inducing, or  aiding or abetting unauthorized aliens incurs a maximum of 5 years per  alien, unless the offense was committed for commercial advantage or  private financial gain, in which case the maximum is 10 years per alien.  Bringing an alien (whether authorized or not) into the United States in any  place other than a port of entry is punishable by up to 10 years  imprisonment per alien. Appendix III contains more detail on the  disposition of alien smuggling cases along the southwest border.

		Use of State Law to Combat Alien Smuggling in Southwest Border States

Arizona, the only southwest border state with an alien smuggling law,  enacted a statute in 2005 that prohibits intentionally engaging in the  smuggling of human beings for profit or commercial purpose. The statute  defines the smuggling of human beings to include transporting, procuring  transportation, or using property or real property, knowing or having  reason to know that the individual transported or to be transported is not  a U.S. citizen, permanent resident alien, or person otherwise lawfully in  the state of Arizona. Arizona courts have also interpreted this provision in  conjunction with Arizona’s conspiracy statute to allow prosecution of  smuggled aliens for conspiracy to commit human smuggling. A violation of  the Arizona statute is a felony, punishable by a minimum of 1 to 3.75 years  in prison, with significantly higher sentencing ranges for dangerous  conduct or repeat offenses. Passage by the Arizona state legislature of an  alien smuggling law occurred in the context of heightened violence in  Arizona associated with alien smuggling. For example, alien smugglers  engaged in a shootout on an Arizona Interstate highway in 2003 in which  four people were killed and five were wounded. One set of smugglers was  attempting to steal the other smugglers’ cargo of undocumented aliens,  resulting in the gun battle.
In Texas, state and federal law enforcement are using existing Texas  transportation law to revoke the licenses of truck drivers who are caught  committing a felony, including alien smuggling, while driving any motor  vehicle, including a commercial vehicle. Under the Texas Commercial  Driver’s License Act, the first felony conviction leads to a 1-year  suspension of a commercial driver’s license, with lifetime suspensions if  convicted two or more times of committing a felony (or if convicted of  multiple felonies arising from two or more separate incidents). In addition,  lifetime suspensions apply to first instances of using a motor vehicle to  commit an offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 that involves the transportation,  concealment, or harboring of an alien. The Border Patrol in Laredo and the  Texas Department of Public Safety established a joint initiative based on  this state transportation statute, which includes a media campaign and  public outreach to proactively inform commercial truck drivers of the  legal consequences if caught smuggling aliens.

	OI Work Years Spent Investigating Alien Smuggling Recently Increased; Opportunity Exists to Better Leverage Resources

Along the southwest border, OI work years devoted to investigating alien  smuggling increased from about 190 work years in fiscal year 2005 to  about 197 work years in fiscal year 2009, an overall increase of 4 percent.  As shown in figure 2, the overall number of work years decreased from  about 190 work years in fiscal year 2005 to 174 in fiscal year 2008, but  increased by 23 work years from 2008 to 2009. This net increase was the  result of an increase of 39 work years in Arizona and a corresponding  decrease of 16 work years devoted to alien smuggling by the other three  SAC offices. According to the Arizona SAC, a large number of investigators  were detailed to Arizona in 2009 to deal with an ongoing investigation. The  work years OI devoted to investigating all types of immigration and  customs violations along the southwest border have also increased since  fiscal year 2005. For fiscal years 2005 to 2009, the total number of  investigative work years for all investigations increased from about 1,122  work years to about 1,190 work years, an increase of about 6 percent.
From fiscal years 2005 through 2009 the proportion of all reported  investigative hours spent on alien smuggling relative to all other reported  investigative areas along the southwest border remained relatively  constant, ranging from an average of 16 percent to 17 percent, as shown in  figure 3. During these same fiscal years, OI reports working about 42  percent of its total investigative hours on drug smuggling. The remaining  proportion of hours were divided among 14 other program areas OI  investigates, such as enforcing immigration laws in workplaces.
SAC offices along the southwest border account for nearly half of OI hours  spent on alien smuggling nationwide. From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal  year 2009, the four SAC offices along the southwest border accounted for,  on average, 43 percent of all alien smuggling hours nationwide.
OI investigations resulted in hundreds of arrests, indictments, and  convictions each year from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009. As  shown in figure 4, the results varied by SAC office. For example, in the El  Paso office arrests, indictments, and convictions increased from fiscal  years 2005 through 2007 but then decreased in fiscal years 2008 and 2009.  In Phoenix, arrests, indictments, and convictions fluctuated greatly during  this period for all categories. For example, in fiscal year 2006, 188 cases  resulted in criminal arrests; however, that number increased to 339 cases  resulting in arrests in fiscal year 2009. In addition, convictions decreased  by 34 percent from fiscal years 2005 through 2009. In San Antonio arrests,  indictments, and convictions all increased from 2005 through 2008, but  indictments and convictions decreased slightly in 2009. In San Diego,  convictions went from 37 in fiscal year 2005 to 57 in fiscal year 2007 to 107  in fiscal year 2009.
According to a 2008 ICE report, the increase in CBP border patrol agents  and field operations officers along the southwest border has increased the  number of CBP investigative referrals. According to the report, the  number of OI agents decreased from fiscal years 2004 through 2007,  straining OI’s ability to respond to the increasing number of referrals. As a  result, all southwest border SAC offices, where alien smuggling is the  second highest resource-intensive investigative area, relied on overtime to  meet workload demands, which is supposed to be limited to 480 hours of  overtime per agent per year. According to the report, in fiscal year 2007, all  of the southwest border SACs reported agents working more than 480  hours of overtime per year. For example, OI investigators in the San Diego  SAC office worked on average 640 hours of overtime in fiscal year 2007,  160 hours over the 480-hour limit.
DHS and our previous work have recognized the importance of  implementing human capital policies in order for an organization to be  effective at addressing its mission and programmatic goals. According to  DHS’s Human Capital Accountability Plan, DHS is committed to ensuring  that human capital resources are aligned with mission accomplishments  and are deployed efficiently and effectively. In addition, GAO’s Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that effective  management of an organization’s workforce—its human capital—is  essential to achieving results and ensuring that workforce skills match  organizational objectives.
Although OI has reported that its investigative resources are strained, in  some cases OI investigators are conducting immigration-related activities  that are not consistent with OI’s primary mission of conducting criminal  investigations or the job description of a criminal investigator. Officials  from two of the four SAC offices we visited (San Antonio and El Paso) told  us that OI has been tasked to respond to calls from state and local law  enforcement agencies that have apprehended aliens who may be subject  to removal, a task that is not aligned with its main mission of conducting  criminal investigations. These responses result in little or no investigative  work and instead involve transporting and processing aliens for possible  removal. According to ICE, OI is the lead unit for responding to local  police calls regarding aliens who may be subject to removal. Prior to 2003,  the former INS was responsible for responding to local police calls for  assistance related to encounters with aliens. With the creation of ICE and  the formation of OI and DRO in 2003, the responsibility of responding to  such calls fell upon OI investigators, as this duty carried over with them  from INS. According to ICE officials, OI has continued to perform this  function.
The amount of time spent on the non-investigation-related calls by the two  offices varied. OI officials reported that in the San Antonio SAC office,  investigators spent approximately the hours of the equivalent of two full- time investigators each week responding to non-investigation-related calls  from different police departments during fiscal year 2009. For the El Paso  SAC office, OI officials estimated spending 17 staff hours per week  responding to an average of 20 calls per week from local police  departments that are noninvestigative in nature. Officials in the two offices  stated that responding to noninvestigative calls from local police  departments left less time available for investigators to focus on  investigations of alien smuggling and other customs and immigration- related crimes. According to OI officials, to respond to a noninvestigative  police call, investigators need to travel to the location where the aliens are  being detained, which could involve traveling to locations that are several  hours away. OI investigators need to then transport the aliens back to their  office and prepare the paperwork related to the aliens’ arrest and removal,  which in some cases can take up to 4 hours per alien.
ICE’s DRO is the DHS component primarily responsible for removing  aliens who are subject to removal and has positions for both deportation  officers and immigration enforcement agents that are commensurate with  this responsibility. In 2006, to respond to immigration-related calls for  assistance from state and local law enforcement agencies in the Phoenix  metropolitan area, DRO developed the LEAR program. OI was previously  the primary ICE office providing assistance to state and local law  enforcement agencies in the Phoenix area. From October 1, 2008, to May  24, 2009, the LEAR program processed 3,776 aliens, aliens who OI would  have had to process in the absence of the LEAR program.
According to the Phoenix SAC, the LEAR program has been highly  successful. For example, the program has allowed his office to focus more  agents and technical resources on the proactive investigation of alien  smuggling cases rather than responding to local police calls. According to  TECS’s self-reported investigation data, Phoenix increased the amount of  work hours on alien smuggling by 11 percent from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal  year 2008, the period subsequent to the implementation of the LEAR  program.
According to DRO officials, the LEAR program is highly successful in the  Phoenix region because it offers local law enforcement agencies a  mechanism for an immediate federal response for handling aliens who  may be subject to removal. DRO headquarters officials stated that they  have discussed expanding the LEAR program beyond Phoenix but have  yet to conduct an evaluation to identify the best locations for expanding  the program. By studying the feasibility of expanding the LEAR program,  and expanding the program if feasible, ICE would be in a better position to  evaluate alternatives for aligning staff responsibilities to its subcomponent  agency missions and helping ensure that its resources are more efficiently  directed toward alien smuggling and other priority investigations.  According to ICE headquarters officials, OI investigators in the Southwest  would likely work on more alien smuggling cases if the LEAR program  expanded beyond the Phoenix area since alien smuggling is the second  most worked investigative area in all four southwestern SAC locations.  DRO officials estimate the cost of a LEAR program unit to be $7 million  per year for a fully staffed unit in one metropolitan area.
In addition to its own investigations, OI has taken steps over the last 4  years to participate in or develop coordination efforts, working groups, or  task forces that address alien smuggling. These activities have been  primarily focused on regional border activities where OI has historically  encountered the greatest proportion of alien smuggling violations.  Appendix IV contains more detail on these coordination efforts.

	Alien Smuggling Asset Seizures Have Decreased since 2005; Opportunities Exist to Leverage Additional Financial Investigative and Seizure Techniques

		The Value of OI Alien Smuggling Asset Seizures Has Decreased since 2005

In 2005 we reported that OI and Treasury’s Executive Office for Asset  Forfeiture anticipated that in fiscal year 2005 and in future years alien  smuggling investigations would result in increasing volumes of asset  seizures as OI applied its financial and money laundering expertise, which  it acquired when elements of legacy INS components and U.S. Customs  merged to form OI in 2003. For alien smuggling asset seizures, OI  collaborates with U.S. Attorney’s office officials, who are responsible for  litigating any contested seizures and CBP, as the agency responsible for  processing seizures. According to data provided by OI, and shown in table  2, the value of alien smuggling seizures nationwide increased from about  $11.2 million in fiscal year 2005 to $17.4 million in fiscal year 2007, but  declined to $7.6 million in fiscal year 2009. According to ICE, alien  smuggling generates illicit revenues estimated to reach billions of dollars  annually. Seizures of currency; means of transporting smuggled aliens,  such as automobiles and boats; and real estate make up the bulk of OI’s  asset seizures. The remainder of seizures is made up of drugs, counterfeit  goods, weapons, and other items, such as computers.
OI officials attributed the decline in alien smuggling asset seizures from  fiscal years 2007 through 2009 to several factors. First, the declining real  estate market throughout the United States has made homes used as stash  houses for smuggled aliens less attractive for seizure because the homes  generally have little or no equity available. Second, enhanced border  security during this period, according to OI officials, and a corresponding  decrease in alien smuggling activity, may also have led to a decline in  assets seized. For example, the amount of currency seized by OI may be  affected if increased enforcement on the border results in a larger  percentage of alien smuggling loads being interdicted before making their  way to the interior of the United States. These interdictions reduce  criminal alien smuggling proceeds subject to seizure because the smuggled  alien has not had the opportunity to pay the smuggler before being  apprehended. Third, OI officials also cite the declining U.S. economy as  leading to a general decline in alien smuggling activity. According to the  officials, most smuggled aliens are drawn to the United States for  economic reasons. The lack of opportunity for employment during this  period may have affected the decision of aliens to illegally enter the United  States using the services of alien smuggling organizations.
According to OI officials in all four SAC offices we visited, OI had  increased its efforts to identify and seize assets related to alien smuggling.  Each of the four SAC offices had an asset forfeiture unit that supported OI  investigations, including alien smuggling investigations. This unit, for  example, reviews financial data such as bank records that OI investigators  obtain through a subpoena, to identify potential assets, such as bank  accounts, vehicles, or real estate, that can be seized and also to identify  other individuals who may be involved in the alien smuggling organization.  According to ICE headquarters officials, all OI investigators receive basic  training on financial investigative techniques, which includes the various  resources that are available to investigators. All OI investigators also have  access via their computers to financial information available through a  FinCEN financial transactions database. According to FinCEN officials,  the database allows OI investigators to directly query BSA data such as  suspicious activity reports (SAR) and currency transaction reports (CTR).  FinCEN officials stated that the BSA data housed in this database  represent millions of financial transactions from banks, money  transmitters, insurance companies, and other industries that report  information to FinCEN.
FinCEN also provides financial analyses upon request by law enforcement  agencies, including OI. These analyses provide FinCEN’s evaluation of  financial records that span various types of financial institutions and can  connect multiple individuals with illicit transactions. Approximately 60  such analysis requests were made of FinCEN by OI investigators related to  alien smuggling cases from August 2004 to April 2009. FinCEN also acts as  a liaison between domestic law enforcement agencies that make requests  for financial information from abroad and foreign entities that maintain  financial information. According to OI officials, OI investigators do not  extensively rely upon FinCEN for this service because the process can  take 45- to 60 days before financial information is returned to the  investigator subsequent to the initial request. According to FinCEN  officials, this 45 to 60-day time period is due to the time it takes for foreign  financial entities to respond, which is beyond FinCEN’s control. Instead,  OI investigators rely upon ICE’s OIA attachés, stationed in most foreign  countries, who are able to retrieve financial information needed for  investigations within several days.
In addition to using financial information to track and seize assets, OI  investigators can use financial information to help convict someone under  those provisions of the alien smuggling statute that carry higher penalties.  When prosecuting an alien smuggling case, evidence that the suspected  smuggler was engaging in the activity for financial gain is necessary in  order to obtain enhanced penalties for alien smuggling convictions. Such  financial information helps connect an alleged smuggler with the crime of  smuggling and also can support enhanced penalties should the smuggler  be convicted.
OI investigators we interviewed reported that they rely upon a variety of  information sources when tracking financial information associated with  alien smuggling, ranging in level of sophistication. One investigator  described how documents, such as transaction slips from a bank or wire  transfer company that demonstrate that a smuggler received payment for  smuggling services, can be among the most successful pieces of financial  evidence used against smugglers. The investigator also described logs that  list smuggled alien names and payment amounts, often found in stash  houses, as strong financial evidence to use against alien smugglers.  Financial analysis, whereby OI analysts evaluate smugglers’ incomes and  expenses and are able to identify illicit funds (usually in the form of  unexplained income), is also a useful technique, according to another  investigator. An investigator working in another southwest border office  stated that tracking multiple money service bank transactions to one  smuggler’s identity is often the strongest type of evidence that the  investigator can provide for an alien smuggling prosecution. Other  investigators we interviewed stated that much of this information is  gathered through the use of subpoenas, obtained by the U.S. Attorney’s  offices. Table 3 summarizes several OI alien smuggling investigations.

		The Number of Border Patrol Alien Smuggling Asset Seizures Has Declined since 2005

In addition to OI’s seizure activity, the Border Patrol seizes assets during  the course of its interdictions of alien smugglers along the southwest  border. According to Border Patrol officials, the Border Patrol has the  legal authority (as do all agencies with enforcement authority under Title  8) to seize vehicles, vessels, aircraft, or other commercial conveyances  that are involved in criminal activity. After a seizure and forfeiture, the  Border Patrol has the option to keep the property or to auction it off and  release the proceeds to the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. Border Patrol  officials in each of the sectors we visited stated that a primary benefit of  seizing alien smuggler assets is that it disrupts their smuggling activities.  For example, Border Patrol officials in one sector stated that when an  expensive vehicle, such as a tractor trailer, is seized, alien smugglers must  expend new resources to replace the vehicle in order to continue  operating. The seizure therefore increases costs to the alien smuggling  business and disrupts the operation until a replacement vehicle is  purchased.
As shown in table 4, 90 percent of all Border Patrol seizures made during  alien smuggling apprehensions are vehicles. While the volume of vehicles  seized remained relatively constant from fiscal years 2005 through 2006,  the number of vehicles seized declined from fiscal years 2007 through  2009. Border Patrol headquarters officials attribute the decline in alien  smuggling asset seizures to the decline in overall apprehensions since  2006. The officials also stated that the El Paso and Tucson Border Patrol  sectors account for the majority of the decrease in alien smuggling  seizures; both sectors have seen steady declines in removable alien  apprehensions since fiscal year 2006.

		Lack of Civil Asset Forfeiture Authority Makes Seizing Real Property Difficult

We previously reported on the limitations presented by a lack of civil asset  forfeiture authority for real property used to facilitate alien smuggling,  which makes seizing real property (such as real estate) infrequent and  difficult in alien smuggling cases. Civil asset forfeiture authority allows  federal authorities to seize property used to facilitate a crime without first  having to convict the property owner of a crime. We reported in 2005 that  Justice and ICE headquarters officials said that a concern for investigators  was the lack of adequate statutory civil forfeiture authority for seizing real  property—particularly stash houses used by smugglers that were not  owned by the smugglers. According to Justice, in 2005 analysis of civil and  criminal forfeiture statutes generally led the department to conclude that a  statute that provides only for criminal and not civil forfeiture of facilitating  property will be inadequate in such cases. We recommended that the  Attorney General, in collaboration with the Secretary of Homeland  Security, consider developing and submitting to Congress a legislative  proposal, with appropriate justification, for amending the civil forfeiture  authority for alien smuggling. Justice agreed with our recommendation. In  response to this recommendation, civil asset forfeiture authority for real  property used to facilitate alien smuggling was sought by Justice and  incorporated into several larger bills addressing immigration enforcement  or reform since 2005, but none of these bills had been enacted into law as  of March 2010. According to Justice officials, the current administration  has not yet taken a position on civil asset forfeiture authority for alien  smuggling cases.
We continue to believe it is important for Justice to submit its views to  Congress as to whether it needs civil asset forfeiture authority to seize real  property used to facilitate alien smuggling in order to combat this crime  effectively. During our site visits along the southwest border, OI  investigators indicated that lack of such authority makes it difficult to  seize real estate involved in alien smuggling activity. For example, in one  OI office, officials pointed to a graphic depiction of over 300 stash houses  the investigators were aware of over the past several years in one  metropolitan area. The officials stated that they were able to seize only  one of those houses and that civil asset forfeiture authority would have  made it easier to seize far more. As we reported in 2005, civil asset  forfeiture laws are designed to strike a balance between the law  enforcement and property interests involved, and a proposal to expand  civil forfeiture for alien smuggling to correspond with that permitted for  drug trafficking or money laundering would need to take this context into  account.

		Arizona Attorney General Has Disrupted Alien Smuggling Operations and Seized Assets by Focusing on Money Services Businesses; Opportunities Exist to Leverage These Resources

According to Arizona law enforcement officials and court affidavits we  reviewed, wire transfers through money services businesses (MSB) are a  primary method of payment for smuggled aliens in the southwest border  region. The federal interagency 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy  and its accompanying 2005 U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment  identify MSBs as an increasing threat for laundering illicit proceeds.  According to the strategy, MSBs are becoming increasingly attractive to  criminal groups for several reasons. The majority of wire transfers at  MSBs are paid for with cash and therefore MSBs provide excellent  camouflage for the initial introduction of the illicit proceeds into the  financial system. The sheer volume of legitimate cash transactions also  provides an excellent camouflage for money laundering activity in this  placement stage. MSBs offer inexpensive services and often impose less  rigorous anti-money laundering programs and compliance than traditional  financial institutions. Lastly, with offices in thousands of cities around the  world, MSBs allow customers to move funds from nearly any location  directly to any other location. The strategy states that law enforcement  believes that large amounts of funds sent to the southwest border via  MSBs are related to alien smuggling.
In order to address the threat posed by alien smugglers’ use of MSBs, in  2000 the Arizona Financial Crimes Task Force (the Task Force), composed  of investigators from the Arizona Department of Public Safety, the Arizona  Attorney General’s Office, the Phoenix Police Department, and the former  U.S. Customs Service, implemented a strategy that focused on following  the money flowing through MSBs in Arizona to identify suspected alien  smugglers and those MSBs that may be complicit in laundering proceeds  from alien smuggling. The Task Force’s strategy contained the following  major investigative techniques:    CTRs and SARs. The Task Force began analyzing CTRs in 1999 prior to the  initiation of SAR reporting for MSBs in 2001. Under Arizona law as well  as federal law, an MSB is required to file a SAR if the MSB suspects, for  example, that the transaction is related to a possible violation of law or  regulation. Task Force investigators analyzed these SARs to identify  potential smugglers.
Geographic targeting orders (GTO). Beginning in June 2003, Arizona  issued a GTO that allows the state to require additional identification or  reporting requirements for certain financial transactions in a geographic  area. Under the GTO, for all person-to-person transactions arriving in high- volume MSB locations in the southern one-third of the state in amounts  over $500, Arizona required MSBs to obtain the receivers’ fingerprints and  signatures.
Transaction data. According to Task Force officials, the foundation to  their strategy has been their ability to obtain and analyze data from  individual MSB transactions. Each transaction has a unique money  transfer control number and contains, for example, the sender’s name and  address, the amount sent, the sending MSB’s unique identification number,  the receiver’s name and address, the amount received, as well as the  receiving MSB’s unique identification number. Using the Arizona Attorney  General’s subpoena power, the Task Force initially obtained data on all  transactions greater than $750 (in 2003 the threshold changed to $500)  entering or leaving Arizona from all major MSBs in the Phoenix area.  Using computer analytics software, the Task Force searched for data  anomalies that based upon Task Force officials’ experience, could indicate  laundering of alien smuggling proceeds. For example:  Individuals who and MSBs that conducted more transactions and  received larger dollar amounts than the norm.  Individuals who received the same dollar amount consistent with the  going rate for smuggling an alien from numerous senders in different  states.
MSBs that had a higher ratio of large to normal transactions than the  norm.
Repetitive wire transfers in large amounts sent to the same receiver  names within a few days.
Patterns of false information appearing in MSB transaction records,  such as a receiver providing multiple addresses, Social Security  numbers, or telephone numbers for wire transfers received over a  short time (such as a few months).
Patterns of imbalance in the volume of wire transfers sent to Arizona  from corridor states (states most preferred by smuggled aliens as final  destinations) compared to the volume of wire transfers sent from  Arizona to those corridor states.
These anomalies were occurring during the time of year when most alien  smuggling was believed to be occurring, what the Task Force called the  “seasonal coyote pattern.” Using criteria such as these, the Task Force  selected a random sample of transactions to determine the extent to which  the criteria could be relied upon to identify potential smugglers, MSBs  involved in alien smuggling, or both. According to a court affidavit filed by  a Task Force investigator, over 90 percent of the transactions selected in  the various samples taken since the Task Force began analyzing these data  were related to alien smuggling, including in some cases those for other  criminal activity, such as drug trafficking. Since the Task Force began  analyzing these data, it has refined its criteria based upon evidence  obtained during its investigations and additional data analysis. According  to Task Force officials, the Task Force has a database containing millions  of transactions and continues to receive transaction data on a weekly  basis from some of the major MSBs in Arizona.
Seizure warrants. Based upon the above analysis of MSB transaction data  as well as other evidence gathered through traditional law enforcement  actions, the Task Force obtained approximately 20 court-ordered warrants  from the summer of 2001 through 2006 to seize wire transfers it believed  were for the payment of alien smuggling or narcotics trafficking. Under the  warrant, the MSB was ordered to electronically divert into a holding  account wire transfers sent to or from Arizona that matched specifically  targeted names or criteria. When the receiving individuals tried to obtain  the funds, they were told that the funds had been seized by the state and  that they could call a dedicated 1-800 number if they believed the state  erred in seizing their funds. According to Task Force officials, most of the  seizures were not contested.
According to Arizona law enforcement officials, while alien smuggling into  Arizona has not been eliminated, the above strategy has significantly  disrupted alien smuggling operations in Arizona and has largely eliminated  the ability of MSBs in Arizona to receive smuggling payments. According  to Arizona law enforcement officials, since 2001 they seized about   $17 million in funds transacted through MSBs, arrested over 300 alien  smugglers, and seized 8 car dealerships and 9 travel agencies involved in  alien smuggling. They also shut down approximately 35 MSB outlets in  Arizona for facilitating illicit transactions. Arizona law enforcement  investigators described how their strategy of targeting MSBs led to  disruptions of alien smuggler activities. For example, surveillance of MSBs  suspected to be involved in laundering alien smuggling payments  identified suspected smugglers who were then followed, enabling Task  Force investigators to locate previously unknown stash houses holding  undocumented aliens. In one instance, evidence found at one such stash  house led investigators to identify and eventually prosecute owners of a  travel agency that provided airline tickets to move undocumented aliens  from the border area to the interior to the United States. The evidence led  to the seizure of 6 travel agencies engaged in alien smuggling. According to  Task Force officials, analysis of wire transfer data has resulted in  identifying other criminal activity as well, including narcotics trafficking,  off-shore gambling, criminal activity by members of the Russian Mafia, and  identity theft.
As shown in figure 5, the dollar amount of wire transfers over $500  declined from a high of over $35 million per month in March 2005 to less  than $10 million by March 2006, and to nearly zero by August 2006.  According to an Arizona Attorney General senior litigation counsel, the  declines in March to April of 2005 and February to March of 2006  coincided with seizure warrants conducted by the Task Force during these  time periods. In June 2006, Western Union, the largest MSB in Arizona and  whose agents were the target of several Task Force investigations,  imposed a limit of $450 on the amount of funds that could be wired into  Arizona from any location, in effect, inhibiting smugglers’ ability to use  Western Union agents since the smuggling fee at that time was at least  $1,800 per person. In addition, in 2008 Western Union was fined $2 million  for, among other things, failure to comply with the Arizona Attorney  General’s GTO, failure to record required customer identification, and  failure to comply with a previous 2006 order that it comply with the  Arizona Attorney General’s GTO and record required customer  identification. In 2006 Western Union was also fined $5 million for failing  to comply with the Arizona Attorney General’s GTO and record required  customer identification.
As a result of Arizona’s enforcement efforts and the $450 Western Union  limit on wire transfers to Arizona, alien smugglers have adjusted their way  of receiving smuggling payments. According to Task Force officials and  court affidavits, payments for aliens smuggled into Arizona are now wired  to smuggler contacts in Mexico or to contacts in other U.S. states, such as  Nevada. The contacts then notify the smuggler once payment has been  received. Arizona law enforcement officials attempted to obtain a warrant  to seize certain wire transfers sent from other states to Mexico. However,  the Arizona Supreme Court eventually ruled that the state court did not  have jurisdiction to issue such a warrant. According to federal law  enforcement officials in Arizona, alien smugglers also now use “funnel  accounts,” which are deposit accounts established at traditional banks for  the purpose of holding payments for smuggling services. The officials  provided the example of a large U.S. bank, with a nationwide branch and  automated teller machine (ATM) network. A deposit account would be  opened in Arizona with this bank and sponsors of smuggled aliens could  then deposit payment for smuggling services directly into this account  through an ATM or bank office from anywhere in the United States. The  alien smuggler could then withdraw money from this account.
According to both OI and Arizona law enforcement officials, one of OI’s  predecessors (the U.S. Customs Service) began as a partner in Arizona’s  seizure activity, and OI continued that role until it withdrew in 2005 after  concerns about alien safety and the legality of the seizure warrants used  by Arizona law enforcement officials. According to OI officials, there was  a concern that alien smugglers might harm or hold hostage the smuggled  aliens once payments for smuggling services were seized. In addition, OI  and Justice officials told us that they had concerns that Arizona’s seizure  warrants that focused on seizing wire transfers based upon their  characteristics (e.g., dollar amount, coming from a specific state, or being  picked up at a specific MSB location) rather than a specific individual  known to be a smuggler may not be allowed under federal law. OI is not  currently targeting MSBs for alien smuggling investigations southwest  border-wide. However, the OI’s Phoenix SAC has assigned one investigator  to the Task Force.
According to OI headquarters officials, OI does not have a position on the  effectiveness of the Arizona Attorney General’s efforts to disrupt alien  smuggling. The officials cite lack of sufficient information regarding  Arizona’s alien smuggling initiatives—such as the targeting methodology  employed to identify suspect remittances, the underlying legal theory and  framework upon which the initiative was based, an explanation of the  state statutory authority permitting the use of the seizure warrants in this  context absent particularized probable cause connecting a specific  remittance to an alien smuggling incident, analysis of any performance  measures or results produced by the Arizona Attorney General, and  information on the civil litigation that resulted from this initiative—that  would permit a thorough analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness of  these efforts. The officials acknowledge that it may be useful to have an  assessment of these issues completed so that any effective and applicable  techniques can be shared and used by OI field offices as part of their alien  smuggling investigations. OI headquarters officials also told us that a fuller  examination of Arizona’s financial investigative techniques and their  potential to be used at the federal level would be useful and that they  would be willing to facilitate meetings or exchanges of information  necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of Arizona’s financial strategy to  disrupt alien smuggling.

		Assessing Arizona Financial Investigative Techniques and Approach Could Identify Opportunities for Leveraging Resources to Counter Alien Smuggling across the Southwest Border

Arizona’s financial investigative techniques and resources offer the  potential to enhance efforts to counter alien smuggling as well as advance  other federal anti-money laundering goals and objectives. For example,  Task Force investigators have developed analytical capabilities that when  applied to MSB transaction data can, according to Task Force  investigators, identify with a high degree of certainty transactions and  related individuals and MSBs involved in laundering alien smuggling  proceeds. OI’s ability to obtain MSB transaction data from other states  along the southwest border, when warranted, might be leveraged with  Arizona’s analytical capabilities to identify money laundering related to  alien smuggling in locations across the southwest border other than  Arizona. Identifying MSBs involved in alien smuggling might support the  federal government’s goal of identifying and prosecuting MSBs that  facilitate money laundering, as stated in the National Money Laundering  Strategy. Arizona used GTOs that imposed additional reporting  requirements on MSBs located in certain geographic areas in Arizona.  Federal BSA regulations also allow for the use of GTOs in geographic  regions for which there is evidence of heightened risk for the evasion of  BSA requirements. The June 2009 National Southwest Border  Counternarcotics Strategy states that Treasury is to work with federal law  enforcement agencies to determine whether the use of GTOs could help to  disrupt money laundering networks that utilize MSBs. According to  FinCEN, imposition of additional reporting requirements through a GTO  may assist in disrupting alien smuggling.
As discussed earlier in this report, HSTC was created to achieve greater  integration and overall effectiveness in the U.S. government’s law  enforcement efforts related to issues of alien smuggling and human  trafficking. One of HSTC’s responsibilities is to prepare strategic  assessments related to aspects of human smuggling, such as proven law  enforcement and other approaches for countering alien smuggling, in  order to provide policymakers with accurate, objective analysis about  threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities for action. An assessment, by  HSTC or another ICE-designated entity, could identify how resources  might be leveraged and also address federal concerns regarding the use of  seizure warrants. An overall assessment of whether and how these  techniques may be applied in the context of disrupting alien smuggling  could help ensure that ICE is not missing opportunities to take additional  actions and leverage resources to support the common goal of countering  alien smuggling.

	OI and CBP Have Established Objectives for Their Alien Smuggling- Related Programs, but Can Do More to Better Measure Progress toward Achieving Program Objectives

		Program-Related Documents Identify OI and CBP Objectives for Addressing Alien Smuggling

Standards for internal control in the federal government state that federal  programs should have clear objectives. Consistent with these standards,  both OI and CBP have established objectives for their alien smuggling  programs. With regard to alien smuggling, ICE’s April 2005 interim  strategic plan states that OI’s overall objective is to use its combined  customs and immigration authorities to more effectively prevent  trafficking and smuggling of people, weapons, and other contraband into  the United States by identifying, locating, disrupting, and prosecuting the  organizations that commit these crimes. The plan identified several  strategies to accomplish this objective, including denying smuggling  organizations the profit from criminal acts, tracking financial information  to identify additional targets and further OI investigations, and applying  asset forfeiture to disrupt and dismantle smuggling organizations.  Further, according to an ICE report, OI enhances ICE’s role as the lead  investigative entity for alien smuggling by identifying and targeting illicit  organizations’ ill-gotten proceeds for forfeiture. OI officials in the four  SAC offices we visited also told us that tracking and attempting to seize  alien smuggling funds was a part of any alien smuggling investigation.
CBP and DRO have also defined the objectives of their enforcement  programs with a nexus to alien smuggling. For the OASISS program, which  targets alien smugglers for prosecution in Mexico, CBP has documented  the objectives and goals of the OASISS program in training materials. For  example, according to OASISS-related training documents, OASISS  objectives include performing cross-border investigations, facilitating  binational information exchange, coordinating binational law enforcement  efforts, and conducting binational prosecutions in an effort to dismantle  smuggling organizations in Mexico and the United States. Further, all of  the Border Patrol OASISS program officials we interviewed stated that a  key objective of the OASISS program is to reduce the numbers of alien  smugglers who recidivate by apprehending them and transferring them to  Mexico for prosecution. According to CBP officials, the objective of ATEP  is to transport removable aliens out of the apprehending sector for  subsequent removal to Mexico through an adjacent sector in order to  disrupt alien smuggling organizations operating in the participating Border  Patrol sectors. For the Operation Streamline program, which prosecutes  removable aliens for illegal entry into the United States, CBP officials told  us that one of the goals of the program is to deter aliens from crossing into  the United States illegally again, thereby reducing the number of  individuals seeking assistance from alien smuggling organizations.  Regarding MIRP, in accordance with the 2004 MIRP MOU between the  United States and Mexico the objectives are to remove aliens from the  United States—apprehended during the summer months, generally the  hottest and most dangerous time of year for border crossings— to the  interior of Mexico to deter them from returning in order to reduce loss of  life and to combat organized crime linked to the smuggling, trafficking,  and exploitation of persons.

		ICE and CBP Have Not Fully Evaluated Progress in Meeting Alien Smuggling Objectives

			Taking Actions to Fully Measure Progress toward Achieving Objectives Would Help ICE and CBP to Evaluate Their Effectiveness along the Southwest Border

Federal internal control standards call for agencies to establish  performance measures and indicators in order to evaluate the  effectiveness of their efforts. Measuring performance allows  organizations to track the progress they are making toward their goals and  gives managers critical information on which to base decisions for  improving their programs. We have previously reported on some of the  most important attributes of successful performance measures, including  that performance measures should (1) be linked to an agency’s mission  and goals, (2) be clearly stated, and (3) have quantifiable targets or other  measurable values.
Until fiscal year 2009, OI measured its performance by calculating the  percentage of closed investigative cases that had an enforcement  consequence (defined as an arrest, indictment, conviction, seizure, fine, or  penalty) for all investigative areas combined. OI performance in  addressing alien smuggling was not specifically assessed. According to OI  officials, beginning in fiscal year 2009, OI measured the percentage of  closed human trafficking and human smuggling investigative cases that  have an enforcement consequence. The goal for fiscal year 2009 was 50  percent. OI plans to implement a similar performance measure for all of its  other investigative areas in future years.
Although it did not establish a performance measure for alien smuggling  enforcement consequences until fiscal year 2009, OI provided us with such  data for the period from fiscal years 2005 through 2009. These data do not  include human trafficking cases, which OI plans to include in the future  metric. As shown in table 5, in fiscal year 2009, two of the four SAC offices  met the 50 percent goal.
Although one of the objectives of OI’s alien smuggling investigations is to  seize smugglers’ assets, OI does not have performance measures for asset  seizures related to alien smuggling cases. OI plans to track as a  performance measure asset seizures across investigative areas and has  implemented a new measure that tracks the dollar value of asset seizures  derived from drug operations. Tracking the use of asset seizures in alien  smuggling investigations as a performance measure could help OI monitor  its progress toward its goal of denying smuggling organizations the profit  from criminal acts. Alien smuggling is the second most resource-intensive  investigative area (next to drug trafficking) in OI’s southwest border  locations. Monitoring the use of alien smuggling asset seizures could also  help assess the worthiness of seizure techniques and help assess  investigative resource needs.
Although DRO and CBP have defined the objectives of their alien  smuggling-related enforcement programs, they have not yet established  performance measures. For MIRP, while DRO does not currently have  performance measures, the program has had performance measures in the  past. When the former INS established MIRP as a pilot program in 1996, it  established performance measures for the program. According to INS’s  operational plan for the program, the recidivism rate for removable aliens  processed through MIRP should not exceed 5 percent within the first 6  months and should not exceed 20 percent within the first year of initial  processing. The plan noted that after the first year, the recidivism rate  should not exceed 40 percent in order for the program to be considered  successful.
Although DRO has not established any performance measures to measure  MIRP’s effectiveness, there is evidence that removable aliens processed  through MIRP may be less likely to reenter the United States illegally.  According to a 2005 Homeland Security Institute study, 7 percent of the  removable aliens repatriated through the program were reapprehended  during the following 2-½-month period while 28 percent of the removable  aliens not repatriated through MIRP were reapprehended during the same  period, as shown in table 6.
For the OASISS program, CBP officials told us that they are in the process  of developing measures. According to CBP officials, the Border Patrol  organized two 2-day workshops designed to foster the development of a  Program Performance Framework for the OASISS program. The  framework is to include objectives, performance measures, and data  collection requirements for the program. CBP officials told us in January  2010 that the final approval of the framework and corresponding  performance measures was pending and they expect to implement  performance measures for the OASISS program during fiscal year 2010.  CBP has not established performance measures for ATEP and Operation  Streamline to assess progress toward achieving program goals. According  to CBP officials, while they have not established ATEP performance  measures for the entire southwest border, measures are in place at the  Border Patrol sector level based upon reapprehensions. However, they  acknowledged that because these measures are not assessing performance  for the entire southwest border, the full effect of ATEP is unknown.  Regarding Operation Streamline, CBP officials agree that there are no  performance measures in place for the program. Without performance  measures for MIRP, the OASISS program, ATEP, and Operation  Streamline, DRO and CBP program officials may lack critical information  with which to track the progress they are making toward program goals.
The Homeland Security Institute evaluation of MIRP offers insight into  possible performance measures that CBP could use to evaluate the  effectiveness of ATEP and Operation Streamline. The study compared the  recidivism rates of aliens processed through MIRP and those not  processed through MIRP to evaluate the effectiveness of MIRP at deterring  illegal reentry.

			CBP Officials Are in Preliminary Discussions to Establish Systematic Program Evaluations, but Have Not Established a Plan, with Time Frames, for Their Completion

Program evaluations are systematic studies that are conducted  periodically to assess how well a program is working while performance  measures identify a program’s progress toward a defined outcome.  Moreover, federal standards for internal control specify that promptly  evaluating findings from audits and other reviews to determine proper  actions is essential to monitoring the outcomes of agencies’ performance.  However, CBP has not conducted program evaluations of the OASISS  program, ATEP, and Operation Streamline to determine the extent to  which these enforcement programs have been effective in helping to deter  alien smuggling and meet its strategic goal of securing the border.
As a first step, in December 2008, CBP implemented a computer software  application, called e3, to capture data that could be used to evaluate CBP  enforcement programs. CBP officials told us that one of the reasons CBP  developed e3 was to create an interface with the ENFORCE Integrated  Database to improve CBP’s information-gathering capabilities and  streamline and improve the collection of complete, accurate, and  consistent data from all Border Patrol sectors. The application is to  interface with other agency databases, which should allow law  enforcement agencies to exchange information.
CBP officials told us that e3 will provide a standardized method of data  collection that will ease their ability to eventually perform program  evaluations. In June 2009, program fields were added to e3 that allow  border patrol agents to select the specific enforcement program, such as  ATEP, MIRP, or Operation Streamline, associated with the removable  alien. Capturing these data should allow CBP to compare enforcement  program results of removable aliens associated with specific enforcement  programs with those of removable aliens not involved with specific  programs as one way of measuring program effectiveness. Emphasizing  the need to capture enforcement program data, the Chief of the Border  Patrol issued a December 2009 memorandum noting that recent statistics  show that program data within e3 had not been captured on a consistent  basis. Further, the memo stated that in order to analyze the effectiveness  of these programs, capturing data in e3 is of utmost importance and he  directed agents to ensure that they are aware of correct data processing  procedures, particularly with regard to tracking Border Patrol  enforcement programs. The Border Patrol also provided guidance on the  types of information that need to be collected, such as fingerprint  identification number, name, age, and apprehension date that are  processed in e3.
Based on existing federal guidance, our prior work, and the work of  others, standard practices in project management for defining, designing,  and executing programs include developing a program plan to establish an  order for executing specific projects needed to obtain defined  programmatic results within a specified time frame. In October 2009, CBP  officials told us that they have a project to develop systematic evaluation  practices that will allow them to conduct program evaluations of the  OASISS program, ATEP, and Operation Streamline. CBP officials told us  that they were discussing what key elements to include in their evaluation  practices, such as performance measures, improved data collection  methods, agreed-upon data points, and universal operational definitions.  However, CBP had not developed a project plan that outlined the time  frames for the development of these key elements and what office would  be responsible for conducting the program evaluations. As a result, CBP  officials told us that they were unsure of a timeline or implementation date  for the evaluation process. Developing a project plan could help CBP  ensure that the necessary mechanisms are put into place as it intended so  that it can conduct the desired program evaluations.
According to CBP officials, while the agency has not conducted  evaluations of its enforcement programs, they partially attribute the  decreased number of apprehensions and deaths in recent years along the  southwest border to these programs. CBP officials said that the programs  have benefited the surrounding border communities by reducing illicit  cross-border traffic, thereby reducing crimes directly related to the actions  of criminal smuggling organizations and illegal border crossers. Program  evaluations using comprehensive and reliable data could help determine  the effectiveness of these programs in such things as reducing illicit cross- border traffic.

	Conclusions

Alien smuggling is a growing problem along the southwest border; it has  brought increasing violence to area communities and the potential for  smuggling aliens from special interest countries into the United States.  Both ICE and CBP have made significant antismuggling efforts, but  opportunities exist to leverage resources to further combat the problem  and better evaluate progress toward accomplishing their respective  missions. By studying the feasibility of expanding the LEAR program along  the southwest border, ICE would be in a better position to evaluate  alternatives for aligning the duties of its OI staff with OI’s investigative  mission and helping ensure more efficient use of its resources. Assessing  whether the Arizona Attorney General’s financial investigative techniques  could be used and would be useful in disrupting alien smuggling would  better position OI in determining whether it could take advantage of an  opportunity to further its mission. Developing performance measures for  alien smuggling asset seizures would allow ICE to assess progress toward  this particular goal. Reassessing the prior proposal to Congress for civil  asset forfeiture authority in view of current circumstances would help  determine whether amending the civil forfeiture authority for real property  used to facilitate the smuggling of aliens remains necessary. Further, DRO  and CBP manage programs that counter alien smuggling, but have not  developed performance measures for some of their programs. Also, CBP  has not established a plan with time frames for program evaluation using  e3 data. Completing these tasks would help DRO and CBP assess progress  toward achieving their goals.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to improve federal efforts to address alien smuggling, we are  making six recommendations to DHS and Justice. We recommend that the  Assistant Secretary for ICE take the following four actions:    To better align agency staff responsibilities with their agency missions and  improve efficiency, study the feasibility of expanding the LEAR program  along the southwest border and, if it is found to be feasible, expand the  program.
To determine whether ICE could utilize Arizona’s financial investigative  techniques to address alien smuggling, direct HSTC or another ICE- designated entity to conduct an assessment of the Arizona Attorney  General’s financial investigations strategy to identify any promising  investigative techniques for federal use.
To better assess OI’s progress toward its investigative goals, develop  performance measures for asset seizures related to alien smuggling  investigations.
To help ensure that DRO’s MIRP achieves the results intended, develop  performance measures for the program.
To help ensure that CBP’s alien smuggling-related enforcement programs  achieve the results intended, we recommend that the Commissioner of  CBP establish a plan, including performance measures, with time frames  for evaluating CBP’s enforcement programs.
To enhance the ability of the federal government to seize real property  associated with alien smuggling activities, we recommend that the  Attorney General assess whether amending the civil forfeiture authority  for real property used to facilitate the smuggling of aliens remains  necessary and, if it remains necessary, develop and submit to Congress  such an amendment with appropriate justification.

	Agency Comments, Third-Party Views, and Our Evaluation

We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS, Justice,  Treasury, and the Arizona Attorney General. On May 11, 2010, DHS  provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix V. DHS also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.  Justice did not provide written comments to include in our report.  However, in an e-mail received May 3, 2010, the Justice liaison stated that  Justice concurred with our recommendation that the Attorney General  assess whether amending the civil forfeiture authority for real property  used to facilitate the smuggling of aliens remains necessary and, if it  remains necessary, develop and submit to Congress such an amendment  with appropriate justification. In an e-mail received April 26, 2010, the  Treasury liaison indicated that Treasury had no comments on the report.  The Arizona Attorney General provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
In commenting on the draft report, DHS stated that department officials  concurred with four of the five recommendations directed to DHS and  discussed actions planned or under way to implement them. However, it is  not clear to what extent these actions will fully address the intent of three  of the recommendations. Moreover, DHS stated that it did not concur with  our fourth recommendation to measure the performance of DRO’s MIRP.
ICE concurred with the first recommendation, to study the feasibility of  expanding the LEAR program and stated that expanding the program  would continue to improve ICE’s efficiency by aligning the responsibilities  of OI and DRO in a more effective manner. DHS also stated that ICE has  studied the feasibility of expanding the LEAR program to other areas, such  as Los Angeles. Subsequent to receiving DHS’s comments, we followed up  with ICE to obtain a copy of the feasibility study. A DRO official clarified  that DRO and OI have continued to discuss expanding the LEAR program  beyond Phoenix, but ICE has not conducted and documented a feasibility  study of expanding the LEAR program along the entire southwest border.  By conducting a more complete study of the feasibility of expanding the  program throughout the southwest border region and expanding the  program if it deems it feasible, ICE would be in a better position to help  ensure that its resources are more efficiently directed toward alien  smuggling and other priority investigations. As a first step in potentially  expanding the program nationwide, DHS stated that DRO’s Criminal Alien  Division prepared and submitted a resource allocation plan proposal for  its fiscal year 2012 budget.
Regarding the second recommendation, to assess the Arizona Attorney  General’s financial investigative techniques, DHS stated that ICE  concurred and reported that during the week of April 12, 2010, ICE  participated in the inaugural meeting of the Southwest Border Anti-Money  Laundering Alliance, a body consisting of federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies all along the southwest border. The main purpose of  the meeting was to synchronize enforcement priorities and investigative  techniques along the southwest border. While synchronizing enforcement  priorities and investigative techniques are positive steps toward combating  money laundering along the southwest border, it is not clear to what  extent these actions will result in ICE evaluating the use of the Arizona  Attorney General’s financial investigative techniques. An overall  assessment of whether and how these techniques may be applied in the  context of disrupting alien smuggling could help ensure that ICE is not  missing opportunities to leverage resources to support the common goal  of countering alien smuggling.
DHS also stated that ICE concurred with the third recommendation  related to performance measures for asset seizures and stated that ICE is  in the process of assessing all of its performance measures and creating a  performance plan. While these efforts have yet to result in the  establishment of performance measures for asset seizures related to alien  smuggling investigations, developing such measures could help ICE to  better monitor its progress toward achieving its seizure goals. “In order to ensure efficiency in the implementation of arrangements for repatriation and to  agree on whatever individual and joint measures are necessary to improve their  effectiveness, the principles set forth in this Memorandum of Understanding should be  evaluated by the appropriate officials of the Participating Agencies at least annually or at  any mutually acceptable time.”
Thus, we believe that measuring MIRP’s program performance would be  consistent with the MOU’s intent that the principles be periodically  evaluated. In addition, our recommendation does not specify a particular  performance measure to be used; measuring numbers of Mexican  nationals returned or the cost-effectiveness of the program may not be  necessary for assessing MIRP’s performance. However, we continue to  believe that developing performance measures for MIRP is necessary to  determine whether the program is meeting its objectives of reducing the  loss of human life and combating organized crime linked to the smuggling,  trafficking, and exploitation of persons.
DHS stated that CBP concurred with the fifth recommendation for  establishing a plan, including performance measures, with time frames, for  evaluating CBP’s enforcement programs. Moreover, DHS stated that CBP  is developing a plan that will include program mission statements, goals,  objectives, and performance measures. However, it is not clear to what  extent this plan will include time frames for evaluating CBP’s enforcement  efforts. For some of its enforcement programs, CBP has begun gathering  data and holding workshops with subject matter experts to begin  developing performance measures. These efforts are a positive step  toward implementing performance measures for CBP enforcement  programs, but we continue to believe that including time frames in its plan  for evaluating these programs could help CBP ensure that the necessary  mechanisms are put in place within time frames management intended for  conducting the desired program evaluations.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Arizona  Attorney General, appropriate congressional committees, and other  interested parties. This report also will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any further questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

	Objectives

To provide insights concerning the federal government’s efforts to address  alien smuggling along the southwest border, the Chairman of the House  Committee on Homeland Security and Congressman Harry Mitchell  requested that we examine the efforts made by the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) and its largest investigative component, U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Accordingly, this report  addresses the following three questions:    Since fiscal year 2005, what has been the trend regarding the amount of  investigative effort ICE’s Office of Investigations (OI) has devoted to alien  smuggling along the southwest border, what have been the results, and is  there an opportunity for ICE to use its investigative resources more  effectively?
What progress has OI made in seizing assets related to alien smuggling  since fiscal year 2005 and what, if any, promising financial investigative  techniques could be applied along the southwest border to target and seize  the monetary assets of smuggling organizations?
To what extent do ICE OI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  have objectives related to alien smuggling along the southwest border and  to what extent have they implemented internal controls to measure  progress toward these objectives?
For the purposes of this report, we use the term alien smuggling to mean  the procurement of illegal entry into a country of which the smuggled  person is neither a citizen nor a lawful permanent resident. Alien  smuggling usually involves a person who has consented to be transported  to another country, and the activity generally produces a short-term profit  for the smugglers. We also define removable alien as an alien who can be  removed from the United States because he or she has violated U.S.  immigration law or has committed a criminal act that renders him or her  removable from the country.

	Scope and Methodology

To address these questions, we conducted site visits and interviews with  officials from CBP’s U.S. Border Patrol, ICE’s OI and Office of Detention  and Removal Operations (DRO), and the Department of Justice’s  Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA). We interviewed officials  from these offices because collectively these offices are responsible for  interdicting and removing smuggled aliens and investigating and  prosecuting alien smugglers. We interviewed officials from each of the  four OI special agent-in-charge (SAC) offices along the southwest border:  San Diego, California; Phoenix, Arizona; El Paso, Texas; and San Antonio,  Texas. We also interviewed Border Patrol officials located in six of the  nine southwest border Border Patrol sectors: San Diego and El Centro,  California; Yuma and Tucson, Arizona; and El Paso and Laredo, Texas. We  selected these six Border Patrol sectors based on their proximity to the OI  SAC offices we visited and their varying volumes of alien apprehensions.  The Tucson and San Diego sectors had the highest levels of apprehensions  during fiscal year 2008, approximately 320,000 and 160,000 apprehensions,  respectively. In contrast, the Yuma sector had relatively few  apprehensions in fiscal year 2008 after experiencing declines from  approximately 120,000 apprehensions in fiscal year 2006 to about 8,400 in  fiscal year 2008. While the perspectives we obtained from officials of the  sectors cannot be generalized to all Border Patrol officials along the  southwest border, they provided us with an overview of how their  enforcement programs operate within and across sectors. We also spoke  with officials from all five U.S. Attorney district offices along the  southwest border: Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, Western  Texas, and Southern Texas. Also, to address these questions, we reviewed  OI and CBP documentation related to alien smuggling investigation and  interdiction efforts. For example, we reviewed ICE’s 2005 interim strategic  plan, the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center’s briefing document on  its operations, and court documents related to OI alien smuggling  investigations. Similarly, we reviewed program documentation for CBP  efforts to address alien smuggling along the southwest border, such as the  Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS)  program training materials and an evaluation of the Mexican Interior  Repatriation Program (MIRP) by the Homeland Security Institute as well  as materials on the operations and costs of the program. We reviewed the  scope, methodology, and findings of the MIRP evaluation with the lead  researcher from the institute and determined that the scope and  methodology of the institute’s evaluation was sufficient for us to rely on it  as an example for how a performance evaluation of MIRP could be  conducted. Finally, we attended an interagency conference in Phoenix on  alien smuggling in February 2009 sponsored by the U.S. Attorney for  Arizona. Participants in the conference included OI officials as well as  Arizona state and local investigators.
To provide supplementary perspectives on federal efforts to address alien  smuggling, particularly in coordinating with state and local law  enforcement agencies, we also interviewed state and local law  enforcement officials in Laredo, Texas; Phoenix, Arizona; and El Paso,  Texas.
In addition to the above, we performed the following work.

		OI Resources Devoted to Alien Smuggling on the Southwest Border

To address OI’s use of investigative resources, we analyzed data from  TECS, the system OI uses to manage its cases. Using TECS data, we  analyzed OI self-reported investigator hours worked nationwide by SAC  location and alien smuggling case arrests, indictments, and convictions  achieved each fiscal year from 2005 through 2009. We compared human  capital policies for using resources effectively and the position  descriptions for OI criminal investigator and DRO immigration  enforcement agent (IEA) to analyze to what extent OI investigators and  DRO IEAs along the southwest border performed their duties as defined in  the position descriptions. We reviewed Law Enforcement Agency  Response program data gathered for Arizona to analyze the volume of  removable aliens processed through the program. We supplemented these  data analyses with interviews of OI and DRO program officials, both in OI  and DRO headquarters and in OI field locations.

		Progress in Seizing Alien Smuggler Assets and Identifying Promising Investigative Financial Techniques

To address progress in seizing assets related to alien smuggling, we  analyzed OI asset seizure data from TECS and Border Patrol asset seizure  data from the ENFORCE Integrated Database from fiscal years 2005 (the  date of our last report) through 2009. We evaluated the data to determine  increases or decreases in the value of alien smuggling seizures by OI and  the volume of Border Patrol seizures during these time periods. To  supplement these quantitative data, we interviewed OI and Border Patrol  officials to better understand financial investigative techniques used in  alien smuggling investigations and methods for seizing assets. We also  interviewed officials from the Department of the Treasury’s Financial  Crimes Enforcement Network to determine how they collaborate with OI  investigators in alien smuggling cases. To identify potentially promising  financial investigative techniques for federal use along the southwest  border, we analyzed the federal interagency 2007 National Money  Laundering Strategy and its accompanying 2005 U.S. Money Laundering  Threat Assessment and an OI report on the results of financial  investigations and interviewed OI officials and Assistant U.S. Attorneys  along the southwest border. In addition, we interviewed the Arizona  Attorney General and officials with the Arizona Attorney General’s  Financial Crimes Task Force (Task Force), and analyzed relevant court  affidavits prepared by Task Force investigators to obtain information on  the results of their efforts to address alien smuggling in Arizona. We also  analyzed data provided by the Arizona Attorney General’s Office on assets  seized from 2001 through September 2009 as a result of its alien smuggling  investigations.

		OI and CBP Objectives and Performance Measures for Addressing Alien Smuggling

To address the extent to which OI and CBP have objectives related to alien  smuggling along the southwest border and have implemented internal  controls to measure progress toward these objectives, we reviewed ICE’s  2005 interim strategic plan, an OI document describing OI’s role in alien  smuggling investigations, documented plans for future OI performance  measures, CBP’s 2005–2010 Strategic Plan, and CBP’s National Border  Patrol Strategy. In addition, we reviewed CBP program-related documents  on the operations for MIRP, the OASISS program, the Alien Transfer Exit  Program (ATEP), and Operation Streamline. Specifically, we reviewed a  legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service MIRP operations plan; the  Border Patrol El Paso, Texas, sector’s briefing slides describing its OASISS  program operations; and the DHS/CBP OASISS program training manual.  We supplemented this documentation by obtaining written responses from  ICE and CBP regarding documented program objectives, performance  measures, and assessments for MIRP, the OASISS program, ATEP, and  Operation Streamline. We analyzed TECS data on the proportion of closed  OI alien smuggling cases that resulted in an enforcement consequence and  the value of OI asset seizures related to alien smuggling investigations  from fiscal years 2005 through 2009. In addition, we interviewed OI  officials both in headquarters and in SAC locations to determine the extent  to which they had established alien smuggling goals and related  performance measures. We also analyzed CBP OASISS program data to  determine the number of alien smugglers processed through the program,  the number accepted for prosecution by the Mexican government, and the  number turned over to Mexican authorities. In addition, we analyzed CBP  ENFORCE Integrated Database data from fiscal year 2005 through May  2009 to determine the extent to which alien smugglers were  reapprehended by CBP after being processed through the OASISS  program.

		Data Reliability

To assess the reliability of data used for this report, we conducted  interviews with agency officials about data integrity processes and the  methods by which data are checked and reviewed internally for accuracy.  For each set of data relied upon for the report, we also replicated selected  calculations used by agency officials to ensure accuracy. As discussed  earlier in this report, the data recorded in selected data fields used in our  analyses are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 through May  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: DRO and CBP Programs That Address Alien Smuggling

DRO and CBP have implemented several programs designed to deter  aliens from entering the country illegally and thereby indirectly disrupting  alien smuggling. One program is specifically aimed at alien smugglers. Not  all programs are in all locations along the southwest border and not all  aliens or alien smugglers apprehended are eligible for all programs. Table  7 summarizes the purpose of each program, when it was established, and  the Border Patrol sectors that have implemented the program.
In fiscal year 2008, over 95 percent of the aliens apprehended entering the  country illegally along the southwest border were Mexican nationals.  According to Border Patrol officials, most are allowed to return voluntarily  to Mexico after being processed for removal. As a result, many try to enter  illegally again, sometimes on the same day. Some individuals arrested for  smuggling aliens are not prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office and are  also voluntarily removed. According to Border Patrol officials, the major  goal of these programs is to remove voluntary return as an option and  impose a consequence for illegal entry or alien smuggling in those  situations where no consequence would have been imposed. The goal is to  deter these individuals from illegally reentering the United States.
MIRP was designed in 2004 as a bilateral effort between the United States  and Mexico to reduce the loss of human life and combat organized crime  linked to the smuggling, trafficking, and exploitation of persons by  returning noncriminal aliens—apprehended during the summer months,  generally the hottest and most dangerous time of year for border  crossings—to the interior of Mexico. From 2004 to 2006, the Border Patrol  operated the program; however, in 2006 DRO took over the operations of  MIRP while CBP still provided initial processing for MIRP participants. In  November 2009, the Assistant Secretary for ICE testified that from   August 22, 2009, through September 28, 2009, 10,560 Mexican nationals  were voluntarily returned through the MIRP initiative. During this time,  ICE detailed 52 officers to the Phoenix areas to support the MIRP  operations and conducted 73 flights from Tucson to Mexico City  facilitating the return of the Mexican nationals to the interior of Mexico.  According to Border Patrol officials we interviewed, once aliens are flown  to the interior part of Mexico, they are bused back to their communities of  origin. Further, Border Patrol officials stated that most do not have the  funding to make the trip back to United States to try another illegal reentry  either within the same week or even the same year, which keeps  reapprehension rates low. According to the Assistant Secretary’s  testimony, more than 93,000 Mexican nationals have been retuned to  Mexico through MIRP over the 5 years it has been in operation. Border  Patrol officials told us that by reducing the number of aliens seeking the  assistance of alien smugglers, the Border Patrol has disrupted smugglers’  operations. In addition, Border Patrol officials attribute to MIRP the  reduced number of rescue missions into the deserts of Yuma and Tucson  where the program operates because those at greater risk when crossing  the desert are returned to the interior of Mexico and are therefore less  likely to try again.

	OASISS Program

Our analysis of the OASISS program’s data indicated that most  reapprehensions of OASISS program participants occur in two of seven  sectors in which the program operates. Across all of the sectors where the  program operates, San Diego and Tucson account for over 80 percent of  the OASISS program reapprehensions. Because of OASISS program data  limitations, we were unable to determine the original Border Patrol  OASISS processing sector in order to compare whether smugglers were  changing locations or continuing to operate in the same locations despite  operation of the program. In light of these factors, officials we interviewed  cited a several possible reasons for reapprehension after initial OASISS  processing: (1) Mexican authorities may release alien smugglers received  from the Border Patrol when Mexican judges have not signed arrest  warrants for the smugglers; (2) Mexican judges may require material  witnesses to testify or be deposed within 72 hours or the smugglers are  released; or (3) there may have been corruption or bribery of Mexican  authorities. Nonetheless, five of the six Border Patrol officials we  interviewed agreed that the OASISS program has helped disrupt alien  smuggling within their areas of responsibility. Additionally, officials cited  increased coordination with Mexican authorities as a benefit of the  OASISS program.

	Operation Streamline

As of August 2009, the Del Rio and Yuma Border Patrol sectors  implemented Operation Streamline for all aliens apprehended along the  border. In other sectors that had Operation Streamline, only aliens  apprehended along a certain portion of the border were processed under  the program. For example, in the Rio Grande Valley sector, only aliens  apprehended along a 45-mile stretch of the sector’s border were processed  under Operation Streamline. The five sectors that have Operation  Streamline process relatively few apprehended aliens under the program.  In fiscal year 2008, CBP estimated that 465,951 aliens were apprehended in  the five sectors where Operation Streamline operated and 36,179, or about  8 percent, were processed through the program. Border Patrol officials we  interviewed told us that the aliens processed through the program spent  anywhere from 10 to 45 days in jail or in a detention facility. These  officials believed that the greatest result of the program is that it deters  aliens from illegally trying to reenter the United States.
ATEP operates within the San Diego and El Centro, California, sectors and  Yuma and Tucson, Arizona, sectors. CBP reported that during fiscal year  2008, the Tucson Border Patrol sector returned 5,830 removable aliens  through ports of entry in California. CBP is unsure how many removable  aliens have been processed through this program since its inception in  February 2008. While data on the results of the program are limited,  Border Patrol officials we interviewed believed that the program helped  them to disrupt or even remove alien smuggling organizations from their  sectors since smuggled aliens cannot easily return to their original  locations to try and reenter the United States with the help of the  smuggling organizations.

Appendix III: Disposition of Alien Smuggling Cases along the Southwest Border

Evaluation of data provided by the Department of Justice (Justice)  provides additional information regarding enforcement consequences for  alien smuggling cases. While OI’s current data system does not capture the  number of cases under a particular statute that are referred to and  prosecuted by U.S. Attorneys, sentencing data provided by Justice contain  information on the overall number of cases received, filed, acquitted,  dismissed, terminated, and sentenced under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 from fiscal  year 2005 through fiscal year 2009. Table 8 shows that U.S. Attorneys in  the southwest border region received over 3,400 cases from federal law  enforcement agencies under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 in fiscal year 2009. U.S.  Attorneys also convicted nearly 3,000 defendants under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 in  fiscal year 2009. According to EOUSA, almost all alien smuggling cases in  the southwest border region are submitted to U.S. Attorneys by either OI  or the Border Patrol.
As shown in figure 6, the number of alien smuggling cases referred by law  enforcement agencies to U.S. Attorney’s offices along the southwest  border peaked in 2006 and has declined each year since then. The number  of cases filed by U.S. Attorneys and the number of individuals convicted  generally increased from fiscal years 2005 through 2008, but declined  slightly in fiscal year 2009.
In fiscal year 2009, the majority of alien smuggling convictions resulted in  a prison term of 2 years or less or no prison at all. Table 9 illustrates that  of the 2,980 alien smugglers convicted in one of the southwest border  districts, 14 percent did not go to prison, 71 percent were sentenced to 1 to  24 months, and 15 percent were sentenced to more than 24 months of jail  time. Conviction statistics from previous years show that since 2005 the  majority of alien smugglers received prison terms of 2 years or less or no  prison at all.
According to OI, many of these convictions are CBP cases that involve  low-level participants in alien smuggling schemes and these individuals  generally receive lower sentences based on current federal sentencing  guidelines. Also, defendants convicted of alien smuggling under 8 U.S.C. §  1324 may also have been convicted of other charges, which could have  resulted in higher prison sentences.

Appendix IV: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Investigations Alien Smuggling Coordination Efforts

ICE’s OI has taken steps over the last 4 years to participate in or develop  coordination efforts, working groups, or task forces that address alien  smuggling. These activities have been primarily focused on regional  border activities where OI has historically encountered the greatest  proportion of alien smuggling violations. The objectives of these activities  and working groups have been to share intelligence and resources and  identify and remove vulnerabilities on the southwest border. Table 10  summarizes the various OI coordination efforts that involve alien  smuggling.
ICE established the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) to  investigate any cross-border criminal activity along the southwest border,  including alien smuggling. The BESTs are tasked with leveraging federal,  state, local, tribal, and foreign law enforcement and intelligence resources  in an effort to identify, disrupt, and dismantle organizations that seek to  exploit vulnerabilities in the border. The task forces include personnel  from ICE; CBP; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Federal Bureau of  Investigation; the U.S. Coast Guard; and U.S. Attorney’s Offices along with  relevant state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies. There are  currently 10 BESTs along the southwest border out of the 15 around the  country.
The BEST effort has resulted in a number of cases initiated and  convictions. From 2004 through June 2009, the BESTs initiated 515 cases  related to alien smuggling and obtained 395 alien smuggling convictions.  While it is unknown whether these results would have been achieved  without the BESTs, ICE and Border Patrol officials from the locations we  visited cited other benefits to BEST coordination. For example, ICE  officials indicated that prior to the BEST effort, they had limited  coordination on alien smuggling investigations across the law enforcement  agencies involved. However, since the BEST effort began, the officials  stated that they are better able to learn from one another and to  understand the methods used by the various agencies in performing their  missions. Moreover, officials from ICE and Border Patrol offices we  visited told us that agents assigned to the BESTs are usually colocated,  which has facilitated information sharing and assisted in building working  relationships between the two components. Border Patrol officials also  noted that the BESTs allow them to coordinate on a more formal level,  thereby also serving as a built-in conflict resolving mechanism between  the components. Another benefit of the BESTs is having clearly defined  roles and responsibilities among all of the BEST members, according to  ICE officials. This has, in turn, helped ICE decrease chances for mission  creep or performing duplicative efforts. In addition, ICE and Border Patrol  officials told us that they have been able to share staff from each other’s  agencies. For example, officials stated that ICE and the Border Patrol have  each provided staff to augment the other’s operations, allowing for  seamless BEST operations.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Michael P. Dino, Assistant  Director, and Ben Atwater, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment.  Laurie Choi, James Leonard, and Bintou Njie made significant  contributions to the work. Michelle Fejfar, Amanda Miller and Minette  Richardson assisted with the design, methodology, and data analysis.  Katherine Davis provided assistance in report preparation, and Frances  Cook and Christine Davis provided legal support.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

Alien smuggling along the southwest border is a threat to the security of the United States and Mexico. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of Investigations (OI)--part of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--is the primary federal agency responsible for investigating alien smuggling along the southwest border. As requested, this report addresses, for the southwest border, (1) OI's efforts to counter alien smuggling since 2005, and opportunities, if any, for ICE to use its resources more effectively; (2) the progress DHS has made in seizing alien smugglers' assets since fiscal year 2005 and any promising techniques that could be applied to seize smugglers' assets; and (3) the extent to which ICE has objectives related to alien smuggling and measures to assess progress. GAO interviewed officials in all four OI offices along the southwest border and analyzed data on OI's cases and seizures, from fiscal years 2005 through 2009.

What GAO Found

OI work years spent investigating alien smuggling increased from 190 to 197 from fiscal years 2005 through 2009, and an opportunity exists to better leverage resources. Officials from two of the four OI offices GAO visited said that in addition to conducting criminal investigations, OI has been tasked to respond to calls from state and local law enforcement to process and transport aliens for possible removal, which diverts OI resources from conducting alien smuggling and other investigations. In 2006, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO), another ICE subcomponent, took over responsibility for responding to state and local law enforcement calls in the Phoenix metropolitan area, through the Law Enforcement Agency Response (LEAR) program. For this program, officials from DRO, not OI, transport and process aliens for removal. From October 1, 2008, to May 24, 2009, the LEAR program processed 3,776 aliens, aliens who OI would have otherwise had to process. By studying the feasibility of expanding the LEAR program, ICE would be in a better position to determine if it could more efficiently direct its OI resources toward alien smuggling and other investigations. OI's alien smuggling asset seizures have decreased since 2005; however, opportunities exist to leverage additional seizure and financial investigative techniques. According to OI data, alien smuggling seizures nationwide increased in value from about $11.2 million in 2005 to about $17.4 million in 2007, but declined to about $12.2 million in fiscal year 2008 and to about $7.6 million in fiscal year 2009. One opportunity to leverage financial techniques to disrupt alien smuggling and seize assets involves assessing the financial investigative techniques used by an Arizona task force. The task force seized millions of dollars and disrupted alien smuggling operations by following cash transactions flowing through money transmitters that serve as the primary method of payment to those individuals responsible for smuggling aliens. An overall assessment of whether and how these techniques may be applied in the context of disrupting alien smuggling could help ensure that ICE is not missing opportunities to take additional actions and leverage resources to support the common goal of countering alien smuggling. ICE has established objectives for its alien smuggling-related enforcement programs, but could do more to better measure progress toward achieving program objectives. For example, one of its components, DRO, has defined the objective of the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP) as to remove aliens who are apprehended during the hot and dangerous summer months from the United States to the interior of Mexico to deter them from returning in order to reduce loss of life and to help disrupt alien smuggling operations; however, DRO has not established performance measures to evaluate its progress in meeting its objective consistent with internal control standards. Thus, ICE does not know the effectiveness of its efforts related to MIRP at deterring individuals from illegally returning to the United States.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS evaluate the feasibility of expanding the LEAR program, assess the Arizona Attorney General's investigations strategy, and develop performance measures for MIRP. DHS agreed with four of five recommendations in this report directed to DHS but disagreed with establishing MIRP performance measures because it did not believe such action was appropriate. GAO believes this recommendation is consistent with the program's intent.