Background

In 1999 the Army announced its intentions to transform its forces over a  30-year period into a more strategically responsive force that could more  rapidly deploy and effectively operate in all types of military operations,  whether small-scale contingencies or major theater wars. Army  transformation plans call for the ability to deploy a brigade anywhere in  the world in 4 days, a division in 5 days, and five divisions within 30 days.  The first step in this transformation is to form and equip six Interim  Brigade Combat Teams, now called Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, as an  early-entry force that can be rapidly deployed, supported anywhere in the  world, and capable of conducting combat operations immediately upon  arrival into a theater of operations, if required. Initially, the Army  established a requirement for Stryker brigades of being capable of  deploying anywhere in the world within 4 days after first aircraft liftoff.  The Army has since made it a goal or target for the Stryker brigades, rather  than a requirement, to help set a vision and design metric for developing  the brigades.
According to the Army’s organizational and operational concept for  Stryker brigades, the brigades are designed to have higher levels of  strategic and tactical mobility than existing Army forces. Strategically, the  brigades are being organized, equipped, and configured to meet a 96-hour  deployment standard. To help achieve the envisioned rapid deployability,  the Army is developing logistical support plans and concepts that will  permit Stryker brigades to deploy with fewer quantities of supplies and  smaller numbers of support personnel and equipment than currently exists  in heavier brigade-size units. At the tactical level, the brigades are to be  capable of intratheater deployment by C-130 air transport. Key to their  increased mobility is their primary combat platform, the Stryker armored  vehicle. According to the Army, the Stryker armored vehicle will fulfill an  immediate requirement for a vehicle that is air transportable any place in  the world, arriving ready for combat. The Stryker is an eight-wheeled  armored vehicle that will provide transport for troops, weapons, and  command and control. The Stryker vehicle weighs about 19 tons,  substantially less than the M1A1 Abrams tank (68 tons) and the Bradley  fighting vehicle (33 tons), the primary combat platforms of the Army’s  heavier armored units.
The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one mechanized infantry  brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first two of six planned  Stryker brigades. The Army completed a congressionally mandated  operational evaluation of the first of these brigades at the end of May 2003,  and it plans to report the results of the evaluation by November 2003. At  that time, the Secretary of Defense is to certify to Congress whether or not  the results of the operational evaluation indicate that the Stryker brigade’s  design is operationally effective and operationally suitable, at which time  this brigade can be deployed overseas for the first time. The Army plans to  complete the formation of the second of the two Fort Lewis brigades in  2004 and to form four more Stryker brigades from 2005 through 2010. The  planned locations of the next four brigades (see fig. 1) are Fort  Wainwright/Fort Richardson, Alaska; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Schofield  Barracks, Hawaii; and a brigade of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard.  Based on defense planning guidance, the Army is planning for the  relocation of one Stryker brigade to Europe in fiscal year 2007.

	Progress Has Been Made, but the Army Cannot Currently Achieve Its Deployment Goal of 4 Days

Although Stryker brigades will be more rapidly deployable than Army  heavy armored brigades, the Army cannot currently achieve its goal of  deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days. The  Army has achieved close to a 50 percent reduction in the Stryker brigades’  deployment requirements compared to that of a heavier armored brigade,  but the Stryker brigade’s airlift requirements—which include moving  about 1,500 vehicles and pieces of equipment and 3,900 personnel—are  still sizable. Deployment times for Stryker brigades from their planned  continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii home stations to any one of  several potential overseas locations would range from 5 to 14 days,  depending on destinations. While the Army set out to design Stryker  brigades to be a rapidly air deployable force, Army officials now recognize  that airlift alone will not be sufficient and that some combination of airlift  and sealift will likely be used to deploy the brigades. However, if sealift  were used to deploy the Stryker brigades, deployment times to many  global regions would be significantly longer than the 4-day goal the Army  has set for itself.

		Stryker Brigades’ Deployment Requirements One-Half of Heavy Armored Brigades’ but Still Sizable

By equipping Stryker brigades with armored vehicles weighing about 19  tons, the Army has achieved close to a 50 percent reduction in the Stryker  brigades’ deployment requirement compared to that of a heavy armored  brigade equipped with 68-ton Abram tanks and 33-ton Bradley fighting  vehicles, along with their larger numbers of support vehicles, equipment,  and personnel. Deploying a heavy armored brigade would require airlifting  almost 29,000 tons of armored vehicles, equipment, and supplies and about  4,500 personnel. Deploying a Stryker brigade would require airlifting about  15,000 tons of vehicles, equipment, and supplies and about 3,900  personnel. Consequently, the amount of airlift that would be needed to  deploy a Stryker brigade would be about one-half of the airlift aircraft  needed to deploy a heavy armored brigade. Based on deployment planning  assumptions the Army uses, about 243 C-17 strategic airlift sorties would  be needed to airlift a Stryker brigade, compared to about 478 C-17 sorties  needed to airlift a heavy armored brigade.
While the airlift requirement of a Stryker brigade is significantly less—  about one-half that of a heavy armored brigade, moving a brigade’s over  300 Stryker armored vehicles, over 1,200 trucks, utility vehicles, and  support equipment, and 3,900 personnel is about twice the deployment  requirement of an Army light infantry brigade. Deploying an Army light  infantry brigade would require airlifting about 7,300 tons of materiel and  about 3,800 personnel, requiring about 141 C-17 airlift sorties. Figure 2  shows a comparison of Stryker brigades’ airlift requirements to that of  Army heavy armored and light infantry brigades.

		Airlift Not Sufficient to Meet Army’s Four-Day Worldwide Deployment Goal for Stryker Brigades

The Army will likely not have the amount of airlift it would need to meet  its goal of deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within  4 days. Deployment times from any one of the four planned Stryker  brigade locations in the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii to  selected representative locations in South America, the Balkans, South  Asia, South Pacific, and Africa would range from about 5 days to  destinations in South America to about 14 days to destinations in Africa.  The minimum time it would take to airlift a Stryker brigade would be  about 5 to 6 days to South America and the Balkans, 7 days to South Asia  and South Pacific regions, and 13 days to Africa. While these timelines are  short of the Army’s 4-day deployment goal, meeting them would offer joint  task force commanders or theater combatant commanders more rapidly  deployable forces than currently exists in heavy armored brigades and  more lethal and mobile forces than currently exist in light infantry  brigades. Figure 3 shows estimated ranges of Stryker brigade air  deployment times from the four current and planned Stryker brigade  locations to selected global regions.  (See app. III for a summary of Stryker  brigade deployment times by origins and destinations.)
According to the U.S. Transportation Command’s Stryker brigade air  mobility deployment analysis, the Army’s deployment goal for Stryker  brigades has significant implications for the U.S. Transportation Command  and the defense transportation system. According to this analysis, the  Army must reduce its transportation requirements and simultaneously  work with the U.S. Transportation Command and the services to improve  deployment timelines.
A 2002 Rand report of Stryker brigade deployment options, sponsored by  the U.S. Air Force, also concluded that Stryker brigades cannot be  deployed by air from the continental United States to distant overseas  locations in 4 days. The study found that it is possible to achieve global air  deployment timelines on the order of 1 to 2 weeks by using a combination  of continental United States based brigades, a Stryker brigade forward- based in Germany, and regional preposition sites. According to the study,  prepositioning of equipment or overseas basing of forces is the single most  effective way to increase the responsiveness of Army forces for operations  in key regions.
Under the 2002 Defense Planning Guidance, the Army is planning for the  relocation of one Stryker brigade to Europe in fiscal year 2007. By air, a  brigade based in Germany, for example, could reach some global regions  in less time than it could from the four currently planned brigade  locations. From Ramstein Air Base in Germany, minimum air deployment  times to sub-Saharan Africa would be 7 to 9 days, compared to a minimum  of 13 days to 14 days from the other brigade locations. From Germany to  the Balkans, it would take 5 days to airlift a Stryker brigade, compared to  about 6 days to 7 days from the other locations. Although the Army  recognizes that some prepositioning of Stryker brigade equipment  overseas would add to a brigade’s strategic responsiveness and is  considering it as a future option, Army officials told us that it would be too  costly to do so at this time.
Based on our analysis of the U.S. Transportation Command’s air  deployment planning factors and airlift allocation assumptions, achieving  the 5 to 14 day air deployment timelines would be difficult because it  would require the Air Force to dedicate about one-third of its projected  2005 primary strategic airlift aircraft fleet of C-17s and C-5s for  transporting only one Stryker brigade. Obtaining this amount of airlift for  deploying one Stryker brigade would require allocating 31 percent of the  Air Force’s total 2005 inventory of C-17 aircraft and 38 percent of its C-5  aircraft inventory. Obtaining an airlift allocation larger than this would be  possible—if airlifting a Stryker brigade is a National Command Authority  top priority and absent competing demand elsewhere for airlift aircraft.  Table 1 shows the U.S. Transportation Command’s estimated airlift  allocation and the percentages of the projected 2005 total airlift inventory  of C-17 and C-5 aircraft needed to strategically airlift one Stryker brigade.

		Army Plans to Use a Combination of Airlift and Sealift to Deploy Stryker Brigades

Because it may not always be possible to obtain sufficient airlift to deploy  an entire Stryker brigade, Army officials anticipate using a combination of  airlift and sealift to deploy the brigades, although sea deployment time  would be slower than the Army’s 4-day worldwide deployment goal to  most locations. Army officials told us that current plans are to deploy  about one-third of a Stryker brigade by air and the remainder of the  brigade would be deployed by sea. While some areas in South America  could be reached by a Stryker brigade located at Fort Polk, Louisiana, via  gulf coast ports in about 4 days, sea deployment times to South America  and other global regions from the three other planned Stryker brigade  locations would take longer. For example, sailing time for a Fort   Lewis-based Stryker brigade from Seattle/Tacoma, Washington, would be  about 10 days to ports in northern regions of South America and more  than 2 weeks to ports in West Africa. From Alaska, sailing time to any of  the eight overseas destinations we included in this analysis would take  from 12 days to 24 days. Similarly, sailing times to the Balkans from any  one of the four planned Stryker brigade locations would take a minimum  of 2 weeks to over 3 weeks. With a Stryker brigade forward based in  Europe, sea deployment times to the Balkans from seaports in Germany,  for example, could be reduced to about 7 days. Figure 3 shows estimated  ranges of Stryker brigade sailing times from the four current and planned  Stryker brigade locations to selected global regions. (See app. IV for a  summary of sea deployment times by origins and destinations.)
In addition to the sailing times needed to reach overseas destinations, it  would take days to transport a Stryker brigade and all of its vehicles and  equipment from its home installation to a seaport. For example, the  Stryker brigade to be located in Alaska would need to travel about 350  miles by rail or highway from Fort Wainwright, near Fairbanks, to seaports  in or near Anchorage. In addition, loading and unloading cargo transport  ships take much longer than loading and off-loading aircraft. According to  Army deployment planning data, it would take about 2 days for loading  ships and another 2 days to unload them after arrival, compared to hours  for loading and unloading aircraft. Furthermore, many areas of the world  in which Stryker brigades are anticipated to operate have no access to a  seaport, and not all seaports would have the capacity to handle large   deep-draft vessels. Additional time would also be needed for Army forces  deployed by sea to move from a seaport to an in-land area of operations,  although a Stryker brigade would be able to move to in-land locations  faster than a heavy armored brigade because Stryker armored vehicles can  be driven while heavier armored vehicles and tanks might require rail or  truck transport. Also, a deployed Stryker brigade would need less time  than a heavy armored brigade would need to unload at a seaport,  assemble, and begin operations: Stryker brigades are organized and  equipped to begin operations soon after arrival in an operational theater,  carrying up to 3 days’ supplies of the fuel and ammunition and  sustainment items, allowing the brigades to immediately conduct a combat  mission. This contrasts with an Army armored or mechanized brigade,  which would need days to draw the fuel, ammunition, and other supplies it  would need before it can begin operations.

	Army’s Plan for Supporting and Sustaining Stryker Brigades in Combat Operations Is Still Evolving

The Army’s plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in combat  operations is still evolving and cannot be considered finalized until a  number of issues are resolved. These issues include the results from the  operational evaluation of the first brigade, funding questions, and  decisions relating to implementing some of the plan’s logistical support  concepts.
The Army will not be able to finish its support plan until November 2003,  when results from the operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade  will be issued. The Army conducted the operational evaluation in April and  May 2003 to assess the first Stryker brigade’s overall operational  effectiveness and suitability. The operational evaluation included the  logistical support plan and processes that augment the brigade’s limited  capabilities to perform basic maintenance, supply, and transportation  services. To make Stryker brigades easier to deploy and support, the Army  designed the brigades with a support structure that is only about one-third  the size of that found in a heavy armored brigade. Thus, Stryker brigades  do not have the capability to sustain operations without the assistance of  external support organizations and resources. Contractors will provide a  key part of this external support to service and maintain newly fielded  Stryker armored vehicles and complex digital command, control,  communications, and computer equipment. Contractor logistics support  will be needed to support the Stryker vehicles and digital systems at least  until these systems are fully fielded. Also, instead of transporting large  inventories of ammunition spare parts, and other supplies into an area of  operation—as a heavy armored brigade would do—Stryker brigades are to  sustain themselves in extended operations by having these items delivered  from numerous locations outside the area of operation, such as Army  depots and theater support bases, where they will be stored and  configured for rapid shipment and distribution to the brigades as they are  needed.
Because these support and sustainment processes are new concepts and  key elements of the Army’s support plan for Stryker brigades, the Army  will complete the plan after it has reviewed the results and lessons learned  from the operational evaluation. Based on the results, the Army plans to  make any adjustments or modifications it determines are necessary before  the plan becomes final. Before it can fully implement the support plan, the  Army will need to determine the cost and decide whether it will fund the  acquisition of vehicles and equipment replacement reserves. The brigades  are designed to do only limited maintenance for vehicles and equipment  on the battlefield; therefore, the Army’s support plan calls for rapidly  evacuating and replacing items needing major maintenance or repair with  what the Army calls ready-to-fight replacements. The plan depends on  having in reserve and readily available sufficient numbers of vehicles and  essential equipment, such as digital components, for rapid shipment into  an area of operation. Before the Army can make a final funding decision, it  will first need to determine the types, amounts, and total cost of the ready- to-fight replacements that would be needed. As of May 2003, the Army had  not made a final decision as to the number, types, and configuration of the  ready-to-fight vehicles, nor the method of their delivery to an area of  operations. Additionally, to reduce the amount of materiel that is deployed  and stockpiled within an operational theater, the Army’s Stryker brigade  support plan includes measures for rapidly distributing directly to the  brigades pre-configured loads of essential sustainment supplies such as  food, repair parts, and ammunition, as they are needed. Before the Army  can implement the plan, it will need to finish the instructions and  guidelines that will identify the types and amounts of supplies to be  distributed in configured loads and the locations and facilities (including  defense supply depots, Stryker brigade installations, and theater support  bases) where configured loads are to be built and stored. The Army also  still will need to identify the personnel and obtain the equipment, supplies,  and funding that will be needed to manage and carry out its planned  configured load distribution system.

	Army’s Plans for Deploying and Sustaining Stryker Brigades Could Change

The Army’s current plans for deploying and sustaining Stryker brigades  could change after the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reviews  options it directed the Army to provide for enhancing the brigades’  capabilities. OSD wants the Army to modify the brigades to be more like  the Objective Force units the Army is developing. OSD has directed the  Army to present a plan by July 8, 2003, that provides options for adding to  the brigade’s enhanced combined arms capabilities. Currently, the  brigades do not have capabilities such as aviation and air defense. Such  changes would enhance the overall organizational effectiveness of the  brigades, but they also could increase deployment and support  requirements, potentially making the brigades more difficult to deploy by  air and to support.
OSD directed the Army to provide options for enhancing the Stryker  brigades to ensure that they would provide a higher level of combat  capability and sustainability across a broader spectrum of combat  operations than those for which they were originally conceived, along with  the capability of being employed independently of higher-level command  formations and support. According to OSD, this additional capability will  result in Stryker brigades that are more prototypical of the combined arms  Objective Force units the Army is developing and would enhance the  transformation of the Army by fielding added capabilities sooner. OSD has  directed the Army not to expend funds in fiscal year 2004 for the fifth and  sixth Stryker brigades until the Army presents a plan to provide options  for enhancing all but one of the brigades. OSD wants the Army to  remodel the brigades to be distinctively different than their original design,  with enhanced combined arms capabilities that might include aviation, air  defense, sensors, and armor.
Many factors—including the numbers, size, and types of equipment— affect the Stryker brigades’ deployment and logistical support  requirements. Based on the U.S. Transportation Command’s deployment- planning factors, every additional 1,000 tons of weight to be airlifted  reduces aircraft range by 250 nautical miles and adds another 15 aircraft  loads. If Stryker brigades were redesigned to include an aviation unit, for  example, transporting the unit’s helicopters from the continental United  States to overseas destinations would most likely need to be done by sea,  and it would take days to unload them after arrival into a theater of  operations. In addition, adding aviation maintenance personnel and the  equipment that is needed to support an aviation unit would also  substantially increase deployment requirements. Once deployed, the  requirements for logistical support, such as fuel and spare parts, would  increase well beyond that for which the Army’s current Stryker brigade  support plan anticipates. Furthermore, the Stryker brigades’ support  structure as currently designed does not have the levels of supply and  support personnel or the necessary equipment to move and distribute the  fuel, spare parts, and ammunition a brigade would need to support an  aviation unit in combat operations.

	Conclusions

With the Stryker brigades, the Army has achieved its intent to create  rapidly deployable yet lethal forces, but currently the brigades’  requirements for airlift are too large for airlift alone to be a practical  option for strategically deploying an entire brigade within its goal of   4 days. The Army plans to use some combination of strategic airlift and  sealift, but it has not established strategic deployability timelines for a  Stryker brigade that reflect the modes of transportation to be used, the  wide range of deployment times that vary in terms of the size of the  deployed force, and the brigades’ location and destination. In addition,  deployment goals may need further modification should the brigade’s  organizational and operational design significantly change in response to  direction from OSD to enhance the brigade’s capabilities. While the 4-day  deployment goal has created a strategic purpose and vision, and is serving  as a constructive design metric for developing the brigades, such a goal is  not a realistic standard by which to measure the considerable progress the  Army is making toward creating more rapidly deployable forces. Without  deployment goals that reflect the wide range of deployment variables and  alternatives, the Army does not have a reasonable baseline from which to  measure its progress toward achieving desired deployment timelines for  Stryker brigades as well as for the future Objective Force; nor do the  theater combatant commanders have information on expected deployment  capabilities they would need in order to plan for the use of a Stryker  brigade in their theater.
Before the first Stryker brigade is certified for overseas deployment, the  Army will need to complete its support plan and make any necessary  adjustments or modifications to the plan based on the results of the  operational evaluation.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army examine alternatives to the  96-hour worldwide deployment goal for Stryker brigades and work with  the U.S. Transportation Command and its components to set realistic  deployment timelines for the brigades that  reflect the use of both airlift and sealift, the size of the deployed force,  a brigade’s location, and its destination and  take into account any organizational or operational changes to the  brigades resulting from modifications and enhancements directed by   OSD.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense  generally concurred with the report and stated that the Army continues to  maintain 96-hour worldwide deployment as an overall program goal for  Stryker brigade deployment, and is working with the U.S. Transportation  Command to reduce constraints that limit the Army’s ability to meet the  goal.
In responding to our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army  examine alternatives to the 96-hour worldwide deployment goal for  Stryker brigades and work with the U.S. Transportation Command to set  realistic deployment timelines, the department stated that the Army is  committed to its 96-hour goal as a target that it needs to continue to work  toward in order to provide the necessary capabilities to combat  commanders within required response times.  The department noted that  achieving this goal requires a concerted effort on the part of all services  and the U.S. Transportation Command to ensure that enroute constraints  are reduced.  We agree that the 96-hour goal is a useful longer-term target  and that the Army should continue to work in concert with the  Transportation Command and the other services to achieve it.  However,  we continue to believe other alternatives to the 96-hour goal should be  considered for measuring progress in the near-term.  As we noted in the  report, the Army cannot currently air deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere  in the world within 96 hours and if sealift were used to deploy the Stryker  brigades, deployment times would be significantly longer than the 96-hour  deployment goal.  We believe that without deployment timelines reflecting  near-term deployment variables and alternatives, such as brigade locations  and the use of sealift, the Army does not have a reasonable baseline from  which to measure its progress toward achieving its 96-hour deployment  goal; nor do the combatant commanders have information on expected  Stryker brigade deployment capabilities.  Thus, we continue to believe our  recommendation has merit.
In responding to our recommendation for setting realistic deployment  timelines for Stryker brigades that take into account organizational or  operational changes to the brigades resulting from any modifications and  enhancements directed by OSD, the department said the Army should  maintain its 96-hour deployment goal, as it is a goal and not a deployment  standard.  The department also noted that when the results of the OSD- mandated study are approved and published, the Army would work with  the combatant commanders and the U.S. Transportation Command to  update the standing contingency plans.  We agree the Army should work  with the combatant commanders and the U.S. Transportation Command to  update contingency plans based on the final outcome of the OSD-  mandated study.  However, if the results of the study significantly increase  the Stryker brigades’ deployment and logistical support requirements, the  Army would need to reexamine brigade deployment goals as we have  recommended.
Appendix I contains the full text of the department’s comments.

	Scope and Methodology

To assess the Army’s progress in meeting its 96-hour deployment goal for  Stryker brigades, we obtained documents and interviewed officials from  the U.S. Transportation Command, the Air Mobility Command, and the  Military Traffic Management Command. To determine Stryker brigade air  deployment times and airlift allocation estimates, we used data from a U.S.  Transportation Command’s air mobility deployment analysis conducted  for the Army in April 2002. To determine sea deployment times, we  analyzed data from the Military Traffic Management Command’s  Transportation Engineering Agency. In addition, we interviewed officials  and obtained documents from the Army’s Deployment Process  Management Office and from Army headquarters staff elements  responsible for operations and plans and logistics. We performed site  visits to Stryker brigade home installations at Fort Lewis, Washington, and  Fort Richardson and Fort Wainwright, Alaska; we also interviewed U.S.  Army I Corps and U.S. Army Alaska and Garrison Command officials at  these locations. We also toured deployment processing and airfield  facilities and obtained information about infrastructure improvements  planned at these locations to validate key assumptions of the U.S.  Transportation Command’s air mobility analysis regarding air deployment  infrastructure capabilities. We did not visit Fort Polk, Louisiana; Schofield  Barracks, Hawaii; or the Pennsylvania National Guard. These locations are  the last three of the six-planned Stryker brigades that are to be formed  from 2006 through 2010. Because it is not planned to become operational  until 2010, we excluded from our review the planned Pennsylvania  National Guard Stryker brigade. We also did not consider possible future  developments in lift assets such as High Speed Vessels or Ultra Heavy Lift  Aircraft in our assessment of Stryker brigade deployability.
To obtain information on the Army’s plan for supporting Stryker brigades  in combat operations, we analyzed Army information on the organizational  design and operational concepts for Stryker brigades to gain an  understanding of the logistical challenges of supporting and sustaining the  brigades. We interviewed officials at Fort Lewis and U.S. Army Alaska for  information relating to support and sustainment plans for the first three  Stryker brigades. In addition, we reviewed documents and interviewed  officials from Army headquarters staff elements responsible for operations  and plans, logistics, and force development. We also interviewed and  obtained documents from the Army’s Forces Command, the Combined  Arms Support Command, and the Tank-automotive and Armaments  Command to learn about support and sustainment options for the Stryker  brigades.
Our review was conducted from April 2002 through March 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Army, and the Director of Management and Budget. We  will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please call me at  (202) 512-8365. Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.;  Kevin C. Handley; Karyn I. Angulo; Pat L. Seaton; Frank C. Smith; and  Susan K. Woodward.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Stryker Brigade Locations and Planned Initial Operational Capability Dates

	Location Fort Lewis, Washington Fort Lewis, Washington Fort Wainwright/Fort Richardson, Alaska Fort Polk, Louisiana Schofield Barracks, Hawaii Pennsylvania National Guard

Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times By Origin and Destination

Appendix IV: Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times by Origin and Destination

Related GAO Products

Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3  Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily  Mandated Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.:  May 30, 2003.
Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should  Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army’s  Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.:  Mar. 28,  2003.
Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation  of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.:   May 17, 2002.
Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for  Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96.  Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001.
Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems  Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.:  May 21, 2001.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Army is organizing and equipping rapidly deployable Stryker brigades as the first step in its planned 30-year transformation. Stryker brigades are to help fill a gap in capabilities between current heavy and light forces--heavy forces require too much time to deploy, and light infantry forces lack the combat power and mobility of the heavy forces. The Army has a goal to be able to deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world with 4 days. As part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army transformation, GAO assessed the Army's progress in (1) meeting its deployment goal for Stryker brigades and (2) supporting and sustaining a deployed Stryker brigade in combat operations.

What GAO Found

The Army has made significant progress in creating forces that can be more rapidly deployed than heavy forces with its medium weight Stryker brigades, but it cannot deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days. Meeting the 4-day worldwide deployment goal of a brigade-size force would require more airlift than may be possible to allocate to these brigades; at present, it would take from 5 to 14 days, depending on brigade location and destination, and require over one- third of the Air Force's C-17 and C-5 transport aircraft fleet to deploy one Stryker brigade by air. Because airlift alone may not be sufficient, the Army is planning to use a combination of airlift and sealift to deploy the brigades. However, if sealift were used to deploy the Stryker brigades, deployment times to many global regions would be significantly longer than the 4-day goal the Army has set for itself. The Army's plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in combat operations is still evolving. The Army will not be able to finish its support plan until November 2003, when the results from an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade will be issued. Before it can fully implement the support plan, the Army will also need to make funding and other decisions relating to implementing some of the plan's logistical support concepts. Deployment goals may need modification should the brigades' design significantly change in response to direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to enhance the brigades' capabilities.