Background

The Army has been faced with a significant challenge to meet the facility  needs associated with several recent initiatives, such as the transformation  of the Army’s force structure, the permanent relocation of thousands of  overseas military personnel back to the United States, the implementation  of Base Realignment and Closure actions, and the planned increase in the  Army’s active-duty end strength. As shown in figure 1, the Army estimated  that taken together these initiatives resulted in a threefold increase in the  Army’s military construction program with appropriated funds increasing  from about $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2005 to a peak of about $10.7 billion in  fiscal year 2009 before beginning to decline in fiscal year 2010.

		The Army Adopted Changes to Its Military Facility Acquisition and Construction Practices

To meet the challenges associated with the large increase in its military  construction program and ensure that required new facilities would be  completed in time to meet planned movements of organizations and  personnel, the Army concluded that it could not continue to rely on its  traditional military facility acquisition and construction practices. The  Army’s solution was the adoption of a new strategy in 2006 that the Army  termed military construction transformation. The strategy included  numerous changes to the Army’s traditional practices that were designed  to reduce facility acquisition costs and construction timelines. Included  among the changes were the following:    The development of clear requirements that need to be met in              43 different types of Army facilities and the creation of standard  designs for 24 common facility types, such as headquarters buildings,  company operations and tactical equipment maintenance facilities,  barracks, dining facilities, and child care centers.
A transition from “design-bid-build” project delivery, where a project’s  design and construction are normally awarded via separate contracts,  to “design-build” project delivery, where a project’s design and  construction are awarded to a single contractor. By using one  contractor and overlapping the design and construction phases, the  design-build approach attempts to reduce project risk and  construction timelines.
The development of a standard solicitation approach for most  common-type facilities that used performance-based criteria focused  on what the Army needed rather than on detailed, prescriptive criteria  that focused on how the Army’s requirements should be met. Under  the approach, the Army revealed to potential bidders the available  funding for the project and tasked project bidders to provide an  innovative proposal that meets the performance-based criteria while  maximizing quality, sustainability, and energy conservation.
Army officials stated that its new standard solicitation approach  encouraged potential bidders to develop design solutions that considered  the use of all types of construction materials and methods allowed by DOD  building guidance. This included the use of wood materials and modular  building methods in addition to the use of steel, concrete, and masonry  materials and on-site building methods traditionally used by the Army, the  Navy, and the Air Force for permanent facilities, such as administrative  buildings and barracks. As a result, under its military construction  transformation strategy, the Army expanded the use of wood materials  and modular building methods for some permanent facilities. Appendix II  contains further details on the various categories of construction materials  and methods allowed by DOD guidance.
Because the Army believed that the changes it made to its facility  acquisition and building practices under its transformation strategy would  result in lower construction costs and shorter building timelines, the Army  established goals to reduce its military construction costs by 15 percent  and facility construction timelines by 30 percent beginning in fiscal year  2007. The Army planned to implement the cost reduction goal by having  project planners reduce the estimated cost of planned facilities by             15 percent, requesting funding from the Congress for the reduced amount,  and then attempting to award and complete the project within the  approved funding amount. Thus, the goal was not directly related to actual  facility costs but rather to estimated facility costs. While continuing to  apply the strategy to its military construction program, the Army  discontinued these numerical goals in fiscal year 2010, stating that most  cost and timeline reduction benefits from its strategy would have been  obtained by the end of fiscal year 2009.

		DOD Antiterrorism Construction Standards and Sustainable Design Goals

As required by Section 2859 of Title 10, DOD has developed and  implemented antiterrorism construction standards designed to reduce  facility vulnerability to terrorist attack and improve the security of facility  occupants. The standards include 22 mandatory standards, such as  requiring open areas around new facilities to keep explosives at a distance  from the facilities, and 17 recommended but optional measures, such as  avoiding exterior hallway configurations for inhabited facilities. Appendix  III contains further details on the standards and measures.
For decades, the federal government has attempted to improve energy  efficiency and energy and water conservation at federal facilities. Over the  past few years, several laws, executive orders, and other agreements  added new energy efficiency and energy and water conservation  requirements for federal facilities. In particular, in January 2006, DOD  joined 16 other federal agencies in signing a memorandum of  understanding that committed the agency to leadership in designing,  constructing, and operating high-performance and sustainable buildings.  The main goals of sustainable design are to avoid resource depletion of  energy, water, and raw materials; prevent environmental degradation  caused by facilities and infrastructure; and create facilities that are livable,  comfortable, safe, and productive.
To help measure the sustainability of new military buildings, DOD uses the  U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental  Design Green Building Rating System. The system defines sustainable  features for buildings and includes a set of performance standards that can  be used to certify the design and construction of buildings. The standards  are categorized under five major topics—sustainable sites, water  efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials and resources, and indoor  environmental quality. By meeting the standards during facility design and  construction, builders can earn credits and become certified in  accordance with an established four-level scale—certified, silver, gold, and  platinum. For fiscal year 2009, DOD set a goal that at least 70 percent of  military construction projects would be silver-level certifiable, which is  the second level on the four-level scale with platinum being the highest  rating. Appendix IV contains additional details on DOD’s sustainable  design goals.

		Responsibilities for DOD’s Military Construction Program

The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and  Environment has responsibility for DOD’s installations and facilities. The  office is responsible for establishing policy and guidance for DOD’s  military construction program and monitoring the execution of the  services’ military construction projects. The United States Army Corps of  Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command have primary  responsibility for planning and executing military construction projects for  the Army and the Navy, respectively. Air Force officials stated that the Air  Force Center for Engineering and the Environment has primary  responsibility for planning and overseeing the construction of Air Force  military construction projects, although the Army Corps of Engineers or  the Naval Facilities Engineering Command normally executes the  individual projects for the Air Force and DOD guidance provides these  organizations with a role in design and construction.

		Prior GAO Reports

Since 1997, we have identified management of DOD support infrastructure  as a high-risk area because infrastructure costs have affected the  department’s ability to devote funds to other more critical programs and  needs. In a January 2009 update to our high-risk series, we noted that  although DOD has made progress in managing its support infrastructure in  recent years, a number of challenges remain in managing its portfolio of  facilities and in reducing unneeded infrastructure while providing facilities  needed to support several simultaneous force structure initiatives.  Further, we noted that because of these issues, DOD’s management of  support infrastructure remains a high-risk area.
We have issued several reports over the past few years that highlighted  aspects of DOD’s military construction program and challenges in  managing the program. For example, in a 2003 report, we found that  opportunities existed to reduce the construction costs of government- owned barracks through greater use of residential construction practices,  which included the use of wood materials. However, we also found that  questions remained concerning the durability of wood-frame barracks and  the ability of wood-frame barracks to meet all antiterrorism force  protection requirements. We recommended that engineering studies be  undertaken to resolve these questions. DOD concurred with our  recommendation and subsequently the Army determined that wood-frame  barracks could be built in a manner that met all antiterrorism construction  standards. However, DOD did not undertake studies on the durability of  wood-frame barracks. In a 2004 report, we found that while DOD had  taken a number of steps to enhance the management of the military  construction program, opportunities existed for further improvements.  Among other things, we recommended that DOD complete management  tools for standardizing military construction practices and costs. DOD  agreed and subsequently took steps to provide a more consistent approach  to managing facilities and planning construction projects and costs.   Further, in a September 2007 report, we discussed the complex  implementation challenges faced by the Army to meet the infrastructure  needs associated with the growth of personnel assigned to many  installations as a result of base realignment and closure, overseas force  rebasing, and force modularity actions. Also, in October 2009, we issued  a report that discussed agencies’ progress toward implementing  sustainable design and high-performance federal building requirements  found in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. This report  also addressed the key challenges agencies may encounter when  implementing federal building requirements for reducing energy use and  managing storm water runoff. Further, in a January 2009 testimony befo the House of Representatives’ Committee on Transportation and  Infrastructure, we noted that investment in infrastructure could reduce  energy and operations and maintenance costs and address important  energy and water conservation measures as well as other measures  outlined within the Energy Independence and Security act of 2007. A list  of these reports can be found at the end of this report in the Related GAO  Products section.

	The Army Did Not Measure the Achievement of Goals to Reduce Military Construction Costs and Timelines

Because the Army did not measure the achievement of its goals to reduce  military construction costs and timelines, the Army did not know to what  extent the goals were met nor whether its military construction  transformation strategy resulted in actual reductions in facility costs. Our  review of selected project information showed that the Army did reduce  the estimated cost of some facility construction projects and shortened  building timelines during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, but it did not  meet its overall stated goals. We also found that the Army did not  consistently apply the cost reduction goal to all facility projects during  fiscal years 2007 through 2009. Although the Army discontinued these  numerical goals in 2010, Army officials believed its efforts to transform its  military construction acquisition and building practices were successful in  dampening the escalation of Army facilities’ costs and would continue to  help ensure cost-effective and timely facilities in future years.

		The Army Set Goals to Reduce Construction Costs and Timelines but Did Not Monitor Its Level of Achievement

When the Army set goals to reduce construction costs and building  timelines, it did not establish a framework for monitoring the achievement  of these goals. Effective management practices call not only for setting  program goals but also for monitoring goal achievement so that results can  be measured and adjustments can be made to programs, if needed, to  better achieve the goals. According to internal control standards for  federal agencies, activities need to be established to monitor performance  measures and indicators and managers need to compare actual  performance to planned or expected results so that analyses of the  relationships can be made and appropriate actions taken. During our  review, senior Army headquarters officials acknowledged that a  framework to measure goal achievement should have been established  when the cost and timeline goals were instituted. The officials also stated  that the only explanation for not monitoring the goals was that they were  so involved in implementing the many changes adopted under the Army’s  military construction transformation strategy that no one took the time to  monitor and track the results being achieved from the changes.

		The Army Did Not Subject All Facility Projects to the Cost Goal

During our review, we found that the Army did not subject all Army  facility projects to its 15 percent cost reduction goal. According to Army  officials, the Army planned to implement the cost goal by having project  planners reduce the estimated cost of planned facilities by 15 percent,  requesting funding from the Congress for the reduced amount, and then  attempting to award and complete the project within the approved funding  amount. Thus, the cost goal was not directly related to actual facility  costs but rather to estimated facility costs. However, all facility projects  were not subjected to the reduction in estimated costs, as the following  examples illustrate:    For fiscal year 2007, Army officials stated that the 15 percent cost goal  only applied to military construction facility projects that were  budgeted for under the base realignment and closure program.  Reductions were not required in the estimated costs of facility projects  budgeted under the Army’s regular military construction program.  According to Army officials, reduced funding was not requested for the  regular military construction program projects because the project  estimates for the regular program were already complete before the  reduction goal was announced, and the Army did not have sufficient  time to recalculate the project estimates at the reduced amount before  the budget request had to be submitted.
For fiscal year 2008, Army officials stated that all Army facility cost  estimates were subject to the 15 percent cost reduction goal,  regardless of the funding source or type of facility. However, while all  fiscal year 2008 projects were subject to the goal, Army officials stated  that the 15 percent cost reduction in estimated costs was mandatory  only for brigade, battalion, and company headquarters buildings,  barracks, and dining facilities. For other types of facilities, if project  planners believed that a 15 percent cost reduction could not be  achieved when construction bids were ultimately solicited, the  planners could submit a justification stating the reasons that a  reduction was not made to the facility’s estimated cost.
For fiscal year 2009, Army officials stated that the 15 percent reduction  goal was applied only to five specific types of facilities—brigade,  battalion, and company headquarters buildings, barracks, and dining  facilities. Cost estimates for all other types of facilities were not  subjected to the goal. According to Army officials, general cost  increases in the construction industry indicated that a 15 percent cost  reduction could not be achieved for most fiscal year 2009 facilities.  However, because of the changes incorporated under the Army’s  military construction transformation strategy, the officials believed  that reductions could be achieved for the five specified facility types.

		The Army Achieved Some Reductions in Estimated Costs but Did Not Meet Its Overall Goal

Because the Army had not monitored and thus did not know to what  extent it had met its cost goal, we performed an analysis and found that,  while the Army reduced the estimated cost and met its goal on some  facility projects, it did not meet the goal on other projects. Specifically, we  reviewed the construction cost estimates for a non-probability sample of  75 facility projects that were in the categories subject to the goal to  determine whether a 15 percent reduction was taken in the estimated cost  of the facilities, as reported in each facility’s project justification. The 75  facilities included 15 fiscal year 2007 facilities funded under the base  realignment and closure program, 30 projects from fiscal year 2008, and 30  projects from fiscal year 2009 for the five facility types subject to the goal.  As shown in table 1, we found that the Army met its goal in 31 of the  facilities (41 percent) and did not meet its goal in 44 of the facilities (59  percent). However, some reduction, but less than 15 percent, was made in  the estimated cost of 24 of the 44 facilities that did not meet the goal.  Although the Army had information on the actual costs of completed  military construction projects, the Army did not routinely document the  actual costs of the individual facilities included in the projects. For this  reason, we could not determine whether any of these facilities resulted in  actual savings compared to cost estimates based on DOD cost estimating  guidance.
The following examples illustrate the achievement of the Army’s cost goal  in selected projects we reviewed:    A fiscal year 2008 Army military construction project at Schofield  Barracks, Hawaii, included a barracks. According to DOD military  construction cost estimating guidance for that year, the project  planners should have estimated $24.7 million for the cost of this  barracks. However, according to the project’s justification, the  barracks’ estimated cost was $20.9 million, which was the amount  requested for funding. Because the barracks’ estimated cost was about  $3.8 million, or about 15 percent, less than the amount based on DOD  guidance, the Army achieved its goal in this case.
A fiscal year 2009 Army military construction project at Fort Lee,  Virginia, included a dining facility. According to DOD military  construction cost estimating guidance for that year, the project  planners should have estimated $5.8 million for the cost of this facility.  However, according to the project’s justification, the dining facility’s  estimated cost was $5.4 million, which was the amount requested for  funding. In this case, the facility’s estimated cost was $400,000              (7 percent) less than the amount based on DOD guidance. Thus, the  Army achieved some reduction in the estimated cost of this facility but  did not meet the 15 percent goal.
A fiscal year 2009 Army military construction project at Fort Stewart,  Georgia, included a barracks. According to DOD military construction  cost estimating guidance for that year, the project planners should  have estimated $82.0 million for the cost for this facility. However,  according to the project’s justification, the barracks’ estimated cost  was $86.4 million, which was the amount requested for funding. In this  case, the barracks estimated cost was about $4.4 million (5 percent)  greater than the amount based on DOD guidance. Thus, the Army did  not meet the 15 percent goal and actually requested more funding than  it would have requested based on DOD guidance.
Army officials stated that the cost goal was not met in some projects  because the projects’ planners believed that a 15 percent cost reduction  could not realistically be achieved when bids for the project were solicited  because of local construction market conditions. In addition, the officials  stated that, although the 15 percent goal might not have been achieved for  all projects, they believed that the Army’s efforts to transform its military  construction acquisition and building practices were successful in  dampening the escalation of Army facility costs.

		The Army Shortened Some Building Timelines but Did Not Meet Its Overall Goal

Because the Army had not monitored and thus did not know to what  extent it had met its 30 percent building timeline reduction goal, we  performed an analysis to assess goal accomplishment and found that,  while the Army shortened some building timelines, the overall goal was  not achieved. Specifically, our analysis compared the actual average  lapsed time between key building milestones for all completed projects  approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009 with the average lapsed  times for the same milestones for completed projects approved in fiscal  years 2004 through 2006—the 3 years before the implementation of the  Army’s military construction transformation strategy. To illustrate, one  key Army building timeline measure is the lapsed time between the date  that a project’s design begins and the date that the project is ready for  occupancy. As shown in table 2, we found that the Army’s average lapsed  time for this timeline measure was reduced by about 11 percent during  fiscal years 2007 through 2009—an improvement, but less than the Army’s  30 percent goal.
Another key Army building timeline measure is the lapsed time between  the date that the Army notifies the building contractor to begin  construction and the date that the project is ready for occupancy. As  shown in table 3, we found that the Army’s average lapsed time for this  timeline measure was reduced by about 5 percent during fiscal years 2007  through 2009—also an improvement, but also less than the Army’s             30 percent goal.
Army officials stated that they were pleased that average building  timelines had been reduced even if the 30 percent goal was not achieved.

		The Army Discontinued Its Construction Cost and Timeline Reduction Goals in Fiscal Year 2010

During our review, Army officials stated that the Army decided to  discontinue its construction cost and timeline reduction goals beginning in  fiscal year 2010. The officials stated that, although the Army did not know  to what extent cost and timeline reductions had been achieved, they  believed that most of the cost and timeline reduction benefits from the  Army’s military construction transformation strategy had been obtained by  the end of fiscal year 2009. The officials also stated that, although the  specific cost and timeline goals were discontinued, the numerous changes  made to the Army’s facility acquisition and construction processes under  the military construction transformation strategy would help ensure the  continued delivery of cost-effective and timely facilities in the future.

	Questions Remain about Whether the Use of Alternative Building Materials and Methods Will Yield Long-term Savings

DOD guidance allows the use of various building materials and methods  and the Army appears to have achieved some savings in initial  construction costs by expanding the use of wood materials and modular  construction methods for some permanent facilities. However, DOD has  not determined whether the use of these materials and methods also will  result in savings over the long term compared to the traditional use of  steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site building methods.

		DOD Guidance Permits the Use of Various Building Materials and Methods

Over the past several years, DOD has taken several steps to bring  uniformity among the military services in the criteria, standards, and codes  used to design and construct military facilities. This has included the  development of DOD’s unified facilities criteria and unified facilities guide  specification system of guidance for the design, construction, sustainment,  restoration, and modernization of all DOD facilities. For example, in  2007, DOD issued guidance—the Unified Facilities Criteria 1-200-01,  “General Building Requirements”—which applies to the design and  construction of all new and renovated facilities throughout DOD. The  guidance states that the 2006 International Building Code, with some  other  modifications and exceptions, is the building code for DOD. Among e types of  things, the International Building Code defines several allowabl construction based, in part, on the materials used in the construction and  the materials’ potential to be a fuel source in case of a fire. For example,  type I and type II construction use materials such as steel, concrete, and  masonry that, in accordance with applicable testing standards, are  classified as noncombustible. Type V construction allows the use of  various materials, including combustible materials, and typically includes  facilities built with wood framing. Although the code allows the use of  many construction materials, the military services have traditionally used  types I and II construction consisting of steel, concrete, and masonry  when building permanent common facilities, such as administrative  buildings, barracks, and dining facilities. Appendix II contains further  details on DOD’s building materials and methods, including descriptions of  types III and IV construction.

		Substantial Quantitative Information Is Lacking on the Relative Merits from the Use of Alternative Construction Materials and Methods

During our review, we identified little quantitative information that  compared the relative merits and economic impacts from the use of wood  materials and modular construction methods with steel, concrete and  masonry materials and on-site construction methods. The Army’s decision  to expand its consideration and use wood materials and modular  construction for some permanent facilities was primarily based on the  Army’s desire to reduce military construction costs and building timelines  in view of the significant increase in the Army’s construction requirements  beginning in fiscal year 2006. According to Army officials, the Army  believed that the increased use of wood framing and modular construction  would reduce initial construction costs and building timelines for new  facilities, result in facilities that met the Army’s needs, and also result in  lower facility life-cycle costs. However, the Army did not have substantial  quantitative information or analyses to support its view on lower life-cycle  costs. For example, according to Army officials, the Army had performed  only two analyses that compared the life-cycle costs of permanent  facilities built with alternative construction materials and building  methods. One analysis compared the life-cycle cost of a barracks built  with wood materials with the life-cycle costs of a similar barracks built  with steel, concrete, and masonry. Although this analysis estimated that  the barracks constructed with wood would have lower life-cycle costs, the  analysis was not based on actual costs. Instead, the analysis used cost  estimates which might or might not provide a reliable prediction of actual  costs over the long term. In addition, our review of the analysis found  other flaws and data errors, such as understating the square footage of one  of the projects by 39 percent, which affected the outcome of the analysis  and cast further doubt on the reliability of the analysis. The other Army  analysis assessed life-cycle costs for several types of construction  materials and methods. However, it also was not based on actual costs but  rather on estimates obtained in planning documents.
The Navy and the Air Force generally disagreed with the Army’s views on  the benefits from expanded use of wood materials and modular building  methods. Senior officials with the Naval Facilities Engineering Command  and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment stated that  they believed that use of wood materials and modular methods instead of  steel, concrete, and masonry would result in facilities with shorter service  lives and higher, not lower, life-cycle costs. To illustrate, the officials  noted that features sometimes used in wood-frame construction could  result in higher maintenance costs. For example, a wood-frame building  finished with a shingle roof might have higher maintenance costs over the  long term compared to a building finished with a steel roof because the  shingles would have to be replaced periodically over the life of the  building. While their views differed with the Army, Navy and Air Force  officials stated that they had little quantitative support for their views and  had performed no analyses that compared the long-term costs of facilities  built with wood materials versus steel, concrete, and masonry materials.
During our visits to private organizations that represented the interests of  wood, modular building, and concrete and masonry industries, we found  various views and opinions on the long-term merits and economic benefits  from the use of alternative construction materials and building methods.
However, we did not find documented analyses comparing the actual life- cycle costs of facilities constructed with alternative materials and  methods.

		Wood-Frame Construction Can Result in Lower Initial Construction Costs

To gain some insight into the economic merits of the Army’s increased use  of wood materials and modular construction, we reviewed available  information related to initial facility construction costs depending on the  materials and methods used to construct new buildings. We found  evidence that the use of wood-frame construction can result in lower  initial building costs. For example, we found that the Army apparently had  achieved construction cost savings by using wood-frame construction in  several barracks projects that were initially designed to be built with steel,  concrete, and masonry. To illustrate, according to Army officials, a fiscal  year 2006 project at Fort Carson to construct a barracks and company  operations facility was estimated to cost about $35 million based on actual  contract bids and the use of steel, concrete, and masonry construction.  After switching the barracks’ design to wood-frame construction and  resoliciting the project, the officials stated that the project was  subsequently awarded for about $24 million, a savings of about                 $11 million, or 31 percent in estimated costs (see fig. 2).
Similarly, a fiscal year 2001 barracks project at Fort Meade, Maryland,  called for the construction of eight three-story barracks buildings with a  total of 576 private sleeping rooms. On the basis of the project’s initial  design using steel, concrete, and masonry, the Army estimated that the  project would cost about $48 million, which was more than the amount  approved for the project. In an effort to reduce the cost, the project was  redesigned to specify the use of wood materials and residential  construction practices. Subsequently, the project was constructed at a  cost of about $39 million, or about $9 million (19 percent) less than the  original estimated cost (see fig. 3).
Sources outside of DOD also have noted that the use of wood-frame  construction can result in lower initial building costs. For example, an  August 2009 building valuation guide published by the International Code  Council reported that the use of residential building methods, including  wood-frame construction, for several types of facilities resulted in a 19  percent to 25 percent construction cost savings compared to the use of  commercial construction methods, including the use of steel, concrete,  and masonry materials. Also, a 2005 study collected information from  cities across the United States to develop a construction cost model to  accurately evaluate the relative construction costs of a multifamily  building constructed using five different construction materials.  Information collected during the study showed that the use of wood-frame  construction could result in an average 6 percent to 7 percent construction  cost savings compared to the use of masonry construction.

		Some Information Suggests That the Use of Wood Building Materials Might Result in Lower Long-term Costs

Although we found little quantitative information on the long-term  economic merits from the use of alternative building materials and  methods, we found some evidence suggesting that the long-term costs of  facilities built with wood-frame materials might result in lower or equal  long-term costs compared to similar facilities built with steel, concrete,  and masonry materials. For example, we reviewed the annual maintenance  costs associated with two wood-frame barracks projects constructed in  2003 and 2006 at Fort Meade and Fort Detrick, Maryland, respectively.  These facilities are the Army’s initial two modern, permanent barracks  constructed with wood frame. During fiscal years 2007 and 2008, the  annual maintenance costs of the wood-frame barracks on a square-foot  basis was significantly less than the annual maintenance costs of other  barracks at each installation constructed with steel, concrete, and  masonry methods. However, the wood-frame barracks were newer by  several years compared to the concrete and masonry barracks, which  could account for the difference in maintenance costs. Still, local officials  responsible for barracks maintenance at each installation stated that  based on experience to date they believed that even in the long term the  annual maintenance costs of the wood-frame barracks would be no  greater than the annual maintenance costs of the installations’ concrete  and masonry barracks.
As another illustration, we visited two privatized housing projects for  unmarried servicemembers where service officials stated that private  developers were responsible for constructing, owning, operating, and  maintaining the housing for 50 years in one case and 46 years in the other.  During each visit, the developers stated that wood-frame construction was  being used because the developers believed that, based on their internal  long-term cost analyses, this type of construction would result in the most  economical project over the long term. For example, the Navy partnered  with a developer to build a pilot privatized housing project for  unaccompanied personnel in the Norfolk, Virginia, area. The project  includes the construction of 755 rooms in a six-story midrise building and  435 rooms in 87 separate housing units. The developer stated that the  midrise building used noncombustible materials, such as concrete, and the  87 separate housing units used wood-frame materials. The developer  stated that the type of construction used for each type of building was  based on the most cost-effective type of construction, considering life- cycle costs, to provide the lowest total cost over a 50-year period. Further,  the developer also stated that, because the exterior surfaces and interior  finishes for both the midrise building and separate housing units were very  similar, no difference in operation and maintenance costs was anticipated  with regard to the different types of construction (see fig. 4).
In the other project visited, the Army had partnered with a developer to  build, own, and operate a privatized housing project for senior unmarried  servicemembers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for 46 years. The project  includes 13 apartment-style buildings with a mix of 312 one- and two- bedroom apartments. The developer stated that wood-frame construction  was used in the project because, compared to the use of noncombustible  materials and building methods, wood-frame construction resulted in  lower initial construction costs and, based on the developer’s long-term  analyses, was expected to also result in lower life-cycle costs (see fig. 5).

		Questions Remain about the Service Life and Durability of Facilities Constructed with Wood Materials and Modular Methods

Determining the relative merits and economic impacts of alternative  building materials and methods over the long term requires the  consideration of possible differences in facility service life and durability  resulting from the use of different building materials and methods.  Although we found no DOD studies or definitive analyses assessing  possible service life and durability differences and any associated impact  on life-cycle costs, we discussed opinions on the issue with service  headquarters officials and local officials at five Army installations we  visited.
Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters officials expressed the opinion  that steel, concrete, and masonry facilities generally had longer service  lives and were more durable than wood-frame facilities. However, we  found that the services had different opinions on the importance of  durability. For example, although Army officials agreed with the opinion  of Navy and Air Force officials that the use of steel, concrete, and masonry  generally resulted in more durable facilities, the Army’s opinion differed  from the other services’ opinions on whether greater durability also meant  that such facilities were more desirable. Army officials stated that because  missions, requirements, and standards change over time, facilities  constructed today will be outdated in 20 to 25 years and will require major  renovation or possibly conversion to other uses to meet needs in the far  outyears. Thus, Army officials stated that considering facility use beyond  25 years is not productive and facilities built with wood-frame materials  and modular building methods will meet the Army’s needs even if they do  not last as long as facilities constructed with steel, concrete, and masonry.
Officials at the Army installations we visited had various opinions on the  expected service life and durability of facilities constructed with wood  materials and modular building methods. Officials at Fort Meade and Fort  Detrick, for example, stated that they were satisfied with the durability of  wood-frame barracks constructed on-site at their installations and would  not seek to use steel, concrete, and masonry even if they had the  opportunity to rebuild the facilities.
With respect to wood modular construction, we found the following  concerns expressed by officials at Fort Bliss and Fort Carson:    Fort Bliss officials noted that because modular units were constructed  off-site and then transported in some cases over 1,000 miles to the  installation for assembly, the vibrations experienced during  transportation might affect the units’ structures and result in durability  issues. The modular industry, however, contends that modular units  are constructed to withstand such transportation stresses.
Fort Carson officials expressed concern that temperature changes  would cause the expansion and contraction of the joints where  modular units were joined, which might adversely affect durability in  the long term.
Fort Bliss and Fort Carson officials expressed concerns that settling of  the different sections of modular facilities might show stress where  they join together, resulting in additional maintenance requirements in  the long term.
Officials at Fort Bliss and Fort Carson also said that reconfiguring  modular-built facilities for other uses, if needed in the future, might be  more difficult compared to wood-frame facilities built on-site, and thus  result in a shorter facility service life.
Figure 6 shows a Fort Bliss barracks under construction using modular  building methods.
Fort Bliss officials added that, although they had some concerns about the  durability of modular construction, the use of modular construction  methods resulted in faster building timelines compared to steel, concrete,  and masonry construction, which would help ensure the timely  completion of facilities needed to accommodate the large number of  soldiers reporting to the installation over the next few years.
Although officials at some installations we visited expressed concerns  over the durability of facilities built with modular building methods, other  sources have reported information that supports the durability of modular  facilities. For example, after Hurricane Andrew hit Florida in 1992, a team  from the Federal Emergency Management Agency conducted a study of  various building types and how well they weathered the storm. On the  basis of its observations, the team concluded that, in general, both  masonry buildings and wood-framed modular buildings performed  relatively well.

	Conflicts Exist between Antiterrorism Building Standards and Sustainable Goals, but the Services Consider the Conflicts to Be Manageable

Although there are areas of conflict when designing facilities that meet  both antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design goals,  military service officials stated that the conflicts are considered to be  manageable and not a significant obstacle to the design and construction  of new facilities. Service officials noted, however, that achieving higher  levels of sustainability in future construction projects while still meeting  the antiterrorism standards would further increase initial facility costs and  create additional design challenges.

		DOD Has Recognized and Routinely Manages the Conflicts between Antiterrorism Building Standards and Sustainable Design Goals

DOD has recognized that areas of conflict exist between DOD’s  antiterrorism building standards and sustainable design goals and has  developed approaches to help deal with the conflicts. To illustrate,  military service officials noted that the antiterrorism mandatory building  standard to provide standoff distances around new facilities to keep  potential explosives at a distance reduces development density and  conflicts with a sustainable design goal to increase development density.  Similarly, some officials stated that sustainable design goals related to  greater use of windows to increase natural lighting conflicts with the  recommended antiterrorism building measure related to minimizing  hazards from flying glass fragments from windows.
To help deal with such conflicts, a facility planning tool was developed  that identifies and addresses the potential conflicts from integrating  required antiterrorism standards with sustainable design goals. The tool  uses a color-coded matrix to identify the relationship between the  antiterrorism standards and sustainable design goals. Conflicting or  possibly conflicting relationships are coded red and yellow, respectively,  and the tool provides additional information to aid project designers in  dealing with these areas.
The services do not consider the conflicts between antiterrorism building  standards and sustainable goals to be a significant obstacle when  designing and building new military facilities. Service officials stated that  with use of the facility planning tool and a comprehensive design  approach, project designers are able to develop successful building  solutions that ensure both secure and high-performance facilities. In  particular, officials in each military service stated that the services had set  a goal that beginning in fiscal year 2009 all new major military  construction buildings would be designed and constructed to be silver- level certifiable under the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in  Energy and Environmental Design Green Building Rating System. This 100  percent goal was higher than the DOD-wide goal for fiscal year 2009,  which called for 70 percent of new buildings to be silver-level certifiable.  Further, service officials stated that in some cases military buildings have  been constructed that met the rating system’s next higher sustainable  design level—the gold level—while still complying with all antiterrorism  standards. However, service officials also noted that achieving higher  levels of sustainability while still meeting all antiterrorism standards  increases initial facility costs and creates additional design challenges.
To obtain additional details on how the services were dealing with the  conflicts between the standards and the goals, we followed up with the  project planners responsible for 90 military construction projects from a  non-probability sample of Army, Navy, and Air Force projects approved  during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. According to the planners, 80 of the  90 projects (89 percent) required no special steps or workarounds to meet  both antiterrorism standards and sustainable design goals. For the projects  where special steps or workarounds were needed, most issues related to  facility windows and the required building standoff distances. For  example, the planners of a fiscal year 2007 child development center at  Fort Lewis, Washington, reported that special steps or workarounds were  needed to simultaneously meet antiterrorism standards and sustainable  goals. According to the planners, both the child care program and  sustainable design goals encouraged large window areas on the exterior of  the building for daylighting and child-height window views on both the  building’s exterior and interior. However, the antiterrorism standards and  recommendations encourage reduced window sizes with specific window  glazing techniques to minimize hazards from flying glass fragments and the  use of reflective glazing to prevent views of a building’s interior. The  planners stated that an acceptable design solution was developed, but the  result significantly increased the cost of the facility’s windows.
Although the project planners stated that 80 of the 90 projects in our  sample required no special steps or workarounds to meet both  antiterrorism standards and sustainable design goals, the planners also  reported that in some cases meeting both the standards and goals resulted  in additional land use, community decentralization, or installation  development sprawl. Specifically, project planners reported that,  primarily because of the required standoff distances around new facilities,  18 (20 percent) of the 90 projects we reviewed resulted in additional land  use, community decentralization, or installation development sprawl. For  example, planners of a fiscal year 2008 instruction building at Fort  Huachuca, Arizona, reported that because of the antiterrorism standoff  distance standard, the building site was approximately 50 percent larger  than required if there were no standoff requirements. Similarly, project  planners of a fiscal year 2009 unit maintenance facilities project at Fort  Campbell, Kentucky, stated that complying with the antiterrorism standoff  distance standard resulted in additional land use, including the  construction of an additional parking lot situated across the street from  the facilities.

		Antiterrorism Building Standards and Sustainable Design Features Add to Facility Construction Costs

According to service officials, incorporating antiterrorism standards in  new facilities typically adds about 1 to 5 percent to construction costs and  incorporating sustainable design building features typically adds about       2 percent to construction costs. The officials noted, however, that each  project is unique and the estimated cost to incorporate antiterrorism  standards and sustainable design features can vary significantly among  military construction projects.
To obtain additional details on the costs of incorporating antiterrorism  standards and sustainable design features in new facilities, we reviewed  information contained in the project justifications for the 90 military  construction projects included in our non-probability sample of Army,  Navy, and Air Force projects approved during fiscal years 2007 through  2009. The review showed that the average estimated cost to incorporate  antiterrorism standards in the projects was about 2.0 percent of a project’s  total cost with the range varying from 0.3 percent to 6.6 percent. The  review also showed that the average estimated cost of the sustainable  design features was about 1.6 percent of a project’s total cost with the  range varying from 0.7 percent to 2.6 percent. According to the project  planners, the actual costs of incorporating antiterrorism standards and  sustainable design features in new projects was not available because  contractors normally do not separately identify these costs in their bids  responding to solicitations for project construction.

	Conclusions

Although the Army appears to have achieved some savings in initial  construction costs by expanding the use of wood materials for some  permanent facilities, the military services had little quantitative  information on whether the use of wood materials and modular building  methods will also result in lower long-term costs compared to the  traditional use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site  building methods. Determining the relative merits and economic impacts  from the use of alternative construction materials and methods is an  important issue for the military services to resolve to help ensure that  DOD’s military construction program meets requirements at the lowest  cost over the long term. Unless the services perform additional study and  analysis to determine the relative merits and long-term economic impacts  from the use of alternative construction materials and methods, DOD will  not know whether the use of wood materials and modular building  methods will result in the most economical long-term building solution or  whether DOD’s unified facilities criteria, or other military construction  program guidance, needs to be changed so that new facilities are  constructed with materials and methods that meet requirements at the  lowest cost over the long term.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To address unanswered questions about the merits and long-term costs  from the use of alternative construction materials and methods for new  common facilities, such as administrative buildings and barracks, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to commission a tri- service panel that would be responsible for determining and comparing  the estimated life-cycle costs of facilities built with alternative  construction materials and methods, including a mix of wood and steel,  concrete, and masonry construction materials and on-site and modular  construction methods.
We also recommend that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment) use the results from the tri-service panel’s  determinations to revise DOD’s unified facilities criteria or other  appropriate military construction guidance, as deemed appropriate, to  ensure that new facilities are constructed with the materials and methods  that meet requirements at the lowest cost over the long term.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Officials from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment) provided oral comments on a draft of this  report. In the comments, DOD stated that it agreed with our  recommendation to commission a tri-service panel that would be  responsible for determining and comparing the estimated life-cycle costs  of facilities built with alternative construction materials and methods.  DOD stated that the department needed to better understand the life-cycle  cost implications of different building materials and methods and to use  this knowledge in evaluating and comparing total life-cycle cost  alternatives. In view of the questions raised during the course of our  review, DOD stated that it had already initiated a tri-service panel to  develop a template that will objectively evaluate the relative life-cycle  costs between competing construction proposals in the facilities  acquisition process. When complete, the template is expected to allow  prospective project designers to propose alternative construction  materials and methods, among other design considerations, to achieve  lower life-cycle costs or best overall value. DOD stated that this approach  would recognize that the department cannot be solely responsible for  determining the life-cycle cost implications of each possible alternative  and needs to consider the best available industry knowledge, expertise,  and innovation for any particular facility requirement. Nonetheless, DOD  stated that it expects to monitor the performance of alternative materials  and methods to better inform this process over time. We believe that  DOD’s actions, once implemented, will address the intent of the  recommendation.
DOD stated that it partially agreed with our recommendation that the  department use the results of the tri-service panel’s determinations to  revise DOD’s unified facilities criteria or other appropriate military  construction guidance, as deemed appropriate, to ensure that new  facilities are constructed with the materials and methods that meet  requirements at the lowest cost over the long term. DOD stated that it  agreed with the general concept that lessons learned should be  incorporated into facilities criteria and specifications to the extent  practical. However, DOD also stated that in some cases, such as to  minimize adverse environmental impacts, facilities might be built with  materials or methods that do not result in the lowest cost but in the best  value for the department. In short, DOD stated that the use of the lowest- cost materials and methods should be an important consideration in  facilities acquisition, but not the overriding goal. Our recommendation was  not intended to restrict DOD in its efforts to achieve the best value, but  rather to ensure adequate consideration of the long-term merits and  economic impacts from building alternatives. We continue to believe that  when all costs are considered over the long term, including environmental  costs, the best value to DOD will normally be the construction alternative  with the lowest life-cycle cost. Further, as stated in our recommendation,  when revising its construction guidance based on the tri-service panel’s  determinations, we believe that DOD should only make revisions that it  deems to be appropriate. As a result, we believe DOD’s plan to incorporate  the tri-service panel’s findings into its guidance will address the intent of  the recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of  the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions on the  information discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4523  or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in   appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the Army’s measurement and achievement of its military  construction cost and timeline reduction goals, we interviewed Army  headquarters and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials and reviewed  applicable documentation concerning the Army’s military construction  transformation strategy and the associated establishment and  implementation of the Army’s goals to reduce construction costs and  building timelines. We also reviewed guidance for internal controls and  effective management practices that call for the monitoring of  performance goals and discussed with Army officials the reasons that the  Army did not establish a framework to monitor the achievement of its  construction cost and building timeline reduction goals. To obtain some  insight into the Army’s accomplishment of its cost goal, we reviewed the  construction cost estimates for a non-probability sample of 75 facility  projects to determine whether a 15 percent reduction was taken in the  estimated cost of the facilities, as called for according to the Army’s plan  for implementing the goal. We selected projects for review from a list of all  Army military construction projects approved during fiscal years 2007  through 2009. The projects selected represented a range of facility types  and geographic locations and were in the categories of facilities subject to  the cost reduction goal. More specifically, the 75 facilities included 15  fiscal year 2007 facilities funded under the base realignment and closure  program, 30 projects from fiscal year 2008, and 30 projects from fiscal year  2009 for five facility types subject to the goal. The construction cost  estimates were included in the project justifications submitted to the  Congress as part of the Army’s funding request. To obtain some insight  into the Army’s accomplishment of its building timeline goal, we used  actual Army project timeline information to compare the average lapsed  time between key building milestones for all completed projects approved  during fiscal years 2007 through 2009 with the lapsed times for the same  milestones for completed projects approved in fiscal years 2004 through  2006—the 3 years before the implementation of the Army’s military  construction transformation strategy. Although we did not independently  validate the Army’s building timeline data, we discussed with the officials  steps they had taken to ensure reasonable accuracy of the data. As such,  we determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.
To evaluate the merits and economic impacts from the Army’s expanded  use of wood materials and modular building methods for permanent  facilities, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy,  and Air Force officials and reviewed related documentation, policies, and  construction guidance on the use of construction materials and building  methods for military facilities. We also discussed how various  construction materials and building methods could affect initial  construction costs, long-term costs, service life, and durability of new  military facilities and reviewed available documentation on the issue from  the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Naval Facilities Engineering  Command, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, and  from representatives of three industry groups—the American Wood  Council, the Modular Building Institute, and the National Concrete and  Masonry Association. To observe the use of alternative construction  materials and methods and discuss the issue with local military officials,  we visited five Army installations—Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Bragg, North  Carolina; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Detrick, Maryland; and Fort Meade,  Maryland—where wood materials or modular building methods had been  used to construct permanent facilities. During the visits, we obtained  opinions and reviewed available information on the relative merits and  economic impacts from using alternative construction materials and  building methods. We also met with the developers of two military  privatized unaccompanied personnel housing projects to discuss the  reasons that the building materials and methods used in the projects were  chosen. One privatized project was associated with the Navy and was  located in the Norfolk, Virginia, area and the other project was associated  with the Army and was located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
To review potential conflicts between antiterrorism construction  standards and sustainable design goals and the costs to incorporate the  standards and goals in new facilities, we reviewed applicable Department  of Defense (DOD) policies, guidance, goals, and costs related to  incorporating antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design  goals in new military facilities. We also interviewed officials at the Office  of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Naval  Facilities Engineering Command, and the Air Force Center for Engineering  and the Environment concerning how potential conflicts between the  standards and the goals are identified and addressed and how  incorporating the standards and goals affects the cost of new facilities. To  obtain additional details on how the services were dealing with potential  conflicts between the standards and the goals, we followed up with the  project planners responsible for 90 military construction projects selected  from a non-probability sample of Army, Navy, and Air Force projects  approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. We selected projects for  review from a list of all Army, Navy, and Air Force military construction  projects approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. We also selected  projects to represent a range of facility types and geographic locations and  included 10 Army, 10 Navy, and 10 Air Force projects approved in each of  the three fiscal years—for a total of 30 projects approved in each fiscal  year. During the follow up, we asked the project planners whether the  projects required any special steps or workarounds to meet both  antiterrorism standards and sustainable design goals and whether the  projects resulted in additional land use, community decentralization, or  installation development sprawl. We did not independently verify the  information provided by the project planners. In addition, to obtain  additional details on the costs of incorporating antiterrorism standards  and sustainable design features in new facilities, we reviewed information  contained in the project justification of each of the 90 projects. The  justifications included the estimated cost to incorporate antiterrorism  standards in the project and, for fiscal year 2009 projects, the justifications  also included the estimated cost to incorporate sustainable design goals.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 to February 2010  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: DOD Construction Practices

In 2007, DOD issued guidance—the Unified Facilities Criteria 1-200-01,  General Building Requirements—that applies to the design and  construction of all new and renovated facilities throughout DOD. The  guidance adopted the 2006 International Building Code, with some  modifications and exceptions, as the building code for DOD. The  International Building Code defines allowable types of construction based  on factors such as the size, configuration, and planned facility use and  categorizes planned buildings into five construction types. The  construction type classifications are based on the fire-resistive capabilities  of the predominant materials used in the construction progressing from  type I, the most fire-resistive, to type V, the least fire-resistive. More  specifically, types I and II construction incorporate materials such as steel,  concrete, and masonry which, in accordance with applicable testing  standards, are classified as noncombustible. Types III and V construction  incorporate the use of any material permitted by the code to include  combustible materials such as wood products and plastics. Type IV  construction is related to the use of heavy timber. Table 4 illustrates the  materials that are allowed to be used in the building elements—i.e., the  structural frame, bearing walls, nonbearing walls, floor, and roof—of a  facility built according to each type of construction.
In each of the construction types, the intended level of fire protection is  achieved by assembling building elements to achieve fire-resistance  ratings established by the International Building Code. In a type I steel- frame building, for example, spray-applied fire-resistive material can be  used to enable the structural frame to achieve the 3-hour fire-resistance  rating required by the code, and in a type V wood-frame building, covering  exposed wood with drywall allows the affected building elements to  achieve the 1-hour fire-resistance rating required by the code. In addition  to the fire protection provided by the assembly of building elements, the  code establishes requirements for use of automatic fire sprinkler systems  based on factors to include the planned use and size of a facility and the  planned number of occupants.
The International Building Code also serves to limit building size based on  the level of fire protection provided by its construction. Because type I  construction is the most fire-resistive of the construction types, the code  places minimal limits on the dimensions of type I buildings. To account for  the comparatively lower level of fire protection provided by type II  through type V construction types, the code establishes limits on building  dimensions. For example, a type V barracks building that is protected with  an automatic sprinkler system is limited under the code to a maximum  height of 4 stories, or 60 feet, with each story having maximum floor area  of 36,000 square feet.
DOD has traditionally built permanent buildings using on-site construction  where materials are delivered to the construction site and the materials  are then assembled into a finished facility. However, as part of its military  construction transformation strategy, the Army has allowed, among other  alternative construction techniques, the use of modular construction. In  this method of construction, building sections are fabricated off-site in a  factory environment, transported to the construction site, and then  connected to other building sections to assemble the facility. Although  some on-site construction is normally needed to complete the facility, the  Modular Building Institute reports that in a typical modular construction  project between 80 and 95 percent of the total construction is completed  at an off-site factory. Because the off-site construction can proceed under  controlled conditions at the same time that on-site foundation and other  work is being completed, modular construction projects can potentially be  completed with less material waste and in less time compared to projects  built with on-site construction methods.

Appendix III: DOD’s Antiterrorism Construction Standards

DOD’s minimum antiterrorism construction standards are contained in  DOD’s Unified Facilities Criteria 4-010-01, DOD Minimum Antiterrorism  Standards for Buildings. The standards include 22 mandatory standards  and 17 recommended, but not required, measures designed to mitigate  antiterrorism vulnerabilities and terrorist threats in inhabited buildings.  Mandatory standards 1 through 5 are considered site planning standards.  These standards note that operational, logistic, and security requirements  must be integrated into the overall design of buildings, equipment,  landscaping, parking, roads, and other features and that the most cost- effective solution for mitigating explosive effects on buildings is to keep  explosives as far as possible from the buildings. Standards 6 through 9 are  considered structural design standards. These standards require that  additional structural measures be incorporated into building designs to  ensure that buildings do not experience progressive collapse or otherwise  experience disproportionate damage even if required standoff distances  can be achieved. Standards 10 through 15 are considered architectural  design standards. These standards cover many aspects of building layout  that must be incorporated into designs to improve overall protection of  personnel inside buildings. Standards 16 through 22 are considered  electrical and mechanical design standards. These standards address  limiting damage to critical infrastructure; protecting building occupants  against chemical, biological, and radiological threats; and notifying  building occupants of threats or hazards. Concerning the 17 recommended  measures, DOD states that incorporating these measures can enhance site  security and building occupants’ safety with little increase in cost and  should be considered for all new and existing inhabited buildings. Table 5  provides a brief summary description of each mandatory standard and  recommended measure.

Appendix IV: DOD’s Sustainable Design Goals

Sustainable design, or development, generally refers to efforts to design,  construct, maintain, and remove facilities in ways that efficiently use  energy, water, and materials; improve and protect environments; and  provide long-term benefits for occupant health, productivity, and comfort.  Sustainable design efforts are generally grouped under six fundamental  principles—optimize site potential, optimize energy use, protect and  conserve water, use environmentally preferable products and practices,  enhance indoor environmental quality, and optimize operational and  maintenance practices. Within the building industry, sustainable design is  also known by such terms as green, high performance, or environmentally  friendly.
DOD sustainable design requirements are contained in DOD’s Unified  Facilities Criteria 4-030-01, Sustainable Development. The document  provides instruction, requirements, and references for DOD facility  professionals and architect/engineer and construction contractors to apply  sustainable development principles and strategies consistently in DOD  facilities throughout their life cycle—from planning to programming and  securing of funds; to site selection, design, and construction; to  documentation and operations and maintenance; and to reuse or  deconstruction and removal. The document’s purpose is to help produce  and maintain DOD facilities that comply with existing service policies and  federal mandates for sustainable design, energy efficiency, and  procurement of environmentally preferable materials. Further, the  document provides guidance to help reduce the total cost of facility  ownership, while minimizing negative impacts on the environment and  promoting productivity, health, and comfort of building occupants.
To help measure the sustainability of new military buildings, DOD uses the  U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental  Design Green Building Rating System. Created in 1998, the rating system  represents the Council’s effort to provide a nationally accepted benchmark  for the design, construction, and operation of high-performance green  buildings. The system also provides for a certification program for new  construction projects by identifying a set of prerequisites and credits  categorized under several environmental categories. The prerequisites are  required tasks in order to be considered for a certification. The credits are  tasks, steps, or measures that could be incorporated into a construction  project and include a variable number of points—some based on  performance levels and some based on addressing distinct measures  related to an overarching sustainable concept. The United States Green  Building Council can award a specific certification level to a new building  depending on the total number of points achieved in the design and  construction of the building. The certification levels for new construction  and renovation projects under the 2009 rating system include: certified (40  to 49 points), silver (50 to 59 points), gold (60 to 79 points), and platinum  (80 points and above). For fiscal year 2009, DOD set a goal that at least 70  percent of DOD’s new buildings would be silver-level certifiable. However,  each of the military services set a goal that beginning in fiscal year 2009 all  new major military construction buildings would be designed and  constructed to be silver-level certifiable.
Table 6 below shows by category the prerequisites, credits, and available  points under the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and  Environmental Design Green Building Rating System.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Terry Dorn, Director; Michael  Armes, Assistant Director; Laura Durland, Assistant Director; Grace  Coleman; George Depaoli; Tobin McMurdie; Jeanett Reid; and Gary  Phillips made significant contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Federal Energy Management: Agencies are Taking Steps to Meet High- Performance Federal Building Requirements, but Face Challenges and  Need to Clarify Roles and Responsibilities. GAO-10-22. Washington D.C.:  October 30, 2009.
Real Property: Infrastructure Investment Presents Opportunities to  Address Long-standing Real Property Backlogs and Reduce Energy  Consumption. GAO-09-324T. Washington D.C.: January 22, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.:   January 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military  Construction Program. GAO-04-288. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2004.
Military Housing: Opportunities That Should Be Explored to Improve  Housing and Reduce Costs for Unmarried Junior Servicemembers.   GAO-03-602. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2003.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

To meet the challenges associated with a threefold increase in the Army's military construction program between fiscal years 2005 and 2009, the Army adopted numerous changes, including the expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods, designed to reduce building costs and timelines for new facilities. With the changes, the Army set goals to reduce building costs by 15 percent and timelines by 30 percent. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have also faced challenges associated with incorporating both antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design ("green") goals into new facilities. GAO was asked to (1) assess the Army's progress in meeting its goals, (2) evaluate the merits from the Army's expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods, and (3) examine potential conflicts between antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design goals. GAO reviewed relevant documentation, interviewed cognizant service officials, analyzed selected construction project data, and visited five Army installations to review facilities built with alternative materials and methods.

What GAO Found

The Army set goals to reduce its estimated construction costs by 15 percent and building timelines by 30 percent, but it did not monitor goal achievement and thus did not know to what extent the goals had been met or whether changes made to its military construction program resulted in actual reductions in facility costs. GAO's review of selected project information showed that the Army did reduce the estimated cost of some facility construction projects and shortened building timelines during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, but it did not meet its overall stated goals. For example, GAO found that the average building timeline for one key measurement (design start to ready for occupancy) was reduced by about 11 percent--an improvement, but less than the 30 percent goal. The Army discontinued the numerical goals in fiscal year 2010, and Army officials stated that, although the specific goals might not have been achieved, they believed that the Army's efforts were successful in dampening the escalation of Army facilities' costs and would continue to help ensure cost-effective and timely facilities in future years. The Army appears to have achieved some savings in selected construction projects by expanding the use of wood materials and modular construction methods for some of its facilities, but GAO found little quantitative data on whether the use of these materials and methods will result in savings over the long term compared to the traditional use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site building methods. Without long-term or life-cycle analyses that consider not only initial construction costs but also possible differences in facility service lives and annual operating and maintenance costs between the construction alternatives, it is not clear that the Army's expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods will achieve the Army's intended purpose of reduced facility costs over the long term. The Navy and the Air Force generally disagreed with the Army's view and believed that the use of wood materials and modular construction will result in facilities with shorter service lives and higher life-cycle costs. However, none of the services had the analyses to support its views. Without additional study and analysis, DOD will not know whether military construction program guidance needs to be changed to ensure that facilities are constructed with materials and methods that meet needs at the lowest cost over the long term. Conflicts between antiterrorism building standards and sustainable design goals exist, but military service officials stated that the conflicts are considered to be manageable. GAO's review of 90 Army, Navy, and Air Force military construction projects, approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, showed that although incorporating the standards and the goals in new facilities added to construction costs, 80 of the projects required no special steps or workarounds to meet both the standards and the goals. However, service officials noted that achieving higher levels of sustainability in future construction projects while still meeting the antiterrorism standards would further increase initial facility costs and create additional design challenges.