Background

As the primary federal agency that is responsible for protecting and  securing GSA facilities and federal employees across the country, FPS has  the authority to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting  federally owned and leased properties and the persons on such property,  and, among other things, to conduct investigations related to offenses  against the property and persons on the property. To protect the over one  million federal employees and about 9,000 GSA facilities from the risk of  terrorist and criminal attacks, in fiscal year 2007, FPS had about 1,100  employees, of which 541, or almost 50 percent, were inspectors. FPS  inspectors are primarily responsible for responding to incidents and  demonstrations, overseeing contract guards, completing BSAs for  numerous buildings, and participating in tenant agencies’ BSC meetings.   About 215, or 19 percent, of FPS’s employees are police officers who are  primarily responsible for patrolling GSA facilities, responding to criminal  incidents, assisting in the monitoring of contract guards, responding to  demonstrations at GSA facilities, and conducting basic criminal  investigations. About 104, or 9 percent, of FPS’s 1,100 employees are  special agents who are the lead entity within FPS for gathering intelligence  for criminal and anti-terrorist activities, and planning and conducting  investigations relating to alleged or suspected violations of criminal laws  against GSA facilities and their occupants.
FPS also has about 15,000 contract guards that are used primarily to  monitor facilities through fixed post assignments and access control.  According to FPS policy documents, contract guards may detain  individuals who are being seriously disruptive, violent, or suspected of  committing a crime at a GSA facility, but do not have arrest authority.
The level of law enforcement and physical protection services FPS  provides at each of the approximately 9,000 GSA facilities varies  depending on the facility’s security level. To determine a facility’s security  level, FPS uses the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Vulnerability  Assessment Guidelines which are summarized below.
A level I facility has 10 or fewer federal employees, 2,500 or fewer square  feet of office space and a low volume of public contact or contact with  only a small segment of the population. A typical level I facility is a small  storefront-type operation, such as a military recruiting office.
A level II facility has between 11 and 150 federal employees, more than  2,500 to 80,000 square feet; a moderate volume of public contact; and  federal activities that are routine in nature, similar to commercial  activities.
A level III facility has between 151 and 450 federal employees, more than  80,000 to 150,000 square feet and a moderate to high volume of public  contact.
A level IV facility has over 450 federal employees, more than 150,000  square feet; a high volume of public contact; and tenant agencies that may  include high-risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies, courts,  judicial offices, and highly sensitive government records.
A Level V facility is similar to a Level IV facility in terms of the number of  employees and square footage, but contains mission functions critical to  national security. FPS does not have responsibility for protecting any level  V buildings.
FPS is a reimbursable organization and is funded by collecting security  fees from tenant agencies, referred to as a fee-based system. To fund its  operations, FPS charges each tenant agency a basic security fee per square  foot of space occupied in a GSA facility. In 2008, the basic security fee is  62 cents per square foot and covers services such as patrol, monitoring of  building perimeter alarms and dispatching of law enforcement response  through its control centers, criminal investigations, and BSAs. FPS also  collects an administrative fee it charges tenant agencies for building  specific security services such as access control to facilities’ entrances and  exits, employee and visitor checks; and the purchase, installation, and  maintenance of security equipment including cameras, alarms,  magnetometers, and x-ray machines. In addition to these security services,  FPS provides agencies with additional services upon request, which are  funded through reimbursable Security Work Authorizations (SWA), for  which FPS charges an administrative fee. For example, agencies may  request additional magnetometers or more advanced perimeter  surveillance capabilities.

	FPS’s Ability to Accomplish Its Mission Is Hampered by Operational Challenges and the Steps It Has Taken May Not Fully Resolve Them

FPS faces several operational challenges, including decreasing staff levels,  which has led to reductions in the law enforcement services that FPS  provides. FPS also faces challenges in overseeing its contract guards,  completing its BSAs in a timely manner, and maintaining security  countermeasures. While FPS has taken steps to address these challenges,  it has not fully resolved them.

		FPS’s Staff Has Steadily Declined Since It Transferred to DHS

Providing law enforcement and physical security services to GSA facilities  is inherently labor intensive and requires effective management of  available staffing resources. However, since transferring from GSA to  DHS, FPS’s staff has declined and the agency has managed its staffing  resources in a manner that has reduced security at GSA facilities and may  increase the risk of crime or terrorist attacks at many GSA facilities.  Specifically, FPS’s staff has decreased by about 20 percent from almost  1,400 employees at the end of fiscal year 2004, to about 1,100 employees at  the end of fiscal year 2007, as shown in figure 1. In fiscal year 2008, FPS  initially planned to reduce its staff further. However, a provision in the  2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act requires FPS to increase its staff to  1,200 by July 31, 2008. In fiscal year 2010, FPS plans to increase its staff to  1,450, according to its Director.
From fiscal year 2004 to 2007, the number of employees in each position  also decreased, with the largest decrease occurring in the police officer  position. For example, the number of police officers decreased from 359 in  fiscal year 2004 to 215 in fiscal year 2007 and the number of inspectors  decreased from 600 in fiscal year 2004 to 541 at the end of fiscal year 2007,  as shown in figure 2.

		Critical Law Enforcement Services Have Been Reduced or Eliminated

At many facilities, FPS has eliminated proactive patrol of GSA facilities to  prevent or detect criminal violations. The FPS Policy Handbook states that  patrol should be used to prevent crime and terrorist attacks. The  elimination of proactive patrol has a negative effect on security at GSA  facilities because law enforcement personnel cannot effectively monitor  individuals who might be surveilling federal buildings, inspect suspicious  vehicles (including potential vehicles for bombing federal buildings), and  detect and deter criminal activity in and around federal buildings. While  the number of contract guards employed in GSA facilities will not  decrease and according to a FPS policy document, the guards are  authorized to detain individuals, most are stationed at fixed posts from  which they are not permitted to leave and do not have arrest authority.
According to some regional officials, some contract guards do not exercise  their detention authority because of liability concerns.
According to several inspectors and police officers in one FPS region,  proactive patrol is important in their region because, in the span of one  year, there were 72 homicides within 3 blocks of a major federal office  building and because most of the crime in their area takes place after  hours when there are no FPS personnel on duty. In addition, FPS officials  at several regions we visited said that proactive patrol has, in the past,  allowed its police officers and inspectors to identify and apprehend  individuals that were surveilling GSA facilities. In contrast, when FPS is  not able to patrol federal buildings, there is increased potential for illegal  entry and other criminal activity at federal buildings. For example, in one  city we visited, a deceased individual had been found in a vacant GSA  facility that was not regularly patrolled by FPS. FPS officials stated that  the deceased individual had been inside the building for approximately  three months.
In addition, more recently, at this same facility, two individuals who fled  into the facility after being pursued by the local police department for an  armed robbery were subsequently apprehended and arrested by the local  police department. While the local police department contacted FPS for  assistance with responding to the incident at the federal facility, FPS  inspectors were advised by senior FPS supervisors not to assist the local  police department in their search for the suspects because GSA had not  paid the security fee for the facility.
In addition to eliminating proactive patrol, many FPS regions have  reduced their hours of operation for providing law enforcement services in  multiple locations, which has resulted in a lack of coverage when most  federal employees are either entering or leaving federal buildings or on  weekends when some facilities remain open to the public. Moreover, FPS  police officers and inspectors in two cities explained that this lack of  coverage has left some federal day care facilities vulnerable to loitering by  homeless individuals and drug users. The decrease in FPS’s duty hours has  also jeopardized police officer and inspector safety, as well as building  security. Some FPS police officers and inspectors said that they are  frequently in dangerous situations without any FPS backup because many  FPS regions have reduced their hours of operation and overtime.

		Adequate Oversight of Contract Guard Program Remains a Challenge

Contract guard inspections are important for several reasons, including  ensuring that guards comply with contract requirements; have up-to-date  certifications for required training, including firearms or cardiopulmonary  resuscitation, and that they perform assigned duties. While FPS policy  does not specify how frequently guard posts should be inspected, we  found that some posts are inspected less than once per year, in part,  because contract guards are often posted in buildings hours or days away  from the nearest FPS inspector. For example, one area supervisor  reported guard posts that had not been inspected in 18 months while  another reported posts that had not been inspected in over one year. In  another region, FPS inspectors and police officers reported that managers  told them to complete guard inspections over the telephone, instead of in  person. In addition, when inspectors do perform guard inspections they do  not visit the post during each shift; consequently some guard shifts may  never be inspected by an FPS official. As a result, some guards may be  supervised exclusively by a representative of the contract guard company.  Moreover, in one area we visited with a large FPS presence, officials  reported difficulty in getting to every post within that region’s required one  month period. We obtained a copy of a contract guard inspection schedule  in one metropolitan city that showed 20 of 68 post inspections were  completed for the month.
Some tenant agencies have also noticed a decline in the level of guard  oversight in recent years and believe this has led to poor performance on  the part of some contract guards. For example, according to Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and GSA officials in one of the regions we  visited, contract guards failed to report the theft of an FBI surveillance  trailer worth over $500,000, even though security cameras captured the  trailer being stolen while guards were on duty. The FBI did not realize it  was missing until three days later. Only after the FBI started making  inquiries did the guards report the theft to FPS and the FBI. During  another incident, FPS officials reported contract guards—who were  armed—taking no action as a shirtless suspect wearing handcuffs on one  arm ran through the lobby of a major federal building while being chased  by an FPS inspector. In addition, one official reported that during an off- hours alarm call to a federal building, the official arrived to find the front  guard post empty while the guard’s loaded firearm was left unattended in  the unlocked post.
We also personally witnessed an incident in which an individual attempted  to enter a level IV facility with illegal weapons. According to FPS policies,  contract guards are required to confiscate illegal weapons, detain and  question the individual, and to notify FPS. In this instance, the weapons  were not confiscated, the individual was not detained or questioned, FPS  was not notified, and the individual was allowed to leave with the  weapons. We will shortly begin a comprehensive review of FPS’s contract  guard program for this Subcommittee and other congressional  committees.

		Difficulties in Ensuring Quality and Timeliness of Building Security Assessments

Building security assessments, which are completed by both inspectors  and physical security specialists, are the core component of FPS’s physical  security mission. However, ensuring the quality and timeliness of them is  an area in which FPS continues to face challenges. The majority of  inspectors in the seven regions we visited stated that they are not provided  sufficient time to complete BSAs. For example, while FPS officials have  stated that BSAs for level IV facilities should take between two to four  weeks to complete, several inspectors reported having only one or two  days to complete assessments for their buildings. They reported that this  was due to pressure from supervisors to complete BSAs as quickly as  possible. For example, one region is attempting to complete more than 100  BSAs by June 30, 2008, three months earlier than required, because staff  will be needed to assist with a large political event in the region. In  addition, one inspector in this region reported having one day to complete  site work for six BSAs in a rural state in the region.
Some regional supervisors have also found problems with the accuracy of  BSAs. One regional supervisor reported that an inspector was repeatedly  counseled and required to redo BSAs when supervisors found he was  copying and pasting from previous BSAs. Similarly, one regional  supervisor stated that, in the course of reviewing a BSA for an address he  had personally visited, he realized that the inspector completing the BSA  falsified information and had not actually visited the site because the  inspector referred to a large building when the actual site was a vacant  plot of land owned by GSA. In December 2007, the Director of FPS issued  a memorandum emphasizing the importance of conducting BSAs in an  ethical manner.
FPS’s ability to ensure the quality and timeliness of BSAs is also  complicated by challenges with the current risk assessment tool it uses to  conduct BSAs, the Federal Security Risk Manager system. We have  previously reported that there are three primary concerns with this  system. First, it does not allow FPS to compare risks from building to  building so that security improvements to buildings can be prioritized.  Second, current risk assessments need to be categorized more precisely.  According to FPS, too many BSAs are categorized as high or low, which  does not allow for a refined prioritization of security improvements. Third,  the system does not allow for tracking the implementation status of  security recommendations based on assessments.

		Some Security Countermeasures Have Not Been Maintained

According to FPS, GSA, and tenant agency officials in the regions we  visited, some of the security countermeasures, such as security cameras,  magnetometers, and X-ray machines at some facilities, as well as some  FPS radios and BSA equipment, have been broken for months or years and  are poorly maintained. At one level IV facility, FPS and GSA officials stated  that 11 of 150 security cameras were fully functional and able to record  images. Similarly, at another level IV facility, a large camera project  designed to expand and enhance an existing camera system was put on  hold because FPS did not have the funds to complete the project. FPS  officials stated that broken cameras and other security equipment can  negate the deterrent effect of these countermeasures as well as eliminate  their usefulness as an investigative tool. For example, according to FPS, it  has investigated significant crimes at multiple level IV facilities, but some  of the security cameras installed in those buildings were not working  properly, preventing FPS investigators from identifying the suspects.
Complicating this issue, FPS officials, GSA officials, and tenant  representatives stated that additional countermeasures are difficult to  implement because they require approval from BSCs, which are composed  of representatives from each tenant agency who generally are not security  professionals. In some of the buildings that we visited, security  countermeasures were not implemented because BSC members cannot  agree on what countermeasures to implement or are unable to obtain  funding from their agencies. For example, a FPS official in a major  metropolitan city stated that over the last 4 years inspectors have  recommended 24-hour contract guard coverage at one high-risk building  located in a high crime area multiple times, however, the BSC is not able  to obtain approval from all its members. In addition, several FPS  inspectors stated that their regional managers have instructed them not to  recommend security countermeasures in BSAs if FPS would be  responsible for funding the measures because there is not sufficient  money in regional budgets to purchase and maintain the security  equipment.

		FPS Has Taken Some Actions To Resolve Operational Challenges But Its Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges

According to FPS, it has a number of ongoing efforts that are designed to  address some of its longstanding challenges. For example, in 2007, FPS  decided to adopt an inspector-based workforce approach to protect GSA  facilities. Under this approach, the composition of FPS’s workforce will  change from a combination of inspectors and police officers to mainly  inspectors. The inspectors will be required to complete law enforcement  activities such as patrolling and responding to incidents at GSA facilities  concurrently with their physical security activities. FPS will also place  more emphasis on physical security, such as BSAs, and less emphasis on  the law enforcement part of its mission; contract guards will continue to  be the front-line defense for protection at GSA facilities; and there will be  a continued reliance on local law enforcement. According to FPS, an  inspector-based workforce will help it to achieve its strategic goals such as  ensuring that its staff has the right mix of technical skills and training  needed to accomplish its mission and building effective relationships with  its stakeholders.
However, the inspector-based workforce approach presents some  additional challenges for FPS. For example, the approach does not  emphasize law enforcement responsibilities, such as proactive patrol.  Reports issued by multiple government entities acknowledge the  importance of proactive patrol in detecting and deterring terrorist  surveillance teams, which use information such as the placement of armed  guards and proximity to law enforcement agency stations when choosing  targets and planning attacks. Active law enforcement patrols in and  around federal facilities can potentially disrupt these sophisticated  surveillance and research techniques. In addition, having inspectors  perform both law enforcement and physical security duties simultaneously  may prevent some inspectors from responding to criminal incidents in a  timely manner and patrolling federal buildings.
FPS stated that entering into memorandums of agreement with local law  enforcement agencies was an integral part of the inspector-based  workforce approach because it would ensure law enforcement response  capabilities at facilities when needed. According to FPS’s Director, the  agency recently decided not to pursue memorandums of agreement with  local law enforcement agencies, in part, because of reluctance on the part  of local law enforcement officials to sign such memorandums. In addition,  FPS believes that the agreements are not necessary because 96 percent of  the properties in its inventory are listed as concurrent jurisdiction  facilities where both federal and state governments have jurisdiction over  the property. Nevertheless, the agreements would clarify roles and  responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies when responding to  crime or other incidents.
However, FPS also provides facility protection to approximately 400  properties where the federal government maintains exclusive federal  jurisdiction. Under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the federal government  has all of the legislative authority within the land area in question and the  state has no residual police powers. Furthermore, state and local law  enforcement officials are not authorized to enforce state and local laws or  federal laws and regulations at exclusive federal jurisdiction facilities.  According to ICE’s legal counsel, if the Secretary of Homeland Security  utilized the facilities and services of state and local law enforcement  agencies, state and local law enforcement officials would only be able to  assist FPS in functions such as crowd and traffic control, monitoring law  enforcement communications and dispatch, and training. Memorandums  of agreement between FPS and local law enforcement agencies would  help address the jurisdictional issues that prevent local law enforcement  agencies from providing assistance at facilities with exclusive federal  jurisdiction.
As an alternative to memorandums of agreement, according to FPS’s  Director, the agency will rely on the informal relationships that exist  between local law enforcement agencies and FPS. However, whether this  type of relationship will provide FPS with the type of assistance it will  need under the inspector-based workforce is unknown. Officials from five  of the eight local law enforcement agencies we interviewed stated that  their agency did not have the capacity to take on the additional job of  responding to incidents at federal buildings and stated that their  departments were already strained for resources. FPS and local law  enforcement officials in the regions we visited also stated that  jurisdictional authority would pose a significant barrier to gaining the  assistance of local law enforcement agencies. Representatives of local law  enforcement agencies also expressed concerns about being prohibited  from entering GSA facilities with service weapons, especially  courthouses. Similarly, local law enforcement officials in a major city  stated that they cannot make an arrest or initiate a complaint on federal  property, so they have to wait until a FPS officer or inspector arrives.
Another effort FPS has begun is to address its operational challenges by  recruiting an additional 150 inspectors to reach the mandated staffing  levels in the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act. According  to the Director of FPS, the addition of 150 inspectors to its current  workforce will allow FPS to resume providing proactive patrol and 24- hour presence based on risk and threat levels at some facilities. However,  these additional 150 inspectors will be assigned to eight of FPS’s 11  regions and thus will not have an impact on the three regions that will not  receive them. In addition, while this increase will help FPS to achieve its  mission, this staffing level is still below the 1,279 employees that FPS had  at the end of fiscal year 2006 when, according to FPS officials, tenant  agencies experienced a decrease in service.
FPS’s Risk Management Division is also in the process of developing a new  tool referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP) to  replace its current system (FSRM) for completing BSAs. According to  FPS, a pilot version of RAMP is expected to be rolled out in fiscal year  2009. The RAMP will be accessible to inspectors via a secure wireless  connection anywhere in the United States and will guide them through the  process of completing a BSA to ensure that standardized information is  collected on all GSA facilities. According to FPS, once implemented,  RAMP will allow inspectors to obtain information from one source,  generate reports automatically, enable the agency to track selected  countermeasures throughout their lifecycle, address some issues with the  subjectivity of BSAs, and reduce the amount of time spent on  administrative work by inspectors and managers.

		FPS’s Actions to Address Budgetary Challenges Have Had Adverse Implications

FPS funds its operations through the collection of security fees charged to  tenant agencies for security services. However, until recently these fees  have not been sufficient to cover its projected operational costs. FPS has  addressed this gap in a variety of ways. When FPS was located in GSA it  received additional funding from the Federal Buildings Fund to cover the  gap between collections and costs. Since transferring to DHS, to make up  for the projected shortfalls to ensure that security at GSA facilities would  not be jeopardized, and to avoid a potential Anti-deficiency Act violation in  fiscal year 2005, FPS instituted a number of cost saving measures that  included restricted hiring and travel, limited training and overtime, and no  employee performance awards. In addition, in fiscal year 2006, DHS had to  transfer $29 million in emergency supplemental funding to FPS. FPS also  increased the basic security fee charged to tenant agencies from 35 cents  per square foot in fiscal year 2005 to 62 cents per square foot in fiscal year  2008. Because of these actions, fiscal year 2007 was the first year FPS’s  collections were sufficient to cover its costs. FPS also projects that  collections will cover its costs in fiscal year 2008. In fiscal year 2009, FPS’s  basic security fee will increase to 66 cents per square foot, which  represents the fourth time FPS has increased the basic security fee since  transferring to DHS.
However, according to FPS, its cost savings measures have had adverse  implications, including low morale among staff, increased attrition and the  loss of institutional knowledge, as well as difficulties in recruiting new  staff. In addition, several FPS police officers and inspectors said that  overwhelming workloads, uncertainty surrounding their job security, and  a lack of equipment have diminished morale within the agency. These  working conditions could potentially impact the performance and safety of  FPS personnel. FPS officials said the agency has lost many of their most  experienced law enforcement staff in recent years and several police  officers and inspectors said they were actively looking for new jobs  outside FPS. For example, FPS reports that 73 inspectors, police officers,  and physical security specialists left the agency in fiscal year 2006,  representing about 65 percent of the total attrition in the agency for that  year. Attrition rates have steadily increased from fiscal years 2004 through  2007, as shown in figure 3. For example, FPS’s overall attrition rate  increased from about 2 percent in fiscal year 2004 to about 14 percent in  fiscal year 2007. The attrition rate for the inspector position has increased,  despite FPS’s plan to move to an inspector-based workforce. FPS officials  said its cost-saving measures have helped the agency address projected  revenue shortfalls. The measures have been eliminated in fiscal year 2008.
In addition, according to FPS, these measures will not be necessary in  fiscal year 2009 because the basic security fee was increased and staffing  has decreased.

		FPS’s Basic Security Fee Does Not Account for Risk and Raises Questions about Equity

FPS’s primary means of funding its operations is the fee it charges tenant  agencies for basic security services, as shown in figure 4. Some of the  basic security services covered by this fee include law enforcement  activities at GSA facilities, preliminary investigations, the capture and  detention of suspects, and BSAs, among other services. The basic security  fee does not include contract guard services.
However, this fee does not fully account for the risk faced by particular  buildings or the varying levels of basic security services provided, and  does not reflect the actual cost of providing services. In fiscal year 2008,  FPS charged 62 cents per square foot for basic security and has been  authorized to increase the rate to 66 cents per square foot in fiscal year  2009. FPS charges federal agencies the same basic security fee regardless  of the perceived threat to that particular building or agency. Although FPS  categorizes buildings into security levels based on its assessment of the  building’s risk and size, this categorization does not affect the security fee  charged by FPS. For example, level I facilities typically face less risk  because they are generally small storefront-type operations with a low  level of public contact, such as a small post office or Social Security  Administration office. However, these facilities are charged the same basic  security fee of 62 cents per square foot as a level IV facility that has a high  volume of public contact and may contain high-risk law enforcement and  intelligence agencies and highly sensitive government records.
In addition, FPS’s basic security rate has raised questions about equity  because federal agencies are required to pay the fee regardless of the level  of service FPS provides or the cost of providing the service. For instance,  in some of the regions we visited, FPS officials described situations in  which staff is stationed hundreds of miles from buildings under its  responsibility. Many of these buildings rarely receive services from FPS  staff and rely mostly on local police for law enforcement services.  However, FPS charges these tenant agencies the same basic security fees  as those buildings in major metropolitan areas in which numerous FPS  police officers and inspectors are stationed and are available to provide  security services.
FPS’s cost of providing services is not reflected in its basic security  charges. For instance, a June 2006 FPS workload study estimating the  amount of time spent on various security services showed differences in  the amount of resources dedicated to buildings at various security levels.  The study said that FPS staff spend approximately six times more hours  providing security services to higher-risk buildings (levels III and IV  buildings) compared to lower-risk buildings (levels I and II buildings). In  addition, a 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton report of FPS’s operational costs  found that FPS does not link the actual cost of providing basic security  services with the security fees it charges tenant agencies. The report  recommends incorporating a security fee that takes into account the  complexity or the level of effort of the service being performed for the  higher level security facilities. The report states that FPS’s failure to  consider the costs of protecting buildings at varying risk levels could  result in some tenants being overcharged. We also have reported that  basing government fees on the cost of providing a service promotes equity,  especially when the cost of providing the service differs significantly  among different users, as is the case with FPS.
Several stakeholders have raised questions about whether FPS has an  accurate understanding of the cost of providing security at GSA facilities.
An ICE Chief Financial Office official said FPS has experienced difficulty  in estimating its costs because of inaccurate cost data. In addition, OMB  officials said they have asked FPS to develop a better cost accounting  system in past years. The 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton report found that FPS  does not have a methodology to assign costs to its different security  activities and that it should begin capturing the cost of providing various  security services to better plan, manage and budget its resources. We have  also previously cited problems with ICE’s and FPS’s financial system,  including problems associated with tracking expenditures. We also have  previously reported on the importance of having accurate cost information  for budgetary purposes and to set fees and prices for services. We have  found that without accurate cost information it is difficult for agencies to  determine if fees need to be increased or decreased, accurately measure  performance, and improve efficiency.

	FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance

To determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect GSA  facilities, FPS has identified some output measures, such as determining  whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully  operational, the amount of time it takes to respond to an incident and the  percentage of BSAs completed on time. Output measures assess activities,  not the results of those activities. However, FPS has not developed  outcome measures to evaluate the results and the net effect of its efforts  to protect GSA facilities. While output measures are helpful, outcome  measures are also important because they can provide FPS with broader  information on program results, such as the extent to which its decision to  move to an inspector-based workforce will enhance security at GSA  facilities or help identify the security gaps that remain at GSA facilities and  determine what action may be needed to address them. The Government  Performance and Results Act requires federal agencies to, among other  things, measure agency performance in achieving outcome oriented goals.  Measuring performance allows organizations to track the progress they  are making toward their goals and gives managers critical information on  which to base decisions for improving their performance. In addition, we  and other federal agencies have maintained that adequate and reliable  performance measures are a necessary component of effective  management. We have also found that performance measures should  provide agency managers with timely, action-oriented information in a  format conducive to helping them make decisions that improve program  performance, including decisions to adjust policies and priorities.
FPS is also limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to  protect GSA facilities, in part, because it does not have a data management  system that will allow it to provide complete and accurate information on  its security program. Without a reliable data management system, it is  difficult for FPS and others to determine the effectiveness of its efforts to  protect GSA facilities or for FPS to accurately track and monitor incident  response time, effectiveness of security countermeasures, and whether  BSAs are completed on time. Currently, FPS primarily uses the Web  Records Management System (WebRMS) and Security Tracking System to  track and monitor output measures. However, FPS acknowledged that  there are weaknesses with these systems which make it difficult to  accurately track and monitor its performance. In addition, according to  many FPS officials at the seven regions we visited, the data maintained in  WebRMS may not be a reliable and accurate indicator of crimes and other  incidents because FPS does not write an incident report for every incident,  all incidents are not entered into WebRMS and because the types and  definitions of items prohibited in buildings vary not only region by region,  but also building by building. For example, a can of pepper spray may be  prohibited in one building, but allowed in another building in the same  region. According to FPS, having fewer police officers has also decreased  the total number of crime and incident reports entered in WebRMS  because there is less time spent on law enforcement activities. The  officials in one FPS region we visited stated that two years ago there were  25,000 reports filed through WebRMS, however this year they are  projecting about 10,000 reports because there are fewer FPS police  officers to respond to an incident and write a report if necessary.
In conclusion, Madam Chair, our work shows that FPS has faced and  continues to face multiple challenges in ensuring that GSA facilities, their  occupants, and visitors, are protected from crime and the risk of terrorist  attack. In the report we issued last week, we recommended that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of FPS to develop and  implement a strategic approach to manage its staffing resources; clarify  roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies in regards to  responding to incidents at GSA facilities; improve FPS’s use of the fee-base  dsystem by developing a method to accurately account for the cost of  providing security services to tenant agencies; assess whether FPS’s  current use of a fee-based system or an alternative funding mechanism is  the most appropriate manner to fund the agency; and develop and  implement specific guidelines and standards for measuring its  performance including the collection and analysis of data. DHS concurred  with these recommendations and we are encouraged that FPS is in the  process of addressing them.
This concludes our testimony. We are pleased to answer any questions you  might have.

	Contact Information

For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark Goldstein  at 202-512-2834 or by email at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony include Daniel Cain, Tammy Conquest,  Colin Fallon, Katie Hamer, Daniel Hoy, and Susan Michal-Smith.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for providing physical security and law enforcement services to about 9,000 General Services Administration (GSA) facilities. To accomplish its mission of protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual budget of about $1 billion, about 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract guards located throughout the country. GAO was asked to provide information and analysis on challenges FPS faces including ensuring that it has sufficient staffing and funding resources to protect GSA facilities and the over one million federal employees as well as members of the public that work in and visit them each year. GAO discusses (1) FPS's operational challenges and actions it has taken to address them, (2) funding challenges, and (3) how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. This testimony is based on our recently issued report (GAO-08-683) to this Subcommittee.

What GAO Found

FPS faces several operational challenges that hamper its ability to accomplish its mission and the actions it has taken may not fully resolve these challenges. FPS's staff has decreased by about 20 percent from fiscal years 2004 through 2007. FPS has also decreased or eliminated law enforcement services such as proactive patrol in many FPS locations. Moreover, FPS has not resolved longstanding challenges, such as improving the oversight of its contract guard program, maintaining security countermeasures, and ensuring the quality and timeliness of building security assessments (BSA). For example, one regional supervisor stated that while reviewing a BSA for an address he personally visited he realized that the inspector completing the BSA had falsified the information because the inspector referred to a large building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA. To address some of these operational challenges, FPS is currently changing to an inspector based workforce, which seeks to eliminate the police officer position and rely primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities. FPS is also hiring an additional 150 inspectors. However, these actions may not fully resolve the challenges FPS faces, in part because the approach does not emphasize law enforcement responsibilities. Until recently, the security fees FPS charged to agencies have not been sufficient to cover its costs and the actions it has taken to address the shortfalls have had adverse implications. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) transferred emergency supplemental funding to FPS. FPS restricted hiring and limited training and overtime. According to FPS officials, these measures have had a negative effect on staff morale and are partially responsible for FPS's high attrition rates. FPS was authorized to increase the basic security fee four times since it transferred to DHS in 2003, currently charging tenant agencies 62 cents per square foot for basic security services. Because of these actions, FPS's collections in fiscal year 2007 were sufficient to cover costs, and FPS projects that collections will also cover costs in fiscal year 2008. However, FPS's primary means of funding its operations--the basic security fee--does not account for the risk faced by buildings, the level of service provided, or the cost of providing services, raising questions about equity. Stakeholders also expressed concern about whether FPS has an accurate understanding of its security costs. FPS has developed output measures, but lacks outcome measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Its output measures include determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational. However, FPS does not have measures to evaluate its efforts to protect federal facilities that could provide FPS with broader information on program outcomes and results. FPS also lacks a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance measures. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its efforts, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk management decisions.