Background

Under the SSI program, SSA pays monthly benefits to individuals who have  limited assets and income and are aged, blind, or disabled. These benefits  are funded by general tax revenues and based on financial need. SSA has  estimated that, during fiscal year 2002, it will make SSI benefits payments  totaling approximately $31.5 billion to about 6.4 million individuals. Since  1997, we have designated SSI a high-risk program because of its  susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse and SSA’s insufficient management  oversight. Long-standing concerns regarding program abuses and  mismanagement, increasing overpayments, and the inability to recover  outstanding SSI debt have led to congressional criticism of SSA’s ability to  effectively manage and ensure the program’s integrity.
In addition to SSI, SSA administers the OASI and DI programs—together  commonly known as Social Security. These are entitlement programs  funded from trust funds supported by taxes that workers pay on their  wages. OASI provides monthly cash retirement to workers and their  dependents or, when workers die, benefits to their survivors. The DI  program provides monthly cash benefits to workers and their dependents  when workers are disabled. In fiscal year 2002, the OASI and DI programs  collectively are expected to pay approximately $447 billion in benefits to  about 46 million eligible workers, dependents, and survivors.
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation  Act (PRWORA) prohibited fugitive felons from collecting SSI benefits.  Specifically, under the law, an individual is ineligible to receive SSI  payments during any month in which he or she is  fleeing to avoid prosecution for a crime that is a felony under the laws of  the place from which the person flees,   fleeing to avoid custody or confinement after conviction for a crime that  is a felony under the laws of the place from which the person flees, or  violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under federal or  state law.
PRWORA provides SSA with the authority to suspend SSI payments to  fugitive felons and parole and probation violators and to provide  information to law enforcement agencies to aid in locating and  apprehending these individuals. The act does not provide similar authority  for OASI and DI benefits payments.
In response to PRWORA, SSA established the fugitive felon program and  entered into a partnership with its Office of Inspector General (OIG). SSA’s  OIG, with its 63 field divisions and offices, has both program integrity and  law enforcement functions and is the primary interface between SSA and  law enforcement entities. It can investigate and make arrests for program  fraud in collaboration with other law enforcement agencies pursuing SSI  recipients engaging in criminal activities.
Beyond OIG, numerous other offices also assist in implementing the  program. As shown in figure 1, these include SSA’s offices of operations,  disability and income security programs, and systems; its regional and field  offices; and the FBI’s Information Technology Center in Fort Monmouth,  New Jersey. Congress does not appropriate funds to administer the fugitive  felon program. Rather, according to SSA officials, each participating SSA  office (for example, the office of operations and OIG) and the FBI  Information Technology Center use existing funding to support the  program.
Under the fugitive felon program, SSA relies on warrant information from  available federal and state sources to identify ineligible SSI recipients on its  rolls. SSA receives federal and state warrant information from several  sources, including (1) the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC);  (2) state and local law enforcement agencies; and (3) the U.S. Marshals  Service (USMS). SSA receives warrant information from the FBI and USMS  under memorandums of understanding and from certain state and local law  enforcement agencies under matching agreements that establish  conditions for SSA’s use of the warrant information in its matching  operations. According to SSA, in calendar year 2001, it received  approximately 27 million warrant records from these federal, state, and  local law enforcement agencies. Of these, about 2 million records were  eligible to be matched against SSI benefits files. Appendix II provides a  detailed description of the fugitive felon data-matching process.
OIG reports that, since 1996, the fugitive felon program data matching  operations (manual and automated) have helped identify about 45,000  fugitives who were paid approximately $82 million in SSI benefits; of these  fugitives, approximately 5,000 were subsequently apprehended. Appendix  III presents selected cases in which fugitives were apprehended and SSI  benefits were suspended as a result of the fugitive felon program.

	Technological and Other Barriers Contribute to Inefficiencies in the Fugitive Felon Program

In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces several  technological and other barriers that create inefficiencies in its processing  of fugitive warrant information to identify ineligible SSI recipients. These  barriers include a complex, multistep process to obtain and act on fugitive  warrant information and a heavily manual approach to accomplishing  critical program tasks, such as exchanging and verifying warrant  information. In addition, where information systems are used to support  the program, many of them are not interoperable or capable of exchanging  data electronically. Consequently, key portions of the data-matching  process are complicated and time-consuming. Contributing to this situation  is that SSA has not designated a single, central point of management  accountability to direct the fugitive felon program’s operations.

		Fugitive Felon Data- Matching Process Is Complex and Highly Manual

The steps in administering the fugitive felon program—from the point that  SSA receives the fugitive warrant information through the suspension of  SSI benefits—are complicated and include many back-and-forth exchanges  of warrant information among the participating entities. At the time of our  review, each of the organizations participating in the program had  responsibility for distinct segments of the tasks involved in processing  fugitive warrant information received from federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies. However, there was no single entity within SSA that  was able to provide a full explanation of the complete chain of activities  comprising the data sharing and matching process; as a result, we mapped  the process ourselves. We have depicted this overall process in figure 2.
As figure 2 illustrates, SSA receives warrant records (usually on a monthly  basis) from the FBI’s national repository—NCIC—and from USMS and  state and local law enforcement agencies. Using its Enumeration  Verification System, SSA matches the warrant records against its master  files of Social Security number holders and applications to verify identity  information, such as the name, date of birth, and Social Security number of  the individual for whom the warrant was issued. Of those records for which  identities can be verified, OIG screens the data to eliminate  misdemeanors. Then, a second match is conducted against files  maintained in SSA’s supplemental security record to determine which of  the fugitives are receiving SSI benefits. The results of the second match  (addresses of the fugitive benefits recipients) are forwarded to OIG for  further processing.
OIG and its field offices work with the FBI’s Information Technology  Center (ITC) to verify that the felony, probation, or parole violation  warrants are active and that the appropriate individuals have been  identified. Once verifications are made, ITC provides address information  about each SSI recipient (called “leads”) to the appropriate federal, state,  or local law enforcement agency so that it can locate and apprehend the  individual. After action by the law enforcement agency, OIG refers its  findings to the appropriate SSA field offices, which initiate suspension of  SSI benefits.
In this process, SSA relies on its mainframe computers and systems to  match the fugitive warrant information that it receives against the master  files of Social Security number holders and applications and the  supplemental security record. Most other steps, including sharing the  warrant information used in the matching process, are performed  manually. For example, SSA does not have a telecommunications capability  that would allow it to accept warrant information on line. As a result, the  FBI, USMS, and state and local law enforcement agencies must download  warrant information from their respective databases and information  systems onto various electronic media (such as cartridges, tapes, and CD- ROMS) and send this information to SSA via the U.S. mail or FedEx.  Depending on the type of media used, two separate SSA offices—the Office  of Central Operations and the Office of Telecommunications and Systems  Operations—receive, log, and upload the information onto SSA’s  mainframe computer to begin the matching process.
Beyond manually sharing warrant information, many of the steps in  verifying and referring information contained in the matched records also  are performed manually. For example, to accurately identify and locate  fugitives, SSA’s field offices, OIG, and the FBI’s ITC exchange numerous  forms with law enforcement agencies. However, none of these forms are  automated, requiring SSA and ITC staff to manually prepare and fax or mail  them to the appropriate entities.
In addition, both OIG’s and ITC’s program activities are supported by  distinct systems that are not interoperable or compatible, thus further  preventing the efficient exchange of information. Specifically, OIG’s  allegation and case investigative system and ITC’s automated case support  system are used, respectively, to assign case and allegation numbers to  matched records and to verify duplicate instances of matched data.  However, these systems cannot electronically share the matched records  on which both offices must act. Rather, the OIG must download files  containing matched records and mail them to ITC. Further, OIG’s system  uses Microsoft Word and ITC’s system uses Corel WordPerfect; thus, when  ITC receives the files, it must convert them to a usable format to be able to  process the warrant information.

		Manual Processes Have Resulted in a Time- Consuming Operation

The various manual interventions in processing fugitive warrants all  contribute to a time-consuming operation that is less than optimally  efficient. According to program officials, the warrant files that federal and  state law enforcement agencies send to SSA sometimes are not formatted  in accordance with SSA’s specifications and must be returned to the  agencies for correction, delaying action on matching these files. In  addition, the electronic media containing warrant records are sometimes  lost during the mail delivery process or are misplaced before being entered  into SSA’s computers. As a result, this time-sensitive information may go  unaccounted for a number of days. SSA had not determined the extent to  which warrant records are being lost or mishandled and over what length  of time, but program officials acknowledged that the longer it takes to  match the warrant information, the greater the opportunity for fugitives to  remain unaccounted for and to continue to receive SSI benefits payments.  Further, the officials stated that the manual steps involved in verifying  fugitives’ identities and obtaining address information for referring leads to  law enforcement agencies often slow the overall process of locating and  apprehending fugitives.
SSA officials were unable to tell us how much time was actually required to  complete the processing of fugitive warrants. However, our analysis of data  that SSA provided on its existing procedures found that the steps required  to fully process a case that did not involve circumstances such as lost or  mishandled files, or improperly formatted warrant information received  from states reporting warrant information for the first time, could take up  to 165 days. This approximate processing time could be increased up to an  additional 70 days if the fugitive SSI recipient decides to appeal SSA’s  decision to suspend benefits.
As figure 3 shows, the approximate processing time includes about 65 days  during which SSA and the FBI’s ITC conduct matches and initial  verifications of warrant information and refer leads to law enforcement  agencies. The approximate time also includes a total of 90 days that is  devoted to ensuring that individuals are correctly identified and that their  privacy and other rights are protected—60 days that state and local law  enforcement agencies are allowed to locate and apprehend fugitives before  SSA serves notice that benefits will be suspended and 30 days during which  OIG field offices conduct additional verifications prior to sending  summaries of actions taken on matched records to SSA field offices for  suspension of benefits. Program officials informed us that state and local  law enforcement agencies originally were allowed 14 days to locate and  apprehend fugitives; however, the number of days allowed was increased  to 60 to provide these agencies more time to identify and certify actions  taken on the fugitives. According to SSA, one of the difficulties with data  matches is that, because fleeing felons often use aliases, law enforcement  agencies frequently do not have accurate Social Security numbers or  identifying information for them. Moreover, unlike prisoners, fleeing felons  are not incarcerated and may not have been convicted of a crime.
Consequently, the time devoted to manually verifying the currency of  warrant information is vital for ensuring that the correct individuals are  identified and apprehended.
Program officials added that some manual verifications of warrant  information are necessary to help ensure the program’s integrity. However,  automating key tasks, such as the capability to accept warrant information  from other agencies’ databases on line, could help eliminate much of the  time devoted to initially processing and matching warrant information and  verifying and referring leads that results from the matched records (now  estimated to take about 65 days).
At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials told us that they had recently  begun considering options to automate manual processes in the field  offices. For example, they stated that the agency was considering  eliminating many of the field offices’ benefits suspension activities, such as  providing due process notices and preparing OIG final reports and, instead,  performing these activities in one regional office with the use of  computers.
Although SSA’s consideration of options for improving the fugitive felon  process is a positive step, the agency has not analyzed or mapped its  existing fugitive felon data sharing and matching process. Without doing  so, SSA lacks critical information needed for targeting processes that are  most in need of improvement, setting realistic improvement goals, and  ensuring that it selects an appropriate approach for improving its manual  operations. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires agency heads to  analyze, revise, and improve mission-related and administrative processes  before making significant investments in supporting information  technology. Further, an agency should have an overall business process  improvement strategy that provides a means to coordinate and integrate  the various reengineering and improvement projects, set priorities, and  make appropriate budget decisions. By doing so, an agency can better  position itself to maximize the potential of technology to improve  performance, rather than simply automating inefficient processes.

		SSA Could Benefit from Clear and Unified Management Accountability to Direct the Fugitive Felon Program

Although the fugitive felon program is achieving results, it could benefit  from increased management accountability. SSA relies on multiple  agencies and offices to implement the fugitive felon program. However,  there is no unified source of management accountability to provide the  consistent oversight and program continuity that is essential to sustaining  program success. Consequently, staff assigned to administer the program  offered conflicting accounts as to what program tasks were being  performed and by whom. For example, program officials identified three  different SSA offices—operations, program support, and OIG—as having  responsibility for leading the program; yet no officials in these offices could  explain the overall data-matching process or had decision-making and  oversight responsibility for the other participating entities.
In addition, critical data needed to make informed decisions about the  program’s operations, such as technological capabilities, program costs  and benefits, and resource requirements, were not being captured. For  example, none of the participating SSA and FBI offices could state with  certainty the amount of time they devoted to processing fugitive warrant  records. As discussed earlier, no one office within SSA had mapped the  overall fugitive felon data sharing and matching process to  comprehensively assess how many days were required from SSA’s receipt  of warrant information until SSI benefits payments to fugitive felons were  actually suspended. Further, although the program has been in place for 6  years, program officials were unable to provide data on the total costs of  the program.
In discussing their management of the fugitive felon program, SSA officials  acknowledged that the program lacked unified management accountability.  An OIG official stated that, while the agency had initially decided that both  headquarters offices and OIG would jointly administer the program, these  offices had only recently begun considering ways to improve their  management of the program. The agency was considering the development  of a management board to oversee and address program issues and  concerns. However, it had not developed any specific tasks or milestones  for this improvement effort. Given the inherent complexity of the fugitive  felon program and the many entities involved in its implementation,  effective management of operations and data is essential for determining  how best to achieve and sustain future program operations and reporting.

	SSA’s Efforts to Obtain Data-Matching Agreements Have Not Resulted in Comprehensive Data

Having complete and comprehensive warrant information from states is  crucial to ensuring that the objectives of the fugitive felon program are  achieved. Yet, according to SSA, states currently report warrant  information to NCIC on a voluntary basis; therefore, not all outstanding  warrants are being included in the FBI’s NCIC database—a prime source of  SSA’s matching information. Since May 2000, SSA has been taking steps to  obtain more comprehensive state and local information by pursuing data- matching agreements with states that do not report all of their warrant  information to NCIC. However, a number of these states have been  reluctant to enter into agreements or, once they have, have not always  abided by them, largely because of SSA’s and the states’ concerns regarding  the lack of information technology and adequate resources to support the  program.
SSA considers states to be fully reporting warrant information to NCIC if  they submit information on all felonies and parole or probation violators.  States are considered to be partially reporting warrant information if, for  example, they report felonies but not parole and probation violators. As of  May 2002 (the latest month for which data were available), SSA had  identified 21 states and the District of Columbia as fully reporting warrant  information to NCIC and 29 states as partially reporting warrant  information.
In pursuing data-matching agreements to obtain all of the states’ warrant  information, SSA reported as of May 2002 that it had signed agreements  with 18 states and was in various stages of negotiating agreements with 5  other states. SSA had been unsuccessful in reaching agreements with 3  states, all of which had declined to enter into the agreements. It had not yet  begun negotiating agreements with 6 additional states. Figure 4 reflects the  status of SSA’s attempts to obtain data-matching agreements with the states  as of May 2002.
SSA and state officials cited various factors—often related to their uses of  information technology—that had made negotiating data-matching  agreements difficult. For example, in explaining their decision to decline an  agreement, Iowa officials stated that, because SSA does not have the  capability to receive fugitive warrant records on line, state officials would  have to reformat, download to electronic media, and mail the warrant  information to SSA Headquarters. The officials believed that doing so  would not be cost-effective and, thus, elected to continue their practice of  submitting paper printouts of warrant information to the SSA OIG field  office in Des Moines. In Florida, officials explained that their state had not  entered an agreement with SSA and instead was fully reporting warrant  information to NCIC because of SSA’s specifications for formatting and  downloading the warrant information onto electronic media. They  expressed concern that additional resources would be required to perform  these formatting tasks and manually provide the warrant information to  SSA.
Further, SSA and state officials noted that negotiating data-matching  agreements had been hindered by the lack of centralized databases or  repositories of warrant information in some state and local law  enforcement agencies. For example, officials in Oklahoma told us that  because that state lacked a central repository, they did not want to enter  into a data-matching agreement with SSA. The officials explained that not  all of the states’ approximately 700 local law enforcement offices currently  report all of their warrant information at the state level and to NCIC. Thus,  to meet the intent of a data-matching agreement, each local agency would  have to provide their warrant information directly to SSA. However, most  local law enforcement agencies within the state do not have central  repositories for reporting the information to SSA.
Idaho officials added that, in addition to lacking a central repository, they  had chosen not to sign a data-matching agreement with SSA because of  privacy considerations. Specifically, the officials expressed concerns with  the privacy and security implications of submitting sensitive warrant  information via the U.S. mail.
Even when agreements had been reached, however, SSA had not fully  achieved its objective of obtaining comprehensive warrant information  from the states. Specifically, at the time of our review, of the 18 states with  which SSA had signed agreements, only 9 were actually submitting warrant  information to the agency. According to SSA, the remaining 9 states that  had signed agreements but had not yet sent warrant information provided  similar reasons for not complying with the agreements. These included  states’ concerns about the privacy and security of the warrant information  and difficulties complying with SSA’s record layout or formatting  requirements. In addition, although having agreed to submit warrant  information to SSA, 3 states (Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Colorado) later  decided instead to report all warrant information to NCIC.
At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials acknowledged that the  process for obtaining data-matching agreements was difficult and had not  yielded the results that they had anticipated. States essentially provide  warrant information on a voluntary basis, and the agreements are intended  primarily to protect states’ data from unauthorized disclosure and use.  Nonetheless, SSA officials believed that, in the absence of a single and  complete source of fugitive warrant records from all states, the data- matching agreements were necessary for ensuring that the agency could  obtain comprehensive warrant information. We agree that comprehensive  warrant information is vital to the success of the fugitive felon program.  However, the data-matching agreements have not ensured that SSA will  obtain the comprehensive warrant information that it seeks.

	Legislation Prohibiting OASI and DI Benefits for Fugitive Felons Could Have a Substantial Impact on the Program

Under current statutory provisions, fugitives are prohibited from receiving  SSI benefits, but can continue to be paid OASI and DI benefits. Specifically,  SSA maintains address information on fugitives receiving SSI, OASI, and DI  benefits, but can only share information with law enforcement agencies on  those fugitives receiving SSI. However, the increasing realization that OASI  and DI benefits payments may also finance a potentially dangerous  fugitive’s flight from justice has prompted the Congress to pursue  implementing provisions to prohibit payments to fugitives in these  programs as well.
Implementing a nonpayment provision would also permit SSA to share  address information on fugitives who receive OASI and DI benefits. In its  own consideration of such a measure, OIG projected that doing so could  result in substantial savings to the OASI and DI programs. Specifically, in  an August 2000 study, OIG estimated that between August 1996 and June  1999, about 17,300 fugitives had been paid at least $108 million in OASI and  DI benefits. In August 2001, the office revised its estimates, projecting that  OASI and DI benefits amounting to approximately $40 million would be  paid to fugitives through October 2001, and in each additional year that  legislation was not enacted to prohibit such benefits payments—for a 5- year total payout of approximately $198 million.
Should this legislative proposal be enacted, the fugitive felon program’s  workload could increase substantially. SSA officials acknowledged that the  additional OASI and DI files could significantly increase the program’s data- matching activities. According to an analysis that the OIG performed, the  enactment of the legislative proposal would result in three times the  current work level of SSI matches.
The FBI believed that implementing the legislation could have varying  effects on its operations. Specifically, officials in the Criminal Justice  Information Services Division, which manages the NCIC database, stated  that implementing the provision would have no technological impact on  that organization’s ability to provide SSA fugitive warrant information.  They anticipated that the database would continue to supply SSA with  warrant records received daily from state and local law enforcement  agencies. However, FBI and SSA OIG officials stated that the additional  matched records for OASI and DI recipients could substantially increase  ITC’s workload associated with verifying the accuracy of the matched  records and supplying fugitives’ addresses to law enforcement agencies.  Further, based on its study, OIG officials, and those of the FBI, believed  that ITC’s workforce would have to increase substantially—from the  current staff of 7 to about 60—to accommodate the additional workload  associated with handling all the leads generated through the matching  process.
With the potential for workload increases in the fugitive felon program,  SSA and ITC officials recognized that additional information systems  support would be needed to conduct computer matches of warrant  information against the OASI and DI recipient files. However, neither SSA  nor the FBI had yet initiated any evaluations to assess the anticipated  technological impact on their operations. Such an assessment is critical to  helping SSA make an informed decision regarding its ability to ensure that  comprehensive and efficient data-matching operations would continue  under expanded operations. As discussed in our investment guide, good decisions require good data. Consequently, having solid data on a  program’s operations is essential for making informed decisions  concerning workload management and the technological solutions needed  to sustain efficient and effective performance.

	Increased Reliance on Other Agencies’ Databases Could Help Enhance Fugitive Felon Program Operations

As SSA proceeds with implementing the fugitive felon program, having  efficient and effectively run operations will be essential to achieving  sustained program results. SSA officials have acknowledged inefficiencies  in the existing fugitive felon processes and have indicated that they expect  to rely more heavily on information technology to help improve the  program’s operations and outcomes. Information systems and databases  maintained by some of the federal, state, and local law enforcement  agencies that currently participate in the fugitive felon program could offer  SSA opportunities for more efficiently obtaining warrant information to  enhance the program.
Much of the foundation for using information technology to improve the  fugitive felon processes may already exist among state and local agencies  participating in other programs. According to SSA systems officials, SSA  currently has a direct, dedicated on-line connection with every state’s  department of social services. States use these lines to submit information  to SSA covering various programs, such as child support enforcement.  Similarly, as part of the prisoner program, some state and local prison  facilities send federal prisoner data to SSA on line to aid in suspending SSI,  OASI, and DI benefits to incarcerated inmates.
In discussing the exchange of states’ fugitive warrant information, SSA  officials told us that they had not evaluated how on-line connections with  state and local agencies could be used to receive information supporting  the fugitive felon program. They indicated that implementing an on-line  connection to receive fugitive warrant information from each state law  enforcement agency would require each state to have access to a secure  (encrypted), dedicated telecommunications line with SSA. They believed  that data compatibility and privacy issues would also need to be addressed.  Nonetheless, at the conclusion of our review, an SSA official told us that  the agency had reached agreement with one state—Connecticut—to  exchange fugitive felon data via electronic file transfer. According to the  official, Connecticut is preparing to submit data via a Connect:Direct  electronic file transfer method, in which data will be encrypted and sent  from one mainframe computer to another over dedicated lines.
An alternative to each state sending data would be increased reliance on  the NCIC database, which could provide a comprehensive and readily  accessible means of attaining outstanding warrant records from the FBI,  USMS, and from the states. According to FBI data, NCIC’s technical  infrastructure includes high-level security controls and validation and  confirmation procedures for all warrant information exchanged with the  database. In addition, it is designed to interact in an on-line, real-time  capacity with other information systems and databases, including those of  USMS and all 50 states. For example, states transmit warrant data to NCIC  via state criminal justice systems that are linked to the FBI Criminal Justice  Information Services’ network. As discussed earlier, all states transmit all  or some portion of their warrant information on line to the NCIC database  each month.
Within the Department of Justice, USMS relies on on-line connections to  transmit fugitive warrant information to NCIC. Like many state and local  law enforcement agencies, USMS transmits to NCIC the same warrant  information that it sends to SSA via U.S. mail. On the other hand, SSA  officials stated that the Bureau of Prison’s database of incarcerated  inmates, which supports SSA’s prisoner program, could not be used to  effectively support the fugitive felon program, because that database does  not maintain information on the status of fugitive felons.
Both SSA and its OIG officials believed that having a single source of  warrant information would help make the data-matching process less  laborious and eliminate processing inefficiencies.   Accordingly, in  November 2001, OIG recommended to Congress the need for a national  warrant database. In addition, at the conclusion of our review, SSA officials  told us they that they viewed the NCIC database as a potential single source  of warrant information to support the fugitive felon program. The officials  believed that receiving USMS’s and state and local law enforcement  agencies’ warrant information on line via NCIC could potentially eliminate  much of the duplicate warrant information that now contributes to the  program’s inefficiencies. For example, according to federal, state, and local  law enforcement officials, USMS and all states currently transmit all or  some of their warrant information to the FBI’s NCIC. Thus, when the FBI  downloads warrant information from this database to mail to SSA, the  information duplicates some of that which federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies also send to SSA. Fugitive felon program officials  reported that, in calendar year 2001, SSA received approximately 60,000  duplicate warrant records (approximately 5,000 warrant records per  month) as a result of these dual exchanges.
SSA officials noted, however, that achieving a single source of fugitive  warrant information would require that SSA have the capability to accept  data from NCIC on line. At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials  stated that the agency had not explored using an on-line connection to  NCIC to enhance the sharing of fugitive warrant information. In addition,  they stated that, for NCIC to be effective as a single source of  comprehensive warrant information, state agencies would have to be  willing to report that portion of warrant information to NCIC that SSA  currently must obtain from them under data-matching agreements.  However, according to FBI officials, there is no statute or regulation  requiring the states to fully report warrant information to NCIC; rather,  states report information to this database voluntarily.

	Conclusions

In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces significant  technological and other barriers to achieving and sustaining efficient and  effective program operations and, ultimately, helping SSI overcome its  high-risk status. While the program has helped prevent SSI benefits  payments to fugitives, its complex and manually intensive processes have  resulted in operational inefficiencies that could hinder the program’s long- term success. Further, difficulties in negotiating data-matching agreements  with the states have hindered SSA’s efforts to obtain comprehensive  warrant information needed to fulfill program objectives. In the absence of  essential management accountability, SSA lacks critical data needed to  make informed decisions about the program’s processes and activities, as  well as existing and future plans for technology supporting the program.  Overcoming these inefficiencies and limitations will be critical to ensuring  that the fugitive felon program is organized and implemented to achieve the  greatest possible results and that SSA is effectively positioned to fulfill its  potentially broader role in preventing OASI and DI benefits payments to  fugitives.
SSA officials recognized that increased program efficiency and outcomes  could result from more substantial uses of information technology to  perform key data sharing and verification functions and to streamline data- matching operations. Further, given the potential increase in SSA’s  workload that could result from implementing an OASI and DI nonpayment  provision, having the necessary information technology to support its  operations will be even more critical. SSA already has a proven capability  to share data on line with federal, state, and local agencies in support of  other programs. However, SSA has taken few steps toward examining its  current data-matching operations and approaches to obtaining warrant  information or exploring how best to use technology to enhance the overall  fugitive felon process.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the fugitive felon program’s operational efficiency and ensure  sustained, long-term success in identifying fugitive SSI beneficiaries, we  recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security designate a program  management office and program manager to direct, monitor, and control  the program’s activities and progress. In addition, we recommend that the  commissioner direct the program management office and manager to   conduct a detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program’s current  operations and performance, including a complete analysis of the  organizations, processes, information flows, and time frames required to  administer the program, a full accounting of the program’s costs,  estimated and actual program benefits, and current workload  requirements;  identify and prioritize, based on its assessment, those fugitive felon  processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for resolving  technological and administrative barriers preventing their efficient  operation;   continue to examine and propose options for using technology to  automate the currently manual functions involved in exchanging  fugitive warrant information with federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies and in completing the verifications and referral of  this information, including assessing alternatives to using data-matching  agreements to obtain fugitive warrant information, and determining  whether on-line connections with state and local law enforcement  agencies and/or direct telecommunications connections with the FBI’s  NCIC database could offer viable and more efficient means of sharing  warrant information; and   assess the anticipated technological impact on fugitive felon operations  from the implementation of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits  payments to fugitives, including identifying the additional information  systems support that would be needed to conduct and process leads  resulting from computer matches of warrant information against these  benefits recipients’ files.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the  Commissioner of Social Security (see app. IV) and from the Director, Audit  Liaison Office, Justice Management Division, Department of Justice (see  app. V). The Commissioner of Social Security expressed disappointment  with our report and generally disagreed with our recommendations. The  Department of Justice provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated, as appropriate.
Regarding the commissioner’s statement expressing disappointment in our  report, we believe our report provides a fair assessment of the efficiency of  the fugitive felon program. We identify those areas in which improvements  can be made that can benefit SSA’s future efforts at streamlining the  program’s inefficient processes, improving performance and operations,  and applying technology, where appropriate.
In SSA’s comments, the commissioner also stated that the report implied  that neither SSA nor the OIG had a vision for the fugitive felon program and  did not mention that SSA and OIG had embraced the program without start- up funding or additional resources. We recognize the valuable role that SSA  plays in implementing the fugitive felon program to prevent benefits  payments to ineligible SSI recipients. In pointing out technological and  other barriers to the program’s operations, our intent was not to imply that  SSA and other participating components lack a vision for the program.  Rather, given the program’s complexity and multiple entities involved in its  administration, we believe it is important to highlight critical conditions  and operational inefficiencies necessitating SSA’s continual attention in  order to ensure sustained program success. Also, our report does recognize  that funding has not been appropriated to administer the program. SSA, as  a steward of the program, has a responsibility to ensure that it consistently  carries out all aspects of the fugitive felon data-matching operations in an  efficient manner.
Regarding our recommendation to designate a program management office  and program manager to direct, monitor, and control the program’s  activities and progress, SSA disagreed that an agency-wide program  manager was necessary.   SSA stated that managers within its office of  operations and OIG are responsible for the program and that all involved  offices are aware of the overall process and individual office  responsibilities. Further, SSA stated that the Inspector General Act does  not allow its OIG to take direction from or participate in administrative  decisions that appropriately belong to SSA. In addition, regarding our  statement that no program official could explain the overall data sharing  and matching process, SSA disagreed, stating that OIG and SSA officials are  able to explain the process in its entirety. SSA also stated that, to ensure all  involved offices are aware of the overall process and individual office  responsibilities, it had released a detailed process description and provided  a copy to us. Further, SSA added that because its officials had chosen not to  answer questions pertaining to other components’ work during our review,  we had mistakenly inferred that no one within the agency could explain the  overall process.
We recognize that the fugitive felon program is a joint effort and that there  are responsible and knowledgeable managers within each of the  participating components involved in administering the program. Our  recommendation is intended to ensure a unified management oversight  capability for the fugitive felon program that does not currently exist. It is  not intended to prescribe the exact nature or form of that management  oversight capability. With respect to comments regarding possible  limitations on joint efforts as a result of the Inspector General Act, the Act  does not prohibit coordination of joint action between the OIG and the  head of the establishment involved to ensure efficiency of operation and to  avoid duplication of effort, nor do we believe that such coordination would  affect OIG’s personal and professional independence. In this respect, as we  noted in our report, an OIG official has commented on the need for  improved coordination and management of the fugitive felon program.  That official also noted that OIG had already begun to work with SSA’s  Office of Operations to improve management of the program.
Further, during our review, it was evident that management and staff in  each component could explain the distinct segments of tasks that they  were responsible for accomplishing; however, we could not identify any  officials within these organizations who had a clear perspective of overall  program performance and operations. As our report noted, staff within the  SSA and OIG offices provided conflicting accounts of the fugitive felon  data-matching process. While we acknowledge that SSA revised its policy  instructions in April 2002, outlining involved offices’ roles and  responsibilities, these instructions do not address SSA’s overall fugitive  felon processes. In addition, we were unable to identify any aggregate  tracking data to assess the program’s overall cost and performance. Given  the multiple agencies and offices involved in administering this complex  program, we continue to believe that having a unified source of  accountability and authority for the program is essential to effectively and  consistently oversee its progress and ensure that informed decisions are  being made about its implementation. In discussing our findings on May 10,  2002, SSA and OIG officials agreed that the program lacked uniform  management accountability and stated that they had just recently begun  considering the development of a management board to oversee and  address program management issues and concerns.
SSA also disagreed with our recommendation that called for it to conduct a  detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program’s current operations and  performance, including a full accounting of the program’s costs and  benefits and workload requirements. SSA stated that its analysis of the  program’s operations is an ongoing process and that enhancements are  made when deemed necessary. SSA further stated that it had completed  many of the tasks cited in our recommendation prior to starting the  matching process in calendar year 1999, and that OIG has regularly  reported its performance in the program. We agree that ongoing monitoring  and analysis of the program’s operations is essential for ensuring that  management is informed of the program’s cost and progress and to assess  risks to overall performance. However, during our review, SSA could not  demonstrate that it had made an aggregate assessment of the program’s  current operations and performance, including an awareness of the  processes, information flows, and time involved in administering the  program, as well as a full accounting of its costs and requirements. Such  information is vital for making informed decisions about the program’s  progress and for determining where process improvements are needed and  how best to achieve them. The fugitive felon program has been in place  since 1996 (with computerized matching since 1999), giving SSA sufficient  opportunities to perform these necessary and critical assessments. Further,  while SSA stated that OIG has regularly reported its performance in the  fugitive felon program, it is important that SSA conduct its own program  assessment that includes all participating components, which ensures that  the program can be consistently and comprehensively controlled and  managed.
Regarding the need for an assessment, SSA stated that it had completed a  cost-benefit analysis of the fugitive felon program in January 2001. Our  review of the two-page summary found that it lacked substantial  information about the program’s overall costs and benefits. An operations  official who provided the document told us that the summary had  constituted only a rough estimate, rather than an accurate reflection, of the  program’s costs and benefits, and that it had been developed only for the  purpose of renewing SSA’s computer-matching program. The official added  that the development of actual cost and benefits data for the fugitive felon  program would require significantly more time than had been invested in  preparing the current summary.
SSA believed that our recommendation to identify and prioritize those  fugitive felon processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for  resolving technological and administrative barriers preventing their  efficient operation is unnecessary, stating that it provides for these actions  during normal operations. The agency added that it has a number of efforts  under way to automate some of the fugitive felon processes. However, SSA  stated that there are some manual processes in the program that contribute  to minor interruptions to the fugitive felon process.
While SSA stated that it has undertaken efforts to automate some fugitive  felon processes, it needs to develop a strategy for resolving the  technological and administrative barriers affecting the program’s  operations. As our report notes, an overall business process improvement  strategy will better position SSA to prioritize and integrate its various  reengineering and improvement projects and, thus, maximize the potential  of technology to improve the program’s performance. Further, at the  conclusion of our review, SSA provided us with documentation outlining  discussions to automate field office functions. However, the information  provided did not include enough detail on the initiative that it said was  being undertaken; therefore, we could not comment on these  developments. We recognize that there are many steps within the fugitive  felon process that must be completed manually. While we agree that some  of these manual processes are necessary, our report notes that technology  may enhance the program. Given our assessment of the length of the  process (approximately 165 days), we continue to believe that SSA needs  to perform a complete analysis of the fugitive felon program to identify  areas for improvement, as well as areas where technology can be used to  support more efficient operations.
SSA found potential merit in our recommendation that it examine and  propose options for using technology to automate the currently manual  functions involved in exchanging fugitive warrant information with federal,  state, and local law enforcement agencies and in determining the most  efficient means of sharing warrant information. Although our  recommendation included determining whether direct telecommunication  connections with the FBI’s NCIC could offer a viable solution, SSA believed  that the creation of a single national warrant database would be a better  solution to efficiently sharing warrant information. SSA stated that its OIG  had testified before the Congress on the benefits that would be derived if  such a database were established. SSA added that NCIC would be effective  as a single source of comprehensive warrant information only if entry of  states’ warrant information became mandatory.
We acknowledge in our report that the states enter warrant information  into NCIC voluntarily and agree that this could be an impediment to  achieving a comprehensive information repository. Nonetheless, achieving  an optimal solution will in large measure depend on SSA examining the  strengths and limitations of all of the potential alternatives to sharing  warrant information, including NCIC. Accordingly, this recommendation  remains in our report. However, we have also incorporated language  reflecting SSA’s views regarding a national warrant database.
Also in its response to this recommendation and in additional comments,  SSA noted several instances where it believed we had made incorrect  assumptions regarding the fugitive felon process. SSA disagreed with our  assertion that it cannot determine the amount of time that is actually  required to complete the processing of fugitive warrants and stated that it  was able to track the number of days it takes for each individual subject  (fugitive) to be processed. In addition, SSA stated that our analysis of the  fugitive felon processing timeline had incorrectly considered start-up/test  file processing times that can be associated with states’ first submissions of  warrant files, thus accounting for our approximation of 165 days. We  acknowledge that SSA has been able to track fugitive warrant information  on a subject-by-subject basis; however, our review did not find that SSA  had performed any aggregate tracking of the time required to process  fugitive warrants—data that would be helpful to SSA in gauging the  program’s performance. Also, as our report noted, our analysis was limited  to case processing data that did not involve lost, mishandled, or improperly  formatted data. However, we have amended our report to specifically  reflect that we also did not include trial and error times for states reporting  warrant information for the first time.
In addition, SSA interpreted our discussion of states’ perspectives  regarding fugitive felon data formatting and transmission requirements as  an implication that the requirements were unduly restrictive. However, we  recognize the importance of prescribed standards for ensuring consistent  reporting of warrant information and other computerized data. In this  regard, our report aims only to highlight some of the circumstances that  currently prevent SSA from receiving comprehensive warrant information  from state and local law enforcement agencies.
Further, SSA stated that our report had included erroneous information  about the agency’s on-line connections with states’ departments of social  service and in describing its data exchanges with the Bureau of Prisons.  SSA stated that the agency has dedicated lines connecting to each state and  that these lines are used to exchange batch files, and that real-time  transfers are not occurring as indicated in our report. Based on  documentation that SSA’s Office of Systems provided, we determined that  SSA has direct, dedicated on-line connections with every state’s  department of social services. However, we do not imply in our report that  on-line connections mean real-time connections. We have added language  to clarify that SSA’s existing on-line connections with state and local  agencies primarily involve batch, rather than real-time, transfers of data.
Finally, regarding our recommendation that SSA assess the anticipated  technological impact on fugitive felon operations from the implementation  of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments to fugitives, SSA  stated that it and the OIG have already completed this task. In particular,  SSA stated that a joint SSA/OIG analysis of state and federal warrant files  had been started in January 2001 to determine what impact OASI and DI  legislation would have on the program. According to SSA, this analysis had  determined that the legislation would affect staff resources, but would not  affect its need for technology. Further, SSA stated that this information had  been shared with us during our review.
While conducting our review, OIG officials did inform us that they had  performed an analysis to assess the impact of the OASI and DI legislation  on fugitive felon program operations; however, by the conclusion of our  review, the officials had not met our request for documentation supporting  this analysis. OIG officials subsequently provided the analysis to us while  reviewing and commenting on our draft report. We agreed to review the  analysis and make revisions to our report, as necessary. Our review of the  analysis found that OIG’s main objective had been to determine the  increase in the current fugitive felon program workload. However, the  analysis did not include any discussion of the technological implications  resulting from the OASI and DI legislation. Further, SSA commented that,  in June 2001, its Office of Systems had estimated that adding OASI and DI  to the fugitive felon program would require about 8 work years, but that the  agency did not envision any major new or unique information technology  expenditures. In discussing the impact of the legislation during our review,  SSA did not inform us of the Office of Systems’ projection or of  documentation supporting this evaluation. Thus, while we have modified  our report to reflect that OIG had performed analysis that assessed the  workload impact resulting from the OASI and DI legislation, we continue to  believe that additional assessment is necessary to determine whether and  what information systems support would be required to meet the broader  mission.
Beyond these comments, SSA offered clarifications to table 1, which listed  the organizations tasked with implementing the fugitive felon program and  to the definition of “high misdemeanors” discussed in footnote 6 to the  report.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Commissioner of Social Security and to the Director, Office of Management  and Budget. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your office have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-6253, or Valerie Melvin, Assistant Director, at (202)  512-6304. We can also be reached by E-mail at willemssenj@gao.gov and  melvinv@gao.gov, respectively. Individuals making key contributions to  this report were Nabajyoti Barkakati, Mary J. Dorsey, Sophia Harrison,  David L. McClure, Valerie C. Melvin, Tammi Nguyen, Henry Sutanto, and  Eric Trout.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to examine the technological aspects of the fugitive  felon program in order to (1) identify technological barriers restricting (a)  data matching between the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) and the  Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) databases and (b) ongoing efforts  by SSA to obtain data-matching agreements with state and local law  enforcement agencies; (2) assess the technological impact on SSA and the  FBI should Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability  Insurance (DI) benefits be included in legislation restricting payments to  fugitive felons; and (3) determine whether other databases, such as those  maintained by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and the U.S.  Marshals Service, can provide additional support to the fugitive felon  program.
To understand the fugitive felon data-matching process, we obtained and  analyzed various documentation maintained by SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of  Prisons and the U.S. Marshals Service. These documents described data  sharing and matching policies, operational and security procedures, and  the technical infrastructure supporting the fugitive felon program. We  complemented our understanding of the data-matching process by  arranging a demonstration with SearchSoftwareAmerica, an industry  leader with expertise in data-matching software, to understand how data- matching software works in a database environment.
At the time of our review, SSA did not have documentation showing the  flow of warrant information through the fugitive felon data-matching  process, requiring that we map the process ourselves. To accomplish this,  we relied on the results of our document analyses and used business  process flow software to construct a graphical presentation of the fugitive  felon program’s process flow. We provided copies of the completed  business process flowchart to SSA Headquarters offices and its Office of  Inspector General (OIG) to verify the accuracy of our process depiction  and incorporated changes based on their review and comments. In  addition, to further confirm the process, we interviewed agency officials in  all of the offices involved in administering the fugitive felon program.  These included SSA’s OIG and office of operations, SSA and OIG field  offices, and the FBI Information Technology Center (ITC) in Fort  Monmouth, New Jersey.
Also, because SSA had not performed an analysis to determine how many  days it took to process warrant information, we determined the  approximate number of days involved in the process from the receipt of  warrant information from federal, state, and local law enforcement  agencies until the suspension of fugitives’ SSI benefits. We derived the  number of days by performing a detailed analysis of documentation  obtained from various SSA offices. For example, we reviewed completed  samples of incoming data included on log sheets from both the Office of  Central Operations and Office of Telecommunications and Systems  Operations to calculate the approximate number of days it took these  offices to process the warrant data from its receipt until they forwarded it  to OIG. We also interviewed officials in SSA Headquarters, its OIG, and the  FBI ITC regarding the number of days involved in processing fugitive  warrants. We shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA  officials to confirm the validity of our processing timeline estimate.
To identify technological barriers restricting data matching between SSA’s  and the FBI’s databases, we relied on our detailed analysis of SSA’s fugitive  felon process and assessed information describing its supporting technical  infrastructure. We also analyzed documentation describing the FBI’s  repository of fugitives and other criminals—the National Crime  Information Center (NCIC)—along with the agency’s approach to providing  warrant information to SSA. To support our analysis, we applied various  guidance, including Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130,  Appendix I: Federal Agency Responsibilities for Maintaining Records  about Individuals and Appendix II, Security of Federal Automated  Information Resources; and National Institute of Standards and  Technology computer security guidance.
Regarding SSA’s ongoing efforts to obtain data-matching agreements with  state and local law enforcement agencies, we applied the Computer  Matching Privacy and Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988 (P. L. 100-503),  amending the Privacy Act (5 U. S. C. 552a); data-matching agreements fall  under the provisions of the Act, which protects unauthorized disclosures of  computerized data through data matching. In addition, we applied the  Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93-579), which stipulates provisions for protecting  individuals from unauthorized disclosure of non-computerized  information. We also applied knowledge gained through our detailed  analysis of the fugitive felon process, as well as SSA’s model data-matching  agreements, reports documenting the status of negotiations between SSA  and state and local law enforcement agencies, and other policy and  procedural documentation. We conducted site visits and telephone  conferences with 17 randomly selected state and local law enforcement  agencies—Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,  Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio,  Oklahoma, Oregon, and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania—to determine  their involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify any technological  barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and efficiently share data  with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess issues and concerns  affecting their efforts to negotiate data-matching agreements with SSA.
To assess the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should legislation  be enacted to prohibit fugitives from receiving OASI and DI benefits  payments, we analyzed applicable laws: the Personal Responsibility and  Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P. L. 104-193), amending Title  XVI of the Social Security Act, as well as OASI and DI legislation proposed  by the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate. We also assessed SSA  OIG reports and testimony that highlighted the Inspector General’s position  regarding proposed legislation prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments  to fugitive felons and determined SSA’s decisions and actions regarding the  potential impact of such proposed legislation. In addition, as part of our  analysis, we considered our recent correspondence to the House  Committee on Way and Means, which reported on whether SSA has the  authority to deny OASI and DI benefits to fugitive felons and provide law  enforcement agencies with the current addresses and Social Security  numbers of OASI and DI beneficiaries who are fugitive felons. Finally, to  determine whether other databases, such as those maintained by the  Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service could  provide additional support to the fugitive felon program, we obtained and  analyzed documentation describing the agreements between SSA’s OIG and  these agencies. In addition, we analyzed systems documentation pertaining  to the Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service’s databases, as well as  the FBI’s NCIC and state and local law enforcement agencies’ databases.  This documentation included data standards, reporting requirements  (memoranda of understanding and data-matching agreements), policies,  and procedures. We also interviewed pertinent management and staff of  SSA’s Headquarters, field offices, and OIG; the FBI Criminal Justice  Information Services Division; the U.S. Marshals Service; and the Bureau of  Prisons to gain an understanding of how their databases could be used to  support the fugitive felon program.
We conducted our review from August 2001 through May 2002, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching Process

Under the fugitive felon program, the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS),  and state and local law enforcement agencies download warrant  information from their respective databases onto electronic media, such as  cartridges, diskettes, and CD-ROMs, and send it to SSA via the U.S. mail or  FedEx. Warrant information contained on diskettes, paper, and CD-ROMs  is sent to SSA’s Office of Central Operations (any warrant information  received on paper is keyed to diskette), whereas warrant information  contained on tapes, cartridges, or electronic files is sent to SSA’s Office of  Telecommunications and Systems Operations. Upon receipt, staff in these  two offices upload the warrant information onto SSA’s mainframe  computer, located at its National Computer Center (NCC), to begin the  data-matching process.
As part of the data-matching operations, the NCC staff makes backup  copies of the warrant information and processes the data in overnight  batches, using SSA’s Enumeration Verification System (EVS) to verify  fugitives’ names, Social Security numbers, sex, and birth dates. The NCC  staff then notifies SSA’s OIG that the data files are in production. The OIG is  responsible for ensuring that the data files include only individuals charged  with felony and parole or probation violations; it deletes any files naming  individuals charged with misdemeanors.
Following OIG’s review, NCC staff processes the data files against the  supplemental security record to identify fugitives receiving SSI benefits  payments. The records of fugitives identified—called matched records— are then returned to the OIG for further processing.
OIG enters the files containing the matched records into its allegation and  case investigative system and assigns case numbers to them. Case numbers  are assigned based on whether the records represent “exact” matches or  “good” matches. OIG then sends the records containing exact matches  (on electronic media via FedEx) to the FBI’s ITC in Fort Monmouth, New  Jersey and to USMS for additional processing. OIG also notifies its field  offices via E-mail that exact and good matches have been entered into its  allegation and case investigative system.
Upon receiving the exact matches, ITC staff then verifies the address and  status of each individual named in the NCIC matched warrant records to  determine whether the warrants are still active, using a personal computer  to access and query fugitives’ records that are maintained in the NCIC  database. ITC staff does not query NCIC to determine whether states’  matched warrant records are still active, but rather processes and mails the  records to the applicable states for their verification. ITC staff also obtains  from the NCIC database address information on the law enforcement  agencies that originally issued the arrest warrants on the individuals named  in the warrants and manually type each originating law enforcement  agency’s address onto a cover letter. The staff then uses the address  information to mail the “leads,” together with the cover letter, law  enforcement referral form (OI-5B), and the law enforcement certification  form (OI-5C) to the originating law enforcement agencies for their use in  locating and apprehending the fugitives. According to OIG, ITC generally  requires approximately 30 days to process the matched records.
State and local law enforcement agencies use information contained in the  “leads” to locate the fugitive felons and then return certification forms to  ITC indicating the action they have taken on the warrant. Before acting to  suspend SSI benefits, SSA generally allows the originating law enforcement  agencies 60 days to apprehend a fugitive based on the leads provided. By  allowing this “sunset” phase, SSA avoids letting fugitives know that their  status and whereabouts have been revealed before law enforcement  authorities can arrest them.
When ITC receives the certification forms from the law enforcement  agencies indicating the status of the warrants, it forwards the forms to the  appropriate OIG field offices. OIG agents have 30 days from the time that  the forms are returned to them to work the cases (a case consists of 50  subjects or felons) or perform additional verifications, enter the  information from these forms into the allegation and case investigative  system, complete summary and benefits suspension forms, and mail the  forms to SSA field offices. If law enforcement agencies do not return  certification forms indicating the status of the arrest warrant to ITC within  60 days, OIG agents follow up with the law enforcement agencies either by  letter or telephone to determine whether the warrant is still active. OIG  agents also perform additional identification activities for good matches  and send these matches to SSA field offices, where staff query the  supplemental security record for verification. If records cannot be verified  using the supplemental security record, OIG contacts the law enforcement  agencies for verification. If, after contacting law enforcement agencies,  warrants still cannot be verified, records are either destroyed or mailed  back to the originating law enforcement agencies and a note is attached to  records contained in the allegation and case investigative system.
Once warrant records are verified and are determined to be still active, OIG  agents refer them to the appropriate SSA field offices, where action is  taken to suspend the fugitive’s SSI benefits, calculate the amount of  overpayment, and update the SSI files. SSA officials told us that the process  to suspend SSI benefits payments takes approximately 10 days.
Based on our analysis of data that SSA provided about its process, we  determined that from the date on which SSA first receives warrant data  from the law enforcement agencies to when it identifies fugitives who  receive SSI benefits, locates and apprehends them, and then suspends SSI  benefits, the process can take up to 165 days. This approximate  processing time includes 35 days for SSA systems, operations, and OIG  staff to process the matches, 30 days for ITC to verify and batch process  warrants, 60 days for state and local law enforcements agencies to locate  and apprehend fugitives before SSA serves notice of benefits suspension,  30 days for OIG field offices to act on information received from the law  enforcement agencies, and 10 days for processing the suspension of  benefits.
Following the suspension of benefits, fugitive SSI recipients are given due  process. That is, fugitive SSI recipients have 10 days to contact SSA for a  continuance of benefits and 60 days to appeal the suspension. If the fugitive  loses the appeal, SSA will suspend the SSI benefits and again update the  supplemental security record. SSA’s NCC runs master tapes once a month  and submits them to the Department of the Treasury, informing it of any  updated information. Treasury discontinues issuing checks to the identified  fugitive felons.

Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in Apprehending Fugitives and Preventing Them from Receiving SSI Payments

SSA reports that, since its inception in August 1996, the fugitive felon  program has been instrumental in helping identify approximately 45,000  fugitives who improperly collected at least $82 million in Supplemental  Security Income (SSI) benefits. In addition, SSA reports that, as a result of  sharing fugitive warrant information, officer and public safety throughout  the United States has increased. According to SSA’s OIG, among those  fugitives who have been identified as receiving SSI benefits, more than  5,000 have been apprehended since the fugitive felon program began.
The following cases highlight examples of how the fugitive felon program  has contributed to identifying and apprehending fugitives and preventing  improper payments of SSI benefits:  On February 8, 2001, authorities arrested two fugitives as a result of  computer matching between SSA’s OIG and the FBI’s NCIC. Agents from  OIG’s New York field division, state troopers from New Jersey, and  deputies from the Essex County, New York sheriff’s office, arrested one  fugitive wanted on arson charges and a second wanted on charges of  producing and distributing a dangerous controlled substance. Both  fugitives were remanded to the custody of the Essex County jail, and  these cases resulted in the suspension of the fugitives’ SSI benefits.
In New York, the field division of SSA’s OIG used leads from matched  fugitive warrant records to identify a fugitive wanted by the Union  County, New Jersey sheriff’s office on a burglary charge. This fugitive,  arrested in June 2001, with the assistance of an FBI agent, had 13 prior  arrests and 5 prior convictions, including one for homicide. This case  resulted in SSI benefits suspension.
Under the direction of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District  of Michigan, agents from the OIG Detroit office participated in an  operation that focused on locating and arresting 400 adult and juvenile  chronic violent offenders. The 3-day operation resulted in the arrest of  82 individuals—67 of whom were receiving SSI benefits. The  apprehended individuals were wanted for offenses ranging from  criminal sexual conduct to armed robbery and assault with intent to do  bodily harm.
In California on December 7, 2000, the Operation Pretenders Task  Force, (composed of agents from the SSA OIG, U.S. Immigration and  Naturalization Service, and California state parole), assisted by  California’s Department of Health Services and Department of Motor  Vehicles, arrested a registered child sex offender for a parole violation.  The fugitive had eluded officials for approximately 5 years by assuming  the identity of his deceased brother and had applied for and received SSI  benefits under the assumed identity. On January 31, 2001, a grand jury  indicted him on two counts of false statements for SSI benefits, two  counts of fraudulent use of a Social Security number, and three counts  of identity theft.

Comments from the Social Security Administration

Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice

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Summary:
What GAO Found

The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest cash assistance program in the United States. For fiscal year 2002, SSA expects to pay SSI benefits totaling $31.5 billion to more than six million financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled. Since becoming operational in August 1996, the fugitive felon program has provided a valuable service by helping SSA to identify and prevent payments to ineligible SSI benefits recipients and helping law enforcement agencies to locate and and apprehend fugitive felons. Nevertheless, several technological and other barriers are contributing to inefficiencies in the program's operations. Certain information systems that SSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) use in processing matched data are not interoperable or compatible, thus also hindering the efficient exchange of warrant information. Contributing to these inefficiencies is that no one office within SSA has been designated to oversee and manage the overall performance of the fugitive felon program. Consequently, no program officials could explain the overall data sharing and matching process. Largely because of the SSA's and states' limited uses of information technology to support the fugitive felon program, many state law enforcement agencies have been reluctant to enter into data-matching agreements with SSA. According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among the factors that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements were that some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant information and SSA's guidance for formatting, downloading, and manually transmitting the information created additional resource requirements that some states were unable to meet. The enactment of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive felons could increase SSA's recovery of improperly paid benefits and prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing justice. However, the additional matches of warrant records against OASI and DI recipient files could substantially increase the data processing workloads of both SSA and the FBI's Information Technology Center. SSA may be able to improve the fugitive felon program's operational efficiency and outcomes by exploring its existing telecommunications connectivity supporting other federal, state, and local programs. SSA currently has direct, on-line connections with every state that transmits and receives data supporting various other programs, including its program to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners.