Background

State and local governments generally have the primary responsibility for  disaster recovery while the federal government provides support when  requested. Because there are many parties involved in this process— including all levels of government as well as victims and businesses within  the affected communities—effective collaboration is a key factor for  successful recovery. In addition, collaboration among recovery  stakeholders can continue for an extended period of time. Short-term  recovery is immediate and an extension of the response phase in which  basic services are restored. Long-term recovery can include some of these  short-term activities, but typically continues them for a number of months  or years, depending on the severity and extent of the damage sustained. It  also involves restoration of both individuals and the community, including  the redevelopment of damaged areas.
To provide recovery assistance after a disaster, many federal agencies and  program components are called upon to administer disaster supplemental  programs and funding, re-program funds, or expedite normal procedures.  For example, grants, loans, loan guarantees, temporary housing, and  counseling are among the forms of disaster assistance available from  federal agencies including FEMA; the departments of Agriculture,  Commerce, HUD, Treasury, and Transportation; and the Small Business  Administration (SBA).
Some of these federal programs provide financial resources to state and  local governments following disasters, while others provide technical  assistance. For example, FEMA’s Public Assistance grant program  provides funding to repair or replace public infrastructure; HUD’s  Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program provides formula  grants for long-term recovery needs such as rehabilitating and building  housing, EDA’s economic adjustment grant responds to the short- and  long-term effects of severe economic dislocation events on communities;  and DHS’s Flood Insurance Program enables individuals to purchase  insurance against losses from physical damage from floods. Other  agencies directly carry out rebuilding or recovery projects such as the  reconstruction of levees by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the  repair of federal roads by the Federal Highway Administration. Federal  recovery assistance is also provided directly to disaster victims. For  example, FEMA’s Individual Households Program provides housing,  financial assistance, and other direct services while the Internal Revenue  Service provides information about how to claim casualty loss  deductions.
The federal government also provides technical assistance for  communities to engage in long-term community recovery activities,  through the Emergency Support Function #14 (ESF #14), as part of the  National Response Framework. ESF #14 coordinates federal and state  long-term community recovery support and helps communities plan for  and identify the necessary resources for recovery. Developed shortly  before the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, ESF #14 was not in place at the  time of the five past disasters we studied. ESF #14 and FEMA’s Long-Term  Community Recovery Branch in its Disaster Assistance Directorate, which  supports this annex, provide assistance in coordinating federal, state, and  local recovery efforts and developing community recovery plans. The   Long-Term Community Recovery Branch also works with other federal  agencies to help identify program gaps and the potential need for  flexibilities and new authorities during the recovery process.
Our previous work defines collaboration broadly as any joint activity that  is intended to provide more public value than could be produced when the  organizations act alone. Because of the large number and wide variety of  stakeholders involved in the recovery from a catastrophic event,  collaboration is a critical element of this process. We have previously  reported that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts  by engaging in eight practices: defining and articulating a common  outcome; establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; identifying  and addressing needs by leveraging resources; agreeing on roles and  responsibilities; establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other  means to operate across agency boundaries; developing mechanisms to  monitor, evaluate, and report on results; reinforcing agency accountability  for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and reinforcing  individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance  management systems.

	Effective Collaboration Has Facilitated Recovery in Past Disasters

Effective collaboration among recovery stakeholders can play a key role in  facilitating disaster recovery. Because the recovery process requires  partnerships among representatives from all levels of government as well  as nongovernmental groups, effective collaboration is critical. We have  previously identified a number of practices that can enhance and sustain  collaborative efforts, which would help to facilitate disaster recovery. We  found four of these collaborative practices in the past disasters we  reviewed. Specifically, governments (1) developed and communicated  common recovery goals; (2) leveraged resources to facilitate recovery;   (3) used recovery plans to agree on roles and responsibilities; and   (4) evaluated and reported on progress made toward recovery.

		Develop and Communicate Common Recovery Goals

To overcome significant differences in missions, cultures, and established  ways of doing business, collaborating groups must have a clear and  compelling rationale for working together. We have previously reported  that the compelling rationale for collaboration can be imposed externally  such as through legislation or can come from the understanding that there  are benefits to working together. In either case, collaborative efforts  require staff working across organizational lines to define and articulate a  common outcome or purpose they are seeking to achieve that is consistent  with respective organizational goals and mission. In our September 2008  report on disaster recovery, we discussed the importance of recovery  plans and how clearly identified goals in such plans can provide direction  and specific objectives for communities to focus on. Building on this, we  identify two approaches of how stakeholders involved in the recovery  process following the Kobe earthquake in Japan and the Grand Forks/Red  River flood in Grand Forks, North Dakota, worked collectively to define  and articulate common outcomes.
A month after the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the national Japanese  government formed a “reconstruction committee” to organize recovery  efforts. The Japanese government created this body through national  legislation that required the participation of numerous national,  prefectural, and local agencies as well as nongovernmental organizations,  such as the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Prime Minister  personally managed the committee, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary and  Minister of the National Land Agency served as deputy managers. The  reconstruction committee also included representation from other high- ranking government officials—including cabinet ministers, the governor of  Hyogo prefecture, and the mayor of the city of Kobe—as well as  participants from academia. According to an official who participated in  this committee, the involvement of these prominent leaders not only  encouraged stakeholders involved in the reconstruction committee to  collaborate in order to come to agreement on recovery goals, it brought  national attention to recovery issues.
Working together through this committee, these officials and stakeholders  collaborated to create a national plan of action for recovery. This plan  included broad proposals that provided insight for how the national  government would assist in recovery, such as recommending that a long- term recovery plan be developed quickly as well as making housing  reconstruction, debris removal, port reconstruction, and job creation a  national priority. It also included more specific details to guide Hyogo  prefecture and the city of Kobe’s recovery, such as promptly demolishing  unsound structures and using excess concrete from the earthquake rubble  for construction and repairs in the port area.
In addition to providing an action plan, this committee also reviewed  Hyogo prefecture’s and the city of Kobe’s recovery plans to help localities  align their recovery proposals with the funding priorities of the national  government. According to an evaluation of the recovery conducted by the  city as well as outside recovery experts, the specific feedback provided by  the reconstruction committee, along with the recovery goals previously  clarified by the national government helped local officials to come to  consensus on their recovery goals. Within 6 months of the earthquake,  Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe completed recovery plans, which  included specific recovery goals for their regions, such as rebuilding  damaged housing units in 3 years and completing physical recovery in   10 years. According to this evaluation, the delineation of these goals at a  local level played a critical role in helping to coordinate the wide range of  participants involved in implementing recovery projects.
After the Grand Forks/Red River flood in 1997, federal, state, and local  officials worked together to define common goals when planning for the  recovery of Grand Forks, North Dakota. Technical consultants, funded by  a HUD grant, brought together federal and city officials as well as  members of the community to discuss Grand Forks’s rebuilding priorities.  According to a local official, because the city had no experience with the  process of developing common goals for the city prior to the flood, this  external facilitation helped the Grand Forks community and city officials  come to agreement on a set of common recovery goals. The recovery goals  resulting from these meetings were included in a comprehensive recovery  plan for Grand Forks. A subsequent city evaluation found that the process  of specifying goals within the recovery plan—which identified five broad  goals and a number of supporting objectives and tasks to achieve those  goals—helped the city to conceive and formulate projects in coordination  with the city council and representatives from state and local  governments.

		Leverage Resources to Facilitate Recovery

We have previously reported that to effectively collaborate requires the  identification of the human and financial resources needed to initiate or  sustain collaborative effort. In doing so, collaborating groups can bring  different levels of resources and capacities to the task at hand. In our  September 2008 report, we discussed the importance of helping state and  local governments take advantage of all available disaster assistance by  enhancing their financial and technical capacity when needed. Following  the Kobe and Northridge earthquakes, we found examples of how  governments leveraged the knowledge and expertise of diverse  stakeholders to produce effective collaboration and, in turn, facilitate the  recovery process.
In the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the Japanese government  created a formal organization through which human capital resources  from all levels of the government were leveraged to plan for and  implement recovery strategies. A committee comprised of high ranking  officials—including members of the Japanese House of Representatives  and leaders of affected jurisdictions and their staff—developed  intergovernmental recovery strategies. In addition to those high-ranking  officials, the committee also included working-level staff from national  ministries to provide expertise for developing specific details to be  included in the recovery plan. For example, staff from the Ministry of  Transportation brought expertise on infrastructure replacement while  those from the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and Industry contributed  knowledge regarding economic recovery matters. According to a Japanese  official involved in the recovery, this committee combined the political  know-how from the top-level officials and interdisciplinary expertise from  line-level bureaucrats to propose many recovery proposals which laid a  foundation for the national government’s approach to recovery. The  Japanese government also leveraged human capital expertise through this  committee to facilitate the implementation of recovery strategies. Upon  the approval of certain recovery policies, working staff associated with the  committee returned to their respective organizations to guide their home  departments on how best to implement the strategies. A Japanese official  involved in the committee said that this collaboration helped to ensure  that disparate ministries understood and properly implemented the  recovery strategies they helped to develop.
After the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the city of Los Angeles, California,  also leveraged human capital resources to accelerate the rebuilding of its  freeway system. Using the technical expertise of staff from the Federal  Highway Administration (FHWA) and the California Department of  Transportation (CalTrans), the city of Los Angeles developed an expedited  contracting process. To review construction proposals more efficiently,  FHWA and CalTrans staff collaborated to review documents, discuss  needed changes, and then approve projects together in one location.  According to CalTrans officials, state and federal offices normally conduct  separate reviews. This joint process helped to expedite the approval of  projects while still meeting oversight requirements for both levels of  government. Under standard contracting procedures, the contracting  process could take 26 to 40 weeks to complete. However, this  collaborative, co-located process enabled state highway officials to  advertise and award construction contracts in just 3 to 5 days. By  leveraging the knowledge and resources of state and federal staff in this  way, Los Angeles successfully restored its highways within a few months  after the Northridge earthquake.
In addition to leveraging human capital expertise, Los Angeles also found  ways to take advantage of resources from different federal programs to  facilitate housing recovery for certain disaster victims. The city faced  challenges in helping owners of housing units that had suffered extensive  damage in the earthquake. When Los Angeles learned that some of these  dwellings were not eligible for SBA disaster assistance because they had  negative cash flows, the city identified resources available from a HUD  program to help these property owners. Using these funds, the city  allocated $322 million to an Earthquake Supplemental Disaster Relief fund  which assisted property owners who were declined by SBA. To obtain  information on owners who might benefit from this program, the city  entered into a cooperative agreement with SBA to obtain direct referrals  of individuals who were denied loans so that the city could inform them of  this additional source of assistance. A city evaluation of this program  found that Los Angeles received over 5,000 referrals, which represented  more than 22,000 housing units.

		Use Recovery Plans to Identify Roles and Responsibilities

Collaborating organizations can work together to define and agree on their  respective roles and responsibilities. In doing so, they can collectively  agree on who will do what, organize joint and individual efforts, and  facilitate decision making. One way to delineate roles and responsibilities  for disasters is through planning. For the emergency response phase, the  National Response Framework sets out the roles and responsibilities of  key partners at the local, tribal, state, and federal levels. Responsibilities  for recovery stakeholders are detailed in ESF #14, the Long-Term  Recovery Annex. The annex mostly addresses the responsibilities of  federal agencies involved in recovery.
Because state and local governments play a lead role in disaster recovery,  it is also important for their roles and responsibilities to be clearly  delineated. After past disasters, this information has been delineated  through long-term community recovery plans. Communities can develop  such plans either before or after a disaster occurs. Post-disaster recovery  plans typically include detailed projects and approaches to rebuild a  community based on the damage and impacts of the specific disasters.  Some communities have supplemented post-disaster plans by conducting  planning efforts prior to a disaster.
Pre-disaster planning does not involve actually developing rebuilding  programs in advance of a disaster because the patterns of damage from  natural disasters are impossible to predict with sufficient accuracy to  support detailed pre-planning. However, these plans can be helpful in  other ways that foster collaboration, specifically in defining the roles and  responsibilities of recovery stakeholders prior to a disaster. We have  previously reported how effective recovery plans identify specific roles  and responsibilities among various stakeholders. While these plans are  often developed after a disaster takes place, we have identified some  instances where this information was clarified beforehand.
Los Angeles’s Recovery and Reconstruction Plan clearly identified the  roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in recovery. In the  aftermath of the Northridge earthquake in southern California, the city  revised the plan for the purposes of recovery from that event. Specifically,  the plan identified which city departments have responsibility for  implementing pre-determined activities before and after a disaster in  several functional categories, including residential, commercial, industrial  rehabilitation, and economic recovery. An evaluation of the plan funded by  the National Science Foundation found that the assignment of general  responsibilities to the departments was useful because it helped the  various components of city government to understand their post-disaster  roles and responsibilities. Further, the process of developing the plan also  improved collaboration among stakeholders. Specifically, representatives  from many departments—including public safety, planning, public works,  building, and community redevelopment—met several times to develop  and revise the plan.
A good plan is not simply a paper-driven exercise, but rather the result of a  dynamic and inclusive process wherein key stakeholders are consulted  and involved in the identification of priorities and the formation of  strategies. Collaboration among recovery stakeholders was further  enhanced through long-term recovery planning exercises held by the city  of Los Angeles. In these exercises, police and fire officials engaged in role  playing exercises in which they assumed the responsibilities of recovery  officials. For example, a public safety officer played the role of a building  inspector responsible for issuing building permits after an earthquake. A  city official at the time of the earthquake told us that the process of  developing the plan and conducting exercises was an important part of  developing relationships among stakeholders which facilitated  collaboration among city officials after the Northridge earthquake.  According to a federally-funded evaluation of this plan, the contacts  established during the planning process facilitated the recovery after the  Northridge earthquake. Another city official stated a positive outcome of  the planning effort was that participants knew of others who worked on  similar issues with whom they can initiate conversations. In addition, the  process of preparing and testing the plan educated city staff on their post- disaster roles and responsibilities.
More recently, two other communities have taken action to develop  recovery plans prior to a disaster that identify roles and responsibilities for  recovery. In the San Francisco Bay Area, state and local governments used  pre-disaster planning to reinforce a regional approach to recovery as well  as to assign regional roles and responsibilities for recovery. Learning from  past experiences with natural disasters in California including the Loma  Prieta earthquake, the Bay Area recognized the value of planning for  recovery in anticipation of future disasters. Toward that end, Bay Area  officials initiated a regional disaster response planning effort in 2004  culminating with the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan in March  2008, which included a subsidiary plan focused specifically on recovery.
Specifically for recovery, the San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency  Coordination Plan summarizes in a table organizations involved at each  level of government and the primary role of each. For example, the table  specifies that local governments will resume government functions and  request state and federal assistance, that state agencies will implement  state-funded recovery programs, and that regional infrastructure owners  will initiate planning for and implementation of permanent repairs. We  have previously reported on the challenges that state and local  jurisdictions sometimes face with understanding the extent to which the  federal government will pay for disaster-related costs. Pre-disaster  recovery plans that clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of various  stakeholders may prove useful in clarifying the specific types of costs  federal programs are likely to cover as well as some of the requirements of  these programs before a disaster strikes.
Partly as a result of experiences following Hurricane Andrew, Florida’s  Palm Beach County developed the Palm Beach Countywide Post-Disaster  Redevelopment Plan for guiding decision making and action during the  disaster period as well as detailing actions that can be taken before a  disaster strikes to speed the recovery process. Palm Beach County  delineates roles and responsibilities for recovery by creating working  groups who will be responsible for implementing different sections of the  plan, including infrastructure, economic development, and government  operations. Each working group is assigned several issues to cover along  with a chairperson to spearhead those activities for the county.  Additionally, city departments and agencies are represented in each of  these working groups.
As an outgrowth of this plan, a Business and Industry program was  created that formally integrated business interests into the recovery  process. Additionally, the program also created a private-public  partnership comprising local, state, regional, and national businesses as  well as governmental and nongovernmental organizations. According to a  Palm Beach County official, partners in this program are fully engaged in  the development and implementation of recovery initiatives. These  collaboration efforts have resulted in improved relationships among the  governmental, nongovernmental, and business entities involved in the  program.
Post-disaster recovery plans can also provide a vehicle to designate roles  and responsibilities for recovery, among other things. We have previously  reported that well-crafted post-disaster recovery plans can clarify roles  and responsibilities and help jurisdictions make progress with recovery.
For example, the city of Grand Forks’s recovery plan developed in the  wake of the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood clearly identified which  personnel—drawn from city, state, and federal agencies—would be  needed to carry out each task. Specifically, the plan called for  collaboration of staff from the city’s urban development and  engineering/building inspection departments, FEMA, and the U.S. Army  Corps of Engineers to create an inventory of substantially damaged  buildings in the downtown area. By clarifying the roles and responsibilities  of those who would be involved in accomplishing specific tasks, the plan  provided detailed information to facilitate its implementation.

		Monitor, Evaluate, and Report Progress Made toward Recovery

Organizations engaged in collaborative efforts need to create the means to  monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for  improvement. Reporting on these activities can help decision makers,  clients, and stakeholders obtain feedback for improving both policy and  operational effectiveness. We have previously reported that effective  recovery plans identify clear goals that can provide governments with a  basis for subsequent evaluations of the recovery progress. As a next step,  we identify how local jurisdictions impacted by the Kobe earthquake  established a process through which government officials, community  members, and recovery experts worked together to assess the recovery  progress and recommend improvements.
Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe established a system of periodic  recovery assessments in the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan.  Both governments designed a two-phase approach to evaluating the  progress they have made toward recovery, the first taking place about   5 years after the earthquake and the second about 10 years afterward. This  design allowed for both a short- and long-term assessment of the recovery.  Although the Hyogo and Kobe governments funded these evaluations,  neither prefecture nor city employees were directly involved in conducting  these assessments; rather, they used external staff to perform the reviews.  Hyogo prefecture invited domestic and international disaster recovery  experts to serve on its evaluation panels, while the city of Kobe staffed its  reviews with members of local community groups.
These evaluations focused on the goals established in the recovery plans  approved by the national government 6 months after the earthquake. They  enabled policy makers to measure the progress made by various  stakeholders in achieving recovery goals, and identify needed changes to  existing policies, and learned lessons for future disasters. The panels  examined six broad recovery topics—including health, industry,  employment, and urban development—which resulted in many  recommendations to improve recovery from the Kobe earthquake.
For example, as a result of its 10-year evaluation Hyogo prefecture gained  insight into the unintended consequences of how it relocated elderly  earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in policy. After the  earthquake, the prefecture gave priority to the relocation of elderly victims  and grouped them together in special care residences located outside the  city. While this policy ensured that this vulnerable population received  housing quickly, it also had the unintended effect of isolating the relocated  seniors, who were removed from their communities. In fact, the  verification committee attributed this housing arrangement as leading to  untimely deaths for some seniors. After learning of this finding, the  prefecture built new types of residential housing that offer comprehensive  lifestyle support for seniors. In addition, for future disasters the prefecture  plans to develop a system to track displaced populations as they move  from temporary to permanent housing to help maintain better contact with  victims.

	FEMA Has Taken Steps to Facilitate Collaboration among Stakeholders, but Could Do More to Share Recovery Experiences

Recovery experiences from past catastrophes—including good  collaboration practices—can offer lessons for such events in the future.  FEMA has taken some actions to encourage recovery stakeholders to  collaborate by sharing lessons and experiences related to recovery.  However, in contrast to other phases of a disaster for which FEMA has a  specific mechanism dedicated to sharing such information, this is not the  case with the recovery phase.
FEMA has taken steps to support collaboration through planning  and sharing recovery lessons. FEMA has assisted state and local  governments in developing post-disaster recovery plans in various ways,  which in turn can help facilitate collaboration among stakeholders.   First, FEMA, along with other federal agencies such as HUD and EDA,  provided technical assistance for post-disaster recovery plans for several  of the disasters we reviewed. Second, FEMA developed guidance for  conducting the long-term recovery planning process. More specifically, the  agency created a Long-Term Community Recovery Self Help Guide that  offers communities step-by-step guidance for implementing a recovery  program and planning process. Third, FEMA created the Long-Term  Recovery Assessment Tool to help communities analyze the impacts of a  disaster while taking into consideration the local government’s capacity to  assist in promoting its own long-term recovery. The assessment tool helps  federal and other decision makers identity the type and level of  supplemental long-term community recovery assistance that may be  needed for full recovery from a disaster. The tool also includes processes  and procedures for assessing long-term recovery needs, community  evaluation protocols, standard planning templates, staffing strategies, and  timetables for various levels of effort.
FEMA has also taken actions to encourage collaboration among state and  local officials to share experiences and expertise related to disaster  recovery. For example, FEMA’s Long-Term Community Recovery Branch,  working through ESF #14, hosted a teleconference linking officials in  Florida, Mississippi, Colorado, and Iowa with experience recovering from  previous disasters to provide information to officials in Texas recovering  from Hurricane Ike. In this way, officials with direct experience in the  recovery process were able to share good practices related to recovery  planning, disaster funds administration, and coordinating regional efforts  with the participants from Texas. According to FEMA officials, this  collaboration helped the Texas officials identify recovery projects and  develop a community recovery plan. In addition, FEMA is considering  ways to further facilitate the sharing of lessons learned for disaster  recovery, including creating a peer-to-peer mentoring program where  experienced local officials can provide technical assistance, advice, and  support to communities impacted by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.  However, these officials told us that this idea is still at an early stage and  additional specifics are not yet available.
FEMA’s information sharing Web sites do not include a focus on  recovery. FEMA has systematic approaches for sharing lessons regarding  three of the four phases of a disaster—preparedness, response, and  mitigation; however, as of June 2009, the agency does not have an  information sharing system focused on recovery. Officials involved in the  preparedness and response phases of a disaster can share lessons through  FEMA’s Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) Web site. LLIS is a  national online network of lessons learned and best practices for the  emergency preparedness, response, and homeland security communities.  Online since April 2004, LLIS provides users access to over 12,000  documents including state and local plans, after-action reports, best  practices, and lessons learned that are culled from real-world experiences  and exercises. Because the Web site includes some sensitive information,  its registration process is limited to domestic users with “a need to  know.” Information on LLIS is organized through a number of “featured  topics,” such as critical infrastructure, exercise planning and program  management, and wild-land fires. Materials are also organized by  numerous “disciplines” that have an emergency management focus such as  emergency communications, mass care and human services, mortuary  services, as well as search and rescue.
While LLIS does contain materials relating to recovery, the issue is neither  a featured topic nor a discipline, making it challenging to access recovery- related information in an easy or intuitive way. Additionally, the message  boards that allow LLIS users to discuss a variety of homeland security  topics are rarely used to exchange information about recovery. For  example, while almost 600 messages have been exchanged on forums  discussing preparedness and response issues as of June 2009, only two  messages have been posted to the message board focused on disaster  recovery (and they were both from the same individual). A FEMA official  with responsibility for LLIS told us that there is an increasing recognition  that recovery is an underserved area of disaster management, and the  agency can see benefits of potentially including more information about  recovery in LLIS.
To share lessons related to the mitigation phase, FEMA has created a  searchable online portfolio of case studies and best practices submitted by  individuals and communities describing the measures they have taken to  reduce the loss of life or property from future disasters. Communities that  have taken creative steps in implementing good mitigation practices can  submit those stories to FEMA where officials will review and possibly  include them in the online best practices portfolio.
Unlike the information sharing mechanisms it has in place for the  preparedness, response, and mitigation phases of a disaster, FEMA does  not have a similar approach for sharing lessons focused on recovery.  Recovery lessons from specific disasters are sometimes available through  the FEMA Web site under the listings for specific disasters, although the  amount and nature of recovery information available this way varies  greatly. In addition, the Long-Term Community Recovery and ESF #14  Web site contains considerable information on recovery, but this site is  mostly dedicated to providing technical guidance for planning and does  not permit recovery officials to share lessons or learn about recovery best  practices. FEMA officials told us that that they plan to develop a document  compiling community-based best practices for disaster recovery, but they  do not know when it will be available.
Perhaps more useful than the sharing of reports and other written  accounts of recovery lessons and experiences is the ability to directly  network with other recovery officials who can answer questions and relate  insights first-hand. In the course of our work, we learned of instances  where this type of personal connection was particularly valuable. For  example, a Watsonville, California, official told us of his efforts  immediately after the Loma Prieta earthquake to contact a local official in  southern California because he had read that the official had experienced  an earthquake a few years earlier and he wanted to solicit his guidance.  The official from southern California agreed to help and traveled to  Watsonville the next day to share his experiences and provide insights on  potential recovery strategies. In another example, when Hurricane Katrina  hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, officials from Grand Forks, North Dakota,  offered to help city leaders in Biloxi, Mississippi, based on their  experiences with the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood.
Through one-on-one exchanges like these, state and local officials  involved in recovery can obtain tailored advice from individuals who have  addressed similar challenges themselves. For emergency managers  involved in the disaster preparedness and response phases, FEMA’s LLIS  Web site has a network-building feature that can be used to foster this type  of exchange. LLIS provides its users with access to a directory of other  registered users that can be searched for a number of variables including  name, affiliation, and emergency management function (primarily  disciplines such as mass care and human services or public health). The  online directory mostly consists of officials and researchers involved in  various aspects of emergency management. Such a directory, or one  similar to it, might be very useful to recovery officials seeking to network  with, and learn from, others with experiences or expertise in disaster  recovery.

	Conclusions

Collaboration is essential for an effective partnership between the wide  range of participants involved in the disaster recovery process. While  effective collaboration has helped to facilitate recovery in past disasters,  experiences from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes reveal that more can be  done in this area. Specifically, we have identified a number of practices  used during past disasters that can offer insights for effective  collaboration: developing and communicating common goals to guide  recovery; leveraging resources to facilitate recovery; using recovery plans  to agree on roles and responsibilities; and monitoring, evaluating, and  reporting on progress made toward recovery. While there is no one right  way for how jurisdictions should manage recovery nor is there a recipe of  techniques that fits all situations, the examples we describe in this  report—which were tailored to the specific needs and conditions of those  particular disasters—may provide insights into improving collaboration  among the many stakeholders involved in the ongoing recovery efforts in  the Gulf Coast as well as for future catastrophic events.
Recovery stakeholders have a responsibility for fostering collaboration  during disaster recovery. State and local governments have taken the lead  in defining roles and responsibilities within pre- and post-disaster recovery  plans, a step that has helped to facilitate the recovery process. The federal  government has also played an important role in fostering collaboration  for recovery. For example, FEMA has supported post-disaster planning  efforts and hosted videoconferences between experienced officials and  those currently in the recovery process. However, the agency can take  additional steps to share information focused on recovery so that it is  captured and preserved for the future. In the absence of a mechanism for  compiling and disseminating recovery information, valuable expertise  from officials who have first-hand recovery knowledge may be lost.

	Recommendation for Executive Action

To improve the ability of the federal government to capture and  disseminate recovery information, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to establish a  mechanism for sharing information and best practices focused on disaster  recovery, including practices that promote effective collaboration such as  those discussed in this report. Options for doing this could include   (1) creating an approach, similar to the LLIS Web site or the mitigation  best practices portfolio, through which disaster recovery lessons can be  compiled and shared, and personal networks among interested recovery  officials encouraged; and/or (2) modifying the LLIS Web site to add a focus  on recovery by taking steps such as including more recovery documents,  creating a recovery topic area within LLIS, and creating an online  directory for recovery officials to encourage networking and facilitate  further sharing of recovery experiences.

	Agency Comments

On June 19, 2009, we provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of  Homeland Security for comment. We received written comments on July  22, 2009. In its written comments, which are reprinted in appendix VII,  DHS concurred with our recommendation. In addition, the department  provided technical clarifications that we incorporated where appropriate.  We also provided drafts of relevant sections to public officials,  nongovernmental stakeholders, and recovery experts involved in or  knowledgeable of the specific examples cited in this report and  incorporated their comments as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretaries  of Homeland Security and Housing and Urban Development, the FEMA  Administrator, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic  Development, and the state and local officials we contacted for this  review. In addition, the report will be available on our Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-6806 or by email at CzerwinskiS@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To identify recovery lessons from past experiences, we selected 5  catastrophic disasters: the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, Hurricane  Andrew in 1992, the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the 1995 Great Hanshin- Awaji (Kobe) earthquake, and the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood to  review (see fig. 1). The defines a  illion. Under this definition, all the disasters selected for  or exceed $500 m this review qualify as catastrophic. We chose these disasters because they  had devastating communitywide or regional impact and occurred in urban  areas of developed nations. Additionally, these disasters occurred far  enough in the past that we could observe the long-term recovery process,  occurred recently enough so that key officials and supporting  documentation are still available, and represent different types of natural  disasters.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  “catastrophic” event as one where the related federal costs reach  We interviewed officials from national, state, and local governments and  nongovernmental organizations, as well as academic experts, involved in  or knowledgeable of the recovery following each of our selected disasters.  We also obtained and reviewed legislation, ordinances, policies, and  program documents that described steps that were taken to facilitate long- term recovery following each of these disasters as well as the disaster  recovery literature. In some instances, our review was limited by the  availability of historic documents and the accessibility of key officials  engaged in recovery from past disasters. To better understand the federal  government’s role in recovery from these disasters, we interviewed  officials at the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, the Economic  Development Administration in the Department of Commerce, and the  Department of Housing and Urban Development.
We visited the ke our study to meet officials involved in the recovery effort and examine  current conditions. Although we did not visit communities affected by the  1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood, we were able to gather the necessary  information through telephone interviews with key officials involved in the  recovery as well as recovery experts knowledgeable about the disaster.  The scope of our work did not include independent evaluation or  verification regarding the extent to which the communities’ recovery  efforts were successful and the practices we discuss in this report only  represent a selection of the many recovery actions taken after these  disasters.  y communities impacted by four of the five disasters in  To identify examples of good collaboration among recovery stakeholders,  we applied eight key practices we have reported on in prior work that  enhance and sustain collaboration: (1) define and articulate a common  outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify  and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and  responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other  means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to  monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce agency  accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports;  and (8) reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts  through performance management systems. We used this framework to  assess the ways in which recovery stakeholders collaborated in the five  disasters included in our review. While we found examples related to four  of these good collaborative practices, others that enhance coordination  may also exist.
To understand how FEMA supports collaboration among recovery  stakeholders and the extent to which it facilitates the sharing of lessons  and experiences from past recovery efforts, we interviewed officials from  FEMA’s Long-Term Community Recovery Branch and staff responsible for  managing the agency’s Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) Web  site. We also obtained access to LLIS and FEMA’s online mitigation best  practices portfolio, after which we reviewed the content and operations o those systems.

Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake

	Disaster Impacts

The Loma Prieta earthquake, which occurred in the Santa Cruz mountains  in 1989, severely impacted four cities in northern California. San Francisco  experienced damage to several areas, including its Embarcadero freeway,  Marina district, and City Hall. In Oakland, the earthquake caused the  collapse of the Cypress Expressway as well as damage to other  infrastructure and low income housing. The cities of Santa Cruz and  Watsonville, both located near the earthquake epicenter, suffered  devastating destruction to their downtown districts (see fig. 2).

	Long-term Recove Snapshot

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected areas  to facilitate its recovery from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Some  examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 3.
The areas most impacted by the earthquake were Oakland, San Francisco,  and other cities in Santa Cruz county, including Santa Cruz, and  Watsonville. Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing,  economic development, and infrastructure. The following presents an  overview of selected recovery efforts after the Loma Prieta earthquake in  each of these areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive  account of recovery actions taken.

		Planning

Two months following the earthquake, the Santa Cruz City Council  appointed a citizen group to develop an overall plan to rebuild the  devastated downtown area. Santa Cruz faced the challenge of reaching  consensus for decisions regarding recovery. The city facilitated decision  making during the recovery from the Loma Prieta earthquake as a result of  growing tension between citizens and local officials. To do so, the city  devised a formal structure that incorporated time frames that helped  different community groups reach consensus on a unified recovery plan. It  created Vision Santa Cruz, a 36-member citizen advisory body that  included wide representation from the neighborhood and community  groups, business, finance, labor, and nonprofit organizations. To facilitate  decision making among these groups, according to a former Santa Cruz  official, time limits were instituted so that if Vision Santa Cruz did not  agree on a plan by a certain date, city officials would finalize the plan  without the group’s consensus. Further, once a consensus was reached on  an issue, it could not be opened for discussion again. Although faced with  the challenge of uniting political groups with differing views in the  community, Vision Santa Cruz succeeded in bringing the community  together by forging a compromise among different stakeholders for  recovery. Vision Santa Cruz completed the Downtown Recovery Plan in  September 1991, which provided the policies, standards, and guidelines to  direct the downtown rebuilding.
The Downtown Recovery Plan provided guidance for building form,  character, and height; housing; accessibility; open space and streetscape;  circulation; and parking. According to a former Santa Cruz official, the  Downtown Recovery Plan took into account the needs of the retail  community by redesigning the business center. For example, the plan  proposed new design guidelines that made buildings more suitable for  retail purposes, such as requiring large ground floor windows to ensure  that stores received more lighting. Specifically, the main street was  designed to accommodate both pedestrians and low speed traffic (as  opposed to being pedestrian-only), preserved on-street parking, and  widened sidewalks. This plan is still in use today to guide development  projects in downtown Santa Cruz.
Watsonville relied on planning assistance offered by the Urban Land  Institute to create a redevelopment plan. The city followed the plan it  developed to rebuild and revitalize its downtown with a specific focus on  implementation and an ancillary focus on development potential, plann urban design, development goals, and marketing strategies. Watsonville   ing,  took the opportunity to make improvements to address changing  demographics of many blocks that became empty as a result of the  earthquake. However, not all aspects of the plan were successfully  implemented. For example, one of the plan’s goals was to support and open a department store. However, because the store’s upscale retail  marketing did not fit with the changing demographics, sales dropped, an the store closed within one year.
The Urban Land Institute also offered planning assistance to the city of  Santa Cruz; however, the final plan focused heavily on housing, which was  not the direction in which the city was interested. Therefore, the city of  Santa Cruz did not implement the plan. According to a former Santa Cruz  official, a key finding of the Urban Land Institute was the need to establish  a decision-making process to overcome the differing political and business  interests in the community. Toward that end, the city established Vision  Santa Cruz which helped to facilitate the planning process for the city’s  downtown recovery.

		Housing

Approximately 850 housing units in Watsonville (almost 10 percent of th city’s housing stock) were severely damaged or destroyed after the L Prieta earthquake. According to a report funded by the Federal Emerge Management Agency, Watsonville planners drafted a rebuilding ordinan within the first four days after the earthquake that suspended the limits o ned  rebuilding nonconforming construction. The ordinance also streamli the permitting process. Santa Cruz County, which includes the city of  Watsonville, passed a temporary one-half-cent sales tax increase for   6 years, called Measure E. The proceeds were targeted to damaged areas within the county based on an allocation approved by vot received approximately $15 million through Measure E which helped to  repair the damaged housing. Further, Watsonville also used portions o f  existing Department of Housing and Urban Development’s CommunityDevelopment Block Grant funds that it received prior to the earthquake  (and not part of a supplemental or special disaster appropriation) to repair  and replace damaged housing units. Within 1 year of the earthquake,  almost 50 percent of the damaged housing units in Watsonville were  repaired or replaced.
The Loma Prieta earthquake resulted in the loss of many single-room  occupancy units in the cities of Oakland and Santa Cruz. Oakland  experienced destruction or severe damage of 1,300 single-room occupancy  units, which provided housing to many minority and elderly residents.  Oakland financed the replacement of single-room occupancy units through  California’s Disaster Assistance Program. In Santa Cruz, single-roo occupancy units were built in several new buildings. According to a  subsequent evaluation of the earthquake, these buildings represente overall improvement in the housing stock.

		Economic Development

		Infrastructure

Appendix III: Hurricane Andrew

	Disaster Impacts

Hurricane Andrew made landfall over southern Miami-Dade County in  Florida as a category 5 hurricane, severely impacting several cities in  southern Florida, including Homestead and Florida City (see fig. 5). As a  result of the hurricane, the city of Homestead suffered a 31 percent declin to its population, 60 percent of the aggregated residential property value,  and 29 percent of its average commercial real estate value. Additionally,  the Department of Defense’s decision to scale down the presence of the  Homestead Air Force Base contributed to the loss of thousands of jobs. In  Florida City, located near Homestead, Hurricane Andrew damaged every  building, reducing residential property value by 78 percent, and the  average commercial real estate value by 32 percent.

	Long-term Recovery Snapshot

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected area  to facilitate its recovery from Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Some examples  of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 6.
Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic  development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of  selected recovery efforts after Hurricane Andrew in each of these areas.  However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of recovery actions  taken.

		Planning

To help plan for the recovery from Hurricane Andrew, community leaders  created a nonprofit organization called We Will Rebuild. The organization  was led by the publisher of the Miami-Herald as well as other political,  business, and civic leaders in Miami-Dade County. A key role that We Will  Rebuild played was to coordinate the distribution of nearly $28 million of  private and public funds. We Will Rebuild worked to devise recovery  strategies through 29 committees that focused on different issue areas,  including agriculture, business and economic development, housing, social  services, as well as families and children. Committee members developed  plans to achieve goals within those areas and in some instances  implemented those strategies directly. For example, to achieve the goal of  preventing the complete closure of the Homestead Air Force Base, one  committee successfully advocated for the base to be changed into a  combined civil and military facility.
We Will Rebuild also funded planning meetings, coordinated through loca universities, which brought together as many as 300 professionals over a   3 week period to create solutions for rebuilding Miami-Dade County.  Teams comprised of architects, engineers, planners, and as well as others  from the public and private sectors presented proposals for how to rebuild  l  communities and neighborhoods. Eventually these meetings produced   16 projects focused on many issues such as site-specific neighborhood  revitalization plans focused on urban planning, transportation, historic  preservation, and natural resources for 28 communities in the county.  Many of these plans served as the basis for the redevelopment of  neighborhoods and future regional developments related to water  management, transportation development, and the preservation of  buildings and open space.

		Housing

Hurricane Andrew caused devastating housing damage in Miami-Dade  County, resulting in the destruction of over 25,000 homes and major  damage to over 37,000 homes. According to a city official, Florida City  worked with the Department of Housing and Urban Development to create  a program that provided second mortgages for homeowners to repair  damaged housing. Today, the population of Florida City is approximately  10,000, a significant increase from the 3,000 still remaining in the wake of  the hurricane.
Over 8,000 Homestead residents, or 31 percent of its pre-hurricane  population, left the city, leaving many abandoned properties that created  challenges for the city to redevelop some areas. Some residential  communities that suffered significant damage from the hurricane were  eventually rebuilt. For example, the Naranja Lakes development, a private  condominium community of thousands of residents, was razed and is  being rebuilt with a mix of condominium and single family homes.

		Economic Development

f  To rebuild the economy in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, a number o economic development organizations in Miami-Dade County worked to  revitalize affected communities. One of these groups, the Economic  Development Council was founded by local business leaders in response  to Hurricane Andrew to represent the economic development int erests of  the unincorporated portions of Miami-Dade County. The group led efforts  to beautify a major roadway and commercial center through the area. Th e  Economic Development Council hoped that such improvement proje cts  would attract residents who had mov to the county once more.  ed away after the hurricane to return  The mission of the Vision Council, another organization that promoted  economic redevelopment after Hurricane Andrew, was to attract new  businesses to Miami-Dade County. The council serves Homestead, Florida  City, and other parts of southern Miami-Dade County. The Vision Council  experienced mixed success in its economic development efforts. For  example, the Vision Council assisted Homestead’s efforts to market and build a 270 acre commerce park, called Park of Commerce. The Vision  Council also supported the creation of the Homestead-Miami Speedway which sponsors professional car racing events year round. Howev all of its projects have been successful. For example, we observed  Park of Commerce which the Vision Council supported was mostly  today. A Vision Council official explained that factors such as the  perceived risk of another storm in the area, high insurance rates, and  population decline has deterred some businesses from relocating to  Miami-Dade County.

		Infrastructure

Hurricane Andrew destroyed much of the public and transportation  infrastructure in southern Florida. For example, Florida City lost every public building to Hurricane Andrew, according to a city official. The city  rebuilt the government center complex, which included the city hall, jail,  and police statio n. Because the city’s public funds were insufficient to  rebuild the new government center complex, it used funding from the  Economic Development Administration (EDA) in the Department o Commerce and the state to complete the center.
Homestead and Florida City suffered sustained damage to their water  systems. In Homestead, EDA provided $7.7 million partly for the  construction of water and sewer lines, which extended these services to  the Miami-Homestead Speedway and Park of Commerce facilities. W those infrastructure enhancements, these projects could not have been  developed. Florida City also sustained extensive damage to its water  delivery system. EDA provided almost $5 million for the repair,  replacement, and expansion the city’s water system (see fig. 7). As a resu of the water system’s expansion, the State Farmers Market was also  restored, creating almost 400 jobs.

Appendix IV: Northridge Earthquake

	Disaster Impacts

	Long-term Recove Snapshot

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected area  to facilitate its recovery from the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Some  examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 9.
Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic  development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of  selected recovery efforts after the Northridge earthquake in each of these  areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of recovery  actions taken.

		Planning

In 1987, prior to the Northridge earthquake, the city of Los Angeles  developed a Recovery and Reconstruction Plan in preparation for a future  disaster. In the aftermath of the Northridge earthquake, the city adapted  this plan to guide its recovery efforts. According to an evaluation funded  by the National Science Foundation, the plan contributed to fostering good  working relations between city officials and other stakeholders. The  process of developing the plan itself strengthened relationships between  city departments and agencies which in turn helped to facilitate  collaboration during the recovery process. City departments also  implemented several strategies outlined in the plan, such as developing  loan programs for businesses unable to receive Small Business  Administration loans, establishing an interdepartmental group to adapt the  recovery plan for Northridge, streamlining permit processing, establishing  mutual aid agreements, and forming reconstruction task forces.

		Housing

After the earthquake, the city of Los Angeles designated 17 areas that  suffered extensive damage as “ghost towns,” to received priority atten The vacating of 7,500 housing units in those areas resulted in criminal  trespassers such as drug dealers, prostitution rings, and squatters. In turn,  those activities increased burglaries in surrounding neighborhoods and  resulted in local businesses losing their customer base. The city’s housing  department collaborated with the police, public works, and building  departments to create a special work unit to focus on security and offer  refinancing to help property owners in the ghost towns rebuild. A  subsequent evaluation of the housing reconstruction after Northridge  found that this program contributed to the successful rebuilding of those  areas and helped to stabilize surrounding neighborhoods.  tion.

		Economic Development

		Infrastructure

According to Los Angeles officials, the city prioritized the replace restoration of its highway infrastructure to restore the region’s  transportation networks. To maintain partial traffic flows immediately  after the earthquake, the city established alternative detour rout highways. The earthquake resulted in 480 damage locations to federal,  state, and local roads throughout the Los Angeles area and forced the  closure of four major highway corridors that, together, carried over  780,000 vehicles per day before the earthquake. This caused significant  disruption to commuting patterns as well as the transportation of freight.  ing for the  To expedite the completion of highway rebuilding projects, the Califor nia  Department of Transportation (CalTrans) included financial incentives in  its contracts for each major restoration or repair contract. Under this  approach, bonuses were available to each contractor who completed  projects early. CalTrans calculated bonuses based on an analysis of the  economic cost incurred to the region as a result of the disruption to traffic  rded  and associated delays. As a result of this approach, bonuses were awa to 9 out of the 10 eligible contractors. According to a CalTrans official,  these incentives allowed the city to restore these freeways within a months after the earthquake (see fig. 10).
The Federal Highway Administration also granted other measures of  flexibility within its regulations to facilitate infrastructure recovery. For  example, the agency granted exemptions from certain regulations, such as  allowing the California Department of Transportation to proceed without  conducting environmental impact statements as required under the  National Environmental Policy Act.

Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake

	Disaster Impacts

On January 17, 1995, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake caused significant  damage to the Japanese city of Kobe in Hyogo prefecture. As a result of  the earthquake, the affected areas sustained heavy damage and many  casualties. For example, over 6,000 people were killed and 40,000 injured. In addition to destroying over 400,000 homes and buildings, the  earthquake caused extensive damage to roads, railroads, highways, and  subway stations (see fig. 11). The port of Kobe, Japan’s leading container  shipping port at the time, also experienced heavy damage to almost all  container berths.

	Long-term Recove Snapshot

The Japanese government provided significant funding to facilitate  recovery from the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Some examples of national  government assistance for recovery are shown in figure 12.
Recovery after the Kobe earthquake was generally a top-down process of  post-disaster planning and financing. The government prioritized the rapid  rebuilding of infrastructure and economic stabilization and later focused  on housing and social recovery. The physical reconstruction process took  less than 3 years to complete. Specifically, the city of Kobe designated 24  areas to prioritize for rebuilding, using national government funds to  widen roads, add parks and open spaces, and construct other public  facilities. For the first 3 to 4 years after the earthquake, the focus was  mainly focused on physical reconstruction. In subsequent years, the  government shifted it focus to community development, economic  development, and the restoration of communities. Key aspects of disaster  recovery include planning, housing, economic development, and  infrastructure. The following presents an overview of selected recovery  efforts after the Kobe earthquake in each of these areas. However, it does  not provide a comprehensive account of recovery actions taken.

		Planning

Immediately following the earthquake, Japan’s national government  implemented a 2-month moratorium where it did not approve any building  permits so that the local governments could finalize planning before the  rebuilding process began. Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe adopted  complementary recovery plans within 2 months of the earthquake—in  March 1995—which prioritized projects that replaced infrastructure as  well as others that would help stabilize the economy and attract new  businesses.
After the earthquake, there was a relatively short amount of time to  proposals for the national budget in order to be considered for the com year. To ensure that they could take advantage of national go vernment  funding as soon as possible, the city of Kobe and Hyogo prefecture  completed its recovery plans promptly. Facing this deadline, local offici devised a two-phase strategy to develop a plan that could quickly identif broad recovery goals to provide a basis for budget requests to meet the  national budget deadline. After that initial planning phase, the  governments then collaborated with residents to develop detailed plans  for specific communities.

		Housing

The national government funded a 3-year emergency housing plan to build  about 72,000 permanent new housing units throughout Kobe and Hyogo to  replace an estimated 82,000 houses lost due to the earthquake. They  p more than half through public housing agencies. This overall target level lanned to provide around 8,200 through the private rental market and  was achieved by March 1998 when more than 120,000 new housing units were constructed. The accumulated number of new housing units built by2005 was estimated to be over 222,000. Almost all the replacement housingwas provided in multi-rise condominium structures, with approximately 56 percent of those available as public housing units. Both the public andprivate sector used a variety of strategies, aimed at many levels of theult  population, to ensure that replacement housing would be built. The res was that more housing was built than had been lost. According to an  expert on Japan’s recovery, the city of Kobe has recently experience challenges in attracting new occupants—especially younger families—to  move into these units.

		Economic Development

The Kobe earthquake had lasting impacts on several industries, including  the port and small businesses. The port of Kobe, Japan’s leading container  shipping port, sustained heavy damage to almost all container berths. Port  repairs took almost 1 year to complete, during which time the port  disruption was estimated to be an amount equivalent to the income of  40,000 workers. The city of Kobe completed its port restoration by March  1997 (see fig. 13). However, port activity stalled at around 80 percent of  pre-earthquake levels. In October 1998, exports from the port of Kobe to  Asian countries declined by 24.3 percent from the previous year. The  negative impact of damage to the local economy and regional exports, in  addition to the relocation of many container cargos to other ports during  the port of Kobe’s closure contributed to its decline. Further, changing  trends in the international trade industry introduced increased  competition from other Asian ports. As a result of these factors, the port of  Kobe has not fully recovered. For example, while the port ranked 6th in  the world for volume in 1994, it dropped to the 24th position in 1995 and  the 33rd in 2006.
Local industries, such as chemical and steel manufacturers as well as  small businesses, were also affected by the earthquake. Chemical and manufacturers did not operate for several months after the event. Large  companies, such as Kobe Steel and Mitsubishi Industries, were able to  map out effective recovery strategies and were less affected by the  earthquake. On the other hand, smaller industries, also severely damaged  by the earthquake, were unable to recover as easily as the larger  manufacturers. For example, smaller businesses such as shoe  manufacturers, sake breweries, and roof-tile makers never fully recovered  from the earthquake.
The city of Kobe took several actions to stimulate the local economy w mixed success. For example, Kobe established support systems for  affected businesses such as special no-interest loans and subsidies for th construction of temporary stores and factories. The city also created the  “Luminaire,” a festival of illuminated lights which began in the winter  following the earthquake to boost morale of local residents and to attract  tourists. In 2003, the event drew 28.1 million visitors, which increased the  number of tourists by 115 percent from pre-earthquake levels. However, ot have  not all of its efforts were successful. For example, the city did n e  enough funds to help all the small businesses that needed financial  assistance. Some small businesses could not recover from the earthquake  and closed.
Recognizing the need to diversify Kobe’s economy from its traditional port  and manufacturing businesses, the city took steps to attract and develop  several new industries. Kobe recognized that it could benefit from new  infrastructure projects to change the industrial base of the city. Soon after  the disaster occurred, the city conducted a study to assess economic  conditions in Kobe. This study showed that although some of the  economic challenges the city faced were a result of the earthquake, a more  fundamental problem was Kobe’s continued reliance on “old economy”  industries, such as shipbuilding, steel, and shoe manufacturing. With this  information, the city, in coordination with Hyogo prefecture, targeted new  industries—such as medical, pharmaceutical, robotics, and information  technology companies—to establish businesses in the region.
To attract companies from these targeted industries, the city of Kobe and  Hyogo prefecture offered loans, subsidies, tax incentives, and inexpensive  office space. Further, these jurisdictions proposed reductions in existing  government regulations for the medical and information technology  sectors. These plans allowed foreign researchers to work in Kobe without  overly rigorous visa regulations. Additionally, the city sought to remove  regulations that prevented foreign firms from participating in the medical  industry and thereby encourage the entry of foreign researchers and  business persons. Overall, Kobe and Hyogo achieved success in  diversifying its economy. About 10 years after the earthquake, over 285  new companies moved to the city, 40 of which were foreign firms.  Additionally, six public facilities—including centers for business,  developmental biology, and heath care—had relocated to the city  as well.

		Infrastructure

Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood

	Disaster Impacts

The 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood devastated Grand Fo Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Minnesota. Following a season of record  snowfall, the Red River flooded up to 2,200 square miles in these states, an  area about twice the size of Rhode Island. The flood damaged 83 percent  of affected homes and impacted all downtown businesses. In East Grand  Forks, 99 percent of homes and businesses were damaged (see fig. 15).

	Long-term Recovery Snapshot

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected area  to facilitate its recovery from the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood. Some  examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 16.
Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic  development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of  selected recovery efforts after the Grand Forks/Red River flood in each of  these areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of  recovery actions taken.

		Planning

In the wake of the flood, the mayor of Grand Forks asked directors from  the city’s urban development, public works, and finance departments to  collaborate in order to contribute their respective expertise to help the  city create a recovery plan. The mayor delegated much of her authority to  these civil servants, known as the Tri-Chairs, allowing them to set  priorities for recovery, submit action steps for approval, and collectively  manage the city’s recovery resources. The Tri-Chairs, City Council,  representatives from the federal Department of Housing and Urban  Development (HUD), and other city staff collaborated to create a detailed  flood recovery action plan for the city that identified (1) broad recovery  g (3) potential id entified five broad recovery goals covering areas such as housing and  community redevelopment, business redevelopment, and infrastructure  rehabilitation. The plan details a number of supporting objectives and  tasks to be implemented in order to achieve the stated goals. Additionally,  the plan identified a target completion date for each task.  oals, (2) roles and responsibilities associated with specific projects, and   sources for funding those activities. Specifically, the plan  Consultants that provided technical assistance on the planning process  were hired using HUD’s Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). A  key role that these federally-funded consultants played was to maintain  good communications and coordination between the city and HUD. The  consultants facilitated communications through scheduling and  publicizing meetings, providing workspace, and convening weekly  conference calls. According to a subsequent evaluation of the consultants’  efforts, these activities helped to build a team mentality among  stakeholders by encouraging the sharing of information and common  problem-solving. An important result of this communication was the  completion of Grand Forks’ recovery plan. A city evaluation of the  recovery plan found that the process of specifying goals and identifying  funding sources allowed the city to conceive and formulate projects in  collaboration with the city council and representatives from state and  local go vernments. This helped Grand Forks meet its recovery needs as  well as adhere to federal and state disaster assistance funding laws and  regulations.

		Housing

The cities of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks took measures to buy out  housing located in the 100-year floodplain of the Red River. Grand Forks  officials developed a buy-out program that purchased nearly 800 homes,  which was about 10 percent of the city’s housing stock at the time. To  determine the value of properties in the buy-out program, the city created  teams to assess each home and based the value on pre-flood price of the  home along with a deduction of insurance payments. According to a Grand  Forks official, the city also changed existing land-use ordinances to  prevent future building in the 100-year flood zone.
In East Grand Forks, where nearly 99 percent of the homes were dam by the flood, officials also established a buy-out program for  approximately 400 homes located in the 100-year floodplain. The city used  local realtors to determine property values, and the city provided a 7 to 10 percent premium above the house value to account for rebuilding costs.  East Grand Forks used U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal  Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation Grant  Program funding to support its buy-out program.

		Economic Development

To focus on issues of economic recovery, the mayor of Grand Forks  formed a task force on business redevelopment comprised of 15  prominent business leaders to address issues such as getting access to  funding for business recovery and increasing opportunities for business  development and growth. The business redevelopment task force  comprised of seven committees that met regularly to discuss these issues.  Grand Forks created several business redevelopment programs using  federal funding. For example, using almost $2 million from HUD’s CDBG  program and over $5 million from the Economic Development  Administration, the city constructed Noah’s Ark, a large industrial building  developed for the purpose of providing temporary office space to any  displaced small business in the Grand Forks region. According to a Grand  Forks official, the Noah’s Ark building was converted into an Amazon.com  call center in 1999. The city also developed several projects which  incorporated mitigation techniques so those structures would be better  prepared for a future flood. For example, the city changed the design of a  convention center by raising the main event arena space of a convention  center to ground level to mitigate against future flooding. The Universit North Dakota also incorporated disaster resistant features into its  construction of a new $100 million hockey arena to protect it from  blizzards, floods, and wind.  ccording to East Grand Forks officials, the city’s business community  A relied upon the University of Minnesota’s School of Architecture to  development a strategy for economic recovery. As part of its economic  redevelopment after the flood, East Grand Forks entered into an  agreement with a major outdoor retailer to build a $7 million store if it  were to employ local residents in the store. Since its opening, the retailer  has thrived in East Grand Forks and is one of the fastest growing stores in this nationwide chain.

		Infrastructure

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

Stanley J. Czerwinski, Director, Strategic Issues Team, (202) 512-6808 or  CzerwinskiS@gao.gov.

	Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Peter Del Toro, Assistant Director,  and Shirley Hwang were the major contributors to this report.  Additionally, Patrick Breiding, Keya Chateauneuf, Christopher Harm,  Donna Miller, and Diana Zinkl also made key contributions.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

In the wake of the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, coordination and collaboration challenges created obstacles during the government's response and recovery efforts. Because of the many stakeholders involved in recovery, including all levels of government, it is critical to build collaborative relationships. Building on GAO's September 2008 report which provided several key recovery practices from past catastrophic disasters, this report presents examples of how federal, state, and local governments have effectively collaborated in the past. GAO reviewed five catastrophic disasters--the Loma Prieta earthquake (California, 1989), Hurricane Andrew (Florida, 1992), the Northridge earthquake (California, 1994), the Kobe earthquake (Japan, 1995), and the Grand Forks/Red River flood (North Dakota and Minnesota, 1997)--to identify recovery lessons. GAO interviewed officials involved in the recovery from these disasters and experts on disaster recovery. GAO also reviewed relevant legislation, policies, and the disaster recovery literature.

What GAO Found

Effective collaboration among stakeholders can play a key role in facilitating long-term recovery after a catastrophic event. Toward that end, GAO has identified four collaborative practices that may help communities rebuild from the Gulf Coast hurricanes as well as future catastrophic events: (1) Develop and communicate common goals to guide recovery. Defining common recovery goals can enhance collaboration by helping stakeholders overcome differences in missions and cultures. After the Grand Forks/Red River flood, federally-funded consultants convened various stakeholders to develop recovery goals and priorities for the city of Grand Forks. The city used these goals as a basis to create a detailed recovery action plan that helped it to implement its recovery goals. (2) Leverage resources to facilitate recovery. Collaborating groups bring different resources and capacities to the task at hand. After the Northridge earthquake, officials from the Federal Highway Administration and California's state transportation agency worked together to review highway rebuilding contracts, discuss changes, and then approve projects all in one location. This co-located, collaborative approach enabled the awarding of rebuilding contracts in 3 to 5 days--instead of the 26 to 40 weeks it could take using normal contracting procedures. This helped to restore damaged highways within a few months of the earthquake. (3) Use recovery plans to agree on roles and responsibilities. Organizations can collectively agree on who will do what by identifying roles and responsibilities in recovery plans developed either before or after a disaster takes place. Learning from its experiences from the Loma Prieta earthquake, San Francisco Bay Area officials created a plan that clearly identifies roles for all participants in order to facilitate regional recovery in the event of a future disaster. (4) Monitor, evaluate, and report on progress made toward recovery. After the 1995 earthquake, the city of Kobe and the surrounding region established processes to assess and report on recovery progress. These jurisdictions required periodic external reviews over 10 years on the progress made toward achieving recovery goals. As a result of one of these reviews, the city of Kobe gained insight into unintended consequences of how it relocated elderly earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in policy. Past recovery experiences--including practices that promote effective collaboration--offer potentially valuable lessons for future catastrophic events. FEMA has taken some steps to facilitate the sharing of such experiences among communities involved in disaster recovery. However, the agency can do more to build on and systematize the sharing of this information so that recovery lessons are better captured and disseminated for use in the future.