Background

Congress established the Council in the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 1987. The structure, membership, and  responsibilities of the Council are generally found in section 179 of Title  10, U.S. Code. A 1997 memorandum of agreement between DOD and  DOE identified several activities for the Council to perform in support of its  statutory responsibilities, including establishing support committees;  providing guidance to the support committees; and reviewing and acting  on recommendations on the nuclear weapons stockpile from the support  committees. The memorandum also states that the Council will  establish, and modify as necessary, its own procedures.
The membership of the Council is established by statute. The Council  designates the voting members of its support committees, which include a  senior executive-level Standing and Safety Committee and a subordinate,  working-level Action Officers Group. The Council and its support  committees also include nonvoting participants—referred to as observers  and technical advisors—who attend meetings to provide their particular  expertise. For example, representatives from the NNSA laboratories  attend as technical advisors, and representatives from the Navy’s  Strategic Systems Programs office may attend as observers. Figure 1  shows the membership of the Council and its support committees as of  March 2015, based on the unofficial Nuclear Matters Handbook and  information provided by the Council staff.
According to DOD’s unofficial Nuclear Matters Handbook and Council  staff, the Council conducts day-to-day operations and coordinates issues  through its hierarchy of support committees. The Action Officers Group  performs detailed analyses of issues and provides those analyses to the  Standing and Safety Committee, which reviews them and formulates  decision packages for final Council review and decision. An issue may be  sent to a lower-level committee if a higher-level committee determines  that further review and analysis are needed. Issues move to the next  higher or lower committee based on a consensus decision of the  members. Figure 2 illustrates the decision-making process of the Council  and its support committees, as described by the unofficial Nuclear  Matters Handbook and DOD and NNSA officials.
According to DOD’s unofficial Nuclear Matters Handbook and Council  staff, the frequency and timing of Council and support committee  meetings are intended to support this decision-making process. In  general, the Action Officers Group meets about twice a month. The  Standing and Safety Committee meets about once a month, after an  Action Officers Group meeting, so that it can receive results from the  Action Officers Group meetings. Likewise, the full Council also meets  about once a month, after the Standing and Safety Committee meeting,  so that the Council can receive the results from the Standing and Safety  Committee.
A key function of the Council is to provide oversight of the refurbishment  of nuclear weapons. In 2000, the Council developed a standard  process—called the Phase 6.X process—which provides a joint  framework for refurbishing nuclear weapons in order to extend their  operational lives. The Phase 6.X process includes various program  review and decision points that require Council approval before moving  forward to the next phase. For example, the Procedural Guideline for the  Phase 6.X Process requires the program office to obtain the Council’s  approval before beginning a feasibility study, development engineering, or  full-scale production phases.
In October 2005, we identified key practices that can help enhance and  sustain collaboration among federal agencies. Among the practices we  identified were (1) defining and articulating a common outcome; (2)  establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identifying and  addressing needs by leveraging resources; (4) developing mechanisms to  monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (5) reinforcing agency  accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports;  (6) establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to  operate across agency boundaries; and (7) agreeing on roles and  responsibilities. In September 2012, we found that although collaborative  mechanisms differed in complexity and scope, they all benefited from  certain key practices, many of which we had identified in October 2005.  Accordingly, in our 2012 report, we built on our past work and identified  key issues to consider when implementing collaborative mechanisms.  Among the key considerations we identified were whether the  participating agencies documented their agreement regarding how they  will be collaborating; whether participating agencies developed ways to  continually update or monitor written agreements; and whether all  relevant participants had been included.

	The Council Carries Out Its Responsibilities in a Number of Ways but Faces Challenges

The Council carries out its statutory and regulatory responsibilities in a  number of ways, including by developing requirements documents on the  size and composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile, providing  oversight of nuclear weapons refurbishment programs, and coordinating  budget matters to support the stockpile. However, the Council faces  several challenges in carrying out its assigned responsibilities, including  executing new budget-related responsibilities; planning for a greater  number of weapon refurbishment programs than in the past; and  adjusting program priorities in response to budget pressures.

		The Council Takes Various Actions to Carry Out Its Stockpile Management, Oversight, and Budget- Related Responsibilities

According to DOD and DOE officials, the Council takes various actions to  carry out its responsibilities, many of which are related to nuclear  weapons programs. The Council’s responsibilities are laid out in law and  in a 1997 memorandum of agreement between DOD and DOE. The  Council’s actions include stockpile management (i.e., developing  requirements documents on the size and composition of the nuclear  weapons stockpile), providing oversight of weapons refurbishment  programs, and coordinating budget matters to support the stockpile. The  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 gave the Council  several new budget-related responsibilities, such as certifying to  Congress whether the annual budget request for NNSA meets stockpile  program requirements, and approving programming and budget matters  pertaining to nuclear weapons programs between DOD and DOE. Table  1 shows some of the Council’s statutory responsibilities and the actions it  takes to carry out each of them, according to information and  documentation provided by the Council staff.
In addition to these responsibilities, the Council is to assess the NNSA  Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan and determine whether the plan  supports the requirements of the National Security Strategy or the most  recent Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review.   According to DOD’s unofficial Nuclear Matters Handbook, the Council  also is to coordinate the annual Joint Surety Report—which assesses  nuclear weapon safety and security—and send the report to the  Secretaries of Defense and Energy for signature. Finally, the Council is  to prepare a number of reports for Congress or congressional committees  on matters that include weapons refurbishment programs and stockpile- management issues.

		Council Challenges Include Executing New Responsibilities, Planning for More Refurbishment Programs, and Responding to Budget Constraints

The Council faces several challenges in carrying out its responsibilities.  Specifically, the Council faces challenges in (1) carrying out several new  budget-related responsibilities; (2) planning and providing oversight for  more nuclear weapon refurbishment programs than it has in the past; and  (3) adjusting program priorities in response to budget pressures.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 added  several new responsibilities for the Council, including approving  programming and budget matters pertaining to nuclear weapons  programs and submitting a certification on whether the annual budget  request for NNSA and its planned budget for the 4 years thereafter meet  nuclear stockpile requirements. According to DOD and NNSA officials,  these additional responsibilities require a significant amount of the  Council’s time and reduce the time it has to focus on carrying out its  traditional stockpile responsibilities. In addition, DOD and NNSA officials  told us that requirements for implementing some of these new  responsibilities are not clear. For example, the DOD officials we spoke  with expressed confusion over what might constitute “certification” of the  budget request for NNSA. The Council has met this annual responsibility  with a letter to the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services  Committees, as well as the President of the Senate and Speaker of the  House, explaining that the budget request for NNSA includes risks that  could increase if funding is reduced or if savings from NNSA initiatives  are not achieved. Though the Council has new budget-related  responsibilities, officials told us that while the Council can coordinate  across DOD and NNSA to revise plans and programs in response to  changes in budgets, funding, or cost estimates, it cannot direct the work  of DOD or NNSA and has no budget-development or formal approval  authority. For example, officials stated that while the Council is  responsible for certification of the budget request for NNSA, it does not  have the authority to direct changes to either DOD or NNSA’s work or  formally approve their budgets.
Another challenge the Council faces is planning and providing oversight  for more nuclear weapon refurbishment programs than it has in the past.  For example, in 2008, the Council provided oversight for two  refurbishment programs. As of November 2014, the Council is providing  oversight for four such programs and is planning for three additional  programs for different types of interoperable warheads. As a result,  according to Council staff, the Council’s oversight role has increased and  it is challenged in working to adjust program priorities to align with  available resources.
Finally, the Council has adjusted program priorities for the nuclear  weapons enterprise in response to budget pressures. For example, under  funding limitations resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011, as  amended, DOD estimates reductions in planned defense spending from  fiscal years 2012 through 2021 will exceed $1 trillion. NNSA has  similarly projected reductions in the level of spending it had planned for  the 5-year future years nuclear security program. Also, some NNSA  nuclear weapon programs have experienced delays and cost growth  during the past 5 years. For example, the cost estimate for one life  extension program has more than doubled since 2010. According to  NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan for Fiscal Year 2015  and DOD and NNSA officials, due to these increased costs and budget  constraints, the Council has needed to adjust program priorities for the  nuclear weapons enterprise by, for example, extending the date when the  first units will be produced for four programs. Further, the Council has  faced emerging issues—such as the increased scope of one  refurbishment program—that necessitated additional funding and  therefore an assessment of and decision on how such a change may  affect the long-term baseline plan. For example, as one program expands  and requires more resources, the Council has to assess potential ripple  effects on other programs, such as the need to extend timelines.

	The Council’s Actions Generally Follow Most but Not All Key Collaboration Practices

The Council’s actions to coordinate DOD’s and NNSA’s nuclear weapons  stockpile responsibilities are generally consistent with most of the key  practices we have identified for collaborating across agency boundaries,  including defining and articulating a common outcome; establishing  mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; identifying and addressing needs  by leveraging resources; developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate,  and report on results; and reinforcing agency accountability for  collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports. However, we  identified two areas where the Council’s actions are partially but not fully  consistent with key practices or related key considerations for  implementing collaborative mechanisms: (1) having up-to-date, written  agreements and guidance that establishes compatible policies,  procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries and  defines roles and responsibilities and (2) regularly including all relevant  participants.

		Council Actions Generally Follow Most Key Collaboration Practices

Following key practices for interagency collaboration can enhance and  sustain collaboration among federal agencies, thereby improving  performance and results. The Council’s actions are generally consistent  with most of the key practices we have identified for collaborating across  agency boundaries.
Define and articulate a common outcome: The statute establishing  the Council serves as the rationale for DOD and NNSA to work  through the Council toward a common outcome. DOD and DOE  signed a memorandum of agreement in 1997 that articulates, at a  high level, the expected activities of the Council in relation to its  statutory responsibilities.
Establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies: In November  2012, the Council adopted a high-level, long-term baseline plan for  the nuclear weapons enterprise that synchronizes NNSA nuclear  weapons life-extension programs, DOD platform-modernization  programs, and NNSA plans for recapitalizing key nuclear weapons  production infrastructure.
Identify and address needs by leveraging resources: DOD and  NNSA, through the Council, have looked for opportunities to leverage  each others’ resources. For example, in recent years, the Council has  leveraged the capabilities of DOD’s program evaluation office by  asking the office to assess aspects of NNSA’s weapons programs and  infrastructure modernization efforts.
Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results:  According to Council documents such as annual work plans and DOD  and NNSA officials, the Council and its support committees meet on a  regular basis to monitor, evaluate, and report on nuclear weapon  stockpile issues. These meetings include periodic oversight briefings  on nuclear weapon refurbishment programs. Further, the Council staff  develops an annual work plan to guide the Council’s efforts, and the  Council produces several reports each year, such as an annual report  to the congressional defense committees that includes, among other  things, a description of the Council’s activities during the preceding  year.
Reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through  agency plans and reports: According to Council officials, DOD and  NNSA officials collaborated through the Council to approve a new  Requirements and Planning Document in December 2014. The  Requirements and Planning Document specifies nuclear weapon  policies, military requirements, joint DOD and DOE planning factors,  long-term planning considerations that affect the future of the nuclear  weapons stockpile, and supporting programmatic details. In addition,  the Council submits several reports to the President or Congress on a  regular basis, including an annual report to the congressional defense  committees on, among other things, the effectiveness and efficiency  of the Council in carrying out its statutory responsibilities identified in  section 179 of Title 10, U.S. Code.

		The Council Does Not Fully Follow Collaboration Practice of Having Up-to- Date Written Agreement or Guidance

According to key practices for interagency collaboration, agencies need to  establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate  across agency boundaries, and should work together to define and agree  on their respective roles and responsibilities. Two related key  considerations are whether the participating agencies documented their  agreement regarding how they will be collaborating, and whether the  agencies developed ways to continually update or monitor their written  agreements. According to these considerations, agencies that articulate  their agreements in formal documents can strengthen their commitment  to working collaboratively, and such written agreements are most  effective when they are regularly updated and monitored.
The Council does not have an up-to-date written agreement or other  written guidance that reflects the general processes and procedures it  uses to carry out its responsibilities. DOD and DOE signed a 1997  memorandum of agreement to guide the Council’s efforts. However, this  agreement has not been updated in almost 18 years, during which time  the Council’s responsibilities have expanded—particularly on budget- related issues—and the fiscal environment in which the Council operates  has changed. Further, the agreement is high level and does not provide  information on the roles, responsibilities, structure, and functions of the  Council’s support committees; how the Council and its support  committees are to work together; or the general processes and time  frames the Council and its support committees should follow to carry out  their responsibilities. Some officials told us that, as a result, the processes  that the Council and its support committees follow can vary depending on  the preferences of officials in key positions and can change when the  officials holding those positions change. For example, DOD and NNSA  officials said that the frequency and regularity of Action Officers Group  meetings has varied depending on who was serving as the Executive  Secretary of the Standing and Safety Committee. Nor is such information  set out in other formal documents, with the exception of the Council’s  process for overseeing nuclear weapon refurbishment programs, which is  documented in the Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process.  However, the Phase 6.X process document is 15 years old and has not  been updated. The Council began an effort to update that document in  2011, and that effort is ongoing as of March 2015.
According to DOD and NNSA officials, the Council has not updated the  1997 memorandum of agreement or developed other formal guidance to  reflect the processes it will use to carry out its responsibilities, because  some officials do not believe it is necessary and want to preserve the  Council’s flexibility in how it carries out its responsibilities by minimizing  written guidance. However, the Council could formally document its  general processes and procedures and still preserve some flexibility in  how it carries out its responsibilities. Some officials said that it could be  beneficial to update the memorandum of agreement to institutionalize the  processes the Council and its support committees will use to carry out the  Council’s responsibilities because doing so might improve the clarity and  consistency of those processes regardless of who holds key positions in  the Council and its support committees.
According to our prior work on key considerations when implementing  collaborative mechanisms, the action of two agencies articulating roles  and responsibilities into a written document can be a powerful tool for  collaboration, and doing so can codify a clear understanding of those  roles and responsibilities. Without an updated memorandum of  agreement that describes the roles, responsibilities, structure, and  functions of the Council’s two support committees, how the Council and  these groups are to work together, and the general processes and time  frames the Council and its support committees should follow to carry out  statutory responsibilities, it may be difficult for the Council to provide  greater clarity to its members and the support committees on how to  conduct their work—particularly for recently-added responsibilities such  as certifying the annual budget request for NNSA. For example, officials  told us that there has been confusion over the process and means the  Council should use to “certify” the budget request for NNSA and  disagreement over when and what budget information should be made  available to the Council for that purpose. According to key considerations,  clarity can come from agencies working together to define and agree on  their respective roles, responsibilities, and steps for decision making.  Documenting processes in this case would require DOD and NNSA to  first work together to come to agreement on what certification means,  what data should be assessed, and when that data should be provided to  the Council, and then to codify that agreement in writing.
Similar documentation has been created for groups within DOD that,  while not interagency groups, share a structure analogous to the  Council’s that involves collaboration among members drawn from across  different entities. For example, the DOD Instruction regarding the Defense  Materiel Readiness Board provides guidance on the composition,  functions, and procedures of the board. It also provides guidance  establishing two subgroups and identifying their membership,  responsibilities, and procedures. The guidance indicates that issues and  recommendations are to be coordinated in the subgroups before they are  presented to the board. Without similar documentation of Council  processes—such as an update to the 1997 memorandum of agreement  that describes the support committees and their procedures, including  specifying the thresholds for when an issue should move up in the  Council’s decision-making hierarchy—it will be difficult for the Council to  institutionalize its processes. For example, some officials told us there  have been times when issues were pulled up to the Council before being  fully vetted by the lower-level committees, which in their view diminished  the quality of the information provided to the Council for decision making  and led to delays.

		The Council Does Not Fully Follow Collaboration Practice of Routinely Including All Relevant Participants

A key consideration when implementing collaborative mechanisms is  whether all relevant participants have been included. According to our  prior work on this key consideration, even when the right agencies are  participating, their efforts can be limited if they do not have the right staff  to address policy and program challenges. Further, it is helpful when  participants have full knowledge of the relevant resources in their agency  and are able to regularly attend all activities of the collaborative  mechanism. The DOD and NNSA budget and program evaluation  offices are relevant to the Council’s efforts in light of the Council’s new  budget-related responsibilities and the programmatic and fiscal  challenges it must take into account in setting priorities for the nuclear  weapons stockpile. However, these offices are not required to  consistently and routinely attend the meetings of the Council’s Standing  and Safety Committee and its Action Officers Group. DOD and NNSA  officials told us that representatives from DOD’s budget and program  evaluation offices are invited to and generally attend most Standing and  Safety Committee and Action Officers Group meetings, especially if there  is a specific item on the meeting agenda that is budget-related. However,  they said that representatives from NNSA’s budget and program  evaluation offices are invited at the discretion of NNSA members and  generally do not attend Standing and Safety Committee and Action  Officers Group meetings.
According to DOD and NNSA officials, the Council has not required that  representatives from both the DOD and NNSA budget and program  evaluation offices be invited and regularly attend meetings of the  Council’s Standing and Safety Committee and its Action Officers Group  because those offices fulfill a technical consulting role and are needed  only at meetings that are expected to directly involve budget-related  issues. These officials told us that most of the Council’s efforts are not  directly related to budget issues. Further, they said that the views of those  offices are taken into account on budget-related issues. However, if  representatives from both DOD’s and NNSA’s budget and program  evaluation offices do not consistently and routinely attend all Standing  and Safety Committee and Action Officers Group meetings, opportunities  to enlist their expertise may be lost if unanticipated budget issues arise  during meetings. For example, some DOD and NNSA officials told us that  it would be helpful to have budget and program evaluation officials  consistently attend and bring their perspective to support committee  meetings because many issues, in their view, ultimately come down to  cost and how to arrange priorities given budget constraints.
In light of current fiscal constraints, growing refurbishment costs, and the  Council’s new budget-related responsibilities, the Council’s support  committees are dealing with budget and affordability issues more than  they have in the past. Without requiring the consistent and routine  participation of budget and program evaluation officials to provide their  expertise, the attendance of these officials is left to the discretion of the  inviting members, and the Council’s support committees may be limited in  their ability to deal with budget and cost questions as they arise,  particularly when the issues on the agenda do not appear to be directly  budget-related. Also, the Council may be limited in its ability to carry out  its new budget-related responsibilities if DOD and NNSA budget and  program evaluation officials are not required to attend all meetings of the  Standing and Safety Committee and the Action Officers Group. Moreover,  requiring those officials’ attendance would better position the Council to  address the recommendations of the Congressional Advisory Panel on  the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, including aligning the  planning, resourcing, and execution of sustainment and modernization  programs for nuclear weapons and their supporting infrastructure with  DOD’s delivery platforms.

	Conclusions

The Council’s important role as the focal point for interagency activities is  becoming more challenging as the nuclear weapons stockpile, delivery  systems, and infrastructure all age, while budgets remain constrained.  The Council has taken steps to coordinate programs across DOD and  DOE, but its actions are not fully consistent with some key practices and  considerations for interagency collaboration. Employing these key  practices would be an important step in improving DOD and NNSA  collaboration on the Council. For example, updating the 18-year old  memorandum of agreement to describe the general processes of the  Council and, in particular, the roles, responsibilities, structure, and  functions of its support committees—without being overly prescriptive— would better position DOD and NNSA’s collaborative efforts by providing  greater clarity on how the Council’s work is to be conducted, especially  for the Council’s new budget-related responsibilities. Also, requiring the  consistent and routine attendance of both DOD and NNSA budget and  program evaluation officials in all Standing and Safety Committee and  Action Officers Group meetings would better position DOD and NNSA to  consider how to carry out the Council’s newer, budget-related  responsibilities, which are likely to grow in importance as the Council  begins providing oversight for more refurbishment programs and  continues to adjust priorities at a time when budgets are expected to  remain flat.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance collaboration between DOD and NNSA, we recommend that  the Secretaries of Defense and Energy update the 1997 memorandum of  agreement for the Council, and, as part of this update, take the following  two actions: describe the roles, responsibilities, structure, and functions of the  Council’s two support committees, how the Council and these groups  are to work together, and the general processes and time frames the  Council and its support committees should follow to carry out statutory  responsibilities and  include a requirement that budget and program evaluation officials  from both DOD and NNSA will consistently and routinely attend all  meetings of the Council’s two support committees.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOD and NNSA for their review and  comment. In written comments, DOD generally agreed with both of our  recommendations but offered an alternative method of implementation.   NNSA agreed with both our recommendations and said it would work  collaboratively with the Council and DOD to update the memorandum of  agreement and, as part of this effort, ensure appropriate guidance is  issued to document requirements for the Council’s two support  committees and for participation of budget and evaluation officials in  support committee meetings. DOD’s and NNSA’s written comments are  reproduced in appendixes IV and V, respectively. DOD also provided  technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. NNSA did not  provide technical comments.
For our first recommendation, DOD agreed to update the 1997  memorandum of agreement for the Council. In its comments, DOD  proposed that once the memorandum of agreement was updated and  fully coordinated with all members of the Council, the Council Chairman  would issue a letter to the Council members documenting the roles and  responsibilities, structure, and functions of the Council’s support  committees. DOD believed that this approach was more appropriate than  including that information in the high-level agreement between the  Secretaries of Defense and Energy. According to DOD’s written  comments, this approach would preserve the Council’s ability to quickly  respond to changing needs without the delay and inherent challenges of  renegotiating an interagency memorandum of agreement. We believe that  this is a reasonable approach and meets the intent of our  recommendation to institutionalize the roles, responsibilities, structure,  and functions of the Council’s two support committees—the Standing and  Safety Committee and the Action Officers Group—in a formal document.
For our second recommendation, DOD stated that the letter from the  Council Chairman that would be developed to address our first  recommendation would require that budget and program evaluation  officials from both DOD and NNSA consistently and routinely attend  meetings of the Council and its support committees. Such a requirement  would meet the intent of our recommendation by ensuring that the  expertise of budget and program evaluation officials would be available at  all Standing and Safety Committee and Action Officers Group meetings.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and  Administrator of NNSA. In addition, this report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact Joseph Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 (kirschbaumj@gao.gov) or  David Trimble at (202) 512-3841 (trimbled@gao.gov). Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found   on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix VI.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our review assessed: (1) how the Nuclear Weapons Council (Council)  carries out its statutory and regulatory responsibilities and any challenges  it faces in doing so and (2) the extent to which the Council’s actions are  consistent with key practices for interagency collaboration. To address  these objectives, we reviewed relevant laws, agreements, and guidance  and interviewed officials from the Council; the Department of Defense  (DOD); the Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear  Security Administration (NNSA); and the Office of Management and  Budget. We also reviewed the November 2014 final report of the  Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security  Enterprise.
To determine how the Council carries out its statutory and regulatory  responsibilities and identify any challenges it faces in doing so, we  reviewed DOD, NNSA, and Council documents related to those  responsibilities, such as Council reports and decision memorandums, and  we interviewed DOD and NNSA officials. Specifically, we identified the  Council’s statutory and regulatory responsibilities and asked Council staff  to respond to specific questions on a subset of those responsibilities. We  selected the subset of responsibilities to ask the Council staff about  based on whether a responsibility was related to management of the  nuclear weapons stockpile or nuclear weapons refurbishment. For each  responsibility in our subset, we asked the Council staff about the process  and guidance used in carrying out the responsibility; any resulting output  and the recipient or recipients of that output; and any challenges or  limitations in carrying out the responsibility. We corroborated the Council  staff’s responses by reviewing documentation, such as Council reports  and decision memorandums.
To evaluate the extent to which the Council’s actions are consistent with  key practices for interagency collaboration, we reviewed documents that  described Council processes, including the 1997 memorandum of  agreement between DOD and DOE; DOD’s unofficial Nuclear Matters  Handbook; and the Council’s Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X  Process and interviewed DOD and NNSA officials about the Council’s  structure and processes. We also reviewed a nonprobability sample of  four programs and activities in which the Council plays a role, for use as  examples of Council processes in action. We selected our nonprobability  sample by first identifying the programs and activities in which the Council  plays a role and then grouping those programs and activities into three  categories: (1) weapon programs; (2) infrastructure-related activities; and  (3) other activities related to the Council’s statutory responsibilities. We  then selected four programs and activities from those categories to  provide a cross-section of the types of programs and activities the Council  oversees. Specifically, we selected the B61-12 life-extension program;  the W76-1 life-extension program; the plutonium strategy; and budget- related activities, such as the Council’s certification of the annual budget  request for NNSA and its adjustments to its long-term baseline plan for  the nuclear weapons enterprise in response to the budget effect of  emerging issues on the W88 Alteration 370 program. We limited our  review of each example we selected to its latest decision cycle, to ensure  that we focused on recent implementation of Council processes. For  each program or activity we selected, we reviewed documentation of the  Council’s actions, such as program briefings, decision memorandums,  meeting minutes, and reports and letters. We reviewed each selected  program or activity in terms of the processes the Council used to provide  oversight of the program or activity; we did not review the selected  programs and activities themselves. We compared the information we  obtained from our review of the Council’s processes and their  implementation against key practices for implementing effective  interagency collaboration that we identified in October 2005. We also  compared the information we obtained from our review against key  considerations when implementing collaborative mechanisms that we  identified in September 2012. We corroborated our comparison in  interviews with DOD and NNSA officials.
We interviewed officials and, where appropriate, obtained documentation  from the organizations listed below:  Department of Defense (DOD)
Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical,  Joint Staff/Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
U.S. Air Force/Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Division
U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
U.S. Navy/Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/Strategy and Policy
U.S. Navy/Strategic Systems Programs
U.S. Strategic Command/Global Strike Capabilities Division  National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation
Office of Defense Programs
Management and Budget Office  Office of Management and Budget  Force Structure and Investment Branch  We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to May 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Membership of the Nuclear Weapons Council and Its Support Committees

Appendix III: Nuclear Weapons Council Statutory Responsibilities

Statutory responsibilities identified in Section 179 of Title 10, United  States Code are as follows:  (d) Responsibilities—The Council shall be responsible for the following  matters:  1.  Preparing the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.  2.  Developing nuclear weapons stockpile options and the costs of  such options and alternatives.  3.  Coordinating and approving programming and budget matters  pertaining to nuclear weapons programs between the Department  of Defense and the Department of Energy.  4.  Identifying various options for cost-effective schedules for nuclear  weapons production.  5.  Considering safety, security, and control issues for existing  weapons and for proposed new weapon program starts.  6.  Ensuring that adequate consideration is given to design,  performance, and cost tradeoffs for all proposed new nuclear  weapons programs.  7.  Providing specific guidance regarding priorities for research on  nuclear weapons and priorities among activities, including  production, surveillance, research, construction, and any other  programs within the National Nuclear Security Administration.  8.  Coordinating and approving activities conducted by the  Department of Energy for the study, development, production, and  retirement of nuclear warheads, including concept definition  studies, feasibility studies, engineering development, hardware  component fabrication, warhead production, and warhead  retirement.  9.  Preparing comments on annual proposals for budget levels for  research on nuclear weapons and transmitting those comments to  the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy before the  preparation of the annual budget requests by the Secretaries of  those departments.  10. Coordinating and approving the annual budget proposals of the  National Nuclear Security Administration.  11. Providing— (A) broad guidance regarding priorities for research  on improved conventional weapons, and (B) comments on annual  proposals for budget levels for research on improved conventional  weapons, and transmitting such guidance and comments to the  Secretary of Defense before the preparation of the annual budget  request of the Department of Defense.  (e) Report on difficulties relating to safety or reliability—The Council  shall submit to Congress a report on any analysis conducted by the  Council with respect to difficulties at nuclear weapons laboratories or  nuclear weapons production plants that have significant bearing on  confidence in the safety or reliability of nuclear weapons or nuclear  weapon types.  (f) Budget and funding matters—(1) The Council shall submit to  Congress each year, at the same time the budget of the President for the  fiscal year beginning in such year is submitted to Congress pursuant to  section 1105(a) of title 31, a certification whether or not the amounts  requested for the National Nuclear Security Administration in such  budget, and anticipated over the four fiscal years following such budget,  meets nuclear stockpile and stockpile stewardship program requirements  for such fiscal year and over such four fiscal years. If a member of the  Council does not concur in a certification, the certification shall include the  reasons for the member’s non-concurrence. (2) If a House of Congress  adopts a bill authorizing or appropriating funds for the National Nuclear  Security Administration for nuclear stockpile and stockpile stewardship  program activities or other activities that, as determined by the Council,  provides insufficient funds for such activities for the period covered by  such bill, the Council shall notify the congressional defense committees of  the determination.  (g) Annual report—Each fiscal year, at the same time the President  submits the budget pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, the Chairman of  the Council, through the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the  congressional defense committees a report, in classified form, that  includes the following:  (1) The effectiveness and efficiency of the Council, and of the deliberative  and decisionmaking processes used by the Council, in carrying out the  responsibilities described in subsection (d).  (2) A description of all activities conducted by the Department of Energy  during that fiscal year, or planned to be conducted by the Department of  Energy during the next fiscal year, for the study, development, production,  and retirement of nuclear warheads and that have been approved by the  Council, including a description of—  (A) the concept definition activities and feasibility studies conducted or  planned to be conducted by the Department of Energy;  (B) the schedule for completion of each such activity or study; and  (C) the degree to which each such activity or study is consistent with  United States policy for new nuclear warhead development or  warhead modification and with established or projected military  requirements.  (3) A description of the activities of the Council during the 12-month  period ending on the date of the report together with any assessments or  studies conducted by the Council during that period.  (4) A description of the highest priority requirements of the Department of  Defense with respect to the Department of Energy stockpile stewardship  and management program as of that date.  (5) An assessment of the extent to which the requirements referred to in  paragraph (4) are being addressed by the Department of Energy as of  that date.  (6) A description and assessment of the joint efforts of the Secretary of  Defense and the Secretary of Energy to develop common security  practices that improve the security of the nuclear weapons and facilities of  the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix V: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contacts

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contacts named above, Penney Harwell Caramia,  Assistant Director; Jonathan M. Gill, Assistant Director; Colin L.  Chambers; Joanne Landesman; David E. Marroni; Timothy M. Persons;  Steven R. Putansu; Michael Shaughnessy; Amie Steele; Sarah E. Veale;  and Brenda M. Waterfield made key contributions to this report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD and DOE's NNSA are jointly responsible for managing aspects of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The Council, established by Congress in 1986, includes five senior officials from both departments; it facilitates coordination between DOD and NNSA and establishes program priorities. DOD and NNSA are working to modernize the nuclear enterprise, including delivery systems and nuclear weapons that are aging and being used longer than originally intended. DOD and NNSA project this work will cost about $332 billion through 2025.
House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review the Council's role, responsibilities, and effectiveness. This report addresses: (1) how the Council carries out its statutory and regulatory responsibilities and any challenges it faces in doing so and (2) the extent to which the Council's actions are consistent with key practices for interagency collaboration. GAO reviewed laws, agreements, and Council documents such as reports and compared Council actions with key practices and considerations for interagency collaboration that GAO identified in 2005 and 2012.

What GAO Found

The Nuclear Weapons Council (Council)—which serves as the focal point of Department of Defense (DOD) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) interagency activities to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile—carries out its statutory and regulatory responsibilities in a number of ways, but faces challenges in doing so. The Council's actions to carry out its responsibilities include documenting requirements for the size and composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile and setting stockpile priorities. The Council also provides oversight of refurbishment programs through periodic program reviews and coordinates budget matters between DOD and NNSA to support the stockpile. However, the Council faces several challenges in carrying out its responsibilities. The Council's challenges include carrying out several new budget-related responsibilities, such as certifying to Congress whether the annual budget request for NNSA meets stockpile requirements; providing oversight for two more refurbishment programs than it has previously; and adjusting program priorities in response to budget pressures, such as delays and cost growth experienced by some NNSA nuclear weapons programs.
The Council's actions to coordinate DOD's and NNSA's nuclear weapons stockpile responsibilities are generally consistent with most key practices for interagency collaboration, but the Council's actions are not fully consistent with those practices and related key considerations in two areas. First, key practices for interagency collaboration call for agencies to define their respective roles, responsibilities, and steps for decision making and to have a current written agreement on how they will collaborate. The Council does not have an up-to-date agreement that reflects the processes it uses to carry out its responsibilities. The 1997 memorandum of agreement between DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE) that is to guide the Council's efforts has not been updated, although the Council's responsibilities were expanded in 2013, and it does not define the roles, responsibilities, structure, and functions of the two support committees that conduct the Council's day-to-day operations. Council officials said they have not updated the agreement because they do not believe it is necessary and that doing so could restrict their flexibility by being too prescriptive. However, other officials said there has been confusion and disagreement over some Council processes such as certifying the budget request for NNSA and that updating the memorandum of agreement might improve the clarity and consistency of the Council's processes. Without an updated memorandum of agreement that describes Council processes, it may be difficult for the Council to provide greater clarity to support committee members on how their work is to be conducted. Second, a key consideration when implementing collaborative mechanisms is whether all relevant participants have been included in the effort. However, DOD and NNSA budget and program evaluation officials are not required to attend Council support committee meetings. DOD budget and program evaluation officials are invited and generally attend, but NNSA budget and program evaluation officials generally do not attend because they are invited at the discretion of NNSA support committee members. Without a requirement that both DOD and NNSA budget and program evaluation officials consistently attend all support committee meetings, the Council may be limited in its ability to manage and respond to unanticipated budget questions as they arise at meetings.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD and DOE update the Council's 1997 memorandum of agreement to (1) describe Council processes and its two support committees' roles, responsibilities, structure, and functions and (2) require that DOD and NNSA budget and program evaluation officials attend all support committee meetings. DOD and NNSA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.