Background

The Marine Corps has been developing new concepts for expeditionary  operations that are characterized by an increase in mobility, flexibility,  and depth of operations. To successfully conduct these operations, the  Marine Corps relies on a “fires triad” composed of land-based artillery and  mortars, attack planes and helicopters, and sea-based surface ships to  destroy or suppress enemy forces. Figure 1 shows the fires triad concept.
The systems within the fires triad are considered complementary. For  example, while surface ships provide the majority of supporting fires for  ground forces during the early phases of expeditionary operations, land- based artillery and mortars assume a greater role in later phases as more  of these assets are placed ashore. Some legs of the triad offer capabilities  others cannot. The guns of artillery and surface ships are more capable of  providing volume of fire—large amounts of sustained fire to suppress or  destroy a target—while aircraft are used for long-range precision strikes or  attacks on moving targets. Regardless of each system’s capabilities or  contributions, all components of the triad are considered necessary for  success.
The sea-based portion of the triad is referred to as naval surface fire  support and is traditionally provided by the guns and missiles onboard  Navy surface ships. For decades the Navy had provided this capability  with the 16-inch guns of the Iowa class battleships that were eventually  taken out of service due to the high cost of their operations and  maintenance. With the decommissioning of the last Iowa class battleship  in 1992, the Navy was left with only the short-range (13 nautical miles) 5- inch guns on destroyers and cruisers to provide naval surface fire support.  According to the Navy, new and improved coastal defense systems  deployed by potential adversaries required that Navy ships protect  themselves by coming no closer than 25 nautical miles to shore, rendering  the existing 5-inch guns ineffective for fire support. In May 1992, the Navy  approved a mission need statement for naval surface fire support that  recognized this gap in capabilities and called for new or improved systems  that could provide increased range, lethality, and accuracy. Since that  time, the Navy and Marine Corps have conducted a number of studies to  identify possible solutions for this gap and to clarify the needs and  requirements associated with naval surface fire support.
In 1994, the Navy developed a plan to improve naval surface fire support  by upgrading existing 5-inch guns on Arleigh Burke class destroyers and  Ticonderoga class cruisers and developing a new 5-inch guided munition  for near-term capabilities, and considered options for long-term  capabilities as it developed concepts for a new surface combatant ship.  Eventually, these concepts evolved into the Extended Range Munition and  the Zumwalt class destroyer programs. The establishment of basic  requirements by the Marine Corps supported efforts to develop these  systems. Marine Corps analysis concluded that since ground-based  artillery would be unavailable during the initial stages of an expeditionary  operation, naval surface fire support must provide, at a minimum, the  same range, accuracy, and lethality as current artillery systems. In 1995,  the Navy began to incorporate this analysis into its plans for acquiring new  weapons systems by approving an initial range requirement of 41 to 63  nautical miles, assuming a 25 nautical mile stand-off range. As Marine  Corps thinking on expeditionary operations evolved over the next decade,  more requirements would be added.

	Agreement on Requirements Took over a Decade and Did Not Address Quantitative Measures for Volume of Fire

For over 10 years the Marine Corps worked with the Navy to develop  requirements for naval surface fire support that align with the concept of  expeditionary operations. It was not until December 2005 that, as a result  of the joint requirements process, an agreement was reached. This  agreement provides the basis for meeting the fire support needs of the  warfighter through a variety of solutions by attempting to define the  effects required. One issue the agreement has not resolved is the lack of a  clear definition for volume of fire. According to the Marine Corps, volume  fires are necessary to execute expeditionary operations, but quantifiable  volume fires requirements have not been established due to the variance in  effects desired from mission to mission and the planned use of precision  munitions. Clearer requirements would inform the acquisition of planned  systems and aid in determining capabilities of any future systems.

		Validated Requirements for Naval Surface Fire Support Are Derived from Marine Corps Concepts for Expeditionary Operations

Although the Marine Corps further defined its needs for naval surface fire  support over the last 10 years, it only recently reached agreement with the  Navy on a new set of requirements through the Joint Capabilities  Integration and Development System, a joint process for establishing  requirements. This process resulted in the Joint Fires in Support of  Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities  Document, which incorporated and validated the Marine Corps’s  requirements for naval surface fire support. These requirements are based  on the concept of expeditionary operations that the service has been  developing since 1992. Table 1 describes the documents and events central  to creation of this concept.
According to the concept created by the Marine Corps, the fundamental  aspect that defines expeditionary operations—sea-based forces operating  with increased depth and mobility in multiple dispersed units—establishes  certain requirements for naval surface fire support. Since land-based  artillery is restricted by the need for a large presence ashore, and air-based  fire support can be restricted by weather conditions, the importance of  sea-based naval surface fire support increases. The depth of operations  envisioned requires ship-based guns and other systems with considerable  range, while the speed and mobility envisioned demand rapid response  times. Fire support for expeditionary forces also requires accuracy and  precision, to increase the probability that targets are destroyed or disabled  and reduce the possibility of marines being killed when calling for  munitions to land close to their own positions. Sustainability and lethality  are needed as well to compensate for the firepower removed from Marine  units to preserve their speed and agility. According to the Marine Corps,  volume of fire, defined as large quantities of munitions delivered over time  or simultaneously to suppress or destroy a target, is also necessary to  immobilize or destroy the enemy and enable maneuver. These  requirements surpass the abilities of the Navy’s existing 13 nautical mile  range 5-inch guns, necessitating the development and fielding of new  weapons systems or the acceptance of risks in executing expeditionary  operations.
The Marine Corps quantified many of the requirements for naval surface  fire support to better communicate them to the Navy and aid in the  development of new systems. While an initial range requirement was  established in 1995, the Marine Corps identified a number of additional  requirements for naval surface fire support that clarify the needs for  expeditionary operations. These requirements were identified in a series  of three letters from 1996 to 2002, with the last letter describing  requirements in terms of desired near-, mid-, and far-term capabilities. The  Marine Corps also provided rationale for its needs by providing an  explanation of each of the requirements. Table 2 lists the requirements as  described in the last of these letters. The Marine Corps sought to use these  letters to establish a more formal agreement on the needs for naval surface  fire support, and even drafted a memorandum of agreement in 2003. While  the Navy did not sign this memorandum, many of the requirements  presented in the letters were used in the development of systems and  technologies to provide fire support. Agreement was reached when the  Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which oversees requirements  development for all four services, approved the Joint Fires in Support of  Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document  in December 2005. This document incorporated and validated Marine  Corps requirements for naval surface fire support.

		Requirements for Volume of Fire Remain Unclear

While some of the Marine Corps requirements for naval surface fire  support have been quantified, validated, and applied to Navy systems in  development, the requirement for volume of fire remains less defined. The  Marine Corps has consistently maintained the need for these fires and has  described their use under the concept of expeditionary operations. The  Marine Corps defines volume of fire as large quantities of munitions  delivered over time or simultaneously to suppress or destroy a target. This  definition establishes two types of volume fires: suppression, which  requires a large quantity of munitions delivered on a target or group of  targets in an area over a period of time, and destruction, where a large  quantity of munitions are delivered simultaneously with as much accuracy  as possible. Marine Corps officials have also identified an increasing need  for multiple simultaneous suppression or destruction missions to support  dispersed units. While the Marine Corps’s letters on naval surface fire  support provide definitions of these missions, the requirements provided  do not offer quantitative measures of effectiveness or success for all the  key elements of volume of fire. The firing rate of weapon systems and their  ability to deliver multiple rounds simultaneously are highlighted as  important, but other factors—such as the amount of time or munitions  typically required for suppression, or the number of simultaneous  engagements to be supported—remain undefined.
Marine Corps and Navy officials have stated that the advent of precision  munitions for naval surface fire support further complicates requirements  and definitions for volume of fire. Currently, volume fires are provided by  ground-based artillery and mortars firing large amounts of inexpensive,  unguided munitions. Due to the perceived benefits of precision in air- delivered weapons and the need to deliver naval surface fire support from  greater distances due to shore-based threats, the Navy has been  developing guided munitions for fire support. These munitions have the  potential to deliver far greater precision and lethality than unguided  munitions, but the high cost of procurement—up to $54,500 per round for  the Extended Range Munition against $1,633 for the current 5-inch  projectile—could preclude the Navy from deploying them in the large  quantities posited for volume fires. Marine Corps officials have stated that  the concept of providing volume of fire with precision munitions is  currently being analyzed and that changes to the way volume fires are  employed could be possible. For instance, as the lethality and precision of  munitions increase, it may be possible to change the way targets are  selected and use fewer rounds to achieve volume effects. Officials state,  however, that there are still scenarios in which large sustained quantities  of munitions are necessary.
The ambiguity surrounding volume of fire, especially when such missions  are executed with precision weapons, has a direct impact on the  procurement of munitions for naval surface fire support. The Navy uses an  estimating process, known as the non-nuclear ordnance requirements  process, to assist in determining the number of munitions needed to  support the warfighter. According to Navy officials, to accurately estimate  the number of rounds needed for volume fires the model requires—but  does not have—a definition of the effects desired from volume fires. In  addition, the process does not currently account for the new capabilities  offered by the precision weapons under development for naval fires.  Without the Marine Corps’s definition of these effects, the model will  produce inaccurate or unrealistic estimates of the number of rounds  needed. Navy officials identified other shortcomings in both the  information provided by the Navy and Marine Corps and in the  assumptions used to model naval surface fire support procurement  quantities. For instance, the model does not provide enough fidelity in the  distance to targets or properly account for the number of precision rounds  carried in each ship. The Marine Corps, through the Expeditionary  Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, is working  with the Navy to refine the data provided to the non-nuclear ordnance  requirements process as well as the assumptions made within the process  itself.
The inability to quantify requirements for volume of fire also affects the  ability of the Navy to develop systems to meet the Marine Corps’s needs.  The Marine Corps has stated that the effects desired from volume of fire  varies from mission to mission and therefore is difficult to quantify.  However, the variance in desired effects from scenario to scenario is a  challenge in other warfare areas as well. In the absence of requirements  that define at least minimum capabilities for common scenarios, such as  the duration and quantity of fire needed to suppress a target, it may be  difficult to develop cost effective systems that meet Marine Corps needs.

	Naval Surface Fire Support Systems Have Experienced Cost and Schedule Growth and Will Deliver Less Capability Than Originally Planned

The Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have required  additional funding and time for development and will not be fielded in the  quantities initially planned. Development of the Extended Range Munition  has been delayed by nearly 11 years due to technical and programmatic  challenges, resulting in cost growth of over 550 percent from initial  estimates. The Navy continues to face challenges related to the  affordability and viability of its plan ahead that must be overcome in order  to field the munition. Optimistic estimates and consequent cost increases  in the Zumwalt class destroyer program have resulted in reductions to  both ship quantities and munition capacities per ship, both of which will  seriously impact capabilities available to support future expeditionary  operations. Candidate technologies to provide future naval surface fire  support capabilities are currently in development as science and  technology programs, and have not yet completed the requirements  documentation and other steps necessary to enter the acquisition process.

		Affordability Concerns in the Zumwalt Class Destroyer Program Have Led to Reductions in Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities and Procurement Quantities

The Zumwalt class destroyer will deliver far fewer quantities of ships and  munitions for naval surface fire support than envisioned 10 years ago. The  primary reason for this reduced capability is that the Navy’s concept for  the Zumwalt class destroyer promised revolutionary performance at an  unrealistically low cost. In 2001, the Department of Defense recognized  that additional time and money were required to develop and field the  destroyer and concluded that a new approach was necessary. Through a  series of decisions, the Navy restructured the program by adding time for  technology development, trading naval surface fire support capability for  lower costs, and reducing the planned number of ships. At the same time,  other ship capabilities were maintained or even expanded, leading to  increased cost and additional technical risk. The capability trades and  quantity reductions in the Zumwalt class destroyer program increase the  Navy’s dependence on the less capable Extended Range Munition (ERM)  to provide naval surface fire support, as shown in figure 4.
The Zumwalt class destroyer program represents the Navy’s solution for  addressing a mission need identified in 1994 for a 21st century surface  combatant capable of, among other things, projecting sustained naval  surface fire support for amphibious and other ground forces. The program  was derived from a concept for a tailored capability ship identified as the  Maritime Fire Support Ship. This concept featured significant naval fires  capabilities—including two advanced 155 millimeter gun systems capable  of firing a land attack munition up to 100 nautical miles—as well as robust  surface and subsurface warfare capabilities, reduced signatures, and  reduced crewing compared to that of current ship classes. The Navy used  the characteristics of the Maritime Fire Support Ship to serve as a basis for  developing requirements for the DD 21 land attack destroyer. These  requirements were approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council  in 1997 and featured robust capabilities related to naval surface fire  support including threshold quantities of 2 advanced gun systems, 1200  munitions capable of long range land attack, and 128 missile launch cells.  When sized to these capabilities, DD 21 was expected to displace over  17,000 long tons. Requirements also included ambitious targets for  reduced manning and a low radar cross section. DD 21 plans, along with  other Zumwalt class program events, are shown in table 4.
In 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense developed concerns that the  program’s cost estimate was unrealistic and that the program was not  adequately funded. Although originally envisioned as a tailored capability  ship, DD 21 requirements outlined a multimission ship featuring several  revolutionary technologies. These concerns prompted the Navy to  restructure the program and revisit its planned family of ships concept. As  a result, the Navy revised its family of ships approach to include a future  destroyer named DD(X), a future cruiser known as CG(X), and a new  littoral combat ship. This approach sought to take advantage of  commonality among the three programs in an effort to mitigate risk in  technology development. Figure 5 shows the different technologies  introduced through the DD 21 and DD(X) programs.
The Navy’s Surface Combatant Spiral Development Review in 2002  recommended a multimission DD(X) configured with 2 advanced gun  systems, 900 land attack munitions, and 96 missile launch cells as the most  cost-effective basis for developing DD(X) requirements. These capability  reductions were expected to decrease the ship’s cost by reducing the  destroyer’s weight from nearly 17,000 long tons expected for DD 21 to  approximately 15,700 long tons. Subsequently, the Chief of Naval  Operations directed that the size of DD(X) be reduced to 14,000 long tons  while retaining multimission capability. To achieve these goals, the Navy  reduced planned DD(X) land attack munitions to 600 and decreased  minimum requirements for missile launch cells to 80 per ship. In an effort  to address Marine Corps concerns regarding the reduced naval surface fire  support capabilities offered by DD(X) as compared to DD 21, the Navy  modified the DD(X) design to include a convertible storeroom capable of  holding an additional 320 land attack munitions. The Chief of Naval  Operations also directed the Navy to revisit its plan for developing a  volume search radar for the DD(X) design. According to Navy officials,  undertaking development of a less technologically mature, but potentially  more powerful volume search radar for DD(X) was worthwhile because it  would help preserve a competitive industrial base in advance of CG(X)  development. The change would also add air defense capability to DD(X),  giving the ship capability that exceeds performance requirements.  Achieving these benefits, however, would require the Navy to delay testing  for the volume search radar and commit nearly $20 million in additional  research, development, test, and evaluation funding for the DD(X)  program to manage the significant technical risk associated with  developing the more challenging technology. One month following the  Chief of Naval Operations’s directive, the Navy modified the ship’s radar  development contract to accommodate the higher risk volume search  radar approach.
In 2004, the Department of Defense approved new program goals and  operational requirements for the DD(X) program that reflected a plan to  procure fewer ships, projecting less naval surface fire support capability  than DD 21. Figure 6 shows how program costs and quantities have  changed over time.
Continuing cost pressures in the program led the Navy to reevaluate  DD(X) capabilities, technologies, and design as part of a comprehensive  cost reduction effort. As part of this effort, the Navy eliminated the DD(X)  convertible storeroom from the ship’s design. Although yielding  approximately $19 million in procurement savings per ship, this decision  reduced the ship’s naval surface fire support capability by almost 35  percent. Other DD(X) capabilities and technologies including the ship’s  dual band radar (volume search radar and multifunction radar), integrated  computing environment, and reduced signature features were not  significantly affected during this process. According to Navy officials,  contractor estimates have identified $265 million in procurement savings  achieved for each Zumwalt class destroyer.
In 2006, the Navy changed the name of the DD(X) program to DDG 1000  Zumwalt class destroyer and reduced planned ship quantities to 7.  Although this decision reflected the practical realities of recognizing more  realistic costs, these reductions nevertheless increase the Navy’s reliance  on successful outcomes in the Extended Range Munition program in order  to complete future naval surface fire support missions. This reliance is  further compounded by Navy decisions that have reduced the number of  land attack munitions each Zumwalt class ship is capable of carrying.  However, because the Extended Range Munition offers less range and  capability than the DD(X) long-range land attack munition, the Navy may  be forced to accept additional risk in certain fire support missions.  Currently, the Navy plans to field the Extended Range Munition on 32  Arleigh Burke class destroyers, which will be supplemented with 7  Zumwalt class ships carrying long-range land-attack munitions.

		Navy Has Begun Development of Some Candidate Systems for Future Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities

The Navy has begun science and technology efforts for the  electromagnetic railgun and multipurpose loitering missile, but has not  approved development or fielding of these systems as formal acquisition  programs. The Office of Naval Research is leading efforts to develop and  test a prototype of the electromagnetic railgun and estimates that the  system will require approximately $216 million to complete its initial  demonstration phase in support of fielding around 2025. The  electromagnetic railgun is one of four key naval prototype efforts within  the Office of Naval Research, which together represent 50 percent of the  agency’s fiscal year 2007 proposed investment in leap-ahead innovations.
Naval Sea Systems Command is managing preliminary tests and the  development effort of the Affordable Weapon System, which is one  candidate for the multipurpose loitering missile concept. The project has  received approximately $155 million to date in support of these efforts.  While neither the electromagnetic railgun nor the multipurpose loitering  missile have been formally chosen as programs for acquisition, these  systems provide the Navy and Marine Corps with potential options for  future naval surface fire support capabilities. Further analysis by the Navy  and the Department of Defense will determine whether these technologies  are feasible and if these systems are needed.

	Needs for Naval Surface Fire Support Exceed Projected Capabilities

Based on the 2005 Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in  Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals, the Extended  Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer will not provide the full  range of capabilities needed for naval surface fire support. Analysis  performed for the initial capabilities document studied the capabilities of  systems across the services to provide fire support in the littorals and  identified 4 capability gaps—command and control of joint fires, engaging  moving targets, minimized collateral damage, and achieving volume fires  effects. While the Navy has initiated efforts to address remaining naval  surface fire support needs, it faces challenges in further defining  requirements for volume of fire, shaping acquisition outcomes to meet the  needs of the expeditionary warfighter, and managing command and  control issues related to fire support.

		Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt Class Destroyer Offer Significant Naval Surface Fire Support Capability, but Cannot Meet All the Needs of Future Warfighters

In December 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed and  validated the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the  Littorals Initial Capabilities Document, which describes some of the fire  support needs of the warfighter for the next decade as well as the gaps  that exist in meeting these needs. Needs were defined by collecting  guidance, tasks, conditions, and standards for fire support from each of  the services, including those presented by the Marine Corps’s letters on  naval surface fire support. Gaps in capability were identified by analyzing  the ability of current and planned systems throughout the fires triad,  including the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer, to  fulfill the defined needs. As could be expected from any analysis of current  versus desired capabilities, the initial capabilities document identified a  number of gaps. The document lists the gaps in order of priority as 1) the  ability to transmit and receive targeting information to enable command  and control of fire support, 2) engaging moving targets in poor weather, 3)  providing fire support when collateral damage or casualties in friendly  forces is a concern, and 4) providing volume fires to achieve suppression  of enemy targets.
While the initial capabilities document approaches fire support needs and  capabilities from a joint perspective—meaning that the need for fire  support and the systems providing it can come from the Navy, Marine  Corps, Army, or Air Force—it does address naval surface fire support  systems specifically. The Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class  destroyer were treated as planned systems within the analysis, as they are  expected to become available within the 2005 to 2015 time period  considered in the study. The analysis conducted for the initial capabilities  document revealed that if these systems are implemented as currently  planned they will provide the warfighter with improved capabilities to  engage certain targets, especially in restricted conditions such as poor  weather. However, they do not provide enough additional capability to  close any of the four gaps. Future systems for naval surface fire support,  such as the electromagnetic rail gun and the multipurpose loitering  missile, were not considered as they will not be available until after 2015.
The analysis performed for the initial capabilities document discussed a  number of weaknesses in current and planned naval surface fire support  systems. For instance, the analysis determined that Navy ships cannot take  full advantage of targeting information communicated from other systems  affecting their ability to provide accurate fire support, especially when  collateral damage is a concern. Munitions currently in use or development  also lack the ability to hit moving targets, as they have neither the sensors  to detect moving targets nor the ability to update the location of targets  while in flight. The need for volume fires is not fully met by the Extended  Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer either, and multiple,  simultaneous calls for volume fire provide a challenge as well. Officials  state that this gap in volume of fire persists despite the low number of  calls for suppression anticipated by the analysis—5 targets or 0.3 percent  of the total fires called for in the scenarios analyzed—due to the  reductions made in munitions available for naval surface fire support and  uncertainty about the effects expected.

		Risks Remain in the Navy’s Approach for Addressing Future Needs in Naval Surface Fire Support

			Requirements for Volume of Fires Need Further Definition

The Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals  Initial Capabilities Document provides greater definition for volume of  fire than articulated in earlier Marine Corps’s correspondence on naval  surface fire support, presenting new measures of effectiveness for  suppression. The document establishes a minimum capability needed to  fill the gap in volume fires for suppression that includes measures of  effectiveness for probability of damage against targets and a number of  targets to suppress as well as capabilities like range and rate of fire.  However, these desired minimum capabilities still lack a measure for the  duration of fire, or how long targets need to be suppressed or fired upon to  cause the stated amount of damage, and the amount of munitions needed  to cause these effects. Instead of providing measures for these capabilities,  the document reiterates previous analyses by stating that more specific  volume requirements are dependant on the situation. Initial capabilities  documents, like the Joint Fires document, do not generally establish  requirements but only suggest capabilities. A set of requirements that  quantitatively captures all the capabilities potentially needed is a  necessary precursor for the Department of Defense to determine whether  and how to address any resultant capability gap regarding volume fires.

			Current Navy Practices for Managing Resources and Requirements Increase Risk That Warfighter Needs Will Go Unaddressed

Navy processes for defining requirements and allocating resources for  naval surface fire support systems may result in acquisition outcomes that  do not align with the priorities of the expeditionary warfighter. The Navy’s  Expeditionary Warfare Division is charged with developing capabilities  and requirements for naval surface fire support. However, this division has  not had a formal oversight role in the Extended Range Munition and  Zumwalt class destroyer programs. Instead, the Navy has assigned  management of requirements and resources for these programs to its  Surface Warfare division, which is charged with developing capabilities  and requirements for destroyers and other surface ships. This approach  places the Navy at risk for making investment decisions in its naval  surface fire support programs without fully understanding the potential  impacts on operating concepts for expeditionary warfare.
For example, quantity requirements in the Extended Range Munition  program were initially established by the Navy’s Surface Warfare Division.  However, a 2005 report from the Department of Defense’s Office of the  Inspector General identified the Navy’s Expeditionary Warfare Division as  responsible for both analyzing warfighting requirements for the Extended  Range Munition and validating planned procurement quantities in the  program. On the basis of the Inspector General’s report the planned  quantities of the Extended Range Munition increased by over 75 percent in  order to meet Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements. In  another example, resources and requirements for the Navy’s multimission  Zumwalt class destroyer are principally managed by the Navy’s Surface  Warfare Division. Cost challenges within the program have required the  Navy to reduce planned capabilities on the ship as well as procurement  quantities, which has significantly reduced the Zumwalt class’s ability and  availability to provide naval surface fire support. This process of cost and  capability trades has been managed by the Navy’s Surface Warfare  Division, not by the customer—represented by the Navy’s Expeditionary  Warfare Division—who depends on the delivered capabilities. As a result,  current naval surface fire support capabilities of the Zumwalt class  destroyer may not be aligned with the priorities of the expeditionary  warfighter.

			Management of Command and Control Issues is Unresolved

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has designated the Navy as the  lead component to analyze the four gaps. The Navy, through its Surface  Warfare Division, has already begun the analysis for the three engagement  gaps presented in the initial capabilities document. However, no  organization has been chosen to analyze the first gap in capability, which  identified issues in fire support command and control. Any attempt to  close this gap could have consequences for systems developed to engage  targets, as they rely on the command and control architecture for target  assignment and information.

	Conclusions

Since the retirement of the battleships in 1992, the Navy and Marine Corps  have worked to develop capabilities for naval surface fire support. The  Navy and Marine Corps chose to pursue an approach in which the  Extended Range Munition would provide near-term capabilities and the  Zumwalt class destroyer would provide capabilities over the medium  term. However, this investment strategy was defined by low levels of  technical knowledge and poor estimates of the financial resources that  would be needed to acquire this capability. As a result, the acquisition of  systems for naval surface fire support has been plagued by technical and  budgetary challenges that have delayed the fielding of any significant  capability.
The recent joint analysis of fire support for forces operating in the littorals  has been an important and constructive process in generating agreement  and improving the knowledge base required to reconcile needs and assets.  Yet, more work needs to be done to reconcile these differences, as  evidenced by the gaps identified in the joint analysis. The presence of gaps  in capabilities should be expected from any analysis of current resources,  and it does not necessarily follow that all gaps must be closed with more  resources. However, if gaps are to remain in place, this result should be  the product of deliberate analysis and decision making that takes into  account the views of the warfighter. At this point, there are several issues  whose resolution will enable the kind of analysis needed to fully reconcile  naval surface fire support needs with fire support assets.
First, although the Marine Corps has quantified many of its requirements  for naval surface fire support in a way that allows the Navy to guide  development of its systems, volume of fire remains ill-defined. While the  Marine Corps maintains the importance of volume fires, the failure to even  roughly quantify needs within thresholds and objectives leads to the  absence of this capability in the systems the Navy develops as well as  difficulty in planning munition procurement. By working with the Navy  and other services to better define the effects required and to create  operational concepts for a system or combination of systems that could  achieve volume effects, the Marine Corps may be able to better provide  this capability to warfighters in future conflicts.
Second, although the Navy and Marine Corps have reached an  understanding on naval surface fire support requirements as a whole,  translation of this understanding to the capabilities and quantities of  individual systems must yet be reached. Over the past 10 years, the  decisions made on individual systems such as the Extended Range  Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer have reduced the capabilities  the Navy plans to make available to provide fire support for the Marine  Corps’s operations. These decisions were reached without providing a  formal role for the Navy’s Expeditionary Warfare Division in deciding the  requirements and resources allocated to platforms that provide naval  surface fire support, increasing risk that acquisition outcomes will not  align with the priorities of the expeditionary warfighter.
Third, because of challenges posed by the development of the Extended  Range Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer, the Navy is now in a  position in which it will rely more heavily on Extended Range Munition to  provide fire support than originally planned. This program still faces  significant development risks, a fact recognized by the decision of the  Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics to  elevate oversight of the program.
Finally, while the Navy’s Surface Warfare Division has begun the analysis  of gaps related to engaging targets, no office has been selected to analyze  the gap in command and control of fire support in the littorals. To ensure  that current and future systems provide a fire support function within the  larger command and control network, it is important that this gap be  analyzed in conjunction with the other identified capability gaps in joint  fire support.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the Department’s efforts to address naval surface fire support  needs, we are making the following four recommendations:    To determine the desired effects for volume of fire, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy and Marine Corps to define  quantitative requirements and operational concepts on use of volume  fires, especially when using precision weapons for suppression or  simultaneous strikes. This analysis should be used to 1) inform and  update the non-nuclear ordnance requirements process used to  determine procurement objectives for these munitions and 2) clarify  the capability gap for volume fires as identified in the Initial  Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary  Operations in the Littorals.
In order to ensure that the systems providing naval surface fire support  are aligned with the requirements and operating concepts of the forces  they assist, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Navy to provide the Chief of Naval Operations’s Expeditionary Warfare  Division, as the division charged with establishing capabilities and  requirements for naval surface fire support and liaison to the Marine  Corps, a formal role in developing requirements, determining  capabilities, and managing resources for Navy systems responsible for  providing naval surface fire support.
In light of the changes to the schedule, budget requirements, and  design of the Extended Range Munition program, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, as the program’s milestone  decision authority, conduct a comprehensive review of the program to  validate progress and acquisition plans that will incorporate results  from current and planned program studies and direct changes as  necessary.
Given the importance of command and control in coordinating fire  support, especially in the complex environment imposed by joint  operations in the littorals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Navy to designate the appropriate organization for managing  an analysis of alternatives related to this gap and ensure that the results  of this analysis are coordinated with solutions for identified  engagement gaps.

	Agency Comments and Our Review

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the  recommendation to define quantitative requirements and operational  concepts on the use of volume fires as well as the recommendation to  conduct a comprehensive review of the Extended Range Munition  program.
DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to provide a formal  role to the Expeditionary Warfare Division in decisions regarding naval  surface fire support, stating that the department will review the existing  role of the Director, Expeditionary Warfare and relevant Navy directives  and make adjustments if necessary. It also stated that the role of  Expeditionary Warfare was recently formalized for the munitions  requirements and procurement process, but that the guns and launchers  which fire these munitions are the responsibility of the Surface Warfare  Division. In conducting its review, we believe the department should be  mindful that naval surface fire support capability is not limited to  munitions but also includes guns, ships, and other systems.
DOD also partially concurred with the recommendation to address the  command and control gap identified by the Initial Capabilities Document  for Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals,  but indicated that full analysis of this gap will be deferred and not  coordinated with the initial analysis of engagement gaps. This is surprising  given that the initial capabilities document identified correcting  weaknesses in command and control as the highest priority in its analysis.  We are concerned that deferring command and control to a later analysis  continues a history of inattention to this area.
DOD’s written comments are included in their entirety in appendix II. The  department also provided technical comments which were incorporated  into the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,  Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the  Navy; and interested congressional committees. We will also provide  copies to others on request. We will also make copies available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report or need additional information,  please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO Staff who made contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess whether well-defined requirements for naval surface fire support  have been established, we reviewed current and historical Navy, Marine  Corps, and joint force documents that identify requirements related to  naval surface fire support and that explain operational concepts for  expeditionary warfare. We analyzed and compared these documents to  determine 1) when the joint services reached formal agreement on naval  surface fire support requirements, 2) how these requirements align with  the Marine Corps’s key operating concepts for expeditionary warfare, and  3) the degree to which these requirements include clear, quantitative  measures of performance. To supplement this analysis, we further  discussed these issues with Navy, Marine Corps, and joint force officials  responsible for establishing naval surface fire support requirements. We  also interviewed Navy program officials responsible for developing and  procuring the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer to  understand how naval surface fire support requirements have been  incorporated into these programs.
To assess the Navy’s progress in developing and fielding the Extended  Range Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer, and future systems for  naval surface fire support, we analyzed key program documentation  including performance requirements, cost estimates, budget submissions,  acquisition strategies, development and demonstration contracts, and  testing plans and results. We also drew from our prior work related to best  practices and development and cost challenges in the Extended Range  Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer programs. In addition, we reviewed  Department of Defense reports related to these and other programs for  naval surface fire support. To supplement our analysis, we interviewed  Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials responsible for  managing resources and requirements in naval surface fire support  programs. We also discussed program challenges and risks with the  acquisition managers, contractors, and testing community associated with  each system.
To determine whether current Navy systems in development will fulfill  naval surface fire support requirements, we comparatively analyzed the  joint services’ most recent requirements document related to naval surface  fire support—the Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in  Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals—with the validated  performance requirements for the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt  class destroyer. To identify actions taken to address situations where  naval surface fire support requirements may not fully align with the  capabilities planned for these systems, we interviewed officials from the  Navy, Marine Corps, joint services, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.
To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from the  Navy’s Surface Warfare and Expeditionary Warfare Divisions; the Marine  Corps’s Combat Development Command and Plans, Policies, and  Operations offices; the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare  Systems; and the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer  program offices. We also met with officials from the Department of  Defense’s Office of the Inspector General, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, the Naval Surface Warfare  Center—Dahlgren Division, the Office of Naval Research, Affordable  Weapon System project office, the Defense Contract Management Agency,  Raytheon Missile Systems, BAE Systems, and Alliant Techsystems.
We conducted our analysis from February 2006 to November 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

Key contributors to this report were Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant Director;  J. Kristopher Keener; Christopher R. Durbin; Ryan Consaul; and Lily Chin.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

Since the mid-1990s, the Navy and Marine Corps have studied ways to better protect landing forces. As new operational concepts evolved, the Marine Corps identified requirements for naval surface fire support and the Navy began developing two systems to meet these needs--the Extended Range Munition for existing classes of ships and the future Zumwalt class destroyer. GAO was asked to address (1) whether requirements for fire support have been established and (2) the Navy's progress on the Extended Range Munition, Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. GAO also analyzed whether these Navy systems fulfill the requirements and whether gaps remain. To address these objectives GAO analyzed key documents on requirements and programs and held discussions with officials from the Navy and Marine Corps as well as other interested organizations.

What GAO Found

In December 2005, more than a decade after the Navy and Marine Corps began to formulate requirements, agreement was reached on the capabilities needed for naval surface fire support. However, quantifiable measures are still lacking for volume of fire--the delivery of a large quantity of munitions simultaneously or over a period of time to suppress or destroy a target. Until further quantifiable requirements are set for volume of fire, it is difficult to assess whether additional investment is necessary or the form it should take. The Navy's Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have cost more, taken longer to develop and field than anticipated, and will deliver fewer capabilities than originally promised. Largely due to technical challenges, the Extended Range Munition is expected to exceed the original cost estimate for development by 550 percent, and the Navy has delayed delivery of initial capability by 11 years. The munition's path for development and fielding remains uncertain as key technologies and munition design have not been adequately demonstrated. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently assumed oversight of the program, and while a comprehensive review has not yet been held, there are ongoing studies that could assist such a review. The Navy has reduced Zumwalt class land attack munitions by 50 percent and cut ship quantities from 32 to 7. The primary reason for reduced capabilities are cost pressures created by the Navy's original concept of revolutionary performance at an unrealistically low cost. The Navy plans to begin construction of the first two ships in the Zumwalt class in fiscal year 2008. The recent study of future fire support needs approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council identifies four capability gaps: command and control of fire support; engaging moving targets in poor weather; engaging targets when collateral damage is a concern; and engaging targets that require a large volume of fire. The analysis that forms the basis of the joint study contends that while the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer offer significant capabilities in some scenarios, they do not provide enough capability to meet all fire support needs. The Navy, through its surface warfare directorate, has begun analyzing the three engagement gaps, but the Navy has not chosen an organization to analyze the gap in command and control, which is essential for target assignment and information. Any attempts to accept the risks or invest in programs to fill remaining gaps should also involve the expeditionary warfare directorate as the Marine Corps representative. The expeditionary warfare directorate does not have a formal role in developing requirements, determining capabilities, and managing resources for systems that provide naval surface fire support.