Background

The LCS consists of two separate acquisition programs: one for the  seaframe and one for the mission packages, which, when integrated with  the seaframe and supplemented with aviation support, provide the ship’s  mission capability. In order to demonstrate LCS mission capability both  seaframe variants will be evaluated through developmental and  operational testing. Developmental testing is intended to assist in  identifying system performance, capabilities, limitations, and safety issues  to help reduce design and programmatic risks. Operational testing is  intended to assess a weapon system’s capability in a realistic  environment when maintained and operated by warfighters, subjected to  routine wear-and-tear, and employed in combat conditions.

		Seaframe

The Navy is procuring two different seaframe designs from shipbuilding  teams led by Lockheed Martin—which builds its ships at Marinette Marine  in Marinette, Wisconsin—and Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama. This  report refers to the Lockheed Martin ships as the Freedom variant and the  Austal USA ships as the Independence variant. The two designs reflect  different contractor solutions to meet the same set of performance  requirements. The most notable difference is that the Lockheed Martin  Freedom variant (LCS 1 and other odd-numbered seaframes, 3 through  23) is a monohull design with a steel hull and aluminum superstructure,  while the Austal USA Independence variant (LCS 2 and other even- numbered seaframes, 4 through 24) is an aluminum trimaran.shows the first two LCS seaframes.
See table 1 for the current status of seaframe construction.
As we previously reported, the Navy is investigating potentially significant  design changes to the ships while production is under way. Some of  these initiatives include:
Changes to improve habitability: Part of the LCS concept is to reduce  the number of crew on the ship by relying extensively on shore-based  support for the ship’s administrative personnel and maintenance  needs. Prior to the deployment of LCS 1 to Singapore, the Navy  added 20 extra beds—called berths—to the ship to accommodate  extra people, and has also made a similar change to LCS 2 and  subsequent ships. However, the Navy did not add equivalent amounts  of crew storage space, additional water and sanitation systems, and  food storage, and while the Navy officials stated that the ships still  meet requirements, the Navy is investigating changes to better meet  Navy standards. The Navy and the shipyards are now evaluating how  to make these changes to both variant designs, but the effects have  been described by the program office as pervasive throughout much  of the ship.
Changes to increase commonality: many of the systems on the two  seaframe variants are not common; commonality can enhance  efficient maintenance, training, manning, and logistics. The Navy is  investigating making changes to improve commonality between the  two variants, including selecting a common combat management  system—an architecture that uses computers to integrate sensors  (such as a radar) with shipboard weapon systems—for both  seaframes.
Changes to improve safety: the Independence variant was designed  without bridge wings, which are enclosed areas that extend out to the  sides of the ship from the bridge to provide enhanced visibility and  safety for the crew for maneuvers like docking the ship. The Navy has  added bridge wings to LCS 2, and now plans to add bridge wings to  all the ships of this variant.

			Ship Weight

As part of the decision to make any design changes to a ship, the  designer needs to consider the effect that the changes might have on  ship weight. Weight is a critical aspect of a ship design, and is measured  in several ways:
Light ship condition: The ship is complete and ready for service,  repair parts are held onboard, and liquids in machinery are at  operating levels. Light ship condition does not include items of  variable load, such as officers and crew; ammunition; aircraft and  vehicles that are fully fueled with repair parts available; full supply of  provisions and stores; and full tanks for potable water, lube oil, and  fuel. For LCS, the light ship condition does not include installation of a  mission package.
Full load condition: Light ship condition plus variable loads. For  LCS, full load condition includes an installed mission package and is  the condition against which performance requirements are assessed.
Naval architectural limit: The maximum weight that a ship can  displace while still meeting its stability and survivability requirements.  For LCS, naval architectural limits are unique to each seaframe  variant.
To ensure that ships meet required capabilities, the Navy and its  shipbuilders typically engage in intensive estimating, weighing, and  reporting processes throughout construction to identify and monitor a  ship’s weight and stability. As part of these processes, shipbuilders  actively estimate and track certain information, including the following:
Builder’s margin, which consists of weight and vertical center of  gravity allowances included in a weight estimate to cover slight  variations of component weight and centers of gravity that take place  throughout the design and construction of a ship.
Service life allowances, which refer to weight and vertical center of  gravity budgets included in a ship’s design to accommodate changes  due to ship alterations and unplanned growth during the ship’s  operational lifetime, which tend to increase displacement and affect  stability.
Weights are definitively determined as part of a ship’s inclining  experiment, which involves moving known weights around the ship and  measuring how they change the ship’s equilibrium. This allows for the  Navy to determine a ship’s displacement and the height and longitudinal  position of its center of gravity. For most ships, inclining experiments take  place immediately prior to delivery and after significant post-delivery  maintenance periods, when necessary.

		Mission Packages

The LCS mission package designs are based on standard shipping  containers that are outfitted with a variety of unmanned systems, sensors,  and weapons that can be loaded onto and off of the seaframe. Mission  packages are also accompanied by an aviation detachment, consisting of  an MH-60 helicopter and its flight and support crew, as well as vertical  take-off unmanned aerial vehicles. These packages are intended to give  the Navy flexibility to change equipment in the field to meet different  mission needs and incorporate new technology to address emerging  threats. The Navy plans on fielding one anti-submarine warfare (ASW)  increment and four mine countermeasures (MCM) and surface warfare  (SUW) increments. The Navy will upgrade all mission packages to the  same configuration as additional increments are fielded. The Navy plans  to buy a total of 64 mission packages—though this quantity could change  if the number of seaframes acquired is reduced. See table 2 for a brief  discussion of the mission packages.

		Initial LCS Deployment

To obtain operational experience with LCS, the Navy last year deployed  USS Freedom carrying an increment 2 SUW mission package. The ship  departed San Diego, California, for operations in the Western Pacific  under the command of the Navy’s 7th Fleet in early March 2013. The ship  was deployed for approximately 10 months, returning to the United States  in late December 2013. The 7th Fleet area of responsibility poses unique  challenges to the Navy given the vast distances it covers. While on this  deployment, USS Freedom participated in an international exhibition as  well as several multilateral naval exercises with regional navies, including  Singapore; Malaysia; Brunei; and Indonesia. The ship also conducted  some real-world operations as directed by the 7th Fleet, such as  participating in humanitarian assistance disaster relief to the Philippines  following a major typhoon. See figure 2 for a map showing the location of  the Singapore deployment and the Navy fleet areas of responsibility in the  Indo-Pacific region.

	Initial Deployment and Further Testing Yielded Additional Learning about LCS Systems and Capabilities, but Gaps in Knowledge Remain

Since July 2013, the Navy has made progress demonstrating and testing  various facets of LCS systems and capability but significant gaps remain  in the Navy’s knowledge of how the LCS will operate and what  capabilities it will provide the Navy. The deployment to Singapore  provided the Navy with an opportunity to examine key LCS concepts  operationally, including: the ship’s smaller manning profile, rotational  crewing, and use of off-ship maintenance and support. The deployment  was limited because only one of the two variants carrying one mission  package was deployed, and mechanical problems prevented USS  Freedom from spending as much time as planned underway—that is, at  sea unanchored and not at port. As a result, some key concepts could not  be demonstrated. While the deployment provided useful insight for the  Navy, it was never intended to be a substitute for formal testing and  evaluation activities. The Navy has also completed additional  developmental testing on the seaframes and mission packages, which  has enabled the Navy to characterize performance of some systems, but  many capabilities have not been demonstrated in an operational  environment.

		Singapore Deployment Provided Useful Knowledge about LCS Operations, but Significant Unknowns Persist Regarding LCS Concepts and Use

Navy officials have stated that they were able to learn some valuable  lessons from the deployment of USS Freedom to Singapore, and the  Navy has taken several steps to analyze post-deployment lessons  learned. According to the Navy, the deployment demonstrated the LCS’s  ability to participate in cooperative exercises and helped carry out the  Navy’s forward presence mission in Asia, thereby freeing up more costly  multi-mission warships to carry out other high-priority Navy duties. Navy  officials also said USS Freedom demonstrated how a LCS can fill the  need for a smaller U.S. ship that can dock in more foreign ports than  larger U.S. vessels, which they believe will be a valuable tool for  engaging with certain countries that might otherwise be hard to access.  Further, USS Freedom’s SUW mission package crew was able to conduct  some launch and recovery operations with Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats and  to participate in boarding exercises, which provided lessons about the  operations of these boats as well as the systems on USS Freedom  needed to launch and recover them. These operations, although  undoubtedly useful for the Navy, were never intended as formal testing  and evaluation activities—or to replace them. Therefore, key unknowns  remain regarding how the Navy will eventually be able to use the LCS  and how well the ship meets its performance requirements.

			Initial Deployment Provided Insight, but Key Concepts Remain Untested or Not Validated

USS Freedom’s deployment to Singapore represented an opportunity for  the Navy to gain insight into the feasibility of the LCS’s unique operational  concepts. However, some of the fundamental concepts on which the  program is premised—such as the maintenance and manning concepts— were demonstrated in a limited manner because the deployment involved  only one ship of the Freedom variant and this ship is not representative of  other ships of that variant. In other cases, certain concepts have not yet  been demonstrated. Therefore, some of the lessons learned from the  deployment cannot be extrapolated to the entire LCS class or all of the  ships planned for the Freedom variant. Until additional deployments  have been conducted—in conjunction with operational test events—the  Navy will have insufficient data to evaluate the feasibility of these  concepts on both variants. Table 3 identifies the key concepts that  underpin the program and the degree to which the Navy was able to   Questions remaining regarding  evaluate them on this deployment.LCS’s underlying concepts will, in turn, have implications for the  practicality of certain requirements and key differences between the two  variants—issues that have the potential to affect future acquisition  decisions.
In addition, mechanical problems hampered the Navy’s ability to operate  USS Freedom as planned during the Singapore deployment. Based on  information provided by LCS program officials responsible for LCS fleet  introduction, USS Freedom’s mechanical failures resulted in 55 days of  mission days lost, which is a significant portion of its 10-month  deployment. Navy officials stated many of these days were planned in- port periods. The ship could not fully participate in at least two planned  or requested exercises and some operational 7th Fleet presence  missions while repairs were conducted. According to the LCS program  office, several of the more problematic pieces of equipment that resulted  in significant lost underway days are either slated to be replaced on  follow-on Freedom class ships or have already have been replaced on  LCS 3 or LCS 5. Table 4 depicts some of the most significant equipment  failures and how the Navy believes they have been corrected on  subsequent seaframes.
Even with the reduced number of operational mission days, the  Singapore deployment raised questions about the practicality of the small  crew size. LCS is intended to operate with a crew that is smaller than  comparable surface combatants. This reduced manning has long been a  focus of Navy analysis, and the increase to a 50-person crew for the  deployment was the maximum size allowed by current program  requirements. This number was augmented by civilian contractor  technical experts who could assist with troubleshooting and some  maintenance. However, as shown in table 3, even with these additional  people the deployment provided indications that the crew strained to keep  up with duties. Further, the ship is currently at capacity in terms of the  number of crew members it can accommodate. Therefore, any increase  in crew size would require a significant redesign of the seaframes and  would necessitate a revision to the maximum 50-person manning  requirement, which has been validated by the Joint Requirements  Oversight Council. Officials from the office of the Chief of Naval  Operations told us after the deployment that they are not considering any  further revision to the manning requirements for the ship, although some  manning studies are under way to assess the rank and billet structure for  the mission packages and aviation detachment.
Additionally, some of USS Freedom’s equipment is unique to that ship,  unique to the Freedom variant, or unique to LCS class, which we were  told made some repair efforts cumbersome and slow. For example, crew  members told us that in some cases they had to track down spare parts  that were sometimes available only in foreign countries rather than being  able to find them in Navy inventories. While some of this may be a first-of- class issue, replacement of some ship systems with more reliable ones or  with systems that are more commonly found in the Navy inventory may  also reduce these burdens on the crew in the future. According to the  LCS program office, replacing these less reliable systems should mean  that future deployments of other ships from the Freedom class should not  incur the same number of failures as USS Freedom. However, as DOT&E  has observed, no formal operational testing has been conducted to verify  and quantify these improvements, although Navy and DOT&E officials  said that they were working together on operational test opportunities.  Until the Navy completes further underway periods and/or testing it will  not be able to determine the significance of improvements on ship  availability.

			Fleet Observations on Deployment Highlight Potential Limitations on LCS Usage

This first deployment provided limited insight into how the LCS might be  utilized in the different theaters in which the Navy operates. USS  Freedom was deployed to Singapore and conducted operations for 7th  Fleet largely consisting of participation in planned multi-lateral exercises.  While 7th Fleet officials noted that a benefit of having LCS in theater was  that the ship could participate in international exercises, thereby freeing  up other surface combatants for other missions, they were still not certain  about the ship’s potential capabilities and attributes, or how they would  best utilize an LCS in their theater. Until the Navy completes additional  testing and deployments, it will not have adequate operational data and  operational experience on which to base assumptions regarding LCS  utilization. Table 5 discusses some of the observations related to the LCS  deployment that we discussed with 7th Fleet officials related to the LCS  deployment.

		Navy Has Made Progress with Recent Testing but Additional Testing Needed to Demonstrate LCS Capabilities

Since July 2013, the Navy has completed additional testing on the  seaframes and mission modules and is seeing results but has not yet  proven performance in an operational environment. Table 6 describes  these recently completed events and some important considerations  about the testing.

	Outstanding Weight Management and Concurrency Risks Continue to Complicate LCS Acquisition

Although the Navy has gained knowledge related to LCS capabilities and  concepts since our July 2013 report, there continue to be significant  acquisition risks to the program. Key among these is managing the weight  of the ships. Initial LCS seaframes face limitations resulting from weight  growth during construction of the first several ships. This weight growth  has required the Navy to make compromises on performance of LCS 1  and LCS 2 and may complicate existing plans to make additional changes  to each seaframe design. While weight growth is not uncommon over the  life of a ship and the Navy builds a weight allowance into ships to account  for this growth, LCS has significantly lower available margin compared to  other ship classes. Compounding these issues, the Navy has not  received complete or accurate weight reports from the LCS seaframe  prime contractors—and the Navy’s lengthy review process has hindered a  timely resolution. Additionally, as we have previously reported, the Navy  has considerable testing to complete before the program demonstrates  operational capability. Further, the Navy has continued with the  acquisition without the knowledge that would be gained from additional  testing. For example, since our last report, the Navy has granted the  mission modules program approval to accelerate the mission package  production rate before completing key test activities to demonstrate their  performance.

		Seaframe Weight Growth Affects Performance and Design Changes, with Navy Oversight Challenged by Inadequate Contractor Weight Reports

Weight growth occurred on the first four LCS seaframes, which affected  the capabilities of both Freedom and Independence variant seaframes.  This situation has led the Navy to accept lower than minimum  requirements on two delivered seaframes (LCS 1 and 2) in endurance  and sprint speeds, respectively. Further, weight growth has caused three  delivered LCS seaframes (LCS 1, 2, and 4) to not achieve the required  service life allowance for weight. Weight management in shipbuilding  programs, including the LCS, is critical to ensuring that performance  requirements associated with survivability, sea keeping (meaning the  ability to withstand rough sea conditions), and the ability to accommodate  upgrades during ship service lives, are met. For LCS seaframes, specific  performance requirements that are sensitive to weight include the  following:
3,500-nautical-mile range (endurance) when operated at a speed of
40-knot sprint speed,
20-foot navigational draft (the greatest depth, in feet, of the keel),
50-metric-ton service life allowance for weight, and
0.15-meter service life allowance for stability.
In the LCS program, weight management and reporting processes also  rely on accurate mission package weight data. The Navy provides  mission package weight estimates to the shipbuilders to include in their  full load condition estimates.
Table 7 identifies the Navy’s current weight estimates for each of the first  six LCS seaframes under full load conditions, along with current service  life allowance projections for each ship as compared to the required 50  metric tons. As is depicted, there are several seaframes that do not have  the required amount of service life remaining due to weight growth.
LCS 2 faces the most significant weight challenges of any of the first six  seaframes, but Navy officials stated they have a strategy to mitigate the  issue while still meeting requirements. According to Navy estimates, LCS  2 is so heavy in the full load condition that it exceeds its naval  architectural limit—an outcome that provides no service life allowance for  weight and restricts the ship’s ability to execute its required missions.  Subject matter experts in naval architecture who we interviewed stated  that operating a ship in excess of its naval architectural limit can make it  prone to failure in certain weather or damage conditions, and the ship can  also see a decreased service life due to structural fatigue. Navy officials  stated that they will limit fuel loads on LCS 2, as necessary, to ensure the  naval architectural limit is not exceeded. In addition, the Navy is  developing design modifications for Independence variant seaframes to  reduce fuel capacity—estimated to total over 100 metric tons—in order to  restore service life allowances. Although this reduction will reduce the  endurance of these ships, the Navy reports that this variant has excess  fuel capacity—as demonstrated during LCS 2 calm water trials in June  2013—and will still meet LCS range at transit speed requirements after  the fuel reduction.
Further, as table 7 shows, three of the other LCS seaframes—LCS 1,  LCS 4, and LCS 6—also do not currently meet their service life allowance  requirements for weight when configured in normal, full load conditions.  For example, LCS 1 and LCS 4 have near or less than 50 percent of the  required 50 metric ton service life allowances for weight (25.8 and 16.5  tons, respectively), and the Navy projects LCS 6 will enter service with  less than 63 percent (31.3 metric tons) of its required 50 metric ton  service life allowance for weight. At present, LCS 6 has over 29 metric  tons of builder’s margin available, which if still available at delivery could  offset that particular ship’s estimated service life allowance deficit for  weight.
Weight growth contributed to LCS 1 and LCS 2 not achieving some  requirements related to endurance and sprint speed respectively, when  operated in normal, full load conditions. For instance, although LCS 1  meets its sprint speed requirement of 40 knots, excess weight growth to  date in part prevents that ship from achieving the 3,500 nautical miles at  14 knots endurance requirement. Alternatively, LCS 2 can only sprint at  39.5 knots under full loads, but is predicted to exceed the endurance  requirement by over 800 nautical miles, albeit at potential risk to its naval  architectural limit, as discussed above.

			LCS Has Low Weight Growth Margins Compared to Other Ship Classes

Complicating the weight growth on early LCS seaframes is the fact that  LCS requirements for service life allowances already fall short of the  growth margins called for under Navy and industry recommended  practice. Table 8 outlines recommended service life allowances for  different ship types as compared to LCS requirements.
Because of the LCS’s comparatively low service life allowance  requirements, the Navy’s ability to accommodate alterations and growth  on these ships over their expected 20-year minimum service lives will be  significantly more constrained than is typical for other surface ships. In  2012, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations highlighted the  importance of this issue across ship classes, noting in an instruction that  inadequate service life allowances for weight and vertical center of gravity  have resulted in expensive corrective ship changes or in the inability to  modernize ships through installation of new weapons systems.

			Low Growth Margins May Complicate Future Changes

Navy program officials told us they expect that most future weight—and  capability—growth on LCS would occur within mission packages, not  seaframes. However, as we previously reported, the Navy is considering  changes to the seaframe designs that could further increase weight  estimates. As mentioned above, these changes could include increases  in: (1) habitability to support larger crews than initially anticipated; (2)  commonality between the seaframe variants and with other Navy ships;  and (3) changes to improve safety. We reported in July 2013 that the  Navy had undertaken several technical studies on these initiatives. These  studies have not yet been completed. Navy officials stated that the  possible changes are low risk and would not affect LCS performance  requirements. However, some changes, including those related to  habitability, are likely to add weight. According to the program office,  weight considerations occur for every change and corresponding trades  are required to be made in order to approve the change. For example:
Early estimates indicate that roughly 10 to 20 metric tons could be  added due to accommodations for a larger crew, and would  require pervasive modifications to each seaframe design. If so,  these changes would heighten weight challenges and resulting  service life allowance shortfalls.
A change was made to LCS 2 in a recent maintenance period to  increase the size of the rescue boat from 5 meters to 7 meters,  which will make the boat more stable in heavier seas. This change  resulted in an approximately 15 metric ton weight increase to LCS  2; it is planned for all Independence variant seaframes. According  to the contractor, by removing weight from other areas of LCS 6  and follow-on ships designs, the larger rescue boat will add 1.3  metric tons.
Another proposed change would increase commonality and  combat capability by replacing the Freedom variant’s rolling  airframe missile system with the heavier missile system found on  the Independence variant. While the specifics of this potential  change have not yet been determined or approved, Navy  technical experts told us that such a modification would  subsequently increase the Freedom variant’s weight and could  also result in center of gravity changes.
Weight constraints could make future modifications more costly than  anticipated. For instance, subject matter experts in naval architecture told  us that the Navy may find it has to seek lighter alternatives to the systems  or equipment it wants, which could complicate the redesign and  construction modification efforts or make them more costly—or both.  Because the Navy has not yet completed technical studies evaluating its  possible changes, the weight effects remain unknown. According to Navy  officials, preliminary studies on the habitability changes should be  completed this year, and more detailed design work will not occur until  fiscal year 2015. The Navy has established a weight working group with  Navy and shipyard representatives that program officials said is intended  to try and identify ways to offset weight growth from some of these design  changes.
Additionally, once a ship is delivered and handed over to the fleet, fleet  operators and maintainers assume responsibility for these weight  management processes, which continue throughout the ship’s service life.  For ships that are weight constrained—meaning, at or nearing their naval  architectural limits for displacement—these weight management  processes are typically more robust and costly. For instance, a Navy  instruction states that weight must be kept within naval architectural limits  and provides that for ships that are weight constrained, any additional  weight must be compensated for by removing weight from the ship.  Inclining experiments must usually be completed following maintenance  periods to ensure the ship’s naval architectural limits remain unbreached.  As operational assets, LCS 1 and LCS 2 are—according to Navy  reporting—both in a weight constrained status.

			Mission Package Weights Continue to Evolve, but Growth Margin Is Constrained

According to Navy officials, the seaframes have low growth margins  because the mission packages are supposed to be flexible enough to  accommodate any future upgrades and growth. However, weight  challenges exist on the mission packages as well, and weight and space  constraints are limiting the extent to which the Navy can accommodate  new mission package systems. Similar to the seaframes, the Navy also  tracks and manages mission package weights. Mission packages  (regardless of which type) are required to consume no more than 180  metric tons when installed aboard a seaframe. Of this 180-metric-ton  allocation, 105 metric tons are allotted to the actual mission package  equipment, whereas 75 metric tons are reserved for fuel to power that  equipment. However, LCS requirements documents do not include a  service life allowance requirement for mission packages, and based on  current weight estimates, room for future growth on the final increments  ranges from approximately 14 metric tons for some configurations of the  MCM mission package to none for the ASW mission package. According  to Navy officials, future additions to mission packages—beyond the  systems currently planned for increment 4 configurations—will be offset  by removing existing systems, described below, to the extent required to  meet the 105 metric ton weight limitation. For MCM, Navy officials stated  that they cannot include all the current increment 4 systems that they are  buying in a package at one time, so they have recently developed two  options with different system configurations. Figure 3 highlights current  mission package weights that are estimated for each increment of  mission package capability, including the two MCM options but excluding  potential weight reduction efforts.
At present, the Navy anticipates that the equipment associated with an  increment 4 SUW package will require slightly less than the 105-metric- ton allotment. This estimate is contingent on surface-to-surface missile  systems not yet selected delivering within the assigned weight margins.
The Navy has identified a weight reduction plan to provide an additional 5  metric tons.
Navy weight estimates for increment 4 of the MCM mission package,  however, do not reflect all the systems being acquired for that package.  Space and weight constraints have required the Navy to modify how it  intends to outfit increment 4 of the MCM mission package. Although the  Navy plans to acquire all the systems planned for that increment, space  and weight limitations will not allow LCS seaframes to carry all of these  systems at one time. According to LCS program officials, MCM mission  commanders will have either (1) the Unmanned Influence Sweep System  and the unmanned surface vehicle that tows it, or (2) the minehunting  Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Undersea Vehicle—called  Knifefish—available—but not both systems. As a result, LCS seaframes  outfitted with the increment 4 MCM package may have decreased  minesweeping or mine detection capability. These scenarios would  preclude LCS from meeting its MCM minesweeping performance  requirements; Knifefish is a new capability that was recently added to the  program, and officials from the mission module program office stated that  it is not a capability currently defined in LCS requirements documentation.  The Navy has identified some options for weight reduction for this  package that could bring the combined weight with these two systems  included together to just under 105 metric tons, but physical space  constraints would still prohibit both being carried together.
Further, ASW mission package equipment is also estimated to exceed its  105-metric-ton allotment by approximately 4 metric tons. In response, the  Navy has identified weight reduction options within that package that it  estimates will shed a combined 10 metric tons of weight. Several of these  options require redesign of existing systems, which could introduce risk.

			Deficiencies in Contractor Reports Have Hindered Navy Oversight of LCS Weight Challenges

The Navy has faced challenges obtaining accurate and complete weight  estimates from the contractors. The Navy’s primary mechanism for  tracking seaframe weights are quarterly weight reports, which are  produced and delivered by each of the LCS prime contractors per  contract requirements. These reports provide data on the physical  characteristics of seaframes under construction, including the magnitude,  location, and distribution of weight within each ship. These data are  based on estimated and calculated weights derived from design  drawings, historical data, and vendor-furnished information, and are  updated with actual component weight information during construction by  the shipbuilder. Under the terms of their contracts, LCS prime contractors  are required to prepare and report data within weight reports in  accordance with Navy and industry recommended practices, which  include using the Navy’s Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure  (ESWBS) classification system to structure and summarize data.  ESWBS facilitates the grouping of materials, equipment, and ship  components in a consistent reporting format, which in turn positions Navy  reviewers to audit the contractors’ work. At their highest level, ESWBS  groupings are organized around major systems of the ship, such as the  hull structure and propulsion plant, but ESWBS groupings are broken  down to include individual components of these respective systems, such  as diesel engines.
An inclining experiment is important as it represents the point where  weight data transitions from estimated or calculated data into actual data.  According to Navy officials, when the weight of a ship is determined at an  inclining experiment, the weight totals should be very close to those  identified in the preceding weight reports. Acceptable deviation is  considered to be only 0.5 percent or less, according to Navy technical  experts. In the LCS program, however, inclining experiments for the first  two seaframes revealed weight growth that the prime contractors had not  fully accounted for within their weight reports. For example, the LCS 1  inclining experiment that followed that ship’s initial post-delivery work  periods revealed that the ship weighed approximately 90 metric tons  more than expected. However, it was unclear to the prime contractor  where this excess weight was located or how it was distributed within the  ship, though Navy program officials told us that they now believe it was  due largely to additional insulation and paint. In response, Lockheed  Martin increased its weight estimates for LCS 3 and worked with the Navy  to evaluate and resolve the 90 metric ton discrepancy. As part of these  analyses, Lockheed Martin was able to assign much of the weight growth  to individual ESWBS accounts, and subsequently inclined LCS 3 to within  1 percent of that ship’s revised weight estimate. However, full resolution  of the 90 metric tons weight discrepancy remains incomplete. Weight  reports for LCS 5 and follow-on ships identified over 23 metric tons of  weight that Lockheed Martin and the Navy have not yet identified as  belonging within specific ESWBS accounts. Similar to LCS 1, LCS 2’s  inclining revealed an approximately 5 percent deviation from expected  weight, and General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works and Austal USA have  over 13 metric tons of weight, outside of the ESWBS accounts, on later  Independence variant seaframes. Carrying forward excess weight can  have impacts on the ships over the course of their service lives, and may  have impacts on construction of follow-on seaframes. In order to remedy  persisting deficiencies in the weight reports, Navy officials stated that the  administrative contracting officer—responsible for ensuring that the  contractor is fulfilling the contract under the specified terms, including  price, schedule, and quality—could withhold a percentage of progress  payments. To date, however, Navy officials report that they have not  pursued such withholds in the LCS program.
As part of the terms of the block buy contracts for LCS seaframes, the  Navy is required to review and comment on weight reports within 60 days  after they are submitted by a prime contractor. During the past 2 years,  the Navy has, in several cases, provided detailed comments back to the  contractors on weight reports that it identified as deficient. Comments  back to the prime contractors identified fundamental classification and  estimating errors and the use of outdated weight information, among  other reporting deficiencies, which the Navy judged as time sensitive and  critically important to address (see appendix II, which contains excerpts  from Navy comments on contractor weight reports). The Navy often  requested LCS prime contractors to modify and resubmit the report within  30 days—consistent with the terms of the contracts.
However, the prime contractors have not addressed the Navy’s  comments and resubmitted weight reports, largely because the Navy’s  review is typically taking longer than 60 days. One contractor stated that  the Navy’s review took 6 to 12 months. According to Navy officials,  reviews of weight reports now take less than 6 months. Nevertheless, by  the time that the Navy’s comments for one particular report are submitted  to the contractor, the contractor has often already submitted the next  quarter’s weight report. As a result, LCS contractors stated to us that they  generally do not make revisions to the previously submitted reports. Thus,  issues raised in the Navy’s comments are not immediately addressed by  the contractors. These revisions can affect weight estimates, but cannot  be identified until a corrected weight report has been submitted. As a  result, serious issues within weight reports persist that could obscure  timely identification of negative weight trends within one or both seaframe  variants.

		Risk of LCS Concurrency Remains—with Mission Package Procurement Exceeding Levels Needed for Operational Testing

As we previously reported, the Navy’s acquisition approach to the LCS  program involves a significant degree of concurrency; that is, the Navy is  buying the ships while key concepts and performance are still being  tested. Since we issued our report in July 2013, the Navy received  approval from DOT&E for the LCS test and evaluation master plan  (TEMP), which sets forth the testing that must be completed to ensure  that the program meets requirements. In order to determine the degree to  which the information from test events would be available to inform the  Navy’s decision to purchase additional seaframes, we compared the  Navy’s current acquisition strategy—which calls for releasing a request  for proposals in 2015 in support of a planned 2016 award of future  seaframe contracts—with the program’s test schedule as outlined in the  most recent TEMP. Figure 4 illustrates the test events that will be  completed before and after these acquisition events.
As shown in figure 4, we found that a number of significant test events as  outlined in the TEMP will not be completed in time to inform the  development or release of a request for proposals or the award of follow- on contract(s), or they will be completed on one variant but not both.  Many of these test events are part of operational testing. Operational  testing includes live-fire testing, which provides timely assessment of the  survivability and lethality of a weapon system. The significance of  conducting operational testing is reflected by the fact that statute requires  a program to complete realistic survivability tests and initial operational  testing before starting full rate production. The Navy plans to continue  buying seaframes before completing operational test events that  demonstrate the capability of the seaframes, that is, equipped with  mission packages that can meet initial requirements. Other tests  highlighted in the figure include shock and survivability tests, which  demonstrate that the ship designs can safely absorb and control damage.  Realistic survivability tests are required by statute before a program  proceeds beyond low-rate initial production.
Moreover, based on current test plans, DOT&E has concerns about the  adequacy and nature of some tests, which led to lengthy revisions of  earlier versions of the TEMP. Due to these concerns, DOT&E issued a  conditional approval letter stating that the test plan was not adequate to  support later phases of operational testing, and that the out-years of the  program are still not well defined. Final performance requirements are  defined in the program’s capabilities development document, and last  year the Navy developed requirements for increment 2 SUW and  increment 1 MCM to support testing. However, no requirements currently  exist for the other increments. DOT&E granted the Navy approval to  move to the operational testing of increment 2 SUW and increment 1  MCM as described in the TEMP, which the Navy plans to begin in 2014  and 2015, respectively, but DOT&E required the Navy to update and  resubmit the TEMP to support testing for later increments. As such, the  above schedule may change with subsequent TEMP submissions.
To help mitigate the concurrency in the LCS program—in particular to  better align planned contractual actions with obtaining knowledge through  some of these test events—we recommended in July 2013 that the Navy  reassess its acquisition strategy. Specifically, we recommended that the  Department of Defense (DOD) limit future seaframe acquisitions until it  completed a full-rate production review. We also recommended that DOD  report to Congress on the relative advantages of each seaframe variant  for each key LCS mission prior to awarding any additional seaframe  contracts. In its written response, DOD did not agree with our  recommendations aimed at slowing the pace of seaframe procurements.  DOD cited the need to buy ships at the planned pace to keep pricing low  and saw no value in reducing production pending the full-rate production  decision. DOD agreed that the Navy could, if requested by Congress,  report on the performance of each seaframe variant against current LCS  requirements, but did not address the need to provide an assessment of  the relative costs and advantages and disadvantages of the variants  against operational and mission needs. Such steps remain important to  help ensure that the level of capability provided by LCS is militarily useful  given the warfighter’s current capability needs and that continued  investment in the program is warranted.

			Pace of Mission Package Procurement Outpacing Levels Needed for Operational Testing

The Navy continues to move forward with a strategy that buys mission  packages before their performance is demonstrated. The Navy held a  Milestone B review for the mission packages in January 7, 2014, which  would typically authorize a program to begin system design and  demonstration efforts and determine the low-rate production quantity,  which is necessary to—among other things—provide production  configured or representative articles for operational tests. Based on this  review, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,  and Acquisitions authorized the program to effectively accelerate mission  package production, granting the program approval to procure 5 test units   According to DOD guidance,  and up to 27 production mission packages.low-rate production usually begins at Milestone C, when programs are  authorized to begin initial production. As we highlighted in our last report,  continuing into what is essentially full-rate production—as this 32 mission  packages is half of the total planned quantity of mission packages for the  program—increases the risk that the Navy will be purchasing systems  that have not been validated to meet requirements through testing. We  also recommended in July 2013 that the Navy only buy the minimum  quantities of mission module systems required to support operational  testing. DOD did not agree with this recommendation, stating that mission  package procurements were at a rate necessary to: support (1)  developmental and operational testing of the two seaframe variants with  each mission module increment; (2) fleet training needs; and (3)  operational LCS ships. In its memorandum on the Navy’s Remote  Minehunting System (RMS) operational assessment and Milestone C  decision, DOT&E raised similar concerns, stating for example that the  Navy should strictly limit any production of RMS, including the Remote  Multi-mission Vehicle (RMMV), until greater system maturity and reliability  are demonstrated on the version of RMS that will be initially fielded.
We also recommended in July 2013 that the Navy ensure that the  program baseline submitted for the mission modules’ Milestone B  establish program goals for cost, schedule, and performance for each  mission module increment. DOD partially concurred with this  recommendation, but our review of the program baseline found that it  does not define the thresholds and objectives for performance for each  increment of the mission modules. Officials from the office of the Chief of  Naval Operations stated that there is no plan to update the baseline to  include this performance information since they believe that the LCS  mission package increments actually represent only one increment of  capability. Without defined performance thresholds and objectives for  each mission package increment, decision makers will continue to lack  information needed to effectively monitor the development of the  increments, and a baseline against which to measure performance.

			Additional Reporting Should Provide Congress with Key Information to Support Decision Making

We raised two matters for Congressional consideration in our July 2013  report. First, to ensure that continued LCS investments are informed by  adequate knowledge, we suggested that Congress consider restricting  funding for additional seaframes until the Navy completes ongoing  technical and design studies related to potential changes in LCS  requirements, capabilities, and the commonality of systems on the two  seaframe variants. Second, to ensure timely and complete information on  the capabilities of each seaframe variant prior to making decisions about  future LCS procurements, we suggested that Congress consider requiring  DOD to report on the relative advantages of each variant in carrying out  the three primary LCS missions.
In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014,  Congress directed the Navy to complete a number of studies that are in  line with our recommendations to provide additional information on some  of the risk areas that we identified. The legislation restricts the obligation  or expenditure of fiscal year 2014 funding for construction or advanced  procurement for LCS seaframes 25 and 26 until the Navy submits the  required reports and certifications. However, as LCS 25 and LCS 26 are  not yet under contract, the Navy cannot use fiscal year 2014 money to  fund these seaframes. As of the end of January 2014, Navy officials told  us that they had just begun coordinating efforts and collecting data to  write reports as required in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. A copy of this  NDAA requirement can be found in appendix III.

	Conclusions

The Navy has made progress since our last report in demonstrating LCS  capabilities. In particular, completing the initial deployment of an LCS with  a mission package to an overseas location provided the Navy with  important real-world lessons learned that are being used to refine plans  for subsequent deployments. However, these deployments are not a  substitute for operational testing. Completing further developmental and  operational test events will continue to provide the Navy will valuable data  with which it can evaluate the performance of systems and make  adjustments, as needed. The Navy still has a great deal of learning to do  about the ships, the integrated capability that they are intended to provide  when equipped with the mission packages, and how the overall LCS  concept will be implemented. Not having adequate knowledge—such as  the results of additional deployments and key operational test events—  may result in the Navy buying ships that are more costly or burdensome  to manage over the course of their service lives. Events such as rough  water trials, shock and total ship survivability trials are intended to provide  confidence that the ships will last their intended lifespan and are  survivable, while deployments and operational testing of initial mission  packages help provide confidence that the LCS will meet its performance  requirements. Moving forward without this information complicates  potential design changes to seaframes or mission packages.
As we have concluded in past work, the Navy’s continued approach of  procuring the ships before proving their capabilities through testing  increases the risks of costly retrofits or reduced performance. In addition,  the Navy’s recent decision to accelerate the acquisition of mission  packages further limits the flexibility that the program will have to adjust to  any problems that may arise during operational testing. With the Navy’s  planned fiscal year 2016 contract awards for seaframes fast approaching,  we believe the recommendations that we made in July 2013 are still  important steps that the Navy can take to reduce risks to the program, but  additional steps are also warranted.
Further, the Navy’s ability to manage the ships’ weight has been  constrained, as the contractors’ reporting has not been accurate or in a  format that would be most useful to naval engineers. The Navy could  improve the expediency with which it reviews and comments on  contractor weight reports. Tools are available to improve the contractor’s  weight reporting, such as pursuing financial withholds, and modifying the  LCS contracts to include additional mechanisms to ensure better  reporting. More accurate and timely reporting will help the Navy target the  drivers of weight growth and assess the feasibility of the additional design  changes being considered for both seaframe variants.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

1.  We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics require—before approving the release of  the request for proposals for future contracts for either seaframe  variant—that both variants:  a.  Have deployed to a forward overseas location;  b.  Have completed rough water, ship shock, and total ship  survivability testing; and  c.  Have completed initial operational test and evaluation of the SUW  mission package on the Freedom variant and the MCM mission  package on the Independence variant.  2.  To improve the Navy’s ability to effectively oversee weight  management of the LCS seaframes, we recommend the Secretary of  the Navy direct the LCS Seaframe Program Manager to  a.  Take steps to ensure that the Navy completes its reviews and  submits comments, if any, on the weight reports to the contractors  within the timeframes dictated by the contract; and  b.  Consider actions to make the contractor more responsive to the  Navy’s identified accuracy and content problems in the weight  reports, including pursuing financial withholds or modifying the  contract language.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, which are included in appendix IV, DOD partially  agreed with our recommendations to complete certain testing and  deployment activities before approving the release of the request for  proposals for future seaframes. DOD agreed with our recommendations  related to seaframe weight management.
DOD officials stated that they have every intention of completing as many  as possible of the test and demonstration items that we identified in our  recommendation before releasing the request for proposals (RFP) for  future seaframe contracts, but disagreed that the release of the RFP  should hinge on completion of these events. DOD officials stated that  creating a break in the production of the seaframes would increase  program costs and have significant industrial base considerations. We are  not advocating a production break, but we do believe it is conceivable that  subsequent seaframe unit cost increases could be lower than the  potential increases in overall program costs if testing uncovered the need  for costly retrofits, redesign, and/or requirements changes that would then  have to be made to ships in production. We chose to use the release of  the RFP as a decision point because we believe that drafting an RFP that  is based on key knowledge of LCS performance serves as an important  risk mitigation tool for the government. Specifically, if the government  goes forward with an RFP that is not fully informed by the results of the  important test activities we identified in our recommendation, any  changes that might be later identified as necessary would have to be  reflected in an amended RFP, which could delay the award of contracts  and potentially cause a production break. The department noted that a  Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review is planned in the fiscal year  2016 time frame and that the Board will approve the Navy’s acquisition  strategy for LCS before additional seaframe contracts are awarded. DOD  stated that this review will take into account the progress of testing for  both seaframes, and that every item we identified in our recommendation  will be completed prior to the DAB except for the completion of the full-  scale ship shock trials. We believe it will be important that the department  makes certain that the DAB review occurs at a point when the Navy can  be directed to pause and revise its acquisition strategy and the RFP for  LCS if necessary to ensure it reflects the most current knowledge gained  from testing and deployments. It is possible that continued testing could  inform changes to the numbers of each variant procured, changes that  would need to be incorporated into the acquisition strategy before the  DAB authorizes the Navy to continue to buy more seaframes.
Further, we continue to believe that the Navy needs to identify a means to  conduct a full-scale ship shock trial before committing to contracts for  further seaframes. Because the LCS seaframes are based on commercial  designs—though heavily modified—we believe these trials are important  to ensure that the Navy is buying ships that will meet its survivability  needs. This is especially true with the Independence class variant, which  is based on a novel hullform for the Navy and represents the Navy’s first- time use of aluminum for a ship of this size. The Navy has itself identified  that it lacks sufficient data on which to confidently base assumptions of  this variant’s performance in an underwater shock environment, which  makes completing this test event before DAB review and award of  contracts important.
DOD agreed to take steps as we recommended to improve the weight  management of the LCS seaframes, and plans to review within 180 days  the process by which it reviews the contractor weight submissions and  the methods by which it can ensure that the contractors are responsive to  Navy accuracy and content concerns.
We also provided relevant portions of the draft report (in particular, the  sections on weight management) to the contractors and incorporated their  technical comments as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report.  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To assess the Navy’s lessons learned from the deployment of the first  Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to Singapore, we analyzed reports from  various LCS stakeholders, including Navy 7th Fleet Destroyer Squadron 7  (responsible for LCS during the deployment), and the Office of the Chief  of Naval Operations (OPNAV). We also traveled to the forward-deployed  location in Singapore, and interviewed USS Freedom’s commanding  officer and some of the crew; as well as officials from the LCS fleet  introduction program office (PMS 505); Destroyer Squadron 7; and  Commander, Logistics Force Western Pacific. We also traveled to Japan  to interview 7th Fleet officials involved with LCS logistics; policy and  planning; warfare requirements; strategy; and operations. Furthermore,  we conducted interviews with relevant Navy officials, such as the OPNAV  office that is the resource sponsor for the LCS program (N96); LCS  seaframe program office (PMS 501); and the LCS and Joint High Speed  Vessel Council. To assess what knowledge the Navy has obtained about  LCS since our previous report, we analyzed DOD, Navy and contractor  documents, including test and evaluation letters of observation from the  Commander, Operational Testing and Evaluation Force (COTF); testing  reports from the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E);  as well as the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) reports. We  analyzed documentation from the LCS mission module program office  (PMS 420), including an LCS contractor test report. Furthermore, we  interviewed officials from OPNAV; the LCS and Joint High Speed Vessel  Council; Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA); DOT&E; COTF;  INSURV; the Naval Surface Warfare Center; the LCS seaframe program  office; the LCS mission module program office; and the Navy Modeling  and Simulation Office. Finally, we leveraged previous GAO reports on the  LCS dating back to 2005.
To assess additional risks for the LCS program related to weight  management, we analyzed Navy and contractor documentation including  weight reports; inclining experiment reports; LCS seaframe contracts; the  LCS Capabilities Development Document; and seaframe building  specifications. To understand weight management and reporting  practices, we analyzed the Society of Allied Weight Engineers  Recommended Practices and NAVSEA policies on weight management.  Furthermore, we conducted interviews with Lockheed Martin; Bath Iron  Works; Marinette Marine; Austal USA; the American Bureau of Shipping;  and the Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding. To evaluate the naval  architecture limits of the LCS seaframes, we interviewed retired naval  architects with significant Navy ship design experience, as well as  American Bureau of Shipping representatives. We also met with technical  experts from the Naval Systems Engineering Directorate (SEA05).We  analyzed Navy and contractor documents, including the LCS test and  evaluation master plan; DOT&E test and evaluation master plan approval  memo; the LCS mission modules Milestone B documentation; and the  Navy’s acquisition decision memorandum. Furthermore, we conducted  interviews with officials from DOT&E; COTF; and INSURV.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to July 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Selected Navy Comments on Recent LCS Weight Reports

Appendix II: Selected Navy Comments on  Recent LCS Weight Reports Navy comment  “Main structural elements such as shell, framing and decks  are calculated by frame… This results in nearly impossible  review and audit capability. This method does not adhere to  Extended Ship’s Work Breakdown Structure (ESWBS)…”
Associated  prime  contractor  Austal USA  “Weight report structure and format are problematic. The  subject quarterly weight report consisted of various  disjointed, mislabeled, and conflicting files which are difficult  to assemble and correlate for reporting purposes.”
LCS 6 and  follow-on  Independence  variant  seaframes   “It appears the computer aided design effort to incorporate  detail data for Group 1 weights is fraught with ESWBS  classification errors…It appears Group 1 has been  arbitrarily classified to the point of a loss of control of the  details.”
LCS 6 and LCS  8  “The LCS 3 quarterly weight reports overestimated the ship  by approximately 90 tons. The details of that same  database have essentially been carried over to the LCS 5  accepted weight estimate and subsequent quarterly weight  reports…The last two quarterly weight reports have not  shown any progress toward improving the details (via  recalculations) and reducing risk…”
Lockheed Martin  LCS 5 and  “The LCS 6 and LCS 8 calculated light ship condition with  remaining margin is projected to be 56 tons lighter than LCS  4 inclined light ship condition. When the…correction is  incorporated into the projection, the full load condition for  weight exceeds the (naval architectural limit) for  displacement by…30 tons. Specifically, the service life  allowance for weight is deficient by 30 tons. This is a  serious and unprecedented situation that has to be  addressed quickly.”
Non-submission  “Submittal did not include an updated quarterly weight  report…a no-submittal indicates the projected full load of  the ship at delivery is currently unknown.”
LCS 6 and  follow-on  Independence  variant  seaframes   “Mission package descriptions, weights and centers have  not been updated in years. The Contractor must update the  mine countermeasures and surface warfare mission  packages with the latest values.”

Appendix III: 2014 National Defense Authorization Act Navy Reporting Requirements

Section 124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2014 restricts the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2014 funding for  construction or advanced procurement for LCS seaframes 25 and 26 until  the Navy submits the required reports and certifications. This section  reads:   SEC. 124. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITYOF FUNDS FOR LITTORAL  COMBAT SHIP  (a) LIMITATION—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this  Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 for construction or  advanced procurement of materials for the Littoral Combat Ships  designated as LCS 25 or LCS 26 may be obligated or expended until the  Secretary of the Navy submits to the congressional defense committees  each of the following: 1)  The report required by subsection (b)(1). 2)  A coordinated determination by the Director of Operational Test  and Evaluation and the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics that successful completion  of the test evaluation master plan for both seaframes and each  mission module will demonstrate operational effectiveness and  operational suitability.  3)  A certification that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council—  a)  has reviewed the capabilities of the legacy systems that the  Littoral Combat Ship is planned to replace and has compared  such capabilities to the capabilities to be provided by the  Littoral Combat Ship;  b)  has assessed the adequacy of the current capabilities  development document for the Littoral Combat Ship to meet  the requirements of the combatant commands and to address  future threats as reflected in the latest assessment by the  defense intelligence community; and  c)  has either validated the current capabilities development  document or directed the Secretary to update the current  capabilities development document based on the performance  of the Littoral Combat Ship and mission modules to date.  4)  A report on the expected performance of each seaframe variant  and mission module against the current or updated capabilities  development document.  5)  Certification that a capability production document will be  completed for each mission module before operational testing.  (b) REPORT—  (1) IN GENERAL—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment  of this Act, the Chief of Naval Operations, in coordination with the Director  of Operational Test and Evaluation, shall submit to the congressional  defense committees a report on the current concept of operations and  expected survivability attributes of each of the Littoral Combat Ship  seaframes.  (2) ELEMENTS—The report required by paragraph (1) shall set forth the  following,  a)  A review of the current concept of operations of the Littoral  Combat Ship and a comparison of such concept of operations with  the original concept of operations of the Littoral Combat Ship.  b)  An assessment of the ability of the Littoral Combat Ship to carry  out the core missions of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century  Seapower of the Navy.  c)  A comparison of the combat capabilities for the three missions  assigned to the Littoral Combat Ship seaframes (anti-surface  warfare, mine countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare) with  the combat capabilities for each of such missions of the systems  the Littoral Combat Ship is replacing.  d)  An assessment of expected survivability of the Littoral Combat  Ship seaframes in the context of the planned employment of the  Littoral Combat Ship as described in the concept of operations.  e)  The current status of operational testing for the seaframes and the  mission modules of the Littoral Combat Ship.  f)  An updated test and evaluation master plan for the Littoral  Combat Ship.  g)  A review of survivability testing, modeling, and simulation  conducted to date on the two seaframes of the Littoral Combat  Ship.  h)  An updated assessment of the endurance of the Littoral Combat  Ship at sea with respect to maintenance, fuel use, and  sustainment of crew and mission modules.  i)  An assessment of the adequacy of current ship manning plans for  the Littoral Combat Ship and an assessment of the impact that  increased manning has on design changes and the endurance of  the Littoral Combat Ship.  j)  A list of the casualty reports to date on each Littoral Combat Ship,  including a description of the impact of such casualties on the  design or ability of that Littoral Combat Ship to perform assigned  missions.  (3) FORM—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in  classified form and unclassified form.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, the following staff members  made key contributions to this report: Diana Moldafsky (Assistant  Director); Greg Campbell; Jenny Chow; Christopher R. Durbin; G. Oliver  Elliott; Laura Greifner; Kristine Hassinger; Kenneth Patton; C. James  Madar; Sabrina Streagle; Roxanna Sun; and Hai Tran.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

LCS represents an innovative approach to Navy acquisitions and operations, consisting of a ship—called a seaframe—and reconfigurable mission packages. These packages provide combat capability to perform three primary missions: surface warfare; mine countermeasures; and anti-submarine warfare. The Navy plans to buy no more than 32 seaframes in two variants from two shipyards, and 64 mission packages, with an estimated acquisition cost of over $25 billion in 2010 dollars. GAO was mandated to examine elements related to the LCS program. This report examines (1) knowledge that the Navy has gained since GAO issued a report on the LCS program in July 2013 and (2) outstanding acquisition risks with the LCS program. GAO analyzed key documents, including test and weight reports, and interviewed Navy officials responsible for the LCS deployment and program officials. This report is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in April 2014.

What GAO Found

Since July 2013, the Navy has continued to demonstrate and test various facets of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) systems and capability, but important questions remain about how LCS will operate and what capabilities it will provide the Navy. The first operational deployment of an LCS to Singapore gave the Navy an opportunity to examine key LCS concepts operationally. The deployment was limited to only one of the two variants carrying one of three mission packages. In addition, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as much time operationally as planned. As a result, some key concepts could not be tested. The Navy has completed some additional testing on the seaframes and mission packages, which has enabled the Navy to characterize performance of some systems, but performance has not yet been demonstrated in an operational environment.
Outstanding weight management and concurrency risks related to buying ships while key concepts and performance are still being tested continue to complicate LCS acquisitions. Initial LCS seaframes face capability limitations resulting from weight growth during construction. This weight growth has resulted in the first two ships not meeting performance requirements for sprint speed and/or endurance, as well as potentially complicating existing plans to make additional changes to each seaframe design. Several seaframes now do not have the required amount of service life allowance—margin to accommodate future changes without removing weight over the ship's lifetime—but Navy officials said they have a plan to recover the service life allowance on the Independence class variant.
b
The Navy has not received accurate or complete weight reports from the seaframe prime contractors, and the Navy's lengthy review process has hindered a timely resolution of the Navy's concerns. Additionally, a number of significant test events, including rough water, shock and total ship survivability trials, will not be completed in time to inform upcoming acquisition decisions—including future contract decisions. Finally, the Navy's recent decision to accelerate low rate initial production of mission packages above the quantity necessary for operational testing limits the flexibility that the program will have to adjust to any problems that may arise during operational testing.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Navy (1) demonstrate certain capabilities for both LCS seaframe variants before the Navy is approved for future contract awards and (2) ensure a timely review of contractor seaframe weight reports and take actions to make contractors more responsive to comments on the reports' content. DOD agreed with the weight report recommendation and partially agreed with the other, noting that it intends to complete as much testing as possible—but not all—before releasing the request for proposals for future contracts.