Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which operations centers managed by different  offices and components within DHS had implemented key practices that  our work has shown can enhance collaboration among federal agencies,  during our original work, we reviewed transition, management integration,  and planning and policy documents from the department. We also  reviewed strategic plans, as well as annual performance reports and  planning documents from DHS and its component agencies. In addition,  we reviewed and analyzed the results of studies undertaken by DHS to  assess and improve coordination and collaboration at the multi-agency  centers as well as reports from GAO, the Congressional Research Service,  the DHS Office of Inspector General, and others that addressed the  integration, coordination, and collaboration of departmentwide program  functions. To determine the extent to which they reflect how DHS has  encouraged the use of the key collaborative practices, we also met with  the acting director and other responsible officials from the Office of  Operations Coordination to discuss its role and responsibilities.
To obtain updated information on DHS’s efforts to implement our  recommendations, we visited the National Operations Center, the National  Infrastructure Coordination Center, the National Response Coordination  Center, and Transportation Security Operations Center and met with  center managers. In addition, we spoke to officials at the National  Targeting Center. We also received a series of briefings on organizational  and operational changes implemented since Hurricane Katrina and  reviewed documentation provided to explain these changes. We relied on  these visits and briefings for updated information on DHS’s response to  our and post-Katrina after action report recommendations; we did not  verify the accuracy of DHS’s officials’ statements or the effectiveness of  the implemented actions. We conducted our original and additional audit  work in accordance with generally accepted government accounting  standards between October 2005 through September 2006, and March 2007  through June 2007, respectively.

	DHS’s Four Multi- Agency Operations Centers Have Unique Missions and Responsibilities, but Also Have Opportunities to Enhance Collaboration

In our October 2006 report on DHS multi-agency operations centers, we  found that they were not unnecessarily redundant in that they have  distinct missions but also contribute to the larger effort, carried out by the  National Operations Center, to provide national situational awareness and  incident management across DHS. In terms of key collaborative practices,  DHS had implemented one practice—leveraging its resources—by having  staff from multiple agencies work together at the four operations centers,  but could take advantage of other relevant practices we have found to be  important to enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal  agencies. We also reported that the establishment of the Operations  Directorate provided DHS with an opportunity to more consistently  implement these practices. As of June 2007, DHS had taken some actions  but had not yet implemented our recommendations for several reasons,  including the stated concern that the Operations Directorate does not have  authority over component centers. Nevertheless, we continue to see merit  in the wider use of the key collaborative practices we identified and a role  for the Directorate to encourage their use across centers.

		The Centers Do Not Define and Articulate Common Outcomes and Joint Strategies, a Key Practice Intended to Enhance and Sustain Collaboration

At the time of our review, the three DHS components responsible for the  four multi-agency centers had not developed or documented common  goals or joint strategies that incorporated all the agencies within the  centers and that our work has shown could, in turn, enhance collaboration  among these agencies. Officials at the multi-agency operations centers we  visited said they did consider formally documenting working agreements  but concluded it was not essential since all of the agencies involved were  part of DHS. While this may be true, documenting common outcomes can  provide a compelling rationale for agencies to collaborate and  documenting joint strategies ensures everyone is working in concert  toward the end results that collectively need to be achieved. Our work  shows that agencies strengthen their commitment to collaborate when  they articulate agreements in formal documents such as memorandums of  understanding, interagency guidance, or interagency planning documents.
Last year, officials from the National Operations Center said that the lack  of formal agreements is a reflection of the speed with which the center  was established and the inherent flexibility offered to DHS agencies in  order to get them to staff the operation center positions. While recognizing  the benefits of such flexibility, it is important to balance the trade-off of  ensuring that all participants understand the common goals and objectives  to be achieved. In addition, within DHS, external and internal  memorandums of agreement and other interagency joint operating plans  are often used to document common organizational goals and how  agencies will work together. For example, the Office of Investigations at  Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border  Protection’s border patrol have a memorandum of understanding that  governs the interaction between the two components as they carry out  their missions to investigate and reduce vulnerabilities in the customs and  immigration systems and to protect our borders, respectively, and  formalizes roles and responsibilities in order to enhance information  sharing. In addition, the DHS Office of Inspector General has reported that  memorandums of understanding are valuable tools for establishing  protocols for managing a national-level program between two  organizations. For these reasons, we recommended that the Operations  Directorate develop and provide guidance to the three agencies that  sponsor the operations centers to help ensure they define common goals  and joint strategies that incorporate all the agencies working at the  centers.
In our recent follow-up to our recommendations, DHS officials said that  they had not issued such guidance, but pointed to several other post- Katrina actions DHS was taking that it believes are examples of common  strategies and plans that are put into action daily and that enhance  collaboration, and thus, situational awareness. For example, DHS said it  has developed national reporting requirements and a coordinated national  reporting chain for submitting homeland security information during a  crisis, in part in response to Hurricane Katrina lessons learned. The  national reporting requirements and reporting chain is to define  procedures that component centers, among others, are to follow for  inputting and confirming information used during a crisis.
In addition, our past work has demonstrated that agencies should involve  nonfederal partners, key clients, and stakeholders in defining and  articulating outcomes and decision-making. Along those lines, DHS has  created or plans to create several working groups with state, local, and  private sector members to enhance information flow for incident  management, and facilitate decision-making at higher levels. For example,  the Director of the Office of Operations said DHS plans to establish a HSIN  Advisory Council to provide a forum for providing feedback on ways to  improve information sharing among communities of interest.

		The Centers Are at Varying Stages of Assessing Staffing Needs; Doing So Could Help to Ensure Centers Have Enough Staff to Leverage Resources to Increase Efficiency

The extent to which officials responsible for managing the four multi- agency operations centers had conducted needs assessments to determine  the staffing requirements of each center as a means to leverage resources  varied at the time of our review. For example, CBP officials conducted an  evaluation in June 2005 that addressed the Air and Marine Operations  Center’s capabilities and continuing staffing needs related to its personnel,  but it did not clearly address the need for, or responsibilities of, U.S. Coast  Guard staff assigned to the center. Transportation Security Operations  Center and National Operations Center officials said they had not  documented a needs analysis for staff from other agencies. They said they  viewed cross-agency staffing as a historical edict based on a general  assumption that such expertise was needed to fulfill the mission of their  operations center, and believed that the supporting agency providing the  staff best knew the staffing requirements to fulfill its role at the centers.  Our work has shown that identifying and leveraging resources, including  human resources, ensures efficiencies and that the functions of a multi- agency operations center are not compromised by the workforce  limitations of a single agency.
Since our report, DHS said it is updating mission requirements for the  Operations Directorate and will subsequently assess the National  Operations Center’s staffing needs, although DHS did not say when that  assessment would be completed. On the other hand, Officials at the  National Targeting Center and the Transportation Security Operations  Center told us they have not assessed cross-component staffing needs  because they considered such assessments to be the responsibility of the  agency providing staff. Nevertheless, we maintain that such assessments  continue to be useful to ensure efficiency and that operations centers have  the correct mix of staff to perform their missions. Therefore, while we  understand that the Operations Directorate has taken the position it does  not have control over the component center resources, we maintain that  providing guidance to component agencies to assist them in conducting  such staffing needs assessments would allow the component sponsoring  the center to leverage resources more efficiently to meet the operational  needs of the center.

		Not All Centers Have Established a Definition of Watchstander Roles and Responsibilities for All Agencies at Each Center; Doing So Would Help Ensure Staff Understand Each Others’ Duties during Emergencies

Our work has shown that collaborating agencies should work together to  define and agree on who will do what and how they will organize their  joint and individual efforts, and that this facilitates decision-making.  Agencies use handbooks, charters, standard operating procedures, and  other methods to document these agreements. We found, however, that  while three of the four multi-agency operations centers had developed  descriptions for the watchstander position staffed by their own agency at  the time of our review, only one center—the Air and Marine Operations  Center—had developed a position description for staff assigned to the  center from another DHS agency. For example, at this center, officials  require that Coast Guard staff meet a standardized set of requirements for  radar watchstanders. The other centers relied on the components that  provide staff to define their watchstanders’ roles and responsibilities.  While we recognize components may be in the best position to define how  their staff should contribute, we maintain that it is important that each  watchstander’s position within a center be clearly defined and  communicated so that staff understand not only their individual role, but  each other’s responsibilities and span of control, as well as their expected  joint contributions, most critically during major events. In addition,  because of the potentially time-sensitive need for decisive action at  24/7/365 operations centers, it is important that the roles and  responsibilities of watchstanders are described and understood by both  the staff and the officials responsible for managing the operations centers  to enhance and sustain collaboration. Further, a definition of the  watchstander role and responsibilities is important for supporting agency  officials who must make staffing decisions about assigning qualified and  knowledgeable personnel to the centers.
According to DHS, since our report, it has taken steps to further define the  role and responsibilities of the watchstanders in its National Operations  Center and documented them in its Standard Operating Procedures, as  well as to develop Memoranda of Agreements with the components that  will codify the role of the watchstanders they provide to the National  Operations Center. Such an action, like that of the Air and Marine  Operations Center with regard to Coast Guard watchstanders, helps  ensure that the staff received from partnering organizations possess the  necessary skills to support the operations center to which they are  assigned. Given that DHS has recognized the importance of this key  practice within these two instances, we continue to maintain it is  important for DHS to ensure the other centers likewise have clearly  defined and communicated the roles and responsibilities of  watchstanders.

		DHS Has Taken Some Steps to Provide Centers with Standards, Policies, and Procedures, Especially for Information Sharing, to Operate across Agency Boundaries, but Challenges Remain

Since January 2005, we have designated information sharing for homeland  security a high-risk area because the federal government still faces  formidable challenges in analyzing and disseminating key information  among federal and other partners in a timely, accurate, and useful  manner. Likewise, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the inability to  share information during a disaster can impair the speed of response and  recovery efforts. Each operations center shares information so as to  understand threats, maintain situational awareness, and facilitate the  management of responses to incidents. One of the key technical tools DHS  has decided to use to provide for this information-sharing is the HSIN, and  organizations participating in multi-agency operations centers need to be  connected to the network and have the training and guidance that enables  its use, among other things. DHS implemented HSIN in 2004 and reports  that 18,000 individuals across DHS, other federal agencies, as well as state  and local government and private entities are authorized to use it.  However, we, the DHS IG, and the department itself have identified  continuing concerns with this system, which is used for sharing a variety  of information, including law enforcement and emergency response  information used to support situational awareness and incident response  In April 2007, we reported that DHS did not fully adhere to collaborative  practices or Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance in  coordinating its efforts to implement HSIN through state and local  information-sharing initiatives. OMB guidance requires DHS to foster such  coordination and collaboration as a means to improve government  performance, including enhancing information sharing and avoiding  duplication of effort. Key practices to help implement the guidance include  establishing joint strategies and developing compatible policies and  procedures to operate across agency boundaries. However, DHS did not  fully adhere to these practices or guidance in coordinating its efforts on  HSIN with key state and local stakeholders. As a result, the department  faces the risk that, among other things, effective information sharing is not  occurring and that its HSIN system may duplicate state and local  capabilities. The department has efforts planned and underway to improve  coordination and collaboration, but these efforts have just begun or are  being planned with implementation milestones yet to be established. As a  result, we made recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security  to ensure that HSIN is effectively coordinated with state and local  government information-sharing initiatives. The Inspector General’s June  2006 report had similar findings that DHS did not provide adequate  guidance, including clear information sharing processes, training, and  reference materials, needed to effectively implement HSIN so that  stakeholders were sure of how to use the system.
The HSIN program manager pointed to a number of initiatives being  implemented to address these challenges. These actions include the  issuance of a strategic framework and implementation plan, creation of a  Mission Coordinating Committee to define component information  requirements for the network, and, as mentioned previously, the planned  establishment of a HSIN advisory committee comprised of experts, users,  and other stakeholders involved in homeland security operations around  the country. This committee is intended to provide DHS with comments  and feedback on how the HSIN program can better meet user needs,  examine DHS’s processes for deploying HSIN to the states, assess state  resources, and determine how HSIN can coordinate with these resources.  Nevertheless, the program manager also identified challenges in getting  components to participate in the process of identifying user needs, and  said that the department still faced challenges in gaining widespread  acceptance and use of this tool. Furthermore, one component that  sponsors a key portion of HSIN, the Preparedness Directorate, is  considering whether to continue to support and maintain portals to  provide connectivity to private sector owners and operators of critical  infrastructure sites, or whether to pursue other alternatives, raising  questions about the overall utility of HSIN. Finally, the DHS Office of  Inspector General plans to conduct an evaluation of the HSIN beginning  later this year as a follow-up to its 2006 report to determine the progress  the Department has made in fixing the shortcomings identified.

		Three of Four Centers Had Not Developed Methods to Monitor and Evaluate the Results of Joint Efforts

With the exception of the Air and Marine Operations Center, the multi- agency centers had not developed methods to monitor and evaluate the  results of joint efforts at the time of our review, a key practice for ensuring  collaboration. For example, the Office of Management and Budget’s  assessment of the National Operations Center for 2005 determined that  center officials had not established effective annual or long-term  performance goals, a first step in an effective performance management  and measurement process. Nor were performance measures or other  mechanisms in place to monitor and evaluate the joint efforts of multiple  DHS agencies at the Transportation Security Operations Center and the  National Targeting Center. Without annual goals and a means to measure  performance, it is difficult for an organization to determine how well it is  functioning and identify how it could be more effective. Likewise, our  work has shown that developing performance measures and mechanisms  can help management, key decision makers, and both stakeholders and  customers obtain feedback to improve operational effectiveness and  policy.
To date, DHS has not provided guidance to the multiagency centers to help  implement mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the results of  collaborative efforts. However, as we further discuss later in this  statement, the Operations Directorate said the National Operations Center,  and, as relevant, other centers, have participated in, and will be  participating in, exercises to test some of the changes the centers have  implemented. These exercises provide a means to monitor and evaluate  collaboration during real or hypothetical events, and the after-action  reviews or lessons learned reviews conducted such as Katrina after-action  reports and recommendations, as well as its own exercises and lessons  learned, such as the exercises to test and revise HSIN and the Common  Operating Picture (COP). The center director also described several new  inter-agency groups designed to improve operations that also offer a  means to monitor and evaluate results as well.

		The Centers Are at Various Stages of Using Joint Agency Planning and Reporting to Reinforce Accountability for Collaborative Efforts

In our prior work, we determined that neither DHS nor the component  agencies responsible for managing multi-agency operations centers  consistently discussed, or included a description of, the contribution of  the centers’ collaborative efforts in the components’ strategic or annual  performance plans and reports. Our work has shown that federal agencies  can use these plans and reports as tools to drive collaboration with other  agencies and partners, as well as to establish complementary, consistent,  and reinforcing goals and strategies for achieving results. Published  strategic and annual performance plans and reports make agencies  answerable for collaboration, and help to ensure that Congress has the  information necessary to monitor, oversee, and effectively make  investment decisions.
In terms of using strategic and performance plans to reinforce  collaboration, the most recent DHS strategic plan, issued in 2004, neither  included a discussion of performance goals for, nor addressed the joint  operations of, the multi-agency centers. On the other hand, the Air and  Marine Operations Center’s strategic plan for 2005 generally discussed the  importance of strengthening collaboration with other component agencies  and included a goal to strengthen component agency partnerships to  maximize homeland security strategies.
In terms of using published reports to increase accountability for  collaboration, CBP’s 2005 annual report on the operations of the National  Targeting Center did include a section dedicated to the contributions of  personnel from other DHS components. But, reports from the other  components that manage the centers did not address the roles and  contributions of supporting agencies in accomplishing the centers’  missions. Thus agencies are missing an opportunity to reinforce the value  of partner agency contributions and investments. Likewise, reports from  the DHS agencies that provide staff to these centers also did not address  their participation in their own performance reports.

	DHS’s Operations Directorate Has Given Priority to Fixing the Problems that Hurricane Katrina Exposed

According to DHS officials, the Operations Directorate and the National  Operations Center have been focused on responding to the congressional  and administration reports and corresponding recommendations  generated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. These reports pointed to  a number of failures and problems attributed to the predecessor to the  National Operations Center—the Homeland Security Operations Center— including unclear roles and responsibilities; problems with the flow of  information in and out of the center, especially to senior leadership; a lack  of planning; problems confirming and validating information, and  clarifying conflicting information; and untimely reporting. The reports  concluded that as a result, senior leaders in the Department and the  Administration were not aware of problems with the levees and flooding  as early as they should have been. To address these problems, the after  action reports made a series of recommendations, including the:    Creation of a national operations center to provide national situational  awareness, facilitate incident management, and a common operating  picture;    Establishment of a permanent planning element for incident  management and a national planning and execution system; and    Creation of a national reporting system as well as national information  requirements and a reporting chain.
In response to these concerns, among others, DHS reported that it made a  series of changes to its operations, organization, and procedures for  sharing information in order to maintain situational awareness and  provide for incident management. The changes included giving priority to  improving coordination with external stakeholders, such as other federal  agencies, state and local entities who are the first responders and  ultimately manage recovery efforts, and its own components and their  respective operations centers. The DHS National Operations Center staff  with whom we spoke maintained that implementing these changes could  in turn create an environment where the components and centers may be  more disposed to implementing the key practices for improving  collaboration that our work has identified.
To address problems with collecting, analyzing, and timely disseminating  of critical information during an incident that Katrina exposed, DHS  officials said the Operations Directorate and the National Operations  Center established several initiatives within the last year or so. Among  other things, these initiatives included a new notification system aimed at  providing protocols for sharing information on a graduated scale (from  steady state to awareness, concern, and finally urgency). The Operations  Directorate and the National Operations Center also defined a reporting  structure, ranging from more real-time, unvetted information available  from and to a wide range of stakeholders to reports intended to be more  complete, vetted and validated through designated lead agencies and  higher-level summaries geared for more senior leadership. DHS has  initially developed these protocols and processes for sharing information  for hurricane response and recovery and is expanding them to other  scenarios and concerns.
One other major DHS initiative to better share information for situational  awareness and decision support that responds to key post-Katrina  recommendations also depends on HSIN. DHS has created the Common  Operating Picture within HSIN as a web-based tool designed to be  available to all HSIN users, including key federal, state, and joint field  office homeland security partners, to provide the information needed to  make critical decisions during crises. Initially, DHS created COP templates  to address hurricane disasters in time for the 2006 hurricane season. The  tool includes, among other things, current summaries of specific  situations, the location and operational status of critical infrastructure,  media reports, and streaming video from the field that provides a real-time  picture of developments, especially at an incident site, to enhance  situational awareness. DHS also has created COP Training Teams that  provide training and technical support to DHS components, and other  partners. DHS said training was provided to 17 states on the Gulf and East  coasts in 2006, the most hurricane-prone areas of the country. However,  DHS is still resolving operational issues with COP. For example, DHS  reported in January 2007 that a comprehensive backup capability for the  COP was under development but that the Department was prepared for  contingencies related to power, telecommunications and server outages.  DHS also reported that it continues to develop information requirements  for use in other scenarios, such as pandemics and incidents involving  nuclear devices, among others, as well as to further refine the system.
DHS officials said they have created several new working groups and  organizational entities within the Operations Directorate or National  Operations Center aimed at improving capabilities. The new units include:
Senior Leadership Group. It is comprised of key DHS officials across  the major components and intended to provide a forum for the  Secretary to obtain critical advice from those with the most direct  incident management responsibilities, to communicate decisions, to  facilitate the integration and coordination of intradepartmental  operational missions, activities, and programs at the headquarters  level; and to assist in resolving intradepartmental issues. The group  convenes as necessary, such as during an actual incident or major  exercise, although the Secretary or the Director of Operations  Coordination may convene the group at any time.   Incident Management Planning Team—consisting of 53 members  drawn from 22 DHS components, 25 partner departments or agencies,  and the American Red Cross—that has begun the coordination of  existing plans and the use of resources for domestic disasters.  According to DHS officials, the team is developing plans for the most  likely, and then the most dangerous, of the National Planning  Scenarios—the 15 all-hazards planning scenarios for use in national,  federal, state, and local homeland security preparedness activities that  are representative of the range of potential terrorist attacks and natural  disasters and the related impacts that face our nation.
Disaster Situational Awareness Teams. These teams are to be  comprised of field staff from Immigrations and Customs Enforcement  since they can be more easily deployed and are to be at a site within 24  hours to provide situational awareness reporting and other assistance.
Crisis Action Teams. These multi-agency teams, whose membership  overlaps in part with the new planning teams, are to provide  interagency incident management capabilities and to, among other  things, recommend courses of action, help prioritize incidents and  resources, and serve as a central point for information collection,  evaluation, and coordination, especially for complex or multiple  incidents.
Finally, DHS has completed a study of its operational capabilities and gaps  to guide its future mission and initiatives. Called the Operations Mission  Blueprint, DHS operations staff said the results are still under review;  therefore, that they could not provide us with a copy. Part of this study  includes a plan to consolidate DHS operations centers in headquarters and  its components in a facility located at the St. Elizabeth’s West Campus in  Washington, D.C. The plan cites a number of organizational benefits to  collocating facilities, including enhancing collaboration by bringing  together a large number of DHS executives and line employees currently  dispersed across the region.
While DHS provided us with background briefings, some supporting  documentation, and some after action reports on the initiatives we have  outlined, we did not evaluate the extent to which they have been  implemented and are effective at addressing the problems Katrina  identified, in part because they are so new and in some cases still  concepts. DHS officials themselves, however, identified some challenges  and next steps in implementation. These include, for example, continuing  to outreach to and better integrate DHS components as well as other  stakeholders in planning and implementation, such as state, local, and  private sector partners.
As to this latter challenge, DHS has tested several of its new initiatives,  such as the COP, through daily use, as well as interagency exercises. For  example, through an exercise conducted last year, the National Operations  Center identified opportunities to improve implementation of the COP.  DHS recently completed two other exercises and plans additional  exercises this fall and over the next two years that can also provide helpful  performance information. We agree that the use of exercises, and more  importantly the after-action and lessons learned analyses and  recommendations to fix identified problems, are good methods to help  determine how well initiatives are working, especially when testing under  live, real-time circumstances is not possible.
Complementing this with more systematic performance measures and  ways to obtain feedback from key users and stakeholders on how well the  initiatives meet their needs would also be helpful. For example, officials  noted that there are systematic methods for evaluating what has been  achieved.  The objectives of the HSIN implementation include providing  measurable performance metrics as well as obtaining stakeholder  feedback through its new Advisory Committee, when constituted.   Implementation of the system is to be based on both agency and industry  best practices. Following through on implementation of these types of  measures and feedback loops is particularly important for state and local  stakeholders, as Katrina demonstrated, since they are the first responders  and key to effective incident response planning and implementation.

	Concluding Observations

Our prior work demonstrated that the three component multi-agency  operations centers we reviewed have a critical mission to meet for their  own agencies, as well as a common mission to support the National  Operations Center, the key hub for sharing information on nationwide  situational awareness and for coordinating federal support during major  disasters. Centers rely on staff from multiple agencies to achieve their  missions, so it is important that the centers can collaborate effectively  among the agencies within a center. Our work provides a blueprint of key  practices the centers could use to achieve this collaboration, and also  demonstrates that they have opportunities to implement these practices  more extensively. The payoff can include assurance that all staff clearly  understands roles and responsibilities, especially during a crisis, and that  centers have a common goal for achieving their joint missions, the right  staff from across agencies to do so, and ways to evaluate results achieved  and implement needed corrective actions. In turn, this can better position  DHS, and the nation, to prevent, mitigate and respond to a critical event,  help the Congress to fulfill its oversight and homeland security  responsibilities, and help the department better integrate into a cohesive  unit. While we understand that the Directorate does not control  component centers and is reluctant to issue guidance to them on ways to  implement these best practices as we recommended, we continue to think  that the Directorate can reinforce these practices through such guidance  and example, not only as it works with external stakeholders, but also  with its internal component centers. We believe the Directorate could be  more proactive to accelerate implementation so that centers achieve  anticipated benefits sooner given current priorities and available  resources.
We also understand that the department set its priorities to first focus on  fixing the problems Katrina exposed, as the Congress and Administration  tasked, and recognize that such focus has, and will continue to be, a key  driver in effecting change to improve situational awareness and incident  management capabilities at DHS. We also believe that the initiatives DHS  is implementing in response appear to be the proper steps moving  forward, given that they focus on better planning for disaster response and  better information sharing, as well as include the necessary key players.  However, while these initiatives are aimed at putting the right players,  processes, protocols, and practices in place, both we and the department  recognize that implementation is early, measures of effectiveness must  still be put in place, and challenges must be overcome.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my  prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you  or any members of the subcommittee may have at this time.
For information about this testimony, please contact Eileen Larence,  Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-8777, or  larencee@gao.gov. Other individuals making key contributions to this  testimony include Christopher Keisling, Nancy Briggs, Katherine Davis and  Tony DeFrank.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony summarizes GAO's October 2006 report on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) operations centers--centers run by three DHS components and operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities of potential terrorist activities and other crises. Specifically, GAO assessed the extent to which the centers implemented key practices GAO's work has shown will enhance and sustain collaboration. In addition, GAO is aware of Congress's concerns about the performance of certain DHS components with regard to situational awareness during Hurricane Katrina, and the recent efforts made in response to these concerns identified in hurricane after-action studies and reports. Because these efforts to some extent affect DHS's response to the recommendations made in GAO's previous report, this testimony briefly describes some of the steps DHS reported that it has taken to address situational awareness problems Katrina exposed. However, because these actions are relatively new, it is too early to assess how well they are being implemented.

What GAO Found

The DHS operations centers GAO studied--the Air and Marine Operations Center, the National Targeting Center, the Transportation Security Operations Center, and the National Operations Center--could improve implementation of the key practices GAO identified as having a positive effect on inter-agency collaboration. These key practices include (1) defining common outcomes and joint strategies; (2) assessing each center's needs to leverage resources; (3) defining the roles and responsibilities of the personnel conducting surveillance activities; (4) establishing compatible standards, policies, and procedures for using DHS's primary information sharing network; (5) developing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate results of joint operations; and (6) reinforcing accountability by recognizing joint efforts and outcomes achieved in annual performance plans and reports. The Operations Directorate, established in November 2005 to improve operational efficiency and coordination, provides DHS with an opportunity to more fully implement these key practices by providing guidance to the operations centers. Although GAO recommended that the Directorate provide this guidance, DHS stated that the Directorate does not have control over the component operations centers; therefore, it has not provided guidance to improve collaboration among the centers. According to DHS, it has given priority to fixing issues that affect situational awareness and its ability to respond to national incidents and disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. The actions in response to Katrina include establishing standard roles and procedures for reporting information during a major incident and creating a Web-based tool to provide a common view of critical information during a crisis. While DHS has not fully responded to GAO's recommendation for implementing key collaborative practices, it maintains that the initiatives it has implemented since Katrina will improve collaboration and create an environment to address the recommendations in the future.