Background

DOE’s predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a  program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies in  1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device in Boston  unless he received $200,000. Even though the threat turned out to be a  hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the capability to quickly respond to a  nuclear or radiological incident. To address this deficiency, AEC  established the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) to provide  technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the  Department of State, which is the lead federal agency for terrorism  response outside the United States. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI  is responsible for investigating illegal activities involving the use of nuclear  materials within the United States, including terrorist threats. The NEST  program was designed to assist the FBI in searching, identifying, and  deactivating nuclear and radiological devices. However, the deployments of  search teams were large scale and often slow because they were designed  to respond to threats, such as extortion, when there was time to find the  device.
With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001,  DOE’s capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to nuclear and  radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent terrorists from  detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the core mission, DOE’s  emergency response activities have expanded to include actions to  minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological incident. For  example, DOE maintains an aerial capability to detect, measure, and track  radioactive material to determine contamination levels at the site of an  emergency. DOE has used this capability to conduct background radiation  surveys of most nuclear power plants in the country for the Environmental  Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event of  an accident at a nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be  performed to help determine the location and amount of contamination.
There are currently about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians from  the national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories dedicated to  preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological threat. In fiscal year  2005, DOE had a budget of about $90 million for emergency response  activities. Under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the  Office of Emergency Response manages DOE’s efforts to prevent and  respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that  terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the  United States. These materials could be used to produce either an  improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known as a  dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb made  with highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation experts  estimate that a successful improvised nuclear device could have yields in  the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT).  A 20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the yield of the bomb that  destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart of a medium-size U.S.  city and result in thousands of casualties and radiation contamination over  a wider area.
A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with  radioactive material, using explosive force to disperse the radioactive  material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks. The extent of  contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of  the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and  weather conditions. While much less destructive than an improvised  nuclear device, the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation  sickness for people nearby and produce serious economic costs and  psychological and social disruption associated with the evacuation and  subsequent cleanup of the contaminated areas. While no terrorists have  detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists placed a canister  containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid-1990s. Although the  device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the  incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness to  use radiological materials as weapons of terror.

	DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear  or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized teams  and equipment to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological  devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological  attack. To prevent an attack, search teams use a variety of clandestine and  discreet methods, including the use of radiation sensors carried in  backpacks and mounted on vehicles and helicopters, to detect and locate  radiological sources. In the event of a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE  would, among other things, use radiation-monitoring equipment, including  sensors mounted on aircraft and vehicles, to detect and measure radiation  contamination levels and provide information to state and local officials on  what areas need to be evacuated. Table 1 summarizes DOE’s capabilities  and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack.

		DOE Has Specialized Teams That Use a Variety of Methods and Equipment to Prevent a Nuclear or Radiological Attack

To prevent a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE has specialized teams to  search for and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices. These teams are  manned by full-time professionals and are ready to deploy on either civilian  or military aircraft from the Remote Sensing Laboratories within 4 hours of  notification from the FBI. To detect and locate nuclear or radiological  devices, the teams use a variety of clandestine and discreet methods,  including the use of radiation detectors carried in backpacks that silently  transmit information to the searcher’s earphone and radiation detectors  mounted in vehicles and helicopters.
While backpacks and other hand-held equipment can detect and identify  devices with greater accuracy, vehicle and helicopter-mounted radiation  detectors allow DOE to cover a greater area in a shorter amount of time— which is particularly important when the exact location of a device is  unknown and the teams need to search a large area. Once deployed, the  searchers can also send information they are collecting from radiation  detectors via a secure Internet line to scientists and technicians at the  national laboratories to help them identify nuclear or radiological material  and determine whether the material poses a threat. If the search teams  need additional support to cover a large area, they can train and equip local  responders, such as law enforcement and firefighters, to conduct search  missions. Up to 16 people can become proficient in basic search techniques  in less than an hour.
Should a device be located, a team composed of nuclear weapons  scientists, technicians, and engineers from the national laboratories as well  as the FBI and military ordnance disposal experts would be deployed to  deactivate the device and prepare it for safe transport away from populated  areas to the Nevada Test Site. This would involve, among other things,  clearing booby traps and separating the high explosives from the nuclear  material. It also would involve the use of specialized equipment, such as a  portable X-ray machine, to peer under a bomb’s outer shell and view the  bomb’s components, identify the device, and determine the best way of  deactivating it. This team maintains a comprehensive computer database of  nuclear and radiological weapon design information for identifying and  properly deactivating devices. Once a device is ready to be safely  transported, scientists in an underground tunnel at the Nevada Test Site  would disassemble and dispose of the device. Under certain circumstances,  the team may not be able to safely transport the device and it may be  necessary to destroy the bomb in place and mitigate the potential spread of  radioactive material by, among other things, constructing a nylon tent  around the device and filling it with thick foam.
Since September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability beyond  the Remote Sensing Laboratories to include teams at eight other  emergency response sites, allowing for more rapid deployment across the  country. These Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams traditionally  have assisted state and local governments with responding to facility or  transportation accidents involving radioactive material that may cause  contamination and affect public health. Since these teams have experience  and expertise in responding to nuclear emergencies—and are located in  different regions across the country—their mission was expanded to  include searching for nuclear or radiological devices. The RAP teams can  drive to most cities in their geographic area and do not have to rely on air  transport. In addition, since the two Remote Sensing Laboratories are  located on the East and West coasts, the RAP teams can provide faster  response to cities located in the center of the country.
In fiscal year 2005, the specialized search teams from the Remote Sensing  Laboratories and the RAP teams conducted about 30 search missions. Most  of these missions involved assisting local and state officials in monitoring  large public events, such as the Super Bowl and the State of the Union  address, to provide assurance that no devices were hidden in the stands or  inside the building before the event. A number of these missions also  involved intelligence-driven searches to address potential radiological  threats in U.S. cities. Despite the teams’ expertise and specialized  equipment, DOE officials cautioned that it may still be difficult to detect  nuclear or radiological devices. Radiation detection equipment may not  detect nuclear materials with relatively low levels of radioactivity or  radiological materials that are well-shielded. In addition, without good  intelligence on the location of the device, search teams may not have time  to find the device.
In addition to preventing a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE is also  responsible for responding to an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon.  A DOE team made up of scientists, engineers, technicians, health  physicists, and safety professionals from the national laboratories and  nuclear weapons production facilities are ready to respond within 4 hours  of notification of an accident, such as the crash of a military airplane  transporting a nuclear weapon. In such a scenario, the team would assess  the damage, if any, to the weapon by using, among other things,  radiography to examine the weapon’s internal structure, and how best to  recover it safely. Since nuclear weapons contain chemically reactive  materials and radioactive elements, great care must be taken in gaining  access to them. For damaged weapons, the team has special techniques to  stabilize the internal components. After weapons are safe to move, they can  be packaged and prepared for transport.

		DOE Has a Critical Role to Play in Minimizing the Consequences of a Nuclear or Radiological Attack

DOE maintains capabilities to minimize the impact of a nuclear or  radiological attack. An RAP team likely would be the first DOE team to  respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency, whether resulting from a  terrorist attack or an accident. The RAP teams, located in nine different  parts of the country, would be responsible for assessing the situation and  determining what additional resources would be necessary to manage the  emergency. These teams are expected to arrive at the site of an emergency  within 4 to 6 hours and conduct an initial radiological assessment of the  area. RAP team members are trained to provide initial assistance to  minimize immediate radiation risks to people, property, and the  environment. In responding to an emergency, they would use radiation  detectors and air-sampling equipment to measure contamination and help  state and local officials reduce the spread of contamination.
Large-scale contamination from a dirty bomb or nuclear device would  require the deployment of consequence management teams from the  Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams are  responsible for setting up an operations center near the site of the  emergency to coordinate environmental monitoring and assessment  activities, conduct monitoring and assessment activities with specialized  equipment, and collect and analyze data from the field on the type, amount,  and extent of radiological release. This information would be used by state  and local governments to determine what areas should be evacuated and  how to properly respond to the emergency and by other federal agencies  involved in decontamination and other cleanup activities. These teams  would monitor the area where radioactivity was released until the area was  fully evaluated and the effects known.
In addition to the RAP and consequence management teams, DOE would  collect information on the extent of contamination, using not only planes  and helicopters fitted with radiation detectors but also sophisticated  computer models. DOE has a limited number of planes and helicopters at  the Remote Sensing Laboratories that detect, measure, and track  radioactive materials to determine contamination levels. The aircraft can  provide real-time measurement of low levels of ground contamination.  They can also provide detailed imagery analysis of an accident site. The  planes are deployed first to determine the location and extent of ground  contamination. The helicopters are then used to perform detailed surveys  of any ground contamination. This information is used to decide where to  send ground monitoring teams. Based on information from the aircraft,  scientists are able to develop maps of the ground hazards. In addition to  their ability to track radiation from a dirty bomb or nuclear device, the  aircraft have also been used to search for lost or stolen nuclear material  and to locate medical isotopes left behind after natural disasters, as  occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, to ensure they do not  endanger the public.
Emergency response teams can also use computer models developed by  the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to predict the consequences  of a radiological release by modeling the movement of hazardous plumes.  Based on the time, location, type of accident, and weather conditions, the  model can predict the extent to which the material can spread and estimate  the amount of the release. As technicians receive information from field  teams, they can update the model.
Lastly, DOE can mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting from  radiation exposure. Medical radiation experts are on call 24 hours a day  and can provide medical and radiological advice to state and local  governments or deploy directly to an accident site. These experts also  track the treatment of radiation accident patients and conduct medical  follow-ups.

	DOE’s Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities

DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level  of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,  their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed  across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However,  we found a number of critical emergency response capabilities and assets  that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would  significantly hamper DOE’s ability to quickly respond to a nuclear or  radiological threat. Because these capabilities and assets have not been  fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient  for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.

		DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with the Lowest Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under DOE Guidance Because Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been Dispersed

DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest level  of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE  officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency  response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country  and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE policy guidance for  safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005 required a  review of facilities protected at the lowest level of physical security to  determine whether they were “mission critical.” Mission critical facilities  have capabilities and assets that are not available at any other location and  cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. Under DOE guidance, facilities  designated as mission critical must be protected at a higher level of  physical security. For example, DOE Headquarters was designated as  mission critical because the loss of decision makers during an emergency  would impair the deployment and coordination of DOE resources. As a  result, DOE strengthened the physical security measures around DOE  Headquarters by, among other things, adding vehicle barriers around the  facility.
In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the capabilities  and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and found that they were  not mission critical because if either one or both laboratories were  attacked and destroyed, DOE would be able to easily reconstitute their  capabilities and assets to meet mission requirements. Since September 11,  2001, DOE has dispersed some of the assets and capabilities once found  exclusively at the Remote Sensing Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has  expanded its search mission to include the RAP teams that are located at  eight sites across the country. These teams receive training and equipment  similar to the search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as  radiation detectors mounted in backpacks and vehicles. They have also  participated in a number of search missions, including addressing potential  threats at sporting events and national political conventions, or assisting  customs officials with investigating cargo entering ports and border  crossings.

		DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at These Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE’s Ability to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats

Contrary to DOE’s assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories’  capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the  country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique  emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would significantly  undermine DOE’s ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological threat. The  critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the laboratories include (1)  the teams that help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological  attack, (2) the planes and helicopters designed to measure contamination  levels and assist search teams in locating nuclear or radiological devices,  and (3) a sophisticated mapping system that tracks contamination and the  location of radiological sources in U.S. cities. Furthermore, while the RAP  teams have assumed a greater role in searching for nuclear or radiological  devices, the teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories remain the most  highly trained and experienced search teams.
The consequence management teams that would respond within the first 24  hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote Sensing  Lab at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have specialized equipment for  monitoring and assessing the type, amount, and extent of contamination.  They are responsible for establishing an operations center near the site of  contamination to coordinate all of DOE’s radiological monitoring and  assessment activities and to analyze information coming from the field,  including aerial survey data provided by helicopters, planes, and ground  teams monitoring radiation levels. Without this capability, state and local  governments would not receive information quickly about the extent of  contamination to assess the impact on public health and private property  and how best to reduce further contamination.
DOE’s emergency response planes and helicopters are designed to detect,  measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear or  radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a limited  number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at the Remote  Sensing Laboratories. These planes and helicopters use a sophisticated  radiation detection system to gather radiological information and produce  maps of radiation exposure and concentrations. It is anticipated that the  planes would arrive at an emergency scene first and be used to determine  the location and extent of ground contamination. The helicopters would  then be used to perform more detailed surveys of any contamination.  According to DOE officials, the planes and helicopters can gather  information on a wide area without placing ground teams at risk. Without  this capability, DOE would not be able to quickly obtain comprehensive  information about the extent of contamination. The helicopters can also be  used by search teams to locate nuclear or radiological devices in U.S. cities.  The helicopters can cover a larger area in a shorter amount of time than  teams on foot or in vehicles. The ground search teams can conduct  secondary inspections of locations with unusual radiation levels identified  by the helicopter.
The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a  sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence  management teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or  radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and  helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses  this system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of  contamination in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to  quickly analyze the information collected by various emergency response  capabilities and determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear or  radiological attack. This mapping system can also be used to help find  nuclear or radiological devices more quickly before they are detonated.
DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that are  unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE’s ability  to respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local governments  would not receive information—such as the location and extent of  contamination—that they need in a timely manner in order to manage the  consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public health and  property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and assets, DOE has  not developed contingency plans identifying capabilities and assets at other  locations that could be used in the event that one or both Remote Sensing  Laboratories were attacked. Specifically, DOE has not identified which  RAP team would assume responsibility for coordinating contamination  monitoring and assessment activities in the place of the consequence  management teams from Nellis. During an emergency, the lack of clearly  defined roles may hamper emergency response efforts.
DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and assets of  both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could mobilize  and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or national  laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories, such as  Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure  contamination in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing  Laboratories were destroyed, the RAP teams and the national laboratories  would not have planes and helicopters to conduct large-scale  contamination monitoring and assessment. The RAP teams also do not  have the equipment or expertise to set up an operations center and analyze  data that field teams would collect on contamination levels. In April 2006,  DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight, which is responsible for  independently evaluating, among other things, the effectiveness of DOE’s  programs, reported that the RAP teams, during performance tests, could  not quickly provide state and local governments with recommendations on  what actions to take to avoid or reduce the public’s exposure to radiation  and whether to evacuate contaminated areas. In addition, DOE officials  told us that, based on training exercises, the demands of responding to two  simultaneous nuclear or radiological events strained all of DOE’s  capabilities to manage the consequences. According to DOE officials, if the  consequence management teams at Nellis could not respond and there  were multiple, simultaneous attacks, DOE’s capabilities to minimize the  impact of a nuclear or radiological attack would be significantly hampered.
DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked, their  aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless the aircraft  at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However, DOE policy  generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed at Andrews  remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top government decision  makers and other key government assets. During a nuclear or radiological  emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited airborne capability to  measure contamination levels. In addition, if there were multiple  simultaneous events, there would be considerable delay in providing  information to state and local governments about the extent of  contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a time.
Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available to  provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it with  radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that DOE  would face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not designed  for measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE has a  memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defense and other  federal and state agencies to use their helicopters and planes for transport  and other mission requirements, but that it is unlikely that DOD or any  other agency would provide them with aircraft during an emergency  because those agencies’ priority would be to carry out their own missions,  not to assist DOE. Even if DOE were provided with helicopters, DOE does  not have spare radiation detectors like those found on its own helicopters,  and even if it did have spares, it would not have time to mount radiation  detectors on the exterior of the aircraft. DOE officials told us that radiation  detectors, like those found on their vehicles, could be placed inside an  airplane or helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination would be  significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted detector.
Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the  actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to the  Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on  helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale  contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the  consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that all  of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of consequence  management teams and the planes and helicopters from the Remote  Sensing Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it would be  able to accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities and assets of  the Remote Sensing Laboratories.
Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching for  nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have the  most highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the search  teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams trained to  conduct physically demanding maritime searches to locate potential  nuclear or radiological devices at sea before they arrive at a U.S. port. The  search teams can also repair radiation equipment for search missions in the  field. Furthermore, these search teams are more prepared than the RAP  teams to enter environments where there is a threat of hazards other than  those associated with radiological materials, such as explosives. If there is  a threat of explosives in an area where a search mission would be  conducted, these teams have specialized equipment to detect explosives  and can more quickly request FBI ordnance disposal assistance in order to  complete their search mission. In April 2006, the Office of Independent  Oversight reported that the RAP teams did not always complete their  search missions when there was a high level of risk to the lives of the RAP  team members from explosives. The report found that some RAP teams  refused to perform the mission unless all risk from explosives around a  device was removed and others completed the mission only after certain  safety criteria were met. According to this study, leaders of the RAP teams  had to make on-the-spot judgments weighing the safety of RAP team  members against their ability to complete the search mission because there  was a lack of guidance on how to respond.

		Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect the Facilities against Terrorist Attack

Under DOE guidance, the physical security measures for facilities in the  lowest level of security may include barriers such as fences, walls, and  doors. According to DOE officials, a facility can have, at a minimum, walls  and doors and be in compliance with the guidance. Adding additional  measures, such as fences and vehicle barriers, are under the discretion of  the security officer in charge of the facilities. According to DOE security  officials, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base exceeds  current physical security requirements because DOE placed a fence around  the facility and a vehicle barrier at the front entrance. These additional  measures were taken because, at the time the Remote Sensing Laboratory  was built, these measures were required.
In contrast, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base  does not have a fence or any vehicle barriers because it is located along the  executive route used by the President and foreign dignitaries when they  land at Andrews and exit the base. The buildings along this route must  meet specific aesthetic standards, which prohibit the use of certain  physical security measures, such as fences. Despite these limitations, DOE  security officials told us that the laboratory still meets the minimum  security requirements. According to these officials, the Office of  Emergency Response, which is responsible for managing DOE’s emergency  response capabilities, would have to classify the facilities as mission  critical before more stringent measures would be required.
While current physical security measures are consistent with DOE  guidance and may protect the facilities against trespass and theft of  classified government documents, these measures may not be sufficient to  protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Security officials told us that  current physical security measures at the Remote Sensing Laboratories  have not been hardened or designed to withstand certain types of terrorist  attacks. Security officials told us that the physical security measures  protecting these facilities have not been strengthened because, if there  were credible intelligence that the facilities faced the risk of terrorist  attack, DOE could take additional measures to protect the facility, such as  deploying protective forces around the laboratories and limiting access to  the parking areas near the facilities. However, security officials would have  to rely on good intelligence to prevent such an attack. In addition, under  DOE guidance, facilities that house nuclear weapons or substantial  quantities of special nuclear material that could be used in nuclear  weapons are required to have vehicle barriers and other protective  measures. Since the Remote Sensing Laboratories do not have nuclear  weapons or special nuclear material, additional security measures are not  required unless the facilities are classified as mission critical.
While the laboratories’ location on Air Force bases may appear to provide  an additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force  Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal government  identification may gain entry. In addition, Air Force guards do not inspect  every vehicle. Vehicles are randomly inspected, and Air Force security  guards can use their judgment as to whether a car should be searched. In  fact, GAO staff gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no  scrutiny of their identification, and their vehicles were never searched.

	Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation  surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can later be used to  compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats  in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure radiation levels after a  radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts.  Despite the benefits, there has been a survey of only one major U.S. city.  Since neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for funding and  conducting surveys, there are no plans to conduct additional surveys or to  inform cities about their benefits.

		Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect Radiological Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation Levels in the Event of a Radiological Attack

DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the  location of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing radiation  levels within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from a variety of  sources, such as rock quarries; granite found in buildings, statues, or  cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals; and areas treated with high  amounts of fertilizer, such as golf courses. DOE uses helicopters mounted  with external radiation detectors and equipped with a global position  system to fly over an area and gather data in a systematic grid pattern.  Figure 1 illustrates a helicopter conducting an aerial survey and collecting  information on radiation sources in a city.
Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the  helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians and  scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high radiation  concentrations, also known as “hot spots.”  DOE uses helicopters rather  than airplanes because their lower altitude and lower speed permits a more  precise reading. While conducting the baseline survey, DOE ground teams  and law enforcement officials can investigate these hot spots to determine  whether the source of radiation is used for industrial, medical, or other  routine purposes. DOE officials told us that this baseline information  would be beneficial for all major cities because law enforcement officials  could immediately investigate any potentially dangerous nuclear or  radiological source and DOE could later use the data in the event of an  emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in cleanup efforts. For  example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the National Mall in  Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations. Law enforcement  officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation sources and  ensure the Mall area was safe for the public.
Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement detect  new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb threat,  DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that radiation  data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with new sources of  radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a nuclear or radiological  device would focus their attention on these new locations and might be  able to distinguish between pre-existing sources and potential threats in  order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device more quickly. Conducting  baseline surveys also provides a training opportunity for DOE personnel.  DOE officials told us that regular deployments helped to keep job  performance standards high for pilots, field detection specialists, and the  technicians who analyze the data.
DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in radiation  levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup efforts. A follow-up  survey could be taken afterward to compare changes against the baseline  radiation levels. This information can be used to determine which areas  need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004, DOD funded a survey of the  area around the Pentagon in Northern Virginia in order to assist with  cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or radiological attack. While no study has  reliably determined the cleanup costs of a dirty-bomb explosion in an  urban area, DOE estimates that cleaning up after the detonation of a small  to medium-size radiological device may cost tens or even hundreds of  millions of dollars. DOE officials estimated that information from  background radiation surveys could save several million dollars in cleanup  costs because cleanup efforts could be focused on decontaminating  buildings and other areas to pre-existing levels of radiation. Without a  baseline radiation survey, cleanup crews would not know the extent to  which they would have to decontaminate the area. Efforts to completely  clean areas with levels of pre-existing radiation, such as granite buildings  or hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive.
DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have limitations  and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or radiological devices.  Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded  radiological materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being  surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness of detection systems.  Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good intelligence to find a device.  Law enforcement officials would need intelligence information to narrow  the search to a specific part of a city. Lastly, according to DOE officials,  baseline background radiation surveys may need to be conducted on a  periodic basis because radiation sources may change over time, especially  in urban areas. For example, new construction using granite, the  installation of medical equipment, or the heavy use of fertilizer all could  change a city’s radiation background. Despite these limitations, without  baseline survey information, law enforcement officials may lose valuable  time when searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating  pre-existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if there  were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of baseline radiological data  would likely make the cleanup more costly and time consuming.

		DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City

In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to  conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were  aware that DOE had the capability to measure background radiation and  locate hot spots by helicopter because DOE used this capability at the  World Trade Center site in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS  provided the city with about $30 million in grant money to develop a  regional radiological detection and monitoring system. NYPD decided to  spend part of this money on a complete aerial survey of all five boroughs.  DOE conducted the survey in about 4 weeks in the summer of 2005,  requiring over 100 flight hours to complete at a cost of about $800,000.
According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey  exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant  benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident. First,  NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey, they  identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological sources. Teams  of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and technicians  investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether they posed a  danger to the public. While most of these were medical isotopes located at  medical facilities and hospitals, according to NYPD officials, awareness of  these locations will allow them to distinguish false alarms from real  radiological threats and locate a radiological device more quickly. Second,  NYPD officers are now trained in investigating hot spots and they have real- life experience in locating radiological sources. Third, NYPD officials now  have a baseline radiological survey of the city to assist with cleanup efforts  in the event of a radiological release.
In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary benefit of  the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of the over 80  locations with a radiological signature was a local park that was once the  site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD officials, the survey  disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by large quantities of  radium. Brush fires in the area posed an imminent threat to public health  because traditional fire mitigation tactics of pushing flammable debris into  the middle of the park could release radiological contamination into the air.  Investigating locations with unexplained radiological sources identified by  the aerial background radiation survey alerted NYPD officials to this threat,  and they were able to prevent public exposure to the material.
Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes  over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide  money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hope to  get a better understanding of how and to what extent background radiation  changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue identifying  radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant training to their  officers.

		Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both Agencies from Informing Cities about the Surveys

Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither DOE  nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and conducting  surveys. In addition, neither agency is notifying city officials of the  potential benefits of aerial surveys or that such a capability exists.  According to DOE and DHS officials, New York City is the only city where a  background radiation survey has been completed.
DOE officials told us that DOE is reluctant to conduct large numbers of  additional surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters that  are needed to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological  emergencies. Furthermore, they assert that DOE does not have sufficient  funding to conduct aerial background radiation surveys. In fiscal year 2006,  the emergency response budget for aerial radiation detection was  approximately $11 million to cover costs for items such as aircraft  maintenance, personnel, fuel, and detection equipment. DOE relies on  federal agencies and cities to reimburse them for the costs of surveys.  However, even if DHS funded cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New  York’s case, DOE officials stated that payment would need to include costs  associated with the wear and tear on the helicopters. Furthermore, the  extra costs could not be completely recovered by increasing the charges to  the city because, according to DOE officials, DOE cannot accumulate  money from year to year to pay for future lump-sum repairs. In addition,  DOE officials view background radiation surveys as part of the homeland  security mission to prepare state and local officials against terrorist  attacks, not as part of their emergency response mission. However, DOE  officials told us that because they possess the assets and expertise, they  would be willing to conduct additional surveys if DHS funded the full cost  of the surveys and covered the wear and tear on DOE’s equipment.
DHS officials told us that it is not DHS’s responsibility to conduct aerial  background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability. DHS’s  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) told us it does not have the  expertise or capability to conduct surveys and that surveys are DOE’s  responsibility. However, DNDO is responsible for assisting state and local  governments’ efforts to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological  materials and to develop mobile detection systems. DNDO has not  evaluated the benefits and limitations of background surveys and does not  plan to conduct background surveys as part of this effort. DHS officials  also told us that it is DHS’s responsibility to advise cities about different  radiation detection technology and to help state and local officials decide  which technologies would be most beneficial. However, DNDO does not  currently advise cities and states on the potential benefits of background  surveys.
DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local  governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic events,  including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year 2006, there was  about $2.5 billion available in grant funding for state and local  governments. DHS officials told us that this grant funding could be used for  radiation surveys if cities requested them. However, according to DHS  officials, the agency has not received any requests for funding other than  the 2005 request by New York City. While it is DHS’s responsibility to  inform state and local governments about radiation detection technology, it  has neither an outreach effort nor does it maintain a central database for  informing cities and states about background radiation surveys. DHS  maintains a lessons-learned information-sharing database, which is a  national online network of best practices and lessons learned to help plan  and prepare for a terrorist attack. However, it is the responsibility of state  and local governments to enter information into this database, and DHS  officials told us they were not aware if New York City officials had added  any information to the database about the surveys. According to DHS  officials, it is DOE’s responsibility to inform cities and states about the  surveys, since DOE maintains the capability for conducting them.
In the absence of clear mission responsibility, there are no plans to conduct  additional surveys, and no other city has requested one, in part, because  DOE and DHS are not informing cities about the benefits of these surveys.

	Conclusions

Preventing a nuclear or radiological explosion that could kill or injure  many people and severely disrupt the nation’s economy depends, in part,  on DOE’s ability to search for and deactivate a device with little or no  warning. Reducing the loss of life from radiation exposure and the spread  of contamination in the event of a nuclear or radiological explosion also  depends, in part, on DOE’s capability to determine what parts of a U.S. city  have been contaminated and provide this information to local and state  governments to help evacuate citizens that are at risk of exposure and to  administer medical aid. A number of critical capabilities and assets for  preventing and responding to nuclear and radiological attacks reside at  DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories. Despite efforts to disperse  emergency response capabilities and assets to other regions, the Remote  Sensing Laboratories still play a prominent role in DOE’s ability to search  for and locate nuclear or radiological devices and to minimize the  consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. The capabilities and  assets that are unique to the laboratories include consequence  management teams that provide information to state and local  governments about the extent of contamination; the planes and helicopters  used to locate lost or stolen nuclear or radiological materials and measure  contamination levels; and a sophisticated mapping system that contains  information on the locations of radiological sources in U.S. cities. In  addition, the Remote Sensing Laboratories house specialized teams that  are highly trained in clandestine search techniques and can conduct  physically demanding search missions, such as maritime boarding. Despite  the importance of the assets and capabilities located at these facilities, the  Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at DOE’s lowest level of  physical security. If DOE’s emergency response capabilities were fully  dispersed, then providing only minimal security may be sufficient.  However, since several DOE emergency response capabilities remain  unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories, we believe that the physical  security measures around those facilities may not be sufficient to protect  their capabilities. We recognize that physical protection measures may be  costly and that DOE security officials must prioritize where to spend  limited resources in a fiscally constrained environment. However, in our  view, a modest improvement in security at the Remote Sensing  Laboratories, such as installing vehicle barriers, would significantly  enhance the protection of highly valuable assets against a terrorist attack.
In responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE must rely on all  of the capabilities and assets at its disposal. One capability that remains  underutilized is aerial background radiation surveys. These surveys  establish baseline radiological data that can later be used to more quickly  detect radiological threats in U.S. cities and to measure changes in  contamination levels after a radiological attack in order to better focus and  reduce cleanup costs. Despite their benefits and relatively low cost, there  has been a survey of only one major metropolitan area. Since neither DOE  nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for performing the surveys,  they have not evaluated the costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting  the surveys for metropolitan areas that may be most at risk from a terrorist  attack. While DOE has the expertise to conduct the surveys, the  department is reluctant to encourage cities to request the surveys because  it has a limited number of helicopters at its disposal, and they are generally  reserved for emergency response missions. DHS, which is responsible for  assisting state and local governments in preparing for a nuclear or  radiological attack and has a $2.5 billion grant program to improve state  and local governments’ capacity to do so, has not considered aerial surveys  to be part of its efforts to protect cities against such an attack. With no  agency assuming responsibility for informing cities about the benefits of  these surveys, U.S. cities are missing an opportunity to be better prepared  for a terrorist attack.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To better ensure that all capabilities and assets are available and used to  prevent or minimize the consequence of a nuclear or radiological attack,  we are making the following three recommendations:  The Administrator of NNSA, who implements the emergency response  program within DOE, should review the physical security measures at  the Remote Sensing Laboratories and determine whether additional  measures should be taken to protect the facilities against a loss of  critical emergency response capabilities or whether it is more cost- effective to fully disperse its capabilities and assets to multiple areas of  the country.
The Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security  should evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting aerial  background radiation surveys of metropolitan areas, especially those  that are considered to be most at risk of a terrorist attack; determine  whether they would help prevent and respond to a nuclear or  radiological attack; and report the results to the Congress.
If the Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security  determine that the surveys would help prevent and respond to a nuclear  or radiological attack, the Secretaries should work together to develop a  strategy for making greater use of the aerial surveys. In developing this  strategy, the Secretary of Homeland Security should consider (1) the  costs and benefits of funding these surveys through its existing grant  program for state and local governments or through other means and (2)  ways to inform state and local government officials about the benefits  and limitations of aerial background radiation surveys so that these  government officials can make their own decision about whether they  would benefit from the surveys.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided DOE and DHS with draft copies of this report for their review  and comment. DHS agreed with our recommendations. DOE neither agreed  nor disagreed with our recommendations, but raised concerns about one of  our findings. In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our finding that  the physical security of the Remote Sensing Laboratories may not be  sufficient to protect them against terrorist attacks. According to DOE,  physical security measures at these two facilities are sufficient because (1)  two senior-level managers diligently reviewed the physical security  measures around the facilities and believe that they are sufficient and (2)  the laboratories are located on Air Force bases. We disagree with these  rationales and stand behind our finding. First, while we acknowledge that  current physical security measures for the two Remote Sensing  Laboratories are consistent with DOE guidance, the laboratories are  protected at the lowest level of physical security. This means that a facility  can meet the requirements by having walls and doors but no other physical  security measures.  For example, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at  Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence or any vehicle barriers, but  security officials told us that it still meets the minimum security  requirements. Further, DOE’s justification for protecting the laboratories at  the lowest level of physical security is that their emergency response  capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the country and are not  concentrated at the laboratories. However, although we found that DOE  had dispersed some of its emergency response capabilities and assets, a  number of critical emergency response capabilities and assets still exist  only at the laboratories. Because these capabilities and assets have not  been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be  sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.
Second, the security officials responsible for developing security plans for  the laboratories told us that they do not rely on Air Force personnel to  protect the facility against a terrorist attack. As we reported, while the  laboratories’ location on Air Force bases may appear to provide an  additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force  Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal government  identification may gain entry. Furthermore, guards at these installations do  not inspect every vehicle. In fact, as discussed in our report, GAO staff  gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny of their  identification, and their vehicles were never searched.
In its written comments, DOE agreed that there may be value in performing  additional aerial background radiation surveys. However, DOE was  concerned that existing mission requirements may limit DOE’s ability to  conduct aerial surveys. While we recognize that DOE has limited resources  to conduct aerial surveys, we note that the agency does have the expertise  and that there is funding potentially available under DHS’s grant program  for state and local governments. If neither DOE nor DHS assume mission  responsibility for conducting the aerial surveys and do not inform cities  about the benefits of these surveys, U.S. cities will miss an important  opportunity to be better prepared for a terrorist attack.
DOE also noted that aerial background radiation surveys have limitations.  For example, aerial surveys may not be able to detect well-shielded  radiological materials. We acknowledged these limitations in our report.  However, despite the limitations, without baseline survey information from  an aerial survey, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time when  searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating pre-existing  sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if there were a  nuclear or radiological attack, the lack of baseline radiological data would  likely make the cleanup more costly and time consuming.
DHS provided comments via e-mail. Comments from DOE’s NNSA are  reprinted in appendix I. DOE and DHS also provided technical comments,  which we incorporated, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the  Administrator of NNSA, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and interested  congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix II.

Comments from the Department of Energy

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Leland Cogliani, John Delicath,  Mattias Fenton, Glen Levis, Greg Marchand, Keith Rhodes, Rebecca Shea,  and Ned Woodward made significant contributions to this report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains an emergency response capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the United States. This capability has taken on increased significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major U.S. city. This report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological attacks in the United States, (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities.

What GAO Found

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency response facilities--the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that can readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor the Department of Homeland Security has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys, and there are no plans to conduct additional surveys.