Background

DOD’s ranges are used primarily to test weapon systems and train military  forces; some ranges are used for both testing and training purposes, while  others are limited to one use or the other. These ranges represent  important national assets for the development and sustainment of  U.S. military forces. This report focuses primarily on ranges used for  training purposes. DOD requires ranges for all levels of training to include  airspace for air-to-air, air-to-ground, drop zone, and electronic combat  training; live-fire ranges for artillery, armor, small arms, and munitions  training; ground maneuver ranges to conduct realistic force-on-force and  live-fire training at various unit levels; and sea ranges to conduct surface  and sub-surface maneuvers for training. In a February 2004 report to the  Congress, DOD identified 70 major active-component training ranges in  the continental United States—the Army has 35, the Navy 13, the Marine  Corps 12, and the Air Force 10. The report also identified several National  Guard, Reserve, and smaller training ranges.

		Readiness Reporting for Defense Infrastructure to Include Training Ranges

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness  develops policies, plans, and programs to ensure the readiness of military  forces and provides oversight on training issues. The Secretaries of the  military departments are responsible for training personnel and for  maintaining their respective training ranges and facilities. Until recent  years, DOD had no readiness reporting system in place for its defense  installations and facilities, including training ranges. In fiscal year 2000,  DOD reported to the Congress for the first time on the readiness of its  defense infrastructure as an integral element of its overall Defense  Readiness Reporting System. At the core of the system is a rating  classification, typically referred to as a “C” rating. The C-rating process is  intended to provide an overall assessment for each of nine facility classes  (e.g., “operations and training” and “community and housing”) on a  military installation. Training ranges fall within the operations and training  facility class. While the services provide overall assessments by facility  class, they may not always provide detailed separate ratings for  installation assets, such as training ranges, within a class. With respect to  training ranges, the Army and Marine Corps have data that provide  C-ratings for their ranges, but the Navy and Air Force do not.  The definitions for C-ratings are as follows:    C-1—only minor facility deficiencies with negligible impact on capability    C-2—some deficiencies with limited impact on capability to perform    C-3—significant facility deficiencies that prevent performing some    C-4—major facility deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission  accomplishment.
Although we have previously reported concerns about the consistency and  quality of the services’ approaches to completing these assessments, their  assessments nonetheless have shown a large portion of DOD facilities  across all classes of facilities, which include training ranges, being rated  either C-3 or C-4.

		DOD’s Training Transformation Initiative

To effectively support the needs of combatant commanders in the new  strategic environment of the 21st century, DOD has undertaken a  transformation initiative to change the way it conducts training by  preparing military forces to learn, improvise, and adapt to constantly  changing threats as they execute military doctrine. The joint national  training capability is one of three capabilities of this initiative and calls for  the development of a live-virtual-constructive training environment. To  meet this effort, defense planning guidance required OSD, in collaboration  with the military services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Forces  Command, to develop a plan to transform military training to, among other  things, ensure that training ranges and devices are modernized and  sustainable. The Training Transformation Implementation Plan, which  identifies DOD’s vision, goals, and milestones, was initially issued in June  2003 and subsequently updated in June 2004. Under the joint national  training capability, DOD recognized the need for sustainable and  modernized ranges and stated that range capabilities, such as  instrumentation for the operating platforms, and modern range  infrastructure are necessary to create the training environment, capture  realistic ground situations, assess activity and performance, and promptly  provide feedback to the training audience and serve as the foundation for  the joint national training capability.

		Prior GAO Reports on Training Ranges

In recent years, we have reviewed and reported on constraints,  particularly those related to encroachment, on military training ranges.  A brief summary on those reports follows:  In June 2004, we reported that DOD’s training range report to the  Congress, which was mandated by section 366 of the Bob Stump National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, did not provide a  comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations  on the use of military lands, marine areas, and air space that are available  in the United States and overseas for training. We also reported that  DOD’s training report did not fully identify available training resources,  specific training capacities and capabilities, and existing training  constraints; fully assess current and future training requirements; fully  evaluate the adequacy of current resources to meet current and future  training range requirements in the United States and overseas; or include a  comprehensive plan with quantifiable goals or milestones to measure  progress, or projected funding requirements needed to implement the  plan. In response to our recommendation calling for a comprehensive plan  to fully address training constraints, DOD stated that the services had  initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it considered to be  evolutionary, and disagreed with our implication that DOD has not  executed a comprehensive program to improve the sustainability of  its ranges.
In September 2003, we reported that through increased cooperation DOD  and other federal land managers could share the responsibility for  managing endangered species on training ranges.
In February 2003, we also reported that while the amount of money spent  on facility maintenance has increased, the amounts have not been  sufficient to halt the deterioration of facilities, which include training  ranges. In addition, we also reported a lack of consistency in the services’  information on facility conditions, making it difficult for the Congress,  DOD, and the services to direct funds to facilities where they are most  needed and to accurately gauge facility conditions.
In April 2002, we reported that troops stationed outside of the continental  United States face a variety of training constraints that have increased  over the past decade and are likely to increase further. In June 2002, we  reported on the impact of encroachment on military training ranges inside  the United States with similar findings to those of the April 2002 report.  In both reports, we stated that impacts on readiness were not well  documented. In addition, we testified before the Congress twice on these  issues—in May 2002 and April 2003.
See the Related GAO Products section at the end of this report for a more  comprehensive list of our products related to the issues discussed in  this report.

	Degraded Conditions at Military Training Ranges Adversely Affect Training Activities

Our visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD’s own assessments,  show that military training ranges have been generally deteriorating over  time and lack modernized capabilities. These degraded conditions have  adversely affected training, placed the services at risk of not meeting  DOD’s transformation goals, and jeopardized the safety of military  personnel who use the ranges. Without adequately maintained and  modernized ranges, the department not only compromises the opportunity  to achieve its training transformation goal of sustainable and capable  training ranges but also assumes the risk that its forces will be less  prepared for its missions and subjected to safety hazards.

		Deficiencies Observed at Training Ranges We Visited

Table 1 shows the wide variety of identified degraded conditions or lack of  upgrades to meet current training needs at the ranges that we visited. The  degraded conditions comprise both (1) those physical features of a  training range that are subject to maintenance (e.g., tank trails and roads)  over time and (2) those capabilities that are desirable for a modernized  training range (e.g., automated threat emitters, automated targets, urban  training facilities). Following the table is a discussion of degraded  conditions that we observed.
While the overall C-rating of the Fort Hood ranges in 2004 was C-2,  53 percent of the assessed training areas were identified by installation  officials as having significant (C-3) or major (C-4) deficiencies that  preclude satisfactory mission accomplishment. According to Army  officials, the condition of Fort Hood’s training ranges is understated  because the overall C-rating does not include all assessed training areas. In  addition, training range officials identified 364 (91 percent) of the  400 miles of their tank trails, which are not rated under training areas, as  unusable or hazardous because of deteriorated conditions (see fig. 1). As a  result, units typically detoured onto paved, public roads to travel to and  from training areas causing road damage and creating safety hazards to  the public who use the roads.
In addition, the urban training facilities were outdated, having been  designed for Cold War scenarios that are not applicable to current military  operations. For example, the facilities at Fort Hood resemble European  villages with narrow streets. But in current military operations, tanks and  other military vehicles patrol Middle Eastern settings and downtown  cities. Also, while entrances to these European homes at Fort Hood are  immediately off the road and easily accessible, homes in the Middle East  are generally protected by tall, gated walls and designed around a  courtyard, making soldiers more vulnerable to enemy fire before entering  a home.

			Fort Stewart, Georgia

While the overall C-rating of the Fort Stewart ranges in 2004 was C-3,  60 percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials as  having major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission  accomplishment. In addition, range officials and units told us that the  convoy training area limits soldiers to shoot out of only one side of a  vehicle during ambush training exercises, although soldiers stated that in  actual military operations they could be attacked from multiple directions.  The range also lacks urban training facilities that accurately reflect the  needs of current military operations, such as Middle Eastern-style building  facades. A range official further stated that most of their ranges lack  running water and therefore do not have functioning restrooms or  showers, which leads to delays and inefficient use of training time. Similar  to Fort Hood, the range also has deteriorated training areas that pose  difficulties in maneuvering vehicles during training events (see fig. 2).
There are numerous identified deficiencies at this range—a primary site  for West Coast Navy units to train before deploying—that adversely affect  the quantity and quality of training activities. Range and submarine  squadron officials told us that a major deficiency is the malfunctioning of  the undersea training area’s communications system, which effectively  reduces the available training area to the southern portion of the range  (see fig. 3).
This situation is further exacerbated because the southern portion of the  undersea training area overlaps with surface ship training areas, and so  concurrent training cannot be conducted. Range officials stated that this  and other deficiencies could also impede their ability to meet the  increased demand created by the Navy’s revised ship deployment cycle,  which requires more carrier groups to be deployable at a given time.  Moreover, the range does not have an instrumented shallow-water  capability. A recent study on the range’s capabilities for antisubmarine  warfare found that current range resources are sufficient to meet 90  percent of the minimally required training tasks. However, the study found  that the range does not provide a realistic training environment for 19 (63  percent) of 30 Navy training skills, primarily due to the lack of a shallow- water instrumented training range. The range also lacks adequate support  capabilities, such as piers, docks, and mooring buoys. For example,  although range officials stated that current fleet requirements necessitate  a minimum of eight mooring buoys, only two are in satisfactory condition.  As a result, these buoys are rarely available, which leads to reduced  training support and costly workarounds, such as travel to alternate  locations for the night. In addition, the lack of mooring or docking  capabilities has also resulted in damaged military property and canceled  training events. Range officials and users cited other deficiencies,  including an inadequate number and types of targets, electronic warfare  capabilities, and tracking systems for aircraft, as well as the lack of a  dependable secure high-capacity communication system. In commenting  on a draft of this report, the Navy stated that it is currently funding efforts  to establish dedicated shallow water training ranges on both coasts.  However, during our review, Navy officials acknowledged that the west  coast range will not be established until the service addresses more  restrictive environmental requirements and other anticipated obstacles on  the east coast.

			Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada

Pilots and training range officials stated that the Fallon Range Training  Complex lacks adequate systems to replicate current threats and targets. It  lacks advanced surface-to-air missile threat systems and has an inadequate  concentration of electronic warfare systems. As a result, the quality of  training is adversely affected. Furthermore, because replacement parts for  the current electronic warfare systems are becoming obsolete, the systems  are becoming difficult to maintain. In addition, the range has an  insufficient number of targets, particularly time-sensitive and moving  targets, to reflect the current threat.

			Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

While the overall C-rating of the Camp Lejeune ranges in 2004 was C-3,  12 percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials as  having major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission  accomplishment. We observed several training areas with overgrown  vegetation that obstructed the visibility of targets and range boundary  markers, thereby precluding the use of highly explosive ammunition for  safety reasons. This condition also diminished the trainers’ ability to  accurately observe the Marines’ shooting proficiency. Some training areas  also lack marked firing lanes, and only 5 of the 120 live-fire training areas  had automated targets, thereby limiting the amount of training time  available since Marines must set up and take down targets as a  workaround (see fig. 4).
Similar to the conditions found at Fort Hood and Fort Stewart, the urban  training facilities were outdated and the range lacks an area to conduct  training for soldiers on convoy operations. Consequently, soldiers either  have to travel to other ranges to receive such training, which increases  training costs and the amount of time soldiers are away from their  families, or soldiers remain at their primary ranges and may be less  prepared for the conditions they will face in combat.

			Camp Pendleton, California

While the overall C-rating of the Camp Pendleton ranges in 2004 was C-2,  24 percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials as  having significant (C-3) deficiencies that precluded accomplishment of  some missions. Although encroachment is the primary problem for this  range, several other deficiencies also affect its training and safety. For  example, the range lacks a sufficient number of automated targets to  provide feedback for users. In addition, one of the primary training areas  is located in a dry riverbed lacking emergency escape routes, where range  officials told us one Marine had drowned when it flooded. The training  areas used by Navy special operation units have overgrown vegetation; are  inadequately constructed to meet requirements and safety conditions; and  lack target maintenance and storage facilities, bullet containment walls,  turning and moving targets, and hygiene facilities. A lack of running water  also creates a financial burden for the range office, which, as a costly  workaround, must consequently rent temporary restroom structures. In  addition, helicopter pilots stated that the range lacks needed mountaintop  targets for them to train against threats from an elevated position.

			Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada

Although range officials stated that the Nellis Test and Training Range is  the most capable in the Air Force, we were told about and observed  several deficiencies that affect training, including an insufficient  concentration of buildings to replicate an urban environment, inadequate  scoring and feedback capabilities, and a lack of specific urban-setting  target sets. The range also lacks a sufficient number of opposition forces  for training exercises and advanced surface-to-air missile threat systems,  which adversaries currently own and operate.

			Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona

Pilots and training range officials told us that the Barry M. Goldwater  Range lacks moving targets, camouflaged or concealed targets, enemy  targets embedded within friendly forces and the civilian population, cave  entrances, time-sensitive targets, and strafing pits at specific tactical  locations, which are necessary to provide users with a more realistic  training experience. It also lacks scoring and feedback capability in the  live-fire training areas. Without a scoring system and targets, pilots must  shoot at barren mounds of dirt, which diminishes their ability to obtain  feedback on the proficiency of their attack. The range lacks the capability  to provide remote site feedback, thus diminishing the amount of training  and personal time available to pilots who must as a workaround travel to  another base to receive this feedback. It lacks an adequate concentration  of electronic warfare systems, and the systems it has are becoming  difficult to maintain as replacement parts become obsolete. Also, its  communication system is inadequate.

		Deficiencies Identified by DOD Studies

DOD is aware of training range deficiencies, having issued a number of  studies over the past 10 years that identify these training range  deficiencies. For example, DOD’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review  Report states that unique American training superiority is eroding from  underlying neglect and needs support in sustainment and recapitalization,  particularly as evidenced in the aging infrastructure and instrumentation  of DOD’s training ranges. The Navy has completed a number of studies  over the years that identify deficiencies at specific ranges. For example, in  1995 it issued a tactical training range roadmap identifying deficiencies at  each of its ranges. Many of these deficiencies still exist, such as  inadequacies of shallow-water ranges and of realistic targets. In September  2001, the Navy assessed its ranges and identified several deficiencies,  including inadequate instrumentation at some of its most critical ranges.  In September 2000, it completed a range needs assessment on 19 air-to- ground ranges and identified degraded range conditions and a lack of  capabilities. A 2003 Air Force assessment of its training ranges found  infrastructure deficiencies at 90 percent of its ranges, attributable to age  and limited funding. The assessment considered the deficiencies  significant at 24 of its 32 training ranges. While the Army and the Marine  Corps have not issued composite studies on the deficiencies of their  ranges, they have conducted overall annual range assessments as part of  the readiness reporting system and identified deficiencies as well. Further,  the Navy and Marine Corps have identified a number of deficiencies at  their ranges while developing local range complex management plans.

	Various Factors Affect DOD’s Progress in Improving Training Range Conditions

While OSD and the military services have undertaken a number of  management actions that could improve the conditions of their training  ranges, progress in overall improvements has been limited, due in part to  the lack of a comprehensive approach to manage their training ranges.
Specifically, a comprehensive approach should include, at a minimum,  several key elements, such as well-defined policies that address all factors  impacting range sustainability; plans that guide the timely execution of  range sustainability actions; and range requirements that are geared to  meet both service and joint needs. Further, while the military services lack  adequate and easily accessible information that could precisely identify  training range maintenance and modernization funding, available  information indicates that identified training range requirements have  historically not been adequately funded. Additionally, OSD and the  services have not fully implemented specific actions identified in their  policy, management guidance, reports, and plans for improving training  range conditions. Without a fully implemented comprehensive approach,  OSD and the services will not be able to ensure the long-term viability of  their training ranges, nor their ability to meet transformation goals, nor  will the Congress be in a position to fulfill its oversight role.

		OSD and the Services Have Taken Limited Range Improvement Actions, but a Comprehensive Approach Is Lacking

OSD and the military services have collectively taken a number of steps  that are designed to improve the conditions of training ranges at the  service and local range level. For example, to varying extents, the military  services have developed policies for training range sustainment, developed  service-specific plans, established working groups to coordinate efforts  among multiple organizations, defined range requirements, assessed  conditions, developed Web-based systems to share information within and  among OSD and the services, and developed local range management  plans. While these key actions comprise elements of a comprehensive  approach to training range sustainment, they have focused primarily on  encroachment, or they have not been consistently implemented among the  services, or they have not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of  all officials. Our analysis of the status of OSD’s and the services’  management actions taken to improve range conditions is shown in  figure 5.
Policy—While OSD promulgated a DOD range sustainment policy in 2003,  that policy primarily focuses on external encroachment factors that  impact training and does not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of  several DOD commands that either provide oversight or are impacted by  the conditions of the ranges. Specifically, the policy does not clearly  define the maintenance and modernization responsibilities of the Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment and Special  Operations Command. Consequently, these organizations lack appropriate  assignment of responsibility and accountability for the military training  range improvements they oversee or manage. According to service  officials, the Army and Marine Corps are finalizing draft revisions of their  range sustainment policy, and the Air Force only recently started revising  its policy. Navy officials stated that the service has not yet developed a  policy to implement DOD’s 2003 policy or to clearly define the roles and  responsibilities of the multiple Navy organizations responsible for  maintaining and modernizing its training ranges.
Range sustainment programs—As shown in table 2, OSD and some of  the services have initiated specific range sustainment programs to  integrate their individual components and commands. The Army has  developed such an integrated program that incorporates the multiple  facets of range sustainment, including maintenance and modernization,  and includes involvement of all responsible officials. OSD and the Navy  have established similar programs, but their programs focus primarily on  encroachment issues and not on other factors that impact training, such as  the maintenance and modernization of ranges. The Marine Corps has  taken multiple sustainment initiatives, but has not named their efforts as a  program.
Strategic or implementation plans—Although DOD has developed  strategic plans in other areas, such as the 2004 Defense Installations  Strategic Plan and Training Transformation Strategic Plan, to guide the  services with goals and milestones, it has not developed a comprehensive  strategic plan for the long-term viability of its military training ranges. In  June 2004, we reported that DOD’s training range report to the Congress,  which was mandated by section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense  Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, did not, among other things, provide  a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations  on the use of military lands, marine areas, and air space that are available  in the United States and overseas for training. In response to our  recommendation calling for a comprehensive plan to fully address training  constraints, along with quantifiable goals and milestones for tracking  planned actions and measuring progress, DOD stated that the services had  initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it considered to be  evolutionary, and disagreed with our implication that DOD has not  executed a comprehensive program to improve the sustainability of  its ranges. Defense planning guidance has mandated DOD to develop a  plan to ensure that training ranges are sustainable, but the plan addressed  only encroachment issues impacting military training ranges. Similarly, the  2004 Defense Installations Strategic Plan identifies and provides goals for  addressing encroachment factors impacting DOD’s training ranges, but not  for other issues that affect the quality of training, such as range  maintenance and modernization. The absence of such a plan could  adversely impact DOD-wide initiatives, such as the joint national training  capability and the overseas rebasing of forces to the United States.  Furthermore, lacking a comprehensive DOD strategic plan, none of the  services has developed implementation plans of their own. The Army and  Air Force have developed documents on their sustainable range programs,  but they do not provide specific goals or milestones that the services can  use to measure their progress in meeting their vision and overall goals for  ensuring the long-term viability of their ranges. While the Navy has taken  several actions under its sustainable range program, it still lacks a plan  with specific goals, milestones, funding sources and amounts, defined  roles and responsibilities, and other critical components of a strategic  plan.
Multilevel integrated working groups—OSD and most of the services  have developed formal sustainable range working groups at multiple levels  that are intended to address training range constraints, since range  viability is dependent on a number of fragmented organizations within  OSD and the services. For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense  established a multilevel DOD-wide working group, which includes  representatives from the services and some of the other OSD offices.  However, the working group does not include a representative from  Special Operations Command, although they are responsible for and  impacted by the maintenance and modernization of military training  ranges. Also, both the DOD-wide and Navy headquarters-level sustainable  range working groups are primarily focused on encroachment issues and  not on other issues that impact ranges and training, such as maintenance  and modernization. For example, the Navy’s southwest regional range  director stated that his primary responsibility is encroachment and  munitions cleanup, and that he has not been assigned or been provided the  resources to address the maintenance and modernization of ranges in his  region. Also, on the basis of our discussion with officials, we noted that  only the Marine Corps’ and Air Force’s working groups included all  relevant organizations, such as special operations units, which have an  interest in having maintained and modernized ranges.
Range requirements—The Navy and Marine Corps have begun to  identify or have identified specific requirements or capabilities needed for  their ranges, which could be used for budgeting purposes as well as  assessing training range deficiencies. In addition, the Navy has linked and  the Marine Corps is in the process of linking its training requirements to  these range requirements so that the services can identify specific training  standards that are impacted by the conditions of a specific training area.  However, only the Navy’s draft range requirements document links its  ranges to special operations and joint training requirements to show the  potential impact on the special operation units’ or combatant  commanders’ needs, which is a key objective of DOD’s training  transformation initiative. Also, none of the range requirement documents  identify range support facility needs, although facility conditions directly  impact the quantity and quality of training provided and the level of safety  on the ranges.
Systematic assessment of range conditions and impacts—At the time  of our review, we found that none of the services regularly assessed the  conditions of their ranges, including whether the ranges are able to meet  the specific training requirements of the service and combatant  commanders. While the Army and Marine Corps annually assessed the  physical condition of their training ranges, the services do not assess the  capabilities of the ranges or any impacts to training. While the Army’s  assessment contained clearly defined criteria, local training range officials  stated that because the criteria are revised regularly, comparing  assessments across years is impossible. In addition, the overall assessment  of Army training ranges does not accurately reflect the condition of all  training areas on the range since it does not include the condition of a  number of training areas. Also, according to service officials, both the  Army’s and Marine Corps’ assessments are conducted by public works  officials who do not have the background or specific knowledge of range  infrastructure, as opposed to training range officials or training unit  representatives. In addition, local officials stated that the Marine Corps’  assessment is highly subjective and does not provide the evaluator with  specific criteria. While the Navy and Air Force do not routinely conduct  annual assessments of their training ranges, the Air Force does perform  assessments from time to time and the Navy has completed some one-time  assessments on their ranges while developing local range complex  management plans. We also found that none of the services regularly  assess the impacts to training, and none of the services have linked their  funding resources to the results of the assessments.
Web-based range information management system—DOD reports and  officials have increasingly called for a range information management  system that would allow range offices and users to share information  within and across the services. Such a Web-based system would include  best practices, lessons learned, a scheduling tool, policies, points of  contact, funding information, and range conditions and capabilities. Local  range offices have undertaken a number of initiatives to ensure that their  ranges remain viable while trying to minimize the negative impact on  training, but they often lack an effective mechanism for sharing these  initiatives with other organizations. For example, the range officials at the  Fallon Range Training Complex routinely obtained targets and training  structures at no cost from the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service  to enhance their training capability, but other training offices we visited  were having difficulty obtaining these items or were paying for the items  they were able to obtain. For example, figure 5 shows a mock airfield that  was constructed at the Fallon Range out of materials obtained from the  Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service.
The Marine Corps has an active, centralized training range Web site to  provide information to units and ranges across the world, including related  service regulations, general and detailed information about each of its  ranges, and training range points of contact. The Web site also allows units  from any service to schedule their training events remotely, and provides  them with a map of each training range including photographs and, in  some instances, video footage to assist them in scheduling and designing  their training events. However, to date, the Marine Corps has not used its  Web site to exchange information, such as lessons learned and best  practices, between and among training range offices and military units.  Meanwhile, the Army has developed an initial Web site that provides  similar, but more limited, information about its sustainable range program.
The Air Force has also established a training range Web site to share  information about its training ranges, but it has remained nonfunctional,  since the service did not enter information into the site. The Air Force’s  Air Combat Command is developing a separate training range information  management system. While a cognizant command official stated that the  command plans on adding a chat room feature to exchange information,  the official stated that the system might not be Web-based, so the  information would not be available to other range offices or units within  and across the services. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD  stated that the Air National Guard is in the process of developing a Web- based range scheduling system that could meet some of the service’s  needs, but additional funding is needed to complete this effort. While Navy  reports and officials recognize the need for a servicewide training range  management system, the service has not developed such a system.  However, the Southern California Offshore Range has its own  management system that is used for scheduling, identifying specific  training requirements for each training event, documenting reasons why  training is modified or canceled, tracking training range utilization rates by  specific units, and recording maintenance issues and resolutions. In  addition, the system allows the range office to compute the costs of  training each unit using specific training requirements and warfare areas.
Local range complex management plans—The Navy and Marine Corps  have started to develop local range complex management plans for their  training ranges, which, among other things, provide descriptions of the  training ranges, a strategic vision for range operations, and  recommendations for environmental planning; identify and analyze  required capability shortfalls derived from fleet training needs; and include  an investment strategy to address these deficiencies. Although most of the  Navy’s and Marine Corps’ local range offices have started to develop plans  with investment strategies, these strategies are not linked to any service  investment strategies. Also, due to funding expectations, current needs  have been pushed out 20 years. Consequently, today’s training  requirements are being met with yesterday’s ranges and tomorrow’s  training requirements will be met with today’s ranges. Further, six of the  Marine Corps’ range complex management plans, including two of the  service’s most significant training ranges, are currently unfunded. In  addition, the Army and Air Force ranges we visited have outdated plans.  The Army recently started developing standardized local range plans and  the Air Force is creating a management system to develop plans for its  ranges. However, the system is not scheduled to be operational until 2007.  While these key actions comprise elements of a comprehensive approach  to training range sustainment, they have focused primarily on  encroachment, have not been consistently implemented among the  services, or have not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of all  officials. Such an approach should include, at a minimum, several key  elements, such as an overall comprehensive strategic plan that addresses  training range limitations, along with quantifiable goals and milestones for  tracking planned actions and progress. Other key elements include well- defined policies that address all factors impacting range sustainability,  servicewide plans that guide the timely execution of range sustainability  actions, range requirements that are geared to meet both service and joint  needs, and a commitment to the implementation of this approach.  (See app. II for a more comprehensive list of what we consider to be key  managerial elements of a comprehensive approach).

		Services Have Not Adequately Funded Training Range Maintenance and Modernization

Various documents and training range officials report that training range  requirements have not been adequately funded historically to meet  training standards and needs. According to service officials, a variety of  factors—such as ranges having a lower funding priority amid competing  demands—have contributed to or exacerbated funding limitations.  However, the military services lack adequate and easily accessible  information that could precisely identify the required funding and track  what is allocated to maintain and modernize its ranges.

			Available Data Reflect Funding Shortages for Range Requirements

Available data indicate that funding for training ranges has historically  been insufficient to meet range requirements. For example, the 2003  Special Operations Command report on training ranges states that ranges  are inadequately funded for construction, maintenance, repairs, and  upgrades. In addition, a 2001 Navy range study states that both range  operation funds and base operation funds, which also support range  sustainment, were not adequate, thus adversely impacting utilization of the  Navy’s ranges. A 2004 Naval Audit Service report also found that Navy  range accounts were not being adequately funded and thus were  dependent on funds from other accounts. Further, funding information  provided by training range officials during this review showed that funding  has not adequately met their requirements. For example, Fort Stewart  training data indicated that the installation’s training range maintenance  account was funded approximately 44 percent for fiscal years 1998  through 2002. Similarly, Camp Pendleton data revealed that the overall  identified range needs were funded approximately 13 percent from fiscal  years 1998 through 2002. DOD reports and officials identified the following  as factors in the funding shortages:    Training ranges typically have a lower funding priority than many other  installation activities. Specifically, training ranges do not compete well for  funding against other installation activities that are more visible or related  to quality-of-life issues, such as gymnasiums, child care centers, and  barracks, and consequently training funds are often reallocated from the  range to support other base operations programs. For example, the 2003  Air Force training range assessment stated that critically needed  sustainment funds for ranges were often diverted to fund other base  requirements identified as more pressing.
Service officials identified a number of organizational structure issues that  exacerbate the extent to which training range requirements are prioritized  and funded. While OSD’s and the services’ training range offices are  located in an operations directorate, this directorate does not prioritize or  fund base programs that provide resources for the sustainment,  restoration, and modernization of DOD infrastructure (including ranges).  Recognizing this as an issue, the Navy recently hosted a conference to  address the fragmented management for budgeting and allocating funds to  ranges. During the meeting, Navy officials agreed to 20 specific actions  that could be taken to minimize future funding issues. Also, while local  range personnel are responsible for maintaining and modernizing ranges,  some of these offices are not directly linked to the command that  prioritizes installation resources. For example, the range office at the  Southern California Offshore Range, which is an operational unit, is not  organizationally aligned with the installation management organization  that prioritizes sustainment funds for San Clemente Island. In addition,  although the majority of the Southern California Offshore Range’s  exercises are fleet operations and not air operations, the range office is  aligned under a naval air command and not the fleet command.
In addition, the relative position of training ranges in the organizational  framework affects the extent to which training range requirements are  prioritized and funded. Specifically, while some local range offices report  directly to the senior mission commander that prioritizes funding  resources, other range offices report to offices several echelons below the  commander. For example, the Air Force’s Air Warfare Center commander  stated that since the range office for the Nellis Test and Training Range is  an Air Force wing, it has the same opportunity to identify its requirements  and deficiencies to him as have the other wings at Nellis Air Force Base,  Nevada. Conversely, although the Fallon Range Training Complex range  office used to report directly to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center  commander, who sets funding priorities and requirements, the range office  has since been aligned to a lower echelon position, thus placing the office  at a less advantageous position in having its requirements and deficiencies  identified as priorities.
A lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities can also result in  overlooked training range requirements as well. Specifically, several  training range officials stated that the Navy’s regional installation support  structure lacks clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each of the  program directors within the structure, which results in overlooked  requirements at its training ranges. For example, because the Southern  California Offshore Range is only a portion of the San Clemente Island in  the Pacific Ocean, there are multiple officials responsible for the different  operations occurring on the island, including training ranges, port, airfield,  environmental, facilities, information technology, and safety. However,  according to training range officials, deficiencies on the island are  overlooked because the Navy has not issued guidance providing clearly  defined roles and responsibilities for each of these program directors.  Specifically, training range officials stated that they are unable to obtain  funds to maintain or modernize support facilities on the island, such as the  pier and roads, because program managers either tend to view the entire  island as a training range and therefore not their responsibility or to view  it as not one of their top priorities, since the adverse impact on their  primary missions is relatively limited. Nevertheless, the condition of these  support facilities directly impacts range activities.
Various documented reports and testimonies of cognizant officials suggest  that range needs are understated to the Congress due to the following  factors: (1) installation real property inventories, which are used to  calculate the installations’ sustainment funding requirements, do not  contain complete and accurate information needed to compute  requirements; (2) commands typically understate range needs because  they have come to expect lower funding amounts; and (3) ranges may  receive supplemental funding from units to help maintain conditions. For  example, the 2003 Special Operations Command training range report  found that Army installations had incorrectly categorized their range  facilities built with operations and maintenance funds as multipurpose  ranges, which are considered less costly to maintain than those specially  targeted for the command. Therefore, these installations underbudgeted  for the maintenance and repair of these facilities. In addition, Marine  Corps officials stated that they recently updated their installation real  property inventories and discovered numerous discrepancies that had  resulted in understatement of their ranges’ needs. Also, officials at Fort  Hood stated that 30 percent of its tank trails are not included in its real  property records because the tank trails do not meet military construction  standards. As a result, Fort Hood is unable to obtain sufficient funds to  either sustain or improve the tank trails to an acceptable standard and add  them to the real property inventory. Further, officials stated that  commands understate range funding requirements because they have  come to expect lower funding levels. For example, officials at Fort Hood  stated that although their range modernization funding requirements  totaled at least $8 million, they had programmed and budgeted for only  $4 million. Also, the requirements and budget documents at the Southern  California Offshore Range office showed that the range’s requirements  were understated by about 30 percent for fiscal years 2005 through 2007.  Consequently, range officials stated that even if this amount were fully  funded and not transferred to other accounts, their needs would be unmet.  Since the range has a management system that captures the cost to train  units on the range, the office reported that they would have to cancel  operations due to a lack of funds in May of each year, or eliminate all  command and control and battle group exercises, including 20 already  scheduled significant training events. In addition, a 2004 Naval audit found  that the regular transfer of funds from units to training ranges resulted in  understated requirements and senior Navy management, DOD officials,  and the Congress not having important information needed to efficiently  and effectively manage and fund Navy programs identified by the Congress  as significant to readiness.
The services do not link funding for their training ranges to range  conditions, capabilities, impacts on training, or utilization. For example,  while the number of training hours on the Southern California Offshore  Range increased by 153 percent between fiscal years 1998 and 2001, range  funding data reflect that funding increased by less than 10 percent. As a  result, range officials told us that the training range requirements  continued to be underfunded, conditions continued to deteriorate, and the  capabilities continued to be lacking.
Service officials across all commands lack adequate knowledge and  training about the various resources available for range maintenance and  how modernization impacts funding levels. For example, very few of the  training range officials that we met during our review were aware of  sustainment funds that were generated by the range property in the  installation’s real property inventory systems.
The services lack clearly defined range requirements that distinguish  special operations-specific range needs and servicewide range needs,  which results in confusion between which organization is responsible for  funding range maintenance and modernization. Specifically, the 2003  Special Operations Command training range report stated that when  Special Operations Forces are the primary users of a range funded with  service dollars, disagreement sometimes arises over responsibility for  maintenance costs. Consequently, there needs to be better clarification of  what comprises Special Operations-specific facilities and what comprises  service-common facilities.

			Services Lack the Capability to Accurately Capture Training Range Requirements and Funding Levels

We found, and DOD recognizes, that the services lack the capability to  accurately and easily capture training range funding information. DOD’s  sustainable range working group officials told us that the services were  unable to easily and precisely identify their funding requirements, funding  levels, and trends in expenditures on an annual basis. Consequently, the  group developed a subcommittee in 2004 to begin addressing this issue.  Also, the 2004 Naval audit on range operations funds found that the lack of  a range management system resulted in problems related to the visibility  of the amount and use of funds being provided. Further, while training  range officials for each of the services stated that they could identify some  training range requirements or funding amounts, none were able to  identify all of the funds that their ranges need and receive. For example,  while the Army was able to identify its range operations requirements and  funding levels, it was unable to identify its range sustainment requirements  and funding levels. Officials in these range offices stated that they should  have the ability to accurately identify all funding provided to their ranges if  they are going to be effective program sponsors. Local training range  officials were also unable to identify all their funding requirements and  levels. They noted that a centralized system would provide a mechanism  for service headquarters officials to identify funding requirements and at  the same time relieve them of the burden of responding to constant  requests for information.

		OSD and the Services Have Not Fully Implemented Previously Recommended Actions

Although policy, management guidance, reports, and plans have either  recommended or required specific actions, OSD and the services have not  fully implemented these previously recommended actions. For example,  although DOD’s sustainable range policy requires OSD to, among other  things, provide oversight of training ranges and ensure that DOD-level  programs are in place to protect the future ability of DOD components to  conduct force training, a cognizant OSD official told us that OSD believes  it should be a facilitator rather than a provider of oversight. Without  adequate oversight, DOD-level initiatives, such as transformation efforts,  could be jeopardized. In addition, OSD has not established a means to  assess the readiness benefits of range sustainment initiatives, as required  by the policy. In response to DOD guidance stating that DOD was to  reverse the erosion of its training range infrastructure and ensure that  ranges are sustainable, capable, and available, the Senior Readiness  Oversight Council required the services, working with OSD, to prepare a  prioritized list of range sustainment and upgrade programs and estimated  costs for potential inclusion in the fiscal year 2003 budget. However, the  list was never developed and submitted for potential funding  opportunities. Defense officials could not provide us with an explanation  as to why no appropriate action was taken. In addition, the 2003 Special  Operations Command training range report identified a number of  recommendations that could improve the conditions of training ranges  units within the command use. For example, the report stated that all  special operations’ components need to create master range plans that  address their current and future range issues and solutions; identify and  validate training requirements as well as facilities available and needed;  and define acceptable limits of workarounds. However, according to a  knowledgeable defense official, these recommendations have not been  implemented to date because of resource shortages. Also, in July 1995, the  Navy issued a tactical training range roadmap that, among other things,  applied training requirements to training range capabilities and identified  deficiencies to produce an investment plan for training range  development. Although the plan stated that it should be updated  biannually to remain current and accurately reflect fleet training  requirements and associated instrumentation needs, the Navy has not  updated the plan since that time. Without a commitment to  implementation, it is unlikely that the OSD and the services will be able to  ensure the success of their transformation efforts and long-term viability  of their training ranges.

	Conclusions

DOD training ranges are important national assets that have not been  adequately maintained or modernized to meet today’s needs. While DOD  has undertaken a number of actions in an effort to maintain and  modernize its training ranges, it lacks a comprehensive approach to  address range issues. We have previously recommended and continue to  believe that DOD needs an overall strategic plan that identifies specific  goals, actions to be taken, milestones, and a process for measuring  progress and ensuring accountability. In turn, each service needs to  develop a comprehensive implementation plan if deteriorating conditions  are to be abated and overall training capabilities improved to meet today’s  and tomorrow’s requirements. Similarly, OSD and the services have issued  policies, conducted studies containing recommendations, identified range  officials at various command levels, and developed working groups.  However, not all relevant officials are included, their roles and  responsibilities are not clearly defined, the policies and recommendations  have been ignored or only partially implemented, and several of these  actions focus only on external encroachment issues. DOD needs to ensure  that OSD’s comprehensive strategic plan, the services’ implementation  plans, DOD’s training transformation plan, DOD policies, and identified  recommendations include all relevant officials, clearly define their roles  and responsibilities, comprehensively address all sustainability issues,  including the maintenance and modernization of military training ranges,  and are fully implemented to ensure the long-term viability of these  national assets. Although military training ranges are generally in degraded  condition, which adversely affects the quantity and quality of training and  safety of the users, the military services do not accurately and  systematically assess their ranges, including whether the ranges are able  to meet the specific training requirements of the service and combatant  commanders. Without systematically assessing the conditions of their  ranges, the services cannot accurately identify the ranges where the  conditions negatively impact training and need improvements, the best  locations for training, or which training ranges best meet the needs of  DOD’s training transformation plan and of service and combatant  commanders. Although local training range officials have undertaken a  number of initiatives to ensure that their ranges remain viable while trying  to minimize negative impact on training, the services have not provided  these officials or military units with a Web-based range information  management system. Without such a system, the range offices are unable  to share best practices and lessons learned within and across the services  and military units are unable to identify which ranges best meet their  needs.
Various documents and training range officials report that training range  requirements have historically not been adequately funded to meet  training standards and needs. Without appropriate attention and adequate  funding, the services will be unable to meet DOD’s transformation goals  and ensure the long-term viability of their ranges. The military services do  not have the capability to accurately and easily identify the funding  amounts needed or provided for maintaining and modernizing their  ranges. Without this capability, the military services are constrained in  their ability to accurately plan, program, and budget for the maintenance  and modernization of their training ranges; provide complete and accurate  information to the Congress for appropriation and legislative decision  making; and obtain this information without constant requests for  information from multiple officials at different commands. A variety of  factors, such as ranges having a lower priority in funding, contributes to or  exacerbates funding limitations. Without addressing these and other  factors, training range conditions will continue to degrade.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

We have previously recommended that OSD develop an overall  comprehensive strategic plan for its training ranges that addresses training  range limitations, along with quantifiable goals and milestones for tracking  planned actions and progress. In response to our recommendation, DOD  stated that the services had initiated a comprehensive planning process,  which it considered to be evolutionary, and disagreed with the implication  that DOD has not executed a comprehensive program to improve the  sustainability of its ranges. However, our work has shown that this  recommendation still has merit and should be addressed because it is  fundamental to the comprehensive approach for managing training ranges  that we are advocating.
We are making other recommendations to you as follows:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to:    Update DOD Directive 3200.15 to broaden the focus of the policy to  clearly address all issues that affect the long-term viability of military  training ranges; and clearly define the maintenance and modernization  roles and responsibilities of all relevant DOD components, including  the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and  Environment, Joint Forces Command, and Special Operations  Command.
Broaden the charter of the DOD-wide working group, the Sustainable  Range Integrated Product Team, to address all issues that could affect  the long-term viability of military training ranges; and include all DOD  components that are impacted by range limitations.
Update DOD’s training transformation plan to address all factors that  could impact the sustainability of military training ranges and not just  external encroachment issues.
Direct the Secretaries of the Military Services to implement a  comprehensive approach to managing their training ranges, to include:   A servicewide sustainable range policy that implements the updated  DOD Directive 3200.15 and clearly defines the maintenance and  modernization roles and responsibilities of relevant service officials at  all levels.
A servicewide sustainable range implementation plan that includes  goals, specific actions to be taken, milestones, funding sources, and an  investment strategy for managing their ranges.
Defined training range requirements and a systematic process to  annually assess the conditions of training ranges and their consequent  impact on training, including whether the ranges are able to meet the  specific training requirements of the service and combatant  commanders.
A Web-based range information management system that allows  training range officials at all levels to share information, such as range  conditions and their impact on training; funding sources, requirements  and expenditures; and local range initiatives.
Regularly developed strategies to address the factors contributing to  funding shortages for ranges, including the reassessment of funding  priorities for maintaining and modernizing ranges relative to other  needs.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense for Readiness agreed with our recommendations, stating the  department and military services are or will be taking steps to implement  them.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense’s comments are included in this  report in appendix III. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which  we incorporated as appropriate.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit  a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the  Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on  Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A  written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees  on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made  more than 60 days after the date of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and it will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Mark A. Little, James R.
Reifsnyder, Patricia J. Nichol, Tommy Baril, Steve Boyles, and Cheryl A.  Weissman were major contributors to this report.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the conditions of military training ranges and their  consequent impact, we collected and analyzed training-range-related  information from officials within the headquarters and selected major  commands of the military services. We also visited eight major active  component training ranges situated at various locations in the continental  United States—Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Stewart, Georgia; Southern  California Offshore Range, California; Fallon Range Training Complex,  Nevada; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton, California;  Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada; and the Barry M. Goldwater  Range, Arizona—to observe training range conditions and discuss  consequential impacts. These ranges were selected by identifying the  major training ranges for each service and seeking input from service  range officials as to which ranges could best address our audit objectives.  During our visits we met with installation officials, range managers, and  units that use the ranges. We also reviewed relevant DOD studies and  audit reports identifying the conditions of military training ranges.
To assess the progress the department has made in improving training  range conditions, we discussed and reviewed information relating to  training range initiatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the  Joint Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, and the  headquarters and selected major commands of the military services.  We also examined key documents related to the funding of training ranges  including associated funding requirements and funding allocations. In  addition, we reviewed prior GAO reports and internal service audits  addressing funding issues for military facilities, including training ranges.  We also obtained and reviewed range-related information from range  officials of each of the eight installations that we visited. Further, we  toured the training areas or support facilities at each of the ranges we  visited to observe initiatives implemented by local range offices to  improve the condition or capability of their ranges. Although we found  limitations in the availability of certain data, we believe the available data  gathered are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based on  our discussions with OSD and military service officials and our review of  the prior GAO reports and internal service audits.

	Organizations and Units Visited or Contacted for This Review

Office of the Secretary of Defense    Office of the Director of Readiness and Training, Office of the Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness    Office of Installations Requirements and Management,  Office of the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment   Chief of Staff, Joint Forces Command    Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office, Joint Forces    Joint Training Policy and Validation Division, Special Operations    Training Directorate, Training Simulations Division, Office of the Deputy    Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management  Installation Management Agency—Headquarters  Installation Management Agency—Southeast Region  Installation Management Agency—Southwest Region    Navy Fleet Training Branch, Fleet Readiness Division, Fleet Readiness and  Logistics, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations    Operating Forces Support Division, Chief of Naval Installations    Live Training Ranges Office, Fleet Forces Command    Range and Training Area Management Division, Training and Education  Command   Office of the Director of Ranges and Airspace, Air and Space Operations    Air Combat Command    Air Education and Training Command    Garrison Commander, Fort Hood    Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, III Corps    Headquarters Company, 4th Infantry Division    8th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Division    16th Field Artillery, 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry Division    Headquarters Company, 1st Cavalry Division    3rd Air Support Operations Group (U.S. Air Force)    Directorate of Plans, Training and Security    Directorate of Public Works    Range Division, Directorate of Plans, Training and Security    Garrison Resource Management Office    Deputy Garrison Commander, Fort Stewart    64th Armored Regiment, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division    Headquarters Company, 3rd Infantry Division    Training Division, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization an Security    Directorate of Public Works    Garrison Resource Management Office  Southern California Offshore Range, California    Commodore, Submarine Squadron 11, Commander Submarine Force,    Training and Readiness Department, 3rd Fleet    Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Pacific    Naval Special Warfare Command    Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility Detachment Southern    Commander Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light Wing, Pacific    Public Works Office, Naval Base Coronado    Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Fallon    Program Manager of Ranges, Navy Region Southwest, Chief of Naval    N5 Strike Department, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center    Training Range Branch, N5 Strike Department, Naval Strike and Air    Comptroller, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center  Camp Lejeune, North Carolina    Commanding General, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune    Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations    Range Development Division    Training Resources Management Division    Modeling and Simulation Division    School of Infantry    Special Operations Training Group    2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force    Weapons and Field Training Battalion    Office of the Comptroller, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune    Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Environment    Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations    Range Operations Division    Training Resources Management Division    School of Infantry    1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force    Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 1st Marine  Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada    Commanding Officer, Air Warfare Center    98th Range Wing, Air Warfare Center    414th Combat Training Squadron, 57th Operations Group, 57th Wing,    57th Operations Support Squadron, 57th Operations Group, 57th Wing,  Air Warfare Center    56th Fighter Wing    944th Fighter Wing    56th Fighter Wing Range Management Office    56th Operations Group, 56th Fighter Wing    355th Operations Group, 355th Wing    162nd Fighter Wing Operations Group, Arizona Air National Guard    563rd Rescue Group, Air Force Special Operations Command    Western Army National Guard Aviation Training Site  We conducted our work from August 2003 through March 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Key Management Elements of a Comprehensive Approach for Managing Training Ranges

The flow chart below depicts what we consider to be the defense  organizational roles and responsibilities needed to implement a  comprehensive approach for managing training ranges.
Promulgate DOD policy for comprehensive management of military training ranges.
Develop a comprehensive DOD strategic plan.
Ensure accountability of policy, strategic plan, and other identified actions.
Establish a working group that includes all affected officials (including special operations,  installation management, and operational forces, combatant commanders) to address all  factors that impact military training ranges.
Promulgate servicewide policy for comprehensive management of military training ranges.   Develop a servicewide implementation plan.  Ensure accountability of policy, implementation plan, and other identified actions.
Identify requirements for military training ranges (including cross-service and joint  requirements).
Link training ranges to training requirements (including service-specific, special operations,  and combatant commanders).
Develop a training range investment strategy.
Accurately and easily account for training range funding requirements and funding levels.
Establish a working group that includes all affected officials (including special operations,  installation management, and operational forces) to address all factors that impact military  training ranges.
Develop a Web-based mechanism to share information and remotely schedule training  events within and across the services.
Develop and keep current range management plans with investment strategy.
Accurately identify funding requirements and funding levels.
Identify requirements of all users, regardless of service.
Accurately capture training constraints, modifications, and cancellations.
Regularly assess the conditions and capabilities of the range and their impact on training.
Share lessons learned and best practices with other training range officials.
These documents should identify, at a minimum, specific actions, quantifiable goals, and  milestones to measure progress, projected funding requirements and sources, and clear assignment  of responsibility.

Related GAO Products

Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not  Fully Address Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
DOD Operational Ranges: More Reliable Cleanup Cost Estimates  and a Proactive Approach to Identifying Contamination Are Needed.  GAO-04-601. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Military Munitions: DOD Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Approach  for Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites. GAO-04-147. Washington, D.C.:  December 19, 2003.
Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase  Interagency Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training  Ranges. GAO-03-976. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management  Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and  Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on  Training Ranges Still Evolving. GAO-03-621T. Washington, D.C.:  April 2, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and  Strategic Planning Needed to Improve Condition of Military Facilities.  GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Most Recruit Training Barracks Have  Significant Deficiencies. GAO-02-786. Washington D.C.: June 13, 2002.
Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage  Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.:  June 11, 2002.
Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage  Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-727T. Washington, D.C.:  May 16, 2002.
Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected  in Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.
Defense Budget: Analysis of Real Property Maintenance and Base  Operations Fund Movements. GAO/NSIAD-00-87. Washington, D.C.:  February 29, 2000.
Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.S. Forces  for Combat in Urban Areas. GAO/NSIAD-00-63NI. Washington, D.C.:  February 25, 2000.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

Military training ranges are important national assets and play a critical role in preparing military forces for their wartime mission. The Department of Defense (DOD) has reported for years that it faces increasing difficulties in carrying out realistic training at its ranges due to various constraints. While encroachment issues have had high visibility within DOD and the Congress, much less attention has been given to the overall conditions of training ranges, which can also have an adverse impact on training activities. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority, discusses (1) the condition of military training ranges and their impact on training activities, and (2) what factors are affecting DOD's progress in improving training range conditions.

What GAO Found

GAO's visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD's own assessments show that ranges are deteriorating and lack modernization. This adversely affects training activities and jeopardizes the safety of military personnel. To ensure readiness, servicemembers must have access to capable ranges--a key DOD transformation goal--that enables them to develop and maintain skills for wartime missions. However, GAO observed various degraded conditions at each training range visited, such as malfunctioning communication systems, impassable tank trails, overgrown areas, and outdated training areas and targets. Whenever possible, the services work around these conditions by modifying the timing, tempo, or location of training, but officials have expressed concern that workarounds are becoming increasingly difficult and costly and that they compromise the realism essential to effective training. Without adequate ranges, DOD compromises the opportunity to achieve its transformation goal and assumes the risk that its forces will be less prepared for missions and subjected to hazards. DOD's progress in improving training range conditions has been limited and is partially attributable to a lack of a comprehensive approach to ensure that ranges provide the proper setting for effectively preparing its forces for warfare. First, while the services have individually taken a varying number of key management improvement actions, such as developing range sustainment policies, these actions lack consistency across DOD or focus primarily on encroachment without including commensurate efforts on other issues, such as maintenance and modernization. Second, even though the services cannot precisely identify the funding required and used for their ranges, identified range requirements have historically been inadequately funded, as evidenced by conditions GAO saw, and inadequately addressed. Service officials identified a variety of factors that have exacerbated funding limitations, such as ranges having a lower priority in funding decisions. Third, although DOD policy, reports, and plans have either recommended or required specific actions, DOD has not fully implemented such actions.