Background

Since it started development in 2003, FCS has been at the center of the  Army’s efforts to modernize into a lighter, more agile, and more capable  combat force. The FCS concept involved replacing existing combat  systems with a family of manned and unmanned vehicles and systems  linked by an advanced information network. The Army anticipated that the  FCS systems, along with the soldier and enabling complementary systems,  would work together in a system of systems wherein the whole provided  greater capability than the sum of the individual parts. The Army expected  to develop this equipment in 10 years, procure it over 13 years, and field it  to 15 FCS-unique brigades—about one-third of the active force at that  time. The Army also had planned to spin out selected FCS technologies  and systems to current Army forces throughout the system development  and demonstration phase.
As we reported in 2009, the FCS program was immature and unable to  meet the Department of Defense’s (DOD) own standards for technology  and design from the start. Although adjustments were made, such as  adding time and reducing requirements, vehicle weights and software code  grew, key network systems were delayed, and technologies took longer to  mature than anticipated (see fig. 1). By 2009, after an investment of 6 years  and an estimated $18 billion, the viability of the FCS concept was still  unknown. As such, we concluded that the maturity of the development  efforts was insufficient and the program could not be developed and  produced within existing resources.
In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense proposed a significant restructuring  of the FCS program to lower risk and address more near-term combat  needs. The Secretary noted significant concerns that the FCS program’s  vehicle designs—where greater information awareness was expected to  compensate for less armor, resulting in lower weight and higher fuel  efficiency—did not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency  and close-quarters combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, the  Secretary recommended    accelerating fielding of ready-to-go systems and capabilities to all combat    canceling the vehicle component of the FCS program, reevaluating the  requirements, technology, and approach, and relaunching the Army’s  vehicle modernization program; and    addressing fee structure and other concerns with current FCS contracting  arrangements.
In June 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics issued an acquisition decision memorandum that canceled  the FCS acquisition program, terminated manned ground vehicle  development efforts, and laid out plans for follow-on Army Brigade  Combat Team Modernization efforts. DOD directed the Army to transition  to an Army-wide modernization plan consisting of a number of integrated  acquisition programs, including one to develop ground combat vehicles  (GCV).
Subsequently, the Army has been defining its ground force modernization  efforts per the Secretary’s decisions and the June 2009 acquisition decision  memorandum. Although the details are not yet complete, the Army took  several actions through the end of calendar year 2009. It stopped all  development work on the FCS manned ground vehicles—including the  non-line-of-sight cannon—in the summer of 2009 and recently terminated  development of the Class IV unmanned aerial vehicle and the countermine  and transport variants of the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment  unmanned ground vehicle. For the time being, the Army is continuing  selected development work under the existing FCS development contract,  primarily residual FCS system and network development. In October 2009,  the Army negotiated a modification to the existing contract that clarified  the development work needed for the brigade modernization efforts.

	The Army Has Started a Series of Development and Fielding Efforts

The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall  modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense’s decisions  to significantly restructure the FCS program. It is transitioning from the  FCS long-term acquisition orientation to a shorter-term approach that  biennially develops and fields new increments of capability within  capability packages. It now has an approved acquisition program that will  produce and field the initial increment of the FCS spinout equipment,  which includes unmanned aerial and ground vehicles as well as  unattended sensors and munitions, and preliminary plans for two other  major defense acquisition programs to define and develop follow-on  increments and develop a new GCV. The Army also plans to integrate  network capabilities across its brigade structure and to develop and field  upgrades to other existing ground force equipment.
The first program, Increment 1, is a continuation of previous FCS-related  efforts to spin out emerging capabilities and technologies to current  forces. Of the Army’s post-FCS modernization initiatives, Increment 1,  which includes such FCS remnants as unmanned air and ground systems,  unattended ground sensors, the non-line-of-sight launch system, and a  network integration kit, is the furthest along in the acquisition  development cycle (see fig. 2). The network integration kit includes,  among other things, the integrated computer system, an initial version of  the system-of-systems common operating environment, early models of  the Joint Tactical Radio System, and a range extension relay. In December  2009, the Army requested and DOD approved, with a number of  restrictions, the low-rate initial production of Increment 1 systems that are  expected to be fielded in the fiscal year 2011-12 capability package. The  Army will be continuing Increment 1 development over the next 2 years  while low-rate initial production proceeds. The projected development and  production cost to equip nine brigades with the Increment 1 network and  systems, supported by an independent cost estimate, would be about $3.5  billion.
Provides enhanced situational awareness and force protection  through reduced exposure to hazards during soldier-intensive  and/or high-risk functions.
Provides enhanced communications and situational awareness  through radios with multiple software waveforms, connections to  unattended sensors, and links to existing networking capabilities.
Provides force protection in an urban setting through a leave- behind, network-enabled reporting system of movement and/or  activity in cleared areas.
Provides independent, soldier-level aerial reconnaissance,  surveillance, and target acquisition capability.
Provides the ability to precisely attack armored, lightly  armored, and stationary or moving targets at extended ranges  despite weather/environmental conditions and/or presence of  countermeasures.
Provides enhanced situational awareness, force protection, and  early warnings in a tactical setting through cross-cues to sensors  and weapon systems.
For the second acquisition program, Increment 2 of brigade  modernization, the Army has preliminary plans to mature Increment 1  capabilities—potentially demonstrating full FCS threshold requirements— as well as contributing further developments of the system-of-systems  common operating environment and battle command software, and  demonstrating and fielding additional capabilities. For example, these may  include the Armed Robotic Vehicle Assault (Light)—an unmanned ground  vehicle configured for security and assault support missions—and the  Common Controller, which will provide the dismounted soldier a  handheld device capable of controlling, connecting, and providing data  transfer from unmanned vehicles and ground sensors. Army officials  indicated that they are currently working to define the content, cost, and  schedule for Increment 2 with a low-rate initial production decision  planned for fiscal year 2013 and a Defense Acquisition Board review  expected later in fiscal year 2010.
The third acquisition program would develop a new GCV. The Army  reviewed current fighting vehicles across the force structure to determine  whether to sustain, improve, divest, or pursue new vehicles based on  operational value, capability shortfalls, and resource availability. Per DOD  direction, the Army also collaborated with the Marine Corps to identify  capability gaps related to fighting vehicles. For development of a new  GCV, the Army’s preliminary plans indicate the use of an open architecture  design to enable incremental improvements in modular armor; network  architecture; and subcomponent size, weight, power, and cooling. DOD  and the Army met in February 2010 to make a materiel development  decision on the GCV, and the Army was subsequently authorized to release  a request for proposals for GCV technology development. Over the next  several months, the Army will be conducting an analysis of alternatives to  assess potential materiel solutions for the GCV. The Army expects to  follow the analysis with a Milestone A decision review on whether to begin  technology development in September 2010. After Milestone A, Army  officials are proposing the use of competitive prototyping with multiple  contractors—the number of which will depend on available funding— during the technology development phase, which will feature the use of  mature technologies and the fabrication and testing of prototype  subsystems. In the technology development phase, the contractors will be  expected to fabricate and evaluate several subsystem prototypes,  including an automotive test rig and a mine blast test asset. The  contractors will also be expected to develop a near-critical design review  level design for their integrated vehicle and, in the process, inform the  GCV concept development document. That document is expected to be  finalized at the Milestone A decision point. Competitive prototypes will be  fabricated and tested during the engineering and manufacturing  development phase. A preliminary design review would be used to validate  contractor readiness to enter detailed design at Milestone B in fiscal year  2013. The Army’s preliminary plans indicate that the first production  vehicles could be delivered in late fiscal year 2017, about 7 years from  Milestone A.
The Army is planning to incrementally develop and field an information  network to all of its brigades in a decentralized fashion, that is, not as a  separate acquisition program. The Army has defined a preliminary  network strategy and is in the process of defining what the end state of the  network will need to be, as well as how it may build up that network over  an undefined period of time. In the near term, the Army is working to  establish a common network foundation to build on and to define a  common network architecture based on what is currently available and  expected to become available in the near future. Current communications,  command and control, and networking acquisition programs will continue  and will be expected to build upon the current network foundation and  architecture over time. Networking capabilities will be expected to meet  specific standards and interface requirements. According to Army officials,  the ongoing incremental network and software development activities and  requirements will be dispersed to these acquisition programs, where they  will be considered for further development and possible fielding. The only  original FCS network development activities that the Army plans to  continue under the FCS development contract are those supporting the  network integration kit for Increment 1 and whatever additional  networking capabilities may be needed for Increment 2. DOD expects the  Army to present its network development plans later in 2010. (See table 1.)
As shown in table 1, the Army is proposing to make substantial  investments in its post-FCS acquisition initiatives. For fiscal year 2011, the  Army is proposing research and development funding of about $2.5 billion  and procurement funding of about $683 million. For the following 4 years  (fiscal years 2012-2015), the Army plans additional research and  development investments of about $10.4 billion and procurement  investments of about $10.7 billion.

		Recent Army Contract Actions Related to Its Post- FCS Efforts

For the time being, the Army is continuing selected development work— primarily that related to Increment 1, Increment 2, and network  development—under the existing FCS development contract. In October  2009, the Army negotiated a modification to the existing contract that  clarified the development work needed for the brigade modernization  efforts. The Army previously awarded a contract for long lead item  procurement for Increment 1. A modification to that contract was recently  issued to begin low-rate initial production of the Increment 1 systems. The  Army has also recently released a request for proposals for the technology  development phase of the proposed GCV development effort.
Contractor proposals for GCV are expected to include plans, solutions, or  both for, among other things, survivability (hit avoidance system, armor,  and vehicle layout) and mobility (propulsion and power generation and  cooling). According to the request for proposals, the proposals can utilize  prior Army investment in armor recipes, but the contractors will not get an  inherent advantage for doing so. Each solution will be based on its own  merits. Contractor proposals are to be submitted in April 2010 and  contract awards, for cost-plus type contracts, are to be awarded after the  Milestone A decision in September 2010.

	Acquisition Direction and FCS Lessons Learned Offer Opportunities to Promote Successful Outcomes, but Decision to Proceed with Initial Production Is Premature

The challenge facing both DOD and the Army is to set these ground force  modernization efforts on the best footing possible by buying the right  capabilities at the best value. In many ways, DOD and the Army have set  modernization efforts on a positive course, and they have an opportunity  to reduce risks by adhering to the body of acquisition legislation and  policy reforms—which incorporate knowledge-based best practices we  identified in our previous work—that have been introduced since FCS  started in 2003. The new legislation and policy reforms emphasize a  knowledge-based acquisition approach, a cumulative process in which  certain knowledge is acquired by key decision points before proceeding. In  essence, knowledge supplants risk over time. Additionally, DOD and the  Army can further reduce risks by considering lessons learned from  problems that emerged during the FCS development effort. Initial  indications are that the Army is moving in that direction. However, in the  first major acquisition decision for the Army’s post-FCS initiatives, DOD  and the Army—because they want to support the warfighter quickly—are  proceeding with low-rate initial production of one brigade set of  Increment 1 systems despite having acknowledged that the systems are  immature and unreliable and cannot perform as required.

		New Acquisition Reforms Point Way to Lower Risk

The body of acquisition legislation and DOD policy reforms introduced  since FCS started in 2003 incorporates nearly all of the knowledge-based  practices we identified in our previous work (see table 2). For example,  DOD acquisition policy includes controls to ensure that programs have  demonstrated a certain level of technology maturity, design stability, and  production maturity before proceeding into the next phase of the  acquisition process. As such, if the Army proceeds with preliminary plans  for new acquisition programs, then adherence to the acquisition direction  in each of its new acquisition efforts provides an opportunity to improve  the odds for successful outcomes, reduce risks for follow-on Army ground  force modernization efforts, and deliver needed equipment more quickly  and at lower costs. Conversely, acquisition efforts that proceed with less  technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge than best practices  suggest face a higher risk of cost increases and schedule delays.
As shown in table 2, the cumulative building of knowledge consists of  information that should be gathered at three critical points over the course  of a program:  Knowledge point 1 (at the program launch or Milestone B  decision): Establishing a business case that balances requirements  with resources. At this point, a match must be made between the  customer’s needs and the developer’s available resources—technology,  engineering, knowledge, time, and funding. A high level of technology  maturity, demonstrated via a prototype in its intended environment,  indicates whether resources and requirements match. Also, the developer  completes a preliminary design of the product that shows that the design  is feasible and that requirements are predictable and doable.
Knowledge point 2 (at the critical design review between design  integration and demonstration): Gaining design knowledge and  reducing integration risk. At this point, the product design is stable  because it has been demonstrated to meet the customer’s requirements as  well as cost, schedule, and reliability targets. The best practice is to  achieve design stability at the system-level critical design review, usually  held midway through system development. Completion of at least 90  percent of engineering drawings at this point provides tangible evidence  that the product’s design is stable, and a prototype demonstration shows  that the design is capable of meeting performance requirements.
Knowledge point 3 (at production commitment or the Milestone C  decision): Achieving predictable production. This point is achieved  when it has been demonstrated that the developer can manufacture the  product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. The best practice is to  ensure that all critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control— that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and capable of consistently  producing parts within the product’s quality tolerances and standards—at  the start of production.
The Army did not position the FCS program for success because it did not  establish a knowledge-based acquisition approach—a strategy consistent  with DOD policy and best acquisition practices—to develop FCS. The  Army started the FCS program in 2003 before defining what the systems  were going to be required to do and how they were going to interact. It  moved ahead without determining whether the FCS concept could be  developed in accordance with a sound business case. Specifically, at the  FCS program’s start, the Army had not established firm requirements,  mature technologies, a realistic cost estimate, or an acquisition strategy  wherein knowledge drives schedule. By 2009, the Army still had not shown  that emerging FCS system designs could meet requirements, that critical  technologies were at minimally acceptable maturity levels, and that the  acquisition strategy was executable within estimated resources.
With one notable exception, there are initial indications that DOD and the  Army are moving forward to implement the acquisition policy reforms as  they proceed with ground force modernization, including the Secretary of  Defense’s statement about the ground vehicle modernization program—to  “get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay.” In addition, DOD  anticipates that the GCV program will comply with DOD acquisition policy  in terms of utilizing competitive system or subsystem prototypes.  According to a DOD official, a meeting was recently held to consider a  materiel development decision for the GCV, and the Army is proposing to  conduct a preliminary design review on GCV before its planned Milestone  B decision point. Additionally, a configuration steering board is planned  for later in 2010 to address reliability and military utility of infantry  brigade systems.

		Army’s Decision to Proceed with Low-Rate Initial Production for Increment 1 Increases Risk

In the first major acquisition decision for the Army’s post-FCS initiatives,  DOD and the Army—because they want to support the warfighter  quickly—are proceeding with low-rate initial production of Increment 1  systems despite having acknowledged that systems are immature, are  unreliable, and cannot perform as required. In December 2009, the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics approved  low-rate initial production of Increment 1 equipment for one infantry  brigade but noted that there is an aggressive risk reduction plan to grow  and demonstrate the network maturity and reliability to support continued  Increment 1 production and fielding. In the associated acquisition decision  memorandum, the Under Secretary acknowledged the risks of pursuing  Increment 1 production, including early network immaturity; lack of a  clear operational perspective of the early network’s value; and large  reliability shortfalls of the network, systems, and sensors. The Under  Secretary also said that he was aware of the importance of fielding  systems to the current warfighter and that the flexibility to deploy  components as available would allow DOD to “best support” the Secretary  of Defense’s direction to “win the wars we are in.” Because of that, the  Under Secretary specified that a number of actions be taken over the next  year or more and directed the Army to work toward having all  components for the program fielded as soon as possible and to deploy  components of the program as they are ready. However, the Under  Secretary did not specify the improvements that the Army needed to make  or that those improvements are a prerequisite for the Under Secretary  approving additional production lots of Increment 1.
The approval for low-rate initial production is at variance with DOD policy  and Army expectations. DOD’s current acquisition policy requires that  systems be demonstrated in their intended environments using the  selected production-representative articles before the production decision  occurs. However, the testing that formed the basis for the Increment 1  production decision included surrogates and non-production- representative systems, including the communications radios. As we have  previously noted, testing with surrogates and non-production- representative systems is problematic because it does not conclusively  show how well the systems can address current force capability gaps.  Furthermore, Increment 1 systems—which are slated for a fiscal year  2011-12 fielding—do not yet meet the Army’s expectations that new  capabilities would be tested and their performance validated before being  deployed in a capability package. As noted in 2009 test results, system  performance and reliability during testing was marginal at best. For  example, the demonstrated reliability of the Class I unmanned aerial  vehicle was about 5 hours between failure, compared to a requirement for  23 hours between failure. The Army asserts that Increment 1 systems’  maturity will improve rapidly but admits that it will be a “steep climb” and  not a low-risk effort.
While the Under Secretary took current warfighter needs into account in  his decision to approve Increment 1 low-rate initial production, it is  questionable whether the equipment can meet one of the main principles  underpinning knowledge-based acquisition—whether the warfighter needs  can best be met with the chosen concept. Test reports from late 2009  showed conclusively that the systems had limited performance, and that  this reduced the test unit’s ability to assess and refine tactics, techniques,  and procedures associated with employment of the equipment. The  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation recently reported that none of  the Increment 1 systems have demonstrated an adequate level of  performance to be fielded to units and employed in combat. Specifically,  the report noted that reliability is poor and falls short of the level expected  of an acquisition system at this stage of development. Shortfalls in meeting  reliability requirements may adversely affect Increment 1’s overall  operational effectiveness and suitability and may increase life-cycle costs.
In addition, in its 2009 assessment of the increment’s limited user test—the  last test before the production decision was made—the Army’s Test and  Evaluation Command indicated that the Increment 1 systems would be  challenged to meet warfighter needs. It concluded that, with the exception  of the non-line-of-sight launch system, which had not yet undergone flight  testing, all the systems were considered operationally effective and  survivable, but with limitations, because they were immature and had  entered the test as pre-production-representative systems, pre-engineering  design models, or both. Additionally, the command noted that these same  systems were not operationally suitable because they did not meet  required reliability expectations.
In recent testimony before a House subcommittee, the Director,  Operational Test and Evaluation stated that flight testing of the non-line- of-sight launch system was conducted in January and February 2010. In  that testing, two of six missiles fired achieved target hits and four missed  their targets. The Army informed the Director that Failure Review Board  investigations of the flight failures are under way.

	Concluding Remarks

Army and DOD officials made a very difficult decision when they canceled  what was the centerpiece of Army modernization—the FCS program. As  they transition away from the FCS concept, both the Army and DOD have  an opportunity to improve the likely outcomes for the Army’s ground force  modernization initiatives by adhering closely to recently enacted  acquisition reforms and by seeking to avoid the numerous acquisition  pitfalls that plagued FCS. As DOD and the Army proceed with these  significant financial investments, they should keep in mind the Secretary  of Defense’s admonition about the new ground vehicle modernization  program: “get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay.” Based on the  preliminary plans, we see a number of good features, such as the Army’s  decision to pursue an incremental acquisition approach for its post-FCS  efforts. However, it is vitally important that each of those incremental  efforts adheres to knowledge-based acquisition principles and strikes a  balance between what is needed, how fast it can be fielded, and how much  it will cost. Moreover, the acquisition community needs to be held  accountable for expected results, and DOD and the Army must not be  willing to accept whatever results are delivered regardless of military  utility.
We are concerned that in their desire for speedy delivery of emerging  equipment to our warfighters in the field, DOD and the Army did not strike  the right balance in prematurely approving low-rate initial production of  Increment 1 of brigade modernization. Although the Army argues that it  needs to field these capabilities as soon as possible, none of these systems  have been designated as urgent and it is not helpful to provide early  capability to the warfighter if those capabilities are not technically mature  and reliable. If the Army moves forward too fast with immature Increment  1 designs, then that could cause additional delays as the Army and its  contractors concurrently address technology, design, and production  issues. Production and fielding is not the appropriate phase of acquisition  to be working on such basic design issues.
In our recent report, we made recommendations intended to reduce the  risk of proceeding into production with immature technologies. In that  regard, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense mandate that the  Army correct the identified maturity and reliability issues with the  Increment 1 network and systems prior to approving any additional lots of  the Increment 1 network and systems for production. Specifically, the  Army should ensure that the network and the individual systems have  been independently assessed as fully mature, meet reliability goals, and  have been demonstrated to perform as expected using production- representative prototypes. We also recommended that the Secretary of the  Army should not allow fielding of the Increment 1 network or any of the  Increment 1 systems until the identified maturity and reliability issues  have been corrected.
In response, DOD concurred with our recommendations and stated that  the need to correct those issues has been communicated to the Army.  DOD also asserted that Increment 1 systems will be tested in their  production configuration, and performance will be independently assessed  against capability requirements prior to DOD approving production of any  additional lots of Increment 1 systems. The Army has many Increment 1  development and testing activities planned for the coming months and we  intend to monitor their progress closely. DOD also stated that Increment 1  systems would not be fielded until performance is sufficient to satisfy the  warfighter’s capability requirements. It is essential that (1) Increment 1  network and systems clearly demonstrate their ability to fully satisfy the  needs of the warfighter and (2) DOD and the Army not be willing to accept  whatever acquisition results are delivered regardless of their military  utility. Again, we intend to follow the Army and DOD’s activities and  actions in the coming months.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have.

	Contacts and Acknowledgments

For future questions about this statement, please contact Michael J.  Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contacts for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this testimony. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include William R. Graveline, Assistant Director; William C.  Allbritton; Andrea M. Bivens; Noah B. Bleicher; Tana M. Davis; Marcus C.  Ferguson; and Robert S. Swierczek.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program's performance led to the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the acquisition program. As a result, the Army is outlining a new approach to ground force modernization. This statement outlines the Army's preliminary post-FCS actions and identifies the challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army must address as they proceed. This testimony is based on GAO's report on the Army's Ground Force Modernization effort released on March 15, 2010. It emphasizes the December 2009 decision to begin low-rate initial production for Increment 1 of the Brigade Combat Team Modernization.

What GAO Found

The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure the FCS program. It is transitioning from the FCS long-term acquisition orientation to a shorter-term approach that biennially develops and fields new increments of capability within capability packages. It now has an approved acquisition program that will produce and field the initial increment of the FCS spinout equipment, which includes unmanned aerial and ground vehicles as well as unattended sensors and munitions. It has preliminary plans for two other major defense acquisition programs to (1) define and develop follow-on increments and (2) develop a new ground combat vehicle (GCV). The individual systems within Increments 1 and 2 are to be integrated with a preliminary version of an information network. Currently, the Army is continuing selected development work--primarily that related to Increments 1 and 2 and the information network--under the existing FCS development contract. The Army has recently released a request for proposals for the technology development phase of the proposed GCV development effort. The Army's projected investment in Increments 1 and 2 and GCV is estimated to be over $24 billion through fiscal year 2015. With these modernization efforts at an early stage, DOD and the Army face the immediate challenge of setting them on the best possible footing by buying the right capabilities at the best value. DOD and the Army have an opportunity to better position these efforts by utilizing an enhanced body of acquisition legislation and DOD policy reforms--which now incorporate many of the knowledge-based practices that GAO has previously identified--as well as lessons learned from the FCS program. Preliminary plans suggest that the Army and DOD are strongly considering lessons learned. However, DOD recently approved the first of several planned low-rate initial production lots of Increment 1 despite having acknowledged that the systems and network were immature, unreliable, and not performing as required. That decision reflects DOD's emphasis on quickly providing new capabilities to combat units. This decision did not follow knowledge-based acquisition practices and runs the risk of delivering unacceptable equipment to the warfighter and trading off acquisition principles whose validity has been so recently underscored. The Army needs to seize the opportunity of integrating acquisition reforms, knowledge-based acquisition practices, and lessons learned from FCS into future modernization efforts to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes.