Background

CBP’s U.S. Border Patrol is the uniformed enforcement division  responsible for border security between designated official ports of entry  into the country. The Border Patrol reports that its priority mission is to  prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons, including weapons of mass  destruction, from entering the United States. In addition, the Border Patrol  has a traditional mission of preventing illegal aliens, smugglers, narcotics,  and other contraband from crossing the border between the ports of entry.  To carry out its missions, the Border Patrol had a budget of $3.5 billion in  fiscal year 2009 to establish and maintain operational control of the U.S.  border. As of June 2009, the Border Patrol had 19,354 agents nationwide,  an increase of 57 percent since September 2006. Of these agents, about 88  percent (17,011) were located in the nine Border Patrol sectors along the  southwest border. About 4 percent of the Border Patrol’s agents in these  sectors were assigned to traffic checkpoints, according to the Border  Patrol.
Despite efforts to enhance border security in recent years, DHS reports  show that significant illegal activity continues to cross the border  undetected. At the ports of entry, CBP has both increased training for  agents and enhanced technology. However, the DHS Annual Performance  Report for fiscal years 2008-2010 sets a goal for detecting and  apprehending about 30 percent of major illegal activity at ports of entry in  2009, indicating that 70 percent of criminals and contraband may pass  through the ports and continue on interstates and major roads to the  interior of the United States. Between the ports of entry, CBP is  implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion- dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal  immigration through a comprehensive border protection system.
Along the southwest border, overall Border Patrol apprehensions of illegal  aliens have declined over the past 3 years, from nearly 1.1 million in fiscal  year 2006, to 705,000 in fiscal year 2008. This decreasing pattern was  reflected in all sectors except San Diego, which showed a steady increase  across these years, as shown in figure 1.
The Tucson sector continues to have the largest number of apprehensions  compared to other sectors along the southwest border, as shown in figure  1. Border Patrol officials stated that targeted enforcement efforts in other  Border Patrol sectors in previous years caused a shift in illegal cross- border activity to the Tucson sector.

		Checkpoint Role and Characteristics

Checkpoints are the third layer in the Border Patrol’s three-tiered border  enforcement strategy. The other two layers are located at or near the  border, and consist of line watch and roving patrol. According to the  Border Patrol, the majority of Border Patrol agents are assigned to line  watch operations at the border, where they maintain a high profile and are  responsible for deterring, turning back, or arresting anyone they encounter  attempting to illegally cross the border into the United States. Roving  patrol operations consist of smaller contingents of agents deployed behind  the line watch to detect and arrest those making it past the first layer of  defense in areas away from the immediate border. Traffic checkpoints are  located on major U.S. highways and secondary roads, usually 25 to 100  miles inland from the border. This permits them to be far enough inland to  detect and apprehend illegal aliens, smugglers, and potential terrorists  attempting to travel farther into the interior of the United States after  evading detection at the border, but are close enough to the border to  potentially control access to major population centers.
The Border Patrol operates two types of checkpoints—permanent and  tactical—that differ in terms of size, infrastructure, and location. While  both types of checkpoints are generally operated at fixed locations,  permanent checkpoints—as their name suggests—are characterized by  their bricks and mortar structure, that may include off-highway covered  lanes for vehicle inspection, and several buildings including those for  administration, detention of persons suspected of smuggling or other  illegal activity, and kennels for canines used in the inspection process (see  fig. 2).
Permanent checkpoints are equipped with technology and computers  connected to national law enforcement databases to enhance the ability of  agents to identify suspects, research criminal histories, and cross-check  terrorist watch lists. Permanent checkpoints generally have electricity,  communication towers, and permanent lighting to enhance operations at  night and in poor weather conditions. These facilities also offer greater  physical safety to agents and the public—particularly when they are  located off-highway—by virtue of protective concrete barriers separating  agents from vehicle traffic, and better signage and lighting. Permanent  checkpoints also have assets to help lessen the chance that illegal aliens  and smugglers will be able to successfully bypass the checkpoint to avoid  detection. These assets include remote video surveillance, electronic  sensors, and agent patrols in the vicinity of the checkpoints, which may  also include horse patrols and all-terrain vehicles. There are 32 permanent  checkpoints along the southwest border, in eight of the nine Border Patrol  sectors, as shown in figure 3. Of the nine sectors, only the Tucson sector  does not have permanent checkpoints, instead operating tactical  checkpoints.
Tactical checkpoints are also operated at a fixed location but do not have  permanent buildings or facilities, as shown in figure 4. One of the intents  of tactical checkpoints is to support permanent checkpoints by monitoring  and inspecting traffic on secondary roads that the Border Patrol  determined are likely to be used by illegal aliens or smugglers to evade  apprehension at permanent checkpoints. Tactical checkpoint  infrastructure may consist of a few Border Patrol vehicles, used by agents  to drive to the location; orange cones to slow down and direct traffic;  portable water supply; a cage for canines (if deployed at the checkpoint);  portable rest facilities; and warning signs. In general, tactical checkpoints  are intended to be set up for short-term or intermittent use, and open and  close based on intelligence on changing patterns of smuggling and routes  used by illegal aliens. As a result, the number of tactical checkpoints in  operation can change on a daily basis. Thirty-nine tactical checkpoints  were operational at some point in fiscal year 2008 on the southwest  border.

		Authority at Border Patrol Checkpoints

Border Patrol agents at checkpoints have legal authority that agents do not  have when patrolling areas away from the border. The United States  Supreme Court ruled that Border Patrol agents may stop a vehicle at fixed  checkpoints for brief questioning of its occupants even if there is no  reason to believe that the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. The  Court further held that Border Patrol agents “have wide discretion” to  refer motorists selectively to a secondary inspection area for additional  brief questioning. In contrast, the Supreme Court held that Border Patrol  agents on roving patrol may stop a vehicle only if they have reasonable  suspicion that the vehicle contains aliens who may be illegally in the  United States—a higher threshold for stopping and questioning motorists  than at checkpoints. The constitutional threshold for searching a vehicle  is the same, however, and must be supported by either consent or  probable cause, whether in the context of a roving patrol or a checkpoint  search.

		Checkpoints in the Tucson Sector

The Tucson sector is the only sector along the southwest border without  permanent checkpoints. Although other sectors along the southwest  border deploy a combination of permanent and tactical checkpoints, the  Tucson sector has only tactical checkpoints that operate from fixed  locations. Legislation effectively prohibited the construction of permanent  checkpoints in the Tucson sector, beginning in fiscal year 1999.  Specifically, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental  Appropriations Act, 1999, stated that “no funds shall be available for the  site acquisition, design, or construction of any Border Patrol checkpoint in  the Tucson sector.” The effect of this legislative language was that no  permanent checkpoints could be planned or constructed in this sector,  which had no permanent checkpoints when the prohibition took effect.  Subsequent appropriations acts carried this construction prohibition  forward through fiscal year 2006. Furthermore, during fiscal years 2003  through 2006, the Border Patrol was subject to an additional  appropriations restriction that required it to relocate checkpoints in the  Tucson sector on a regular basis. Beginning in fiscal year 2007, the  appropriations restrictions that applied to checkpoints in the Tucson  sector did not appear in DHS’s annual appropriations acts. In response,  the Border Patrol fixed the position of the I-19 checkpoint at kilometer  post (KP) 42, near Amado, Arizona. Although the I-19 checkpoint has  been operating since November 2006 at this fixed location, the checkpoint  lacks permanent infrastructure and the associated benefits. For example,  the Border Patrol does not have the facilities to detain apprehended illegal  aliens at or near the checkpoint or the access to national databases to  determine whether apprehended individuals are wanted criminals or  potential terrorists. The facility also lacks protective concrete barriers  separating agents from vehicle traffic and a canopy to protect agents and  canines from exposure to the elements while conducting inspections, as  shown in figure 5.
The Border Patrol has developed plans to construct a permanent  checkpoint on I-19, but the House Committee on Appropriations  instructed the Border Patrol to first take some interim steps. Specifically,  in the House report accompanying DHS’s appropriations bill for fiscal year  2009, the committee instructed the Border Patrol not to finalize planning  for the design and location of a permanent checkpoint on I-19 until it first  establishes and evaluates the effectiveness of an upgraded interim  checkpoint. According to Border Patrol officials, the upgraded interim  checkpoint will have a canopy, a third inspection lane, and an expanded  secondary inspection area, among other improvements. In addition, the  committee also told the Border Patrol to consider the findings from this  GAO study in its planning efforts. The Border Patrol expects the  upgraded interim checkpoint to be completed by May 2010. Tucson sector  officials estimate that constructing the upgraded interim checkpoint will  cost approximately $1.5 million and constructing the permanent I-19  checkpoint will cost approximately $25 million.

	Checkpoint Contributions Support the Border Patrol’s Mission, But Several Factors Affect Higher Levels of Performance

Checkpoint operations have contributed to furthering the Border Patrol’s  mission to protect the border, and have also contributed to protection  efforts of other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.  However, Border Patrol officials have stated that additional canines, non- intrusive inspection technology, and staff are needed to increase  checkpoint effectiveness. Border Patrol officials stated that they are taking  steps to increase these resources at checkpoints across the southwest  border.

		Contributions to the Border Patrol’s Mission Include Seizing Illegal Drugs, Apprehending Illegal Aliens, and Screening for Potential Terrorists

Checkpoints contribute to the Border Patrol’s mission to protect the  nation from the impact of contraband illegally transported across the  border, as well as the impact of illegal aliens, some of whom may have ties  to organized crime or countries at higher risk of having groups that  sponsor terrorism.

			Seizing Illegal Drugs

Border Patrol data show that checkpoints assisted federal efforts to  disrupt the supply of illegal drugs. In fiscal year 2008, over 3,500 of the  almost 10,100 drug seizures by the Border Patrol along the southwest  border occurred at checkpoints. With a relatively small allocation of  agents—about 4 percent, according to Border Patrol officials— checkpoints accounted for about 35 percent of Border Patrol drug seizures  along the southwest border. Checkpoint seizures included various types of  illegal drugs. For example, the Tucson sector checkpoint on I-19 seized  3,200 pounds of marijuana, with an estimated street value of $2.6 million,  in a single event in June 2009. Additionally, the Laredo sector checkpoint  on I-35 seized almost 240 pounds of cocaine with an estimated street value  of $7.6 million in a single event in March 2009.
Overall, the number of drug seizures at southwest border checkpoints  increased slightly from 3,460 in fiscal year 2007 to 3,540 in fiscal year 2008  (an increase of about 2 percent), while total Border Patrol seizures  decreased slightly, from 10,285 to 10,065 (a decrease of about 4 percent).  In two sectors, however, seizures at checkpoints increased substantially,  as shown in figure 6. Specifically, drug seizures at San Diego sector  checkpoints increased by 93 percent from fiscal year 2007 to 2008, while  drug seizures at Yuma sector checkpoints increased by 73 percent. Yuma  sector checkpoints also had more than twice the number of seizures  compared to other individual sectors.
According to San Diego sector officials, the increase in seizures at San  Diego sector checkpoints can be attributed to a number of factors,  including    a 78 percent increase in the operational hours of sector checkpoints,    a 123 percent increase in sector manpower,    utilizing an additional inspection lane during peak traffic times at the  checkpoint on I-8, rather than allowing traffic to pass without  inspection, and  increased infrastructure (fencing, light poles, remote video  surveillance system) in the western corridor of the sector may have  pushed traffic east towards the sector checkpoints.
Yuma sector officials attributed the increase in Yuma sector checkpoint  seizures to factors including increases in tactical infrastructure and  technology at the border, which have allowed the sector to move more  agents and canines to sector checkpoints.

			Apprehending Illegal Aliens

Checkpoints have also contributed to apprehensions of illegal aliens.  Nearly 17,000 illegal aliens were apprehended at checkpoints, or 2 percent  of the more than 705,000 total Border Patrol apprehensions along the  southwest border in fiscal year 2008. Checkpoint apprehensions ranged  from single individuals to large parties of illegal aliens led by “coyotes.”  For example, we observed the apprehension of an illegal alien at a San  Diego sector checkpoint who was hidden beneath the trunk floor of a  passenger vehicle during our visit to the San Diego sector in October 2008.  More recently, the Laredo sector checkpoint on I-35 found 13 illegal aliens  concealed in a tractor-trailer trying to traverse the checkpoint in a single  event in April 2009. The illegal aliens and the driver of the tractor-trailer  were processed for prosecution.
Overall, apprehensions at checkpoints decreased from fiscal year 2007 to  2008, and at a greater rate than for other Border Patrol activities. During  this time frame, the number of apprehensions at all southwest Border  Patrol checkpoints decreased by 26 percent (from 22,792 to 16,959), while  apprehensions for other Border Patrol activities along the southwest  border decreased by 18 percent (from 858,638 to 705,005). In one sector,  however, checkpoint apprehensions increased from fiscal year 2007 to  2008, as shown in figure 7. Tucson sector checkpoint apprehensions  increased by 28 percent from fiscal year 2007 to 2008, although the total  number of checkpoint apprehensions remained higher in the San Diego,  Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley sectors.
Border Patrol officials stated that Tucson sector checkpoint  apprehensions increased because the sector maintained nearly full-time  operations at all sector checkpoints during fiscal year 2008. Additionally,  the Border Patrol increased the number of operational checkpoints in the  sector from 10 in fiscal year 2007 to 13 in fiscal year 2008.
Border Patrol officials said that apprehensions decreased in other sectors  in part due to the deterrent effect of increased Border Patrol presence and  infrastructure, and initiatives to criminally prosecute illegal aliens. For  example, Laredo sector officials said that checkpoint apprehensions  decreased by nearly half from fiscal year 2007 to 2008 due to the following  contributing factors:  Increased staff. The number of Border Patrol agents in the Laredo  sector increased from approximately 1,200 agents in fiscal year 2007 to  approximately 1,636 agents in fiscal year 2008. In addition, Operation  Jump Start, which ended in July 2008, provided 286 National Guard  soldiers to support Border Patrol operations in the sector, with  approximately 36 deployed to support checkpoint operations. These  soldiers were placed in areas highly visible to the checkpoints which,  along with increased Border Patrol agents, created a deterrent to  illegal activity.
Improved infrastructure and technology. Deterrence and detection  capabilities increased in the Laredo sector in terms of improved traffic  checkpoint technology, cameras, license plate readers, and vehicle and  cargo inspection systems (VACIS). In addition, fiscal year 2007 was the  first full fiscal year in which the new state-of-the-art checkpoint on I-35  was operational. Border Patrol officials believe that human and  narcotics smugglers rerouted their cargo to other locations due to the  deterrent effect of the new checkpoint.
Increased prosecutions. At the beginning of fiscal year 2008, Laredo  sector implemented a prosecution initiative—known as Operation  Streamline—to prosecute and remove all violators charged with illegal  entry in targeted areas in the sector. Although sector checkpoints were  not in these targeted areas, sector officials reported that this zero  tolerance policy resulted in a higher prosecution rate in fiscal year  2008, providing a deterrent to illegal aliens across the sector.

			Screening for Potential Terrorists

Checkpoints also help screen for individuals who may have ties to  terrorism. CBP reported that in fiscal year 2008, there were three  individuals encountered by the Border Patrol at southwest border  checkpoints who were identified as persons linked to terrorism. In  addition, the Border Patrol reported that in fiscal year 2008 checkpoints  encountered 530 aliens from special interest countries, which are  countries the Department of State has determined to represent a potential  terrorist threat to the United States. While people from these countries  may not have any ties to illegal or terrorist activities, Border Patrol agents  detain aliens from special interest countries if they are in the United States  illegally and Border Patrol agents report these encounters to the local  Sector Intelligence Agent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint  Terrorism Task Force, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)  Office of Investigations, and the CBP National Targeting Center. For  example, according to a Border Patrol official in the El Paso sector, a  checkpoint stopped a vehicle and questioned its three Iranian occupants,  determining that one of those occupants was in the United States illegally.  The individual was detained and turned over to U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement for further questioning.

		Contributions to Other Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Missions Include Identifying Criminals and Leveraging Resources

Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials from the five sectors we  visited told us that Border Patrol checkpoints enhance their operations  and mission achievement. For example, federal Drug Enforcement  Administration (DEA) officials stated that in addition to individual drug  seizures, checkpoints supported DEA goals to disrupt and dismantle drug  smuggling operations by gathering intelligence from captured drug  smugglers turned over to DEA, helping to identify patterns in smugglers’  routes of ingress to the United States, and increasing smuggling costs by  forcing the use of increasingly sophisticated methods of concealment to  evade detection.
Checkpoints provided benefits to state and local law enforcement  officials, including the identification and detention of criminals who were  attempting to evade arrest by state highway patrol, city police, or county  sheriffs, and providing other services in rural areas with sparse law  enforcement presence. For example, Border Patrol agents at the I-5  checkpoint in San Clemente, California, referred a vehicle with two men to  secondary inspection because the men were acting suspiciously. Upon  inspection, agents found a small quantity of marijuana and  methamphetamine, a large quantity of cash, and a handwritten demand  note. The men and evidence were turned over to the local sheriff who  determined that the men had robbed a local pharmacy and were primary  suspects in another armed robbery. In terms of other services, several  state and local law enforcement officials we met with said that checkpoint  personnel could respond more quickly to highway accidents and provide  access to detention facilities for transfer of illegal aliens captured by local  authorities. For example, a sheriff responsible for law enforcement near  the U.S. Route 77 checkpoint in Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector  reported that the Border Patrol regularly provides assistance and backup  to his office, such as responding to highway accidents or other incidents,  because he often has only one deputy on duty to cover a large geographic  area. Additionally, this same sheriff reported that if he apprehends an  illegal alien, he turns the person over to the Border Patrol agents at the  nearby checkpoint for processing and detention.

		Factors Affecting Checkpoint Performance Include Operational and Resource Limitations

Border Patrol guidance and officials from five sectors we visited identified  operational requirements and resources that are important for effective  and efficient checkpoint performance, including (1) continuous operation,  (2) full-time canine inspection capability, (3) non-intrusive inspection  technology, and (4) number and experience of checkpoint staff. While  most permanent checkpoints were operational nearly 24 hours per day in  fiscal year 2008, Border Patrol officials have stated that additional canines,  non-intrusive inspection technology, and staff are needed to increase  checkpoint effectiveness.

			Continuous Operation

According to the Border Patrol, operating checkpoints continuously—that  is, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week—is key to effective and efficient  checkpoint performance. Keeping checkpoints operational is important  because smugglers and illegal aliens closely monitor potential transit  routes and adjust their plans to ensure the greatest chance of success. For  example, a 1995 study of checkpoint operations in the San Diego sector by  the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service showed that when  the checkpoint on I-5 was closed, apprehensions at the nearby and  operational I-15 checkpoint fell sharply—there was a 50 percent decline in  1 month. According to the study, this decline resulted from illegal aliens  choosing to travel through the closed checkpoint on I-5 instead of the  operational checkpoint on I-15. Recent testimony before Congress by the  Arizona Attorney General discussed the sophisticated surveillance and  communication technology currently used by smugglers. Such  technology could allow for immediate notification of security  vulnerabilities, such as a checkpoint closure. Tucson sector Border Patrol  officials and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge from DEA’s Tucson  District Office explained that smugglers of humans and drugs, often  sponsored by organized crime, store loads of people or drugs in “stash  houses” after illegally crossing the border until transit routes are clear. As  soon as a checkpoint is closed, the people or drugs in the stash houses are  moved through the checkpoint.
Border Patrol data showed that in fiscal year 2008 most of the 32  permanent checkpoints were near continuous operation, with 25 having  operated 22 hours or more, and 3 having operated between 20 and 22  hours per day, on average. Those operated most frequently include  permanent checkpoints located off highway with enhanced weather  infrastructure in place. For example, the U.S. Route 77 checkpoint in  Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector was operational almost 24 hours  per day on average in fiscal year 2008, closing only for a total of 22 hours  because of inclement weather related to Hurricane Dolly.
The remaining four permanent checkpoints were operational less than 7  hours per day on average in fiscal year 2008. These included two  checkpoints with on-highway inspection lanes that were located in high  traffic areas and two checkpoints that were no longer used because they  were relocated to other locations. For example, the I-5 and I-15  checkpoints in the San Diego sector have on-highway inspection lanes, as  shown in figure 8, and the high traffic volume passing through these  checkpoints overwhelms the capability to perform checkpoint inspections  more than 2 hours per day, on average, without causing significant traffic  congestion and safety concerns.
The I-8 checkpoint in Yuma sector was relocated as a new tactical  checkpoint 60 miles east of the location where the former permanent  checkpoint was located, due to encroachment of developers and  increasing freeway traffic. Finally, the Oak Grove checkpoint in the San  Diego sector was operational for only 26 hours in fiscal year 2008 because  checkpoint operations were shifted from the Oak Grove checkpoint to  other checkpoints farther east, as well as roving patrols, to increase  enforcement in those targeted areas, according to sector officials.
Border Patrol data also showed that in general tactical checkpoints are  operated much less frequently than permanent checkpoints, a median of  less than 2 hours per day for tactical checkpoints compared to a median of  over 23 hours per day for permanent checkpoints. Border Patrol officials  said that safety conditions and staff shortages were the primary reasons  for closure. Tactical checkpoints, which generally consist of trailers and  generators, are more vulnerable to adverse weather conditions than  permanent structures, and may be lower in priority for staffing during  times of low traffic volume. In addition, Border Patrol headquarters  officials said that differences in operational hours for tactical checkpoints  across sectors can occur because of the operational decisions of each  sector’s Chief Patrol Agent based on information on smuggling trends and  available staffing to address those trends.

			Use of Canines

Border Patrol checkpoint policy states that full-time canine presence at  checkpoints is important for the effective and efficient inspection of  vehicles and cargo for illegal drugs and persons, but the manager of  Border Patrol’s canine program noted that in general there is not a  sufficient level of canines at checkpoints. According to Border Patrol  officials, smugglers have become increasingly sophisticated in the design  of concealed compartments that agents would find difficult or impossible  to detect without canine assistance. Often, canines alerting to the presence  of illegal drugs or hidden persons may provide Border Patrol agents the  only source of probable cause to search a vehicle or its occupants,  according to Border Patrol officials. (See fig. 9)
Border Patrol officials said there were not enough canines for full-time  checkpoint coverage, even in sectors with the most heavily used  smuggling corridors. In the Tucson sector, for example, sector officials  said that as of July 15, 2009 they have 99 canine teams, but 120 teams  would ensure availability when officers are not available for duty due to  leave, training, or supporting other law enforcement agencies. Border  Patrol’s canine program manager said that the Border Patrol expected to  train 180 canines in fiscal year 2009 and will send a majority of these  canines to southwest border sectors to address gaps in canine coverage at  checkpoints. In fiscal year 2010, the Border Patrol plans to expand its  canine facility to facilitate training and hopes to train an additional 250-300  canines. However, the program manager noted that additional trained  canines will not alleviate the Border Patrol’s immediate need for these  assets as many of the trained canines will replace older canines that will  be retiring. The program manager stated that while the Border Patrol does  not have the resources to address the need for canines in the near term,  the agency plans to train 1,500 canines by fiscal year 2014 which, including  canine retirement and replacement, will result in 1,300 deployed canines  across all Border Patrol activities, including checkpoints.

			Inspection Technology

The Border Patrol has identified the deployment of non-intrusive  inspection technologies that allow the inspection of hidden or closed  compartments—in particular, the ability to find contraband and other  security threats—as one of its high-priority needs to improve checkpoint  performance. Non-intrusive inspection technologies, such as a VACIS or  backscatter X-ray machine, as shown in figure 10, use imaging to help  trained operators see the contents of closed vehicles and containers,  which helps them to intercept a broad array of drugs, other contraband,  illegal aliens, or other items of interest without having to search  physically. Border Patrol officials told us that they have seen smugglers  using increasingly complex concealment methods at checkpoints,  emphasizing the importance of deploying new detection technologies to  counter these threats. For example, Tucson sector officials reported that  within 1 month of deployment of a backscatter machine at a sector  checkpoint, they identified 30 hidden compartments in vehicles being used  to smuggle illegal drugs. Border Patrol officials said that backscatter  machines have been of great value to checkpoint officials for discovering  hidden compartments.
As of May 2009, the Border Patrol reported that it had eight mobile non- intrusive inspection technologies, such as a VACIS or backscatter  machine, deployed to support Border Patrol operations in the nine  southwest border sectors. Of these eight non-intrusive inspection  technologies, four were dedicated to specific checkpoints and four were  deployed to sectors and were moved among checkpoints or other  locations as deemed necessary by the sector’s Chief Patrol Agent. The  Border Patrol reported that the agency is in the process of acquiring  additional mobile non-intrusive inspection equipment for southwest  border checkpoints. Once these units are acquired, the Border Patrol  intends to develop a plan to prioritize the deployment of these units  among checkpoints. Border Patrol officials are of the opinion that mobile  backscatter units are cheaper to obtain and maintain than VACIS units,  require fewer dedicated staff, produce images that are easier for Border  Patrol agents to interpret, and do not require an environmental assessment  to be completed prior to deployment.
Despite tentative plans to deploy additional non-intrusive inspection  technologies at checkpoints, resource constraints may preclude or delay  acquisition and deployment. Both VACIS and backscatter units require a  large concrete apron and trained operators for effective operation, and  some checkpoints lack adequate space or available staff. For example, at  one checkpoint which has a VACIS unit, reportedly only 4 of the 12 agents  originally trained to operate the VACIS remain because of attrition,  decreasing the amount of time the VACIS can be used to screen vehicles.  Border Patrol sector officials said that it can be difficult getting agents to  volunteer for VACIS training, as other Border Patrol duties are preferable.
Furthermore, officials responsible for the current checkpoint on I-19 south  of Tucson, Arizona, reported that more space is needed to improve the  effectiveness of the backscatter unit, as the unit requires an off-road area  sufficient to permit its safe operation without interfering with traffic flow.

			Number and Experience of Checkpoint Staff

Checkpoint performance can also be hindered by limited staffing at  checkpoints. Border Patrol policy recommends the minimum number of  agents for checkpoint operation, but sector managers may have other  priorities for staff placement. Despite the rapid increase in overall staffing  numbers on the southwest border, the number of agents remains  insufficient to fully staff all areas of need, according to Border Patrol  officials. As a result, sector chiefs have developed strategies that prioritize  areas within the sector for achieving operational control. Priority areas  differ among sectors, but generally include the immediate border area and  urban centers, rather than checkpoints. For example, in the Tucson sector,  the Border Patrol deploys about 8 percent of sector operational agents to  sector checkpoints on an average day, according to sector officials.  Tucson officials we met with stated that they would like to deploy  additional staff to the checkpoint, but no additional agents were available,  as the majority of agents are staffed to border areas, which are sector  priority areas. According to Border Patrol officials, checkpoint staffing  numbers should increase as the Border Patrol continues to hire new  agents.
Checkpoint performance can also be hindered when assigned staff are  new and do not have experience gained by continuous on-the-job training  or do not have the desire to work at checkpoints. Border Patrol officials  stated that nearly half of all agents have less than 2 years of experience,  and Border Patrol officials in some sectors stated that agents generally do  not consider checkpoint duty to be a desirable assignment. As such,  checkpoints may be staffed on a rotational basis. These problems are  minimized in locations where Border Patrol stations have operational  responsibilities for checkpoints only. For example, agents at five  checkpoints in the El Paso sector are generally staffed to the checkpoint  or checkpoint circumvention routes on a fairly continuous basis. In  contrast, Tucson sector agents rotate checkpoint duty with roving patrol  and other enforcement activities, such as line watch, and may serve at the  checkpoint at least once every 14 days, according to sector officials.

	Checkpoint Performance Measures Have Been Established, but Data Limitations Hinder their Usefulness

The Border Patrol established a number of measures for checkpoint  performance to inform the public on program results and provide  management oversight; however, information gaps and reporting issues  have hindered public accountability, and inconsistent data collection and  entry have hindered management’s ability to monitor the need for program  improvement.

		Performance Measures Developed for Public Accountability Hindered by Information Gaps and Reporting Issues

The Border Patrol chose 3 of 21 performance measures identified by a  working group in 2006 to begin reporting the results of checkpoint  operations under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993  (GPRA). Under GPRA, agencies are required to hold programs  accountable to Congress and the public by establishing performance goals,  identifying performance measures used to indicate progress toward  meeting the goals, and use the results to improve performance as  necessary. Agencies report their program goals, measures, results, and  corrective actions to the public each year in their Performance and  Accountability Report (PAR). The Border Patrol first reported the  checkpoint performance results for these three measures in CBP’s fiscal  year 2007 PAR.
The three GPRA measures used for public reporting relate to (1)  checkpoint drug seizures as a percentage of all Border Patrol seizures, (2)  checkpoint apprehensions as a percentage of all Border Patrol  apprehensions, and (3) the percentage of checkpoint apprehensions that  are referred to a U.S. Attorney for criminal prosecution. These measures  were chosen as contributing directly to the DHS goals to protect the  nation from dangerous persons and contraband, and were recommended  as GPRA measures in a 2007 study commissioned by CBP. The remaining  18 measures identified by the working group collectively provide some  indication of checkpoint performance, but individually provide more  indirect support of border security goals. For example, the working group  identified separate measures for comparing the number of apprehensions  and seizures at checkpoints to those on circumvention routes and the  number of seizures or apprehensions at checkpoints that involved  methods of concealment to smuggle persons or contraband.
Information gaps preclude using the performance measures to determine  the full extent of a checkpoint’s effectiveness relative to other checkpoints  and Border Patrol strategies for protecting the nation from illegal aliens  and contraband. According to GPRA guidance, measures should reflect  program outcomes and provide information to assess accomplishments,  make decisions, realign processes, and assign accountability. Studies  commissioned by CBP, however, have documented that measures of the  number of seizures or apprehensions bear little relationship to  effectiveness because they do not compare these numbers to the amount  of illegal activity that passes through undetected. In the absence of this  information, the Border Patrol does not know whether seizure and  apprehension rates at checkpoints are low or high, and if lower rates are  due to ineffective performance, effective deterrence, or a low volume of  illegal drugs or aliens passing through a checkpoint. As a result, the  Border Patrol is unable to use these measures to determine if one  checkpoint is performing more effectively or efficiently than another  checkpoint, or how effective the checkpoint strategy is compared to  strategies placing agents at the border or other locations. Border Patrol  headquarters officials said that they do not use the measures as  management indicators of checkpoint performance specifically, although  officials do use the results along with other information for oversight of  overall border strategy.
CBP has not developed models to address these information gaps for  checkpoints, but has done so for other aspects of its border security  strategy. Identifying the extent of illegal activity that occurs is a challenge  faced by law enforcement agencies, but in some cases CBP uses programs  and models specific to certain operations that estimate illegal activity  levels based on various factors. For example, CBP uses a program, known  as Compliance Examination (COMPEX), which estimates the total amount  of illegal activity passing undetected through official U.S. ports of entry.  Developed under the former U.S. Customs Service, COMPEX randomly  selects travelers entering the country for more detailed inspections. On the  basis of the extent to which violations are found in the in-depth  inspections, CBP estimates the total number of inadmissible aliens and  other violators who seek to enter the country. CBP then calculates an  apprehension rate by comparing the number of violators it actually  apprehends with the estimated number of violators that attempted entry,  and reports these results in DHS’s annual performance report to provide  program accountability. Other efforts included models to estimate the  probability of apprehension by sector and an estimate of the number of  illegal border crossings across the southwest border, and estimates of  undetected illegal activity passing across smaller geographic zones. Border  Patrol officials reported that they are exploring the feasibility of  developing a checkpoint performance model to address checkpoint  operational effectiveness and checkpoint impact on overall border  security. Although standard practices in program management call for  documenting milestones to ensure results are achieved, the Border Patrol  did not identify time lines or milestones for completing this effort. Doing  so could help provide the Border Patrol with reasonable assurance that its  personnel will determine the feasibility of developing a checkpoint  performance model within a time frame authorized by management.
Reporting issues at Border Patrol headquarters also hindered using the  performance measure results to inform Congress and the public on  checkpoint performance. The Border Patrol began annual reporting on the  three GPRA measures of checkpoint performance in the CBP fiscal year  2007 PAR, but the information reported was inaccurate, resulting in an  overstatement of checkpoint performance for both fiscal years 2007 and  2008, as shown in table 1. Annual Performance and Accountability Reports  are to document the results agencies have achieved compared to the goals  they established, which, as we have previously reported, is key to  improving accountability for results as Congress intended under GPRA.  We used Border Patrol data to calculate results for the three checkpoint  measures for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and compared these numbers to  results the Border Patrol reported in the PARs. Our analysis showed that  the actual checkpoint performance results were incorrectly reported for  two of the three measures in fiscal year 2007 and for one measure in fiscal  year 2008. As a result, the Border Patrol incorrectly reported that it met its  checkpoint performance targets for these two measures.
The results of our analysis differed from those reported in the PARs for  several reasons. In regard to errors in reporting apprehensions, the Border  Patrol reported that Tucson sector data were excluded because including  such data would unfairly reflect on overall checkpoint performance, as the  Tucson sector has a substantially higher volume of illegal aliens compared  to other sectors. According to the Border Patrol, disclosure statements  explaining the exclusion of Tucson sector data were inadvertently omitted  from the fiscal year 2007 PAR, and that full disclosure would be presented  in future reports.
In regard to errors in reporting the number of checkpoint cases referred to  a U.S. Attorney for criminal prosecution, reported data were overstated  because they included referrals to all prosecuting authorities—federal,  state, and local. Including only those referrals to a U.S. Attorney, as  defined in the PAR, would reduce reported performance results by nearly  one-third in 2007 and nearly two-thirds in 2008. The Border Patrol  indicated that including referrals to all prosecuting authorities is more  representative of checkpoint performance because prosecutions in general  are a deterrent to crime. Department of Justice (DOJ) officials agreed,  noting that there are a variety of cases generated at checkpoints which are  referred to state and local law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. For  example, due to the volume of cases and limited resources, many U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices have “intake” or “prosecution thresholds” by which  narcotics cases below certain quantities are routinely referred to state  authorities for arrest and prosecution, according to DOJ officials. In  addition, there are other state offenses, such as individuals arrested on  outstanding warrants, stolen vehicles or merchandise, or some weapons  violations, that are also intercepted at Border Patrol checkpoints. DOJ  officials stated that a measurement that did not include these types of  cases referred to state authorities would miss a substantial number of  criminal cases which were generated by the checkpoints and thus neglect  a valuable indicator of their effectiveness. For these reasons, Border  Patrol plans to revise the performance measure definition for future PARs  to include referrals to any prosecuting authority.
In addition to these reporting issues, data collection issues across Border  Patrol checkpoints also contributed to inconsistent data reported in the  Performance and Accountability Report. Standards for Internal Control  in the Federal Government call for pertinent information to be recorded  and communicated to management in a form and within a time frame that  enables them to carry out internal control and other responsibilities. This  includes the accurate recording and reporting of data necessary to  demonstrate agency operations. To implement this requirement, the  Border Patrol developed a checkpoint activity report (CAR) in 2006 as a  means for field agents to report daily summaries of checkpoint  performance, and provided relevant guidance. Supervisory agents at each  station and sector had oversight responsibility for ensuring that data entry  complied with agency guidance, and headquarters officials had  responsibility for conducting a final review and reliability check.
Information we collected from stations responsible for checkpoint data  entry showed that data collection practices were inconsistent and  incomplete for the apprehension and referral measures included in the  PAR. We provided a data collection instrument to the Border Patrol  seeking information on how checkpoint agents input data into the CAR for  data fields related to apprehensions and seizures at and around  checkpoints. Border Patrol headquarters officials forwarded this data  collection instrument to stations responsible for operating checkpoints  along the southwest border. The responses we received from stations  responsible for 60 checkpoints operating along the southwest border in  fiscal year 2008 showed inconsistencies in data reporting.
Apprehension measure. Officials responsible for data entry at two  checkpoints in the Rio Grande Valley sector did not follow guidance in  recording apprehensions at the checkpoint. CAR guidance defines “at  checkpoint” as an apprehension or seizure that occurs within the pre- primary, primary, or secondary inspection area of the checkpoint.  Instead, officials at these two checkpoints attributed all apprehensions  within a 2.5-mile radius to the checkpoint, overstating actual  checkpoint apprehensions. Officials said they instituted this practice in  August 2008 because it more accurately represented checkpoint  performance in forcing illegal activity to use longer circumvention  routes to get around the checkpoint. However, the CAR contains other  data fields to capture apprehensions on checkpoint circumvention  routes, and results are reflected in a separate performance measure.
Referral measure. Officials responsible for 26 checkpoints reported  that they did not regularly or accurately enter data for the number of  checkpoint apprehensions referred to a U.S. Attorney, understating  checkpoint performance in apprehending criminals who may pose a  threat to public safety. In some cases, Border Patrol sector officials  said this occurred because at the end of the day when checkpoint data  are submitted, supervisors did not know if cases will be referred, and  the CAR may not have been updated to reflect any subsequent  referrals.
Border Patrol headquarters officials said that they were unaware of these  data inconsistencies, and that headquarters officials had generally  provided limited oversight of checkpoint performance data, relying instead  on checkpoint and sector officials to ensure data reliability. According to  the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, activities  need to be established to monitor performance measures and indicators.  Such controls should be aimed at validating the propriety and integrity of  performance measures and indicators. Establishing controls for  headquarters oversight of checkpoint performance data could provide the  Border Patrol with additional assurance related to the accuracy,  consistency, and completeness of its checkpoint performance data used to  report on the checkpoint performance measures in the annual PAR.  Border Patrol officials said that they have formed a workgroup to examine  these data integrity issues with respect to checkpoint activity reporting,  and would take action to address the identified issues. For example,  regarding the referral measure, Border Patrol headquarters officials said  that they plan to modify the CAR so that information, such as a referral to  a U.S. Attorney, will be extracted from the databases that agents use to  process the aliens administratively and criminally. Because the data are to  be extracted from these systems, agents should no longer have to enter the  information in two places and errors should be eliminated in checkpoint  reporting.

		Performance Measures Established for Program Management Hindered by Limited System Capabilities and Inconsistent Data Entry Practices

In addition to the measures used for public reporting in the annual PAR,  the Border Patrol identified other measures for checkpoints that taken  together can provide indicators of performance for internal management  of the program (see appendix II). According to the Senate report  accompanying GPRA, performance indicators should, wherever possible,  include those that correlate the level of program activity with program  costs, such as costs per unit of result or output. The Border Patrol  checkpoint performance working group established 21 performance  indicators of checkpoint operations that were divided into four main  groups, including indicators of program costs in terms of operations and  maintenance and man-hours:    At the checkpoint. These eight measures examine the extent that  checkpoint resources are operational and effective. They include the  percentage of time checkpoints are operational or closed for various  reasons; number of seizures or apprehensions due to canine detection,  sensors, or other technology; number of smuggling events using a  method of concealment; number of aliens per smuggling load; and cost  effectiveness of checkpoints considering operations and maintenance  costs.
Immediate impact areas. These six measures compare checkpoint  apprehensions and seizures to those on checkpoint circumvention  routes, in geographic areas adjacent to the checkpoint, and at  transportation centers (i.e., bus terminals, train stations) and staging  areas (such as stash houses).
At the border. These three measures compare checkpoint operations  to other Border Patrol enforcement operations. Two of these three  measures—a comparison of checkpoint apprehensions and drug  seizures to all apprehensions and seizures—were used as GPRA  reporting measures in the annual PAR. The third measure related to  cost effectiveness in terms of comparing man-hours dedicated to  checkpoint operations to man-hours dedicated to other enforcement  activities.
Quality of life. These four measures examine how checkpoint  operations help address major crime across communities and assist  other federal, state, local and tribal agencies. One of these four  measures—referral of smugglers for prosecution to a U.S. Attorney— was included as a GPRA reporting measure in the annual PAR. The  remaining three measures examined the reduction of major crimes in  areas affected by checkpoint operations, the number of cases referred  to other agencies identified by checkpoint operations, and the number  of apprehensions turned over to the Border Patrol by other agencies  during times the checkpoint is operational or non-operational.
Inconsistent data entry practices by field agents preclude using many of  the measures as indicators of performance or cost effectiveness.  Responses received from station officials responsible for operating 60  checkpoints on our data collection instrument showed that data reported  in the CAR were often incomplete, inconsistent across stations, or missing  altogether. These officials reported that checkpoint data entry issues were  caused by unclear definitions in checkpoint performance data guidance,  differences between data fields and operations, and perceived duplication  of effort for information available in E-3, which is the primary information  system used by CBP for tracking all enforcement activities conducted by  its components.
Unclear definitions in guidance. Data entry personnel differed in  how they interpreted guidance related to checkpoint data fields,  resulting in inconsistent data reporting across checkpoints and across  different shifts at individual checkpoints. Attributes of successful  performance measures include that the measure is clearly stated, the  name and definition are consistent with the methodology used to  calculate it, and the measure produces the same result under similar  conditions. In reporting the number of apprehensions or seizures on  circumvention routes, however, officials at one checkpoint we visited  considered all activity within the station’s area of responsibility to be  circumventions, while officials at other checkpoints considered only  the activity on defined circumvention routes. Border Patrol guidance  for the CAR defined circumventions as “to avoid, or get around by  artful maneuvering,” but did not specify how this definition should be  applied by checkpoint officials. One Border Patrol field official said  that at one location, supervisors used different definitions for entering  information in the same data fields because of unclear definitions in  CAR guidance, resulting in inconsistencies in data entry. Specifically,  this Border Patrol field official noted that there was confusion among  agents responsible for inputting data into fields related to concealment  methods and cases turned over to other agencies, because neither field  is defined in the CAR guidance. Officials responsible for 16 of 47  checkpoints responding to an open-ended question reported that  agents need additional instruction, training, or clearer guidance in  using the CAR.
Differences between data fields and operations. Some data fields  in the CAR are inconsistent with operations, resulting in an  understatement of some activities, including indicators for one of the  cost effectiveness measures. For example, checkpoint officials are  required to track the number of agents staffed per shift in the CAR, but  at least 20 permanent checkpoints operate using an overlapping four- shift schedule, while the CAR provides for a three-shift format. As a  result, agent hours may be understated at the majority of permanent  checkpoints along the southwest border because checkpoint officials  could not record all of the hours worked in a four-shift schedule.
Duplication with other information systems. Field agents  considered CAR data entry time consuming and somewhat duplicative  of other information systems. Manual efforts by field agents to go  through all arrest reports daily to identify those that are pertinent to  checkpoints for summary in the CAR can be a labor-intensive effort.  Detailed information on the arrest or activity summarized in the CAR is  already reported in E-3, which tracks enforcement efforts from the  initial arrest to final disposition. Officials responsible for 15 of 47  checkpoints responding to an open-ended question in our data  collection instrument recommended that reporting requirements  among information systems should be integrated to reduce duplication  of effort.
Overall, Border Patrol officials said that they were unaware of the extent  of these data entry and reporting issues, and that headquarters officials  had generally provided limited oversight of checkpoint performance data,  relying instead on checkpoint and sector officials to ensure data reliability.  Internal control standards require that agencies monitor their activities,  through management and supervisory personnel, to assess the quality of  performance over time. Consistent with these standards, we have  previously reported that an agency’s management should have a strategy  to ensure that ongoing monitoring is effective and will trigger separate  evaluations where problems are identified or systems are critical to  measuring performance. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that  the workgroup formed to address data integrity issues would take steps to  address these identified data entry issues, but officials did not identify how  they would ensure proper oversight of checkpoint data collection.  Specifically, to address unclear definitions in the CAR, Border Patrol  officials reported that they plan to provide updated directives to field staff  regarding definitions, and would provide associated guidance regarding  data input in the CAR. To address differences between data fields and  operations, Border Patrol officials said they would update the CAR to  reflect the current operation of checkpoints. Border Patrol officials noted  that the time frames for completing these actions are unknown at this  point because guidance and systems need to be developed and then  approved by Border Patrol leadership. Until the Border Patrol fully  addresses these data entry and oversight issues, it will not be able to  ensure that data inputted into the CAR accurately reflects checkpoint  operations. Finally, in regard to system duplication, Border Patrol officials  stated that the recent rollout of E-3 does provide the means to report some  performance data for checkpoints that are common to all components,  such as seizures and apprehensions, but that the CAR is still necessary to  track data for some performance indicators that are unique to  checkpoints, such as hours checkpoints are in operation and staff assigned  to operate those checkpoints.
Other data limitations preclude the Border Patrol from implementing a  measure comparing the cost effectiveness of checkpoint operations with  other Border Patrol strategies, such as line watch and roving patrol  operations. We previously recommended that the Border Patrol implement  such a measure to determine whether it was efficiently utilizing resources  among checkpoints and among its three-tiered border enforcement  strategy, and to assist in allocating additional resources within sectors or  between sectors so that those resources would have the greatest impact.  While the GPRA measures do compare checkpoint apprehensions and  seizures to other Border Patrol activities, the Border Patrol indicated that  data are not available on the number of agents staffed to line watch and  roving patrol operations. Without accurate data on the number of agents  staffed to line watch and roving patrol operations, it will not be possible to  compare the cost effectiveness of checkpoints with these other Border  Patrol activities. According to Border Patrol officials, the agency  discontinued tracking agent hours by assignment in 2004, when it became  cost prohibitive to maintain the information system capturing these data,  and a comparable system to the CAR was not implemented for operations  other than checkpoints. Officials stated that they plan to address this  limitation by developing a new data system to track agent hours and  assignments for border enforcement operations. The Border Patrol plans  to initially deploy this new data system by the end of fiscal year 2009, and  add updates as needed to accurately track agent hours by assignment.

	Border Patrol Considered Community Impact in Checkpoint Placement and Design

Among other factors, the Border Patrol considered community safety and  convenience in recent checkpoint placement and design decisions, in  accordance with Border Patrol guidelines and requirements of other  federal, state, and local agencies. The placement and design process was  completed for three new permanent checkpoints since 2006, and no public  comments were received about their design or placement in fairly remote  areas of Texas. Some members of the public have raised concerns about  the placement and size of a proposed permanent checkpoint for I-19 in  Arizona, which is to be located closer to nearby communities. Draft plans  we reviewed for the I-19 checkpoint were consistent with Border Patrol  guidelines to locate checkpoints in less populated areas away from  schools and hospitals and also considered current and future traffic  volumes in accordance with Department of Transportation goals to  facilitate highway travel and reduce congestion.

		Checkpoint Placement Decisions Considered Factors Related to Public Safety and Convenience

The Border Patrol finalized three placement decisions for new permanent  checkpoints in the last 3 years in accordance with its Design Guide and  policy documents. These checkpoints, all located in Texas, were placed  on I-35, U.S. Route 83, and U.S. Route 62/180. In regard to checkpoint  location, Border Patrol guidance includes factors intended to maximize  operational effectiveness and minimize adverse impact on the public and  surrounding communities. Specifically, the guidance states that to provide  strategic advantage, checkpoints should be placed in locations that  provide good visibility of the surrounding area, near the confluence of two  or more significant roads leading away from the border, and have minimal  routes that could be used by illegal aliens to circumvent the checkpoint.  The guidelines discuss community impact in terms of public safety issues  and traffic considerations. Specifically, preferred checkpoint locations are  at least a half mile from businesses, residences, schools and hospitals, or  other inhabited locations. In addition, the Border Patrol guidelines suggest  that checkpoints be located on a stretch of highway providing sufficient  visibility for traffic compatible with safe operations, for both the traveling  public, as well as agents working at the checkpoint.
We mapped the locations of the three permanent checkpoints placed by  the Border Patrol since 2006 along with relevant population data, schools,  and hospitals, and the results were consistent with Border Patrol  guidance. Specifically, the mapping analysis results, shown in table 2,  indicated that the three checkpoints were located in sparsely populated  areas and at least 9 miles from the nearest hospital or school.
Border Patrol placement decisions for these checkpoints also passed  through federal, state, and local government review, as well as public  review during the environmental assessment process. Our review of  documentation showed that the Border Patrol conducted environmental  assessments for the three checkpoint locations that included potential  community impacts due to noise, air quality, and water resources, as well  as potential socioeconomic impacts on local income, housing or  businesses, child protection, and increased traffic congestion. The results  of the assessments were documented along with relevant correspondence  with federal, state, and local agencies showing compliance with relevant  laws and requirements. Results of the environmental assessment  conducted for the three checkpoints showed no adverse impact on  communities that would require an environmental impact statement, and  no public comments were received.
The placement process for a proposed checkpoint on I-19 in Arizona has  not yet reached the stage of soliciting formal public comment, but some  citizens living in nearby communities have expressed concerns about its  proposed location south of Tucson at KP 41. While some citizens  expressed support for the checkpoint, others noted that the checkpoint  would negatively impact local communities, and should be located  elsewhere, or removed altogether. Community members with this latter  view stated that the Border Patrol should devote checkpoint resources to  deter illegal entry at the border.
Tucson sector officials said they chose KP 41 as the best site for a  permanent checkpoint on I-19 among three other locations: KP 42 (the  location of the current tactical checkpoint), KP 25, and KP 50. According  to Tucson sector officials, while the KP 50 site provided certain strategic  advantages, the KP 41 site was selected because it was furthest from  populated areas while also providing strategic advantage. Officials also  noted that when determining the checkpoint’s location, they consulted  with developers regarding expected population growth and plans for  development along the I-19 corridor, but officials stated that it is difficult  to know what development will or will not take place in the future, as  plans can change. According to officials, these discussions indicated that  development was expected along I-19, but more densely around the KP 25  and KP 50 sites than the KP 41 site. In addition, officials from the Arizona  Department of Transportation said that the KP 41 location would likely  meet state requirements for highway traffic safety, but could not make a  final determination until the final plans were submitted for review and  approval.
We mapped the four proposed locations for the I-19 checkpoint along with  relevant population data, schools and hospitals, and the results were  consistent with Border Patrol guidance, as shown in table 3. For example,  the data showed that the KP 41 and KP 42 sites were in areas with fewer  people than the other two locations. We also reviewed county planning  documents and zoning maps to determine how the proposed checkpoint  locations compared with plans for future development. These documents  showed that areas around KP 41 were zoned for lower density population  than the KP 25 and KP 50 proposed checkpoint locations.
Our mapping analysis also showed that the KP 41 and KP 42 sites were  farther away from schools than the other locations, as shown in figure 11.  Proximity to the Rio Rico high school was a reason cited by the Border  Patrol for not choosing the KP 25 location.
We also traveled to the four proposed locations on I-19 with Border Patrol  officials who showed us differences among the sites and factors they  considered in choosing KP 41, including proximity to populated areas,  tactical advantage, and costs of construction. (See table 4.) Officials noted  that while the KP 41 site had certain disadvantages, such as the highway  access road parallel to the interstate (known as a frontage road) and the  proximity to the community of Tubac, they pointed out that KP 41 was  furthest from populated areas, and was the only site that did not have  outlying roads near the interstate that would allow illegal aliens to  circumvent the checkpoint. We also observed that the terrain around KP  41 was relatively flat, which Border Patrol officials explained would allow  for surveillance of the surrounding area. In contrast, the KP 25 location  was near both elevated areas and canyons where Border Patrol officials  said it would be more difficult to identify and apprehend illegal activity  around the checkpoint. With respect to the KP 42 site, Border Patrol  officials stated that substantial amount of earthwork would be needed to  level the land, which would increase the construction costs. (See appendix  III for photographs of the various sites.)
We also traveled along I-19 from the U.S. border at Nogales to the city of  Tucson and Border Patrol officials showed us why other sites would not  be suitable alternatives for a checkpoint location. Border Patrol officials  stated that areas south of KP 25 are considered too close to the border to  provide strategic value, a factor listed in Border Patrol guidance. Areas  between KP 25 and KP 41, between KP 42 and KP 50, and north of KP 50  were not considered suitable for a checkpoint for reasons including  topography, proximity to communities, availability of circumvention  routes, or highway characteristics—such as curves in the road—that were  not compatible with safe operations.

		Checkpoint Size and Design Generally Considered Safety and Convenience of Travelers, Agents, and Detainees

The Border Patrol’s three permanent checkpoints constructed since 2006  were generally designed in accordance with its checkpoint design  guidelines. Factors of consideration included in the design guidelines  related to operational effectiveness, the safety and comfort of agents and  canines working the checkpoint, the safety and convenience of the public  traveling through the checkpoint as well as detainees held at the  checkpoint, and aesthetics for blending checkpoint architecture with the  surrounding community.
According to CBP facilities management officials, checkpoint size is  largely determined by the number of inspection lanes at the checkpoint,  and primary and secondary inspection areas account for the majority of a  checkpoint’s size. CBP officials stated that checkpoint buildings, such as  the main building housing administration and detention, generally account  for a relatively small percentage of the checkpoint size.
Regarding inspection lane criteria, checkpoint design guidelines  recommend sufficient capacity to quickly and safely move traffic through  the checkpoint. Specifically, the design should consider current and  projected traffic volume traveling through the checkpoint, as well as the  preference to locate inspection lanes off-highway, consistent with national  and state initiatives to reduce traffic congestion and improve highway  safety. The guidelines also recommend a minimum of two primary  inspection lanes to separate commercial and passenger vehicles, and a  canopy to cover all inspection areas.
We reviewed the inspection lanes for the three new permanent  checkpoints—which were all located in Texas—and results were partially  consistent with checkpoint design guidance. In accordance with  checkpoint design guidelines, the design for all three checkpoints included  off-highway inspection lanes that separated commercial and passenger  traffic, canopy covers protecting agents and the public, and at least the  minimum number of primary inspection lanes. However, we could not  determine if the Border Patrol complied with its checkpoint design  guidelines to consider current and future traffic volumes when  determining the number of inspection lanes at each checkpoint, because it  did not conduct traffic studies when designing the three checkpoints.  Although not explicitly required, senior CBP and Border Patrol facilities  officials stated that the number of inspection lanes at a checkpoint should  be based to a large extent on current and projected traffic volume over the  next 20 years to ensure that checkpoint capacity will be sufficient in the  near future, and this should be documented in a traffic study. Traffic  design engineering principles discuss the importance of considering  current and expected traffic volumes over a given period when designing a  project, to ensure sufficient capacity. According to CBP facilities officials,  however, traffic studies were not conducted for the U.S. Route 62/180  checkpoint or the U.S. Route 83 checkpoint, and officials said they have no  record of a traffic study being conducted for the I-35 checkpoint. Officials  stated that traffic studies may not have been conducted because it is not  an explicit requirement in checkpoint design guidelines, but agreed that  they should have been done to inform decisions regarding checkpoint  design and the number of inspection lanes. In the absence of documented  traffic studies, the Border Patrol cannot determine if the number of  inspection lanes at each of these checkpoints is consistent with current  and projected traffic volumes, or if a different number of lanes would have  been more appropriate.
To provide some information on traffic volumes for these three  checkpoints, we obtained available data on 2007 traffic volumes for areas  near the location of each of the three checkpoints from the Texas  Department of Transportation. As shown in table 5, the relative number  of inspection lanes at each checkpoint appears consistent with 2007 traffic  volumes, in that the I-35 checkpoint has a higher traffic volume and more  inspection lanes than the other two checkpoints.
Regarding criteria for facilities and other resources, Border Patrol design  guidance lists the buildings and features that are recommended for  inclusion at new permanent checkpoints. According to Border Patrol  officials, this listing of facilities and resources was based on existing  checkpoint design, as well as the professional judgment of Border Patrol  officials regarding the facilities and resources that enhance checkpoint  operations, and should be adjusted to the circumstances of each  checkpoint to maximize checkpoint effectiveness and efficiency and also  facilitate the safety and convenience of agents, the public, and detainees.  For example, design guidance provides for detention facilities at  checkpoints to reduce the amount of time agents have to leave the  checkpoint to transport illegal aliens to other locations, and also provides  separate areas for men, women, and children who are detained to facilitate  their safety.
We reviewed Border Patrol design documents for the three Texas  checkpoints and results showed that two of the three checkpoints had all  but one of the recommended resources; however, one checkpoint did not  have several resources, as shown in table 6. The one resource not included  at the new I-35 checkpoint in the Laredo sector and the new U.S. Route  62/180 checkpoint in the El Paso sector was commercial truck scales,  which can improve checkpoint operations by giving agents another tool  for detecting contraband. According to Border Patrol officials, truck scales  allow agents to compare the weight of cargo on the truck’s manifest to the  current weight of cargo at the checkpoint. A disparity between the two  measurements could indicate that the amount or type of cargo has  changed. The U.S. Route 83 checkpoint was also lacking many other  recommended resources, such as canine facilities, due to space  constraints at the site, according to sector officials. Officials stated that  there was limited space to accommodate all of the resources, because the  land is not owned by the Border Patrol but provided through a multiuse  agreement between DHS and the Texas Department of Transportation.  These officials added that additional funding would be needed to expand  the checkpoint site to accommodate these resources. However, sector  officials stated that the resources currently available at the checkpoint are  sufficient for basic operations, considering the relatively low volume of  traffic at the checkpoint.
Border Patrol guidelines also include criteria to use aesthetics in the  architecture and design of checkpoints. These criteria state that  checkpoints should be designed in a manner that complements the  indigenous architecture of the surrounding area, including building scale  and proportion. The environmental assessments for the three Texas  checkpoints showed no significant aesthetic impact because of the remote  locations of the checkpoints and lack of community concern over the  design of existing checkpoints. No public comments were received during  the 30-day comment period raising concerns about the lack of aesthetics in  the three checkpoints’ final designs.

			I-19 Permanent Checkpoint Design

The design process for the proposed permanent checkpoint on I-19 in  Arizona has not yet been completed as of July 2009, but some citizens  living in nearby communities have expressed concerns about its potential  size and appearance. Border Patrol officials stated that in general, the I-19  and other new permanent checkpoints are to be larger than existing  checkpoints because many of the latter are outdated and undersized to  address current traffic volume and changes in operation. As these older  checkpoints are replaced, the Border Patrol plans to enlarge and redesign  them to reflect new technology and to incorporate lessons learned from  experiences with more recently built checkpoints, according to officials.
CBP and Border Patrol officials stated that plans for the permanent I-19  checkpoint are based on the recently constructed I-35 checkpoint near  Laredo, which they identified as a model checkpoint in terms of layout,  resources, and size. (See figure 12.) Tucson sector officials said that the I- 19 checkpoint design also incorporated lessons learned from the I-35  checkpoint design. For example, officials stated that the design of the I-35  checkpoint was found to be too small and had to be expanded to  accommodate a VACIS unit, and that operations at the I-35 checkpoint  showed that more space was needed in the inspection areas for safe truck  maneuvering.
One key difference between the I-19 checkpoint design and that of the  three new checkpoints in Texas is that the Border Patrol plans to  incorporate aesthetics into the I-19 checkpoint design, in response to  community concerns. Some community members who visited the I-35  checkpoint were concerned that the I-19 checkpoint would disrupt the  beauty of the local landscape in that it would be too large and visually  unappealing. Although not reflected in the current draft design, Border  Patrol officials said the final design issued for public comment would  reflect input from the community on options for blending the checkpoint  in with the surrounding community and landscape.
Border Patrol officials from the Tucson sector and the community have  coordinated on other aspects of the I-19 checkpoint design. Tucson sector  officials have met with community members at least 45 times from 2006 to  2009 to address community questions or concerns. In addition, a  community workgroup was established in April 2007 to allow direct  community involvement in discussions about the proposed permanent  checkpoint. In June 2007, this workgroup split into two subcommittees.  One subcommittee issued a report to the Border Patrol with  recommendations to reduce the impact of the checkpoint on surrounding  communities and to improve its effectiveness and public convenience. The  other subcommittee issued a report expressing opposition to a permanent  checkpoint on I-19, recommending that resources be placed on the border  instead.
We met with Border Patrol officials and reviewed documents showing  how the Border Patrol has modified the design of the checkpoint in  response to community input. To address concerns about the size of the  checkpoint, for example, Border Patrol officials said they removed certain  structures from the design plans, such as a station house, helipad, and  fueling island. In addition, to ensure checkpoint lighting did not adversely  impact a local observatory, officials stated that they plan to comply with  the local dark sky ordinance by covering checkpoint lighting with a  canopy, among other things. Border Patrol officials stated that other  recommendations made by the workgroup to increase the safety and  convenience for travelers through the checkpoint—such as clearly posted  signage—will be included in the checkpoint design, as shown in table 7.
Our review of the draft plans for the I-19 permanent checkpoint showed  that it is planned to surpass the I-35 checkpoint as the largest checkpoint  on the southwest border in terms of total acreage and acreage used for  checkpoint operations, including primary and secondary inspection lanes,  as shown in table 8. Overall, the I-19 checkpoint is about 20 percent larger  than the I-35 checkpoint in terms of total acreage and about 69 percent  larger in terms of the acreage to be used for checkpoint operations.
Border Patrol officials estimate that 11 of the 18 total acres at the I-19  checkpoint site are not planned to be dedicated to checkpoint operations,  but are expected to be used for    graded slope area (4.0 acres),  storm water retention areas and septic water filtration areas (3.5  acres), and  freeway on and off ramps (3.7 acres), which is a requirement from the  Arizona Department of Transportation.
According to the CBP project manager for the I-19 checkpoint, the large  size of the checkpoint is largely due to the number of inspection lanes that  are planned to meet current and future traffic volume, per design  guidelines. The guidelines indicate that a sufficient number of primary and  secondary inspection lanes are needed to ensure that current traffic  volume can be processed through the checkpoint with minimal traffic  backups and vehicle wait times, as longer wait times create safety  concerns and inconvenience the traveling public. When traffic backups  reach a certain distance from the checkpoint, sector officials said that they  allow traffic to pass through the checkpoint uninspected, which decreases  checkpoint effectiveness. Smugglers and illegal aliens use these  opportunities to pass through the checkpoint undetected, according to  sector officials.
Of the eight primary inspection lanes included in the draft design plan for  the I-19 permanent checkpoint, five lanes are required to address current  traffic volume, according to sector officials. The lanes for processing the  current traffic volume include two lanes for commercial traffic and three  lanes for passenger traffic. The design is consistent with guidance and the  community workgroup recommendations to include off-highway  inspection lanes that separate commercial and passenger vehicles,  dedicated truck and bus lanes, and canopy coverage for all inspection  areas.
The remaining three primary inspection lanes in the I-19 checkpoint design  plan are to ensure sufficient capacity for processing future traffic volume.  Border Patrol budget documents state that the checkpoint construction  process alone is estimated to take 5 years, and design guidelines  recommend that construction projects consider capacity needs over the  next 10 years, which can reduce overall construction costs and maintain  longer periods of operational efficiency. The Arizona Department of  Transportation projects that traffic on the I-19 corridor will increase by 23  percent from 2007 to 2017, and 35 percent from 2007 to 2027. Using traffic  projections for the year 2017, the site engineer for the proposed I-19  checkpoint estimated that the five lanes for passenger vehicles will result  in wait times averaging less than 2 minutes, except for three one-hour  periods per day when wait times may increase to 8 to 10 minutes.  According to the engineer, if the number of passenger lanes is reduced to  four, for example, then wait times are estimated to exceed 20 minutes  three times per day during peak traffic periods, which would require  suspension of inspection activities and which is unacceptable, according  to the Border Patrol. Border Patrol officials stated that six of the eight  lanes will be able to convert between screening passenger vehicles and  commercial traffic, which will give the I-19 checkpoint flexibility during  operation to adapt to changing traffic patterns.
In regard to the secondary inspection lanes, the proposed nine lanes were  found to be insufficient to meet the Border Patrol’s targeted rates of  inspection, according to reports by an engineering firm commissioned to  provide an advisory review for the I-19 checkpoint design. The engineer  reported that to meet target inspection rates during peak periods, the  Border Patrol would need to increase the number of secondary lanes for  non-commercial traffic from 7 to 22 lanes. Tucson sector officials said that  they will not build the additional secondary lanes because they do not  have the resources and staff to use them at this time. As a result, the  number of referrals of non-commercial traffic from primary to secondary  inspection will be decreased as needed to preclude traffic congestion.
Plans for the size of the I-19 checkpoint facilities are also consistent with  relevant guidelines. Space allocation guidelines are based on many factors,  including a functional evaluation of individual space, group consensus of  Border Patrol staff, comparison to existing structures, and use of standard  formulae. Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines include general  processes for determining the size of these resources or the space  required—such as how large the main checkpoint building should be—but  do not impose a one-size-fits-all approach on checkpoints. As a result, the  sizes of each of these areas may vary at different checkpoints based on the  unique circumstances and operational needs of each checkpoint. For  example, the size of the main checkpoint building, which includes  administration, processing, and detention facilities, is larger at the  planned I-19 checkpoint than the I-35 checkpoint by approximately 3,400  square feet, reflecting a greater estimated need at the I-19 checkpoint for  processing and detention of illegal aliens. Sector officials stated that  having sufficient processing and detention capability at the I-19  checkpoint increases operational efficiency and effectiveness, as agents  will no longer have to frequently transport apprehended individuals to the  Tucson or Nogales stations for processing and detention. In comparison,  the canine kennel building at the I-35 checkpoint is nearly 2,900 square  feet larger than the planned kennel at the I-19 checkpoint. According to  CBP data, the canine kennel building at the I-35 checkpoint is  approximately 3,200 square feet, while the I-19 checkpoint kennel is  planned for approximately 290 square feet. Laredo sector officials said that  the I-35 checkpoint kennel was large because the building includes an  office, storage room, bathing room for the canines, bathroom, mechanical  room, and a quarantine area. Tucson sector officials stated that the smaller  size is because the I-19 checkpoint kennel will be only used as a rest area  for the canines.
Plans for the types of resources to be placed at the I-19 checkpoint for  conducting effective operations are also consistent with relevant  guidelines. For example, at the I-19 checkpoint, the Border Patrol plans to  include canine facilities, non-intrusive inspection technology, vehicle lifts,  and loading docks, among other resources, as shown in figure 13.

	Community Members Cited Some Adverse Impacts of Checkpoint Operations, and Border Patrol Reported Having Limited Resources to Minimize Them

Community members living near checkpoints we visited across the four  southwest border states told us they generally supported checkpoints  operating near them because of the law enforcement presence they  provide, but remained most concerned about the property damage that  occurs when illegal aliens trespass on private property to avoid the  checkpoints. Border Patrol policy highlights the need to detect and  respond to this circumvention activity; however, officials stated that other  priorities sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum number  of agents and resources on checkpoint circumvention routes. Tucson  sector officials stated that when a permanent checkpoint on I-19 is  constructed, it will provide additional technological enhancements to  monitor activity in the surrounding areas, but they have not documented  the number of agents that would need to be deployed to address this  activity. Despite concerns regarding property damage type incidents,  community members we spoke with generally said that checkpoint  operations had not adversely impacted their communities in terms of  violent crime, business, or property values, except for those around the I- 19 checkpoint in Arizona. Although the Border Patrol has identified  performance measures that could be used to monitor the quality of life in  areas affected by checkpoint operations, these measures have not been  implemented. Data were not available to determine any causal relationship  between checkpoint operations and community well-being; however, some  data were available showing overall trends in real estate values, tourism,  and crime without controlling for checkpoint operation or other factors.

		Property Damage, Theft, and Littering Cited as Adverse Impacts of Checkpoint Operations

Members of local governments, state and local law enforcement, business  groups, ranchers, and residents responding to our request for input  generally supported the Border Patrol and checkpoint operations because  of the law enforcement presence they provide, but generally agreed that  checkpoint operations cause illegal aliens and smugglers to attempt to  circumvent the checkpoint—resulting in adverse impacts to nearby  residents and communities, such as private property damage, theft, and  littering. These concerns were cited most often by ranchers and residents  in areas around checkpoints. Ranchers in Texas, California, and Arizona  said that they experienced cut fences that allowed cattle or other livestock  to escape; drained water tanks or water wastage from irrigation lines that  were left open; theft of water, food, clothing, or vehicles; and trash  including plastic water jugs and food containers that are either left on the  property as trespassers move through the area, or that washed down rivers  or streams from other areas. Local law enforcement officials near two  checkpoints in Texas we visited said that they frequently respond to calls  from ranchers for these reasons, and ranchers said that these impacts have  increased their ranch security expenses. The level of concern was lower  in areas where checkpoints operated infrequently. For example, the San  Diego sector’s checkpoints on I-5 and I-15 are rarely operational, resulting  in little need for circumvention and fewer concerns expressed by  community members.
The greatest level of concern about trespassing and property damage was  expressed in the Tucson sector, which has experienced higher levels of  illegal alien apprehensions across the southwest border. In fiscal year  2008, for example, just under half of the 705,000 total Border Patrol  apprehensions of illegal aliens across the southwest border occurred in  the Tucson sector, and sector officials cited a high level of interaction with  the community in responding to citizen concerns. However, these  apprehensions occurred all across the sector, making it difficult to  determine the extent that trespassing on private property was due to  attempts to circumvent the checkpoint or use of other transit routes.
Our review of Border Patrol data for the Tucson sector showed that  significantly more illegal aliens were apprehended in the area around the I- 19 checkpoint than at the checkpoint itself, although the reverse was true  for drug seizures, as shown in table 9. Specifically, data show that in  fiscal year 2008 about 94 percent of apprehensions occurred in the areas  surrounding the I-19 checkpoint compared to 27 percent of drug seizures.
These data also show that increases in the number of apprehensions and  drug seizures were greater in the areas surrounding the I-19 checkpoint  than at the checkpoint itself between 2007 and 2008, suggesting that  community impact may have also increased. Specifically, from 2007 to  2008 there was a 72 percent increase in the number of apprehensions in  the surrounding area, compared to a 7 percent increase at the checkpoint.  Data show that the number of drug seizures for these areas increased by  27 percent from 2007 to 2008, while declining by 8 percent at the  checkpoint.
Data limitations precluded our determining where illegal aliens and  smugglers were apprehended in relation to community boundaries, or  comparing the extent that apprehension patterns on circumvention routes,  or other transit routes, were similar across sectors. Tucson sector Border  Patrol officials stated that illegal activity on circumvention routes  generally occurs in remote locations, but the Tucson sector has not yet  implemented global positioning technology sector-wide, as used by some  other sectors, to pinpoint the location of apprehensions and drug seizures.  Instead, this information is tracked among geographic grids comprising 7.4  square miles. In addition, while the CAR contains data fields to capture  activity on apprehensions made of those attempting to circumvent  checkpoints, definitions for these fields were not used consistently across  all checkpoints, based on an analysis of checkpoint officials’ responses to  our data collection instrument.
Border Patrol officials stated that the checkpoint strategy intends to push  illegal aliens and smugglers off-highway into rural areas where they can be  more easily apprehended, and the extent that these persons attempt to  avoid the checkpoint is an indicator that checkpoints are an effective  deterrent. Border Patrol officials said that when a new checkpoint is put in  place, or an enhancement is made at an existing checkpoint,  apprehensions commonly increase, followed by a decrease as smugglers  and illegal aliens search for less rigorously defended transit routes that  provide a greater chance of success. In terms of the I-19 checkpoint, for  example, Border Patrol officials attributed increasing rates of checkpoint  circumvention apprehensions to fixing the checkpoint at its permanent  location at KP 42 in November 2006. Over time, officials said that the fixed  location for the checkpoint resulted in more continuous operation and  greater ability to deploy sensors and other resources that enhance  checkpoint effectiveness.
Border Patrol officials acknowledged that the checkpoint strategy can  adversely impact private property owners, and said that sometimes there  were not enough agents in place to deter illegal activity or apprehend  trespassers in surrounding areas. According to Tucson sector officials, for  example, eight agents per shift are assigned to work the checkpoint lanes  and two to four agents per shift are generally assigned in proximity to the  I-19 checkpoint to address activity in the surrounding areas, but that  number varies from shift to shift and depends on the activity levels during  a given time of year. Border Patrol policy highlights the need to detect and  respond to checkpoint circumvention, stating that it is just as critical to  checkpoint effectiveness as the inspection process, and should be  addressed with appropriate staff. However, despite the rapid increase in  overall staffing numbers on the southwest border, Border Patrol sector  managers may have other priorities for staff placement and stations may  only staff checkpoints—and circumvention routes—with the minimum  required manpower. In the Tucson sector, for example, checkpoints and  other interior locations had lower priority for staffing than border  locations, especially border towns such as Nogales, which are major  transit routes for illegal activity and had experienced higher levels of  violent crime. As the Border Patrol has gained better control of these  priority areas at the border, planning documents show that emphasis will  shift to other areas, including the I-19 checkpoint.
Checkpoint guidance also identifies other resources, such as technology,  that can assist Border Patrol agents in detecting and responding to  circumvention activity, but checkpoints do not always have these  resources available on a continuous basis. This guidance states that a  combination of resources, including ground sensors and video surveillance  cameras, should be used by each sector and station as needed to monitor  and address local circumvention activities. According to Border Patrol  officials, the placement and use of these resources can depend on the  proximity of checkpoints to populated areas, the extent of illegal activity  in the area, and the availability of circumvention routes around the  checkpoint. However, officials said that checkpoints may have lower  priority than other Border Patrol activities to receive new technology, and  older equipment may be less reliable and less available for continuous  operation, particularly at tactical checkpoints. For example, the four  cameras being used at the I-19 checkpoint are not connected to  commercial power and are therefore vulnerable to generator and  microwave transmitter issues, according to sector officials. We also noted  during our visit to the Tucson sector that staff were not available to  monitor the remote surveillance cameras, limiting their effectiveness. A  sector official stated that these cameras were continuously monitored only  when there was a sufficient number of staff operating the checkpoint lanes  and back-up patrols. Having these technology resources available—and  monitored—on a continuous basis is important because Border Patrol  officials said that circumvention routes were more likely to be patrolled in  response to a sensor alert or camera indicating that a response is needed  to address activity in these areas.
Tucson sector officials stated that when a permanent checkpoint on I-19 is  constructed, it will include a wider range of sensors and technology  improvements, such as SBInet towers, that will provide a better view of  the surrounding areas than the towers at the current checkpoint site and  that will enhance agents’ ability to monitor the circumvention areas  around the checkpoint. However, checkpoint design and planning  documents do not include an estimate of the number of agents that would  be deployed to address circumvention activity at the new checkpoint. Our  prior work on strategic workforce planning stated that staffing decisions,  including needs assessments and deployment decisions, should be based  on valid and reliable data. Per Border Patrol checkpoint design  guidelines, sector officials are expected to determine the number of staff  they will need for checkpoint operations, such as inspections and  processing, as part of the design process for constructing new  checkpoints. For example, the anticipated staffing level for the new  permanent I-19 checkpoint would be 39 agents on the peak shift,  according to Border Patrol officials. However, the anticipated  deployments of these agents are not included in official design or  operational documents, and sector officials are not required to conduct a  workforce planning needs assessment to determine how to best address  impacts on surrounding areas from illegal aliens and smugglers attempting  to avoid the checkpoint. Sector officials stated that technology  improvements would enable fewer agents to monitor illegal traffic in these  areas, and that a sufficient number of agents will be deployed as necessary  in response to the level of illegal activity. However, given the limited  resources currently deployed to address circumvention activity at the I-19  checkpoint and community concerns regarding the extent of illegal  activity in the circumvention areas, conducting a workforce planning  needs assessment at the checkpoint design stage could help the Border  Patrol ensure that sufficient resources are planned for and deployed at the  new checkpoint to address circumvention activity.
Citizen reports are also important sources of information alerting Border  Patrol agents to illegal aliens and smugglers trespassing on private  property, and Border Patrol officials told us they also make efforts to  establish relationships with local ranching and community groups. For  example, in the Laredo and San Diego sectors, there are a total of 19  agents whose full-time or collateral duties are to regularly coordinate with  local ranchers, maintain relationships, and provide the ranchers with a  direct point of contact. Border Patrol stations within these sectors can  develop their own community relations strategies. In the Rio Grande  Valley sector, for example, Falfurrias station officials told us they hold a  monthly meeting with local ranchers to discuss any issues or information  that should be shared regarding the level of activity and number of  incidents on the various circumvention routes. In contrast, the Patrol  Agent in Charge of the Kingsville station said he prefers to maintain  personal relationships with local area ranchers. The Tucson sector, where  officials have cited a high level of community interaction, has a full-time  Community Relations Director who participated in more than 45  community meetings from 2006 to 2009 to discuss issues relating to the  current and planned I-19 checkpoint. Across other sectors, community  relations strategies can include participating in community events and  organizations such as fairs, car shows, and reading to children in local  schools.

		Increased Violent Crime and Decreased Business and Real Estate Values Not Commonly Cited as Adverse Impacts of Checkpoint Operations

Despite concerns regarding property damage type incidents,  representatives of local government, state and local law enforcement,  business, ranching, and residents responding to our request for input  generally stated that checkpoints had no adverse effects on their  communities in terms of violent crime rates, business, and real estate  values, similar to findings in our 2005 report in which we reported that  most local community members we contacted saw traffic checkpoints as  beneficial to their communities. In some cases this could be due to the  fact that many checkpoints are located in remote areas away from large  population centers, or that some checkpoints are operated infrequently. In  regard to crime, officials from 12 law enforcement agencies across the  four southwest border states told us that checkpoint operations did not  cause an increase in local violent crime rates. Furthermore, officials from  seven of these law enforcement agencies stated that they believed  checkpoints, as well as the presence of Border Patrol agents, provided a  deterrent to criminal activity in their communities. For example, officials  from the Alamogordo, New Mexico, Department of Public Safety stated  that their 2007 crime rates place them with some of the lowest crime rates  among similarly sized cities in New Mexico. The Department’s Director  believed that this was due, in part, to the presence of the Border Patrol  agents at the checkpoints on U.S. Routes 54 and 70, approximately 25  miles south and west of the city of Alamogordo, respectively. In regard to  real estate values, an official from the local Economic Development  Council in Kingsville, Texas, told us that homes sales and values north of  the U.S. Route 77 checkpoint had increased over the years, which he  believed was due to the increase in agents purchasing homes in the area.
In contrast, some community members living near the I-19 checkpoint in  the Tucson sector—which is operated for nearly 24 hours per day and is in  the proximity of small communities—expressed concerns that checkpoint  operations caused adverse impacts to their communities in terms of  increased violent crime, loss of tourism, and reduced real estate values. A  2007 letter from U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords to the Border  Patrol Chief detailed concerns from residents in her district that smugglers  were invading their communities, threatening their homes, and that they  had been affected by violence associated with what appeared to be  disputes among drug smugglers. Residents from the town of Tubac,  Arizona, which is a community close to the I-19 checkpoint location,  reported concerns that tourism in their community had declined due to the  proximity of the checkpoint. In addition, the president of a local civic  association from Tubac told us that the checkpoint had negatively affected  home sales and housing values.

		Border Patrol Has Identified Measures for Assessing Impact of Checkpoint Operations on Surrounding Areas, but Has Not Used Them

Border Patrol officials said that they are not yet using performance  measures they had developed to examine how checkpoint operations— including checkpoint circumvention activity—impact the quality of life in  surrounding communities. The measures—which are consistent with the  Border Patrol National Strategy to reduce crime and consequently improve  the quality of life and economic vitality in border enforcement areas— examine major crime reduction, smuggler activity in areas affected by  checkpoint operations, and coordination with other federal, state, and  local law enforcement agencies. (See appendix II for a description of the  quality of life measures.) We have previously reported that measuring  performance allows organizations to track the progress they are making  toward their goals and gives managers critical information on which to  base decisions for improving their programs. Our previous work has  shown that when evaluating performance, agencies needed to have  measures that demonstrated results, covered multiple priorities, provided  useful information for decision making, and successfully addressed  important and varied aspects of program performance.
The Border Patrol has included data fields in the CAR to collect  information relevant to some of the quality of life measures, but the  Border Patrol has not developed specific guidance for using the data to  assess the impact of operations on surrounding areas, and not all sectors  and stations consistently enter the data necessary to use the measures.  These limitations in guidance and data collection have hindered the ability  of the Border Patrol to assess the impact of checkpoints on local  communities. For example, one quality of life measure examines the  number of apprehensions and seizures turned over to the checkpoint from  other agencies, known as agency assists or referrals, when the checkpoint  is operational or non-operational. These data can provide information on  the extent to which the Border Patrol is able to address illegal activity  traveling through communities to circumvent the checkpoint when it is  operational. While the Border Patrol does not consistently track agency  assists and referrals from local law enforcement agencies in the CAR, data  we obtained from two local sheriff’s departments near the I-19 checkpoint  in the Tucson sector show that analyzing this information over time may  be informative. As shown in figure 14, Arizona’s Santa Cruz County  Sheriff’s Department reported a total of 84 assists to other agencies,  including the Border Patrol, in District 2 (which contains the I-19  checkpoint) an increase of approximately 8 percent from 2007.North of  the I-19 checkpoint, Pima County Sheriff’s Department Green Valley  District reported a total of 247 referrals to the Border Patrol in 2008, a  decrease of approximately 7 percent from 2007. Analysis of these data by  the Border Patrol may show, for example, the extent to which relative  fluctuations and differences in agency assists or referrals in and among  locations are due to checkpoint operations or other factors, such as  Operation Stonegarden, a program providing funding to state and local law  enforcement personnel to provide additional coverage on routes of egress  from border areas.

		Data Unavailable to Link Checkpoint Operations to Changes in Community Crime Rates, Tourism, or Real Estate Values

Sufficient data were not available for us to determine any causal  relationship between checkpoint operations and local crime rates, tourism  trends, or real estate values in nearby communities. With respect to the I- 19 checkpoint, these data limitations also precluded a comparison of  community impacts for the time before and after the checkpoint on I-19  became fixed at the KP 42 location in November 2006. Such a comparison  would require a complete set of historical data to develop a baseline  understanding, before interpreting factors that can change the baseline.  However, there are limited data sets for specific geographic areas around  the I-19 checkpoint, with county level data the smallest possible  geographic area, in many cases. We conducted a literature search and  identified several studies that attempted to link Border Patrol checkpoints  or other aspects of border enforcement operations to local crime,  business, or real estate values. These studies were also unable to establish  a causal link between Border Patrol operations and changes in crime rates  or real estate values due to unavailable or incomplete data, or the inability  to separate the impact of border operations from many other contributing  factors, such as local and national economic factors. In terms of crime  data, for example, officials from Santa Cruz and Pima County Sheriff’s  Departments said that data are not available in their information systems  to identify the number of crimes committed by illegal aliens, or how many  crimes occurred on checkpoint circumvention routes. A more detailed  discussion on our methodology and limitations to this analysis can be  found in appendix I.
Despite the limitations in determining any causal relationship between  checkpoint operations and crime, tourism, and real estate values in nearby  communities, some historical data were available from federal, state, and  local agencies that could be used to show overall trends in real estate  values, tourism, and crime for some communities near the I-19  checkpoint, relevant counties, and the state, without controlling for  checkpoint operations or other factors. As shown in figure 15, the I-19  checkpoint in Arizona is located in the northern part of Santa Cruz County  and the county immediately to the north is Pima County. Communities  closest to the I-19 checkpoint include Tubac, which is located  approximately 4 miles south of the checkpoint in Santa Cruz County, and  Green Valley, which is located about 15 miles north of the checkpoint in  Pima County.
Real estate property values for locations south and north of the I-19  checkpoint have generally been increasing in the years from 2002 through  2008 as measured by the median county tax assessed value, shown in  figure 16. The Tubac community had the highest real estate values of the  areas we examined, with property values more than three times as high as  properties in Santa Cruz County, and more than twice as high as  properties in the Green Valley community and Pima County. Data on the  median sales price and net assessed value of homes in these areas showed  similar results, as shown in appendix IV.
Tourism data, as reflected by visitor data reported by Arizona state parks,  showed no consistent pattern between the years 2002 through 2008 for  parks located near Tubac community (Tubac Presidio State Historic  Park), or in other areas of Santa Cruz County (the Patagonia Lake State  Park), and Arizona. As shown in figure 17, the number of visitors to these  parks generally fluctuated within a 15 percent window from year to year,  except for the year between 2006 and 2007, when visitors to Tubac state  park decreased by 29 percent, a substantial difference compared to other  locations. According to an Arizona State Parks representative, this decline  could have been caused by several factors, including a large number of  events in 2006 at the Tubac state park to celebrate the park’s 50th  anniversary that resulted in more park attendees in 2006, an overall  decline in visitors to other parks in Santa Cruz County, and a statewide  decline in overall spending and international visitors. All of these parks  experienced a decline in visitors the following year ending 2008, ranging  from 7 to 10 percent. Similar declines were seen in other tourism data  based on lodging statistics for the counties and state of Arizona (see  appendix VI).
Violent crime data from county sheriff departments showed that the  number of homicides, sexual and aggravated assaults, and robberies was  substantially lower in the district containing the I-19 checkpoint and the  surrounding communities of Tubac, Tumacacori, Carmen, Amado, and  Arivaca than other nearby areas, from 2004 through 2008, but has been  increasing at a higher rate than nearby areas in the last 2 years as shown in  figure 18. Specifically, violent crime in District 2 almost doubled from 8  offenses in 2006 to 15 offenses in 2008. In contrast, violent crime in the  Green Valley District north of the I-19 checkpoint has been decreasing  since 2006, although the number of offenses remains almost twice as high.  Additional information on crime trends for these counties can be found in  appendix VII.
Crime patterns were similar for property offenses, which include burglary,  larceny, auto theft, and arson. As shown in figure 19, District 2 containing  the I-19 checkpoint experienced a 38 percent increase in property crimes  compared to Green Valley District from 2007 to 2008, although the total  number of offenses in 2008 was much lower; 58 versus 534 offenses,  respectively. County level changes were also higher for Santa Cruz County  compared to Pima County, which had a slight decline.

	Conclusions

Within the past few years, CBP and the Border Patrol have increased staff,  fencing, and other technology at the border to deter repeated illegal  border crossings. Despite these investments at the border, however, it  would appear that checkpoints will continue to serve a purpose as part of  the Border Patrol’s three-tiered strategy. As long as agency goals indicate  that the majority of major criminal activity will pass through the ports of  entry undetected, checkpoints are uniquely positioned to provide  additional opportunities to apprehend illegal aliens and contraband that  travel from the ports along U.S. interstates or roads.
Since our last report, the Border Patrol has established performance  measures indicating checkpoint contributions toward apprehending illegal  aliens and seizing illegal drugs, but the lack of information on those  passing through checkpoints undetected continues to challenge the  Border Patrol’s ability to measure checkpoint effectiveness and provide  public accountability. While the Border Patrol has developed other  measures in response to our 2005 recommendation that collectively may  provide some indication of checkpoint effectiveness and efficiency, these  measures cannot be effectively used until field agents accurately and  consistently collect and enter performance data into the checkpoint  information system. Field agents are unlikely to do so until guidance is  improved, and rigorous oversight is implemented at the station, sector,  and headquarters levels. The Border Patrol states that it will take action to  address these issues. Until these actions are completed, however, the  integrity of the CBP performance and accountability system in regard to  checkpoint operations is uncertain. We reiterate the need for CBP to act  on our prior recommendation to implement a cost-effectiveness measure  in order to help encourage action by headquarters and field managers to  identify best practices for checkpoint operation, and implement these  practices across locations. Similarly, while the Border Patrol’s national  strategy cites the importance of assessing the community impact of Border  Patrol operations, the implementation of such measures is noticeably  lacking. Implementing such measures in areas of community concern may  serve to provide greater attention and priority in Border Patrol operational  and staffing decisions to address any existing issues.
Although the Border Patrol’s checkpoint design process includes factors  related to the safety and convenience of travelers, agents, and detainees,  the absence of explicit requirements in Border Patrol checkpoint design  guidelines and standards to consider current and expected traffic volumes  when determining the number of inspection lanes and to conduct traffic  studies could result in inconsistencies in the checkpoint design process  and the risk that checkpoints may not be appropriately sized.  Furthermore, the fact that the checkpoint strategy intends to push illegal  aliens and smugglers to areas around checkpoints—which could include  nearby communities—underscores the need for the Border Patrol to  ensure that it deploys sufficient resources and staff to these areas.  Conducting a needs assessment when planning for a new or upgraded  checkpoint could help better ensure that officials consider the potential  impact of the checkpoint on the community and plan for a sufficient  number of agents and resources.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the reliability and accountability of checkpoint performance  results to the Congress and the public, we recommend that the  Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection take the following four  actions:    Establish milestones for determining the feasibility of a checkpoint  performance model that would allow the Border Patrol to compare  apprehensions and seizures to the level of illegal activity passing  through the checkpoint undetected.
Establish internal controls for management oversight of the accuracy,  consistency, and completeness of checkpoint performance data.
Implement the quality of life measures that have already been  identified by the Border Patrol to evaluate the impact that checkpoints  have on local communities. Implementing these measures would  include identifying appropriate data sources available at the local,  state, or federal level, and developing guidance for how data should be  collected and used in support of these measures.
Use the information generated from the quality of life measures in  conjunction with other relevant factors to inform resource allocations  and address identified impacts.
To ensure that the checkpoint design process results in checkpoints that  are sized and resourced to meet operational and community needs, we  recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection  take the following two actions:    Require that current and expected traffic volumes be considered by  the Border Patrol when determining the number of inspection lanes at  new permanent checkpoints, that traffic studies be conducted and  documented, and that these requirements be explicitly documented in  Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines and standards.
In connection with planning for new or upgraded checkpoints, conduct  a workforce planning needs assessment for checkpoint staffing  allocations to determine the resources needed to address anticipated  levels of illegal activity around the checkpoint.

	Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for review and  comment. DHS provided written comments on August 24, 2009, which are  presented in appendix VIII. In commenting on the draft report, DHS and  CBP stated that they agreed with our recommendations and identified  actions planned or underway to implement the recommendations. DOJ did  not provide formal comments. CBP and DOJ also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the  Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any further questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

	Objectives

This report addresses the following four principal questions:    How has checkpoint performance contributed to meeting Border  Patrol goals for securing the southwest border, and what factors, if  any, have affected checkpoint performance?
To what extent has the Border Patrol established measures of  performance for checkpoints?
To what extent has the Border Patrol considered community impacts  in the placement and design of checkpoints since 2006, including the  planned I-19 permanent checkpoint?
How do checkpoint operations impact nearby communities,  particularly those near the I-19 checkpoint, and to what extent does  the Border Patrol address those impacts?

	Scope and Methodology

To address our objectives, we examined and analyzed Border Patrol  checkpoint policy documents, reports, manuals, and guidance concerning  border strategy and checkpoint operations. We interviewed cognizant  Border Patrol officials at Washington, D.C. headquarters, officials in sector  offices, and personnel at selected permanent and tactical checkpoints. We  visited five Border Patrol sectors—San Diego, California; Tucson, Arizona;  Laredo, Texas; Rio Grande Valley, Texas; and El Paso, Texas (which also  covers all of New Mexico). In total, we visited 12 permanent checkpoints  and 3 tactical checkpoints, as shown in table 10.
The five sectors we visited were selected to provide a range in the size and  types of checkpoint operations; estimated annual volume of illegal aliens;  volume of vehicular traffic transiting checkpoints; topography and density  of road networks; presence or absence of large urban areas on or near the  border, both on the U.S. and Mexican sides; and types of checkpoints  (permanent and tactical). As we were told by the Border Patrol in deciding  which sectors and checkpoints to visit, and as we found during our site  visits, these five sectors contained a wide variety of operating conditions.  For example, we observed that traffic volumes varied widely at different  checkpoints. Similarly, there were variations in the estimated numbers of  illegal aliens entering these sectors over the last several years, and  differences in topography, with some being comparatively mountainous  and others being comparatively flat. During the winter months, the Laredo  and Rio Grande Valley sectors have the Rio Grande as a natural barrier to  illegal immigration, while the Tucson sector has a flat desert at the border  that is easily crossed. Some sectors have permanent checkpoints, such as  at Temecula, California, that must be supplemented with tactical  checkpoints, because of substantial secondary road networks around the  permanent checkpoint. Others, such as Rio Grande Valley, have no  alternative secondary roads available to evade the permanent checkpoints  on the limited north-south highways. Some sectors, such as San Diego and  Laredo, have large U.S. and Mexican urban areas on or very near the  international border, while others, such as Tucson, have only a few much  smaller cities on either side at the border. In choosing these sectors, which  are located in all four southwest border states (California, Arizona, New  Mexico, and Texas), we sought and found a wide range of conditions that  appear to reasonably represent the range of operating conditions faced by  the Border Patrol across the Southwest. However, we were unable to  observe all operating conditions at all times and the conditions we  describe are therefore based on available documentation and observations  at our site visits only.
We also interviewed selected officials in communities near some of the  checkpoints, including state and local law enforcement and community  officials, selected community leaders, citizens, and owners of local  businesses. These included the communities of Temecula, California;  Green Valley, Arizona; Nogales, Arizona; Sahaurita, Arizona; Tubac,  Arizona; Laredo, Texas; Sarita, Texas; Kingsville, Texas; Falfurrias, Texas;  Las Cruces, New Mexico; and Alamogordo, New Mexico. Because these  places and persons was a nonprobability sample, the results from our site  visits cannot be generalized to other locations, checkpoints, local officials,  or citizens, but what we learned from our site visits and the persons we  interviewed provided a useful perspective on the issues addressed in this  report.
However, this report does not address some of the larger issues  surrounding illegal immigration into the United States, such as the  disparities in average daily wages between Mexico and the United States,  and the incentives created by these disparities for illegal immigration, as  well as the difficulties of neutralizing such disparities through work site  enforcement. We have addressed some of these issues in prior work. In  addition, although deterring illegal immigration through the likelihood of  detection and apprehension is a goal of the Border Patrol—and  checkpoints—we did not attempt to measure the deterrent effect of the  Border Patrol’s operations, as this would have required, among other  things, opinion surveys of Mexican citizens and potential contraband  smugglers. This report also does not address the larger factors related to  illegal drugs in the United States, such as the demand for illegal drugs in  the United States and the incentives those create, U.S. and Mexican  government efforts to address the smuggling of illegal drugs, and the U.S.  government anti-drug policies.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to August 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform our audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence  obtained provides this reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.

		Checkpoint Contributions

To assess the contributions checkpoints make to the Border Patrol’s  mission and the factors that affect checkpoint performance, we reviewed  Border Patrol policy and guidance regarding checkpoint operations and  interviewed officials at Border Patrol headquarters, including the Chief  and other senior managers, and officials responsible for operating  checkpoints in five of the nine Border Patrol sectors on the southwest  border. We obtained data reported in Border Patrol’s checkpoint activity  report (CAR) for all checkpoints, permanent and tactical, located in  southwest border states. We were limited to data from fiscal years 2007  and 2008 because while the CAR was implemented in July 2006, consistent  data for all checkpoints were not available until October 2006—the  beginning of fiscal year 2007. To obtain checkpoint apprehensions and  seizures by sector, we added apprehensions and seizures that occurred at  each sector’s checkpoints for each fiscal year. Of the 71 checkpoints  located in the nine southwest border sectors, only two checkpoints in the  Rio Grande Valley sector defined apprehensions and seizures at  checkpoint in a manner inconsistent with Border Patrol guidance. These  two checkpoints count all apprehensions and seizures occurring within 2.5  miles of the checkpoint as occurring “at checkpoint,” as of August 2008.  Prior to August 2008, these two checkpoints used the same definition as  other checkpoints—that an apprehension or seizure at a checkpoint  occurs “at the immediate checkpoint.” Nevertheless, we believe these  checkpoint data to be sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes, with  limitations noted, based on the steps we describe in the next section. We  also obtained data from the Border Patrol on total apprehensions and drug  seizures across each of the nine southwest border sectors to compare the  relative contributions of each sector’s checkpoints to overall  apprehensions and drug seizures on the southwest border. In addition, we  obtained data from the CAR on the number of aliens from special interest  countries encountered at checkpoints in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and  obtained information from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and  Border Patrol officials regarding how those encounters are managed and  documented. We reviewed Border Patrol guidance and interviewed  officials responsible for checkpoint operations in five Border Patrol  sectors regarding factors that influence checkpoint performance. We also  interviewed Drug Enforcement Administration and selected local law  enforcement officials located near checkpoints in five Border Patrol  sectors to determine the extent to which Border Patrol checkpoints  support or impact their respective law enforcement operations.

		Assessment of Checkpoint Performance Measures

To assess Border Patrol’s checkpoint performance measures, we reviewed  documents from Border Patrol and CBP, including a document identifying  various checkpoint performance measures developed by Border Patrol,  CBP’s annual Performance and Accountability Reports (PAR) for fiscal  years 2006 through 2008, and DHS’s annual performance reports for fiscal  years 2007 through 2010. We also reviewed our prior report on  checkpoints, which found that Border Patrol had not established adequate  performance measures for checkpoints. We met with Border Patrol  headquarters officials responsible for developing and implementing  checkpoint performance measures to discuss the measures and how they  are used by Border Patrol management. We also met with officials at the  Border Patrol sectors we visited to discuss the checkpoint performance  measures. In addition, we compared Border Patrol’s performance  measures and data collection practices with the Government Performance  and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and GAO’s Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government.
To assess the reliability of checkpoint performance data and to determine  how checkpoint supervisors input information into the CAR, we sent a  data collection instrument to Border Patrol officials, who provided it to all  Border Patrol stations along the southwest border responsible for  operating checkpoints. The CAR is the primary data collection system for  checkpoint performance data. We received responses from 60  checkpoints. We determined, based on these responses, our own  observations of checkpoint data entry at some checkpoints, and a review  of Border Patrol provided data, that data on “at checkpoint”  apprehensions and seizures were sufficiently reliable for reporting  purposes, but other data fields were not consistently collected and  therefore not reliable for our reporting purposes. Based on the results of  the data collection instrument, we identified various factors that  contribute to checkpoint data reliability issues. We also interviewed  Border Patrol headquarters officials and officials at the five sectors we  visited in the field about data integrity procedures, including methods by  which data are checked and reviewed for accuracy. We also reviewed  documents to determine what guidance is provided for collecting and  reporting checkpoint performance data, and what steps could be taken to  address identified data problems.
To assess Border Patrol’s reporting of checkpoint performance measures  in the annual CBP PAR, we compared the reported results with our own  calculations of checkpoint performance data. These checkpoint  performance measures reported in the PAR are (1) apprehensions at  checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol apprehensions, (2) drug  seizures at checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol drug  seizures, and (3) percentage of checkpoint cases referred to a U.S.  Attorney. For the first two measures, we used data from the CAR to  calculate the total number of checkpoint apprehensions and checkpoint  drug seizures, and divided that result by total apprehensions and drug  seizures in Border Patrol’s nine southwest border sectors. For the referral  measure, we again used data from the CAR to calculate the total number  of checkpoint cases that result in a referral to a U.S. Attorney. We then  divided that number by total apprehensions occurring at southwest border  checkpoints. We noted discrepancies between Border Patrol’s reported  performance and our analysis of the results of Border Patrol performance  measures, and we discussed these discrepancies with Border Patrol  officials responsible for checkpoint performance measurement.
We attempted to analyze other aspects of checkpoint performance, such  as apprehensions at checkpoints compared to apprehensions on  circumvention routes and apprehension and seizures using methods of  concealment. However, our ability to report on these measures for all  checkpoints was limited because we identified inconsistencies through  our data collection instrument in how those data are reported by  checkpoints in southwest border sectors. We discussed the issues we  found with Border Patrol headquarters officials responsible for oversight  of checkpoint operations.
We also developed additional measures intended to allow for comparisons  between checkpoints, but certain data limitations hinder detailed  quantitative analysis. As stated earlier, it is not possible to use the  numbers of apprehensions and seizures made at checkpoints as the sole  basis for comparison between checkpoints, because there are a number of  factors and variables that can influence and impact checkpoint  performance. For example, a checkpoint that accounted for 500  apprehensions is not necessarily better or more effective than a  checkpoint that accounted for 50 apprehensions. The differences in  apprehension totals between the checkpoints could be attributed to a  number of factors that are outside of the control of the checkpoint, such  as variations in operational hours and differences in traffic volume. As  such, we developed measures that were intended to normalize or control  for these variables. These measures included examining apprehensions  and seizures on an operational hour basis, apprehensions and seizures per  agent year, and apprehensions and seizures based upon the average annual  daily traffic volume at the checkpoint.
First, in the case of our operational hour analysis, checkpoints that were  not operational as long as others appeared to perform better than  checkpoints that were operational nearly 24 hours per day. For example,  using this measure, the I-5 checkpoint in the San Diego sector is one of the  best performing checkpoints. However, it is only operational, on average,  1.5 hours per day. Meanwhile, the checkpoint located on U.S. Route 281 in  Falfurrias, Texas, seizes more drugs and apprehends more illegal aliens  than the I-5 checkpoint, and is open 23 hours and 20 minutes every day, on  average, but does not perform as well as the I-5 checkpoint using an  operational hour measure. Therefore, while the I-5 checkpoint performs  well using an operational hour analysis measure, one can assume that  drugs and illegal aliens pass through that checkpoint in the hours that it is  not operational.
Second, we attempted to develop a cost effectiveness measure for  permanent checkpoints that would examine apprehensions and seizures  per agent work year. We chose this measure because a question that is  frequently, if not almost universally, asked about government programs, is,  “What is known about their cost effectiveness?” One potential measure of  such cost effectiveness for the Border Patrol would be how much did it  cost to apprehend a single person or seize illegal drugs in one checkpoint  compared with other checkpoints or other Border Patrol activities? While  this measure and others should not be taken in isolation as further guides  to management decisions, knowledge of the basic costs of an agency’s key  outcomes (such as apprehensions of illegal aliens) per unit of input (agent  labor costs) can be part of the basis for improved allocation of resources.
While such a performance measure can provide some information on cost  effectiveness, some apprehensions or seizures may be considered more  important to the agency than others. For instance, apprehending a drug  smuggler or a terrorist might be considered more important than  apprehending an illegal alien job seeker. Additionally, in attempting to  develop this measure, we learned that at least 20 of the 32 permanent  checkpoints on the southwest border have migrated to a four overlapping  shift format, while the CAR is limited to reporting of three shifts. As a  result, at least 20 permanent checkpoints are unable to accurately report  the number of agents assigned to the checkpoint, limiting our ability to  conduct an apprehension and seizure by agent work year analysis. In  addition, the Border Patrol does not track the number of agents staffed to  line watch and roving patrol operations, so we could not compare the  performance of checkpoints (as measured by apprehensions and seizures  per agent work year) to these other Border Patrol activities.
Third, we attempted to conduct an analysis of permanent checkpoints’  apprehensions and seizures in relation to traffic volume. Because it could  be assumed that checkpoints with high traffic volumes may also have high  apprehension and seizure totals, such an analysis was an attempt to  normalize for differences in traffic volume to determine if certain  checkpoints have higher apprehension and seizure rates per traffic volume  than others. Higher rates of apprehensions and seizures could indicate a  more effective checkpoint—that is, one that is better able to detect illegal  activity—or it could be due to volume of illegal traffic coming through the  checkpoint. We attempted to use the traffic volume numbers reported by  checkpoint in the CAR, but could not determine whether those numbers  were reliable. Therefore, we accessed the online transportation databases  for the four southwest border states and obtained average annual daily  traffic volume for major highways in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and  Texas. However, we could not conduct a comprehensive analysis for all  checkpoints using this measure because (1) checkpoints were located at  various distances from a traffic counter or (2) checkpoints (particularly  tactical checkpoints) were on a highway that did not have a traffic  counter.

		Border Patrol’s Consideration of Community Impacts in the Checkpoint Placement and Design Process

Regarding checkpoint placement and design, we met with officials from  CBP Facilities Management and Engineering, Border Patrol Tactical  Infrastructures, Border Patrol Southwest Operations Division, and Border  Patrol sector and station offices to understand the checkpoint placement  and design process and the roles and responsibilities of each office and  component. We also reviewed available Border Patrol and CBP  documentation describing the checkpoint placement and design process,  such as the 2003 Border Patrol Facilities Design Guide and Border Patrol  checkpoint policy.
We assessed the extent to which the Border Patrol considered community  impacts in the design and placement of checkpoints that were either (a)  new permanent checkpoints constructed in the last 3 years, or (b) new  permanent checkpoints currently under construction. We did not include  all checkpoints in our analysis, because the guidelines and standards for  checkpoint placement and design have changed over time, and it would  not be appropriate to assess checkpoints that were built decades ago with  current checkpoint placement and design guidelines. In addition, limited  documentation is available for checkpoints constructed prior to 2006,  according to Border Patrol and CBP officials. We did not include  checkpoints that were or are being renovated or expanded, because they  would not be subject to Border Patrol’s checkpoint placement guidelines.  We also did not include tactical checkpoints in our analysis, because these  lack permanent infrastructure. We also included in our analysis the  planned I-19 permanent checkpoint, rather than all planned checkpoints,  because of the extent of the controversy regarding that particular  checkpoint.
We obtained information on checkpoints that met our criteria from Border  Patrol and CBP. Based on this information, and review of available  documentation, we determined that three checkpoints met our criteria: (1)  the I-35 checkpoint in the Laredo sector, which was completed in 2006, (2)  the U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint in the El Paso sector, which was  completed in 2009, and (3) the U.S. Route 83 checkpoint in the Laredo  sector—expected to be completed in October 2009. For each of these  checkpoints, we reviewed available documentation related to the  placement and design of these checkpoints, including Border Patrol  Facilities Design Guide—which has a section for checkpoint design—and  Border Patrol checkpoint policy. These documents describe Border  Patrol’s guidelines for placement and design of checkpoint facilities,  including where they should be located and the types of resources and  capabilities that checkpoints should include. Border Patrol officials noted  that these documents provide general guidance on checkpoint placement  and design, rather than specific requirements. We also reviewed  environmental assessments, which describe the Border Patrol’s rationale  for selection of a particular site, information on consideration of  environmental and community impact, and the Border Patrol’s  coordination with various federal and state agencies. We also talked with  CBP and Border Patrol headquarters officials and Border Patrol sector  officials about how placement and design decisions were made for these  checkpoints.
Regarding the planned I-19 permanent checkpoint, we used the Border  Patrol Facilities Design Guide and Border Patrol checkpoint policy as our  primary basis for evaluating the placement and design of the I-19  checkpoint. We reviewed available documentation from Border Patrol’s  Tucson sector regarding the placement factors considered in determining  the location of the I-19 permanent checkpoint. To observe firsthand the  possible checkpoint locations, we traveled along the I-19 corridor, from  Nogales to Tucson, with Border Patrol officials who explained their  rationale for tentatively choosing the KP 41 location, and why other sites  were not suitable, in their view.
We reviewed available documentation related to the design of the  checkpoint, including a site plan which showed the layout of the proposed  checkpoint and draft environmental assessments. We also met with Border  Patrol officials about their rationale for the design for the checkpoint,  including total size (footprint), resources, and size of various functional  areas. We talked with officials from the Arizona Department of  Transportation (ADOT) about their input and requirements for the I-19  permanent checkpoint location. We obtained and analyzed ADOT traffic  projection data, which was developed by a contractor working for ADOT,  and talked with ADOT engineers and the I-19 permanent checkpoint  project manager about traffic projections. We also talked with officials and  reviewed planning documents from the Santa Cruz County Department of  Community Development to obtain information on plans for development  in the areas near the proposed checkpoint location. In addition, we  reviewed the recommendations on the design of the permanent I-19  checkpoint made by the Workgroup on Southern Arizona Checkpoints,  and the Border Patrol’s responses to the recommendations.
We also analyzed the Program Advisory for the I-19 permanent checkpoint,  which was prepared by an engineering firm contractor to the Border  Patrol. This document identifies space recommendations based on an  assessment of checkpoint requirements, traffic capacity, apprehension and  holding assessments, checkpoint operations, and number of staff. We met  with the project manager for the I-19 checkpoint project to discuss these  documents and the placement and design of the checkpoint. The project  manager also provided square footage information for both the proposed I- 19 permanent checkpoint and the I-35 checkpoint in the Laredo sector,  which allowed us to compare the sizes of the two checkpoints. We used  the I-35 checkpoint as a basis for comparison because Border Patrol  officials told us that the I-35 checkpoint was used as a frame of reference  for the I-19 permanent checkpoint, and the I-35 checkpoint was also a  large, permanent checkpoint. We also compared plans for the proposed I- 19 permanent checkpoint with other large checkpoints in terms of number  of primary and secondary inspection lanes, and total property size  (acreage). We obtained data on number of inspection lanes and  checkpoint size from the Border Patrol and CBP, and found the data to be  sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. For other potential variables,  such as number of buildings, total building square footage, and traffic  volume, we found that data were not consistently available and therefore  were not sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes.
To determine if the Border Patrol followed its checkpoint placement  guidelines regarding locating checkpoints in remote areas for the three  checkpoints either constructed or under construction since 2006, we  calculated the distances between each checkpoint and the nearest school  and hospital, as listed in MapInfo’s institution data. To determine the  reliability of the institution data for schools, we compared it to the  Department of Education’s Common Core Data (CCD) for schools in the  counties surrounding the checkpoints. We determined that the institution  layer supplemented with data from the CCD was sufficiently reliable for  our purposes. To determine the reliability of the institution data for  hospitals, we compared it to a list of Medicare eligible hospitals in the  counties surrounding the checkpoints. We determined that the institution  layer supplemented with the Medicare Hospital data was sufficiently  reliable for our purposes. We also used 2000 Census data to estimate the  populations within 1 and 5 miles of each location. Population estimates  were calculated by using MapInfo to draw a circle with a 1- or 5-mile  radius around the checkpoint locations provided by the Border Patrol.  These circles were then layered over 2000 Census block group-level  population data. For each block group, we determined the proportion of  the area that fell within the 1- or 5-mile radius of the checkpoint. The  Census population for each block group that fell within the boundary of  interest was multiplied by the proportion as an estimate of what  proportion of the population in the block group lived within 1 or 5 miles of  the checkpoint. The estimates for each block group were then added  together to estimate the total population living around the checkpoint. For  the planned I-19 permanent checkpoint, we calculated distances of four  proposed checkpoint locations from the nearest school and hospital, and  we used 2000 Census data to estimate the populations within 1 and 5 miles  of each location.

		Community Impacts of Checkpoint Operations

To assess the extent that the Border Patrol has considered community  impacts in the operation of checkpoints, we reviewed Border Patrol  operational guidance, policy documents, and training materials that  describe Border Patrol standards and processes for monitoring and  responding to circumvention activity. We also met with Border Patrol  officials at the 15 checkpoints we visited to discuss their efforts to monitor  and respond to circumvention activity and how they coordinate with  nearby communities.
To understand the extent that operations from Border Patrol checkpoints  impact surrounding areas, we interviewed state and local law  enforcement, business groups, community leaders, and other members of  communities in the areas we visited to obtain their perspectives on  impacts, if any, experienced by those who live or work within the areas  surrounding checkpoints. In the five Border Patrol sectors we visited, we  met with the following  Fourteen law enforcement agencies in five sectors:    Tucson sector: Arizona Department of Public Safety; Pima County  Sheriff’s Department; Sahuarita Police Department; Santa Cruz County  Sheriff’s Department; and Tucson Police Department.
San Diego sector: California Highway Patrol; Oceanside Police  Department; San Diego County Sheriff’s Department; and Temecula  Police Department.
Rio Grande Valley sector: Kenedy County Sheriff’s Department    Laredo sector: Laredo Police Department and Webb County Sheriff’s  Department.
El Paso sector: Alamogordo Department of Public Safety and Doña  Ana County Sheriff’s Department.
Business organizations in three sectors:    Temecula Chamber of Commerce (San Diego sector),    Kingsville Economic Development Council (Rio Grande Valley sector),    Tubac Chamber of Commerce and other Chamber of Commerce  members who were participants in the Community Workgroup on  Southern Arizona Checkpoints town hall meeting (Tucson sector).
And ranchers and residents in three sectors (San Diego, Tucson, and  Laredo) that we, or the Border Patrol, identified because they were  landowners, residents, or business owners of the areas surrounding  specific Border Patrol checkpoints.
For each sector we visited, we attempted to identify local community  organizations or community members who could provide insight into the  impacts of checkpoint operations. However, in some cases—such as when  checkpoints were located in areas that were rural and remote—we were  unable to identify appropriate local organizations or community members  that could provide insight on the impacts of checkpoint operations. In  those cases we relied on the perspectives of local law enforcement  officials that patrolled the area of jurisdiction around the checkpoint. In  our meetings with these organizations and community members, we asked  specific questions regarding the impacts from checkpoint operations and  Border Patrol’s response to these impacts. Because the checkpoints and  potential interviewees were a nonprobability sample, the results from our  site visits cannot be generalized to other locations and checkpoints;  however, what we learned from our site visits provided a useful  background into the types of impacts that occur as a result of checkpoint  operations.
In the Border Patrol Tucson sector, there was a community group—known  as the Community Workgroup for Southern Arizona Checkpoints—that  was organized around issues relating to the I-19 checkpoint. Chaired by  the Border Patrol sector chief and U.S. Congresswoman Gabrielle  Giffords, the mission of the workgroup was to build a better  understanding among southern Arizona communities on checkpoint  operations and community impacts and to make recommendations on  issues, concerns, and ideas regarding the current checkpoint and proposed  permanent checkpoints. We reviewed documents from the workgroup and  news articles that reported concerns of the community. While in the  Tucson sector, we held a town hall style meeting for all workgroup  members and others from the community. The town hall meeting was  facilitated with a prepared set of questions to ensure that we obtained  input regarding perceived community impacts from checkpoint  operations. This was the only Border Patrol sector that had an organized  and involved community group that had been actively discussing Border  Patrol checkpoints, as far as we could determine.
We attempted to determine the extent to which checkpoint operations can  be linked to third-party indicators such as crime, economic, tourism, and  property value data. Based on extensive research and analysis, we  determined there were many limitations to drawing such causal links.  Third-party indicators, such as these, are complex statistics impacted by  numerous factors, many of which have little to do with border  enforcement. It is difficult to further separate checkpoint operations from  overall border enforcement, and data on crime, economic, tourism, and  property values can fluctuate in ways that have no correlation to  checkpoint operations, but may be influenced by other factors, such as the  U.S. and global economies. Additionally, to understand any trends in these  indicators there needs to be a complete set of historical data to develop a  baseline understanding before interpreting factors that can change the  baseline. If checkpoint operations could impact trends, data should be  tracked for several years before and after a checkpoint is established to  understand and control for external variables that may also be impacting  trends. Given the community concerns regarding the checkpoint on the I- 19 highway in the Tucson sector, we collected some historical data on  crime, business, and real estate values for communities close to the I-19  checkpoint, the checkpoint’s surrounding and nearest counties, and the  state of Arizona. Those data are presented in the report and appendices  simply to show overall trends, without controlling for checkpoint  operation or other factors. We are unable to draw any conclusions from  these data and cannot link checkpoint operations to any of these  indicators. We also cannot infer that real estate values, tourism, or crime  trends are better or worse for nearby communities since the checkpoint  on the I-19 highway became fixed at the KP 42 location in November 2006.  We determined that the property value, economic, tourism, and crime data  used within the report and appendices were sufficiently reliable for  providing historical trends and general descriptions of each of the below  categories. To determine the reliability of these data, we reviewed existing  information about the data systems and interviewed knowledgeable  officials about the data, as available.
Property value data. We obtained and reviewed data on property values  from federal, state, and local agencies. At the federal level we reviewed  available data on property values from several nationwide data sets, such  as Federal Housing Finance Board, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban  Development, Case-Shiller, National Association of Realtors, and U.S.  Census Bureau, and determined that their level of geographic reporting  was not specific enough to the areas of interest, such as Tubac and Green  Valley. At the state level we reviewed available data from the Arizona  Department of Commerce and the Arizona Tax Research Association,  which provides annual publications on property tax rates and assessed  values. The publication is completed every 2 years and compiles county-  and district-level data on net assessed values for all properties, which is  based on tax rates and levy sheets that are officially adopted by each of  the County Board of Supervisors. The values provided to the Board of  Supervisors comes from each of their Tax Assessor’s offices and are all  calculated in the same way. Within this publication, Tubac is defined by  the Tubac Fire District boundaries. We used available data from the  Arizona Tax Research Association from 2000 to 2008, calculated  percentage changes from year to year, and compiled the data into charts  for reporting. At the county level, we reviewed median property values as  provided by the Santa Cruz County and Pima County Tax Assessor’s  Offices. Santa Cruz County Tax Assessor’s Office provided annual median  property values for the county and the area of Tubac. Pima County Tax  Assessor’s Office provided annual median property values for the county  and the area of Green Valley, as defined by the Green Valley Fire District  boundaries. Each of the offices use guidelines set by the Arizona  Department of Revenue to determine median property value, which is  calculated based on sales for each tax year and have an 18 month lag. For  example, for tax year 2008, property sales data analyzed was from the time  frame of January 1 through December 31, 2005, and January 1 through  June 30, 2006. We used available data, calculated percentage changes from  year to year, and compiled the data into charts for reporting. We also  obtained Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data from Brasher Real Estate,  Inc., a real estate company located in the Tubac area. MLS data is listings  of sales of land and residential properties within specific geographic areas.  We obtained data on sales in Tubac, Rio Rico, Amado, Nogales,  Tumacacori, and Green Valley. We used available data to calculate  quarterly totals and compiled the data into a chart for reporting. Because  real estate values can be calculated in different ways we reported data on  several indicators to provide a complete picture of property values in the  various geographic areas. With each of these indicators it is important to  note that there has been a significant housing market downturn  nationwide that can affect any and all of these available data sets and we  cannot draw any conclusion between checkpoint operations and the  health of property values in a specific area.
Economic data. We obtained and reviewed data from multiple state and  national agencies, such as Arizona Indicators, Arizona Department of  Commerce, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and U.S.  Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census  Bureau. Each of these data sets track information by the North American  Industry Classification System (NAICS), which is the system used to  classify establishments by industry by the United States, Canada, and  Mexico. Because art and tourism are important to the economy of Tubac,  and concerns had been expressed regarding the impact of the Border  Patrol checkpoint on the real estate industry in Tubac, we also collected  data on the Accommodation and Food Services, Arts, Entertainment, and  Recreation, and Real Estate and Rental and Leasing NAICS industries for  each of the data sets. One limitation to using any type of economic data is  that it is important to consider the context of the increases and decreases  in percentage changes within the significant economic downturn faced  nationwide. After reviewing available data sets, we compiled data and  calculated the annual percentage change for each of the indictors:    U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, County Business  Pattern annual data on annual payroll, number of employees, and  number of establishments, broken down by NAICS category, for the  state of Arizona, Pima County, Santa Cruz County, and the area of  Tubac, through the end of 2006. Data from 2007 were unavailable at  the time of our report. One limitation to using these data is that the  variation in number of establishments over time gives little sense of  how big the establishments or variations are, for example, whether  there were consolidations that reduced the number of establishments  but not the level of economic output.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis annual  data on the number of jobs and personal income, broken down by  NAICS category, for the state of Arizona, Pima County, and Santa Cruz  County, through the end of 2007. Annual state Gross Domestic Product  data are also available through the end of 2007. Data for the Tubac  area were not available.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly  Census of Employment and Wages quarterly and annual data on wages,  broken down by NAICS category, for the state of Arizona, Pima  County, and Santa Cruz County, through the end of 2007. Data for the  Tubac area were not available.
Although the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics  data were more current than the U.S. Census Bureau County Business  Pattern data (as data were available for 2007 and 2008), data were not  available at the ZIP code level—only for the county level. Therefore, we  decided not to include those data within our report.
Tourism data. The Arizona Office of Tourism provides data on Arizona’s  tourism industry, compiling data at the state and county levels. For the  state of Arizona, Pima County, and Santa Cruz County, we obtained and  reviewed data from 1998 to 2008 on occupancy rates, average daily rates,  and revenue per available room and 2005 through 2008 on lodging demand  and supply. Data for the Tubac area were not available for these  indicators. However, the Arizona State Parks collects data on the total  number of visitors to all Arizona state parks, including a state park near  Tubac. We obtained and reviewed data on total annual number of visitors  from 2001 to 2008 for Tubac Presidio State Historic Park and Patagonia  Lake State Park, which is also in Santa Cruz County. We used available  data to calculate percentage changes from year to year, for each of the  indicators, and compiled the data into various charts for reporting.
Crime data. We obtained and reviewed 2004 through 2008 crime  reporting from the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Pima County  Sheriff’s Department, and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department. We  also obtained and reviewed 2004 through 2007 annual crime reporting  from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports for  Pima County and the state of Arizona. Pima County and Santa Cruz County  Sheriff’s Departments both provided additional district level data for us to  review crimes that occurred within the areas closest to the I-19  checkpoint. We calculated the annual percentage change for major crime  categories and compiled the data into various charts for reporting. We  present the crime data to show overall trends and number of various types  of offenses in the communities near the I-19 checkpoint, but cannot link  any of these crimes to checkpoint operations, due to several important  limitations. First, local law enforcement agencies we collected data from  do not track the citizenship status of those arrested for crimes and could  not identify which crimes were committed by illegal aliens. They also do  not determine whether a crime was committed by someone attempting to  circumvent the checkpoint. Accordingly, there is no way to determine if a  particular criminal act was committed by an illegal alien that was  attempting to circumvent the checkpoint or if the crime was unrelated to  the checkpoint. Second, local law enforcement agencies we collected data  from compile their crime data by county or by districts, not by a specific  geographic region around checkpoints. As a result, these agencies could  not provide data that would show the number and types of crimes that  occurred within a certain radius around a checkpoint.

Appendix II: Proposed Border Patrol Checkpoint Performance Measures

In 2006, the Border Patrol convened a working group led by Border Patrol  headquarters officials with participation from field representatives. This  group identified 21 possible performance measures regarding checkpoint  operations. These 21 possible performance measures were divided into  four main groupings:    At the border    Quality of life  The 21 performance measures and a description of each measure are listed  below.  1.  Ensure the traffic checkpoints are consistently operational in  accordance with national and sector priorities and threat levels:  This measure is to examine the percentage of time traffic checkpoints  are operational compared to non-operational.  2.  Maintain compliance with national Border Patrol checkpoint  policy: This measure is to examine the percentage of time for each  reason why traffic checkpoints are non-operational.  3.  Determine effectiveness of canines at traffic checkpoints: This  measure is to examine the number of smuggling events, both human  and narcotics, at traffic checkpoints detected by canines compared to  the number of smuggling events detected without canine assists.  4.  Identify types of concealment methods used by smugglers at  traffic checkpoints: This measure is to examine the number of  apprehensions made at traffic checkpoints with concealment methods  used compared to apprehensions without concealment methods.  5.  Identify the number of aliens in smuggling loads: This measure is  to examine the number of apprehensions in each smuggling load made  at traffic checkpoints.  6.  Utilize technologies in support of traffic checkpoint operations  to identify the appropriate technology required for efficient  checkpoint operations: This measure is to examine the number of  apprehensions and seizures attributable to technology support for  traffic checkpoint operations.  7.  Examine the effectiveness of sensors on traffic checkpoint  operations: This measure is to examine the number of apprehensions  and seizures attributable to sensor activations when the traffic  checkpoints are operational or non-operational.  8.  Examine operating and maintenance cost effectiveness of  checkpoint operations: This measure is to examine the cost  effectiveness associated with operating and maintaining permanent  traffic checkpoints compared to tactical traffic checkpoints. This  measure is to also examine the cost effectiveness associated with the  operating and maintenance of traffic checkpoint operations compared  to the overall budget allocated for border enforcement activities.  9.  Evaluate changes in patterns and trends to identify checkpoint  circumvention routes: This measure is to compare the number of  apprehensions at the traffic checkpoint to apprehensions on  circumventing routes.  10. Compare checkpoint apprehensions to apprehensions from  circumventing routes when the checkpoint is operational: The  measure is to compare the number of apprehensions at the traffic  checkpoint to apprehensions on circumventing routes.  11. Compare checkpoint narcotics seizures to narcotic seizures on  circumventing routes when the checkpoint is operational: The  measure is to compare the number of seizures at the traffic checkpoint  to seizures on circumventing routes.  12. Monitor effects of checkpoint operation on other areas: This  measure is to compare the percentage of apprehensions and seizures  at traffic checkpoints to the apprehensions and seizures in adjacent  zones or other zones impacted by checkpoint operations.  13. Examine the impact the operational checkpoint has on  transportation check activities, such as aircraft, bus, or train  checks: This measure is to compare the number of apprehensions  from transportation checkpoints compared to when traffic  checkpoints are operational and non-operational.  14. Examine the impact operational checkpoints have on staging  areas (i.e., stash houses): This measure is to compare the number of  apprehensions at staging areas when traffic checkpoints are  operational or not operational.  15. Compare traffic checkpoint operation apprehensions to other  enforcement activities: This measure is to examine the number of  traffic checkpoint apprehensions compared to all other enforcement  activities.  16. Compare traffic checkpoint operation seizures to other  enforcement activities: This measure is to examine the number of  traffic checkpoint seizures compared to all other enforcement  activities.  17. Compare man-hours dedicated to checkpoint operations to man- hours dedicated to other enforcement activities: This measure is  to compare the percentage of manpower used at traffic checkpoints to  the manpower used at other enforcement activities.  18. Examine the reduction of major crimes in areas affected by  checkpoint operations and beyond: This measure is to examine the  number of apprehensions of major crimes in areas affected by traffic  checkpoint operations compared to the number of major crimes in  other border enforcement areas without traffic checkpoint operations.  19. Refer smugglers for prosecution: This measure is to examine the  number of border related cases pertaining to traffic checkpoint  operations referred to the U.S. Attorney (including state, county, and  local attorneys) or not referred.  20. Coordinate with federal, state, local, and tribal agencies to  support and improve border enforcement activities: This  measure is to compare the number and type of events/cases that were  referred to or notified for other agencies that are related to traffic  checkpoint operations.  21. Examine the number and location of apprehensions turned over  to the Border Patrol by other agencies when the checkpoint is  operational to determine effect of operational checkpoint on  communities: This measure is to compare the number of  apprehensions turned over to Border Patrol by other agencies  compared to when the traffic checkpoint is operational and non- operational.

Appendix III: Photographs of Potential Checkpoint Locations on I-19, in Arizona

The following figures represent aerial photographs of the four potential  checkpoint locations considered by the Border Patrol, on I-19, in southern  Arizona. These photographs show the interstate, nearby roads, and the  surrounding areas.

Appendix IV: Additional Property Value Data for the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac

In addition to the median property values that were included earlier in this  report, we identified additional indicators for showing local trends in  property values. We obtained multiple listing service (MLS) data, from a  real estate agency in Tubac, and net assessed values, as reported by the  Arizona Tax Research Association. MLS data provides listings for  residential and land sales at the ZIP code level. The data show all listings  within a ZIP code area, providing the listing prices, final sale prices, and  number of transactions in specific geographic areas. The Arizona Tax  Research Association publishes annual data on the total net assessed  values for all properties in the state of Arizona. Net assessed value is the  full cash value, or market value, of all real property in Arizona.
According to MLS data, the median sales price for a home in Tubac has  fluctuated from July 2006 to March 2009, as shown in figure 26. In 2008 the  median sales price was approximately $384,000, and in 2007 it was  $375,000.
The net assessed value of properties in Santa Cruz County, Tubac, Pima  County, and Green Valley have increased each year from 2000 to 2008, as  shown in table 11 and figure 27. The net assessed value of properties in  Santa Cruz County increased by 18 percent from 2007 to 2008, from  approximately $341,684,000 to approximately $404,366,000.

Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac

We identified indicators for showing local economic trends from the U.S.  Census Bureau. The U.S. Census Bureau provides an annual series of  County Business Pattern data available at the national, state, county, and  ZIP code level and tracks the number of establishments, number of  employees, and total payroll across industries. The data are derived from  U.S. Census Bureau business establishment surveys and federal  administrative records. These data are available through the end of 2006.
The U.S. Census Bureau County Business Patterns provides subnational  economic data, which covers most of the country’s economic activity, is  used for studying the economic activity of small areas and analyzing  economic changes over time, and is available by North American Industry  Classification System (NAICS) industry. According to the Arizona  Department of Commerce, art and tourism are important to the economy  of Tubac, and concerns had been expressed regarding the impact of the  Border Patrol checkpoint on the real estate industry in Tubac.  Accordingly, the NAICS industries included within the following analysis  are Accommodation and Food Services, Arts, Entertainment, and  Recreation, and Real Estate and Rental and Leasing. In 2006, over half of  the total 87 establishments in Tubac were retail trade and  accommodation and food services, with 38 and 10 establishments,  respectively, as shown in figure 28 and table 12. The four other industries  with the highest numbers of establishments in Tubac are shown in figure  28, other services (except public administration) with eight establishments  and construction, real estate, rental and leasing, and professional,  scientific and technical services each with seven.
From 2004 to 2006, the total number of establishments in Tubac increased  from 67 to 87, as shown in figure 29. In 2006, the 87 establishments was a  16 percent increase from 2005, compared to a 1.3 percent increase for  Santa Cruz County.
With respect to the number of real estate, rental and leasing  establishments from 2001 to 2006, Tubac consistently had fewer than 10  establishments, and Santa Cruz County ranged between 51 and 65  establishments. However, Pima County followed a similar pattern to the  state of Arizona, as shown in figure 30.
Figure 31 shows that in 2006, Tubac had 2 art, entertainment, and  recreation establishments, compared to 305 in Pima County and 1,859 in  the entire state of Arizona.
From 2005 to 2006, Santa Cruz County had an increase in the number of  accommodation and food service establishments, from 89 to 96, and Tubac  had no change, with 10 establishments each year. Arizona and Pima  County had percentage increases of 2 and 1 percent respectively, from  2005 to 2006, as shown in figure 32.
In terms of number of employees, Tubac saw a decrease from 2004 to  2005, when compared to Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and the state of  Arizona, as shown in figure 33. From 2005 to 2006, the number of  employees in Tubac increased by 2 percent, while the number of  employees in the state increased by 8 percent.
With respect to total annual payroll, from 2004 to 2005 Tubac had a 1  percent decrease, while the state and counties had between 6 to 10  percent increases, as shown in figure 34. However, from 2005 to 2006,  Tubac saw a larger percentage increase—19 percent, to $10,093,000—than  the state and counties.

Appendix VI: Additional Tourism Data for the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, and Pima County

The Arizona Office of Tourism provides information on tourism within the  state and counties. It provides statewide and county data on occupancy  rates, revenue per available room, and lodging supply and demand,  through 2008. However, none of these indicators were available for the  area of Tubac. Overall, occupancy rates for the state of Arizona, Pima  County, and Santa Cruz County have been in a steady decline since 2006,  with Santa Cruz County having the largest percentage decrease in 2008  occupancy rates, when compared to the others, as shown in figure 35.  According to an Arizona Office of Tourism representative, the state and  county downward trends in tourism are a part of the downward trends  seen in the general economic climate in Arizona and that the overall  demand for tourism has been decreasing, possibly due to a general  downturn in the nationwide economy. In 2008, Santa Cruz County had a 62  percent occupancy rate for all lodging in the county.
With respect to revenue per available room, the state of Arizona, Santa  Cruz County, and Pima County followed similar trends from 2006 to 2008.  From 2007 to 2008, all areas saw a decline in revenue per available room,  with Santa Cruz County having the largest percentage decrease, as shown  in figure 36. In 2008, Santa Cruz County was making $45 revenue per each  available room, a decline from $50 the previous year.

Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac

Regarding crime indicators, we obtained additional data from the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program,  Pima County Sheriff’s Department, and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s  Department. Law enforcement agencies throughout the country—at the  city, county and state levels—participate in the UCR program by providing  summarized reports on eight major offenses, which include violent  crimes and property crimes known to law enforcement, through the end  of 2007, at the state and jurisdiction level. In addition to these eight crime  categories, we obtained data on all other crimes from the Pima County  and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Departments, which provide information  on the frequency of offenses within the jurisdictions. In our discussions  with each of these agencies, they told us that they do not attribute any of  the below trends to checkpoint specific activities. Furthermore, the  agencies do not track which offenses are committed by illegal aliens.
According to FBI UCR data, from 2006 to 2007, the state of Arizona has  seen a decline both in violent and property crimes, as shown in figure 37.  Data on these crimes within the state of Arizona is presented to allow for  comparisons to the local jurisdiction crime rates. From 2006 to 2007,  Arizona’s decline in both violent crimes and property crimes went from  approximately 316,000 to 310,000.
According to offense data provided by Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s  Department, total offenses in Santa Cruz County have declined from 2006  to 2008, as shown in figure 38. The Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s  Department has three patrol districts: District 1 is the area of Rio Rico,  which includes the I-19 corridor from Nogales to District 2; District 2  includes the I-19 checkpoint and Tumacacori, Carmen, Tubac, Amado, and  Arivaca; and District 3 includes Sonoita, Elgin, Canelo, Lochiel, Mowery,  and San Rafael Valley. As shown in figure 38, the majority of crimes in  Santa Cruz County occur within District 1, which is the area of Rio Rico,  with 2,085 total offenses in 2008, compared to 398 and 219 from Districts 2  and 3, respectively. From 2007 to 2008, District 1 had a 7 percent decrease  in total offenses, District 2 had a 3 percent decrease, and District 3 had a  0.5 percent increase.
With regards to violent crimes, from 2005 to 2008 District 2 has seen an  increase each year, while the number of violent crimes within Districts 1  and 3 have fluctuated, as shown in figure 39. From 2007 to 2008, District 1  had an increase from 40 to 47 offenses, District 2 had an increase from 10  to 15, and District 3 had a decrease from 5 to 2 violent crime offenses.
Property crime offenses increased in Districts 1 and 2 from 2004 to 2008,  as shown in figure 40. More recently, between 2007 and 2008 District 1 had  an increase from 281 to 303 offenses, District 2 had an increase from 42 to  58, and District 3 had an increase from 23 to 26.
In addition to crime data on districts within Santa Cruz County, we also  obtained crime data for the Pima County Green Valley District, which is  adjacent to District 2 of the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department and  closest to the I-19 checkpoint. Figures 41, 42, and 43 present various crime  data from Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department District 2 and Pima  County Sheriff’s Department Green Valley District.
From 2005 to 2008, the number of violent crimes within both districts has  fluctuated, with no clear pattern emerging, as shown in figure 41.
With respect to property crime data, the number of crimes within Green  Valley District has varied from 2005 to 2008, while property crimes within  Santa Cruz County District 2 have remained relatively stable over the same  time period, as shown in figure 42. For the most recent quarter in which  data are available, there were 147 property crime offenses in the Pima  County Sheriff’s Department, Green Valley District, compared to 17 in the  Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2.
We also obtained cross-district data on criminal damage offenses, which  also shows no clear trends in the number of offenses within each district  from 2005 to 2008, as shown in figure 43. In the last quarter of 2008, there  were 37 criminal damage offenses in the Pima County Sheriff’s  Department, Green Valley District, compared to one in the Santa Cruz  County Sheriff’s Department, District 2.
The number of narcotics and drug related offenses in Santa Cruz County  Sheriff’s Department, District 2, peaked in 2006, and has declined since  then, as shown in figure 44. In 2008, there were a total of five narcotics and  drug related offenses.
In addition to data on major crimes, we also obtained data on selected  other offenses and incidents within Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s  Department District 2, from 2004 to 2008 (see table 13).

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant Director,  and Adam Hoffman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Ryan  MacMaster, Jim Russell, and Amy Sheller made significant contributions to  the work. Michele Fejfar and Chuck Bausell assisted with design,  methodology, and data analysis, and Melinda Cordero assisted with  mapping analysis. Frances Cook and Christine Davis provided legal  support. Pille Anvelt and Karen Burke developed the report’s graphics, and  Katherine Davis assisted with report preparation.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), operates checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur. As part of a three-tiered strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal aliens, Border Patrol agents at checkpoints screen vehicles for illegal aliens and contraband. GAO was asked to assess (1) checkpoint performance and factors affecting performance, (2) checkpoint performance measures, (3) community impacts considered in checkpoint placement and design, and (4) the impact of checkpoint operations on nearby communities. GAO work included a review of Border Patrol data and guidance; visits to checkpoints and communities in five Border Patrol sectors across four southwest border states, selected on the basis of size, type, and volume, among other factors; and discussions with community members and Border Patrol officials in headquarters and field locations.

What GAO Found

Checkpoints have contributed to the Border Patrol's ability to seize illegal drugs, apprehend illegal aliens, and screen potential terrorists; however, several factors have impeded higher levels of performance. Checkpoint contributions included over one-third of the Border Patrol's total drug seizures, according to Border Patrol data. Despite these and other contributions, Border Patrol officials said that additional staff, canine teams, and inspection technology were needed to increase checkpoint effectiveness. Border Patrol officials said they plan to increase these resources. The Border Patrol established three performance measures to report the results of checkpoint operations, and while they provide some insight into checkpoint activity, they do not indicate if checkpoints are operating efficiently and effectively. In addition, GAO found that a lack of management oversight and unclear checkpoint data collection guidance resulted in the overstatement of checkpoint performance results in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 agency performance reports, as well as inconsistent data collection practices at checkpoints. These factors hindered management's ability to monitor the need for program improvement. Internal control standards require that agencies accurately record and report data necessary to demonstrate agency performance, and that they provide proper oversight of these activities. The Border Patrol generally followed its guidelines for considering community safety and convenience in four recent checkpoint placement and design decisions, including the proposed permanent checkpoint on Interstate 19 in Arizona. Current and projected traffic volume was a key factor in the design of the proposed Interstate 19 checkpoint, but was not considered when determining the number of inspection lanes for three recently completed checkpoints in Texas due to a lack of guidance. Having explicit guidance on using current and projected traffic volumes could help ensure that future checkpoints are appropriately sized. Individuals GAO contacted who live near checkpoints generally supported their operations but expressed concerns regarding property damage that occurs when illegal aliens and smugglers circumvent checkpoints to avoid apprehension. The Border Patrol is not yet using performance measures it has developed to examine the extent that checkpoint operations affect quality of life in surrounding communities. The Border Patrol uses patrols and technology to detect and respond to circumventions, but officials said that other priorities sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum number of agents on checkpoint circumvention routes. The Border Patrol has not documented the number of agents needed to address circumventions at the proposed I-19 checkpoint. Given the concerns of nearby residents regarding circumventions, conducting a workforce planning needs assessment at the checkpoint design stage could help ensure that resources needed for addressing such activity are planned for and deployed.