Background

DOD is a massive and complex organization entrusted with more taxpayer  dollars than any other federal department or agency. Organizationally, the  department includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, numerous defense agencies and  field activities, and various unified combatant commands that are  responsible for either specific geographic regions or specific functions.  (See fig. 1 for a simplified depiction of DOD’s organizational structure.)
In support of its military operations, DOD performs an assortment of  interrelated and interdependent business functions, such as logistics  management, procurement, health care management, and financial  management. As we have previously reported, the DOD systems  environment that supports these business functions is overly complex and  error prone, and is characterized by (1) little standardization across the  department, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the same  data stored in multiple systems, and (4) the need for data to be entered  manually into multiple systems. The department recently requested about  $17.3 billion for its business systems environment and IT infrastructure  investments for fiscal year 2012. According to the department’s systems  inventory, this environment is composed of 2,258 business systems and  includes 335 financial management, 709 human resource management, 645  logistics, 243 real property and installation, and 281 weapon acquisition  management systems.
DOD currently bears responsibility, in whole or in part, for 14 of the 30  programs across the federal government that we have designated as high  risk because they are highly susceptible to fraud, waste, abuse, and  mismanagement. Seven of these areas are specific to the department,  and seven other high-risk areas are shared with other federal agencies.  Collectively, these high-risk areas relate to DOD’s major business  operations that are inextricably linked to the department’s ability to  perform its overall mission and directly affect the readiness and  capabilities of U.S. military forces and can affect the success of a mission.  In particular, the department’s nonintegrated and duplicative systems  impair its ability to combat fraud, waste, and abuse. As such, DOD’s  business systems modernization is one of the high-risk areas and is an  essential enabler in addressing many of the department’s other high-risk  areas. For example, modernized business systems are integral to the  department’s efforts to address its financial, supply chain, and information  security management high-risk areas.

		Enterprise Architecture and IT Investment Management Controls Are Critical to Achieving Successful Systems Modernization

Effective use of a well-defined enterprise architecture is a hallmark of  successful organizations and a basic tenet of organizational transformation  and systems modernization. Since the early 1990s, we have promoted  federal department and agency enterprise architecture adoption as an  essential means to achieving a desired end: having operational and  technology environments that maximize institutional mission performance  and outcomes. Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),  and the federal Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council have also  recognized the importance of an architecture-centric approach to  modernization. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, among other things,  requires the CIOs of federal departments and agencies to develop,  maintain, and facilitate architectures as a means of integrating business  processes and agency goals with IT. Further, the E-Government Act of  2002 established the OMB Office of Electronic Government and assigned  it, among other things, responsibility for overseeing the development of  enterprise architectures within and across agencies. In addition, OMB,  the CIO Council, and we have issued guidance that emphasizes the need  for system investments to be consistent with these architectures. For  example, in April 2003 and in August 2010, we published a framework  that emphasizes the importance of having an enterprise architecture as a  critical frame of reference for organizations when they are making IT  investment decisions. Also, in December 2008, OMB issued guidance that  addresses system investment compliance with agency architectures.
A corporate approach to IT investment management is another important  characteristic of successful public and private organizations. Recognizing  this, the Clinger-Cohen Act requires OMB to establish processes to  analyze, track, and evaluate the risks and results of major capital  investments in IT systems made by executive agencies. In response to the  Clinger-Cohen Act and other statutes, OMB developed policy and issued  guidance for planning, budgeting, acquisition, and management of federal  capital assets. We have also issued guidance in this area that defines  institutional structures (such as investment boards), processes for  developing information on investments (such as cost/benefit), and  practices to inform management decisions (such as whether a given  investment is aligned with an enterprise architecture).

		Enterprise Architecture: A Brief Description

An enterprise architecture provides a clear and comprehensive picture of  an entity, whether it is an organization (e.g., a federal department or  agency) or a functional or mission area that cuts across more than one  organization (e.g., financial management). An architecture describes the  enterprise in logical terms (such as interrelated business processes and  business rules, information needs and flows, and work locations and  users) as well as in technical terms (such as hardware, software, data,  communications, security attributes, and performance standards). It  provides these perspectives both for the enterprise’s current environment  and for its target environment, and it provides a transition plan for moving  from the current to the target environment. This transition plan provides a  temporal road map for moving between the two environments and  incorporates considerations such as technology opportunities,  marketplace trends, fiscal and budgetary constraints, institutional system  development and acquisition capabilities, legacy and new system  dependencies and life expectancies, and the projected value of competing  investments.
The suite of products adopted for a given entity’s enterprise architecture,  including its structure and content, is largely governed by the framework  used to develop the architecture. Since the 1980s, various architecture  frameworks have been developed, such as John A. Zachman’s “A  Framework for Information Systems Architecture,” and the DOD  Architecture Framework.
The importance of developing, implementing, and maintaining an  enterprise architecture is a basic tenet of both organizational  transformation and systems modernization. Managed properly, an  enterprise architecture can clarify and help optimize the  interdependencies and relationships among an organization’s business  operations and the underlying IT infrastructure and applications that  support these operations. Moreover, when an enterprise architecture is  employed in concert with other important management controls, such as  portfolio-based capital planning and investment control practices, the  architecture can greatly increase the chances that an organization’s  operational and IT environments will be configured to optimize mission  performance. The alternative, as our work has shown, is the perpetuation  of the kinds of operational environments that burden many agencies  today, where a lack of integration among business operations and the IT  resources supporting them leads to systems that are duplicative, poorly  integrated, and unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface.
In February 2002 and April 2003, we issued versions 1.0 and 1.1 of our  Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity Framework; in August  2010, we issued a major revision (version 2.0). The framework provides a  standard yet flexible benchmark against which to determine where the  enterprise stands in its progress toward the ultimate goal: having a  continuously improving enterprise architecture program that can serve as  a featured decision support tool when considering and planning large- scale organizational restructuring or transformation initiatives. In addition,  it also provides a basis for developing architecture management  improvement plans, as well as for measuring, reporting, and overseeing  progress in implementing these plans.
Several approaches to structuring enterprise architecture exist and can be  applied to the extent that they are relevant and appropriate for a given  enterprise. In general, these approaches provide for decomposing an  enterprise into its logical parts and architecting each of the parts in  relation to enterprisewide needs and the inherent relationships and  dependencies that exist among the parts. As such, the approaches are  fundamentally aligned and consistent with a number of basic enterprise  architecture principles, such as incremental rather than monolithic  architecture development and implementation, optimization of the whole  rather than optimization of the component parts, and maximization of  shared data and services across the component parts rather than  duplication. Moreover, these approaches are not mutually exclusive and,  in fact, can all be applied to some degree for a given enterprise, depending  on the characteristics and circumstances of that enterprise. The  approaches, which are briefly described here, are federated, segmented,  and service-oriented.

			Federated

Under a federated approach, the architecture consists of a family of  coherent but distinct member architectures that conform to an  overarching corporate or parent architecture. This approach recognizes  that each federation member has unique goals and needs as well as  common roles and responsibilities with the members above and below it.  As such, member architectures (e.g., component, subordinate, or  subsidiary architectures) are substantially autonomous, but they also  inherit certain rules, policies, procedures, and services from the parent  architectures. A federated architecture enables component organization  autonomy while ensuring corporate or enterprisewide linkages and  alignment where appropriate.

			Segmented

A segmented approach to enterprise architecture development and use,  like a federated approach, employs a “divide and conquer” methodology in  which architecture segments are identified, prioritized, developed, and  implemented. In general, segments can be viewed as logical aspects, or  “slivers,” of the enterprise that can be architected and pursued as separate  initiatives under the overall corporate architecture. As such, the segments  serve as a bridge between the corporate frame of reference captured in the  enterprise architecture and individual programs within portfolios of  system investments. OMB has issued guidance related to segment  architectures. As part of its guidance, agencies are to group segments  into three categories: core mission areas (e.g., air transportation), business  services (e.g., financial management), and enterprise services (e.g.,  records management).

			Service-Oriented

A service-oriented approach to enterprise architecture is intended to  identify and promote the shared use of common business capabilities  across the enterprise. Under this approach, functions and applications are  defined and designed as discrete and reusable capabilities or services that  may be under the control of different organizational entities. As such, the  capabilities or services need to be, among other things, (1) self-contained,  meaning that they do not depend on any other functions or applications to  execute a discrete unit of work; (2) published and exposed as self- describing business capabilities that can be accessed and used; and (3)  subscribed to via well-defined and standardized interfaces. This approach  is intended to reduce redundancy and increase integration, as well as  provide the flexibility needed to support a quicker response to changing  and evolving business requirements and emerging conditions.

		IT Investment Management: A Brief Description

IT investment management is a process for linking investment decisions to  an organization’s strategic objectives and business plans that focuses on  selecting, controlling, and evaluating investments in a manner that  minimizes risks while maximizing the return of investment.
During the selection phase, the organization (1) identifies and analyzes  each project’s risks and returns before committing significant funds to any  project and (2) selects those IT projects that will best support its mission  needs.
During the control phase, the organization ensures that, as projects  develop and investment expenditures continue, the projects meet mission  needs at the expected levels of cost and risk. If the project is not meeting  expectations, or if problems arise, steps are quickly taken to address the  deficiencies.
During the evaluation phase, actual versus expected results are compared  once a project has been fully implemented. This is done to (1) assess the  project’s impact on mission performance, (2) identify any changes or  modifications to the project that may be needed, and (3) revise the  investment management process based on lessons learned.
Consistent with this guidance, our IT Investment Management (ITIM)  framework consists of five progressive stages of maturity for any given  agency relative to selecting, controlling, and evaluating its investment  management capabilities. (See fig. 2 for the five ITIM stages of maturity.)  The overriding purpose of the framework is to encourage investment  selection and control and to evaluate processes that promote business  value and mission performance, reduce risk, and increase accountability  and transparency. We have used the framework in many of our  evaluations, and a number of agencies have adopted it.
In our ITIM framework, with the exception of the first stage, each maturity  stage is composed of “critical processes” that must be implemented and  institutionalized in order for the organization to achieve that stage. Each  ITIM critical process consists of “key practices” (organizational structures,  policies, and procedures) that must be executed to implement the critical  process. Our research shows that agency efforts to improve investment  management capabilities should focus on implementing all lower-stage  practices before addressing the higher-stage practices.
Stage 2 critical processes lay the foundation by establishing successful,  predictable, and repeatable investment control processes at the project  level. Stage 3 is where the agency moves from project-centric processes to  portfolio-based processes and evaluates potential investments according  to how well they support the agency’s missions, strategies, and goals.  Organizations implementing these Stage 2 and 3 practices have in place  selection, control, and evaluation processes that are consistent with the  Clinger-Cohen Act. Stages 4 and 5 require the use of evaluation  techniques to continuously improve both investment processes and  portfolios in order to better achieve strategic outcomes.
Our research shows that agency efforts to improve investment  management capabilities should focus on implementing all lower-stage  practices before addressing the higher-stage practices and therefore our  reviews tend to focus on Stage 2 and Stage 3 critical processes.  Specifically, within Stage 2, there are five critical processes and nine  associated key practices (known as organizational commitments) that call  for policies and procedures associated with effective project-level  management. These are shown in table 1.
Within Stage 3, there are four critical processes and five associated key  practices (known as organizational commitments) that call for policies  and procedures associated with effective portfolio-based investment  management. These are shown in table 2.

		DOD’s Institutional Approach to Business Systems Modernization

The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 designated the Deputy Secretary of  Defense position as the Chief Management Officer for DOD and created a  deputy position to assist the Chief Management Officer. The Chief  Management Officer’s responsibilities include developing and maintaining  a departmentwide strategic plan for business reform and establishing  performance goals and measures for improving and evaluating overall  economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and monitoring and measuring the  progress of the department. The Deputy Chief Management Officer’s  responsibilities include recommending to the Chief Management Officer  methodologies and measurement criteria to better synchronize, integrate,  and coordinate the business operations to ensure alignment in support of  the warfighting mission. The Business Transformation Agency supports  the Deputy Chief Management Officer in leading and coordinating  business transformation efforts across the department. This includes  maintaining and updating the department’s enterprise architecture for its  business mission area.
The Chief Management Officer and Deputy Chief Management Officer are  to interact with several entities to guide the direction, oversight, and  execution of DOD’s business transformation efforts, which include  business systems modernization. These entities include the Defense  Business Systems Management Committee, which serves as the highest- ranking investment review and decisionmaking body for business systems  modernization activities and is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of  Defense; the principal staff assistants, who serve as the certification  authorities for business system modernizations in their respective core  business missions; the investment review boards (IRB),  which are  chaired by the certifying authorities and form the review and decision- making bodies for business system investments in their respective areas of  responsibility; and the Business Transformation Agency, which is  responsible for supporting the IRBs and for leading and coordinating  business transformation efforts across the department. In August 2010 and  in January 2011, the Secretary of Defense announced the plans to  disestablish the Business Transformation Agency and the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information  Integration/Department of Defense CIO (ASD(NII)/DOD CIO) (who is a  member of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee),  respectively. According to DOD officials, the mission of the Office of the  Deputy Chief Management Officer duplicates many of the Business  Transformation Agency functions. They added that rather than lead in the  development of better business practices, the agency’s prime focus has  changed to the management of several relatively small business systems  and providing direct support to the Deputy Chief Management Officer on  various policy issues. As a result, according to these officials, the narrower  function does not justify continuing the Business Transformation Agency  as a stand-alone defense agency.
The Secretary of Defense also directed that the remaining functions of the  Business Transformation Agency be reviewed and transferred to other  organizations in DOD, as appropriate and that the disestablishment of the  agency should be no later than June 30, 2011. However, as of June 2011,  these implementation decisions had yet to be made and both the Business  Transformation Agency and the Office of the ASD (NII)/DOD CIO  organizations were still in operation.
Table 3 lists governance entities and provides greater detail on their roles,  responsibilities, and composition.

		Overview of DOD’s Tiered Accountability for Business Systems Modernization

Since 2005, DOD has employed a “tiered accountability” approach to  business systems modernization. Under this approach, responsibility and  accountability for business architectures and systems investment  management are assigned to different levels in the organization. For  example, the Business Transformation Agency is responsible for  developing the corporate business enterprise architecture (i.e., the thin  layer of DOD-wide policies, capabilities, standards, and rules) and the  associated enterprise transition plan. Each component is responsible for  defining a component-level architecture and transition plan associated  with its own tiers of responsibility and for doing so in a manner that is  aligned with (i.e., does not violate) the corporate business enterprise  architecture. Similarly, program managers are responsible for developing  program-level architectures and plans and for ensuring alignment with the  architectures and transition plans above them. This concept is to allow for  autonomy while also ensuring linkages and alignment from the program  level through the component level to the corporate level. Table 4 describes  the four investment tiers and identifies the associated reviewing and  approving entities.
Consistent with the tiered accountability approach, the Fiscal Year 2008  NDAA required the secretaries of the military departments to designate the  department under secretaries as chief management officers with primary  responsibility for business operations. Moreover, the Fiscal Year 2009  Duncan Hunter NDAA required the military departments to establish  business transformation offices to assist their chief management officers  in the development of comprehensive business transformation plans. In  response, all of the military departments have designated their respective  Under Secretaries as the chief management officers.
We reported in January 2011 that DOD and the military departments had  made limited progress in developing business transformation plans that  are supported by a strategic planning process and would enable them to  align goals and planning efforts and to measure progress. Specifically, we  reported that DOD had not set up internal mechanisms, such as  procedures and milestones, by which it can reach consensus with the  military departments and others on priorities, synchronize the  development of plans with each other and the budget process, and guide  efforts to monitor progress and take corrective action. Therefore, while  the military departments were in varying stages of developing business  transformation plans, it was unclear to what extent the business  transformation priorities for the military departments will be aligned with  the priorities identified in DOD’s Strategic Management Plan or how these  business transformation priorities will influence the department’s budget  requests. Accordingly, we made recommendations to enhance DOD’s  ability to set strategic direction for its business transformation efforts, and  better align and institutionalize its efforts to develop and implement plans  and measure progress against established goals. DOD partially agreed with  the recommendations.

			DOD’s Approach to Certifying Business System Investments

DOD has a two-stage process to select investments, which it refers to as  certification and is a key step in its IT investment process that DOD has  aimed to model after GAO’s ITIM framework. The first stage involves  selection of systems using the Joint Capabilities Integration and  Development System, the Defense Acquisition System, and the Planning,  Programming, Budgeting, and Execution management systems. At this  level, proposals and alternatives are viewed and prioritized for system  selection. The second stage of selection involves (1) certifying and  approving Tiers 1 through 3 investments and (2) elevating certain  component investments to an enterprisewide status. More recently, DOD  developed Business Capability Lifecycle guidance, dated November 2010,  intended to streamline business system acquisition, and investment  management processes to better guide and constrain departmentwide  systems modernizations.
For certification, the IRBs rely on documentation submitted by  appropriate chief management officers for the military departments and  precertification authorities for the defense agencies. This documentation  includes but is not limited to, a memorandum asserting that an investment  is compliant with the business enterprise architecture; an economic  viability analysis, which addresses the investment’s cost and benefits or  cost effectiveness; a business process reengineering determination, which  identifies the investment’s business process weaknesses, gaps, and  opportunities for process improvement; and a certification dashboard,  which includes cost and schedule status information. DOD guidance also  gives the boards broad authority in their certification reviews and actions,  thus allowing each board to review and consider whatever investment- related information that it deems appropriate. Moreover, Business  Transformation Agency and IRB officials told us that a board is not limited  in the conditions it can place on a program. After an IRB review, the  Defense Business Systems Management Committee will be notified of all  certification decisions and may elect to approve or disapprove a  certification. If a certification is approved, the committee will sign an  approval memo that warrants the ability to obligate the related funding for  the investment.
Under DOD’s approach, there are four types of certification actions:    Certify: An IRB certifies the modernization as fully meeting criteria  defined in the act and IRB investment review guidance, such as  compliance with the business enterprise architecture and the extent to  which the investment is consistent with component and department IT  investment portfolios, which are asserted by the component Chief  Management Officer.
Certify with conditions: An IRB certifies the modernization with the  understanding that it will address specific investment review board- imposed conditions. For example, the Army’s General Fund Enterprise   Business System was certified with a condition to develop a plan for  complying with the data standards of DOD’s Item Unique Identifier  Registry.
Recertify: An IRB certifies the obligation of additional modernization  funds for a previously-certified modernization investment. For example,  the Air Force’s Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System  was recertified in September 2010 for $26.7 million to be spent across  fiscal years 2010 and 2011. This recertification was in addition to the  approximately $22.7 million previously certified in December 2009. In  addition, a program must request IRB recertification if the program plans  to redistribute previously approved modernization funds among multiple  fiscal years and this redistribution will result in the funding for any given  fiscal year exceeding the previously approved amount by 10 percent or  more.
Decertify: An IRB may decertify or reduce the amount of modernization  funds available to an investment when (1) a component reduces funding  for a modernization by more than 10 percent of the originally certified  amount, (2) the period of certification for a modernization is shortened, or  (3) the entire amount of funding is not to be obligated as previously  certified. For example, the Special Operations Command’s Special  Operations Resource Business Information System had about $4.59 million  decertified because funding was reduced by more than 10 percent of the  originally certified amount. An investment review board may also decertify  a modernization after development has been terminated. For example,  DOD reported that approximately $2.77 million in research, development,  test and evaluation funding for the Army’s Wounded Warrior  Accountability System was decertified because it was determined that the  system provided a capability that could be better utilized under another  system.

		Summary of Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA Requirements

Congress included provisions in the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA that are aimed  at ensuring DOD’s development of a well-defined business enterprise  architecture and associated enterprise transition plan, as well as the  establishment and implementation of effective investment management  structures and processes. According to the act, DOD is required to    develop a business enterprise architecture and an enterprise transition  plan for implementing the architecture, identify each business system proposed for funding in DOD’s fiscal year  budget submissions,   delegate the responsibility for business systems to designated approval  authorities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, require each approval authority to establish investment review structures  and processes, and   effective October 1, 2005, not obligate appropriated funds for a defense  business system modernization with a total cost of more than $1 million  unless the approval authority certifies that the business system  modernization meets several conditions.
The Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA also requires that the Secretary of Defense  annually submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the  department’s compliance with the above provisions.

		Recent GAO Reviews of DOD’s Business Systems Modernization

Between 2005 and 2008, we reported that DOD had taken steps to comply  with key requirements of the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA relative to  architecture development, transition plan development, budgetary  disclosure, and investment review, and to satisfy relevant systems  modernization management guidance; however, each report also  concluded that much remained to be accomplished relative to the act’s  requirements and relevant guidance. We also reported that DOD had fully  satisfied the requirement concerning designated approval authorities and  continued to certify and approve modernizations costing more than $1  million. We concluded that the department had made progress in defining  and beginning to implement institutional management controls (i.e.,  processes, structures, and tools). We reiterated existing recommendations  to address each of the areas.
In May 2008, we reported that progress in establishing corporate  management controls needed to be replicated within the military  departments. For example, we reported that the military departments did  not yet have mature enterprise architecture programs. We also reported  that they had yet to fully establish key investment review structures and  had yet to define related policies and procedures for effectively  performing both project-level and portfolio-based investment  management. Because we had previously made recommendations to DOD  aimed at putting in place the management controls needed to fully comply  with the act and related federal guidance, we did not make additional  recommendations.
In May 2009, we reported that the pace of DOD’s efforts in defining and  implementing key institutional modernization management controls had  slowed compared with progress made in each of the last four years,  leaving much to be accomplished to fully implement the act’s requirements  and related guidance. For example:    The corporate business enterprise architecture had yet to be extended  (i.e., federated) to the entire family of business mission area architectures,  including using an independent verification and validation (IV&V) agent to  assess the components’ subsidiary architectures and federation efforts.
The fiscal year 2009 budget submission included some, but omitted other  key information about business system investments, in part because of the  lack of a reliable, comprehensive inventory of all defense business  systems.
The business system information used to support the development of the  transition plan and DOD’s budget requests, as well as certification and  annual reviews, was of questionable reliability.
DOD and the military departments had yet to fully define key practices  (i.e., policies and procedures) related to effectively performing both  project-level (Stage 2) and portfolio-based (Stage 3) investment  management as called for in the ITIM. For example, of the nine Stage 2 key  practices and five Stage 3 key practices, DOD had defined four and one,  respectively, while Air Force had defined three and one, respectively.  Subsequent to our reports, Army reported that it had (as of May 2009)  efforts planned and under way to develop effective investment  management processes, but the efforts did not fully satisfy any key  practices at the time.
Business system investments costing more than $1 million continue to be  certified and approved, but these decisions were not always based on  complete information.
Accordingly, we reiterated existing recommendations to address each of  these areas and further recommended that DOD, among other things,  improve the quality of investment-related information. DOD partially  agreed with our recommendations and described actions being planned or  under way to address them. DOD is currently in the process of addressing  these recommendations.
In May 2010, we reported that the scope and completeness of key  information provided in the report were limited. Specifically, the report  omitted information on the number of business system investment  certification actions taken during fiscal year 2009 and did not include  performance measures, such as measures of progress against program  cost, capability, and benefit commitments. Further, we concluded that  certification and approval decisions may not be sufficiently justified  because investments were certified and approved without conditions even  though our prior reports had identified program weaknesses that were  unresolved at the time of certification and approval. Accordingly, we  recommended that DOD ensure that the scope and content of future  annual reports to Congress on compliance with section 332 of the NDAA  for fiscal year 2005 be expanded to include cost, capability, and benefits  performance measures for each business system modernization  investment and actual performance against these measures as well as all  certification actions on its business system modernization investments  that were taken in the previous year by the department. In addition, we  recommended that DOD guidance be revised to include provisions that  require investment review board certification submissions to disclose  program weaknesses raised by us and the status of actions to address our  recommendations to correct the weaknesses to ensure that investment  review board certification actions are better informed and justified. DOD  agreed with our recommendations.

	DOD Continues to Strengthen Management of Its Business Systems Modernization, but Long-standing Challenges Remain

DOD continues to take steps to comply with the provisions of the Fiscal  Year 2005 NDAA and to satisfy relevant system modernization  management guidance. In particular, DOD released its fiscal year 2011  enterprise transition plan in December 2010, followed by an update to its  business enterprise architecture (version 8.0) in March 2011, and its  annual report to Congress in May 2011 describing steps that have been  taken and are planned relative to the act’s requirements. Collectively,  these steps address several statutory provisions and best practices  concerning the business enterprise architecture, transition plan, budgetary  disclosure, and investment review of systems costing in excess of $1  million. However, challenges that we identified in prior years still need to  be addressed in order for the department to be in full compliance with  guidance and NDAA requirements. Most notably, the department has yet to  extend and evolve its business enterprise architecture to the military  departments’ architectures and to fully define IT investment management  policies and procedures at the DOD enterprise and component levels.  DOD officials agreed that additional steps are needed. They said that the  lack of progress is due in part to the uncertainty and pending decisions  surrounding the roles and responsibilities of key organizations and senior  leadership positions, such as the Business Transformation Agency and  ASD(NII)/DOD CIO. However, until DOD fully implements these long- standing institutional modernization management controls required by the  act, addressed in GAO recommendations, and otherwise embodied in  relevant guidance, its business systems modernization will likely remain a  high-risk program. As a result, it is important that the department act  quickly to resolve pending decisions about roles and responsibilities.

		Adopting a Federated Approach to Architecture Continues to Be a Challenge with Much Remaining to Be Accomplished at the Component Level

Among other things, the act requires DOD to develop a business enterprise  architecture to cover all defense business systems and their related  functions and activities. According to the act, the architecture should  extend to all defense organizational components. In 2006, the department  adopted an incremental and federated approach to developing such an  architecture. Under this approach, the department releases new  architecture versions every year that include a corporate business  enterprise architecture that is to be augmented by a coherent family of  component architectures. As we have previously reported, such an  approach is consistent with best practices and appropriate given DOD’s  scope and size.
On March 18, 2011, DOD released its business enterprise architecture  version 8.0, which focuses on improving the department’s ability to  manage business operations from an end-to-end perspective. This version  continues to represent the thin layer of corporate architectural policies,  capabilities, rules, and standards that apply DOD-wide (i.e., to all DOD  federation members). This means that version 8.0 appropriately focuses on  addressing a limited set of enterprise-level (DOD-wide) priorities and  provides the overarching and common architectural context that the  distinct and autonomous member (i.e., component) architectures inherit.  Nevertheless, this also means that version 8.0 does not provide the total  federated family of DOD parent and subsidiary architectures for the  business mission area. Having such an architecture is dependent on each  military department (Air Force, Army, and Navy) having the capability to  manage its enterprise architecture and develop the necessary content.
To assist DOD in its architecture federation efforts, we have previously  made a number of recommendations. Specifically, in May 2007, we  recommended that the department include in its annual report, required  under the act, the results of its IV&V contractor’s assessment of the  completeness, consistency, understandability, and usability of the  federated family of architectures. While DOD agreed with the  recommendation, none of its annual reports since 2007, including its latest  annual report (issued in May 2011), have included this information.  According to Business Transformation Agency officials, IV&V activities  have focused on the corporate business enterprise architecture and not on  the entire federated family of architectures. Business Transformation  Agency officials provided us with a report dated March 25, 2011, which  summarizes selected IV&V contractor observations and recommendations  relative to version 8.0’s ability to provide a foundation for business  enterprise architecture federation. Overall, the summary confirms our  findings by stating that, while there has been previous work to develop a  business enterprise architecture federation plan, the execution of the  federation has yet to be completed. According to Business Transformation  Agency officials, the current requirement under the IV&V contract is to  provide analysis of the business enterprise architecture. There are no  plans for reviewing the military departments’ enterprise architectures.
The challenges that the department faces in federating its architecture and  the importance of disclosing to congressional defense committees the  state of its federation efforts are amplified by our prior report on the state  of the military departments’ enterprise architecture programs. Specifically,  we reported in May 2008 that none of the three military departments could  demonstrate through verifiable documentation that it had established all  of the core foundational commitments and capabilities needed to  effectively manage the development, maintenance, and implementation of  an architecture, as outlined in our Enterprise Architecture Management  Maturity Framework version 1.1.
Since then, each of the military departments has adopted a federated  approach to developing its respective architecture program. However, the  extent to which each of their architecture programs has improved since  2008 varies. For example, while all three have or are in the process of  establishing an executive committee with responsibility and accountability  for the department’s enterprise architecture, none have fully developed an  enterprise architecture methodology or have a well-defined business  enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide and constrain business  transformation initiatives. Table 5 provides a description of the military  departments’ progress relative to those elements that we previously  reported as not satisfied by one or more of the military departments.  (These elements were common to both versions 1.1 and 2.0 of our  Enterprise Architecture Maturity Management Framework.)
As described in the table, the military departments have made progress in  managing their respective enterprise architecture programs since we last  reported in 2008. However, each has yet to address key elements,  including developing the architecture content, in order to advance to a  level that can be considered fully mature. According to DOD officials, the  lack of progress in addressing key management elements has been due to  the uncertainty and pending decisions surrounding the roles and  responsibilities of key organizations and senior leadership positions. Air  Force officials attributed the state of its enterprise architecture program in  part to the lack of resources. Army officials also stated that a major  challenge has been the lack of resources (i.e., people and funding) due to  the shift of resources to higher priority initiatives. Navy officials stated  that there is not one overarching reason for the state of the Navy  enterprise architecture program but rather a number of reasons, such as  limited resources. Navy officials agreed that work remains to be done and  stated that they will continue to address the missing elements as they  move forward. Although all the military departments reported resources to  be a challenge, as noted earlier, DOD requested about $17.3 billion for its  business systems environment. Given the department’s prioritization of  about $17 billion, the military department architecture programs have not  received resources that they deemed sufficient to meet their needs. What  this means is that DOD, as a whole, is not as well positioned as it should  be to realize the significant benefits that a well-managed federation of  architectures could afford its business systems modernization efforts. We  have ongoing work looking at the status of each of the military  departments’ enterprise architecture programs relative to all the  applicable elements in our Enterprise Architecture Management  Maturity Framework version 2.0.

			Military Departments Continue to Develop Architecture Content, but Have yet to Develop Well-Defined Business Enterprise Architectures and Transition Plans

The Fiscal Year 2009 NDAA requires that each military department  develop a well-defined enterprisewide business architecture and transition  plan encompassing end-to-end business processes and that is capable of  providing accurate and timely information in support of business decisions  of the military department. However, while each of the departments has  taken steps to develop architecture content, none has a well-defined  business enterprise architecture and associated transition plan to guide  and constrain its business transformation initiatives. Individual examples  of progress made and challenges still facing each department are  discussed next.
Department of the Air Force  The Department of the Air Force is developing a corporate enterprise  architecture and 12 subordinate “sub-enterprise” architectures, each of  which is to be supported by subordinate domain architectures (i.e.,  acquisition), as appropriate. According to Air Force officials, work is still  under way to identify the respective domains and determining which  domains will support each sub-enterprise. According to these officials, the  Air Force business enterprise architecture was until now being developed  as a separate initiative but work is under way to integrate it with the Agile  Combat Support sub-enterprise architecture.
In 2008, we reported that, as part of its Agile Combat Support sub- enterprise architecture, the department had developed enterprise  architecture products that described some, but not all, elements of its  current and target environments as well as a transition plan for its  business area. Specifically, we reported that the Air Force had not defined  the architecture products that described its logistics enterprise  architecture for its current environment and its acquisition enterprise  architecture and health services enterprise architectures for its target  environments. We also reported that, while it had developed a sequencing  plan of systems, it had not defined a gap analysis describing how the  department would transition from the current to the target environment.  Since then, the department has developed architectural artifacts that  capture some of the missing business-related elements. For example, the  Air Force has identified acquisition transformation goals, health services  operational activities, and logistics systems and services, such as the  Commodity Management Service. In addition, the department has  identified and described business transformation initiatives (e.g.,  streamline civilian hiring process to meet DOD’s goal of 80 days by 2012).  However, not all important business enterprise architecture contents have  been described, including current functional capabilities and data objects  necessary for current business operations.
Furthermore, although the department has identified some business- related elements, it does not have a well-defined business enterprise  architecture and a transition plan to guide and constrain business  transformation initiatives. In particular, it has yet to develop architectural  products under its Air Force business enterprise architecture that would  describe its current and target business environments in terms of business,  information/data, application/service, technology, performance, and  security. According to the Air Force, it is focused instead on capturing and  using existing architecture artifacts that describe current and target  architectures associated with priority areas for improvement. In addition,  although the Air Force has outlined the business improvement priorities, it  has yet to develop an enterprise transition plan for the business  environment, including descriptions of gaps in terms of functional  capabilities, performance shortfalls of business processes, and potential  duplications of system functions.
The department also has yet to determine what, if any, of the business  architectural artifacts under the Agile Combat Support sub-enterprise is to  be leveraged for the development of the Air Force business enterprise  architecture. According to Air Force officials, the Air Force business  enterprise architecture and the Agile Combat Support sub-enterprise will  use one common set of artifacts, and the department has identified the  business architectural artifacts from the Agile Combat Support sub- enterprise to be merged with the Air Force business enterprise  architecture. However, we have yet to be provided with a listing of these  artifacts. In addition, according to these officials, discussion is still under  way on how the department plans to federate the sub-enterprise  architectures, including the Agile Combat Support, to the corporate  enterprise architecture.
According to Air Force officials, in the future, the Air Force business  enterprise architecture will focus on end-to-end processes with defined  outputs and it will include an alignment of business systems to these end- to-end business processes. Also, according to the Air Force, it plans to use  an architecture-based approach to align current Air Force capabilities and  systems against specific business processes to identify duplication or gaps  in process-based capabilities. According to the department, an  implementation plan will be developed by the end of fiscal year 2011.
Without architectural descriptions of current and target business  environments and an associated transition plan, as well as a clear picture  of how to leverage prior content in development of the Air Force business  enterprise architecture, the department is not well positioned to realize  the significant benefits that a well-defined enterprisewide business  architecture and transition plan can provide, including objective decision  making regarding capability enhancements across end-to-end business  processes and resources allocation across business system investments.
The Department of the Army has yet to develop or establish plans for  developing a corporate enterprise architecture that identifies and  describes rules, policies, procedures, and services to be federated across  the Army. Instead, the department’s approach consists of developing three  separate and distinct segment architectures (i.e., battle command,  networks, and generating force), each of which is being developed by  separate department organizational units and is supported by individual  segment and solution architectures. According to department officials, the  department’s current approach to developing its business enterprise  architecture calls for this content to be developed as part of the generating  force enterprise architecture effort.
In 2008, we reported that Army had not defined its current and target  business environments and developed a transition plan. To its credit, the  department has since made progress in developing its first version of the  Army’s business enterprise architecture. Specifically, it has defined the  scope of this architecture, which comprises traditional business functions  such as acquisition, logistics, financial management, human capital  management, and installation and environment. The scope of the Army’s  business enterprise architecture is also extended to include training and  sub-segments of the LandWarNet/Battle Command functions. This  provides logical groupings of the key business activities the department  performs, and can be used to identify subbordinate architectures that  support the department’s generating force mission area. In addition, the  architecture includes the 15 end-to-end business processes listed in the  DOD business enterprise architecture and Army plans to use these  processes to guide and constrain business process modeling efforts and  identify business systems that are to be integrated. This is consistent with  DOD’s approach of using end-to-end business processes to optimize  business processes and the systems that support them. Further, the  department has outlined its business transformation initiatives (e.g.,  civilian hiring reform) to accelerate business process improvement and  cost savings.
However, Army does not have a well-defined business enterprise  architecture and a transition plan to guide and constrain business  transformation initiatives. In particular, although the first version provides  systems mappings to several end-to-end business processes (e.g., Procure- to-Pay), it has yet to provide evidence of mappings of system functions to  all the end-to-end business processes, such as Service Request-to- Resolution. According to officials, the mapping of system functions to  process steps will take place when the department performs detailed  business process mapping. Further, the first version does not describe  how end-to-end business processes will be implemented, including  principles and guidance for implementing technologies that would support  planned business systems investments. Without this, there is an increased  risk of incompatible implementation and/or not being able to leverage the  most benefits from the technologies.
The Army has also made progress in developing aspects of a business  transition plan. For example, it identifies business transformation  initiatives, such as civilian hiring reform, and describes results or changes  to business operations to be achieved by the business transformation  initiatives. It also includes diagrams that depict the migration from legacy  business systems to commercial off-the-shelf enterprise resource planning  solutions. Such diagrams provide a life cycle view of enterprise systems  resources, including describing how each system evolves over time.  However, the plan still does not include important content such as gap  analyses at the enterprise level and for each business function (e.g.  acquisition, financial management) and timelines for addressing the gaps.  A gap analysis is an assessment of the differences between the current and  target architectures. For example, a performance gap analysis identifies  performance measures (e.g., effectiveness) of a business process,  highlights which performance measures are not being met in the current  environment, and describes performance expectations for these measures  in the target environment, thereby describing expected performance  improvements of the business process. This performance gap analysis  should also identify the business process activities or steps that need to be  changed to achieve the future performance expectations. As such, these  gap analyses are important to help identify changes or adjustments that  are necessary at the enterprise level and within each business function to  achieve desired business performance results and mission outcomes.
The Department of the Navy’s enterprise architecture is comprised of  corporate architecture products, which include applicable laws,  regulations, and policies as well as enterprisewide reference models and  architecture content and subordinate architectures, which comprise nine  segment architectures, with each addressing a distinct functional area  such as logistics and command and control. These subordinate  architectures are to be developed by communities of practice groups that  have yet to be formally established. According to Navy officials, the  current approach calls for the Navy business enterprise architecture  content to be incorporated into the corporate enterprise architecture and  applicable segment architectures (e.g., corporate management and  support, force support, and logistics segment architectures), as  appropriate.
In 2008, our analysis showed that Navy had developed enterprise  architecture products that describe some, but not all, elements of its  current and target environments as well as a transition plan for its  business area. Specifically, we found that the Navy had not defined its  current core business processes or provided a comprehensive picture of  its current business problems that the department needs to address. We  also found that it had yet to develop a well-defined target architecture,  including the purpose and scope of all the functional areas (e.g., joint  logistics and planning). In addition, we also found that, while the  department had developed a transition plan as part of its architecture, the  plan was not based on a gap analysis between the current and target  environments. This is important to lay out a road map for optimizing  mission performance and transforming business operations by  systematically implementing changes to technologies and processes.
Since 2008, Navy has identified its business segments such as logistics and  force support, representing some of its core business processes. In  addition, according to Navy officials, it plans to establish communities of  practice to oversee the development of segment reference architectures  and a road map for developing these architectures. It has also added  additional business-related architecture content. For example, the  architecture includes the Navy’s Common Operational Activity List that  specifies some business activities related to identifying and resolving  accounting records discrepancies. Such operational activities provide a  basis from which the department identifies the business activities or  functions to be reused (and optimized) across the department and those  activities or functions that remain unique to each business segment or  domain.
Nonetheless, Navy does not have a well-defined enterprisewide business  architecture and transition plan to guide and constrain business  transformation initiatives. In particular, the department has not developed  a business enterprise architecture that provides a clear and  comprehensive picture of its current and target business environments.  For example, the enterprise architecture does not describe current and  target business capabilities, systems that are to be integrated to support  DOD end-to-end business processes, and information exchange  requirements among business activities. According to Navy officials, rather  than capturing the department’s current and target business environments,  the focus of Navy’s enterprise architecture is to develop artifacts that are  “actionable” such as enterprise rules for assessing compliance of business  systems. While such actionable artifacts provide value, they do not provide  a comprehensive and systematic approach for transforming business  operations. Further, there is no evidence that the department has  documented current problems or defined the scope and purpose for all of  the business-related segment reference architectures. Documenting  current problems will enable the Navy to identify opportunities (e.g., new  applications, new processes, or new management approaches) for  improvement and to assess whether transformation efforts address these  problems.
Moreover, although Navy has developed an enterprise transition plan, the  plan is not well-defined and does not include an enterprise gap analysis  that identifies the differences between the current and target business  architectures, particularly the critical differences or shortfalls that affect  the successful accomplishment of the department’s mission. According to  officials, gaps and shortfalls in the current department programs can be  identified through enterprise architecture compliance assessments, and  enterprise architecture waivers are granted with specific expiration dates  and conditions that are to be met to address the gaps and shortfalls.  Nevertheless, the focus of these compliance assessments is on gaps and  shortfalls of individual programs (e.g., limited system availability) and not  on gaps and shortfalls from the perspective of end-to-end business  processes (e.g., process gaps) that are needed to achieve the target  environment. Moreover, a well-defined business enterprise architecture  and transition plan is essential for establishing an implementation road  map to address key gaps and shortfalls that can significantly impact  business operations across the department and for evolving and  developing business systems that optimize their mission value.

		Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Submission Did Not Include Key Information on All Business Systems

Among other things, the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA requires DOD’s annual IT  budget submission to include key information on each business system for  which funding is being requested, such as the system’s designated  approval authority and the appropriation type and amount of funds  associated with modernization (i.e., development) and current services  (i.e., operations and maintenance).
The department’s fiscal year 2012 budget submission includes a range of  information for 1,637 business system investments. Of these, 272 involve  development and modernization. For each of the 272, the information  provided includes the system’s name, approval authority, and  appropriation type. The submission also identifies the amount of the fiscal  year 2012 request that is for development and modernization versus  operations and maintenance. For systems in excess of $1 million in  modernization funding, the submission also cites its certification status  (e.g., approved, approved with conditions, approved decertification close- out, and withdrawn) and the Defense Business Systems Management  Committee approval date, where applicable.
However, similar to prior budget submissions, the fiscal year 2012 budget  submission still does not reflect all business system investments. To  prepare the submission, DOD relied on business system investment  information (e.g., funds requested, mission area, and system description)  that is entered by the components into DOD’s Select and Native  Programming Data Input System—Information Technology (SNAP-IT). In  accordance with DOD guidance and according to ASD(NII)/DOD CIO  officials, the business systems listed in SNAP-IT should match the systems  listed in the Defense Information Technology Portfolio Repository  (DITPR)—the department’s authoritative business systems inventory.  However, the DITPR data provided by DOD in March 2011 included 2,258  business systems. Therefore, SNAP-IT does not reflect about 620 business  systems that are identified in DITPR.
We previously reported that the information between SNAP-IT and DITPR  were not consistent and accordingly made a recommendation for DOD to  develop and implement plans for reconciling and validating the  completeness and reliability of information in its DITPR and SNAP-IT  system data repositories, and to include information on the status of these  efforts in the department’s fiscal year 2010 report in response to the act.  DOD agreed with the need to reconcile information between the two  repositories and stated that it had begun to take actions to address this.  However, according to the Office of the ASD(NII)/DOD CIO, efforts to  provide automated SNAP-IT and DITPR integration work were delayed  due to increased SNAP-IT requirements in supporting the fiscal year 2012  budget submission and ongoing reorganization efforts within DOD. The  department plans to restart the process of integrating the two systems  beginning in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. Until DOD has a reliable,  comprehensive inventory of all defense business systems, it will not be  able to ensure the completeness and reliability of the department’s IT  budget submissions. Moreover, the lack of current and accurate  information increases the risk of oversight decisions that are not prudent  and justified.

		DOD Has Continued to Establish Investment Management Processes but Has Yet to Fully Define and Implement Key Practices

Since our 2009 report, DOD has continued to establish investment  management processes but has not fully defined all key practices. Further,  with regard to certifying and overseeing investments—two key DOD IT  management processes for selecting, managing, and monitoring  investments—the department largely followed these processes for four  department investments we reviewed, but key steps integral to these  processes were not performed. Until DOD fully defines these key practices  and performs integral key steps, it is unlikely that the department’s  reported 2,258 business system investments—totaling $17.4 billion in fiscal  year 2011—will be managed in an effective manner that maximizes  mission performance while minimizing or eliminating system overlap and  duplication.

			DOD Has Continued to Establish Effective Investment Management Processes, but Has Yet to Fully Define Many Key Processes and Associated Policies and Procedures

Since we reported in 2009, DOD has continued to make progress in  establishing the kind of investment management processes and associated  key practices (i.e., policies and procedures) called for in the act and our  ITIM framework as being integral to effective IT investment management.  Specifically, since 2009, Air Force, Navy, and Army have implemented  additional key practices associated with effectively managing investments  as individual business system programs (Stage 2) and as portfolios of  programs (Stage 3), while the DOD-level organizations (herein referred to  as DOD enterprise) responsible for DOD-level processes have not. With  regard to Stage 2 practices, Navy and Army implemented two key  practices, and Air Force implemented one such practice. For Stage 3, Navy  implemented one key practice. For those key practices that have yet to be  fully defined, DOD enterprise and the military departments have in large  part partially defined these practices. Nonetheless, even with this  progress, DOD enterprise and the military departments have yet to fully  define a majority of the Stage 2 and Stage 3 practices.
Table 6 provides a summary (by DOD enterprise and each military  department) of the key Stage 2 practices implemented since 2009 along  with those practices we reported in 2009 as having been implemented. The  table also includes those practices yet to be implemented. As such, table 6  provides an overall snapshot of where DOD enterprise and the military  departments stand with regard to building their investment management  foundation, including the ability to manage investments as individual  business system programs.
As shown in the table, since 2009:    DOD enterprise has not implemented any additional key practices.
Air Force has implemented one key practice—documenting policies for  meeting business needs. Specifically, in its IT Investment Review Guide,  Air Force defines a process for ensuring that IT business system  investments support the department’s ongoing and future business needs.  This process includes having an IRB—consisting of senior executives from  IT and functional business units, including the Office of the Air Force  CIO—to regularly review all business systems, including those in  operations and maintenance, to assess their alignment with business needs  using factors such as how well investments support the Air Force’s  mission and their strategic value and risk.
Navy has implemented two additional key practices—(1) instituting an  enterprisewide IT investment board and (2) documenting policies for  meeting business needs. Specifically, in March 2011, Navy established an  Information Enterprise Governance Board—consisting of senior  executives from IT and functional business units, including the Navy  CIO—to serve as a business systems IRB. Among other things, the board is  responsible for business system investment governance, including  approving and annually reviewing business system investments. In  addition, for meeting business needs, Navy’s Investment Review Guide  dated October 2009 defines a process for conducting annual reviews of  ongoing IT investments to ensure they support ongoing and future  business needs. The process calls for the annual review of all business  systems, including those in operations and maintenance, to demonstrate  that they support ongoing and future business needs by, among other  things, complying with applicable strategic business guidance such as  DOD’s business enterprise architecture (BEA).
Army has implemented two key practices associated with capturing  investment information. First, it has established policies and procedures  for collecting information about the department’s investments.  Specifically, Army’s investment review guide dated March 2010 defines  procedures directing Army’s system owners to submit, update, and  maintain IT projects and system information in a departmental data  repository called the Army Portfolio Management Solution. Second, Army  has assigned responsibility for investment information collection and  accuracy. Specifically, Army’s investment review guide states that system  owners are responsible for the accuracy of their data in the repository.
With regard to Stage 3 key practices, the following table provides a  summary (by DOD enterprise and each military department) of the key  practices implemented since 2009 and those practices that have yet to be  implemented. Table 7 provides an overall snapshot of where DOD  enterprise and the military departments stand in having the capability to  build a complete investment portfolio.
As shown in the table, although DOD enterprise, Air Force, and Army have  not implemented additional key practices, Navy has implemented one key  practice associated with defining portfolio criteria—assigning  responsibility to an individual or group to manage the development and  modification of IT portfolio selection criteria. Specifically, Navy developed   guidance that assigns Mission Area Leads and Functional Area  Managers with responsibility for portfolio selection criteria.
With regard to the Stage 2 and Stage 3 key practices that have yet to be  fully implemented, it is important to note that DOD and the military  departments have partially defined these practices. For example, for  selection, DOD established a process that calls for investments involving  more than $1 million in obligations to be certified and approved before  funds are to be expended. Specifically, the process calls for investments to  be, among other things, compliant with DOD’s BEA and be economically  justified. However, the process does not fully address all aspects of the  selection key practice. For example, the process does not specify how the  IRBs are to use the full range of cost, schedule, and benefit data in making  selection (i.e., certification) decisions, as called for in our ITIM  framework.
In addition, for oversight, DOD has established an oversight process that  calls for, among other things, investments to be reviewed annually to  assess how each is performing. As part of the process, the IRBs assess  program performance relative to cost, schedule, and capability  commitments. However, DOD’s oversight process does not provide  sufficient visibility into the military department’s investment management  activities, including its reviews of systems in operations and maintenance  and smaller investments, commonly referred to as Tier 4 investments.
Nonetheless, DOD enterprise and the military departments have still not  fully defined these Stage 2 and 3 key practices. Specifically, with regard to  the nine Stage 2 practices, DOD enterprise, Air Force, and Navy, as shown  in table 6, have yet to fully define five key practices (or 56 percent of the  practices), and Army has yet to do so for seven (or 78 percent) of the  practices.
With regard to the five Stage 3 practices, DOD enterprise, Air Force, and  Navy, as shown in table 7, have yet to fully define four key practices (or 80  percent of the practices), and Army has yet to do so for any (100 percent)  of the practices.
Officials from DOD enterprise and the military departments attributed the  incomplete state of their IT investment management processes to the  following:    DOD enterprise officials said the condition of its processes, including the  lack of progress since 2009, was due in part to current ongoing DOD  efforts to reorganize the business systems governance organizations (e.g.,  the Business Transformation Agency) that are responsible for  implementing IT investment management at the DOD enterprise level. As  noted earlier, in August 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced the  plans to disestablish the Business Transformation Agency and that the  functions of the Business Transformation Agency, such as its IT  investment management function, be reviewed and transferred to other  organizations in DOD, as appropriate. The DOD officials stated that these  implementation plans have yet to be finalized and have resulted in their  investment management implementation efforts being delayed. These  officials added that they are aware of the absence of documented project- level and portfolio-level management practices; they also said they are  currently working on developing policies and procedures to address the  missing processes and practices but were not able to provide us with  milestones and a plan with defined steps for when the policies and  procedures were to be completed.
Air Force and Navy officials said their investment management  implementation efforts were taking longer than originally planned given  their workload and other priorities assigned to them since initiating  investment management efforts. They also acknowledged that their  processes were missing certain documented project-level and portfolio- level management policies and procedures and said they were in the  process of developing policies and procedures to address these missing  processes and practices. In particular, Air Force officials stated that they  planned to have their policies and procedures approved and finalized by  October 2011.
Army officials said the state of their IT investment management process is  due to the fact that the department focused on first establishing selected  institutional capabilities—such as defining roles and responsibilities and  establishing a department-level IRB—rather than attempting to do  everything at once. The officials added that once its initial steps are  completed, Army intends to then focus on implementing remaining Stage 2  and three key processes and practices. Specifically, these officials said  that they are aware that Army lacks a military department-level IRB and  added that until now they have been relying on functional area experts to  review investments before they are sent to the DOD IRBs. They also  acknowledged that Army is missing certain documented project-level and  portfolio-level management policies and procedures. They further stated  that the department is currently working on guidance to address these  missing items with the goal of having it approved and finalized by August  2011.
As discussed in our ITIM framework and previous reports on DOD’s  investment management of its business systems, adequately documenting  both policies and associated procedures that govern how an organization  manages its IT projects and investment portfolios is important because  doing so provides the basis for rigor, discipline, and repeatability in how  investments are selected and controlled across the entire organization.  Until DOD fully defines missing policies and procedures, it is unlikely that  the department’s reported 2,258 business systems will be managed in a  consistent, repeatable, and effective manner that, among other things,  maximizes mission performance while minimizing or eliminating system  overlap and duplication. To this point, there is evidence showing that DOD  is not managing its systems in this manner. For example, DOD reported  that of its 79 major business and other IT investments, roughly a third are  encountering cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls requiring  immediate and sustained management attention. In addition, we have  consistently reported for some time that DOD’s business system  environment has been characterized by (1) little standardization, (2)  multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the same data stored in  multiple systems, and (4) manual data entry into multiple systems.  Because DOD spends over $10 billion each year on its business systems  and related IT infrastructure, the potential for identifying and avoiding the  costs associated with duplicative functionality across its business system  investments is significant.

			DOD Has Largely Followed Its Certification and Oversight Processes for the Investments Under Review, but Validation and Other Key Steps Were Not Performed

As discussed, certification and oversight are key DOD processes for  selecting, and overseeing IT investments. DOD guidance calls for  investments to be certified and approved before funds are to be expended  on modernization activities. More specifically, the guidance states that  investments involving more than $1 million in obligations are to be  certified by designated approval authorities and as part of that  certification, authority officials are to attest that each investment  is compliant with DOD’s BEA, including all relevant architecture products,  such as products that specify the technical standards needed to promote  interoperability among related systems or examine overlaps with other  business systems; is economically justified, based on an economic viability analysis  developed using disciplined and rigorous cost estimating practices; and   has undergone sufficient business process reengineering analysis,  including identifying and developing approaches to streamlining and  improving involved processes.
As part of each of these three requirements, we have said it is important  for designated approval authorities to validate the results of BEA and  other assessments to ensure investment decision making is based on  accurate and reliable information. More specifically, we previously  reported that DOD had not been performing this step and made  recommendations that they do so. DOD agreed with our findings and  recommendations, and stated that it planned to assign validation  responsibilities and issue guidance that describes the methodology for  performing validation activities but were not able to provide a date for  when this would be completed.
Once investments have been certified, DOD guidance calls for investments  to be effectively overseen. This includes reviewing annually the progress  of investments using predefined criteria and checkpoints, in meeting cost,  schedule, risk, and benefit expectations.
Consistent with this, DOD guidance calls for IRBs to annually review  certified investments and in doing so, to focus on program performance  against cost, schedule, and performance baselines, and progress in  meeting the certification conditions discussed. Our ITIM research and  experience with federal agencies also shows that it is important for  oversight and other decisionmaking authorities to validate performance  information used to make decisions so that investment decision making is  based on accurate and reliable information.
DOD largely followed the certification process for each of the four  investments we reviewed, but did not perform validation and other key  aspects of the process. Specifically:  BEA compliance. DOD enterprise and the military departments took  steps to assess BEA compliance of their respective systems. This included  following DOD guidance (the appropriate version of DOD’s BEA  Compliance Guidance) and using an automated tool (called Architecture  Compliance and Requirements Traceability) to determine and report on  the extent of each system’s architectural compliance. In addition, in each  case, once the BEA assessment had been completed, the appropriate DOD  enterprise and military department precertification authorities asserted  (via memorandum of certification) that each system was compliant with  DOD’s BEA.
For example, on the Project Management Resource Tool (PMRT) project,  Air Force followed the BEA compliance guidance and used the  Architecture Compliance and Requirements Traceability tool to develop a  compliance report that mapped BEA activities to PMRT’s capabilities. In  August 2010, Air Force’s Director of Business Transformation and Deputy  Chief Management Officer stated in a supporting precertification  memorandum that this information was used to assert that PMRT was  compliant with DOD’s BEA.
In another example, on the Defense Travel System, DOD also assessed  BEA compliance by using the BEA Compliance Guidance and the  Architecture Compliance and Requirements Traceability tool to develop a  report showing extent of compliance. In an October 2010, precertification  memo, DOD’s CIO said this information was used to assert that the system  was compliant with DOD’s BEA.
Although DOD took these steps to certify BEA compliance, it did not take  other key steps. For example, DOD and component designated approval  authorities did not validate the assessments and assertions. Specifically,  the BEA compliance assessments performed on the investments under  review were not validated by DOD certification and approval entities.  Although this was not done, the systems were nevertheless certified as  compliant. We reported on this weakness in 2008 and made  recommendations to DOD to, among other things, explicitly assign  responsibility for validating program BEA compliance assessments and  issue guidance that describes the methodology for performing such  validation activities. To date, DOD has yet to implement these  recommendations. However, DOD officials told us the department has  actions planned or underway to address these recommendations, although  they were not able to provide milestones for when this would be  accomplished.
In addition, our 2008 report showed that DOD BEA assessments did not  include all relevant architecture products, such as products that specify  the technical standards needed to promote interoperability among related  systems or examine overlaps with other business systems. Despite the  limited assessments, DOD nonetheless certified the investments as BEA  compliant even though they did not adequately demonstrate such  compliance. Accordingly, we have made recommendations to DOD to  revise its BEA compliance guidance, among other things, to address these  shortfalls. To date, DOD has yet to implement the recommendations.  However, DOD officials said the department has actions planned or  underway to address the recommendations but they were not able to  provide a date for when this would be completed.
Economic viability analysis. For the investments under review, DOD  enterprise and the military departments used DOD’s IT Investment Review  Process Guidance (dated January 2009) that specifies how investment  economic viability is to be analyzed and assessed. They also used a related  automated tool designed to support the development of such analyses.  Once the analyses had been performed, the precertification authorities for  each of the systems asserted that the efforts had been reviewed, and  showed the investments were economically justified to proceed with  obligating funds.
For example, on the Logistics Modernization Program, Army used DOD’s  guidance to conduct its economic viability analysis. The Army also used  the economic viability tool to complete the analysis. In addition, in  December 2010 memorandum, the Army’s Chief Management Officer  asserted that the economic viability analysis had been completed, and  showed the investment was justified to proceed with obligating funds.
In another example, on the Navy Enterprise Resource Planning system,  Navy used the January 2009 DOD guidance to comply with the economic  viability analysis requirement and used the economic viability tool to  complete the analysis. Further, in a July 2010 memo, the Navy’s Chief  Management Officer asserted that the investment’s economic viability  analysis had been completed, and showed the investment was justified to  obligate funds.
Although DOD enterprise and the military departments took these steps to  justify the investments, they did not perform other key steps. Specifically,  DOD enterprise and the military departments did not use important cost  estimating practices critical to developing such analyses. For example, in  developing its economic justification for its ERP system, Navy did not  implement key aspects of earned value management or develop risk  mitigation strategies to address this risk. We have previously reported on  these weaknesses and made recommendations to address them. Although  the recommendations are still open, DOD enterprise and military  department officials have said they have actions planned and under way to  address the recommendations. However, they were not able to provide a  timetable for when the actions are to be completed.
Business process reengineering assessment. For the investments  under review, DOD enterprise and the military departments used DOD’s  Business Process Reengineering Guidance (dated April 2011) to assess  whether the investments complied with the business process  reengineering requirement. Consistent with the guidance, DOD enterprise  and the military departments completed questionnaires (contained in the  guidance) that aim to help DOD enterprise and the military departments  identify and develop approaches to streamlining and improving existing  business processes. Once these assessments had been completed, the  DOD enterprise and military department precertification authorities  asserted that business process reengineering assessments had been  performed.
For example, on the PMRT project, Air Force used the DOD reengineering  guidance to assess whether there were ways to streamline and improve  existing business processes to be supported by the system investment. Air  Force completed the assessment in July 2010. Air Force reported that as  part of this assessment, it had representatives from the offices of the CIO  and the Deputy Chief Management Officer review the completed  assessment questionnaire and supporting documentation to determine  whether the project team had followed the reengineering requirement.  Subsequently, in August 2010, the Air Force’s Director of Business  Transformation and the Deputy Chief Management Officer used this  information to assert that sufficient business process reengineering had  been conducted in order for the program to obligate investment funding.
While DOD enterprise and military department precertification authorities  largely followed DOD’s guidance, they did not perform the key step of  validating the results of these reengineering assessments to ensure they,  among other things, accurately assessed process weaknesses and  identified opportunities to streamline and improve affected processes. We  have ongoing work on actions the Air Force and Army have taken to  comply with statutory requirements regarding business process  reengineering.
The reason DOD did not follow key aspects of the certification process— primarily not validating assessment results—is attributed in part to  unclear roles and responsibilities. According to military department  officials responsible for the investments we reviewed, validation activities  did not occur because DOD policy and guidance does not explicitly require  them to be performed and there is no guidance that specifies how  assessments should be validated. According to DOD officials, the oversight  and designated approval authorities did not validate the DOD enterprise- level assessments and assertions because DOD policy and guidance has  not yet been revised to require these authorities to do so. Consequently,  until the policy and guidance is updated and roles and responsibilities with  regard to who is to perform validation functions are clearly defined, there  is an increased risk that DOD will be making business system investment  decisions based on information that is inaccurate and unreliable.
For the investments under review, DOD largely followed its oversight  process but did not perform an important validation activity. Specifically,  DOD’s oversight process (as specified in the January 2009 Investment  Review Guide) calls for investments to be reviewed annually to assess  how each is performing. As part of this process, the IRBs assess program  performance relative to, among other things, cost, schedule, and capability  commitments. The IRBs do this using updated information provided by the  programs and screened by DOD enterprise and military department  precertification authorities for completeness. These oversight reviews are  important because an investment board should have visibility into each  project’s performance and progress toward predefined cost, schedule, and  benefit expectations as well as each project’s exposure to risk. Without  such visibility and validated information, organizations risk making  investment decisions that are inconsistent and are not fully grounded in  reliable and accurate data.
Consistent with this direction, DOD conducted (or is planning to conduct)  annual reviews for the investments we reviewed. For example, DOD  conducted annual reviews for the Defense Travel System in December  2010 and the Navy Enterprise Resource Planning system in July 2010. In  doing these reviews, DOD assessed investment performance using the  cost, schedule, and performance information provided by the programs  and screened by precertification authorities.
Although DOD largely followed its oversight process, it did not validate  the cost, schedule, and performance information used for decision  making. This finding is consistent with our previous report noting that  DOD’s oversight process does not provide for sufficient visibility into the  military department’s investment management activities, including its  reviews of systems in operations and maintenance and smaller  investments, commonly referred to as Tier 4 investments. Such visibility is  important because DOD reports that only 100 of approximately 2,258 total  business systems are annually reviewed by the IRBs. This means that the  vast majority of business systems are overseen only within the military  departments. Accordingly, we have made recommendations to address  this area. DOD officials said they plan to address the recommendations but  were unable to provide a schedule for when this work is to be completed.
In explaining why the information used by the IRBs is not validated, DOD  officials cited the same reasons—outdated policy and guidance and  unclear roles and responsibilities—as those provided for the lack of  validation in the investment certification process. Consequently, until such  roles and responsibilities are clarified, DOD faces increased risk that it will  not effectively be able to oversee its extensive business systems  investments.

		DOD’s Annual Report Describes Certification Actions for Its Business System Investments

Among other things, the act requires DOD to submit an annual report to  congressional committees on DOD’s compliance with requirements of the  act, including a description of specific actions the department has taken  on each business system modernization investment submitted for  certification. The act further requires that such investments involving  more than $1 million in obligations must be certified by a designated  approval authority as meeting specific criteria, such as demonstrating  compliance with DOD’s business enterprise architecture. Further, the act  requires the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to  approve each of these certifications.
In May 2010, we reported that the department’s annual report did not  discuss certification actions for all systems on which certification actions  had been taken, primarily excluding business system recertifications. We  recommended the Deputy Secretary of Defense expand future DOD annual  reports to Congress to include all certification actions that had been taken  in the previous year by the department on its business system  modernization investments. DOD agreed with our recommendation and  stated that it would include recertifications in future reports. Since then,  the department has addressed this recommendation by including all types  of certification actions in its 2011 annual report, including recertification  actions. As it has since 2005, DOD continues to certify and approve  business system modernization investments in excess of $1 million.
DOD’s annual report identifies IRB certification actions associated with  137 business system investments that underwent the IRB certification and  Defense Business Systems Management Committee approval process for  fiscal year 2010 and cost approximately $1.3 billion. Specifically, the  annual report accurately states that during fiscal year 2010, 52 unique  business system modernizations were certified—35 with and 17 without  conditions. For the 35 systems, 32 conditions were reported. Examples of  conditions cited in the report are the need for business enterprise  architecture compliance to improve interoperability and integration of  cross-functional processes and improved program management functions.  The report also identifies 93 recertifications and 28 decertifications. For  example, the Navy’s Enterprise Resource Planning system had about $7.6  million recertified in early August and another $96.6 million recertified  later in the month.
While DOD has made progress by reporting its certification actions, the  basis for these certification actions and subsequent approvals is limited as  discussed in the previous section.

	Conclusions

A well-defined federated architecture and accompanying transition plans  for the business mission area, along with well-defined investment  management policies and procedures across all levels of the department,  are critical to effectively addressing DOD’s business systems  modernization high-risk area. Relatedly, it is important for the department  to obtain independent assessments of the completeness, consistency,  understandability, and usability of the federated family of business mission  area architectures, including associated transition plans. Equally  important is for the department to actually implement its architecture and  investment management controls in the years ahead on each and every  business system investment, and in doing so ensure that it has reliable  information on each investment on which to base executive decision  making.
DOD has continued to take steps in defining and implementing these key  institutional modernization management controls, but challenges that we  identified in prior years still need to be addressed. Specifically, while DOD  continues to release updates to its corporate enterprise architecture, the  architecture has yet to be federated through development of aligned  subordinate architectures for each of the military departments. In this  regard, each of the military departments has made progress in managing  its respective architecture program, but there are still limitations in the  scope and completeness, as well as the immaturity of the military  department architecture programs, including the completeness of their  own transition plans. In addition, while DOD continues to establish  investment management processes, the DOD enterprise and the military  departments’ approaches to business systems investment management  still lacks the defined policies and procedures to be considered effective  investment selection, control, and evaluation mechanisms. Finally,  information used to support the development of DOD’s budget requests, as  well as to inform certification decisions, is still of questionable reliability.  Collectively, these long-standing limitations in the department’s  institutional modernization management controls continue to put the  billions of dollars spent annually on thousands of business system  investments at risk. Our previous recommendations to the department  have been aimed at accomplishing these and other important activities  related to its business systems modernization. To the department’s credit,  it has agreed with these recommendations and is committed to  implementing them.
However, the state of progress of DOD and military department business  system modernization efforts is due, in part, to uncertainty and pending  decisions surrounding the roles and responsibilities of key organizations  and senior leadership positions. Accordingly, it is essential that DOD  resolve these matters expeditiously, as doing so is on the department’s  critical path for fully establishing the full range of institutional  management controls needed to address its business systems  modernization high-risk area.

	Recommendation for Executive Action

Because we have existing recommendations that address the institutional  management control weaknesses discussed in this report, we are making  no further recommendations in these areas.
To address the uncertainty and pending decisions surrounding the roles  and responsibilities of key organizations, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense expeditiously complete the implementation of the  announced transfer of functions of the Business Transformation Agency  and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Information Integration/Department of Defense CIO and provide  specificity as to when and where these functions will be transferred.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Deputy Chief  Management Officer and reprinted in appendix II, the department agreed  with our recommendation and stated that it expects to announce the  implementation details concerning the transfer of functions of the  Business Transformation Agency and the Office of the Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Department of  Defense CIO prior to June 30, 2011.
We support the department’s efforts to address our recommendation and  reiterate the importance of following through in implementing the  recommendation within the stated time frame.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the  Secretary of Defense. This report will also be available at no charge on our  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions on matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-6304 or melvinv@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

As agreed with congressional defense committees, our objective was to  assess the actions by the Department of Defense (DOD) to comply with  provisions of section 332 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. This included (1) developing a  business enterprise architecture and a transition plan for implementing the  architecture, (2) identifying systems information in its annual budget  submission, (3) establishing a system investment approval and  accountability structure along with an investment review process, and (4)  certifying and approving any system modernizations costing in excess of  $1 million. (See the background section of this report for additional  information on the act’s requirements.) Our methodology relative to each  of these four provisions is as follows:    To address the architecture and transition plan provision, we focused on  the progress the departments of the Air Force, Army, and Navy have made  in developing their respective parts of the federated DOD business  enterprise architecture. In doing so, we compared the baseline enterprise  architecture program status information as presented in our 2008 report,  with information on the current status of each military department’s  enterprise architecture program. In doing so, we focused on those select  elements that were either similar or slightly modified across versions 1.1  and 2.0 of our Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity  Framework  and that were either partially or not satisfied by one or more  of the military departments. Specifically, we reviewed written responses  and supporting documentation on steps completed, under way, or planned  from each military department to identify examples of progress made in  addressing those elements that we had previously identified as being not  satisfied or partially satisfied. We also reviewed business architectural  artifacts to determine the progress each department had made in  developing their respective business architectural content since we last  reported in 2008. We interviewed cognizant DOD officials to validate the  responses and identify any discrepancies. Further, we reviewed the  independent verification and validation contractor’s statement of work  and other work products to determine whether they addressed the  department’s federated family of corporate and subordinate architectures.
To determine whether DOD’s fiscal year 2012 IT budget submission was  prepared in accordance with the criteria set forth in the act, we reviewed  and analyzed the Report on Defense Business System Modernization FY  2005 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 332, dated March 2011  and compared it to the specific requirements in the act. We also compared  information contained in the department’s system that is used to prepare  its budget submission (SNAP-IT) with information in DOD’s Defense  Information Technology Portfolio Repository (DITPR) system to  determine if DOD’s fiscal year 2012 budget request included all business  systems. We interviewed Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Information Integration/Department of Defense Chief Information Officer  officials to discuss the accuracy and comprehensiveness of information  contained in the SNAP-IT system, the discrepancies in the information  contained in the DITPR and SNAP-IT systems, and efforts under way or  planned to address these discrepancies. We did not independently validate  the reliability of the cost and budget figures provided by DOD because the  specific amounts were not relevant to our findings.
To assess the establishment of DOD enterprise and component investment  management structures and processes, we analyzed whether DOD and its  military departments’ information technology investment management  processes were compliant with federal guidance and the extent to which  DOD and the military departments were following their investment  management processes, including those at the DOD enterprise-level for  approving and certifying investments. To perform the first task, we  compared the status of DOD enterprise and military department (Air  Force, Army, and Navy) investment management processes—as noted in  our May 2009 report and other sources—with the current status of these  organization’s processes. As part of this analysis, we focused on the  definition of project-level (Stage 2) and portfolio-level (Stage 3) policies  and procedures contained in our Information Technology Investment  Management (ITIM) Framework that were identified in our previous work  as not being established. Specifically, we analyzed written department  responses and supporting documentation on steps completed, under way,  or planned against ITIM key practices to identify where progress had been  made in addressing such previously identified practices. Where there were  variances (i.e., support did not show the department was meeting a key  practice), we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed  appropriate DOD enterprise and military department officials to identify  the causes and impacts.
With regard to our second task, we selected four DOD enterprise-level and  military department-level investments that met the following criteria: the  investment was (1) either a (Tier 1 or 2) major automated information  system from key DOD functional areas (i.e., Weapon Systems Lifecycle  Management; Materiel Supply and Services Management; and Human  Resources Management) and (2) was at a life cycle phase—such as  production and deployment and operations and maintenance—where  there were extensive opportunities for system investment officials to  demonstrate the organization was following ITIM key practices. In  reviewing these investments, we focused on DOD enterprise and military  department activities related to certification and oversight, which are a  key part of selecting, managing, and overseeing IT investments as called  for in our ITIM framework and DOD guidance. For certification, we  reviewed DOD Investment Review Board guidance to understand the types  of actions related to the certification of business system modernizations  and, in doing so, focused on three certification requirements (e.g.,  ensuring that designated approval authorities assert that each investment  is compliant with the business enterprise architecture). For each  requirement, we reviewed supporting documentation from DOD enterprise  and the military departments to determine whether there was a  documented process for how the requirement was to be certified and to  ascertain whether artifacts prepared as part of the process demonstrated  that the certification process was being followed. We did the same for the  oversight process. When there were variances between the criteria and  what DOD enterprise and the military departments had done, we  interviewed cognizant DOD enterprise-level and military department-level  officials on the causes and impacts.
To determine whether the department was certifying and approving  business system investments with annual obligations exceeding $1 million,  we reviewed and analyzed all Defense Business Systems Management  Committee certification approval memoranda as well as IRB certification  memoranda issued prior to the Defense Business Systems Management  Committee’s final approval decisions for fiscal year 2010 and compared  the results to those certification actions described in the annual report to  identify differences. We also reviewed DOD IRB guidance to understand  the types of actions related to certification of business system  modernizations. We interviewed officials from the Business  Transformation Agency and IRBs to discuss any discrepancies.
We conducted this performance audit at DOD and military department  offices in Arlington, Virginia, from January 2011 to June 2011, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objective.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Gerard Aflague, Mathew Bader, Carl Barden, Shaun Byrnes, Debra  Conner, Elena Epps, Rebecca Eyler, Nancy Glover, Neelaxi Lakhmani  (Assistant Director), Anh Le, Lori Martinez, Gary Mountjoy, Freda Paintsil,  David Powner (Director), Christine San, Sylvia Shanks, Donald Sebers,  Teresa Smith, Jennifer Stavros-Turner, and Adam Vodraska.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

For decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been challenged in modernizing its timeworn business systems. Since 1995, GAO has designated DOD's business systems modernization program as high risk. Between 2001 and 2005, GAO reported that the modernization program had spent hundreds of millions of dollars on an enterprise architecture and investment management structures that had limited value. Accordingly, GAO made explicit architecture and investment management-related recommendations. Congress included provisions in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 that were consistent with GAO's recommendations and required GAO to assess DOD's actions to comply with these provisions. To do so, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed military officials on the progress the military departments have made relative to developing their respective parts of the federated business enterprise architecture and establishing investment management structures and processes.

What GAO Found

DOD continues to take steps to comply with the act's provisions and to satisfy relevant system modernization management guidance. Collectively, these steps address several statutory provisions and best practices concerning the business enterprise architecture, budgetary disclosure, and review of systems costing in excess of $1 million. However, long-standing challenges that GAO previously identified remain to be addressed in order for DOD to be in compliance with guidance and the act. In particular, (1) While DOD continues to release updates to its enterprise architecture, the architecture has yet to be augmented by a coherent family of component architectures. In this regard, each of the military departments has made progress in managing its respective enterprise architecture program since GAO last reported in 2008. However, each has yet to address key elements, including developing the architecture content, to advance to a level that could be considered mature. For example, while each department has established or is in the process of establishing an executive committee with responsibility and accountability for the enterprise architecture, none has fully developed an enterprise architecture methodology or a well-defined business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide and constrain business transformation initiatives. (2) DOD continues to establish investment management processes, but neither DOD-level organizations nor the military departments have defined the full range of project-level and portfolio-based IT investment management policies and procedures that are necessary to meet the investment selection and control provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. Specifically, with regard to project-level practices, DOD enterprise, Air Force, and Navy have yet to fully define 56 percent of the practices, and Army has yet to do so for 78 percent of the practices. With regard to the portfolio-level practices, DOD enterprise, Air Force, and Navy have yet to fully define 80 percent and Army has yet to do so for any of the practices. In addition, while DOD largely followed its certification and oversight processes, key steps were not performed. For example, as part of the certification process, DOD performed three process assessments specified in DOD guidance, such as assessing investment alignment with the architecture, but did not validate the results of the assessment, thus increasing the risk that certification decisionmaking was based on inaccurate and unreliable information. It is essential that DOD address GAO's existing recommendations aimed at addressing these long-standing challenges, as doing so is critical to the department's ability to establish the full range of institutional management controls needed to address its business systems modernization high-risk program. Department officials attributed the state of progress in part to the uncertainty and pending decisions surrounding the roles and responsibilities of key organizations and senior leadership positions as well as the lack of resources (i.e., people and funding). Because GAO has existing recommendations that address the long-standing challenges discussed in this report, it is making no further recommendations in these areas.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD complete the implementation of the reorganization of key organizations. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendation.