Background

		Federal Prison System

To carry out its responsibility for the custody and care of federal  offenders, BOP currently houses inmates across six geographic regions  in 120 long-term federal institutions. The Central Office and regional  offices provide administrative oversight and support to institutions, among  other things. The management officials located at each institution,  including wardens and associate wardens, provide overall direction and  implement policies.
Male long-term institutions include four security-level designations–– minimum, low, medium, and high––and female long-term institutions  include three security designations––minimum, low, and high. The  security-level designation of a facility depends on the level of security and  staff supervision that the facility is able to provide, such as the presence  of security towers; perimeter barriers; the type of inmate housing,  including dormitory, cubicle, or cell-type housing; and inmate-to-staff ratio.  Additionally, BOP designates some of its institutions as administrative  institutions, which specifically serve inmates awaiting trial, or those with  intensive medical or mental health conditions, regardless of the level of  supervision these inmates require. As of June 2014, BOP owned and  operated seven stand-alone minimum-security institutions, 30 low- security institutions, 47 medium-security institutions, 16 high-security  institutions, 1 administrative maximum (ADX) institution that houses  inmates requiring the highest levels of security, and 19 administrative  institutions. Many of these facilities are colocated on BOP-operated  complexes that also contain minimum-security camps, which are  nonsecure facilities that generally house nonviolent, low-risk offenders  that are not included in this count. For example, USP Yazoo City is  located on the Yazoo City Complex, which also includes a medium- security FCI, a low-security FCI, and a minimum-security camp.
BOP calculates the number of inmates a given institution is built to safely  and securely house and defines this as its rated capacity. BOP  establishes a rated capacity for each of the institutions that it owns and  operates. In determining rated capacity, BOP considers occupancy and  space requirements. According to BOP, rated capacity is the basis for  measuring crowding and is essential to both managing the inmate  population and BOP’s annual congressional budget justifications for  resources.
After an inmate receives his or her sentence, BOP initially designates that  person to a particular institution based on (1) the level of security and  supervision the inmate requires; (2) the level of security and staff  supervision the institution is able to provide; (3) the inmate’s program  needs, such as residential drug treatment or intensive medical care; (4)  where the inmate resides at the time of sentencing; (5) the level of  crowding in an institution; and (6) any additional security measures to  ensure the protection of victims, witnesses, and the public.

		BOP’s Schedule Estimates

BOP communicates its schedule estimates related to activating new  institutions to Congress through the annual budget process. BOP  receives appropriated funds through two accounts—Buildings and  Facilities (B&F) and Salaries and Expenses (S&E)—which BOP has  divided into subaccounts, called decision units. The B&F account funds  the construction of new institutions and the maintenance of existing  institutions. Specifically, the B&F account has two subaccounts: (1) new  construction and (2) modernization and repair. The B&F account includes  no-year appropriations, which are available until expended. BOP’s B&F  account’s modernization and repair subaccount funds are used to  rehabilitate, modernize, and renovate buildings and associated systems,  as well as repair or replace utilities or other critical infrastructure at BOP  institutions. BOP’s B&F budget justification includes accompanying  budget exhibits, which, among other things, provide estimated timelines  for when new institutions will provide rated capacity. Broadly, the S&E  account covers costs for staffing; inmate medical care, food, and  programming; and utilities at existing institutions. Specifically, the S&E  account has four subaccounts: (1) inmate care and programs, (2)  institution security and administration, (3) contract confinement, and (4)  management and administration. Generally, the S&E account includes 1- year appropriations, which are available for obligation only in the fiscal  year for which they were appropriated.

		Description of the Activation Process

BOP receives congressionally directed funding for activation—the overall  process by which BOP staffs and equips institutions and then populates   BOP officials stated that,  them with inmates—through its S&E account.generally, BOP does not start the activation process until it has received  congressionally directed activation funding. Upon receipt of  congressionally directed activation funds, BOP begins completing what,  for the purposes of this report, we consider “preactivation” steps, which  include completing renovations; hiring staff, such as wardens and  executive staff to manage the institution; and ordering supplies and  equipment. Preactivation also includes meeting with community  members, recruiting and training new staff, and furnishing the new  institution.
When these steps are completed, the institution begins receiving inmates,  and when this occurs, for the purposes of this report, we consider that  institution to be partially activated. Once the institution houses inmates at  its rated capacity, or the number of inmates BOP determines the  institution can safely and securely house, we consider that institution to  be fully activated. All of the institutions in our review are currently in the  preactivation or partial activation phases of the activation process  because they do not yet house the number of inmates they were  designed to hold. See figure 1 for a description of the life cycle of those  institutions.
BOP’s Design and Construction Branch is responsible for, among other  things, overseeing the construction of new institutions, and when  construction of an institution is almost complete, it transfers responsibility  to the regional office or the local institution, thereby formally transitioning  from construction to the beginning of the activation process. Once this  responsibility has been transferred, regional or local officials work with the  construction contractor to ensure that all items covered by the  construction contractor’s warranty, such as cooling and heating systems,  are working properly prior to the warranty’s expiration. They also work to  conduct some alterations, installations, and repairs, such as placing  additional razor wire and upgrading security features, that must be  completed before the institution can securely house inmates. BOP made  similar repairs to four of the six institutions in our review.
When the institution is ready to accept inmates, BOP issues an  “Activation Memo” that specifies the criteria that inmates must meet in  order to be housed in the new institution. Such criteria are based on the  security level of the institution and the medical and mental health care  services the institution was designed to provide. The criteria also  generally include inmate characteristics that will allow for smooth  transitions as the institution prepares for activation. For example, the  Activation Memo may state that inmates should have histories of good  conduct, no prior gang affiliation, and be generally healthy. Institutions  that have inmates that meet those criteria can request that those inmates  be transferred to the activating institution by submitting a formal request  to the Designation and Sentence Computation Center, which officially  approves the transfer. The Designation and Sentence Computation  Center is also responsible for classifying inmate security levels and  designating those inmates to specific institutions.

		Background on Institutions in the Activation Process

From fiscal years 2005 through 2007, the President’s annual budget  request included a moratorium on new institution construction in an effort  to have BOP take greater advantage of public and private sector bed  space, which operate under contract with BOP, to meet the need for  greater capacity. As a result of that moratorium, BOP officials reported  that they were reluctant to proceed with the construction of several   BOP has six federal institutions  institutions, as we previously reported.across the country currently in different phases of the activation process,  as we discuss later in this report. See figure 2 for a description of each of  those institutions.

	BOP Is behind Schedule Fully Activating New Institutions, and Does Not Have an Activation Policy or Schedules That Meet Best Practices

BOP is behind schedule in fully activating, or reaching rated capacity for,  all six institutions in the activation process. This is due, in part, to  challenges posed by the locations of the activating institutions. However,  although the institutions’ locations posed challenges related to staffing,  BOP is not effectively monitoring staffing challenges at individual  institutions to ensure that they are staffed and, in turn, fully activated,  within estimated time frames. Further, BOP does not have a policy in  place to guide the activation process, or an associated schedule that  meets best practices, which limits BOP’s ability to accurately assess  activation progress and ensure that the new institutions effectively reduce  crowding as intended.

		BOP Is behind Schedule, In Part, because of Challenges Posed by Institutions’ Locations

All six institutions in the activation process have had schedule slippages  due to challenges caused by their locations and delays in receiving  congressionally directed activation funding. According to BOP officials,  delays in receiving congressionally directed activation funding are outside  BOP’s control and can exacerbate existing challenges with staffing or  populating an institution with inmates. This type of delay generally occurs  because of aspects of the appropriations process, including continuing  resolutions, that have resulted in BOP receiving its final funding level and  associated congressional direction late in the fiscal year. In addition, in  some fiscal years, BOP does not receive congressionally directed  activation funding for specific institutions. Generally, either the annual  appropriations act or the conference report accompanying BOP’s annual  appropriations act directs BOP to use S&E appropriations for activation  activities at particular institutions. BOP generally follows directives  contained in the conference report language even if not incorporated into  the appropriations act and therefore, in practice, does not activate  institutions without congressional direction. Figure 3 illustrates the fiscal  year in which BOP initially expected each institution to be fully activated,  the subsequent revisions to that estimate, and the reasons for delay.  Appendix I provides additional details on how delays in congressionally  directed activation funding have resulted in schedule slippages for each  of the institutions in the activation process.
On our site visits to these institutions, we found that the locations of these  institutions posed challenges related to staffing institutions and populating  them with inmates within schedule estimates. For example, officials from  FCI Aliceville stated that the institution’s location made it challenging to  hire staff up to authorized staffing levels during activation because of the  low locality pay in Alabama compared with pay in other states.  According to officials, it has been difficult to find local applicants who  could pass BOP’s preemployment background check because  prospective hires often had disqualifying levels of debt, even though they  met the qualifications based on skill.Southeastern Regional Office stated that staffing two of the institutions  within its region—FCI Aliceville and USP Yazoo City—has been  challenging because of their rural locations. Further, officials from USP  Yazoo City told us that it was particularly challenging to hire medical staff  because of the institution’s location and low pay in that area.
Similarly, officials from the  Moreover, we found on our site visits that the locations of some of these  institutions also posed challenges related to populating them with  inmates. In particular, these institutions generally accept inmates who are  healthy, because the institutions are not located close to hospitals that  can provide care for inmates with chronic or serious conditions requiring   For example, officials  frequent visits, such as those with liver disease. from FCI Berlin told us that they had difficulty populating the institution  with inmates because it could provide care only for generally healthy  inmates, given its distance from major hospitals.more than 2 hours away from the closest large hospital that can provide  care for inmates with serious health conditions. As a result, according to  officials from FCI Berlin, they originally planned to transfer to FCI Berlin  only those inmates who are in overall stable health—those with a Care  Level 1 designation—as doing so would minimize the need to regularly   In fact, FCI Berlin is  transport inmates to faraway hospitals for necessary medical care.However, there were not enough Care Level 1 inmates who also met the  other criteria FCI Berlin specified, such as inmate security level, so the  institution expanded its health care designation to also accept stable Care  Level 2 inmates, who need more medical care than Care Level 1 inmates.  BOP officials acknowledged that distance from major hospitals is a  primary factor in determining the care level for institutions, such as FCI  Berlin.
The conference report, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-278, at 83 (2001), accompanying the  Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies  Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (Nov. 28, 2001), stated that  “he conference agreement provides that of the $650,047,000 provided for increases as  outlined below, $5,000,000 shall be for partial site and planning of the USP Northeast/Mid- Atlantic facility, to be located in Berlin, New Hampshire.” environmental impact statements.congressional budget justification is used to convey BOP’s funding and  housing needs, and these justifications would allow DOJ and BOP  officials the opportunity to convey to Congress any potential challenges  BOP may be facing or anticipating with respect to selecting certain sites  for new institutions.
In contrast, BOP’s annual  According to BOP officials, when BOP is congressionally directed to  investigate a particular location, BOP generally considers this as a  direction to focus its efforts on constructing an institution in that specific  location. However, officials from both BOP’s Central Office and activating  institutions acknowledged that the locations of these newly constructed  institutions make activation more difficult. Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government states that management should ensure that  there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining  information from, external stakeholders, such as Congress, that may have  a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals.activations limit BOP’s ability to reduce crowding as BOP intended, DOJ  and BOP would be better positioned for future activations and could more  effectively manage activation costs and timelines by using BOP’s annual  congressional budget justification to communicate to Congress the factors  that might delay future activations, such as challenges hiring staff and  placing inmates, associated with the locations of new institutions. In turn,  congressional decision makers could be better positioned to take such  factors into account when directing BOP where to build new institutions.

		BOP Does Not Analyze Staffing Data at the Institution Level to Mitigate Staffing Challenges

BOP’s Central Office reviews aggregated data of staffing system-wide,  but it does not monitor or analyze staffing data by individual institutions,  such as those located on a complex, or track how long it takes individual  activating institutions to hire staff. When we analyzed OPM’s EHRI data  on BOP staffing, we found that none of the institutions in the activation  process has a full complement of staff. Although the following  institutions are partially activated, FCI Aliceville is 63 percent staffed, FCI  Berlin is 67 percent staffed, and FCI Mendota is 73 percent staffed.  Since these institutions are not fully staffed, they cannot be fully activated  until they have a full complement of staff to effectively manage additional  inmates.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for  agencies to identify, capture, and distribute operational data to determine  whether an agency is meeting its goals and effectively using resources.
Because BOP’s Central Office does not review staffing data at the  institution level, BOP’s human resources officials from the Central Office  could not tell us whether all of the specific institutions in our review,  specifically those located on complexes, faced obstacles recruiting and  retaining staff. Likewise, BOP officials were not positioned to discuss the  impact of potential staffing challenges on activation. Such staffing  challenges could affect how quickly BOP can reduce crowding across the  system—one of BOP’s key strategic goals.
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. where institutions hired staff at higher rates in each consecutive year,  authorized positions remained unfilled. In addition, for example, not all of  the employees FCI Mendota hired from fiscal years 2010 through 2013  remained on board to work at the institution. Additionally, our analysis of  OPM data indicates that each institution undergoing activation has had  staff sever employment with BOP or transfer to other institutions,  compounding existing staffing issues. For instance, each year more staff  have separated from employment at FCI Mendota than in the prior year,  for a total of 40 employees—about 21 percent of its total hires—from  fiscal years 2010 through 2013. Additionally, according to data provided  by BOP from its personnel database for fiscal year 2014—through July— an additional 11 employees separated from FCI Mendota. See appendix  II for our analysis of BOP’s human resources data.
OPM defines the minimum rate as the minimum wage an employee may be paid based  on the employee’s scheduled rate of pay. authorized staffing levels or to develop effective, tailored strategies to  mitigate those challenges.

		BOP Does Not Have a Policy to Guide Activation or a Schedule That Meets Best Practices

BOP institutions in the activation process rely on the expertise of staff and  two templates that the Central Office developed to guide the activation  process: (1) the activation handbook, which identifies roles and  responsibilities for BOP officials during the activation process, and (2) the  staffing timeline, which provides a general sequence of hiring events that  BOP staff are to follow prior to the institution receiving inmates. Activating  institutions complete these templates, and may modify the documents at  their discretion; thus, they differ in style, scope, and substance depending  on the institution completing them. However, the two templates do not  constitute a documented, bureau-wide policy related to activation, nor do  they include an activation schedule that incorporates best practices, such  as accounting for factors that might delay activation, including delays in  receiving congressionally directed activation funding or challenges with  staffing institutions.

			No Documented Activation Policy

Activating institutions in our review did not have a detailed policy or  schedule to guide the activation process. Instead, they relied heavily on  relationships with individuals who had experience with activations. For  example, officials at half of the institutions told us that they relied on the  experience of officials who had previously been involved with activations  to help guide the process. Further, on our site visit to USP Yazoo City,  officials told us that the primary challenge related to financial  management during the activation process was ensuring that the  managers of each of the departments in the institution, such as business  administration or human resources, knew what was required for  activation. The business administrator sought out assistance from the  regional office and visited another institution that was activated prior to  USP Yazoo City to review records and itemized lists of what officials had  determined they needed for that activation. Further, BOP relied on the  experience of a now-retired official serving as the Activation Coordinator  for the institutions in our review. BOP relied on that official to initiate the  activation process by ordering necessary supplies and equipment.  Officials we interviewed from the regional offices noted that without the  Activation Coordinator’s guidance, they would not have known what  supplies and equipment were needed for activation. Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government states that policies and  procedures are needed to enforce management’s directives, and that  significant events need to be documented in policies and procedures.According to BOP documents and officials, BOP does not plan to  construct, and subsequently activate, new institutions for the foreseeable  future. In addition, officials contend that BOP has vast institutional  knowledge to guide the activation process, rendering a formal written  policy unnecessary. Nevertheless, BOP will likely face difficulty during  future activations since about 32 percent of BOP staff will be retirement  eligible within 5 fiscal years—a proportion that is similar to the retirement  rate for the federal workforce as a whole. Such staffing attrition  underscores the need to have documented policies in place to ensure  that future staff can conduct and complete activations effectively and  within cost and schedule commitments.

			Activation Schedule Does Not Meet Best Practices

According to our analysis of the details included in each institution’s  version of the activation handbook template and the staffing timeline  template, we determined that BOP’s schedules do not meet all 10 best  practices required for a schedule to be reliable. Specifically, we assessed  each of the six institutions’ versions of the activation handbook and  staffing timeline templates against four characteristics of a reliable  schedule associated with the 10 best practices.collectively, the six BOP institutions minimally met two and did not meet  two of these four characteristics.

	BOP Obligated Funds from Two Accounts to Maintain Partially Activated Institutions

From fiscal year 2010 through March 2014, BOP obligated about $25  million from its S&E account to maintain partially activated institutions  while it waited for congressionally directed activation funding through the  S&E account. The amount of congressionally directed activation funding  included in BOP’s annual spend plans reflects the amount the bureau  planned to spend activating each of the individual institutions in our  review from fiscal year 2010 through March 2014. However, we found  that BOP obligated more than its planned amount for two of the three  partially activated institutions (see table 2).
Specifically, BOP obligated about $7.5 million and $17.7 million more  than it planned to activate FCI Berlin and FCI Mendota, respectively, for a  collective total of about $25.2 million more than it estimated in its spend  plan. Additionally, we found that BOP’s obligations for activating those  three institutions are similar to what BOP has spent in the past when  activating new institutions. Specifically, when adjusting for inflation, BOP  spent, on average, about $41,100 per bed for those institutions, and  spent, on average, about $40,600 per bed on the 21 institutions activated  from 1994 through 2000.
To finance the additional $25 million of activation-related activities, BOP  officials told us they used S&E funds that are generally used to fund the  operation of all BOP institutions. Specifically, BOP officials told us that  BOP spends between $1 million and $4 million each year to maintain a  newly constructed or acquired institution while waiting for the  congressionally directed activation funding needed to complete the  activation process. This additional spending supports, among other  things, salaries of a core group of staff and the cost of utilities to maintain  institutions and keep them secure prior to receiving congressionally  directed activation funding. According to BOP officials, when BOP is  waiting for congressionally directed activation funding for a given  institution, BOP hires a facility manager to ensure that the building is  operating appropriately and covers costs associated with utilities, such as  electricity and water. For example, to maintain Administrative USP  Thomson while waiting for congressionally directed activation funding,  BOP obligated $1.3 million in fiscal year 2013, and, as of March 2014,  BOP has obligated about $440,700. Those costs included relocation  expenses, uniforms, and training for the maintenance staff; utilities; and  mechanical services for the institution, among other things. In addition,  BOP officials told us that BOP spent about $150,000 over 2 fiscal years to  fund a state of Illinois employee to maintain the institution while waiting  for BOP staff to be hired. Further, BOP spent about $10 million in utility  and personnel costs to maintain FCI Berlin for an additional 2 fiscal years  while BOP waited for congressionally directed activation funding to begin  activation. According to BOP officials, that additional funding covered the  salary expenses for 16 employees that the agency hired to maintain the  institution. BOP officials told us they had planned on paying for these  salaries with its requested activation funding, but because the activation  funding was delayed, BOP used other available funds from its S&E  account to keep the staff in place.
In addition to maintaining empty institutions while waiting for  congressionally directed activation funding, BOP has also obligated funds  from its B&F account to provide a range of modifications to new  institutions after construction is complete. According to BOP data, BOP  spent a total of about $1.2 million on alterations, installations, and repairs  at four of the six institutions in our review, with costs per institution  ranging from about $130,000 to $458,000. For example, FCI Berlin spent  $150,000 repairing roofs that could not handle the heavy amounts of  snowfall and constructing overhangs at exterior doorways to provide  protection from the weather.are generally related to maintaining empty institutions because of a lag in  receiving activation funds. As discussed earlier in this report,  communicating the potential challenges that certain locations may pose  for activation could help BOP minimize the amount of renovation or staff  relocation expenses it ultimately spends while awaiting congressionally  directed activation funding.

	The Six Institutions Being Activated Will Reduce Crowding System-wide when They Reach Rated Capacity

BOP plans to activate and fully populate all six institutions with inmates by  fiscal year 2016, which would add 7,852 beds to BOP’s overall capacity.If BOP achieves this goal, these institutions will reduce the overall  crowding rate from almost 42 percent to 34 percent. According to our  estimates using BOP’s projections of the future inmate population, we  found that crowding reductions will vary for inmates depending on their  gender and security level. To determine how these institutions will affect  system-wide crowding, we compared crowding rates with and without the  addition of new beds that BOP anticipates the six institutions will provide  by fiscal year 2016. On the basis of that comparison, we estimate that  BOP will have spent almost $200 million per percentage point decrease in  the overall crowding rate—or about $1.6 billion since fiscal year 2003—on  constructing, acquiring, and activating the institutions in our review. For  specific details on these institutions’ impact on crowding, see table 3.
Crowding by gender. The new institutions housing male inmates will add  a total of 6,316 beds to total capacity once they are fully activated. The  addition of these beds will reduce crowding among male institutions by  about 7 percentage points, lowering the rate from about 41 percent to  about 34 percent, assuming that the institutions will reach rated capacity  by fiscal year 2016 as BOP intends. Similarly, the only new institution to  add beds for female institutions, FCI Aliceville, will add a total of 1,536  beds to total capacity for institutions housing female inmates. The  addition of these beds will reduce crowding among female institutions by  about 21 percentage points, falling from about 45 percent to about 24  percent.
Crowding by security level. The new institutions housing medium- security inmates will add a total of 3,456 beds, while the new institutions  housing high-security inmates will add a total of 2,860 beds, once they  are fully activated. Additionally, the new institution housing low-security  female inmates will add 1,536 inmates. The addition of medium-security  beds at FCI Berlin, FCI Hazelton, and FCI Mendota will reduce crowding  at that security level by about 13 percentage points, lowering the  crowding rate from about 55 percent to about 42 percent, assuming that  the new institutions will reach rated capacity by fiscal year 2016 as BOP  intends. Similarly, the addition of high-security beds at Administrative  USP Thomson and USP Yazoo City will reduce crowding at that security  level by about 26 percent, lowering the crowding rate from about 57  percent to 31 percent. Finally, once fully activated, FCI Aliceville will  reduce crowding among low-security female institutions by about 56  percentage points, or a decrease from about 84 percent to about 28  percent. Because FCI Aliceville will add 1,536 beds to an overall capacity  of 5,048 beds among medium-security institutions housing female  inmates, these new beds will have a large effect on crowding at that  security level.

	DOJ Purchased Thomson to Reduce High-Security Crowding, but It Will Increase Costs

DOJ purchased the Thomson Correctional Center in an effort to reduce  high-security crowding, and if the institution reaches rated capacity by  fiscal year 2016, we estimate that the institution will reduce high-security  crowding by about 16 percentage points. However, purchasing Thomson  resulted in unplanned costs at the time of the purchase and will increase  costs in the future.

		DOJ Purchased Thomson to Provide High-Security Bed Space and Used Several Accounts to Finance the Purchase

DOJ stated in its budget requests that acquiring the Thomson  Correctional Center in Illinois would address high-security crowding and  support BOP’s mission, as well as DOJ’s strategic goal to ensure the fair  and efficient administration of justice. The state of Illinois constructed the  institution in 2001 to address inmate crowding in state-operated  institutions, but never populated the high-security portion of the institution  with inmates because of the institution’s high operating costs, among  other things. In December 2009, the President issued a memorandum to  the Attorney General and Secretary of Defense directing DOJ and the  Department of Defense to purchase and use the Thomson Correctional   The memorandum stated that the acquisition of the institution  Center.would facilitate the closure of detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay  Naval Base and reduce BOP’s shortage of high-security, maximum- custody bed space. However, legislation limited or prohibited the use of  federal funds to transfer Guantanamo Bay detainees into the United  States, and DOJ officials stated that the department was committed to  fully adhering to those prohibitions. DOJ pursued the purchase of the  institution to provide beds for high-security inmates who, according to  DOJ officials, were not previously detained at Guantanamo Bay.
DOJ requested funding from Congress to purchase and activate the  Thomson Correctional Center in its annual budget requests for fiscal  years 2011 and 2012. Congress did not provide funding for either  request. While DOJ continued to wait for specific funding for the  acquisition of the Thomson Correctional Center, DOJ and the state of  Illinois assessed the purchase of the institution. During this time, DOJ  obtained two appraisals indicating an average value of $165 million, and  the state of Illinois conducted three appraisals. On the basis of the  average value from the two appraisals conducted on behalf of the federal  government, DOJ and the state of Illinois agreed on a price of $165  million (the compensation for the taking of the property by the federal  government as described below).
Congress did not provide specific funding to finance the purchase of the  Thomson Correctional Center. Therefore, in July 2012, DOJ notified the  Senate and House Committees on Appropriations of its intention to  allocate $165 million in existing funding to purchase the institution.
DOJ  and BOP allocated funds from three separate funding sources.  Specifically, BOP reprogrammed $5 million in its B&F appropriation from  the modernization and repair subaccount into the B&F new construction  subaccount, and transferred $9 million from BOP’s S&E account to  BOP’s B&F account. In addition, DOJ transferred $151 million from  DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund Super Surplus to BOP’s B&F account.  According to DOJ and BOP budget officials, the absence of specific  funding for purchasing the Thomson Correctional Center, and restrictions  on transferring and reprogramming applicable to BOP’s annual  appropriations affected DOJ’s decisions to use these multiple funding   In September 2012, the Director of BOP filed in the United  streams.States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois a “declaration of  taking” to acquire the Thomson Correctional Center and deposited the  $165 million with the court as compensation. In October 2012, DOJ  acquired the Thomson Correctional Center from the state of Illinois and  subsequently renamed the institution Administrative USP Thomson.

		Purchasing Thomson Will Address Crowding at the High-Security Level, but Will Result in Increased Operational Costs

Once it reaches rated capacity, according to our analysis of inmate  population data, Administrative USP Thomson will help address crowding  at the high-security level by about 16 percent for male inmates, which is  similar to the decrease in crowding rates that DOJ asserted in the  business cases submitted to Congress as part of the annual budget  process. The expenses associated with the initial purchase price shifted  funds away from BOP repairs and program services, and the continued  expenses of operating and maintaining the institution will incur future  costs. BOP officials acknowledged that the purchase of Administrative  USP Thomson posed costs at the time of the purchase and will pose  costs in the future, but said that the benefits that Administrative USP  Thomson provides—particularly high-security bed space—far outweigh  the costs associated with the institution. The activation of any new  institution, including Administrative USP Thomson, will increase BOP’s  operational costs. Further, according to DOJ officials, the purchase of  Administrative USP Thomson provided bed space at a lower cost than  constructing a new institution.
The $14 million DOJ used from BOP’s S&E and B&F accounts toward the  purchase of Administrative USP Thomson came from accounts that BOP  uses for the operation and maintenance of the federal prison system.  Specifically, BOP uses funds from the B&F account’s modernization and  repair subaccount to address outstanding, unfunded modernization and  repair items system-wide, otherwise known as BOP’s maintenance and  repair backlog. BOP maintains a list of these backlogged items that are in  excess of $300,000, such as replacing roofs and boilers, that it considers  important in order to rehabilitate, modernize, and otherwise repair  physical structures and systems needed to maintain safety and security at  its institutions and avoid costlier repairs in the future. BOP’s list from 2012  totaled approximately $346 million and included 150 items, the most  expensive of which was about $16 million. Since Thomson is a 13-year- old facility and will incur repair costs as it ages, it may add new items to  BOP’s existing list of unfunded maintenance and repair priorities. BOP’s  S&E account funds staffing, inmate medical care, food, utilities, and  services at various BOP institutions, such as inmate educational or  vocational programs, among other things. In addition, during the nearly 2  years BOP has owned Administrative USP Thomson, it has spent  approximately $1.8 million from the S&E account to maintain the empty  facility while waiting for activation funding.
BOP estimates that once Administrative USP Thomson is fully activated,  it will cost $160 million each year to operate it as a high-security  institution that primarily houses special management unit (SMU)  inmates. Of that amount, $45 million is expected to cover food, medical,  clothing, laundry, utilities, programming, and other related operating  expenses, and $115 million is expected to cover staff salary and benefit  costs. This $160 million estimated total annual operating cost is higher  than that for all but two other BOP institutions, Federal Correctional  Complex (FCC) Butner and FCC Coleman, based on fiscal year 2013  operational cost data. In BOP’s fiscal year 2014 congressional budget  request, BOP estimated the need for 1,158 correctional positions at  Administrative USP Thomson, 749 of which will be positions for  correctional officers. SMUs require more staff than institutions with  lower security levels because more staff are needed to provide constant  inmate supervision. BOP officials told us that Administrative USP  Thomson will require a large number of staff to operate because BOP  plans to move some of the most dangerous SMU inmates housed  elsewhere into Administrative USP Thomson.
Administrative USP Thomson has a rated capacity of 2,100 beds—1,900  high-security SMU beds and 200 minimum-security beds at the onsite  camp—and, according to BOP officials, the potential to use some of its  high-security rated capacity to house up to 400 ADX inmates.  Additionally, BOP officials told us that they estimate the institution  eventually will be overcrowded by about 30 percent, given current and  projected inmate population levels system-wide. Accordingly, they  estimate that Administrative USP Thomson will ultimately house between  2,600 and 3,000 inmates. While this level of crowding would be lower  than the current rate of 52 percent at BOP’s other high-security  institutions, the daily cost per inmate at Administrative USP Thomson will  still exceed the daily cost per inmate for SMU bed space at USP  Lewisburg, which is the only other institution whose USP entirely houses  SMU inmates. Specifically, we estimate that BOP will spend between  $146.12 and $168.60 each day per inmate housed at Administrative USP  Thomson and its camp. In comparison, we estimate that BOP spends  about $100.46 daily per inmate for all inmates at USP Lewisburg (i.e., the  SMU and camp inmates). This cost rises to $123.33 daily for only those  inmates in its SMU.
GAO, Bureau of Prisons: Improvements Needed in Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring and  Evaluation of Impact of Segregated Housing, GAO-13-429 (Washington, D.C.: May 1,  2013). activation, its uncertainty regarding the number and security level of the  inmates it plans to house there underscores the challenge of activating  institutions without a comprehensive policy and without a schedule  anchored in best practices, as discussed earlier in the report. If BOP had  a policy in place to guide its activation of new institutions and a schedule  that could account for different scenarios, it would be better positioned to  determine more precisely the number and type of inmate it plans to house  at Administrative USP Thomson and help ensure that the institution is  activated within schedule estimates. BOP would also be better positioned  to make adjustments to account for changes in resources, as well as  variations in cost, while keeping within established time frames.

	Conclusions

BOP’s six new institutions will reduce crowding system-wide, but doing so  has cost more and taken longer than BOP initially estimated because of  internal and external challenges, many of which, according to BOP  officials, are outside of BOP’s control. Doing more to guide the aspects of  the activation process over which BOP does have control could prevent  similar schedule delays in future activations. In particular, by using the  BOP annual budget justifications to clearly communicate to Congress the  factors that might delay activation, like institution locations, DOJ could  more effectively mitigate activation challenges and better meet the  bureau’s needs. Further, ensuring that the Central Office is analyzing  staffing data at individual institutions in the activation process and  developing effective strategies to mitigate staffing challenges would help  expedite the activation process. In addition, by developing and  implementing a comprehensive activation policy that incorporates the  knowledge of staff with experience activating institutions, as well as the  four characteristics of scheduling best practices, BOP would be better  positioned to ensure that future activations are implemented in  accordance with realistic cost and schedule commitments. While the  success of new institution activations relies heavily on congressional  direction regarding activation funding, BOP ultimately is responsible for  the taxpayer dollars it spends on construction, acquisition, and activation  of new institutions. Taking action to address challenges that BOP can  control will help mitigate obstacles in ongoing and future activation of new  institutions.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that the challenges that BOP faces activating new institutions  are clearly conveyed to decision makers, we recommend that, in future  activations, the Attorney General use DOJ’s annual congressional budget  justification for BOP to communicate to Congress factors that might delay  activations, such as challenges hiring staff and placing inmates  associated with the locations of new institutions.
To better address obstacles that occur during the activation process and  to help ensure that institutions are activated within estimated timeframes,  including those institutions that do not currently have inmates, such as  Administrative USP Thomson and USP Yazoo City, we recommend that  the Director of the Bureau of Prisons take the following three actions: direct the Central Office to analyze staffing data at individual  institutions in the activation process to assess their progress toward  reaching authorized staffing levels and use that assessment to  develop effective, tailored strategies to mitigate those challenges; develop and implement a comprehensive activation policy that  incorporates the knowledge of staff with experience activating  institutions; and develop and implement an activation schedule that incorporates the  four characteristics of scheduling best practices.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for review and comment. DOJ  provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix IV, and  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOJ agreed  with all four of the recommendations and outlined steps to address them.  If fully implemented, these actions will address the intent of our  recommendations.
With respect to the first recommendation, DOJ agreed to use the  annual congressional budget justification to communicate with  Congress any factors that might affect schedules in future activations.
Regarding the second recommendation, DOJ agreed that BOP’s  Central Office will analyze staffing data at individual institutions in the  activation process to assess progress toward reaching authorized  staffing levels and use that assessment to develop effective strategies  to mitigate those challenges. DOJ stated that BOP’s regional offices  will monitor staffing levels and report to the Central Office quarterly.  BOP’s Central Office will provide oversight of staffing at activating  institutions and will work to develop effective strategies, such as using  recruitment incentives, when hiring challenges occur at those  institutions.
In response to the third recommendation, DOJ agreed to develop and  implement a comprehensive activation policy that incorporates the  knowledge of staff with experience activating institutions. DOJ stated  that BOP will use knowledgeable staff to develop a new institution  activation handbook. However, DOJ did not state what information  would be included in this new institution activation handbook or how it  would differ from the current activation handbook template. Ultimately,  BOP should have a consistent policy that staff at institutions can use  during the activation process to ensure that all future activations follow  the same process.
Finally, for the fourth recommendation, DOJ agreed to develop and  implement an activation schedule that incorporates the four  characteristics of scheduling best practices. DOJ stated that a  template of this schedule will be included in the new institution  activation handbook and will take into account the best practices  outlined in GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide.
Further, DOJ commented that BOP cannot begin the activation process  until Congress provides the necessary funding, which occurs over  multiple years. DOJ stated that it cannot be held to activation estimates  included in its annual budget requests when it does not receive such  funding. As we note in the report, each of the institutions in the activation  process has experienced schedule slippages due to delays in receiving  congressionally directed activation funding, which is outside of BOP’s  control, as well as challenges associated with institutions’ locations. We  also note that institutions have experienced delays even after BOP has  received multiple years of congressionally directed activation funding,  which indicates that there is more that BOP could do to ensure that  institutions are activated within schedule estimates. If BOP had a  schedule that reflected best practices, it could revise its estimates, when  warranted, for when activation would be completed. The ability to make  such schedule revisions would allow BOP to adjust for the risks  associated with funding delays and more accurately reflect the status of  activation.
Finally, DOJ commented that Administrative USP Thomson, like every  newly activated prison, will increase BOP’s future operational costs. DOJ  also stated that BOP’s primary cost driver is the number of inmates, not  the number of prisons. We agree that activating any new institution will  consequently increase BOP’s operational costs, and that this is not  specific to Administrative USP Thomson. We also agree, and have  previously reported, that the number of inmates entering the federal  prison system is the primary driver of operational costs, rather than the  number of institutions that BOP operates. However, we believe it is  important to note that the acquisition or construction any new institution,  including Administrative USP Thomson, will incur costs to operate and  maintain in the future.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Attorney General of  the United States, appropriate congressional committees, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix V.

Appendix I: Description of Schedule Slippages due to Delays in Receiving Congressionally Directed Activation Funding

Each of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) institutions in the activation  process has had schedule slippages due to delays in receiving  congressionally directed activation funding. Such delays can exacerbate  existing staffing challenges related to recruitment and retention, as  discussed in appendix II. None of the six institutions is at rated capacity— the number of inmates that a given institution can safely and securely  house.
Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Mendota. BOP estimated in  fiscal year 2008 that FCI Mendota would be fully activated by fiscal  year 2010, but received congressionally directed activation funding in  fiscal year 2010. As a result, BOP subsequently revised this estimate  to fully activate FCI Mendota in fiscal year 2011. After BOP received a  second year of congressionally directed activation funding for FCI  Mendota in fiscal year 2012, BOP determined the FCI would accept  its first inmate in February 2012 and accepted the first inmate that   As of August 2014, FCI Mendota has not reached rated  same month. capacity—4 fiscal years after BOP’s initial estimates—with 85 percent  of its 1,152 beds occupied.
FCI Berlin. BOP estimated in fiscal year 2008 that FCI Berlin would  be fully activated by fiscal year 2010. However, BOP subsequently  revised this estimate to fully activate FCI Berlin in fiscal year 2011  because it had not received congressionally directed activation  funding. After BOP received congressionally directed activation  funding for FCI Berlin in fiscal year 2012, BOP determined that the  FCI would accept its first inmate in January 2013 and accepted the  first inmate 1 month later, in February. BOP received congressionally  directed activation funding for FCI Berlin in fiscal year 2013. As of  August 2014, FCI Berlin has not reached rated capacity—4 fiscal  years after BOP’s initial estimate—with 83 percent of its total 1,152  beds occupied.
A specific activation date is determined by the activating institution and regional office  staff primarily based on funding, staffing, and training needs.
FCI Aliceville. BOP estimated in fiscal year 2008 that FCI Aliceville  would be fully activated by fiscal year 2011. However, BOP  subsequently revised this estimate to fully activate FCI Aliceville in  fiscal year 2012 because it did not receive congressionally directed  activation funding. After BOP received congressionally directed  activation funding for FCI Aliceville in fiscal year 2012, BOP  determined that the FCI would accept the first inmate in June 2013  and accepted the first inmate 1 month later, in July. BOP received  congressionally directed activation funding for FCI Aliceville in fiscal  year 2013. As of August 2014, FCI Aliceville has not reached rated  capacity—3 fiscal years after BOP’s initial estimate—with 77 percent  of its total 1,536 beds occupied.
FCI Hazelton. BOP estimated in fiscal year 2008 that FCI Hazelton  would be fully activated by fiscal year 2012. However, BOP  subsequently pushed back this estimate twice—once to fully activate  FCI Hazelton in fiscal year 2013 and again to fully activate the  institution in fiscal year 2014—because it had not received  congressionally directed activation funding. After BOP received  congressionally directed activation funding for FCI Hazelton in fiscal  year 2013, it determined that the FCI would accept its first inmate in  March 2014. BOP received congressionally directed activation funding  for FCI Hazelton in fiscal year 2014. However, as of August 2014, the  institution has not yet reached rated capacity—2 years after BOP’s  initial estimate—with about 27 percent of its 1,152 beds occupied  because of a leaking roof that had to be fixed before inmates were  housed there.
U.S. Penitentiary (USP) Yazoo City. BOP estimated in fiscal year  2009 that USP Yazoo City would be fully activated by fiscal year  2013. However, BOP subsequently revised this estimate to fully  activate USP Yazoo City in fiscal year 2014 because it had not  received congressionally directed activation funding. BOP received  congressionally directed activation funding in fiscal years 2013 and  2014. According to BOP, it has not completed activation of the  institution because it was waiting for a congressional response to its  spend plan relating to fiscal year 2014 funding. BOP received  responses from the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations  in April and May 2014, respectively, supporting BOP’s plans to  activate USP Yazoo City. As of August 2014, USP Yazoo City has not  admitted any inmates.
Administrative USP Thomson. BOP initially estimated that  Administrative USP Thomson would be fully activated by fiscal year  2011. However, BOP subsequently revised this estimate to fully  activate Administrative USP Thomson in fiscal year 2014 because it  had not received congressionally directed activation funding in fiscal  year 2012 or 2013. BOP received conflicting congressional direction  regarding activation funding for Administrative USP Thomson in the  committee reports corresponding to the DOJ/BOP fiscal year 2014  annual appropriations act. BOP subsequently included funding to  activate that institution in its fiscal year 2014 spend plan, which was  submitted to the Committees on Appropriations. BOP received  responses from the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations  in April and May 2014, respectively. However, those responses also  included conflicting direction regarding activation funding for  Administrative USP Thomson. As of August 2014, Administrative USP  Thomson has not admitted any inmates.

Appendix II: Analysis of BOP’s Human Resources Data

We analyzed data from the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM)  human resources database, Enterprise Human Resources Integration  (EHRI) Statistical Data Mart, on staffing levels at the three institutions in  our review that are partially activated and found that each faced obstacles  hiring staff up to authorized levels (see table 4). Specifically, although  FCI Aliceville, FCI Berlin, and FCI Mendota are all partially activated,  none has a full complement of staff, as demonstrated by the number of  employees on board each fiscal year. For example, FCI Berlin is  authorized to fill 378 positions and has been staffing the institution since  fiscal year 2010, even though BOP first received activation funds for that  institution in fiscal year 2012, but it was only 67 percent staffed at the end  of fiscal year 2013.
Furthermore, our analysis of OPM data demonstrates that two of the  three partially activated institutions have experienced increases in the  number of staff they hire each fiscal year through fiscal year 2013, when  institutions hired greater numbers of staff in each consecutive year  although authorized positions remained unfilled (see table 5). As a result,  these staffing challenges have implications for activating institutions  because, as BOP officials told us, being able to receive additional  inmates and thereby reach rated capacity relies, in part, on having  enough staff to provide adequate security for those inmates.
In addition to facing challenges recruiting qualified applicants, officials  from two of the six institutions we visited reported that they faced  challenges in retaining both new hires and experienced BOP staff that  transferred from other BOP institutions. Officials said that BOP staff  transfer to activating institutions to gain experience before receiving  promotions elsewhere, so some staff do not stay in those new institutions  over time. Further, officials from all of the institutions we visited noted that  certain positions, such as those for medical staff, are particularly  challenging to fill because, among other things, it is difficult to provide  competitive salaries for those positions compared with what those staff  could make in the private sector. Officials from BOP’s Central Office also  noted that recruiting medical staff, such as doctors and nurses, was a  challenge system-wide, not just within the institutions undergoing  activation. In fact, one of BOP’s objectives in its strategic plan is to attract  and retain competent health care professionals using a range of  strategies, including recruitment and retention bonuses. Similarly, our  analysis of OPM data demonstrates that partially activated institutions  have had staff sever employment with BOP (see table 6). For instance,  each year more staff have separated from employment at FCI Mendota  than in the prior year, for a total of 40 employees—about 21 percent of its  total hires—from fiscal years 2010 through 2013. Additionally, according  to data provided by BOP from its personnel database for fiscal year  2014—through July—an additional 11 employees separated from FCI  Mendota.

Appendix III: Analysis of BOP’s Schedules against Best Practices

We determined that BOP’s schedules for activating the six institutions in  our review are not reliable based on our assessment of whether those  schedules met best practices as outlined in our Schedule Assessment  Guide.

	Purpose and Scope of the Schedule Guide

In May 2012, we issued GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide to provide  guidance to auditors in evaluating government programs. According to  that guide, the success of a program depends, in part, on having an  integrated and reliable master schedule that defines when and how long  work will occur and how each activity is related to the others. A schedule  is necessary for government programs for many reasons. The program  schedule provides not only a road map for systematic project execution,  but also the means by which to gauge progress, identify and resolve  potential problems, and promote accountability at all levels of the  program. A schedule provides a time sequence for the duration of a  program’s activities and helps those involved understand both the dates  for major milestones and the activities that drive the schedule. A program  schedule is also a way to develop a budget that incorporates the time it  will take to complete phases of the project. Moreover, the schedule is an  essential basis for managing trade-offs among cost, schedule, and scope.  Among other things, scheduling allows program management to decide  between possible sequences of activities, determine the flexibility of the  schedule according to available resources, predict the consequences of  managerial action or inaction on events, and allocate contingency plans  to mitigate risks. Moreover, an integrated and reliable schedule can show  when major events are expected to occur as well as the completion dates  for all activities leading up to them, which can help determine if the  program’s parameters are realistic and achievable.
Our research has identified 10 best practices associated with effective  schedule estimating, which can be collapsed into four general  characteristics: well constructed, and credible.
After reviewing documentation BOP submitted for its activation schedule  estimates and conducting interviews with BOP officials involved in  activations, we determined that the documents used as schedules by the  six activating institutions are not reliable. Collectively, the six BOP  institutions minimally met two of the four characteristics of a reliable  schedule and did not meet the remaining two characteristics, as  summarized in table 7. To arrive at this determination, we examined the  extent to which each of BOP’s six activating institutions adhered to each  of the 10 best practices. We then assigned a corresponding score. We  took the average score for all six institutions, by best practice, and  collapsed the 10 best practices into the four characteristics to get an  average that reflected an overall assessment by schedule characteristic.
As summarized above, BOP’s six activating institutions minimally met two  of the four characteristics of a reliable schedule and did not meet the  remaining two characteristics. Each of the sections below provides  greater detail about where BOP’s practices were deficient.
Comprehensive. We reviewed the activation handbooks and staffing  timeline documents that each of the six institutions completed and  found that they minimally met the requirements for a comprehensive  schedule, as illustrated by table 8.
To guide activation, BOP’s Central Office provides each activating  institution with a standard activation handbook template and general  staffing timeline. With respect to the activation handbook template  provided to activating institutions, this document contains some elements  of a work breakdown structure, which is an important feature in a  comprehensive schedule. In particular, the activation handbook template  lists necessary tasks, organized by responsible departments or  contractors. However, the activation handbook template provides the  tasks, or activities, in the list in a general way, but none of the six  institutions tailored the tasks to meet their specific requirements, which  limits the bureau’s ability to oversee all activation activities. Similarly, the  activation handbook template does not fully include all work associated  with each deliverable and does not identify the specific personnel within  the department responsible for each activity—and none of the six  institutions modified the template to provide this information. For example,  the activation handbook template specifies that the Correctional Services  department is responsible for coordinating with on-site project staff to  evaluate all entrances, doors, locks, intercoms, cameras, and so forth.  However, it does not provide additional detail about what is required as  part of these evaluations, how these requirements might differ by  institution, which specific staff should be executing or overseeing these  activities, or what the costs associated with this activity might be. Two of  the six institutions adapted the activation handbook template to provide  detail on some resource costs associated with activation. In the case of  FCI Berlin, that institution’s activation handbook included details on the  associated costs by department, such as Correctional Services, Food  Services, or Medical Services, and the materials those departments  would need to provide services to inmates, such as vaccines. However,  FCI Berlin’s activation handbook did not provide sufficient information  about why the specific resources would be needed to keep the activation  on schedule and the impact of not having the resources. Finally, none of  the six institutions included any reference to project duration in its  respective modified activation handbook. For example, the activation  handbook template provided by BOP to activating institutions states that  the Case Management Coordinator is responsible for establishing transfer  arrangements for inmates and coordinating assignments for the transfers’  work areas, but it does not provide an indication of how long the activity  may take to complete. Without information about the estimated length of  time required to complete each activity, management cannot accurately  identify the staffing resources required to complete it, assess the progress  of the activation process, or establish realistic dates for institution  activation.
With respect to the general staffing timeline template BOP’s Central  Office provides, this document roughly identifies when particular staff  resources are needed based on the anticipated activation date. For  example, the general staffing timeline template specifies that 7 months  prior to activation, the institution should hire the Warden, Executive  Assistant, and Secretary within the Executive Staff department. However,  the general staffing timeline template is based on the anticipated  activation date rather than based on the activities each of these  individuals would be doing—and none of the six institutions made  modifications to elaborate on these activities. According to best practices  for comprehensive schedules, resources, such as staff, should be  assigned to particular activities in order to facilitate completion of these  activities.
Because of these deficiencies, the information contained in each of the  six institutions’ activation handbooks and staffing timelines does not  assist management in forecasting whether activities will be completed as  scheduled or as budgeted. Further, these documents do not allow insight  into the allocation of resources, increasing the likelihood that the  activation process will not be completed as anticipated and limiting BOP’s  ability to ensure accountability for the total scope of work.
Controlled. The activation handbooks and staffing timeline templates  that each of the six institutions modified minimally met the  requirements for a controlled schedule, as illustrated in table 9.
Two of the activating institutions provided versions of BOP’s activation  handbook and staffing timeline templates that contained some indication  that information on key dates and activities was updated at some point in  time by the activating institutions. However, those activation handbook  and staffing timeline templates modified by each institution did not  indicate whether they had been updated at regular intervals, or that they  reflected the actual status of the respective activations. For example, the  activation handbook and staffing timeline templates modified by officials  at FCI Aliceville that were used to guide that activation included  handwritten dates for when specific steps in the activation process were  expected to be completed, but these did not appear to be updated  systematically or include an indication of when or if those activities had  been completed. Further, none of the activating institutions’ activation  handbooks or staffing timelines included the status of key milestone  dates, such as whether specific activities had been completed, or when  the activation should be completed. In addition, none of the activating  institutions used activation handbooks or staffing timelines that described  the critical risks that the institution faced in meeting its goals for activation  or contingencies if those risks were realized. As BOP officials have noted,  meeting scheduled dates for activation is often dependent on receiving  specific activation funding as planned, and, according to best practices for  a controlled schedule, such risks should be documented to ensure  reliability. Without regularly updating the schedule based on the current  status of the activation at each respective institution, BOP is limited in its  ability to monitor activation progress or make decisions on how to mitigate  risk or allocate resources for activating institutions.
Well constructed. The activation handbooks and staffing timeline  documents that each of the six institutions modified did not meet the  requirements for a well-constructed schedule, as illustrated in table  10.
The activation handbook and staffing timeline templates modified by  activating institutions did not always provide specific information  regarding start and finish dates, durations, or sequencing of activation- related activities. For example, BOP’s general staffing timeline template  identifies the sequence in which staff should be hired, which is an  important feature of a well-constructed schedule, but there is no  sequencing of the activities listed in the activation handbook template. For  example, the general staffing timeline specifies that within the Facilities  department, the Communication Technician should be hired 7 months  prior to activation, while the Facility Manager and Electrician and others  should be hired 6 months prior to activation, but it does not provide  contingencies if predecessor positions cannot be filled “on time” or  describe the effects, if any, of filling positions out of sequence. Aside from  staffing-related issues, the activation handbook template does not contain  information on the order in which any of the activation tasks should occur.  As a result, BOP does not have insight about the interdependencies  between activities or the way in which early delays in some activities  could affect activities later on as well as the overall activation completion  date. Additionally, without identifying linkages between activities, BOP  does not know the critical path of the activation process—that is, which  activities can or cannot be delayed if the overall schedule is to be met.  This prevents the agency from providing Congress with reliable timeline  estimates or anticipated activation dates.
Credible. The activation handbook and staffing timeline templates  that each of the six institutions modified did not meet the requirements  for a credible schedule, as illustrated in table 11.
With respect to the best practice of vertically and horizontally aligning  activities, two institutions adapted BOP’s activation handbook template to  insert targeted due dates for selected activities; however, neither  identified subset activities or linked overall activities in any specific order.  Without this vertical alignment, BOP is not positioned to ensure that  subactivities are on track for an overall activity’s completion. Similarly,  without a clear sequencing of all activities, which is horizontal integration,  BOP also is limited in the extent to which it can monitor overall progress  toward activation. For risk assessment, neither the activation handbook  template nor the staffing timeline contains a schedule risk analysis. Such  an analysis typically focuses on key risks and how they affect the  schedule’s activities. Without a schedule risk analysis, the likelihood of  the project’s completion date or the activities or risks, such as funding  details, most likely to delay activation cannot be determined.
The activation handbooks and general staffing timeline templates that  BOP has developed and institutions have modified during activation are  positive steps toward a baseline schedule that could be used to guide  future institution activations, because they provide some level of detail  regarding the activities required for activation. However, the activation  handbook and general staffing timeline contain only limited information  consistent with best practices and therefore cannot be used by  management to reliably measure, monitor, or report on performance.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact listed above, Joy Booth, Assistant Director;  Pedro Almoguera; Billy Commons; Adam Couvillion; Emily Gunn; and Jan  Montgomery made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to  this report were Lorraine Ettaro, Susan Hsu, Elizabeth Kowalewski, Karen  Richey, Rebecca Shea, and William Varettoni.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The federal inmate population has increased over the last two decades, and as of July 2014, BOP was responsible for the custody and care of more than 216,000 inmates. To handle the projected growth of between 2,500 and 3,000 or more inmates per year from 2015 through 2020, BOP has spent about $1.3 billion constructing five new institutions and acquiring one in Thomson, Illinois. BOP is activating these institutions by staffing and equipping them and populating them with inmates.
GAO was requested to review BOP's activation process of newly constructed and acquired institutions. GAO reviewed, among other things, (1) the extent to which BOP is activating institutions within estimated timeframes and has an activation policy or schedules that meet best practices, and (2) why DOJ purchased Thomson and how the purchase affected system wide costs. GAO reviewed BOP budget documents from fiscal years 2008 to 2015 and assessed schedules against GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide. GAO conducted site visits to the six institutions, interviewed BOP officials, and reviewed staffing data from fiscal years 2010 through 2013.

What GAO Found

The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is behind schedule activating all six new institutions—the process by which it prepares them for inmates—and does not have a policy to guide activation or an activation schedule that reflects best practices. BOP is behind schedule, in part, because of challenges, such as staffing, posed by the locations of the activating institutions. According to BOP officials, delays in receiving congressionally directed activation funding can exacerbate these challenges (see fig.). None of the six institutions is fully activated, or at rated capacity, as they do not house the number of inmates they are designed to safely and securely house.
BOP does not effectively communicate to Congress how the locations of new institutions may affect activation schedules. BOP officials said that when directed by Congress to investigate a location, they consider this as direction to focus on construction at that site. DOJ and BOP could more effectively manage activation timelines and costs by using the BOP annual budget justification to communicate to Congress the factors associated with certain locations that can delay activations, such as challenges hiring staff and placing inmates in institutions. Also, BOP officials said they review staffing data system-wide, but they have not prioritized an analysis of such data at the institution level. Analyzing staffing data on institutions in the activation process could help BOP assess its progress in staffing and tailoring effective mitigating strategies. Finally, BOP lacks a comprehensive activation policy to guide activations, as well as an activation schedule that reflects best practices, and it has largely relied on staff's past experience to complete ongoing activations. Developing and implementing a comprehensive policy and a schedule that reflects best practices, could better position BOP to meet its estimated timeframes and activation costs.
DOJ purchased Thomson to help reduce crowding among inmates requiring high levels of security. Once it is fully populated, it will reduce BOP-wide crowding by 16 percent at the high-security level. Thomson will cost about $160 million annually to operate once fully activated, adding to BOP's system-wide costs. BOP officials said Thomson will provide benefits, such as high-security bed space, which outweigh the costs associated with the institution.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOJ use its annual budget justification to communicate to Congress factors that might delay prison activation, and that BOP analyze institution-level staffing data and develop and implement a comprehensive activation policy and a schedule that reflects best practices. DOJ concurred with all of GAO's recommendations.