Background

		Legislation and Requirements Pertaining to Immigration Detention

The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, provides ICE with  broad authority to detain aliens believed to be removable while awaiting a  determination of whether they should be removed from the United States  as well as aliens ordered removed, and mandates that ICE detain certain  categories of aliens. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant  Responsibility Act of 1996 increased the number of aliens subject to  mandatory detention, resulting in the former Immigration and  Naturalization Service expanding the number of detention beds available  to meet the mandate. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention  Act of 2004 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to further  increase the number of detention beds by 8,000 annually starting in fiscal  year 2006 and continuing through fiscal year 2010. Subsequently, the  House Appropriations Committee began incorporating a mandate into the  annual appropriations bill. The fiscal year 2014 appropriation act requires  DHS to maintain 34,000 detention beds per day.

		Detention Population, Facility Types, and Locations

Immigration custody is civil, not criminal, detention, and is not to be  punitive; rather, ICE is to confine detainees for the administrative purpose  of holding, processing, and preparing them for removal. According to ICE  data, during fiscal year 2013, the agency housed an average of 32,805  detainees in its detention facilities each day and held detainees for an  average of about 27 days.women from a wide variety of countries and with criminal and noncriminal   ICE detainees include a mix of men and  backgrounds. When detention facilities admit aliens, they are to use a  classification system that separates detainees by threat risk and special  vulnerabilities by assigning them a custody level of low, medium, or high.  From fiscal years 2010 through 2013, about 44 percent of ICE detainees  were of a low custody level, 41 percent were of a medium custody level,  and 15 percent were of a high custody level.
ERO oversees the confinement of ICE detainees in approximately 250  detention facilities that it manages in conjunction with private contractors  or state or local governments, of which 166 were authorized to house  detainees for over 72 hours, as of August 2013. Over 90 percent of the  facilities are operated under agreements with state and local  governments and house about half of ICE’s total detention population,  together with, or separately from, other confined populations. The  remaining facilities house exclusively ICE detainees and are operated by  a mixture of private contractors and ICE, state, and local government  employees. Table 1 presents information about the number and types of  facilities that ICE uses to house detainees, the entities that own and  operate them, and the percentage of the detainee population confined in  each facility type.
ICE’s detention facilities are located across the United States. In general,  facilities that house the most detainees and exclusively ICE detainees are  concentrated in the states along the southern United States border, while  facilities that house fewer detainees are more evenly distributed across  the nation. Figure 1 presents the locations of ICE’s over-72-hour facilities  by size and type.
The number of admissions to detention and related appropriations has  more than doubled since 2005, as shown in figure 2. In fiscal year 2014,  Congress provided about $2.8 billion for detention and removal  operations, which include ICE’s maintenance of 34,000 detention beds,  as required by law.
ICE primarily uses three sets of national detention standards with varying  requirements to govern the conditions of confinement in its detention  facilities. ICE establishes the set of standards applicable to each  detention facility through an individual contract or agreement with the  facility. Accordingly, different facilities are governed by different  standards. Table 2 provides information about each of these three sets of  standards.

	Incomplete ICE Data and Limitations in Controls to Track and Manage Costs Limit Assessment of Cost Variances across Detention Facility Types

		ICE Does Not Have Complete Data for Managing Detention Costs and Operations

ICE has two offices, OBPP and ERO Operations Support Division, that  use different methods to collect and assess data on detention  expenditures and costs for different purposes; however, these two  methods do not provide ICE with complete data for managing detention  costs across facilities and facility types. First, for the purposes of  developing ICE’s annual budget requests for detention, ICE’s OBPP  developed a method to estimate total detention costs per detainee per  day. ICE refers to this as the bed-rate—or the total cost to house 1  detainee for 1 day. OBPP estimates this bed rate for budgetary purposes  by conducting standardized, repeatable queries of ICE’s financial  management system—the Federal Financial Management System.  These standardized queries provide ICE with an average overall bed rate  and the average bed rate for each of ICE’s 24 areas of responsibility.However, ICE officials stated that through fiscal year 2013 these queries  did not produce data that can be used to track or manage costs for  individual facilities or facility types because of errors in how ICE field  office personnel enter data into ICE’s Federal Financial Management  System and limitations in the system that make it difficult for ICE to  accurately record expenditures for all individual facilities. Specifically,  OBPP officials said that field office personnel manually enter financial  codes for each expenditure to categorize and provide descriptive  information about that expenditure—such as if it was for detention  operations—which allows ICE to link expenditures to specific facilities,  among other things. However, OBPP officials have found significant  coding errors in these data fields for costs incurred through fiscal year  2013. For example, according to the officials, charges for 5 facilities  operating under intergovernmental service agreements (IGSA) in five  states were erroneously assigned to a SPC, because, according to ICE  officials, the facilities were in different counties with the same name. In  addition, while ICE could link expenditures to individual facilities of certain  types—specifically SPCs, contract detention facilities (CDF), and facilities  operating under a dedicated intergovernmental service agreement  (DIGSA)—in its Federal Financial Management System in fiscal year  2013, it could not link expenditures to individual facilities operating under  an IGSA because there were not codes in ICE’s Federal Financial  Management System to link expenditures to IGSAs during fiscal year  2013. According to ICE officials, in fiscal year 2014, ICE introduced new  financial coding processes. These processes are intended to address this  limitation and allow costs to be linked to all types of facilities, including  IGSA facilities; however, as ICE has recently begun to implement these  new processes, it is too soon to determine the extent to which they will  provide ICE with more reliable cost data across individual facilities and  facility types.
Second, for the purposes of tracking monthly costs at individual facilities,  among other purposes, ICE ERO’s Operations Support Division—the  budget office within ERO—developed a mechanism to manually track  monthly costs by facility, called the Contract Financial Monitoring File,  according to ICE ERO Operations Support Division officials. Specifically,  the Operations Support Division developed the Contract Financial  Monitoring File to monitor obligations and monthly expenditures related to  the primary contract for each detention facility using information manually  taken from facility invoices and contracts in addition to data in the Federal  Financial Management System, according to ERO officials and Contract  Financial Monitoring File guidance. The Operations Support Division  developed this manual tool to work around the limitations in the Federal  Financial Management System, which, in addition to those limitations  discussed above, does not automatically interface with ICE’s invoice  management system, according to ICE officials. Operations Support  Division officials said they use the Contract Financial Monitoring File data  to determine how much funding to allocate to each facility and to track  expenditures and contract pricing at a single facility over time, among  other uses. However, these data have limitations that preclude using the  data to track and manage costs across individual facilities and facility  types. For example, the Contract Financial Monitoring File data do not  consistently or completely capture costs for facilities because some  facility contracts include services such as medical care and  transportation, while other contracts do not. For facilities with contracts  that do not include such services, ICE or service providers contract with a  third-party to provide these services. As a result, ICE officials said that  some higher-cost facilities may therefore be providing services that are  not provided by lower-cost facilities, or that are provided and billed by  third parties. For example, ERO officials said that ICE provides medical  care at most CDFs either through the ICE Health Service Corps or  through a separate third-party contract with a health care provider,   ICE’s medical costs paid  instead of directly through the facility operator.for through headquarters—which, according to ICE officials totaled about  $157.6 million in fiscal year 2013—are not reflected in facility invoice  costs, and therefore are not included in the Contract Financial Monitoring  File as costs to those individual facilities. Other facilities that directly  provide these services would reflect these costs in facility invoices, and  these costs would therefore be tracked separately in the Contract  Financial Monitoring File. Further, some facilities provide transportation  for detainees as part of the primary detention contract, and therefore the  Operations Support Division captures these costs—which composed up  to 47 percent of total facility expenditures in fiscal year 2013—for each  facility in the Contract Financial Monitoring File. However, at other  facilities, transportation services are not included in the facility contract.  For these facilities, ICE provides transportation services for detainees  through separate contracts with transportation providers, which ERO  tracks separately, and does not link these costs to individual facilities in  the Contract Financial Monitoring File. In addition, the file’s cost data do  not include ICE overhead costs that vary across facilities. These costs  include, among other things, shared utilities and telecommunication  charges that occur in the field but are paid for through ICE service-wide  contracts, according to an ICE official. As a result of these limitations, the  Contract Financial Monitoring File data cannot be used for tracking and  managing cost data across individual facilities and facility types.
Since 2009, ICE has taken some steps to strengthen how it tracks and  manages detention costs and expenditures. However, we identified  limitations in ICE’s controls and processes in three areas. These  limitations relate to (1) collecting and maintaining cost data, (2) ensuring  cost is considered in placing aliens in detention facilities, and (3)  preventing improper payments to detention facility operators.
Collecting and maintaining cost data. ICE is in the process of planning  to upgrade its new financial management system; however, ICE does not  have a target time frame for when this upgrade will occur, according to  ICE officials. The agency, however, has taken steps to manually track  and manage costs, referred to as manual work-arounds. First, ICE has  required field office personnel to use a new coding system to link all  financial transactions entered into the Federal Financial Management  System to individual facilities, including IGSAs, to help ICE more reliably  track costs. According to ICE OBPP officials, this requirement began in  fiscal year 2014. Second, ICE has taken steps to help ensure that  expenditures are correctly applied to obligations in the Federal Financial  Management System. These steps include developing standard operating  procedures for linking obligations to expenditures and, beginning in the  third quarter of fiscal year 2014, requiring personnel to input a specific  period of performance for each facility expenditure, according to ICE  officials. Finally, as a manual work-around for estimating transportation  costs, ICE has developed a statement of work to study transportation  costs to optimize ICE’s ground and air transportation networks and  identify any inefficiencies in the current process.
Although these manual work-arounds are positive steps that should help  strengthen the completeness and reliability of ICE data on detention  facilities costs, ICE has not assessed the extent to which these manual  work-arounds are sufficient to address data limitations and allow it to  reliably compare costs among and across facilities and facility types,  according to ICE officials. ICE officials said they have not conducted such  an assessment because they have focused on higher priorities, such as  developing a national bed rate to support the agency’s annual budget  request. In addition, ICE has not assessed the extent to which additional  internal controls are needed to address the challenges we identified and  collect and maintain more complete data on costs and expenditures for  individual facilities. For example, as previously discussed, ICE identified  data entry errors made by staff in entering cost data into the Federal  Financial Management System. ICE also identified challenges in tracking  and maintaining complete data on all costs or expenditures associated  with individual facilities, including costs for medical care and  transportation, for example. ICE has not assessed the extent to which  additional controls, such as a process to check for data entry errors, could  help the agency track and maintain more complete data on detention  facility costs, as ICE stated that the agency recently implemented the  manual work-arounds.
The ICE Strategic Plan FY2010-2014 states that ICE will proactively  identify and correct financial and operational risks and continually  strengthen internal controls to safeguard the public’s resources and trust.  ICE has strengthened some controls, but it has not assessed the extent  to which it has appropriate internal controls in place for all tracking and  reporting of financial information to link costs to individual facilities.  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that  internal controls are an integral part of each system that management  uses to regulate and guide its operations, and that control activities are an  integral part of an entity’s planning, implementing, review, and  accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving  effective results. Furthermore, the standards state that control activities,  which include a wide range of diverse actions and maintenance of related  records, need to be clearly documented and help to ensure that all  transactions are completely and accurately recorded. Assessing the  extent to which ICE’s manual work-arounds could provide ICE with more  complete data on facility costs and the extent to which additional controls  may be needed could better position ICE to have more reliable data for  tracking and managing costs across facilities and facility types. Moreover,  as ICE is in the process of planning for upgrading its financial  management system, assessing the extent to which the appropriate  internal controls are in place for tracking and managing detention facility  costs and developing any additional controls deemed necessary could  help provide ICE with more complete data to help ensure that ICE is  accurately tracking costs and has the data needed to appropriately and  effectively manage detention costs.
Ensuring cost is considered in placing aliens in detention facilities.  ICE ERO officials stated that field office personnel are to take cost into  account, as appropriate, when making detainee placement decisions;  however, ICE headquarters does not have a process or controls in place  to ensure that field offices are appropriately considering cost in order to  promote efficient field office management. ERO field offices are  responsible for deciding where to house detainees within their areas of  responsibility and are to consider a variety of factors, including cost, when  making detainee placement decisions, according to ICE officials. ICE  ERO officials stated that other factors that may be more important than  cost in making placement decisions include whether (1) the detainee has  medical needs that can be best served by a particular facility, (2) the  detainee has an attorney or family located near a particular facility, and  (3) there are transportation requirements to bring the detainee to the  facility.
ERO officials stated that field offices are to place detainees in facilities  that have guaranteed minimum populations when possible, as ICE pays   In addition,  for these beds regardless of whether or not they are used.facilities that have guaranteed minimums tend to have tiered pricing— meaning the contractor charges a lower per diem for each detainee  housed above an agreed-upon guaranteed minimum number of detainees  and below the facility’s full capacity—than at other facilities that do not  have guaranteed minimums.
In 2009, the DHS Office of the Inspector General reported that ICE had  not fully implemented its National Detention Management Plan, resulting  in mixed progress in moving toward a more cost-effective strategy for  acquiring detention bed space.the agency has taken steps to ensure that cost is taken into account, as  appropriate, in deciding where to house detainees. For example, ICE  ERO headquarters develops daily capacity reports that show the  percentage of capacity filled at SPCs, CDFs, DIGSAs, and large IGSAs.  According to ICE ERO headquarters officials, if they notice that a  particular area of responsibility has open space in facilities with  guaranteed minimums, they can call the field office director to find out  why the guaranteed minimum is not being met.
Since then, according to ICE officials,  However, our analysis of ICE data showed that in some cases ICE did not  fill all guaranteed minimum bed spaces, effectively paying for beds that  the agency did not use. Specifically, our analysis of the ADP and ICE’s  contractual guaranteed minimums at selected dedicated facilities for fiscal  years 2011 through 2013 showed instances where ICE paid for beds it  did not use. For example, our analysis showed that the ADP at a CDF  had fewer detainees than the guaranteed minimum for each fiscal year,  2011 through 2013, which is the equivalent of about $3.6 million in bed  space that ICE did not use, based on the per diem rates for this period.  According to ICE officials, the guaranteed minimum had been negotiated  with the facility by USMS, which previously used the facility, and ICE  renegotiated a lower guaranteed minimum in fiscal year 2012. However,  we noted that the ADP in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 remained below the  revised guaranteed minimum number of beds. ERO officials also said  that during that timeframe ICE moved detainees from the CDF to a new  facility that ERO opened nearby that was intended to better meet ICE’s  civil detention goals.
We also found instances through fiscal year 2014—as of July 2014—in  which ICE placed the guaranteed minimum of detainees in facilities, but  did not take advantage of the tiered pricing structure, which would have  provided less costly bed rates for detainees placed above the guaranteed  minimum. For example, at one CDF, ICE met the guaranteed minimum  each year from fiscal years 2011 through 2013 and also housed  additional detainees at the facility, for whom ICE was charged a lower  bed rate because the facility has a tiered pricing structure. However, the  number of detainees housed over the guaranteed minimum also  decreased each year over that time period. Therefore, because ICE did  not maximize the number of detainees over and above the guaranteed  minimum, the average cost per detainee at the facility increased from  $133 per day in 2012 to $135 per day in 2013. analysis, ICE’s bed space procurement study—published in April 2014— found that at certain SPCs, ICE underutilized facilities with guaranteed  minimums. Therefore ICE could conserve resources by better filling the  capacity above the guaranteed minimum, as it costs ICE less per  detainee to house detainees in these facilities.
As described above, these costs may not include the full costs of detention at that  facility. ICE ERO Operations Support Division did not have complete data for fiscal year  2011. guidance, ERO officials said they will be working with ICE OBPP to  develop and share cost reports and facility utilization reports with field  office management. While ICE’s plan to develop and issue this guidance  is a positive step, as of August 2014, ICE did not have plans to monitor  the extent to which field offices consider and implement cost as a factor in  making detainee placement decisions over time, according to ICE  officials. In particular, ICE’s daily capacity reports are intended to provide  information to ICE personnel regarding bed space availability on a daily  basis. However, ICE ERO does not currently use these reports or other  data to monitor and ensure field offices are appropriately considering cost  in making detainee placement decisions over time. The ICE strategic plan  for fiscal years 2010-2014 notes that to expend government resources  wisely, ICE will work to increase efficiency in every step of the removal  process—from apprehension through removal. Furthermore, Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that managers need  to compare actual performance with planned or expected results  throughout the organization and analyze significant differences, and  should monitor the quality of performance over time. Developing an  oversight mechanism to ensure that field offices comply with guidance to  place detainees, whenever possible, in facilities with guaranteed  minimums and tiered pricing could provide ICE with better assurance that  it is cost-effectively managing detainee placement.
Preventing improper payments to detention facility operators. ICE  has taken steps to strengthen internal controls over the process used to  pay contractors for detention services; however, ICE ERO remained  designated as at high risk for making improper payments in fiscal year  2013 by DHS. ICE uses manual internal controls over the process to  review invoices and pay contractors for detention services. Contractors at  all ICE detention facilities are to receive payment for providing detention  services by submitting invoices to ICE for review and payment.  Contractors are to submit summary invoices to the Burlington finance  center and all required invoice support documentation to the contracting  officer representative (COR) at the ICE ERO field office overseeing the  facility. Burlington finance center personnel are to provide an initial review  of the summary invoice to ensure that the necessary contract information  is correctly recorded and if it is, are to notify the COR that the invoice is  available for approval. The COR is then required to review the invoice to  verify that it accurately reflects work completed in accordance with  requirements in the contract. The COR is also to ensure that all required  supporting documentation is received prior to approving an invoice.
The Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) of 2002, the Improper  Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) of 2010, and the  Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act (IPERIA)  of 2012 require agencies to review payments made by their components  in order to identify those susceptible to significant improper payments and  to carry out cost-effective programs for identifying and recovering  overpayments made to contractors. Improper payments are calculated  as the percentage of the total dollar value of payments made in each year  that were improper. For fiscal year 2013, a significant improper payment  was defined as exceeding $10 million of all program or activity payments  and 1.5 percent of program payments, or exceeding $100 million alone.   IPERIA of 2012 applied these thresholds to fiscal year 2014 and each  fiscal year thereafter.
DHS’s annual review of component improper payments has highlighted  that ICE ERO had unacceptable levels of improper payments. ICE ERO reduced improper payment amounts by nearly half from fiscal year 2011  to 2012, but remains designated as at high-risk for making improper  payments. DHS reported that in fiscal year 2012 testing of fiscal year  2011 payments, ICE ERO made an estimated $133 million in improper  payments (approximately 8 percent of all payments), and fiscal year 2013  testing of fiscal year 2012 payments showed that ICE made an estimated  $73 million in improper payments (approximately 4 percent of all  payments).
ICE has taken several steps to address the primary reasons for improper  payments. ICE’s analysis of the findings revealed that most of ERO’s  improper payments were caused by either unresolved discrepancies  between the invoice and contract documents or that ERO personnel  responsible for invoice approval did not ensure sufficient documentation  had been provided by contractors to support the payment of invoices. To  reduce the improper payment rate, ICE ERO issued requirements aimed  at standardizing the invoice submission and review process across  facilities, and strengthening the process, among other actions. These  requirements include a requirement that facilities provide an itemized list  of charges and list contract line items on invoices, among other things.  According to ICE officials, as of September 2013, ICE had updated all  facility contracts with the new requirements, and invoices submitted by  facilities for services in December 2013 and later should meet the new  requirements.
However, our review of a sample of 31 of 158 invoices from 15 facilities  for detention services provided in December 2013 showed that corrective  actions taken by DHS and ICE had not yet fully addressed issues of the  completeness and accuracy of invoices and supporting documentation  submitted by detention contractors. Specifically, our review showed that  13 invoices from 6 facilities did not include all invoice elements required in  ICE’s new guidance. Examples of missing elements included unit prices  for mileage and the contractor’s address. In addition, our analysis showed  that 20 invoices from 11 facilities did not include all required supporting  documentation, as specified in ICE’s new invoice submission and review  guidance. Invoices for transportation charges were the type of invoice that  was most commonly missing supporting documentation. For example,  invoices included the dates detainees were transported, but did not  include elements such as the names of detainees, or the number of  detainees transported.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that  control activities should be efficient and effective in accomplishing the  agency’s control objectives, and should occur at all levels of the agency.  The standards also note that the responsibility for good internal control  rests with managers, and that management sets the objectives, puts the  control mechanisms in place, and monitors and evaluates the controls.    In June 2014, ICE issued a policy manual to provide general instruction  and guidance to CORs in recording the receipt and acceptance of goods  and services, including the processing of contractor invoices, and plans to  further assess the need for additional controls through April 2015. Such  an assessment of internal controls is necessary as ICE ERO has  remained at high risk for improper payments despite issuance of past  guidance. By taking additional steps to help ensure that personnel  responsible for reviewing and paying invoices follow internal control  procedures contained in the new guidance to ensure proper payment,  and that their actions are appropriately overseen and reviewed by  management, ICE ERO could have better assurance that its detention  management practices are in compliance with relevant laws to safeguard  federal resources for detention services.

		ICE Data Indicate Generally Higher Costs per Detainee per Day at ICE-Owned Facilities

Despite the limitations we identified with ICE’s data on facility costs, we  determined—by interviewing officials and checking data for errors—that  data maintained by the ICE ERO Operations Support Division in its  Contract Financial Monitoring File were sufficiently reliable to provide a  general indication of approximate cost ranges across and within facility  types for fiscal year 2013. Our analysis of these data indicated that ICE  generally spent more per detainee per day at ICE-owned SPCs than at  other types of detention facilities. Specifically, our analysis indicated that  while the median expenditure per detainee per day at SPCs was about  $200, these costs were lower at about $120 for CDFs and about $75 for  IGSAs and facilities operated under USMS intergovernmental agreement  (IGA) or contract. Our analysis of these data also indicated that the  range of costs within a facility type was greatest for SPCs than for other  types of facilities. Specifically, our analysis showed that the range  between the lowest- and highest-cost SPC facilities was about $195,  while the range was lower for IGSAs and IGAs (about $110), CDFs  (about $80), and DIGSAs (about $50).
ICE officials cited labor costs—which compose approximately 70 percent  of all facility costs—as one of the common reasons for the differences in  the ranges of costs across types of detention facilities. ICE officials stated  that the agency has limited ability to negotiate labor rates in its detention  and ground transportation contracts because they are subject to the  Service Contract Act (SCA) of 1965, which, among other things, specifies  prevailing wages by geographic area. ICE officials stated that as a result  of the SCA’s requirements, facilities that are located in more expensive  areas tend to have higher labor costs.
Factors that influence the amount of labor needed also affect overall  costs at a particular facility, according to ICE officials. For example, a  facility’s design and physical layout affect the number of staff needed to  monitor the facility, and therefore affect older facilities, which usually have  more blind corners and require more staff, according to officials. Other  cost drivers include characteristics of the detainee population held at the  facility, such as a large population with specialized medical needs that  increase staff costs; the distance between the facility and other locations,  such as immigration courts, which affects transportation costs; and the  extent to which there are other nearby facilities that can house  immigration detainees, which can lower costs because of competition,  according to ICE officials.
ICE has taken steps to more specifically identify the reasons for cost  differences across facility types, including hiring a contractor to identify  actions the agency could take to more efficiently manage the  procurement options for dedicated facilities.
Other issues at CDFs contributing to higher costs were a need to consolidate detention  bed capacity among facilities within common operating areas and the lack of competition  that drives up prices. business over a longer time period.a DIGSA had a profit margin of 20 percent.
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Government- and privately owned IGSAs. According to officials, the  study did not specifically examine costs at individual IGSAs, but noted  that facility costs at IGSAs may increase in the future when  implementing the 2011 PBNDS—ICE’s most recently implemented  detention standards. The study did not estimate such costs but  presumed that according to interviews with ICE officials and  contractors, implementing the 2011 PBNDS at IGSAs would not be  cost neutral and would require significant contracting action.

	ICE Applied Different Federal Standards across Facilities but Has Not Documented Reasons for the Differences

		ICE Applies the Most Rigorous Detention Standards to 15 Percent of Facilities Housing Over Half of Detainees

ICE detention standards vary in rigor as defined by the number and  content of standards in place to protect detainees and focus on  performance outcomes. Since 2000, ICE has primarily used three sets of  detention standards—the 2000 NDS, the 2008 PBNDS, and the 2011  PBNDS. In regard to the number of standards, the 2000 NDS contains  38 standards related to aspects of detainee care and services and facility  operation, while the 2008 PBNDS contains 41 standards and the 2011  PBNDS contains 42 standards. These standards are discussed in further  detail in appendix II. ICE has added standards over time to address  issues of heightened concern or to address gaps in procedures. For  example, ICE added a standard in the 2008 PBNDS to address sexual  abuse and assault, and a standard in the 2011 PBNDS to address  medical care for women. According to ICE ODPP officials, the agency  made enhancements or revisions to 39 of the 42 standards in the 2011  PBNDS, such as in the areas of medical and mental health care. In  regard to the content of standards, ICE noted certain additional  requirements that were applicable to a different extent across facility  types. For example, under the NDS and 2008 PBNDS, ICE requires ICE- owned SPCs and privately owned CDFs to conform to these additional  requirements, while ICE states that government- or privately owned  DIGSAs and IGSAs may adopt, adapt, or develop alternatives to the  procedures provided they meet or exceed the intent represented by the  additional requirements. Appendix III provides more detailed information  on the additional requirements that SPCs and CDFs are required to  follow. ICE officials said that under the 2011 PBNDS, some of these more  substantive requirements became applicable to all facilities and ICE also  introduced a new concept of optimal provisions that agency officials  characterize as more stringent than the mandatory provisions, and  therefore contractors may choose to adopt the optimal provisions  voluntarily. While these optimal provisions are voluntary, ICE states that  facility implementation of these provisions would further effective facility  operation at the level intended by ICE under the revised standards.  Appendix IV provides additional information on optimal provisions and an  example. Finally, in regard to the focus of the standards, ICE officials  explained that the 2008 PBNDS and 2011 PBNDS shifted language from  expressing what is to be done under the required policies and procedures  to focus on the results or outcomes the required procedures are expected  to accomplish; they also provide a higher level of procedural detail than  the 2000 NDS. ICE officials stated that the expected outcomes each  standard is intended to produce are stated, rather than assumed, and the  prescribed expected practices represent what is to be done to accomplish  those expected outcomes. For example, while both the NDS and PBNDS  include policies and procedures related to medical care, the 2000 NDS  states that facilities “must have a procedure in place” to ensure that  medical staff are alerted to health care requests in a timely manner, while  the 2008 PBNDS states that health care needs “will be met in a timely  and efficient manner,” and that each facility shall have a procedure to  ensure that sick call requests are “received and triaged by appropriate  medical personnel within 48 hours.”
According to ICE officials, ICE is to specify in each facility’s contract or  agreement the standards to which the facility is to be held. Our analysis of  ICE documents, however, showed that in fiscal year 2013, ERO held 3  (2.5 percent) of the 118 facilities that had the 2000 NDS or nonfederal  standards cited in the contract or agreement to the more rigorous 2008  PBNDS during the inspection process. For facilities operating under a  contract that cites the NDS, ERO officials stated that field officials  responsible for overseeing the facilities, or the administrators operating  the facilities, may decide to inspect them to the 2008 PBNDS if the  officials judge that the facilities are able to meet the more rigorous  requirements, and the facilities agree to this practice, or if the facilities  themselves ask to be held to more rigorous standards. An ICE official  responsible for detention policy explained that ERO inspecting a facility to  more rigorous standards than those cited in the facility’s contract or  agreement can be beneficial to ICE and detainees because it permits the  agency to hold facilities accountable for more rigorous requirements.  According to this official, it can be more efficient and cost-effective for ICE  to ensure that facilities adhere to more rigorous standards through the  inspection process rather than modifying the facilities’ contracts or  agreements to include the more rigorous standards because, for  example, facility contractors may request to open negotiations for the  entire contract, which could be a time-consuming process, as well as  request additional funding from ICE for the change in contract terms. For  example, inspecting a facility to the 2008 PBNDS when the facility  contract cites the 2000 NDS standards allows ERO to hold the facility  accountable to standards for sexual abuse and assault prevention and  intervention that would not be required of the facility if it was inspected  under the 2000 NDS, which do not include those provisions.
ICE officials reported that as of January 2014, 20 of the 22 facilities that  exclusively house ICE detainees—SPCs, CDFs, and DIGSAs—as well as  5 IGSAs, were held to the most recent and rigorous 2011 PBNDS. In  fiscal year 2013, ICE housed approximately 54 percent of its ADP in  these 25 facilities. Fourteen of the remaining 141 IGSA facilities—or  approximately 16 percent of ADP—are held to the 2008 PBNDS, while  the remaining 125 IGSA facilities—or 28 percent of ADP—that house ICE  detainees along with other populations are held to 2000 NDS (see fig.3).
Furthermore, ODPP officials stated that a number of facilities, regardless  of whether they have been updated to the 2011 PBNDS, have voluntarily  adopted the Sexual Abuse and Assault Prevention and Intervention  standard of the 2011 PBNDS, which requires, among other things, that  written sexual abuse and assault prevention and intervention policies and  procedures include components beyond those of the 2008 PBNDS, such  as a statement of a zero tolerance policy for all forms of sexual abuse or  assault.
As of April 2014, ICE officials said that they were in the process of  requesting that additional facilities authorized to hold detainees for 72  hours or longer implement the most recent 2011 PBNDS, and  documenting that change in facility contracts. Specifically, ICE officials  stated that they planned to request that all such facilities with an ADP of  150 detainees or greater adopt the 2011 PBNDS by the end of fiscal year  2014. If implemented, this would increase the number of facilities held to  the 2011 PBNDS from 25 to 61 facilities, or from 54 percent to 89 percent  of the ADP. According to ICE officials, implementing the 2011 PBNDS  has taken longer than anticipated. In April 2012, ICE disseminated an  implementation plan to dedicated facilities requesting that they adopt the  2011 PBNDS over a staggered 6-month period. According to ODPP  officials, ICE reached out to dedicated facilities first because they house  the greatest population of detainees and because any increased costs  would be spread across the entire population of the facility. ODPP  officials said that ICE did not meet the plan’s original milestones because  most facility contractors submitted extensive questions about the new  standards and then requested that ICE modify their contract or agreement  to include higher per diem rates to cover estimated costs of complying  with the higher standards. ICE’s attempts to minimize the potential  increased costs associated with adopting the newer standards required  lengthy negotiations with facilities to arrive at cost-neutral contracts. In  the case of nondedicated facilities that house fewer ICE detainees, ICE  officials said it may not be cost-effective for the agency to negotiate with  the facility contractors to increase standards for relatively few detainees  who are held in detention or are held for short periods of time. For  example, in fiscal year 2013, 46 facilities housed fewer than 10 detainees  during the year, and the time these detainees spent in detention averaged  less than 14 days. In addition, some facilities may be limited in their ability  to comply with higher standards because of reasons such as space  limitations. For example, the 2011 PBNDS require that detainees in  administrative segregation receive at least 1 hour of daily exercise  opportunities outside of the living area, but according to ICE officials,  some facilities that house ICE detainees may not have space to expand  the opportunities for outdoor recreation.

		ICE Did Not Have Documentation for Reasons Why Standards Vary across Facilities

ICE has not documented the reasons for using different standards across  facilities or why the 125 facilities under 2000 NDS as of January 2014 had  not been transitioned to the 2011 PBNDS. ICE officials said that reasons  different standards were used across facilities include cost issues as well  as facilities’ ability to comply with recent standards. These officials also  stated that agency implementation plans for progressively adopting the  2008 and 2011 PBNDS across certain facilities served to document the  agency’s rationale for using different standards across facilities. However,  while these plans documented which facilities were to receive requests to  adopt the newer standards, they do not document the reasons why these  facilities were chosen or why remaining facilities cannot be transitioned to  the most recent standards. For example, the implementation plan for the  2011 PBNDS did not explain why some smaller—in terms of facility type  and ADP—facilities that were not listed in the plan were transferred to the  2011 PBNDS, while other, similar facilities not included in the plan were  not transferred to the newer standards.
ICE officials said that in certain instances, detention facilities can have  standards waived after a review and approval by ICE. Specifically, the  agency may choose to waive certain detention requirements for a facility  if the contractor can comply with all but a specific detention standard,  such as the 2011 PBNDS standard for outdoor recreation, which  describes detainees’ access to exercise and recreation activities within  the appropriate security restraints. These officials said that waivers are  granted infrequently and usually only after ICE has (1) reviewed the  facility contractor’s request, (2) worked with the facility contractor to  identify a work-around solution that would allow the facility to comply with  the standard, and (3) confirmed that the facility has a “better than  acceptable” process in place that meets the intent of the standard even if  it does not meet the strict letter of the standard. According to ICE ERO,  as of August 2014, waivers were in effect for 41 standard components— the line items that compose the standards—across 35 facilities; these  waivers were approved from fiscal year 2012 through August 2014. Our  analysis of these waivers showed that 22 (54 percent) of the waivers are  related to a component of the environmental health and safety standard,  which requires facilities to, among other things, maintain a dedicated  barbering space and test power generators every 2 weeks. For example,  one facility lacks a separate barbering facility and has collocated  barbering services in a multipurpose room that is also used for dental  appointments. Another 6 (15 percent) of the 41 waivers relate to a  component of the key and lock standard, which requires facilities to  ensure that an on-site security officer completes locksmith training. In  these instances, facilities have agreed to use a contractor to install and  repair locks because they say training a security officer to perform that  function would be too expensive. The remaining 13 waivers address a  variety of other standards. According to ERO officials, copies of  approved waivers are provided to the facility contractor and to the ICE  ERO field office that oversees the facility; copies are also to be provided  to ODO officials upon request.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government specifies that all  transactions and other significant events should be clearly documented  and the documentation should be readily available for review. According  to ICE officials, implementation of the 2011 PBNDS at facilities with an  ADP of fewer than 150 is to be conducted on a case-by-case basis.  However, ICE ERO was not able to provide documentation of the reasons  it decided to implement the 2008 or 2011 PBNDS at some of these  facilities while keeping other facilities at the older, less rigorous 2000 NDS  or 2008 PBNDS. A senior ICE official stated that ICE relies on institutional  knowledge within the agency to track reasons for assigning certain  standards to individual facilities. For example, our analysis identified 1  facility that reverted to 2008 PBNDS after attempting to adopt the higher  2011 PBNDS; ICE officials stated that the rationale for this decision had  not been documented. Documenting reasons why facilities cannot be  transitioned to the most recent standards could help strengthen ICE’s  ability to oversee facilities’ compliance with detention standards and could  provide an institutional record of decisions ICE has made about why  facilities are held or not held to certain standards.

	ICE Uses More Oversight Mechanisms at Facilities with Greater Detainee Populations, with Some Inconsistencies in Results across Key Mechanisms

		Amount of ICE Oversight Is Driven by Detainee Population and Resources

ICE uses four mechanisms for assessing facilities’ compliance with  detention standards: (1) annual or biennial inspections conducted by an  ERO contractor, (2) annual self-inspections conducted by facility staff  under ERO’s Operational Review Self-Assessment (ORSA) process, (3)  periodic compliance inspections of selected facilities by ODO personnel,  and (4) on-site monitoring provided by an ERO detention service  manager (DSM). ICE officials responsible for detention oversight stated  that these different oversight mechanisms complement one another and  serve different purposes. ERO inspections are to assess compliance with  all applicable detention standards at each facility. Likewise, self- inspections, which apply to more than half of the smallest IGSAs and  IGAs—generally those with an ADP of fewer than 10 detainees—cover  key components of the detention standards. ODO is to conduct in-depth  compliance inspections that focus on certain standards and facilities  selected through a risk-based approach. DSMs are to monitor facility  adherence to ICE’s detention standards on a day-to-day basis and  provide facilities with technical guidance, including guidance advising how  to implement corrective action plans, as needed.
Five medium IGSA and USMS IGA facilities (1 percent)—ranging in average daily  population from 69 to 137—had on-site monitors during fiscal year 2013 and are excluded  from this analysis. monitoring, and none received an ODO compliance inspection. ICE  typically applied fewer types of oversight mechanisms at facilities with  small detainee populations—generally less than 10 ADP—where more  than half received oversight in the form of a self-inspection and about a  third were inspected by ERO. These small facilities were not subject to  ODO compliance inspections and did not have DSMs. Eighteen facilities  that housed about 1 percent of total ADP in fiscal year 2013 were not  subject to any of the four types of oversight mechanisms. ICE officials  attributed this to various reasons, such as ICE not holding detainees in  the facility during the year, ICE deciding to no longer use the facility, and  the fact that some facilities met the criteria for biennial review and  therefore they were not inspected in fiscal year 2013 (their next  scheduled inspection was in fiscal year 2014).
ICE ERO officials stated that the agency determines which ERO oversight  mechanisms are to be used at facilities primarily based on the size of the  facility—total detainee population—and available resources, among other  factors. For example, facilities that have an ADP of between 10 and 50  are inspected by a contractor on an annual basis, or a biennial basis if  their past two inspections were satisfactory. Because of time and  resource concerns, facilities that have an ADP of fewer than 10 may not  be inspected by ERO, but are required to perform self-inspections on an  annual basis and report the results of the inspections to ERO. According  to ERO officials, DSMs are to monitor facility conditions on a day-to-day  basis. However, ERO officials also stated that ERO generally reserves  on-site monitoring for facilities with large populations of 100 or more  detainees and that resource constraints currently limit further expansion  of the program. According to ODO officials, resource constraints also limit  the number of facilities ODO can inspect on an annual basis.
Our analysis of the number of detainees confined in facilities where ICE  used varying oversight mechanisms showed that in fiscal year 2013,  nearly all ICE detainees were housed in facilities that were subject to at  least one form of oversight. Further, in fiscal year 2013, the majority of  detainees—94 percent of ICE’s average daily population—were in  facilities that received an annual ERO inspection—and continuous on-site  monitoring by a DSM—78 percent of ICE’s average daily population—as  shown in figure 5. About 40 percent of ICE’s average daily population of  detainees were held in facilities that received an in-depth ODO  compliance inspection in fiscal year 2013. A small minority of detainees— about 1 percent of ICE’s average daily population—was housed in  facilities that conducted a self-inspection. Additionally, less than 1 percent  of the average daily population was not subject to any of these oversight  mechanisms during fiscal year 2013.

		ICE Has Not Assessed Reasons for Inconsistencies in Facility Inspection Results

ERO and ODO conducted inspections at many of the same facilities, but  collectively their inspections showed different results in fiscal year 2013.  Specifically, our analysis of ICE inspection results showed that ERO and  ODO included 35 of the same facilities in their inspections conducted  during fiscal year 2013, and in 29 of these inspections, ODO found more  deficiencies than ERO across facility types (see table 3). Collectively,  for those 35 facilities, ODO identified 448 deficiencies and ERO identified  343 deficiencies. For these facilities inspected under the 2000 NDS and  the 2008 and 2011 PBNDS, these deficiencies represented failure to  comply with one or more components that constitute a detention  standard, but not failure to comply with the overall standard.
For the 35 facilities at which both ICE ERO and ODO conducted an  inspection in fiscal year 2013, in some cases ERO and ODO found  different facility deficiencies within the same standards. This included  three standards that ICE has determined are some of the highest-priority  standards, because they have a high potential for adverse effects:   For  Medical Care, Special Management Units, and Use of Force.example:
Medical Care. ICE ERO and ODO inspection reports differed in the  extent to which they found deficiencies in medical care for the same  facilities, including facility inspection reports in which only ERO found  deficiencies, facility reports in which only ODO found deficiencies, and  reports in which both ERO and ODO found deficiencies but the  specific deficiencies differed. For example, at one IGSA, ODO found  that the facility was not properly safeguarding detainee medical  information, as all facility staff had access to each detainee’s medical  intake form. At this same facility, ICE ERO did not find any  deficiencies related to medical care.
Special Management Units. ERO and ODO inspection reports  differed in the extent to which they identified deficiencies pertaining to  special management unit standards. For example, at one facility, ERO  found the facility deficient in most elements of the special  management unit standard, as the facility did not have a special  management unit. ODO noted that the facility did not operate a  special management unit and therefore did not report the absence as  a deficiency. At another facility, ODO reported that the facility’s  policies and procedures did not require the facility administrator to  consult with ERO’s Detention Management Division prior to approving  the placement of an individual in a special management unit cell,  which would provide ERO an opportunity to consult with DHS or ICE  legal counsel as required by the standard. At that same facility, an  ERO inspection found that the facility met all components of the  special management unit standard.
Use of Force. ODO and ERO inspections both found deficiencies  related to the use of force standard. For example, at one facility, ODO  found two deficiencies in the standard: (1) the facility had no  procedures established for after-action reviews of use of force  incidents, and (2) facility policy did not require calculated use of force  incidents to be video-recorded, as required by the standards. At this  same facility, ERO found one use of force deficiency—staff were not  trained in use of force team techniques, as required.
ICE officials told us they have not assessed the extent to which ODO  compliance inspection results showed a greater number of deficiencies at  facilities in fiscal year 2013, or the extent to which ERO contract  inspections have the capacity to fully capture deficiencies in facilities’  compliance with relevant detention standards. However, ICE officials  cited several reasons as to why ERO and ODO inspection results may  differ across facilities:
Timing of inspections. According to ICE officials, between  inspections, facilities may resolve previously identified deficiencies or  may incur new ones. In fiscal year 2013, ERO and ODO inspections  at the 35 facilities ranged from less than 1 to 10 months apart.
Coverage and depth of inspections. According to an ICE official,  ODO’s in-depth compliance inspections are more likely to identify a  greater number of deficiencies. For example, in reviewing the medical  care standard, ERO inspectors may select 10 files to review to  determine if a facility is following policies and procedures. ODO may  check 50 files to assess overall compliance and may look beyond the  standards and inspection checklist requirements addressed by ERO  to address any quality of care concerns that have been raised.
Reporting of results. According to ICE officials, differences in ERO  and ODO reporting styles can make it difficult to assess the extent to  which inspection results differ. ERO’s contracted inspector uses a  checklist to identify deficiencies in the components that compose the  standards, and determine whether the number of deficient  components rises to the level of a deficiency in standards. ODO does  not use a checklist and reports its findings in a narrative descriptive  report and identifies deficiencies in components but does not assess  whether these deficiencies meet the threshold of a deficient standard.  For example, if the ICE ERO inspection sheet does not include a  component directly related to a particular part of the standard, ODO  may cite a deficiency that ERO may not find or identify.
Given the different purposes of ODO and ERO inspections, it is  reasonable to expect in some cases the respective findings differ,  according to differences in the depth and scope of the inspections.  However, without assessing why these differences occur, ICE is not well  positioned to determine the extent to which the oversight mechanisms are  functioning as intended. Moreover, Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government calls for operational information to be recorded and  communicated to management and others within the entity so that the  entity can determine whether compliance requirements are being met. In  addition, management is to ensure there is adequate and effective  communication between internal and external stakeholders to help ensure  appropriate decisions are made based on reliable and relevant  information.
ICE officials stated that ERO and ODO have not discussed differences in  their inspection findings and have not addressed broader issues of why  ERO and ODO inspection results differed across almost all inspections  conducted at the same facilities within fiscal year 2013, or to what extent  oversight mechanisms are functioning as intended. Assessing the  underlying reasons why ERO and ODO inspection results may differ, and  the extent to which these differences may reflect broader issues, could  help ICE ensure that inspection mechanisms are working as intended and  the extent to which any changes may be needed to ensure safe, secure,  and humane confinement.

	Conclusions

As the number of aliens in detention facilities has dramatically increased  over the past decade, so too have the associated costs of maintaining  and operating what is now the nation’s largest civil detention system. ICE  has recently taken steps to assess the primary drivers of facility costs by  types of facilities while continuing to improve confinement standards and  maintain a robust oversight program. However, ICE faces challenges in  the extent to which it can use its financial management system—including  manual work-arounds—to reliably identify and compare facility costs, a  fundamental aspect of effectively estimating and controlling the cost of  operations. Assessing and developing additional internal controls over the  management of facility cost data could help ensure that the mechanisms  ICE has in place, or is developing, to identify facility costs are accurate  and reliable, and provide ICE with more reliable data to effectively  manage detention costs. Similarly, while we recognize that ICE faces  competing priorities in determining detainee placement, developing an  oversight mechanism to ensure that field offices comply with guidance to  appropriately consider costs in making detainee placement decisions  could help ensure that the agency is effectively managing the costs of  housing detainees. Moreover, although ICE has taken steps to reduce the  improper payment rate for facility contractors, taking additional steps to  ensure that responsible personnel follow internal control procedures to  ensure contractor payments are accurate and properly supported could  provide additional assurance that ICE’s detention management practices  comply with relevant laws and are effectively protecting federal resources.
As it seeks to more efficiently manage facility costs, ICE is also in the  process of applying more rigorous detention standards to generally larger  detention facilities. Documenting the reasons why remaining facilities are  not held to the new standards could provide the agency with an  institutional record and enhance the transparency and accountability of  the agency’s process for managing detention facilities.
Finally, identifying the underlying reasons why inspections conducted by  ERO and ODO for the same facilities may result in different findings could  help ICE better ensure that oversight mechanisms are working as  intended and inspection results are accurately reflecting facilities’  compliance with relevant standards.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance ICE’s ability to analyze and manage detention facility costs,  ensure transparency and accountability in the management of detention  facilities, and strengthen the oversight mechanisms that ensure detention  facilities provide safe, secure, and humane confinement, we recommend  that the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement take the  following five actions: assess the extent to which ICE has appropriate internal controls for  tracking and managing detention facility costs and develop additional  controls as necessary; develop an oversight mechanism to ensure that field offices comply  with guidance to appropriately consider costs in making detainee  placement decisions;  take additional steps to help ensure that personnel responsible for  reviewing and paying facility detention invoices follow internal control  procedures to ensure proper payments; document the reasons facilities cannot be transitioned to the most  review reasons for differences between ERO and ODO inspection  results and assess the extent to which differences reflect broader  issues with the inspection mechanisms themselves to help ensure the  mechanisms are working as intended.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for their review and  comment. In an e-mail from DOJ’s Audit Liaison on September 10, 2014,  DOJ indicated that it did not have any comments on the draft report. DHS  provided written comments, which are summarized below and reproduced  in full in appendix V, and technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. DHS concurred with four of the five recommendations in the  report and described actions underway or planned to address them. DHS  did not concur with one recommendation in the report.
With regard to the first recommendation, that ICE assess the extent to  which ICE has appropriate internal controls for tracking and managing  detention facilities costs and develop additional controls as necessary,  DHS concurred and stated that the ICE Office of the Chief Financial  Officer developed enhanced financial coding to identify expenditures by  individual detention centers and began collecting data in fiscal year 2014.  DHS stated that ICE will monitor expenditures to determine proper  allocation, future funding requirements, and if additional internal controls  are required. DHS provided an estimated completion date of September  30, 2015. These planned actions, if fully implemented, should address the  intent of the recommendation.
With regard to the second recommendation, that ICE develop an  oversight mechanism to ensure that field offices comply with guidance to  appropriately consider costs in making detainee placement decisions,  DHS concurred and stated that ICE ERO will develop such an oversight  mechanism using the Self-Inspection Program. DHS provided an  estimated completion date of September 30, 2015. To the extent that the  Self-Inspection Program provides ICE with oversight of field office  compliance with the guidance, these planned actions, if fully  implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.
With regard to the third recommendation, that ICE take additional steps to  help ensure that personnel responsible for reviewing and paying facility  detention invoices follow internal control procedures to ensure proper  payments, DHS concurred. DHS stated that ICE had issued a new policy  applicable to all program offices and will assess if additional internal  controls are required and implement any needed ones, as appropriate.  DHS estimated a completion date of April 30, 2015. To the extent that  ICE assesses the status and need for internal controls necessary to  ensure personnel compliance with the policies to ensure proper  payments, these planned actions, if fully implemented, should address  the intent of the recommendation.
With regard to the fourth recommendation, that ICE document the  reasons facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards,  DHS did not concur. DHS stated that ICE believed it had already  appropriately documented the rationale for the decisions made in the  course of implementing PBNDS 2011 and that additional documentation  is not necessary in this regard. DHS stated that it established and  followed an implementation plan for transitioning facilities to PBNDS 2011  first focusing on dedicated facilities, to be followed by non-dedicated  intergovernmental service agreement facilities with an average daily  population of 150 or greater and that on an ongoing basis, has been  making efforts to incorporate PBNDS 2011 into facility agreements as  contracting opportunities arise. DHS stated that the implementation  process was labor-intensive and time-consuming, and ICE made an  assessment of which facilities represent priorities for transitioning to  PBNDS 2011 given the limits on agency personnel and resources, and in  recognition of the fact that not all 250 facilities could be transitioned at  once, or quite possibly, compelled to transition at all. DHS stated that our  findings and recommendation appeared to presume PBNDS 2011 as a  starting point for all detention facilities, with ICE making decisions on a  case-by-case basis whether to make an exception and deviate from that  norm. DHS noted that as ICE does not have the authority to unilaterally  impose new detention standards upon facilities, it can only request that a  facility adopt the new standards with the facility retaining the right to  refuse implementation or to request additional funds as a condition of  compliance.
We continue to believe that ICE should document the reasons why  individual facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards. In  our report, we noted that ICE makes requests to facilities to adopt new  standards and that facilities’ adoption of new standards may involve  contract negotiations between ICE and the facilities. For example, in our  report, we noted that ICE has attempted to minimize the potential  increased costs associated with adopting the newer standards and that  these attempts have required lengthy negotiations with facilities to arrive  at cost-neutral contracts. Further, as noted in our report, ICE’s  implementation plan discusses priorities for transitioning facilities to the  2011 PBNDS. In its comments to our draft report, DHS discussed the  reasons why some smaller (less than 150 ADP) nondedicated facilities  have been transitioned to the 2011 PBNDS—these facilities were  transitioned because their contracts had come up for renegotiation of the  per diem rate—however, the 2011 PBNDS implementation plan did not  document these reasons or why remaining facilities cannot be  transitioned to the most recent standards. For example, the  implementation plan for the 2011 PBNDS did not explain why some  smaller facilities that were not listed in the plan were transferred to the  2011 PBNDS, while other, similar facilities not included in the plan were  not transferred to the newer standards. Specifically, the plan did not  discuss why the 125 individual facilities under 2000 NDS as of January  2014 were not transitioned to 2011 PBNDS. Documenting reasons why  facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards would help  strengthen ICE oversight of facility detention standards and provide an  institutional record of decisions ICE has made about why facilities are  held or not held to certain standards. It would also provide more  transparency and accountability to facility contractors and to the public  regarding ICE management decisions that result in different standards of  care for detainees across facilities.
With regard to the fifth recommendation, that ICE review reasons for  differences between ERO and Office of Detention Oversight inspection  results and assess the extent to which differences reflect broader issues  with the inspection mechanisms  to ensure the mechanisms are working  as intended, DHS concurred. DHS estimated that ERO and ODO would  complete such action by March 30, 2015, and stated that it was important  to note that ODO must maintain independent oversight authority when  conducting inspections, and that any proposed changes must be  reviewed by senior ICE leadership prior to implementation, as  appropriate. This planned action, if effectively implemented, should  address the intent of the recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General of  the United States, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512- 8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VI.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the following three objectives:  1.  How do federal costs compare across different types of immigration  detention facilities, and to what extent does Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE) have processes to track and manage these costs?  2.  To what extent do the federal standards that govern conditions of  confinement vary across different types of immigration detention  facilities, and what are the reasons for any differences.  3.  To what extent do federal oversight and the results of that oversight  vary across different types of immigration facilities?
In this report, we assessed the costs to the federal government of  housing ICE detainees at different types of facilities, the federal standards  that govern confinement conditions at those facilities, and ICE oversight  mechanisms for ensuring compliance with these standards. The  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an immigration  detention facility as a confinement facility operated by or affiliated with  ICE that routinely holds persons for over 24 hours. However, of the 251  facilities authorized by ICE to hold detainees as of August 2013, we  limited our analysis to the 166 facilities that were designated to hold  detainees for 72 hours or longer because of the frequent turnover in the  detainee population at short-term facilities—such as holding facilities— which temporarily house detainees waiting for ICE transfer. These 166  facilities also exclude three federal prisons where ICE had detention bed  space in fiscal year 2013; two of the prisons housed a few detainees and  the third prison was discontinued for immigration detainees as of the end  of calendar year 2013, according to Bureau of Prisons and ICE officials.  We also excluded facilities for juvenile detainees—individuals under 18  years of age—because these facilities are regulated by the Department of  Health and Human Services.
To determine how federal costs compare across different types of  immigration detention facilities, we analyzed ICE fiscal year 2013 data,  the most recent fiscal year for which data were available, related to ICE  expenditures for detention facilities. These data include the Contract  Financial Monitoring File (CFMF), a manual tool maintained by ICE Office  of Enforcement and Removal Operations’ (ERO) Operational Support  Division to budget and track costs at individual facilities, and ICE Office of  Budget and Program Performance (OBPP) fiscal year 2013 data drawn  from ICE’s Federal Financial Management System (FFMS). ICE OBPP  uses these data to calculate ICE’s average facility “bed rate”—the  average cost to house one detainee for 1 day. To determine the reliability  of the CFMF, we conducted data testing to look for anomalies, reviewed  related documentation, and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials.  We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes,  but have limitations as discussed in this report. To assess the reliability of  ICE OBPP’s bed rate data, we tested the data and interviewed  knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the data are not  reliable for reporting on the differences in cost by facility type, as  discussed in this report. To determine the reasons for possible  differences in costs, we analyzed ICE documents, including an ICE- funded study of detention bed rate costs across facilities and in particular  at ICE-owned service processing centers (SPC), and interviewed agency  officials. We assessed the methodology for the ICE-funded study and  determined that it was reliable for our purposes. To determine the extent  to which ICE has processes in place to track and manage detention  facility costs, we analyzed relevant documents, including DHS annual  financial reports, previous GAO reports related to DHS financial  management, and ICE financial management guidance, and interviewed  agency officials. We assessed our findings related to ICE’s financial  management practices against Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government and ICE’s 2010-2014 strategic plan. We also  analyzed the extent to which ICE’s average daily population (ADP) in its  facilities met the guaranteed minimums—the number of beds ICE pays  for each day regardless of their utilization—in those facilities. We  assessed ICE’s plans to develop guidance for the field related to  considering cost in detainee placements against Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government. We reviewed relevant laws,  including the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) of 2002, the  Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) of 2010, and  the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act  (IPERIA) of 2012, as well as related Office of Management and Budget  guidance. We analyzed a sample of invoices and supporting  documentation submitted to ICE by detention services contractors for  services provided in December 2013 to determine the extent to which  these invoices met ICE’s requirements for invoice elements and  supporting documentation, and were managed in accordance with  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We selected  invoices from December 2013 because, according to ICE officials,  invoices from December 2013 and later should adhere to ICE’s new  invoice submission and review guidance. We analyzed 31 of the 158  invoices for detention services in December 2013 that ICE had received  by February 2014. The selection included invoices from a range of facility  types. Results of our analysis are not generalizable beyond the sample,  but they provide insight into facility invoice adherence to the new  guidance. To determine the extent to which ICE has processes to track  and manage detention facility costs and plans for developing guidance  related to detainee placements, we also interviewed cognizant agency  officials.
To assess the extent to which the federal standards that govern  conditions of confinement vary across different types of immigration  detention facilities and reasons for any differences, we identified ICE  detention standards, including the 2000 National Detention Standards  (NDS), the 2008 Performance-Based National Detention Standards  (PBNDS), and the 2011 PBNDS and analyzed the extent to which ICE  applied these different standards across detention facilities. We analyzed  these three sets of standards to assess the similarities and differences  among the standards in terms of the number, content, and application  across facilities. To identify the standards to which each facility was held,  we first analyzed the standards included in 166 facility contracts and  agreements in place as of August 2013, the date that ICE had provided  us a list of facilities that are authorized to house detainees for over 72  hours when we began our analysis. Because ERO officials told us that  facilities can be inspected to higher standards than those specified in the  signed contract or agreement, we next analyzed ERO inspection data to  identify the standards to which facilities were inspected in fiscal year  2013, or the most recent year inspected. If a facility was inspected to a  more rigorous set of standards than those identified in its contract or  ERO’s facilities list, we categorized the facility by the standards to which it  was inspected. Finally, we updated our analysis to incorporate facility  standards updated by ERO in facility contracts or agreements as of  January 2014, to capture all updates made during 2013. To determine the  percentage of ICE detainees who were covered by each set of standards  during fiscal year 2013, we analyzed the standards to which each facility  was held against the ADP. In addition, we assessed the extent to which  ICE documented its decision-making process for determining which  standards to apply at which facilities in accordance with Standards for   Further, we analyzed 41  Internal Control in the Federal Government.waivers ICE had granted to detention facilities to exempt them from  certain detention standards, and which were still in effect in August 2014,  when we performed the analysis. These waivers were approved from  fiscal year 2012 through August 2014. We assessed these waivers to  identify the specific standards for which ICE has issued waivers. We also  interviewed ICE officials to determine the reasons why standards vary by  facility type and ERO’s plans to implement the most recent set of  detention standards at facilities.
To assess how federal oversight compares across different types of  immigration detention facilities, we identified the various oversight  mechanisms ICE used at detention facilities in fiscal year 2013 and  analyzed differences in their use and results. Specifically, we analyzed  the extent to which ICE used (1) annual and biennial facility inspections  conducted by the ERO contractor, (2) annual facility self-inspections  conducted under ERO’s Operational Review Self-Assessment (ORSA)  process, (3) ERO’s detention service manager (DSM) on-site monitoring  program, and (4) Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) risk-based facility  inspections at 166 ICE facilities authorized to hold detainees for over 72  hours as of August 2013. With respect to ERO’s inspection program, we  analyzed ERO inspection data for fiscal year 2013, the most recent fiscal  year for which inspection data were available. To determine the reliability  of ERO’s inspection data, which are maintained in ERO’s Facility  Performance Management System (FPMS), we conducted data testing to  identify anomalies and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials. We  concluded that the FPMS data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes  of this report. We interviewed cognizant agency officials regarding these  mechanisms and the reasons why different oversight mechanisms were  used at different facilities. We compared the percentage of fiscal year  2013 ADP in immigration detention facilities by facility type and oversight  mechanisms used at facilities to determine what percentage of detainees  are housed in facilities at which ICE uses the various oversight  mechanisms. To determine the extent to which the results of oversight  mechanisms vary, we compared the results of ICE ERO’s annual  inspections and ICE ODO inspection results for the 35 facilities that  received both an ERO and ODO inspection in fiscal year 2013.  Specifically, we compared ERO and ODO inspection results across the  35 facilities to determine differences in the overall number of deficiencies  identified by each office. We also compared ERO and ODO facility  inspection results for selected facilities across three standards that ICE  has identified as high priority—medical care, special management unit,  and use of force—to illustrate differences between ERO and ODO  inspections of the same facilities. We also interviewed ICE ERO and  ODO agency officials regarding the reasons for any differences in results  between the two oversight mechanisms. We assessed the extent to which  ICE addressed the differences in the results of the two oversight  mechanisms and communicated these differences to management and  others within the agency in accordance with Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2013 to October 2014,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comparison of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Detention Standards

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement primarily uses three sets of  national detention standards with varying requirements to govern the  conditions of confinement in its detention facilities—the 2000 National  Detention Standards (NDS), the 2008 Performance-Based National   The 2000 NDS  Detention Standards (PBNDS), and the 2011 PBNDS.contains 38 standards related to aspects of detainee care and services  and facility operation, while the 2008 PBNDS contains 41 standards, and  the 2011 PBNDS contains 42 standards, as shown in table 4.

Appendix III: Example of an Italicized Requirement

In addition to the procedures that all detention facilities are expected to  meet, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention  standards can require specific types of facilities to conform to more  detailed procedures; however, all sets of standards identify these detailed  procedures in italicized text (referred to as “italicized requirements”).  ICE’s 2000 National Detention Standards (NDS) and the 2008  Performance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS) require  service processing centers (SPC) and contract detention facilities (CDF)  to conform to the more detailed procedures; facilities operating under a  nondedicated intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA), however,  may either conform to the italicized procedures or adopt, adapt, or  establish alternative procedures. The 2011 PBNDS require all dedicated  facilities—SPCs, CDFs, and those dedicated facilities operating under an  intergovernmental service agreement (DIGSA)—to conform to the more  detailed procedures; nondedicated IGSAs may choose to conform to or  adopt alternative procedures. According to ICE, the italicized procedures  are intended to make conditions of confinement more uniform at facilities  where only ICE detainees are housed. Table 5 presents an example of an  italicized procedure from the 2011 PBNDS. For a complete list of 2011  PBNDS italicized procedures, go to  http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2011/.

Appendix IV: Example of an Optimal Provision in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 2011 Performance- Based Detention Standards (PBNDS)

Appendix IV: Example of an Optimal Provision  in U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement’s (ICE) 2011 Performance-Based  Detention Standards (PBNDS)
In the 2011 PBNDS, ICE introduced the concept of optimal provisions— nonmandatory provisions that facilities may choose to implement, but are  not required. According to ICE, implementation of these provisions  furthers the effective operation of a facility at the level intended under the  revised 2011 PBNDS. ICE reports that these optimal provisions allow for  a range of compliance across its diverse facilities, which facilitates the  immediate implementation of the revised standards—at minimal cost— while ICE continues to lay the groundwork for future reform of the  detention system. Table 6 provides an example of an optimal provision in  the 2011 PBNDS. For a complete listing of all optimal provisions in the  2011 PBNDS, go to http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2011/.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Lacinda Ayers (Assistant  Director), Pedro A. Almoguera, Carla D. Brown, Frances A. Cook,  Michele Fejfar, Allyson R. Goldstein, Barbara A. Guffy, Melissa Hargy,  Paul D. Kinney, Amanda K. Miller, Jessica S. Orr, James J. Ungvarsky,  John Warner, and Eric M. Warren made significant contributions to this  report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

DHS has reported that the number of noncitizens in immigration detention has increased from about 230,000 in fiscal year 2005 to about 440,600 in fiscal year 2013. ICE applies various sets of detention standards—such as medical services—at over 250 facilities owned by ICE or private contractors, or owned by or contracted to state and local governments. GAO was asked to examine differences in cost, standards, and oversight across types of facilities.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) ICE has processes to track costs, (2) standards vary across facility types and the reasons for any differences, and (3) oversight and the results of that oversight vary across facility types. GAO reviewed ICE data and information on costs, detention population, standards, and oversight for 166 facilities that held detainees for 72 hours or more, from fiscal years 2011 through 2013, reviewed facility contracts, and interviewed federal contractors and DHS and ICE officials.

What GAO Found

Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) uses two different methods to collect and assess data on detention costs; however, these methods do not provide ICE with complete data for managing detention costs across facilities and facility types. One method uses the agency's financial management system to estimate total detention costs per detainee per day for the purposes of developing ICE's annual detention budget request. However, ICE identified errors in the entry of data into this system and limitations in the system make it difficult for ICE to accurately record expenditures for individual facilities. ICE's other method involves the manual tracking of monthly costs by individual facilities for the purposes of reviewing data on individual facility costs. However, this method does not include data on all costs for individual facilities, such as for medical care and transportation, and such costs are not standardized within or across facility types. Thus, ICE does not have complete data for tracking and managing detention costs across facilities and facility types. ICE has taken some steps to strengthen its financial management system, such as implementing manual work-arounds to, among other things, better link financial transactions to individual facilities. However, ICE has not assessed the extent to which these manual work-arounds position ICE to better track and manage costs across facilities or facility types and the extent to which additional controls are needed to address limitations in its methods for collecting and assessing detention costs, in accordance with federal internal control standards. Conducting these assessments could better position ICE to have more reliable data for tracking and managing costs across facility types.
GAO's analysis of ICE facility data showed that ICE primarily used three sets of detention standards, with the most recent and rigorous standards applied to 25 facilities housing about 54 percent of ICE's average daily population (ADP) as of January 2014. ICE plans to expand the use of these standards to 61 facilities housing 89 percent of total ADP by the end of fiscal year 2014; however, transition to these standards has been delayed by cost issues and contract negotiations and ICE does not have documentation for reasons why some facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards in accordance with internal control standards. Documenting such reasons could provide an institutional record and help increase transparency and accountability in ICE's management of detention facilities.
GAO's analysis of ICE facility oversight programs showed that ICE applied more oversight mechanisms at facilities housing the majority of the ADP in fiscal year 2013. For example, 94 percent of detainees were housed in facilities that received an annual inspection. GAO's analysis of ICE's inspection reports showed that inspection results differed for 29 of 35 facilities inspected by both ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) and Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) in fiscal year 2013. ICE officials stated that ODO and ERO have not discussed differences in inspection results and whether oversight mechanisms are functioning as intended. Assessing the reasons why inspection results differ, in accordance with internal control standards, could help ICE better ensure that inspection mechanisms are working as intended.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that ICE assess the extent to which it has appropriate controls for tracking facility costs, document reasons why facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards, and review reasons for differences in inspection results. DHS concurred with all recommendations but one to document reasons why facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards because, among other reasons, DHS believes it already has sufficient documentation. As discussed in this report, GAO continues to believe in the need for such documentation.