Background

In May 2010, the DOD Comptroller issued the FIAR Guidance to provide  a standard methodology for DOD components to follow in developing an  audit strategy and implementing FIPs. The FIAR Guidance was most  recently updated in November 2013 and describes the following five audit  readiness phases and activities that DOD reporting entities (including the  Army) are to include in their FIPs.
Discovery Phase: Entities document their processes and identify,  test, and assess their controls and evaluate and confirm the existence  of documentation supporting relevant financial statement assertions.
Corrective Action Phase: Entities develop and execute plans to  address identified deficiencies and verify implementation of corrective  actions.
Assertion/Evaluation Phase: The FIAR Directorate reviews  assertions by entity management that assessable units are audit  ready. An IPA or the DOD Office of Inspector General (OIG) examines  readiness, and entity management addresses any reported  deficiencies.
Validation Phase: The FIAR Directorate validates audit readiness  based on its assessment of the IPA examination report and  documentation supporting successful remediation of auditor-identified  deficiencies.
Audit Phase: An IPA or the DOD OIG performs an audit of the  financial statements or specified elements of them and issues an  opinion on whether they are fairly presented in accordance with  generally accepted accounting principles.
Appendix II provides more specific information on the phases, tasks, and  deliverables that the FIAR Guidance requires reporting entities to include  in their FIPs.
In response to component difficulties in preparing for a full SBR audit, the  November 2012 FIAR Plan Status Report and the March 2013 FIAR  Guidance included a revision to narrow the scope of initial audits to only  current year budget activity and expenditures on a Schedule of Budgetary  Activity (SBA). Under this approach, beginning in fiscal year 2015,  reporting entities are to undergo an examination of their SBAs by an IPA  or the DOD OIG reflecting the balances and associated activity related  only to funding approved on or after October 1, 2014. As a result, SBAs  will exclude unobligated and unexpended amounts carried over from prior  years’ funding as well as information on the status and use of such  funding in subsequent years (e.g., obligations incurred and outlays).
These amounts will remain unaudited. Over the ensuing years, as the  unaudited portion of SBR balances and activity related to this funding  decline, the audited portion is expected to increase. The NDAA for Fiscal  Year 2010, as amended by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, requires that  the FIAR Plan describe specific actions to be taken and the costs  associated with ensuring that DOD’s SBR is validated as ready for audit  by not later than September 30, 2014. Further, the FIAR Plan Status  Report is required to include a determination by the Chief Management  Officer of each military department concerning its ability to achieve an  auditable SBR by September 30, 2014, and if the department is unable to  meet this deadline, an explanation as to why it is unable to meet the  deadline as well as an alternative deadline and a description of the plan  for achieving an auditable SBR by the alternative deadline. In addition, all  material amounts reported on the SBR will need to be auditable in order  to achieve the mandated goal of full financial statement audit readiness  by September 30, 2017.

		Army General Fund SBR Audit Readiness Strategy

The Army prepared its audit readiness strategy to provide a high-level  overview for Army leaders and stakeholders to understand the Army’s  approach for achieving audit readiness in accordance with the FIAR  Guidance. In connection with this strategy, the Army’s approach for  achieving General Fund SBR audit readiness includes four separate FIPs  developed to guide improvement efforts in the following areas: (1) budget  execution, (2) military pay, (3) financial reporting, and (4) FBWT. The  Army also relies on service providers to ensure the audit readiness of  service provider systems and business processes that support services   In addition, as  provided to the Army and affect its General Fund SBR.shown in figure 1, establishing the Army’s audit-ready systems  environment is integral to the Army’s audit readiness strategy, including  implementation of the General Fund Enterprise Business System  (GFEBS) and other key enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems.
GFEBS is absorbing more than 100 legacy accounting and other systems  to standardize business processes and provide more accurate data on  funds availability and execution. According to Army sources, GFEBS is  one of the world’s largest ERP systems, supporting approximately 1  million transactions each day and over 53,000 users at over 200 locations  in 71 countries in fiscal year 2013. Also, according to Army sources,  obligations incurred associated with contracts, civilian pay, and other  business activities that were processed in GFEBS represented about 52  percent of total obligations incurred reported in the Army’s General Fund  SBR for fiscal year 2013. Based on efforts to record military pay  expenditure and accounting data in GFEBS beginning in fiscal year 2014,  Army officials stated that GFEBS is expected to be the primary system for  processing Army obligations incurred for fiscal year 2014.
The Army reported that it completed Discovery Phase audit readiness  efforts for all four of its General Fund SBR FIPs, including the FIP for  budget execution, in March 2013 and expects to complete the Corrective  Action and Assertion/Evaluation Phases by June 2014 and September  2014, respectively. The Army’s FIP for budget execution, the focus of this  report, is particularly important as it addresses improvement efforts  involving significant budgetary resources and financial activity reported in  its General Fund SBR across multiple business processes. Further, this  FIP focuses on the development of GFEBS-based audit-ready processes,  including those that affect obligations incurred reported in the Army’s  General Fund SBR, and emphasizes incremental “waves” of audit  readiness assertions and IPA examinations to assess progress of Army  locations and business processes operating in the GFEBS environment.  Originally, the Army planned four waves, but in fiscal year 2012 it  compressed its assertions to three waves to meet the DOD time frame  and NDAA mandate for achieving audit readiness. The activity and timing  of these waves are as follows.
Wave 1. In June 2011, the Army asserted audit readiness at 3 of 227  locations with five business processes.examination in November 2011 and reported that the Army did not  effectively design test plans for evaluating the operating effectiveness  of key controls for several processes. The IPA also reported that the   An IPA completed an  Army did not (1) properly identify all key control objectives and  activities and risks of misstatement related to its processes or  consider the control environment as a whole and (2) properly identify  the financial statement risks related to key control activities and  objectives within its processes.
Wave 2. In June 2012, the Army asserted audit readiness at 10 of 227   with eight  locations (3 Wave 1 locations and 7 additional locations)business processes. An IPA completed an examination in April 2013  and reported several inadequacies in the Army’s Wave 2 readiness  assertion, as discussed later in our report.
Wave 3. In June 2013, the Army asserted audit readiness for eight  GFEBS processes and activities at remaining locations. An IPA is to  complete an examination by May 2014.
Full General Fund SBA. The Army is to assert audit readiness for all  current year activity and funding by June 2014.

	The Army Did Not Fully Follow FIAR Guidance in Determining the Scope of Its General Fund Budget Execution Audit Readiness Efforts

To help prioritize and guide its efforts, the Army developed its FIP for  budget execution emphasizing the implementation of effective GFEBS  processes for achieving SBR audit readiness. However, the Army did not  fully complete key tasks to help ensure that its FIP adequately considered  the scope of efforts required to achieve audit readiness and addressed  significant qualitative risks or other factors affecting its efforts, as required  by FIAR Guidance. For example, the Army’s analysis identifying Army  and service provider business processes and systems supporting its  General Fund SBR FIP for budget execution was incomplete.
In accordance with the March 2013 FIAR Guidance, the Army limited the  scope of its efforts to focus on achieving SBA audit readiness by  September 30, 2014. Therefore, the Army excluded measures to ensure  the readiness of beginning balances associated with funding received in,  and carried forward from, prior years and activity processed in certain  legacy systems. While achieving SBA audit readiness can provide a  meaningful indicator of progress, the amounts excluded are material to  the Army’s SBR and may continue to represent material portions of future  SBRs. Further, the Army had not performed an assessment to adequately  demonstrate the expected magnitude of these amounts in future years  and address risks associated with them as required. As a result, the Army  lacks important assurance that it will achieve audit readiness goals as  planned. Also, the Army did not address whether it will meet the  September 30, 2014, deadline for an auditable SBR in its determination of  audit readiness included in DOD’s November 2013 FIAR Plan Status  Report and did not clearly indicate an alternative date for achieving full  SBR audit readiness, as required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013.

		The Army’s Identification of Significant SBR Amounts and Processes Was Incomplete

Per the FIAR Guidance, Discovery Phase Task 1 (statement to process  analysis) requires reporting entities to identify the assessable units,  business processes, systems, and other characteristics associated with  amounts reported in each financial statement line item. Also, because of  the significant reliance placed on service providers, the FIAR Guidance  also requires reporting entities to (1) coordinate with them to ensure that  the statement to process analysis identifies significant assessable units  associated with service provider processes and systems supporting each  line item and (2) formalize and document their relationship with the  service providers in a memorandum of understanding (MOU).  Completing these tasks is essential for understanding the relative  importance and multifaceted nature of audit readiness efforts and for  developing an effective strategy. However, we found that the Army had  not effectively completed these tasks as discussed below.
Statement to process analysis. For this task, the Army prepared a  General Fund SBR statement to process analysis supporting its FIP  for budget execution Wave 2 readiness assertion, which identified the  portions of obligations-incurred activity processed in GFEBS that were  attributable to key assessable units, such as civilian pay, contracts,  and supplies. However, this analysis did not show the linkage of key  SBR financial statement line items to all significant assessable units  and therefore was incomplete. Specifically, the Army’s analysis  focused only on obligations-incurred activity processed in GFEBS,  which, as of September 30, 2013, represented about 52 percent, or  $119 billion, of total reported General Fund obligations, as shown in  figure 2.
Assessable units and related amounts associated with remaining  obligations incurred activity processed in non-GFEBS systems,  totaling $109 billion for fiscal year 2013, were not included in the  Army’s analysis. Further, other SBR activity attributable to service  provider business processes and systems was also excluded.  According to Army officials, they excluded these amounts because of  the Army’s expectation that (1) service providers will ensure the  readiness of their systems and processes and (2) the Army’s reliance  on certain legacy systems will decline significantly in connection with  its further implementation of GFEBS. In addition, unobligated and  unpaid obligated amounts carried forward from prior years—or  beginning balances—were excluded from its analysis, which,  according to Army officials, was consistent with the March 2013 FIAR  Guidance revision to narrow the focus of initial audits to SBAs.  Further, Army officials indicated that devoting significant resources to  ensure the readiness of these legacy systems and beginning  balances was not cost effective, and accordingly, they excluded  efforts to ensure their auditability from the scope of the Army’s  readiness strategy.
The Army’s consideration of the cost-effectiveness of its readiness  efforts is important. However, its exclusion of these amounts and  processes did not eliminate the FIAR Guidance requirements to  identify all assessable units with processes that result in transactions  and balances—including beginning balances—material to the SBR  and to consider the risks associated with them in developing its audit  readiness strategy. In addition, documentation provided by FIAR  Directorate officials supporting the rationale for revising the FIAR  Guidance concerning beginning balances specifies that the revision  was not intended to affect Discovery Phase requirements. Further, the  FIAR Guidance also requires reporting entities to identify processes  and systems supporting existing “as-is” environments, in addition to  planned “to-be” environments associated with implementing new  financial systems. This requirement also recognizes the complexities  and challenges associated with implementing large-scale financial  systems, such as GFEBS, and the importance of identifying and  addressing risks associated with legacy systems and related business  processes. Addressing such risks is to be performed during Discovery  Phase Task 2 and is essential for developing a cost-effective  readiness strategy.
Service provider assessable units and MOU. The Army’s analysis  did not identify activity attributable to assessable units associated with  service provider business processes and systems, as required by the  FIAR Guidance, despite the significant impact they have on the  Army’s SBR and its reliance on them to help achieve readiness. Also,  the Army had not established an MOU with its service providers to  formally document a shared understanding of roles and  responsibilities affecting audit readiness efforts as required by the  FIAR Guidance. For example, an MOU would include roles and  responsibilities for the authorization, initiation, processing, recording,  and reporting of transactions affected by the service provider,  including requirements for the retention of supporting documents.  Army officials stated they had established a Mission Work Agreement  with DFAS, a document that defines the terms of work, describing  various types of services DFAS provides to the Army, including those  associated with financial reporting, civilian and military pay, contract  pay, and other processes. However, it does not contain the level of  detail needed in an MOU to help ensure coordination, performance,  and accountability of the parties, such as a clear linkage between the  services described and specific control activities DFAS is required to  perform that affect the Army’s financial reporting objectives. According  to Army officials, efforts to coordinate with service providers to obtain  sufficient information on their business processes and systems and  establish MOUs has been challenging as relationships and audit  readiness interdependencies with the service providers are very  complex. They also indicated that the FIAR Directorate has been  taking a lead role in coordinating efforts of service providers to help  facilitate the development of MOUs but that time frames for finalizing  them had not been determined. Until the relationships between the  Army and its service providers are identified and documented in  sufficient detail, the Army remains at risk of important tasks necessary  to ensure audit readiness not being identified or completed as  intended.

		The Army’s Assessment of Key Risks Is Not Documented

Per the FIAR Guidance, Task 2 of the Discovery Phase (prioritizing  readiness efforts) requires reporting entities to rank all assessable units  based on materiality and to identify and document qualitative risks and  other factors associated with each of those identified. Also, this task  requires reporting entities to identify and document entity-level controls,  including assessments of internal and external risks that may affect their  readiness efforts and serve as the basis for their FIPs. The Army  developed its FIP for budget execution to help guide its General Fund  SBR audit readiness activities and focus efforts on implementing GFEBS- based audit-ready processes. However, for this task, we found that the  Army did not identify and document its consideration of several significant  qualitative risks and other factors in developing its General Fund FIP for  budget execution. Documentation demonstrating the Army’s identification  and evaluation of these risks is essential to help ensure that incremental  SBA and full SBR audit readiness goals will be achieved. Additional  details concerning these risks are highlighted below.
Reliance on service providers. The Army relies heavily on service  providers, such as DFAS, to process accounting and payment  transactions as well as ensure the effectiveness of the controls and  information systems they use in providing support to the Army.
Accordingly, the FIAR Guidance requires service providers to ensure the  readiness of their systems and business processes that have a material  impact on reporting entity SBRs. However, as previously discussed, the  Army’s efforts to better understand and document complex relationships  and audit readiness interdependencies with service providers have not  been completed, hampering its ability to obtain sufficient information  concerning risks associated with their activities. Further, the Army’s ability  to rely on service providers remains unclear since, as discussed later in  this report, IPA or DOD OIG assessments of the audit readiness of  service provider systems and processes have not been completed. As a  result, the Army is at increased risk that it may not meet its audit  readiness goals.
Limitations in scope of audit readiness efforts. As previously  discussed, the Army’s strategy did not include efforts to ensure the audit  readiness of (1) SBR beginning balances and (2) certain legacy systems  and business processes the Army relies on to support significant portions  of its SBR. Risks associated with these scope limitations, if not properly  addressed, could adversely affect the Army’s ability to achieve audit  readiness goals as highlighted below.
Beginning balances. The Army reported beginning balances (as of  October 1, 2012) of $44.3 billion and $138.7 billion for unobligated  and unpaid obligated balances, respectively, on its General Fund SBR  for fiscal year 2013, representing amounts associated with prior year  funding brought forward from fiscal year 2012. While the FIAR  Guidance provides for limiting the focus of initial audits to current year  budget activity and expenditures contained in SBAs, it does not  eliminate the requirement to identify and assess risks associated with  these beginning balances for achieving full SBR auditability.  Accordingly, assessing the extent to which amounts associated with  prior year funding may affect efforts to achieve this goal is essential.  Also, apart from the FIAR requirements, the Army continues to be  responsible for the accuracy of reported balances relating to current  and prior year budget activity in order to comply with appropriations  law, and to accurately report them by appropriation for inclusion in the  President’s annual budget request. Recognizing the need to ensure  the accuracy of information contained in agency budget requests,  agencies are also required to include information in their audited  financial statements showing material differences between key  amounts contained in their SBRs and related amounts contained in  the President’s Budget. However, the Army’s most recent financial  statements for fiscal years 2013 and 2012 remain unaudited and,  importantly, do not provide information regarding material differences,  if any, between comparable amounts reported in its SBR and the  President’s Budget. As a result, the extent to which the Army can  provide needed assurance regarding the accuracy of reported  balances and activity related to prior budget years contained in the  President’s Budget is limited.
Despite these requirements, Army officials told us that the Army had  not identified risks associated with beginning balances reported on its  SBR or assessed how and when efforts to prepare auditable SBAs  would result in full SBR audit readiness. Specifically, at the time of our  review, the Army had not determined how achieving audit readiness  would be affected by expenditures or other activity associated with  beginning balances that are expected to occur in future years. The  Army has various appropriated funds that are available for obligation  for 1, 2, 3, and 5 fiscal years. After these periods of availability expire,  the accounts remain open for 5 additional fiscal years to adjust or  liquidate obligations before the accounts are closed and any  remaining balances are canceled. For example, the fiscal year 2012  ending balances included five 3-year procurement appropriation  accounts containing $12.3 billion that had not been obligated for  payment, and $39.2 billion that the Army had obligated to pay but had  not yet disbursed. The Army will potentially be required to account for  these procurement appropriations into fiscal year 2019, beyond the  current audit readiness plan as well as the September 30, 2017,  deadline for achieving auditability of its full SBR and other financial  statements for fiscal year 2018. Additional analysis documenting and  supporting the Army’s expectations concerning the extent to which  future SBRs may include significant activity and balances associated  with these multiyear appropriation funds would assist in assessing  risks that could impede audit readiness.
Legacy systems. According to the FIAR Guidance, reporting entities  involved in system transformation initiatives are required to assess the  target dates of their to-be environments against their audit-ready  assertion dates to determine whether existing systems, to-be  systems, or both should be included in their current readiness efforts.  In this regard, based on transformation efforts associated with  implementing GFEBS and other key ERP systems intended to replace  certain existing legacy systems, the Army excluded tasks to ensure  the readiness of these legacy systems and related business  processes from the scope of its readiness efforts. The Army expects  the appropriation accounts that would continue to generate  transaction data from such systems to be expended or expired and  thus amounts would become immaterial over time. However, officials  told us that they were uncertain as to how continued reliance on these  systems may affect initial audits. For example, officials told us that a  timeline for transitioning funding for classified and other associated  activity from legacy systems to a GFEBS-based environment has not  been determined. Until this transition occurs, ongoing activity  accounted for in legacy systems could have a major impact on the  Army’s SBAs and SBR. Also, processing billions of dollars in  unobligated balances and unpaid obligations in the Army’s five  procurement appropriation accounts that are accounted for in legacy  systems as previously discussed could take several years. Therefore,  this ongoing activity will likely affect initial examinations of incremental  SBAs currently expected to begin with fiscal year 2015 as well as full  SBRs to be examined in subsequent years.
Army officials acknowledged these risks and that the Army had not  documented its assessment of them. Despite the uncertainty associated  with how these risks may affect the auditability of the Army’s incremental  SBAs and full SBRs, according to Army officials, the scope of their efforts  and plans for adhering to established audit readiness assertion and  examination milestones have remained unchanged. However, without  sufficient documentation identifying these risks and assessing their  potential impact on producing auditable SBAs and full SBRs within  established time frames, the Army is unable to provide needed assurance  that its strategy will achieve audit readiness or when it will be achieved.
Further, as discussed earlier, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires that  DOD’s FIAR Plan Status Reports include the Army’s determination on  whether it will achieve an auditable SBR by September 30, 2014.  Recognizing the potential impact of audit readiness challenges, the NDAA  also requires that the FIAR Plan Status Report include an alternative date  for achieving SBR audit readiness if the Army determines that it is unable  to meet this deadline. However, the Army’s determination, as presented  in the November 2013 FIAR Plan Status Report, did not meet these  requirements. Specifically, while the Army’s determination stated that it  would achieve SBA audit readiness by September 30, 2014, it did not  address whether full SBR auditability would be achieved by that date or, if  not, clearly indicate an alternative deadline for doing so.

	The Army Did Not Effectively Implement Key Tasks in Its Budget Execution FIP in Accordance with FIAR Guidance

For those budget execution audit readiness activities the Army  determined to be within the scope of its FIP for budget execution, the  Army has made progress toward implementing the first three phases of  Discovery, Corrective Action, and Assertion/Evaluation. For example, the  Army identified selected control activities and conducted monthly tests to  assess their effectiveness, developed tools to assist commands in  assessing controls and remediating deficiencies, and outlined efforts to  address IPA-reported deficiencies related to its Wave 2 audit readiness  assertion. However, we found that it did not always follow the FIAR  Guidance in performing tasks required for these phases. For example, we  found that the Army’s documentation and assessment of internal controls  were not always complete or accurate and that extensive deficiencies had  not been remediated prior to an IPA firm’s examination of its audit  readiness efforts. The Army plans to address remaining tasks required for  the Validation and Audit Phases after June 2014.

		Discovery Phase Tasks Were Not Effectively Implemented

As a result of the Army’s decision to limit the scope of its FIP for budget  execution, remaining Discovery Phase efforts largely focused on  establishing an audit-ready GFEBS environment. In connection with these  efforts, the Army prepared narratives, flowcharts, and risk assessments  documenting manual and GFEBS automated control activities and  financial reporting objectives as well as an inventory of key supporting  documents associated with various SBR-related business processes. The  Army also prepared a reconciliation of GFEBS activity to help identify the  population of transactions to be used for assessing controls and  summarized its evaluation of controls in its annual statement of  assurance on internal controls over financial reporting and financial  systems.
However, as discussed below, based on our review of efforts as the Army  was completing its Discovery Phase activities in June 2013, it had not  completed or effectively implemented Discovery Phase Task 3 (document  processes and assess/test controls) and Task 4 (evaluate supporting  documentation) as required by the FIAR Guidance. Without effective  implementation of the Discovery Phase of the FIAR Guidance for its  budget execution FIP, the Army is at increased risk that problems that  could hinder audit readiness efforts will not be identified and controls for  ensuring reliable financial reporting will not be effectively tested,  assessed, or documented. Further, without adequate, reliable information  on the effectiveness of controls, including those at the command level  and those associated with its information technology systems, the Army is  at increased risk of not fully addressing deficiencies that may significantly  affect its ability to achieve its audit readiness goals.

			Documentation of Business Processes and Control Assessments Was Incomplete

With regard to Task 3 of the Discovery Phase on documenting processes  and related control assessments and testing, we found the following.
Documentation of the linkage of certain financial reporting objectives  to related control activities was incomplete.requires reporting entities to evaluate control activities to determine if  they have been designed to meet financial reporting objectives.  However, the Army’s listing of controls used to demonstrate this  linkage did not identify controls to address 13 of 84 financial reporting  objectives, which could lead to weaknesses in financial reporting. For  example, the listing did not identify specific control activities to ensure  that obligations relate to valid appropriations and do not include any   The FIAR Guidance  expired, canceled, or rescinded amounts.the missing linkages we identified and discussions with officials, the  Army did not sufficiently monitor the preparation of the listing to  ensure its completeness. Effective monitoring controls to detect or  prevent such omissions are essential as the lack of complete,  accurate information on the control activities the Army relies on to  achieve its financial reporting objectives could impede future efforts to  audit its financial statements.
Based on our review of
Documentation of the criteria and processes used for identifying key  information technology systems was incomplete. Specifically, the  FIAR Guidance required the Army to identify key systems and feeder  systems affecting audit readiness assertions and to consider various  types of systems, such as general ledger systems, source/feeder  systems, disbursing systems, reporting systems, and property  management systems, as well as system interfaces. According to  documentation provided by Army officials, the Army identified 16 of 66  systems as key systems affecting SBR audit readiness. This included  GFEBS and other systems used to process detailed transactions and  provide accounting data to be recorded in GFEBS, such as the Army’s  key military pay system. Army officials told us that its determination  that a system was key was based on the number and value of  transactions initiated or processed by the system and by other factors,  such as whether the system would be replaced. While its  assessments were discussed in various meetings with FIAR  Directorate and DFAS officials, the Army did not document the  specific criteria and assessment process used to support its  determination. Without adequate documentation to support the  identification of key systems, the Army could not provide assurance  that all key systems had been identified and that they were included in  its audit readiness efforts.
According to the FIAR Guidance, the Army is required to assess the  effectiveness of its internal controls. Further, the Army has determined  that individual commands are responsible for the implementation of  controls within their command. Therefore, the effectiveness of controls  Army-wide depends largely on efforts to ensure that they are  operating effectively at each command. However, Army officials told  us that assessments of the effectiveness of controls at specific  commands were not always reliable. The results of assessments  performed by commands in 2012 using a checklist indicated that 64  percent of controls assessed were operating effectively. However,  Army officials stated that the checklist was to help commands  understand their roles and responsibilities, and acknowledged that the  Army could not rely on self-reporting by commands as a useful  measure of audit readiness. While a checklist can provide guidance  and assist in identifying weaknesses, officials at the commands we  visited told us that users may not be sufficiently knowledgeable to  accurately complete it. Also, officials at all three commands we visited  told us that their ability to review and assess the effectiveness of  controls has been hampered by a lack of funding and staffing. For  example, an official in the organization responsible for reviewing  control assessments at one command told us that its ability to perform  this function was limited because of a 34 percent vacancy rate in  staffing. In addition, this official told us that internal control  assessments prepared at the specific garrison level within a command  were not always reliable. Officials attributed this, in part, to those  preparing them not having appropriate skills or not performing  sufficient testing to adequately assess whether controls were  operating effectively.
Command officials also explained that much of the information they  have on control assessments relates to results associated with the  Army’s centralized testing of the operating effectiveness of manual  controls. In connection with this testing, the Army established a failure  rate of 5 percent or less as its goal for assessing the effectiveness of  controls. Results of this testing on the number of commands tested  through May 2013, when the Army was completing its Discovery  Phase efforts, indicated failure rates that averaged 56 percent, as  shown in figure 3.
Army officials attributed the November 2012 drop in failure rates to 28  percent, in part, to the experience gained by the use of GFEBS by the  four commands that were tested that month. As indicated in figure 3,  beginning in January 2013, Army greatly expanded its testing to  include all remaining installations migrating to GFEBS. With the  substantial increase in new users, test results indicated failure rates  for January and February 2013 of 46 percent and 64 percent,  respectively. Also, the Army found that all the controls tested for  February and March 2013 (14 and 15 controls, respectively) were  operating ineffectively. As installations become more experienced with  GFEBS, the Army expects the failure rate to decrease.
However, the methodology for the Army’s centralized testing was  designed to produce reliable results Army-wide, and as command  officials pointed out, it was not designed to produce reliable  assessments of controls at the specific command level. Further, these  officials highlighted how Army-wide assessments can vary  significantly from more detailed assessments performed at the  command level. For example, controls tested for 6 of 15 Army  Reserve Command sample items associated with two business  processes (i.e., temporary duty travel and supply) were found to be  ineffective during the Army’s February 2013 centralized testing  process, equating to a 40 percent failure rate. Army Reserve  Command conducted its own tests using a larger sample of 412 items  across eight business processes that resulted in a much higher (77  percent) failure rate. Command officials described plans for  performing additional assessments to better understand the  effectiveness of their controls; however, they acknowledged that  insufficient information on the effectiveness of controls has hampered  their ability to develop and execute appropriate corrective actions to  address control deficiencies.
The FIAR Guidance requires reporting entities to document their  understanding of business processes, systems, and related control  activities with narratives, flowcharts, risk assessments, and internal  control worksheets. However, documentation describing Army SBR- related processes and systems was incomplete. The documentation  did not address complete end-to-end processes, including those  related to legacy systems and service provider activities and feeder  systems, thus limiting the Army’s ability to perform complete control  assessments. Service providers are responsible for the systems  they operate and processes they perform on behalf of reporting  entities, and tasks for preparing process and system narratives and  assessing controls associated with four service providers are included  in the Army’s FIP for budget execution. However, we found that the  Army had not completed these tasks and, as a result, did not have  sufficient information to effectively assess how service provider- related activities may affect its ability to achieve SBR audit readiness.  Army officials told us that except for DFAS, service providers had not  provided sufficient documentation of their control activities as required  by the FIAR Guidance. Such documentation is needed for a clear  understanding of how the Army’s financial reporting objectives may be  affected by service provider controls and documentation. According to  the FIAR Guidance, to assess and provide assurance on the  effectiveness of their controls, service providers are to undergo  annual examinations in accordance with Statement on Standards for  Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16, Reporting on Controls at a  Service Organization.
Army officials told us that they are participating in a FIAR Directorate  working group established to direct and coordinate service provider- related audit readiness efforts. According to Army officials, this group  is working to help map out complete end-to-end business processes  involving responsibilities shared by service providers and reporting  entities. In addition, Army officials told us that the group is working to  facilitate and monitor service provider efforts to prepare for SSAE   No. 16 examinations to be conducted by IPA firms to provide an  independent assessment on the effectiveness of service provider  control activities. Because of the Army’s reliance on service provider  controls to achieve its General Fund SBR financial reporting  objectives, Army officials told us that their readiness efforts greatly  depend on the results of service provider SSAE No. 16 examinations.  According to the November 2013 FIAR Plan Status Report, initial  SSAE No. 16 examinations for 7 of 13 service provider assessable  units and systems are scheduled for completion from April 2014  through September 2015. The adequacy of controls associated with  units and systems to be assessed through these examinations—such  as those focused on contract pay at DFAS and the Defense Contract  Management Agency—will affect the Army’s SBR audit readiness  goal. Accordingly, the Army’s efforts to obtain the results of service  provider SSAE No.16 examinations and assess them to determine the  adequacy of controls supporting complete end-to-end business  processes will be essential.

			Audit Readiness Progress Reports Were Not Accurate

With regard to Task 4 of the Discovery Phase on the evaluation of  supporting documentation, the status of audit readiness efforts was not  accurately reflected in the Army’s budget execution FIP status reports.  For example, some activities that have been ongoing since 2010 were, as  of May 31, 2013, reported in the Army’s FIP status report at zero percent  complete although they were expected to be 100 percent complete in  April 2013. An Army official acknowledged that there were several tasks  on the FIP status report that were erroneously reported as zero percent  completed that in fact had been completed.
Further, according to DOD’s May 2013 FIAR Plan Status Report, the  Army’s SBR Discovery Phase efforts were completed as of March 2013.  However, this report was in conflict with the most recent FIP status report  at the time. The March 2013 status report indicated that 62 percent of  Discovery Phase tasks were completed, with many tasks not expected to  be completed until after March 2013. Also, Army officials told us that they  had limited time to update FIP status reports because of efforts focused  on preparing for the Wave 3 assertion in June 2013 and because  OUSD(C) did not require updated reports during the 90-day period  leading up to readiness assertions. According to Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government, entities must have relevant, reliable,  and timely communications to run and control their operations and  determine whether performance plans and accountability goals are being  met. The lack of accurate and consistent information on progress and  plans for completing remaining audit readiness tasks limits the ability to  effectively manage risks and assess performance.

		Corrective Action Phase Tasks Were Not Effectively Implemented

While some progress had been made on the Army’s SBR FIP for budget  execution tasks we reviewed through May 2013 when it was preparing its  readiness assertion for Wave 3 GFEBS processes and locations, it was  still in the process of completing its corrective action efforts. However, for  actions taken through this date, we found that the Army’s efforts did not  effectively address the FIAR Guidance requirements for the Corrective  Action Phase tasks for the budget execution FIP of identifying appropriate  corrective actions, validating their effectiveness, and adequately tracking  progress. As a result, the Army is at increased risk that problems  identified during the Discovery Phase may not be addressed and may  therefore hinder its ability to ensure that audit readiness goals are  effectively achieved.
As defined in the FIAR Guidance, the Corrective Action Phase comprises  five tasks: (1) design of the audit-ready environment, to include  requirements for remediating deficiencies in internal controls and  supporting documentation; (2) development of corrective actions, to  include concrete corrective action plans (CAP) to resolve each deficiency  identified during the Discovery Phase; (3) development of resource  requirements, to include budget estimates of funding and staffing to  execute the CAPs; (4) execution of the CAPs, to include performing  procedures to verify that the CAPs have successfully remediated the  deficiencies; and (5) notification to the FIAR Directorate that the reporting  entity is ready for an examination of its assessable unit. The Army has  taken steps toward completing these tasks, such as developing The SBR  Audit Support Handbook—a reference tool to assist commands in  implementing GFEBS-based processes and remediating deficiencies— and estimates of resources required to execute CAPs and conduct other  audit readiness activities. However, as discussed below, we found that  the Army’s efforts to develop and execute corrective actions (Corrective  Action Phase Tasks 2 and 4) did not provide adequate assurance that  deficiencies identified during the Discovery Phase will be resolved as  required by the FIAR Guidance.

			Effectiveness of Efforts to Develop and Execute Corrective Actions Unclear

According to its FIP status report, the Army began efforts to develop and  execute corrective actions in March 2011 and June 2011, respectively, to  address deficiencies identified during the Discovery Phase. Army officials  explained that the primary components of the Army’s corrective action  strategy are to provide targeted feedback to commands on control failures  identified through monthly testing; perform targeted follow-up visits at  commands to address specific challenges; and provide training, guides,  and other tools to support corrective action within commands. However,  for the Corrective Action Phase, the Army was unable to clearly  demonstrate the extent to which (1) CAPs had been developed containing  specific actions to resolve each identified deficiency (Task 2) and   (2) required actions had been completed and deficiencies had been  resolved (Task 4). These limitations resulted from a corrective action  strategy and related oversight activities that were not designed to provide  sufficient detail on corrective action efforts and to ensure their  effectiveness. Additional information on these limitations is discussed  below.
Extent to which CAPs were developed to resolve identified  deficiencies unclear. The effectiveness of the Army’s corrective  actions depends on its efforts to ensure the completeness and  effectiveness of CAPs containing specific actions planned to resolve  identified deficiencies and their underlying causes. Recognizing the  need to ensure the completeness of corrective actions and provide a  means for tracking their status, the FIAR Guidance requires reporting  entities to include corrective actions to resolve each deficiency  identified in the corrective action sections of their FIP status reports.  However, actions listed in the Army’s report were not linked to specific  CAPs developed to address identified deficiencies, and as a result,  the Army’s ability to demonstrate the completeness of its corrective  actions was limited. Rather than listing specific tasks or references to  specific CAPs, actions listed on the Army’s report largely consisted of  references to specific control activities that were not effectively  implemented based on the results of monthly control testing. Further,  in many instances these references were outdated, as they cited  controls in existence prior to the Army’s realignment of controls in  February 2013. Additionally, we found that the Army’s FIP status  report did not include corrective actions for addressing other known  deficiencies and assessing the severity of each as a deficiency, a  significant deficiency, or a material weakness, as required by the  FIAR Guidance. For example, we found that the Army’s FIP status  reports did not indicate the severity or include actions to correct  deficiencies associated with (1) service provider controls and  systems, (2) GFEBS system issues, and (3) the lack of supporting  documentation identified through substantive testing.
In addition, the effectiveness of the Army’s corrective actions for  resolving deficiencies largely depends on the effectiveness of its  discovery efforts. However, as previously discussed, the Army had not  effectively implemented Discovery Phase tasks, including efforts to  document processes and assess controls. Consequently, its ability to  ensure the effectiveness of corrective actions was limited. Further, we  found that CAPs at the command level were not always effective. For  example, at one of the commands we visited, corrective actions  contained in the commander’s checklist were not specific enough to  address the extensive weaknesses reported. Command officials  explained that this occurred, in part, because sufficient efforts to  assess controls had not been completed to effectively determine the  causes of identified deficiencies, thus limiting their ability to develop  effective corrective actions to remediate the deficiencies. In addition,  command officials told us that other issues hampering their discovery  efforts also adversely affected their ability to effectively develop and  execute corrective actions. These issues included the lack of sufficient  resources and personnel with appropriate skills.
Also, identifying the underlying causes of identified deficiencies is  essential for developing specific tasks to remediate them. As part of  its centralized monthly testing, the Army identified the reasons for  each sample-item failure and communicated them to affected  commands. In Leadership Briefs summarizing test results, the primary  reason provided for these failures was documents not being signed  and dated as evidence of review. However, other reasons contributed  to sample-item failures but the Army had not analyzed them to better  understand their relative significance and assist in identifying  underlying causes. Accordingly, we analyzed the reasons for the  failures for January 2013 through March 2013 by grouping them into  four categories based upon data provided at the time of our review in  May 2013. (See fig. 4.)
Our analysis showed that over half of the failures identified were due  to supporting evidence not being provided. This category also  included samples for which a command had not provided a response   Officials  to requests for documentation within required time frames.at the three selected commands we visited told us that providing the  supporting documentation within 15 days as required by the Army’s  monthly testing schedule was often difficult because they needed to  coordinate with other entities to obtain the documentation. Also, Army  officials stated that they have been analyzing the nonresponses to  better understand why they occurred and attributed them, in part, to  the need to more timely obtain documentation from third-party  stakeholders, such as DFAS. They also acknowledged that some  deficiencies extended across commands and, in some instances,  were outside the control of individual commands. For example,  command officials told us that their test failures sometimes resulted  from following the Army’s guidance for executing business process  activities that had not been updated to reflect changes in procedures  resulting from previously implemented systems changes. However,  the ability to assess the extent to which the Army’s corrective actions  are targeted at addressing the underlying causes contributing to  sample-item failures is limited as corrective actions to address  identified deficiencies were not linked to specific tasks or references  to specific CAPs.
Extent to which required actions were completed and effective  unclear. Recognizing the need for information to measure efforts to  execute corrective actions, the FIAR Guidance requires reporting  entities to (1) verify that CAPs have been effectively implemented and  have remediated identified deficiencies and (2) update FIP status  reports to reflect corrective action progress each month. These  updates are to include any scope and timeline changes resulting from  their efforts. However, we found that the Army was unable to  effectively demonstrate its verification that CAPs had been effectively  implemented. This occurred because corrective actions listed in its  FIP status report were not linked to CAPs containing specific tasks  and time frames for their completion to remediate deficiencies. Army  officials explained that the Army was relying on the results of its  centralized monthly control testing as its primary means to monitor the  effectiveness of corrective actions. These results indicated failure  rates of 56 percent on average, raising questions concerning the  effectiveness of the Army’s corrective actions. Further, while such  results may be a useful indicator of progress, they do not identify the  root causes for testing failures or provide needed assurance that  deficiencies have been resolved. Verification that tasks have been  completed and have effectively remediated deficiencies would enable  the Army to better demonstrate that it has sufficient assurance  concerning the effectiveness of its efforts.
In addition, the Army’s progress toward completing corrective actions  as reported in its FIP status reports was not accurate and the  reliability of its estimates for completing them was unclear.  Specifically, Army status reports indicated the status of many  corrective action tasks as zero percent complete. According to Army  officials, this status was based largely on results associated with its  monthly control testing. They also explained that although the Army  has been working on corrective actions since 2011, it had difficulties  in estimating interim percentages to accurately reflect the extent of  progress achieved. In addition, Army FIP status reports indicated that  corrective actions would be completed by March 2014. This estimate,  according to Army officials, was based largely on dates previously  established to meet audit readiness assertions. However, since the  Army’s reported progress and estimates for completing corrective  actions are not linked to CAPs containing specific actions already  taken and time frames for completing those still remaining to  remediate deficiencies, their accuracy and reliability remain unclear.
According to its corrective action strategy, the Army placed responsibility  on commands to resolve identified deficiencies. However, the limitations  we identified resulted from insufficient oversight steps to clearly  demonstrate the completeness and effectiveness of the Army’s efforts to  resolve deficiencies within planned time frames. Such steps would  include linking corrective actions on its FIP status report to CAPs  containing specific tasks required to resolve identified deficiencies and  their underlying causes and time frames for their completion. Without  such oversight of its corrective actions, the Army lacks needed assurance  concerning whether efforts to achieve auditability of its SBAs and full  SBRs will occur as planned.

		The Army Did Not Follow FIAR Guidance in Implementing Assertion/Evaluation Phase Tasks

Some progress had been made in completing Assertion/Evaluation Phase  tasks, including IPA examinations of the Army’s Wave 1 and 2 audit  readiness assertions, and examination of its Wave 3 assertion is  expected to be completed by May 2014. However, for actions taken  through June 2013, when it was completing its Wave 3 readiness  assertion, we found that the Army’s efforts did not effectively address the  FIAR Guidance requirements for the Assertion/Evaluation Phase tasks for  the budget execution FIP in assessing whether the reporting entity was  ready for an independent audit of its readiness assertion.
As defined by the FIAR Guidance, the Assertion/Evaluation Phase  comprises five tasks: (1) the FIAR Directorate evaluates the  documentation to determine the state of audit readiness; (2) the FIAR  Directorate provides feedback to the reporting entity on its status of audit  readiness; (3) reporting entity management asserts audit readiness and  an auditor is engaged to examine and identify any deficiencies in its  assertion; (4) the reporting entity evaluates the nature and extent of  deficiencies noted by the auditor on its assertion and implementation of  corrective actions to remediate them; and (5) the reporting entity verifies  that corrective actions successfully remediated auditor-identified  deficiencies.
The FIAR Guidance was revised in March 2013 to accelerate the  involvement of IPAs in performing independent assessments to better  identify control deficiencies. However, the guidance continues to require  reporting entities to perform procedures to verify that corrective action  plans were implemented and that they successfully remediated  deficiencies prior to engaging an IPA. Upon the FIAR Directorate’s review  of readiness documentation and approval to proceed with an IPA  examination, reporting entities are required to prepare a written assertion  declaring that the subject matter to be examined is audit ready in  conformity with the internal control and supporting documentation criteria  contained in the guidance.
For the Assertion/Evaluation Phase tasks, the FIAR Directorate evaluated  documentation supporting the Army’s Wave 2 audit readiness assertion,  and the Army outlined efforts to address deficiencies reported by an IPA  based on its examination of the Army’s assertion. However, we found that  the Army did not follow the FIAR Guidance for Assertion/Evaluation  Phase Tasks 2 (FIAR Directorate feedback on audit readiness) and 3  (reporting entity evaluation of audit readiness assertion) as discussed  below.

			Feedback on Audit Readiness Status Highlighted Significant Concerns

With regard to task 2 on providing feedback on the Army’s status of audit  readiness, the FIAR Directorate concluded, based on its review of the FIP  for budget execution efforts contained in the Army’s Wave 2 assertion  package that Army commands within the scope of the assertion were not  ready for the type of examination envisioned under the FIAR Guidance.  Specifically, OUSD(C) noted in a July 2012 memorandum to the Assistant  Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) that the  Army’s testing indicated that (1) 33 percent of identified manual controls  were not implemented, 31 percent were not tested, and 1 percent was  operating effectively and (2) 30 percent of general and application  information technology controls tested were operating effectively.  Further, OUSD(C) highlighted other concerns in its memorandum—such  as key process and control gaps in end-to-end processes, an inadequate  reconciliation of complete populations of transactions to the general  ledger, and insufficient substantive testing to support general ledger  transaction and account balances.
According to the memorandum, OUSD(C) also noted that Army  representatives stated that corrective actions had been implemented and  controls were operating effectively. However, the Army had not fully  retested remediation actions because of time constraints and, as a  consequence, had not provided evidence to demonstrate effective  implementation of corrective actions. Nonetheless, OUSD(C)  documentation indicated that it supported the Army’s efforts to proceed to  an IPA examination, in part, to enable it to accelerate efforts with clear  and independent feedback on its approaches, assumptions, and  judgments. However, based on the extensive nature of the deficiencies  noted above, accelerating these efforts prior to remediating them may not  be cost effective, given the likelihood that an IPA would identify similar  deficiencies during its examination.

			Effectiveness of the Army’s Audit Readiness Assessment Was Unclear

With regard to Task 3 on assessing audit readiness, the Army’s June  2012 assertion memorandum for Wave 2 stated that all applicable control  activities had been effectively implemented. However, specific information  on the effectiveness of controls contained in its assertion package  indicated the existence of extensive deficiencies and control gaps.  Nevertheless, the Army proceeded to have its Wave 2 audit readiness  assertion examined by an IPA firm despite extensive uncorrected internal  control deficiencies. In April 2013, the IPA reported several inadequacies  in the Army’s Wave 2 readiness assertion. The IPA reported one material  deviation (the Army did not identify all financial reporting objectives and  controls in GFEBS and its processes or complete end-to-end process  reviews in accordance with the FIAR Guidance); three material  weaknesses (in GFEBS information technology controls, journal voucher  processing, and documentation supporting the design and operating  effectiveness of controls); and one significant deficiency (in evidence of  internal control implementation). Army officials stated that the IPA exams  were beneficial in giving commands experience in undergoing an audit.
However, an IPA exam to validate audit readiness assertions can be  costly, not only in terms of IPA fees, but also in terms of focusing the  Army’s efforts on a validation process likely to identify deficiencies  already known to exist and potentially delaying efforts to remediate them.  Accordingly, conducting IPA exams prior to the Army taking steps to  verify that significant known deficiencies have been addressed is not a  cost-effective approach for achieving audit readiness. To help minimize  the inefficient use of resources when previously identified deficiencies  have not been addressed, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2002 offered DOD  some relief from the cost and time associated with preparing and auditing  unreliable financial statements. Similarly, redirecting resources toward  addressing known deficiencies rather than validating their existence could  enhance the Army’s ability to ensure the completeness and accuracy of  its audit readiness assertion and achieve SBR auditability in a more cost- effective and timely manner.

	Conclusions

The Army has made a commitment to audit readiness and taken steps to  follow the FIAR Guidance. This commitment has resulted in some  progress and helped to develop an essential foundation on which further  progress can be achieved. However, in implementing its General Fund  SBR FIP for budget execution, the Army has not completed tasks  required by the FIAR Guidance to ensure that risks and other key aspects  of its efforts, including business processes, key systems, and controls  that it and its service providers rely on to achieve audit readiness, are  adequately documented and evaluated. Also, extensive deficiencies  identified have not been resolved, increasing the likelihood that audit  readiness of the Army’s SBR will not be achieved as planned. DOD’s  FIAR Plan and Guidance describe steps for achieving audit readiness of  its full SBR and other financial statements by September 30, 2017, as  mandated by the NDAA of Fiscal Year 2010, as well as incremental SBA  readiness by September 2014. However, the Army had not documented  its assessment for how and when its approach is expected to achieve the  goal of producing an audit-ready SBR, including risks related to excluding  steps to ensure the audit readiness of billions of dollars of beginning  balances and legacy system activity from the scope of its efforts. Overall,  the gaps and deficiencies we identified throughout the various phases of  the Army’s efforts to develop and implement its FIP for budget execution  were largely due to its focus on (1) an approach that emphasizes  establishing audit-ready GFEBS-based processes and (2) meeting  scheduled dates and asserting audit readiness before correcting  extensive control deficiencies. However, this approach raises serious  concerns regarding the reliability of the Army’s readiness assertions, the  likelihood that SBA and full SBR audit readiness will occur as planned,  and the Army’s ability to ensure the accuracy of financial information used  to monitor budgetary resources to achieve its mission.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the Army’s implementation of the FIAR Guidance for its  General Fund SBR FIP for budget execution and facilitate remaining  efforts to achieve SBR auditability, we recommend that the Assistant  Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and Comptroller, take the  following 10 actions:  identify activity attributable to assessable units associated with service  provider systems and business processes having a significant impact  on the Army’s SBR;  coordinate efforts with service providers to obtain and document  within MOUs a shared understanding of roles and responsibilities for  processing Army data;  identify and document qualitative risks and other factors, including  those associated with the Army’s reliance on service provider  readiness efforts as well as other processes and systems supporting  significant portions of its SBR that the Army excluded from the scope  of its readiness efforts and assess their potential impact on SBA and  full SBR auditability and established timelines required to effectively  achieve audit readiness; update the Army’s determination for achieving SBR audit readiness  included in DOD’s FIAR Plan Status Report to address NDAA  requirements; completely and accurately document the linkage of financial reporting  objectives to control activities; document criteria and processes for identifying key information  technology systems that have a significant impact on the Army’s SBR  audit readiness; obtain and assess the results of service provider SSAE No. 16  examinations upon completion to determine the adequacy of internal  controls and document complete end-to-end business processes; update the Army’s FIP status reports to include actions to address  identified deficiencies related to service providers, systems, and other  known issues, along with an assessment of their severity, including  references to current control activities with accurate estimates of the  completion status; link corrective actions and estimates for their completion in FIP status  reports to (1) specific CAP tasks to resolve deficiencies and their  underlying causes and (2) dates for their expected completion; and  correct significant deficiencies or material weaknesses identified  before asserting audit readiness and engaging an IPA to validate the  assertion.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Army for review and comment. In  its written comments, reprinted in appendix III, the Army concurred with  our recommendations. The Army also described planned and ongoing  actions that are being taken in response to our recommendations. These  actions include identifying and defining service providers’ responsibilities,  systems, and controls; assessing risks and additional feeder systems;  and updating its FIP status reports to accurately reflect the status of its  current and planned efforts. Generally, these actions, if effectively  implemented, will help improve the Army’s implementation of its General  Fund SBR FIP for budget execution and facilitate remaining efforts to  achieve SBR audit readiness.
The Army’s comments did not fully address our recommendation that the  Army update its determination for achieving SBR audit readiness included  in DOD’s FIAR Plan Status Report. Specifically, as indicated in its  comments, the Army’s Chief Management Officer’s determination  included in the May 2014 FIAR Plan Status Report stated that most of the  Army is well postured to achieve audit readiness of the Schedule of  Budgetary Activity by September 30, 2014. The Schedule of Budgetary  Activity is expected to reflect the amount of budgetary resources and  associated activity related only to funding approved on or after October 1,  2014, and therefore represents an incremental step building toward an  audit-ready SBR. As discussed in our report, the NDAA for Fiscal Year  2013 included requirements for the FIAR Plan Status Report to include a  determination by the Chief Management Officer of each military  department concerning its ability to achieve an auditable SBR by  September 30, 2014, and, if unable to meet this deadline, provide an  explanation as to why it is unable to meet the deadline as well as an  alternative deadline and a description of the plan for achieving an  auditable SBR by the alternative deadline. The Army’s response did not  address the deadline for full SBR auditability, and the May 2014 FIAR  Plan Status Report does not presently comply with the NDAA  requirements. Updating the FIAR Plan Status Report as required would  provide Congress and DOD decision makers with important information  on DOD’s progress toward meeting auditability and financial management  improvement goals.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Secretary of the Army, and  the Chief Management Officer of the Army. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9869 or khana@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices   of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which the  Army developed and implemented its General Fund Statement of Budget  Resources (SBR) financial improvement plan (FIP) for budget execution  in accordance with the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness  (FIAR) Guidance with regard to (1) determining the scope of activities  included in the FIP and (2) completing those activities included in the  scope of the FIP. To address our objectives, we reviewed the Department  of Defense (DOD) FIAR Guidance and selected provisions of the National  Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) for fiscal years 2013 and 2010 to  understand the methodology the Army is required to use, and related  responsibilities, for achieving audit readiness. We analyzed the Army’s  FIP to determine whether it contained elements, such as audit readiness  tasks, required by the FIAR Guidance for the portions of the Discovery,  Corrective Action, and Assertion/Evaluation Phases completed at the time  of our review. The Army plans to address tasks required by the FIAR  Guidance for the Validation and Audit Phases after June 2014. Appendix  II provides specific information on the phases, tasks, and deliverables  required by the FIAR Guidance for reporting entities to include in their  FIPs.
We also analyzed the SBR FIP deliverables required by the FIAR  Guidance, such as process narratives and flowcharts, internal control  assessments, and test results as well as results of independent public  accountant examinations of the Army’s audit readiness efforts. We  analyzed other documentation, such as DOD FIAR Plan Status Reports,  the Army’s Audit Readiness Strategy, and periodic leadership briefs and  presentations, to understand the Army’s approach for achieving General  Fund SBR budget execution audit readiness and high-level efforts to  monitor and manage progress and risks, and to determine whether the  Army’s FIP accurately reflected the status of tasks required to achieve  audit readiness.
We interviewed the Army’s General Fund Audit Readiness Director  responsible for the Army’s General Fund SBR FIP for budget execution  and Army representatives supporting these efforts, as well as officials in  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), FIAR  Directorate, and Defense Finance and Accounting Service, to obtain  explanations and clarifications associated with our evaluation of the  documentation.
We reviewed SBR FIP and audit readiness issues at the Army command  level by conducting on-site audit work and interviewing installation  officials at Installation Management Command, Fort Sam Houston,  Texas, and Forces and Reserve Commands, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to May 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: FIAR Guidance for Reporting Entities

Table 1 presents the reporting entity methodology in the Financial  Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance, which the Army is  required to follow in implementing its financial improvement plan (FIP) for  General Fund Statement of Budget Resources budget execution.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Army

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made  key contributions to this report: Roger Stoltz (Assistant Director), James  Kernen, Richard Kusman, Marc Oestreicher, Laura Pacheco, Francine  DelVecchio, Maxine Hattery, and Jason Kelly.

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Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to describe how its SBR will be validated as ready for audit by September 30, 2014. The DOD Comptroller issued the FIAR Guidance to provide a standard methodology for DOD components to use to develop and implement FIPs, improve financial management, and achieve audit readiness. The Army's FIP for budget execution provides a framework for planning, executing, and tracking essential steps with supporting documentation to achieve audit readiness of its General Fund SBR.
GAO is mandated to audit the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements, including activities of executive branch agencies such as DOD. This report identifies the extent to which the Army developed and implemented its General Fund SBR FIP for budget execution in accordance with the FIAR Guidance with regard to (1) determining the scope of activities included in the FIP and (2) completing those activities included in the scope of the FIP. GAO reviewed the Army's FIP to determine whether it contained the elements required by the FIAR Guidance and reviewed test results, status reports, and other deliverables.

What GAO Found

The Army has made important progress in developing its financial improvement plan (FIP) for budget execution to help guide its General Fund Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) audit readiness efforts. This FIP covers current year activity associated with the recently deployed General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) emphasizing the implementation of effective business processes. However, the Army did not fully complete certain tasks in accordance with the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance to ensure that its FIP adequately considered the scope of efforts required for audit readiness. For example, the Army did not consider the risks associated with excluding current year activity associated with legacy systems and did not adequately identify significant SBR activity attributable to service provider business processes and systems. These activities may continue to represent material portions of future SBRs and, if not auditable, will likely affect the Army's ability to achieve audit readiness goals as planned.
For GFEBS-related audit readiness activities within the scope of its FIP for budget execution, the Army documented controls in narratives and flowcharts and performed monthly tests to assess their effectiveness. Based on test results from June 2012 through May 2013, the Army identified extensive deficiencies, such as lack of appropriate reviews or approvals, and had an average failure rate of 56 percent.
The Army did not fully follow the FIAR Guidance in performing the tasks required. For example, the Army's documentation and assessment of controls were not always complete or accurate. Further, extensive deficiencies identified by Army had not been remediated prior to an independent public accountant's (IPA) examination of its audit readiness efforts.
Overall, the gaps and deficiencies identified above are largely due to the Army's focus on (1) the audit readiness of new GFEBS processes despite continued reliance on legacy systems and service providers and (2) asserting audit readiness before correcting extensive control deficiencies. Army officials cited adherence to assertion and IPA examination milestones as essential. However, this approach raises serious concerns regarding the likelihood that SBR audit readiness will occur as planned and the Army's ability to ensure the accuracy of financial information used to monitor budgetary resources to achieve its mission.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that among other things, the Army take steps to improve implementation of the FIAR Guidance for its General Fund SBR FIP for budget execution and ensure that all significant SBR processes, systems, and risks are adequately considered and identified deficiencies are resolved. The Army concurred with GAO's recommendations.