Background

Data collected from the states and reported by EPA indicate that EPA and  states have made progress in cleaning up releases from underground  storage tanks over the past decade and a half. According to EPA, of the  more than 447,000 releases confirmed as of the end of 2004, cleanups had  been initiated for about 92 percent, and about 71 percent of these cleanups  had been completed. Figure 1 shows confirmed releases from underground  storage tanks, cleanups initiated, and cleanups completed annually from  fiscal years 1997 through 2004.
As this figure indicates, the number of new releases confirmed annually  declined, from about 12,000 in 2003 to less than 8,000 in 2004—about 35  percent. However, while figure 1 shows a decline in the number of releases  confirmed annually over the period, it also shows a decrease in the number  of cleanups initiated and completed. According to EPA, the number of  cleanups completed each year has generally decreased over recent years  and fell by 23 percent—from more than 18,000 in fiscal year 2003 to just  over 14,000—in fiscal year 2004. Furthermore, there still remains a national  backlog of almost 130,000 cleanups yet to be completed.
EPA’s UST Program is primarily implemented by the states. EPA has  become directly involved in program implementation only in Indian  country and when states have been unwilling or unable to establish  effective underground storage tank programs or to address contamination  at specific sites. Instead, EPA’s primary role has been to establish standards  and regulations to assist the states in implementing their programs. While  all EPA-approved underground storage tank programs must be no less  stringent than the federal program, individual aspects of each state  program differ. For example, state time frames for conducting inspections  vary widely. Also, while some states use only state environmental  personnel to conduct inspections, others use state-certified private  inspectors, or both. Furthermore, state program requirements and  standards are sometimes more stringent and inclusive than those under the  federal program. For example, states often regulate home heating fuel  tanks, tanks on farms, and above-ground tanks that RCRA generally  excludes from the federal program.
EPA’s UST Program receives approximately $70 million each year from the  LUST Trust Fund, about 80 percent of which is used for administering,  overseeing, and cleaning up sites. The remaining money has been used by  EPA for negotiating and overseeing cooperative agreements, implementing  programs on Indian lands, and supporting regional and state offices. EPA  spends about $6 million annually from the LUST Trust Fund on the agency’s  program implementation, management, and oversight activities. Amounts  distributed to the states from the fund each year vary depending primarily  on whether they have an EPA-approved program, the total number of each  state’s tanks, and the number of releases from those tanks. Until recently,  states could use these funds only for cleanup and related administrative  and enforcement activities, and EPA awarded each state about $187,000  annually from the agency’s State and Tribal Assistance Grant account to  help administer their programs and cover inspection and enforcement  costs. Historically, states have used about one-third of their LUST Trust  Fund money for administration, one-third for oversight and state-lead  enforcement activities, and one-third for cleanups, according to EPA.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005, enacted in August 2005, includes a number  of provisions addressing issues relating to training, tank inspections,  prohibitions on fuel deliveries to problem tanks, and funding tank  inspections and enforcement, among others. With regard to training, the act  requires EPA to publish guidelines specifying training requirements for  tank operation and maintenance personnel and authorized EPA to award  up to $200,000 to states that develop and implement training programs  consistent with these guidelines.
In addition, the act requires EPA and any state receiving federal UST  funding to inspect all regulated tanks not inspected since December 22,  1998, within 2 years of the date of enactment. After these inspections are  completed, EPA or the state must generally inspect regulated tanks once  every 3 years. The act allows EPA to extend the first 3-year period for up to  1 additional year if an authorized state demonstrates that it has insufficient  resources to complete all inspections within the first 3-year period.  Furthermore, beginning in 2007, the act prohibits deliveries to underground  storage tanks that are not in compliance with applicable regulations and  requires EPA and states to publish guidelines for implementing the delivery  prohibition that would, among other things, identify the criteria for  determining which tanks are ineligible for delivery. Finally, the act  authorizes substantial appropriations from the trust fund during fiscal  years 2005 through 2009 for a variety of activities, including release  prevention, compliance, training, inspections, and enforcement.

	States Provide EPA with Some Tank and Cleanup Data, but Do Not Provide Separate Information on All Known Abandoned Tanks

EPA collects data on the total number of underground storage tanks and  the status of cleanup activities relating to these tanks from all states, and  reports this information semiannually. Table 1 shows key tank-related data  reported by EPA as of March 31, 2005.
EPA’s semiannual reports also include, among other data, the number of  emergency response actions taken by an implementing agency, such as the  state, to mitigate imminent threats to human health and the environment  from an underground storage tank system.
EPA, however, does not require states to provide specific data on all known  abandoned underground storage tanks. While abandoned tanks are  included in the data reported to EPA, they are generally aggregated with  the other data and cannot be separately identified. However, all 5 states we  contacted compile some limited data on abandoned tanks and report this  information separately to the EPA regional office that manages each state’s  LUST Trust Fund cooperative agreement. In this regard, all 5 states  separately report the number of initiated and completed cleanups of  abandoned tanks using trust fund money. However, these data do not  include separate information on cleanups of known abandoned tanks using  state funds or any known abandoned tanks where cleanup has not yet been  initiated. EPA officials believe that the data the agency currently obtains  from states are sufficient for general program oversight, identifying  program trends, and determining the progress of individual states’  programs. However, because states generally do not provide separate data  on all abandoned tanks, EPA has limited ability to assess and track states’  progress in cleaning up contamination from these tanks. In addition,  although one of the primary purposes of the LUST Trust Fund is to provide  money for cleaning up abandoned tank sites, EPA lacks information—such  as the number of releases from known abandoned tanks in each state and  how many of these releases have been or are being cleaned up—to help it  determine how to most efficiently and effectively allocate funds to the  states for this purpose. EPA allocates amounts from the fund to each state  based, in part, on the data each currently provides, but these allocation  decisions do not now take into account the specific number of the state’s  abandoned sites that may require cleanup funds.

	Several Funding Sources Exist For Cleaning Up Tank Releases, but Some States’ Resources for Remediating Abandoned Tank Sites Are Limited

While tank owners and operators are primarily responsible for cleaning up  contamination from leaks in their underground storage tanks, some states  assist them through financial assurance or indemnification funds. These  funds also sometimes pay for cleanups of abandoned tank sites. However,  not all states have indemnification funds and, in 10 of the 40 states that  have such funds, claims for cleanup cost reimbursements exceeded fund  balances in fiscal year 2004. Consequently, EPA is monitoring the states’  funds to determine their viability as financial assurance mechanisms.
EPA, through the LUST Trust Fund, provides some limited support to states  for cleaning up abandoned sites as well as for administering, overseeing,  and enforcing their cleanup programs. The 5 states we  contacted—California, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and  Pennsylvania—use differing approaches to ensure funding to clean up  contamination from tank leaks. Three of these states—Maryland, Michigan,  and North Carolina—are experiencing difficulties in funding cleanups of  abandoned tank sites and officials of 2 of these states told us that available  resources will be insufficient to clean up all of the abandoned tanks in their  state.

		Tank Owners or Operators and State Indemnification Funds Generally Pay for Cleanups

Owners and operators are primarily responsible for cleaning up  contamination from leaks in their underground storage tanks. However,  according to the director of EPA’s UST Program, many of these  owners/operators, most of which are small, independent businesses, do not  have the financial capacity to pay for expensive cleanups. EPA estimates  that the average remediation cost per site has been about $125,000, but  costs sometimes have exceeded $1 million. Under RCRA, tank owners and  operators must maintain evidence of financial responsibility for carrying  out cleanup actions, using one or more of a variety of mechanisms,  including commercial insurance, corporate guarantee, letter of credit,  qualification as a self-insurer, or an EPA-approved state financial assurance  fund. For commercial insurance, the owner/operator usually pays  premiums as well as a deductible amount and/or co-payments before the  policy begins to cover remediation costs up to some limit of coverage per  leak incident. To assist owners/operators in funding cleanups, as of  November 2004, 40 states had established state assurance or  indemnification funds. State indemnification funds typically have  deductible and co-payment requirements similar to those for commercial  insurance, but these funds are managed by the state. Indemnification funds  are usually capitalized through gasoline and diesel fuel taxes or fees paid  by owners/operators registering or obtaining permits for underground  storage tanks, as required. Any cleanup costs above the maximum coverage  provided by insurance or the indemnification fund are borne by the tank  owner/operator. A state fund qualifies as a financial assurance mechanism  if EPA has approved it for that purpose. In deciding whether to approve a  fund, EPA considers the certainty of the availability of funds for cleanup,  the amount of funds that will be made available, the types of costs covered,  and other relevant factors.
The 5 states we contacted vary in their approaches to ensuring that  contaminated tank sites are cleaned up and that tank owners/operators, to  the extent possible, pay the remediation costs. Three of the 5  states—California, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania—currently have  financial assurance funds that reimburse owners/operators for cleanup  costs under varying conditions. Maryland and Michigan have no such  funds, and, instead, tank owners/operators rely primarily on commercial  insurance to pay cleanup costs.
California: California's Underground Storage Tank program includes a  state financial assurance program—the Underground Storage Tank  Cleanup Fund—to assist tank owners/operators in funding site cleanups.  The fund, established in 1989, is the state’s primary mechanism for  reimbursing owners/operators for their costs of cleaning up leaking  underground storage tanks incurred after January 1, 1988. The fund is  available to most owners/operators of tanks subject to EPA’s Underground  Storage Tank Program, as well as owners of certain small home heating oil  tanks. The California State Water Resources Control Board administers the  fund, which is primarily capitalized through a storage fee—paid by owners  of regulated and permitted underground storage tanks—for each gallon of  petroleum placed in the tanks. According to board officials, the fund  collects about $240 million annually and, except for $200,000 per year that  is used for enforcement, monies from the fund are all used for tank  cleanups, including such activities as direct cleanup by responsible parties,  agency oversight, and replacement of drinking water wells. In fiscal year  2004, California spent approximately $208 million to reimburse responsible  parties for direct expenses incurred in cleaning up leaking underground  storage tanks.
The fund reimburses tank owners/operators for cleanup costs up to $1.5  million per incident for “reasonable and necessary” remediation costs.  Claimants are divided into four classes: class "A" claimants do not have to  pay a deductible before costs are reimbursed by the fund; class “B” and “C”  claimants must pay the first $5,000 in eligible corrective action costs; and  class “D” claimants are responsible for the first $10,000. An Underground  Storage Tank Petroleum Contamination Orphan Site Cleanup subaccount  was established as part of the fund in September 2004, capitalized with $30  million ($10 million per year for 2005 through 2007) transferred from the  fund to reimburse cleanup costs incurred in cleaning up abandoned  contaminated urban brownfield sites. In addition to reimbursing  owners/operators, state officials said that $5 million a year is transferred  from the fund to a subaccount to address emergency, abandoned, and  recalcitrant tank site cleanups.
Board officials we interviewed told us that the fund is adequately  capitalized and that they do not always spend all available funds each year.  Nevertheless, these officials also said that the state is interested in ways to  minimize program costs and is experimenting with pay-for-performance  remediation contracts, which are now being used at 20 cleanup sites in the  state.
Maryland: Although Maryland has 2 trust funds that have financed certain  cleanup activities, it does not have a fund that EPA has approved for use as  a financial assurance mechanism. According to state officials, owners and  operators primarily use commercial insurance to demonstrate financial  responsibility. The state’s Oil Contaminated Site Environmental Cleanup  Fund has provided limited cleanup assistance to owners/operators of  federally-regulated underground storage tanks, among others. The fund  provides funding of up to $125,000 per leak occurrence from underground  storage tanks—subject to deductibles from $7,500 to $20,000—and is  primarily capitalized by a fee of 1.75 cents per barrel of oil imposed at the  first point of transfer into the state. However, the program stopped  accepting applications for reimbursement from owners and operators of  federally-regulated underground storage tanks on June 30, 2005. In  addition, the Maryland Oil Disaster Containment, Cleanup, and  Contingency Fund finances, among other things, state cleanup costs for  abandoned sites. Revenues for this fund, according to the fund’s fiscal year  2004 annual report, are generated by a fee of 2 cents per barrel of oil  transferred into the state. From July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, this fund paid  out about $3.5 million.
Michigan: Michigan's state financial indemnification program for  underground storage tanks was terminated in June 1995, because it had  insufficient funds to pay existing and future claims. Since that time, tank  owners/operators have been required to annually show proof of financial  assurance to cover cleanup costs in order to operate in Michigan. Small  owners/operators usually provide this proof by obtaining commercial  insurance. The state has used a number of sources to fund limited cleanup  work at underground storage tank sites, including the Cleanup and  Redevelopment Fund, the Clean Michigan Initiative Bond Fund, the  Environmental Protection Fund; State General Funds, and the  Environmental Protection Bond Fund. Appropriations from these funds  address soil, groundwater, and sediment contamination from all sources,  including leaking tanks. Most of these funds are no longer available for new  projects. According to state officials, in the fall of 2004, state legislators  voted to establish a Refined Petroleum Fund that will be capitalized by a  7/8 cent-per-gallon fee on refined petroleum products to be collected  through 2010. This fund is expected to accrue approximately $60 million  each year, a portion of which is expected to be used to clean up  underground storage tank sites. A Refined Petroleum Cleanup Advisory  Council was also established to provide the governor and legislature with  recommendations on how to spend the fund’s revenues. State officials told  us that the council is expected to recommend an increase in the 7/8 cent fee  to implement its other recommendations.
North Carolina: North Carolina has a state fund that acts as a financial  assurance mechanism and that reimburses owners/operators for most of  the costs for site assessments, cleanups, and damages related to leaking  underground storage tanks. This fund applies to leaks discovered after  June 30, 1988, from commercial underground tanks containing petroleum.  The fund is primarily capitalized by a 0.297 cent-per-gallon excise tax on  motor fuel sales; a small part of the state inspection tax on motor fuel and  kerosene; and annual tank operating fees. Under provisions of the fund,  owners/operators of tanks that have upgraded corrosion, leak, and overfill  protection pay the first $20,000 of assessment and cleanup costs and the  first $100,000 in third party liability costs. The fund then pays all other  cleanup costs deemed reasonable and necessary, up to $1 million, and an  additional $500,000, with a 20 percent co-payment by the owner/operator,  after which any remaining amount is paid by the owner/operator. The state  paid approximately $21 million in reimbursements for tank assessment and  cleanup costs from this fund in fiscal year 2004.
Because the balance of the fund was not sufficient to cover all obligations,  in June 2002, the fund began operating from month to month, paying out  funds on a first-come, first-paid basis. This action resulted in a significant  backlog of claims with pending payments, according to the fund’s annual  report. Consequently, EPA is currently monitoring North Carolina’s fund to  determine its viability as a financial assurance mechanism. To address  concerns about the viability of the trust fund, North Carolina officials are  considering requiring tank owners/operators to use other forms of financial  assurance, such as commercial insurance.
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania’s Underground Storage Tank Indemnification  Fund was created by the state Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act of  1989, as amended, and is administered by the State Insurance Department,  according to the fund’s 2004 annual report. The fund reimburses tank  owners/operators for reasonable and necessary cleanup costs for leaks that  occur in regulated tanks on or after February 1, 1994, the date it began  operation. The maximum amount of coverage under the fund is currently  $1.5 million; however, for claims reported prior to January 1, 2002, the limit  was $1 million, according to state officials. The aggregate limit is $1.5  million for owners of 100 or less tanks and $3 million for owners of 101 or  more tanks. The fund also covers bodily injury and property damage claims  that arise from a leak, indemnifies certified tank installers, and provides  loans to owners/operators for upgrading their facilities. According to the  fund’s 2004 annual report, a claimant for reimbursement from the fund  must be an owner or operator of a tank registered with the Pennsylvania  Department of Environmental Protection, and must report the claim to the  fund within 60 days of the discovery of the release. Claimants must also pay  the first $5,000 per tank of allowable cleanup costs and $5,000 per tank of  third-party liability claims. State program officials told us that Pennsylvania  law requires that the fund be managed on an actuarial basis and that the fee  structure be reviewed yearly to maintain solvency. They also said that the  fund's objective is to have positive cash flow and invested assets for a  projected period of at least 5 years. The fund is primarily capitalized by (1)  a 1.1 cents-per-gallon fee (for 2004) on substances such as gasoline, new  motor oil, and aviation fuel, (2) investment income generated from fund  balances, and (3) a capacity fee of 8.25 cents-per-gallon for substances such  as diesel, kerosene, and used motor oil.
While the fund does not directly cover costs for remediating abandoned  tank sites, it is authorized to provide allocations to the Pennsylvania  Department of Environmental Protection—which manages the cleanup of  contamination from these tanks—up to a maximum of $12 million annually:  $5.5 million for general environmental cleanup, $5.5 million for  catastrophic release, and $1 million for pollution prevention. Department  officials told us that each year it must request funding from the fund’s  board. The board then allocates funds to the department based on the  fund’s ability to pay tank owners’ claims. State fund officials told us that the  department has not requested the maximum allocation amount for the past  several years, and in some years they have not spent the full amount of the  money they requested. According to state officials, the fund collected $68  million in 2004, and paid out $64 million. These state officials told us that  the fund is fully capitalized and is working effectively with a balance of  $215 million, as of May 2005.

		The Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund Provides Support for State Programs and Abandoned Tank Site Remediation

In addition to the states’ funding sources and mechanisms, the LUST Trust  Fund assists states in (1) overseeing and enforcing corrective actions taken  by tank owners/operators and (2) cleaning up leaking abandoned tanks or  tanks that require an emergency action. EPA allocates amounts from the  trust fund to each state based on a number of criteria, such as the total  number of tanks in the state, the number of confirmed releases, and  whether EPA has approved the state’s program, among other factors.  However, these criteria do not include the number and cleanup status of a  state’s abandoned tanks. According to EPA program officials, states  historically have used about two-thirds of the federal trust fund money  allocated to them each year to oversee and support the cleanups paid for by  state funds, tank owners/operators, and other financial assurance  mechanisms, while the states have used the remaining one-third to directly  pay for cleanups of abandoned tanks that are not covered by the other  funding sources.
As Table 2 shows, for the 5 states we contacted, the amount of funds that  EPA awards from the fund and the portions of these funds the states  allocate for cleaning up tank sites varies, as do the amounts of their own  funds that they spend on leak cleanups.
The LUST Trust Fund’s contribution to state cleanup efforts is generally  small compared to amounts paid by tank owners/operators, state  indemnification programs, and other state mechanisms for cleaning up  sites each year. For example, in fiscal year 2004, EPA awarded $61.7  million in trust funds to assist states’ leaking tank cleanup efforts.  However, according to EPA, states, on average, spend a total of about $1  billion to $1.5 billion each year on tank site cleanups. To illustrate, EPA  program officials told us that for every federal dollar spent to clean up tank  sites, states spend as much as $18 of their own funds.
If cleanup costs paid by owners/operators were included, the actual ratio of  dollars spent by other sources to federal dollars could be significantly  higher than the 18 to 1 calculation provided by EPA. However, tank  owners’/operators’ costs to remediate a site are difficult to determine since  they are not always captured in state and federal records. While state  records may include deductible and co-payment amounts paid by  owners/operators under state programs, they do not typically include any  costs these parties pay that are disallowed by the state. Furthermore,  amounts that owners/operators pay in excess of program limits are not  captured in state and federal data. For example, California program  officials told us that a leaking tank site in Santa Monica contaminated the  public water supply with MTBE, which is typically very expensive to clean  up. While the owner/operator estimated that it may require $50 million to  clean up the site, the state indemnification fund limits reimbursements for  cleanup costs to a maximum of $1.5 million per tank per leak incident. As a  result, the approximately $48.5 million in additional non-reimbursable  costs paid by the owner would not be reflected in program records.

		Some States Believe That Funding From Available Sources Is Inadequate to Address All Sites With Leaking Abandoned Tanks

Some states’ indemnification funds and other resources may be insufficient  to clean up all of the leaking abandoned tanks in their state. For example,  according to a survey of states conducted for the Association of State and  Tribal Solid Waste Management Officials in early 2005, claims for the  reimbursement of cleanup costs exceeded the fund balances in 10 states.  Of the 5 states we contacted, officials of 3—Maryland, Michigan, and North  Carolina—told us that the state is experiencing difficulties in funding  cleanups at abandoned tank sites. Furthermore, officials of 2 of these  states—Maryland and Michigan—said that available resources will be  insufficient to clean up all of them and that additional resource allocations  from the LUST Trust Fund would help address these funding shortfalls and  enhance the states ability to clean up leaking tank sites.
Because of funding constraints, Maryland is now prioritizing and deferring  cleanups of its abandoned tank sites. The state requires tank  owners/operators to demonstrate financial responsibility to pay for  cleanup costs, which they generally do by obtaining commercial insurance  to fund cleanups of the state's nonabandoned tank sites. However, state  officials are concerned that commercial insurance may not provide a  dependable source of funding for tank site cleanups, because insurers have  sometimes been reluctant to pay cleanup costs when leaks occur. For  example, files for the Henry Fruhling Food Store site in Harford County,  Maryland (see app. I), indicated that the site's owner/operator experienced  problems in getting the insurance company to pay for cleanup costs  because he could not prove that the leak occurred during the period of  coverage. The absence of insurance funds to pay cleanup costs may lead to  more abandoned sites—sites where the owners/operators are unable to pay  the cleanup costs themselves—which will require the state to fund cleanup  with its own funds or seek federal resources. State officials told us that, in  the absence of increased allocations of federal trust funds, they asked the  state legislature to approve an increase in Maryland’s special oil transfer  fee to fund the state's tank cleanup needs. The state legislature  subsequently approved the fee increase.
Since Michigan’s indemnification fund was terminated in June 1995,  because of insufficient funds to pay existing and future claims, tank  owners/operators have been required to show proof of financial assurance  to cover cleanup costs in order to operate in Michigan. Small  owners/operators usually provide this proof by obtaining commercial  insurance. However, state LUST program officials cited anecdotal evidence  showing that insurance claims for remediation costs are frequently denied  because it is often difficult to prove that the release occurred under the  period of coverage. If the owner/operator cannot or is unwilling to pay the  costs and these costs are not covered by insurance or some other form of  financial assurance, the burden for cleaning up a site will fall on the state.
In addition, Michigan program officials told us that the state’s causation  standard further exacerbates the funding problem for abandoned tanks  because it requires that the state prove that the present owner/operator is  responsible for a site's contamination before it can be held responsible for  cleanup. Proving responsibility becomes difficult in cases where releases  have occurred at some point in the past and ownership of the property has  changed. If responsibility cannot be established, the state must then fund  any cleanup of the site. In addition, state officials said that underground  storage tank owners/operators acquiring properties after March 6, 1996,  can limit their liability for pre-existing contamination by performing a  baseline environmental assessment of the property—any contamination  found at that point becomes the responsibility of the owner/operator who  caused the contamination or the state if a responsible party cannot be  identified. According to program officials, Michigan now has a backlog of  9,000 confirmed releases from leaking underground storage tanks, an  estimated 4,200 of which are at abandoned sites. State program officials  estimate that it will require about $1.7 billion in public funds to remediate  these 4,200 releases alone. However, according to these officials, resources  available from all state sources are not adequate to remediate these  releases.
North Carolina’s commercial trust fund can be used to assist  owners/operators with cleanup costs and to assist landowners in cleaning  up abandoned sites where the tank owner/operator cannot be located or is  unwilling to perform the cleanup. In recent months, according to program  officials, claims against the fund have exceeded revenues, causing  timeframes for paying reimbursements to stretch out over a year. As a  result, the state is now prioritizing sites based on relative risk and directing  work only to emergency releases and those leaks that pose the highest  risks that can be funded with available resources.
While neither California nor Pennsylvania are experiencing significant  problems funding cleanups of leaking tank sites, officials in both states said  that they could use more federal funding for leak prevention initiatives and  welcome the flexibility to use federal trust funds for that purpose, as  provided by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
In an ongoing review, we are examining the scope and magnitude of states’  workload and funding needs for cleaning up contamination from leaking  underground tanks. Specifically, for each of the 50 states, the District of  Columbia, and 5 U.S. Territories, we are examining (1) how much funding  is currently available for cleaning up contamination from leaking tanks, (2)  the extent to which tank cleanup funds have been used for purposes other  than cleanups, if at all, and (3) what future revenues will be available to  clean up contamination from leaking tanks.

	States Identify, Assess, and Clean Up Leaking Tank Sites Using Similar Means

States become aware of leaking underground storage tanks through a  variety of methods, including owner/operator reports, complaints by local  residents, incidental discovery during land redevelopment or removal of  tanks for upgrading or replacement, and compliance inspections. Regular  and frequent tank inspections also can detect new leaks—and potentially  prevent future ones—before they can lead to serious environmental or  health damage, and lessen or avoid the need for costly cleanups. Once  contamination from leaking tanks is detected and confirmed, the 5 states  we contacted generally use risk-based systems to prioritize sites for  cleanup according to the immediate threat they pose. Whether funded by  the tank owners/operators, state indemnification or other funds, or other  means, states generally direct and oversee site remediation. However, in  circumstances where a site presents an imminent threat, has no viable  responsible party, does not qualify for funding under a state plan, or for  which the magnitude of the cost and cleanup work is beyond state  resources, the state may ask EPA to assume oversight responsibility.

		States Identify Leaking Tank Sites Through a Variety of Methods

Tank owners/operators are primarily responsible for identifying,  confirming, and reporting any leaks that occur in their underground  storage tanks and dispensing systems. EPA and the states have established  a number of requirements that tank owners/operators must follow to  ensure and facilitate the early detection of possible leaks. In this regard, in  1988, EPA issued regulations governing leak detection, among other things.  Under these requirements, tank owners/operators must notify the  designated state or local authority when they discover a release or when  leak detection equipment indicates that a leak may have occurred. This  notification must generally occur within 24 hours. Tanks must generally be  monitored for leaks at least once every 30 days.
Despite these requirements, leaks can remain undetected and/or  unreported. According to state officials, owners/operators sometimes do  not conduct proper inventory checks or leak detection procedures and may  intentionally disconnect leak detection equipment. Also, tank tightness  tests are imprecise and tanks can lose small amounts of pressure or  vacuum during the test and still pass. Such small pressure leaks can result  in large releases of the tanks contents over time. In some cases, tightness  tests have failed to detect significant leaks altogether. For example, during  investigation of the Tranguch Tire Service site in Pennsylvania, the state  Department of Environmental Protection requested tank tightness test  results for that facility as well as 3 nearby tank operating facilities. Even  though test results showed that 3 of these facilities had passed their tests, 2  of them were ultimately found to have leaking tanks, including all 6 tanks at  the Tranguch facility (see app. I). In addition to problems in detecting  leaks, some owners/operators fail to report suspected or actual leaks once  they are discovered. For example, the tank owner/operator of the fourth  facility in the Tranguch investigation did not provide tightness test results  as requested but admitted that a leak had occurred at the site several  months earlier that he had not reported.
While owners/operators identify many leaks through established testing  and monitoring procedures, EPA and officials of the 5 states we contacted  told us that many leaks are discovered only when tanks are removed for  replacement or closure. When tanks are replaced or facilities closed, in  some states—such as California, Maryland, and Pennsylvania—a state  certified or licensed environmental consultant or contractor removes the  tanks, sometimes with state or local agency oversight. Other states, such as  Michigan and North Carolina, do not require the contractor to be certified.  In Michigan, however, any person who removes or installs a tank must have  a million dollars in pollution liability insurance, according to state officials.  As part of this process, soil samples generally are taken from the  excavation and tested to determine whether contamination is present.  However, leaks are often readily apparent because of the presence of liquid  product (gasoline or diesel fuel) and/or strong fumes; state or local  environmental or health agencies may discover leaking tanks when  investigating homeowner complaints about such odors in their residences  or gasoline contamination in their well-water.
Frequently, unknown and abandoned tanks are discovered when land is  being excavated during property redevelopment. In these cases, states  generally follow the same process of sampling and testing described above  to assess contamination at the site. However, if contamination is found, the  responsibility for cleaning up these sites differs from state to state. For  example, in Pennsylvania, the new owner of the contaminated property  would be responsible for cleaning it up, according to state officials.  However, Michigan state officials told us that Michigan law limits the  cleanup responsibility to those who actually caused the contamination.  Therefore, the state would have to pay for the cleanup unless it could  identify the party or parties who caused the contamination, which can be  difficult. In general, cleanup costs for abandoned tanks where no owners  or operators can be found usually become the state’s responsibility.

		Some States’ Inspection Rates May Have Limited the Timely Detection or Prevention of Leaks

In addition to other methods for discovering leaking tanks, state or local  environmental agencies may detect leaking tanks or indications of possible  leaks while inspecting facilities for compliance with regulatory  requirements. EPA recommended that states conduct tank inspections at  least once every 3 years. However, of the 5 states we contacted, as of  mid-2005, only 2 regularly inspected their tanks as frequently as EPA  recommended, according to state officials. State officials told us that  California requires annual inspections of all tanks; Maryland inspected its  state’s tanks every 3 years; Michigan generally inspected every 3 years,  depending upon the location of the tanks and state inspection staffing  levels; North Carolina inspected once every 4 or 5 years, due to funding  limits; and Pennsylvania inspected at least once every 5 years.
EPA reported that, as of September 2004, about 35 percent of the nation’s  underground storage tanks were not in “significant operational  compliance” with the applicable release detection and prevention  requirements, indicating a need for greater emphasis on inspections. EPA  and state officials agreed that regular inspections of underground storage  tanks provide the opportunity to detect new leaks before serious  environmental or health damage can occur and potentially prevent future  leaks. Even if performed on a regular basis, infrequent inspections may  allow violations of leak prevention and other tank requirements to go  undetected long enough for leaks to occur and contamination to spread,  potentially resulting in environmental and health consequences and the  need for costly cleanups.
While more frequent inspections potentially could enhance preventive  efforts, state officials in 4 of the states we contacted told us that increasing  the frequency of inspections would require additional resources. Although  EPA recommended inspections at least once every 3 years, EPA program  officials recognized both the value of increased inspections and some  states’ need for additional resources to conduct more frequent inspections,  and supported providing more flexibility in the use of LUST trust funds for  these purposes.
In 2001, after reviewing EPA's and states' efforts to enforce UST Program  regulations, we recommended that EPA negotiate with each state to reach  a minimum frequency for physical inspections of all its tanks and present to  the Congress an estimate of the total additional resources the agency and  states would need to conduct the inspection, training, and enforcement  actions necessary to ensure tank compliance with federal requirements.  In addition, to strengthen EPA’s and the states’ ability to inspect tanks and  enforce federal requirements, we suggested that the Congress consider (1)  authorizing EPA to establish a federal requirement for the physical  inspections of all tanks on a periodic basis and (2) increasing the resources  available to the UST Program, based on a consideration of EPA’s estimate  of resource needs. We noted that one way to do this would be to increase  the amount of funds the Congress provides from the trust fund and to  authorize states to spend a limited portion of these amounts on inspection,  training, and enforcement activities to detect and prevent leaks, as long as  this did not interfere with tank cleanup progress. Generally consistent with  our recommendations, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, among other things,  generally requires inspections once every 3 years, increases amounts  authorized to be appropriated from the fund, and authorizes these funds to  be used for inspections, training, and other enforcement and prevention  activities.

		States Use Risk-Based Assessments to Determine Cleanup Priorities

The 5 states we contacted all use risk-based systems to prioritize leaking  underground storage tank sites for cleanup according to the immediate  threat they pose to human health, safety, and/or the environment.
California prioritizes cleanup sites based on risk, with the highest risk  sites remediated first. California uses many of the same procedures  employed under the American Society for Testing and Materials’ (ASTM)  risk-based corrective action process. This process has 3 tiers and tables  to determine priority rankings. The highest priority is assigned to sites  that pose a threat to human health and the next highest to those posing  an environmental threat. Under this system, immediate threats are  abated first and then sites with the likelihood of future impact are  addressed.
Maryland uses a risk-based determination to prioritize both abandoned  and nonabandoned leaking tank sites. For example, if contaminated  well water is the primary threat involved, well samples are drawn and  tested and the levels of the various compounds found are compared to  EPA safe drinking water standards. Abandoned sites whose cleanup will  have to be paid for by the state are remediated if they pose an immediate  threat to public health. The cleanup of nonabandoned sites is paid for by  the tank owners and operators and begins immediately regardless of  threat level.
Michigan uses a modified ASTM four-tier classification system to  prioritize sites according to their threat. The classification system  ranges from class 1—an immediate threat to the public or  environment—to class 4—no demonstrable long-term threat. Michigan  also uses a risk-based assessment and corrective action process, based  on the ASTM process, which allows contamination to remain on-site as  long as it is possible to demonstrate that human health and the  environment are adequately protected.
North Carolina prioritizes leaking tank sites according to three levels of  risk: high, intermediate, and low. High risk sites are those that pose an  immediate threat to human health and the environment because, for  example, a leak presents an explosion hazard from petroleum vapors or  a release is within 1,000 feet of a drinking water well. Intermediate risk  sites include those that contaminate or potentially could contaminate  surface water, a wellhead protection area, or an area that recharges  drinking water aquifers, or have groundwater contamination levels high  enough that natural attenuation may be impeded. Low risk sites involve  releases that do not fall into the other 2 categories or that pose no  significant risk to human health or the environment. The state is now  addressing only the highest risk sites and emergency releases, with the  goal of moving them to the intermediate risk level. North Carolina also  uses a risk-based assessment and corrective action process wherein  more contamination can remain on site as long as adequate protection  of human health and the environment can be demonstrated. For  instance, the state groundwater standard for benzene is 1 part per  billion, but cleanup to 5,000 parts per billion may be allowed if it can be  shown that the remaining pollution poses no threat to human health and  the environment.
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection uses a modified  ASTM system that classifies abandoned tank sites based on 4 priority  levels. Priority 1 sites are those that pose an immediate threat to human  health, safety, or sensitive environmental receptors; Priority 2 sites pose  short-term (up to 2 years) threats; Priority 3 sites pose long-term  (greater than 2 years) threats; and Priority 4 sites present no such  demonstrable long-term threats. Pennsylvania does not generally  prioritize responsible party lead cleanup sites addressed under the  state’s indemnification fund—all eligible sites receive funding for  cleanup and are required to follow the corrective action regulations,  according to state officials.

		States Generally Direct and Oversee Remediation, but May Ask EPA to Lead or Support Certain Cleanups

Under RCRA regulations, tank owners/operators must notify the  designated state or local authority when they discover a release or when  leak detection equipment indicates that a release may have occurred.  Owners and operators must then undertake appropriate cleanup action in  accordance with the regulations. Environmental consultants, in  collaboration with the state or local environmental agency, usually perform  the site assessment, determine the technology and approach needed to  contain and remediate the contamination, and implement and complete  site cleanup. The method of cleanup selected is tailored to the specific  characteristics of the site, including the probable pathways the  contamination will follow to threaten the soil, groundwater, and/or the  health of surrounding residents. Depending on whether the contamination  has reached the local groundwater, treatment methods can range from the  removal and on-site treatment of contaminated soil to expensive on-site  pump-and-treat and vapor extraction systems, activated carbon filtration  systems for municipal water systems, and vapor extraction and water  treatment units for nearby impacted or threatened homes and businesses,  among others.
EPA seldom becomes directly involved in this process unless the site is  located at federal facilities or on Indian reservations. However, states may  ask EPA to lead or support the cleanup at sites that present an imminent  threat, have no viable responsible party, do not qualify for funding under a  state plan, or for which the magnitude of the cost and cleanup work is  beyond state resources. For example, state officials asked EPA to assume  the lead on cleaning up the Tranguch Tire Service site in Pennsylvania after  they determined that site remediation costs would far exceed the state’s  resources (see app. I). This leak involved the release of an estimated 25,000  to 50,000 gallons of gasoline. The leaking fuel reached the aquifer and the  contamination plume migrated off-site into the sewer system of the  surrounding residential neighborhood. According to an EPA Region 3  official, gasoline and gasoline fumes seeped into the basements of 20 to 30  homes through the sewer system as well as into a nearby creek. After  conducting an environmental investigation of the area, the Pennsylvania  Department of Environmental Resources required the owner/operator of  Tranguch to begin site characterization and cleanup work. However, in  1995, the owner of the Tranguch facility declared bankruptcy and the state  assumed responsibility for characterizing the site and mitigating vapors in  area homes. By March 1996, the state had spent $2 million on the site and  did not have the funds that were going to be necessary to clean up the site  due to its potential magnitude. According to state officials because of the  emergency nature of the situation and funding problems, the state asked  EPA to take over as the lead agency for remediating the site, which EPA did  in late August 1996. To date, in addition to the amounts paid by the  owner/operator and the state, the Tranguch site remediation has required  over $25 million in federal funding, primarily from the Oil Spill Liability  Trust Fund.

	Conclusions

While the data that states report to EPA on underground storage tanks  provides the agency with information it can use to determine the overall  trends and status of the UST Program, the lack of specific and complete  data on known abandoned tanks limits EPA’s program oversight and its  ability to efficiently and effectively allocate LUST Trust Fund resources.  Without such information, neither EPA nor the Congress can readily  determine the number of abandoned tanks requiring cleanup nationwide,  whether this number is growing, whether states are initiating and  completing or deferring work, and what the potential impacts on state  resources and, ultimately, the LUST Trust Fund may be. Furthermore,  although one of the primary purposes of the fund is to help states clean up  releases from abandoned tanks, EPA currently allocates resources to the  states without taking into account how many abandoned tanks each state  has, how many are leaking, or how many are being cleaned up. All 5 of the  states we contacted provide data to EPA on their abandoned tanks  aggregated with other tank data and separately identify and report some  limited information on abandoned tanks to EPA regional offices. Asking the  states to separately identify information on all known abandoned tanks in  the reports they currently provide to EPA should not pose an additional  burden. In any case, we believe that requiring states to specifically report  information on all known abandoned tanks would provide EPA useful data  for overseeing the UST Program and more efficiently and effectively  allocating LUST Trust Fund resources.
While the extent to which this situation exists nationwide is unknown,  officials in 2 of the 5 states told us that the state’s present resources are  inadequate to cover cleanup efforts. At the same time, the LUST Trust Fund  has continued to grow through a continuing inflow of fuel tax revenue and  accrued interest—reaching a balance of about $2.2 billion at the end of  2004—with only about $70 million to $76 million (less than 4 percent of the  total fund balance) allocated annually to support state programs.  Furthermore, the EPA and state officials we contacted believed that greater  emphasis on leak prevention activities, such as tank inspections, is  necessary to detect compliance problems that can lead to future leaks and  uncover physical evidence of leaking tanks so that states can respond more  quickly, if warranted, to prevent or limit the potential health and  environmental impacts on nearby communities. Moreover, the cost of  taking measures to prevent a release is generally much less than the cost of  cleaning up a release after it occurs. The underground storage tank  provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 may lead to increased  resources for cleanups of leaking tanks and stronger enforcement efforts  that could prevent leaks and lead to the early detection of existing leaks,  thereby reducing the need for costly cleanups.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve EPA's oversight of the leaking underground storage tank  program and its ability to determine how to most efficiently and effectively  allocate, LUST Trust Fund dollars to the states, we recommend that the  Administrator of EPA require that states separately identify, in their reports  to the agency, information on the number and cleanup status of all known  abandoned underground storage tanks within their boundaries.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to EPA and the states of California,  Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania for their review and  comment. In commenting on the draft report, EPA stated that, in general,  the agency thinks that the report’s findings and conclusions have merit, and  that it will assess the feasibility of implementing our recommendation. EPA  agrees that the UST Program could benefit from more specific information  about abandoned tank sites. However, EPA notes that the process that  states must conduct to establish that a tank is abandoned—that its owner is  unknown or unwilling or unable to pay for leak cleanups—may involve  ownership searches to identify the potentially responsible party and  assessment of their financial ability and willingness to pay for cleanup.
With this in mind, EPA is concerned about placing an undue burden on  states by requiring them to provide specific data on abandoned tanks.  Therefore, EPA stated that, in consultation with the states, the agency will  consider how best to incorporate our recommendation.
We share EPA’s concern about placing an additional burden on states by  asking them to determine whether a given tank is abandoned by  undertaking a potentially labor-intensive and costly effort to establish who  owns the tank and whether this owner is financially able and/or willing to  pay for cleaning up a leak. However, we are not suggesting that states  should make an effort to identify unknown abandoned tanks; rather we are  recommending that they report to EPA separately the information they  currently have on tanks that they know are abandoned, and, as new  abandoned tanks are identified in the normal course of program  operations, report this information to EPA as well. This should place no  additional burden on the states. States currently provide EPA data on  known abandoned tanks aggregated with all other tanks in the state. We are  simply recommending that the states break out the data on their  abandoned tanks from total tank data. Because a limited portion of these  data—information on abandoned tanks being cleaned up using LUST Trust  Fund resources—is currently broken out and provided to EPA’s regions, the  UST Program could easily utilize these existing data and EPA would only  have to require states to break out the remaining data on the number and  cleanup status of their known abandoned sites. Having more complete data  on abandoned tanks would allow EPA to better determine the potential  scope of the problem and the progress that states are making towards  addressing it. It would also permit EPA to take this information specifically  into account in allocating LUST Trust Fund resources. Given EPA’s  concerns, we have clarified our recommendation by explicitly stating that  EPA should require states to provide separate data on the number and  cleanup status of all their known abandoned tanks. EPA also provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report as  appropriate. Appendix III contains the full text of the agency’s comments in  a letter dated November 2, 2005.
Officials from the state of Maryland said that they had no comments on the  draft report. California, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania  officials provided a number of technical comments, which have been  incorporated into the report where appropriate. In addition, Pennsylvania  officials expressed concerns similar to those raised by EPA relating to the  additional burden on states of identifying unknown abandoned tanks. As  noted, we have clarified our recommendation to address these concerns.
We will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and to the Administrator of EPA. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3841 or at stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in  appendix IV.

Information on the History and Status of Cleanup Activities at Five Underground Storage Tank Sites

The following are summaries of the major events surrounding the  discovery and cleanup of contamination from leaking underground storage  tanks at 5 sites: (1) Coca-Cola Enterprises in Yuba County, California; (2)  Henry Fruhling Food Store in Harford County, Maryland; (3) Bob’s  Marathon in Grand Ledge, Michigan; (4) R.C. Anderson Trust in Nash  County, North Carolina; and (5) Tranguch Tire Service, Incorporated, in  Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. The summaries include a chronology of  significant site occurrences as well as additional information on the  amount of leaked fuel, the contaminants involved, the impacts of the leak  on the surrounding environment, the costs of remediating the site, the  extent, if any, of EPA involvement in the cleanup, communication between  state agencies and the affected public, and litigation relating to the site.

	Coca-Cola Enterprises, Yuba County, California

The Coca-Cola distribution warehouse on this site was built around 1970,  and was originally used by another business to build mobile home units.  The 5,000 gallon underground storage tank system from which the leak at  the site occurred was reportedly installed on the east side of the building  when the facility was first constructed. The property and surrounding area  are zoned for commercial use. Yuba County Municipal Airport is located  south of the site and a public drinking water supply well operated by the  City of Olivehurst is located about 850 feet east of where the tank system  was formerly located.

		Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files

June 1989 – August 1989: Coca-Cola Enterprises had the 5,000 gallon  unleaded gasoline underground storage tank, piping, and dispensing  system excavated and removed. The tank and piping appeared to be in  good condition, but the soil exhibited a slight petroleum odor.  According to the case file, soil samples were collected from beneath the  system during removal, as required by California law. Field observations  and analysis of soil samples determined that gasoline was present in the  soil in concentrations that required remediation. The Yuba County  Office of Emergency Services filed a report of an unauthorized leak.
December 1989 – May 1990: The site was assessed for contamination,  which included a soil gas survey and the drilling and installation of  borings, groundwater monitoring wells, and vapor extraction test wells.  Groundwater samples were collected as monitoring wells were installed  and an analysis indicated that the groundwater at the site was  contaminated. A municipal drinking water supply well for the City of  Olivehurst was discovered 850 feet east of the tank system’s former  location. However, analyses of water samples from that well did not  indicate any contamination. While the contaminant plume extended 120  feet east of the release site, it was confined within the south and east  boundaries of the property.
May 1990 – December 1990: The Yuba County Air Pollution Control  Office authorized the on-site aeration of contaminated soils that had  accumulated during drilling activities. The soil aeration began in June  1990 and was successfully completed in September 1990. A quarterly  groundwater monitoring and sampling program also began in June 1990.   In August, a vapor extraction pilot test was conducted at the site.  Petroleum was found in a monitoring well at the site in September and  about 7.5 gallons of gasoline were removed from the well from  September through November. By December, approximately 0.08 feet of  gasoline remained in the well.
February 1991 – August 1991: The environmental consultant for  Coca-Cola Enterprises submitted its contamination assessment report,  which assessed the extent of vertical and lateral petroleum  contamination at the site during the underground storage tank removal  operations. The consultant also completed a remedial action plan that  presented a conceptual system design for remediating hydrocarbon  contamination in soil and groundwater at the site. The plan proposed an  integrated remediation system incorporating (1) a groundwater pump  and treat system with an air stripper system to remove volatile  compounds from groundwater, (2) a vapor extraction system to remove  vapors from contaminated soils in the unsaturated zone, and (3) a  thermal oxidizer to burn off the vapors. The consultant estimated that  remediating the site would take 3 years, with one additional year for  monitoring and closure. Cleanup oversight was transferred from the  Yuba County Office of Emergency Services to the Regional Board in  February 1991, and in March 1991, the Board approved the  contamination assessment report.
April 1993 – September 1998: The recommended remediation system  began operation in April 1993. In August 1996, an oxygen release  compound was installed in three perimeter vapor extraction wells to  increase the dissolved oxygen concentrations in groundwater to  enhance the natural bio-attenuation of petroleum hydrocarbons. The  pump and treat system was operated intermittently until mid-November  1997, when the system was shut down to prepare for site closure  following approval from the Central Valley Regional Water Quality  Control Board. Groundwater monitoring and sampling continued on a  quarterly basis. In September 1998, the Board approved initiation of  closure activities.
October 1998 – Early 2000: Monitoring indicated that the  contamination plume might have migrated southward in late 1999 and  early 2000 and that further remediation and changes in the sampling and  analysis program were warranted. The remediation system was  restarted in December 1999, with upgrades to increase flow rates and  optimize efficiency and was completed in January 2000. The revised  sampling and analysis program was initiated shortly thereafter. A survey  to identify water wells within 2,000 feet of the leak site conducted by the  site’s environmental contractor identified 2 municipal wells, with the  nearest approximately 850 feet east of the former tank location.  However, sampling and analysis conducted by the Olivehurst Public  Utility District revealed that the closer of the 2 wells had not been  affected by the contamination plume.
April 2002 – March 2004: Because monitoring and sampling showed  no hydrocarbon concentrations in the groundwater monitoring wells,  the system was again shut down in April 2002. Quarterly groundwater  monitoring after the system was shut down showed that the  contamination plume had stabilized and, in July 2003, the site’s owner  requested the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board’s  approval to close the monitoring wells. The wells were abandoned by  late December 2003, and the Board closed the remediation case in  March 2004.
Status as of August 2005: Cleanup was completed.

		Summary of Key Information from the Case Files

Contaminants and compounds of concern: Gasoline (total petroleum  hydrocarbons as gasoline—TPHG), benzene, toluene, ethyl-benzene,  xylenes (BTEX)
Size of leak: Unknown.
Impacts of contamination: Soil and groundwater contamination  occurred at the site but was contained within the property.
Remediation cost: The California underground storage tank fund spent  $1,202,745 to reimburse site owners/operators for site remediation  costs. Additional amounts that may have been paid by Coca-Cola  Enterprises that were not reimbursed are unknown.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: None.
Communication between responsible agencies and the public: No  evidence of public meetings appears in the case files.
Litigation: Case files show no evidence that any lawsuits were filed  relating to this site.

	Henry Fruhling Food Store, Harford County, Maryland

The Henry Fruhling Food Store was a single family dwelling with an  attached small grocery store. The store had two 1,000 gallon underground  storage tanks and distribution systems for gasoline, which were installed  around 1966, and a 500 gallon underground tank and distribution system  for kerosene. Sometime prior to 1966, 2 similar underground gasoline tanks  and distribution systems were located on the site but were removed by the  previous owner.

		Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files

1970: A nearby resident complained to the owners of the store about an  odor or taste of gasoline in his well water. The tank maintenance  company performed a pressure test on the tanks and distribution  systems but found no leaks.
June 1980 - September 1980: Water samples taken by the Harford  County Health Department in response to another nearby resident’s  complaints about gasoline in his well water indicated petroleum  contamination. That resident was warned not to consume water from  his well and the matter was referred to the Maryland Department of  Natural Resources (the predecessor of the Maryland Department of  Environment) for action. That resident also filed a complaint with the  department concerning the presence of oil in his well, which was  referred to the Environmental Health Administration and the Harford  County Health Department for follow-up actions.
October 1980: One of the store owners was badly burned—and later  died—when gasoline fumes ignited in his basement.
November 1980: Water samples obtained by the Harford County  Health Department identified gasoline in the store owner’s well and the  case was assigned to the Department of Natural Resources for  enforcement action.
January 1981 – February 1981: In mid-January, the Department of  Natural Resources notified the company that had maintained the tanks  and pumps since 1976 of their determination that a pollution violation  had occurred. The Department ordered the company to (1) stop  discharging petroleum products into state waters, (2) test the tightness  of the tanks and supply systems, and (3) initiate actions to recover  petroleum from groundwater at the site. In late January, tightness tests  were performed on both tanks and supply systems and no leaks were  found. In early February, the Department took auger probes at various  locations throughout the Fruhling property and found explosive vapors  in the soil in the vicinity of the tanks and pumps.  In a letter dated  February 27, the Department told the owners and the tank maintenance  company that (1) they had achieved substantial compliance with their  order and that no gasoline was then leaking into the groundwater, (2)  based on information they had provided the Department, there was a  “strong probability” that, at some time during the past several years,  repairs had been made to the gasoline pump that may have eliminated a  leak in the system, and (3) the results of the recent boring tests and a  survey of the area indicated “a very low probability” that the gasoline in  the groundwater was coming from any source other than the system at  Fruhling’s store. Furthermore, the letter stated that the Department’s  only concern was the removal of any recoverable gasoline from the  groundwater at the site.
July 1981 – August 1981: A gasoline recovery and separator system  was installed at the site and well-pumping operations began. The  accumulated effluent from the separation process was sampled by the  Harford County Health Department on a periodic basis and was spread  back on the ground with the knowledge and approval of the County  Health Department. This process continued through January 1988, at  which time a Department of Environment official ordered the owner to  stop the discharge.
November 1981 – December 1981: The Department of Natural  Resources notified both the store owner and the tank maintenance  company that they had satisfactorily removed the gasoline from the well  and complied with their January 1981 order. The Department also  advised them that the remaining unrecoverable gasoline in the  groundwater was a pollution problem that would be referred to the  Harford County and state health departments for appropriate action.  Because laboratory results of samples taken continued to show  unacceptable levels of “aromatic hydrocarbons”, the County required  the owner to continue well pumping until the residuals were reduced to  an acceptable level.
May 1983: A nearby resident raised concerns regarding contamination  of his well. Water samples taken over approximately the preceding three  year period showed minimal contamination from petroleum products.
October 1987 - December 1987: Testing indicated that gasoline  contamination was migrating into a new well at the site.
January 1988: In late January, an official from the Maryland  Department of the Environment (formerly the Department of Natural  Resources) investigated a complaint that effluent runoff from the site  was flowing onto a neighbor’s property. The investigating official  informed the store owner that spreading effluent on the ground was no  longer allowed because this process allowed pollution to migrate back  into the soil and groundwater. The owner was issued a site complaint  and was directed to shut down well pumping operations until further  notice. At this point, pumping and effluent discharge on the ground had  gone on for over 6 years and the gasoline separation unit had been  removed and water had been pumped onto the owner’s yard for the last  2 years.
June 1988: The state took over cleanup operations at the site after the  LUST Trust Fund was established in 1988. Well-pumping from the old  well at the store site continued intermittently until mid-1988.
October 1988: The Maryland Department of the Environment oversaw  the removal of the underground gasoline and kerosene tanks and  distribution systems, which was funded from the LUST Division  account. Inspection revealed no gasoline storage tank perforations, but  soil beneath one gasoline storage tank showed explosive readings.  According to a state official who visited the site in early December 1987,  the store owner stated that the tank maintenance company had pumped  the tanks dry prior to going bankrupt, but she did not recall the exact  date.
January 1989 – April 1989: The Maryland Department of the  Environment contracted with an environmental consulting company to  perform 2 soil gas surveys at the site to delineate the extent of  subsurface gasoline vapor contamination. Analysis of the samples  revealed the presence of elevated gasoline vapor levels at the site, with  the highest concentrations detected near the former pump island.
Late 1989 to early 1990: The state installed charcoal filtration units  on the store owner’s water system and that of a nearby neighbor.
March 1993 – November 1993: The Maryland Department of the  Environment retained a consultant to review ongoing remediation  activities at the site and determine the adequacy of activities to control  and abate contamination. The consultant concluded that the  contamination plume appeared to be getting larger and that vapor  recovery efforts were inadequate. In November 1993, the Department  had the consultant test a combined air sparge and soil vapor extraction  system. Test results indicated that this system could significantly  enhance the existing recovery system.
March 1997: The Maryland Department of the Environment continued  to operate the pump-and-treat system at the Fruhling residence. The  system had treated over 2 million gallons of water. The former Fruhling  domestic well, shallow monitoring wells, and deep monitoring wells all  continued to show elevated levels of dissolved gasoline constituents. As  a result, the Department periodically operated a soil venting system to  keep the wells within discharge guidelines. Periodic sampling of the  surrounding residences identified no additional contaminated domestic  wells.   1999: The groundwater recovery system at the site was shut down.
September 2001: The Maryland Department of the Environment  maintained a granular activated carbon treatment system at two  residences and performed quarterly sampling at six residences.  Petroleum contamination was still present at the Fruhling property and  MTBE levels were detected at the residence across the street from the  Fruhling property. Dissolved petroleum contamination levels had  decreased at all sampling locations.
Status as of August 2005: The site recovery system remained on site,  but was turned off. The site was being monitored in operation and  maintenance status, with sampling performed every three months. No  significant contamination had been detected in the residential wells  from which samples had been taken since July 2001. However, well- monitoring still showed some signs of low-level contamination.

		Summary of Key Information from the Case Files

Contaminants and compounds of concern: Benzene, toluene, ethyl  benzene, total xylenes, and MTBE.
Size of leak: Unknown; Very little liquid product (gasoline) was  recovered.
Impacts of contamination: One death occurred from a leak-related  explosion and fire. Groundwater and residential drinking water wells  were contaminated with petroleum products. Real estate development  and sales were impeded. Residents were granted a reduction in property  taxes.
Remediation cost: Maryland spent about $708,595 in state funds to  remediate the site. Prior amounts that might have been spent by the  company that installed the tanks and the store owner are not included.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: None.
Communication between responsible agencies and the public: In  December 1989, officials of the Maryland Department of the  Environment met with affected parties to discuss contamination at the  Fruhling site. In May 1990, the Department held a follow-up public  meeting to present the results of its initial investigation of the  groundwater contamination.
Litigation: In late July 1981, one of the affected residents filed a lawsuit  against the company that installed the tanks on the site, the tank  maintenance company, and the store owner. Consequently, the tank  maintenance company’s insurer retained a consulting company to  investigate the alleged contamination of groundwater by the producer’s  petroleum products. In May 1982, the consultant for the insurance  company concluded that the products of the oil company represented  by both the tank installer and the tank maintenance company were not  responsible for the groundwater contamination in the affected resident’s  well. In March 1988, the lawsuit was settled out of court for $25,000,  with the defendants expressly denying liability. Prior to the settlement,  the insurance company for the store owner settled with the affected  resident for $7,500.
In 1990, the owner’s insurance company denied responsibility for any  claim under the owner’s policy. Nevertheless, in early 1991, the state of  Maryland sued the owner to recover cleanup costs.
In October 1990, a neighbor in the area of the site sued various parties  involved in the purchase of his property, including the real estate  company, the real estate agent, and the former owners of his house for  not disclosing the groundwater contamination at the time of purchase.

	Bob’s Marathon, Grand Ledge, Michigan

Bob’s Marathon is a gasoline service station and automobile repair shop  bordered by mixed-use commercial and residential properties in the city of  Grand Ledge, Michigan. Two reported releases occurred at the facility and  the released gasoline migrated toward a municipal water supply well  located directly down-gradient and very close (approximate 800 feet) to the  site. MTBE, benzene, and other gasoline components from this spill  potentially impacted the city’s water supply for about 8,300 people.

		Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files

April 1986: Bob’s Marathon registered all three of its underground  storage tanks with the state.
December 1991 – February 1992: Two of the three tanks failed their  tightness tests. One of the owners reported to the Michigan State Police  Fire Marshall Division that she had discovered a leak during a routine  tank gauging inventory check. The leak involved the loss of  approximately 4,500 gallons of gasoline from a 6,000 gallon tank. An  environmental consultant retained by the owners sent the Michigan  Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) the required 20-day report of  initial abatement measures and installed eleven monitoring wells at the  site in December. The monitoring wells were used to determine the  directional flow of groundwater at the site and intercept the gasoline  plume. In January, the consultant installed a product skimming system  in six monitoring wells and a passive recovery system in three wells that  reportedly contained product sheen on the water table and additional  monitoring wells. Also in January, the consultant submitted a site  investigation work plan, site characterization report, free product  removal report, and interim corrective action plan to MDNR. MDNR  concluded that the interim corrective action plan was unacceptable and  provided the consultant with a list of concerns in a deficiency letter. The  environmental consultant estimated that, by late February, 280,300  gallons of contaminated groundwater and 1,200 gallons of gasoline were  removed by the skimming system.
March 1992: Because the consultant’s response to the MDNR  deficiency letter was not adequate, MDNR did not approve the work  plan. The consultant then recommended that a second consulting firm  with a greater capacity to more cost-effectively manage long-term  projects take over the work at the site. The new consultant submitted an  interim corrective action plan and a site investigation work plan to  MDNR for approval. MDNR approved the second consultant’s interim  corrective action plan. In an interoffice communication, a MDNR official  recommended that the first consultant be denied payment for work  conducted at the site and that MDNR consider the consultant a  potentially responsible party because of its failure to take timely action  to abate the situation at the site. Three new underground storage tanks  were installed on the west side of the service station building—two  6,000 gallon tanks and one 15,000 gallon tank. Approximately 400 cubic  yards of soil were removed and disposed of during excavation for these  tanks.
April 1992: MDNR tentatively approved the site investigation work  plan. The groundwater remediation system began operating.
June 1992: An MDNR official stated that the department approved an  interim groundwater treatment system at the site because of the close  proximity of municipal wells and that this action was necessary because  of the first consultant’s failure to take timely action to abate the spread  of the contamination.
January 1993: The company operating the groundwater treatment  system decided to no longer operate and maintain it because of  uncertainty regarding reimbursement from the Michigan Underground  Storage Tank Financial Assurance program for future work.
February 1993: The site owner replaced the second consultant with a  third after a dispute over the need to purchase the remediation  equipment and other issues. This third environmental consultant made  modifications to the existing groundwater treatment system.
May 1993: MDNR informed the owners of Bob’s Marathon that they had  failed to define the full nature and extent of the groundwater  contamination. While the groundwater plume was advancing toward the  Grand Ledge municipal well field, the leading edge of the plume had not  yet been defined. Furthermore, MDNR said that the groundwater system  was ineffective and the contamination plume continued to migrate,  impacting additional groundwater. As a result, MDNR requested that the  owners provide all information on the releases and investigations of the  releases including all soil and groundwater response actions and  investigations. MDNR conditionally approved the amended third  consultant’s site investigation work plan. Approximately $850,000 of  state financial assurance program funding had been spent at the site.
June 1993: An oil/water separator was added to the groundwater  treatment system.
July 1993 – August 1993: The site’s third environmental consultant  informed MDNR that, due to delays in payment from the state financial  assurance program, it was unable to continue site investigation  activities at the site. In light of this development, MDNR reminded the  site owners of their obligation to conduct all appropriate corrective  actions to remedy the environmental problems caused by the release of  contamination at the site including eliminating any impacts to the Grand  Ledge municipal well field. The owners’ attorney informed MDNR that  the owners were unable to proceed with site investigation and  remediation activities without the assurance of funding. In response,  MDNR said that if all current claims were approved and paid by the state  financial assurance program, the one million dollar limit for  reimbursement under the program would have been reached at the site  and the owners would be responsible for financing the remaining  corrective actions including a final remedy. The Michigan Department of  Public Health notified the city of Grand Ledge of MTBE contamination  of a municipal water supply well.
October 1993: MDNR notified the owners that the site would be listed  in the “Proposed List of Michigan Sites of Contamination” for fiscal year  1995.
November 1993: A second leak of 400 to 800 gallons of gasoline was  discovered and reported to the Michigan State Police.
December 1993: According to the third consultant’s initial abatement  report, the second leak was discovered by the owner/operator when he  noticed a strong petroleum odor in the site treatment building. When he  opened the cover of equipment used as part of the cleanup system, he  observed approximately one foot of gasoline. The owner then inspected  the underground storage tank system and found a mixture of water and  gasoline in the area of one tank, due to a pin-hole leak in a gasoline  supply line. The leak detection equipment installed on the system—that  should have detected the leak, sounded an alarm, and automatically  shut off the system—was not functioning. The tank system was taken  out of service until the perforated line could be replaced.
January 1994: The groundwater treatment building was damaged by  fire. According to the fourth consultant’s investigation report, the owner  had discovered gasoline in the equipment and a fire started, damaging  the equipment, before he could remove it. (As of June 2005, the  equipment had not been restored to service).
March 1994: MDNR advised the owners of their responsibility to repair  the fire damaged system and conduct hydrogeological studies related to  both leaks at the site. The owners responded that they could not  continue the remediation work required to clean up the site and they  terminated the services of the consultant at the site. MDNR assumed  control of the investigation and cleanup of the leak at the site.
April 1994: MDNR obtained emergency funds to complete the  groundwater investigation and develop a corrective action plan. MDNR  hired a consultant to update and collect additional information for the  site with the overall goal of protecting the Grand Ledge municipal water  supply from contamination originating from the site.
December 1994: The city of Grand Ledge expressed concern that levels  of benzene in a municipal well continued to increase, indicating  continuing migration of contamination. The city asked MDNR for  monitoring well test results and a report on the current status of the  remediation by the end of the month.
February 1995: The mayor of Grand Ledge asked a state representative  to intercede with state agencies to facilitate the issuance of all permits  and release of state funds needed to allow the design and construction  of soil vapor extraction and groundwater extraction and treatment  systems to proceed immediately.
July 1995: Grand Ledge allowed access to the city well field to  construct and maintain a water treatment system for the contaminated  municipal well and a groundwater blocking well.
December 1995: The system to treat well water contaminated with  volatile organic compounds began operating and a barrier well was  installed to prevent the plume from continuing to reach the municipal  well.
Status as of August 2005: Treatment facilities were operating and  cleanup was ongoing. Michigan Department of Environmental Quality  officials told us that the air sparge and soil vapor extraction systems  were recently turned off to conduct performance monitoring but carbon  treatment of the impacted municipal well was ongoing. According to  these officials, they expected to complete site cleanup between 2007  and 2010.

		Summary of Key Information from the Case Files

Contaminants and compounds of concern: Benzene, toluene, ethyl  benzene, xylenes, and MTBE.
Size of leak: The first release was approximately 4,500 gallons of  gasoline; a second release was 400 to 800 gallons of gasoline.
Impacts of contamination: The leak impacted the water supply for the  city of Grand Ledge and the city had to provide potable water to about  8,300 residents.
Remediation cost: As of about March 2005, approximately $2,150,000  had been spent to clean up contamination from the site. Approximately  $950,000 of this amount came from the Michigan Underground Storage  Financial Assistance Fund to reimburse costs incurred by the owner  prior to the state taking over site remediation. According to Michigan  Department of Environmental Quality officials, continuing efforts to  clean up the site through 2007 to 2010 will involve additional costs of up  to approximately $500,000.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: None.
Communication between responsible agencies and the public: None  identified.
Litigation: A number of lawsuits have been filed relating to the leak at  Bob’s Marathon, according to Michigan environmental officials. An  apartment complex east of Bob’s Marathon filed a lawsuit against the  facility’s owners. In addition, the owners are involved in litigation with  the first two consultants and have filed a lawsuit against the facility’s  gasoline supplier, which is, in turn, suing the manufacturer of the hose  that caused the site’s second leak.

	R.C. Anderson Trust, Nash County, North Carolina

The R.C. Anderson Trust site was owned by R.C. Anderson from 1949 to his  death in 1984, when the property was passed on to his heirs and was  managed as a trust by a bank. Three businesses were located on the site—a  gasoline station (abandoned), a tractor dealership (subsequently a  furniture store), and an automobile repair garage. Contamination was first  reported to the North Carolina Department of Environment, Health, and  Natural Resources (DEHNR) in July 1992, during removal and closure of  the underground and above ground storage tanks and excavation of the soil  around the tanks and pump island. Land uses in the vicinity are  commercial, agricultural, and single family residential.

		Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files

July 1992 – September 1992: In July 1992, three underground  gasoline storage tanks and one above ground diesel tank were removed.  Evidence of a gasoline release from a 3,000 gallon tank was discovered  and reported to DEHNR. An August 1992 closure report also concluded  that there was “high potential” of petroleum contamination on-site.  Accordingly, in September 1992, DEHNR notified the bank that was  acting as trustee for the R.C. Anderson property, that it was in violation  of pollution control rules and regulations and must take action to  comply with corrective action rules.
December 1992: The environmental consulting company completed a  Comprehensive Site Assessment/Corrective Action Plan to assess the  surrounding conditions and risks to area populations from the  remaining contamination at the site. This report was filed to satisfy the  requirements of the North Carolina law pertaining to investigations for  soil and water cleanup.
May 1993: DEHNR reviewed the Comprehensive Site Assessment  report, determined it to be inadequate and required the bank to submit  (1) a more complete report which adequately identified the full vertical  and horizontal extent of the contamination plume(s) and (2) a  corrective action plan. Both reports were to be submitted by July 15,  1993.
October 1993: The environmental consultant resubmitted the  Comprehensive Site Assessment report to DEHNR for review. The  report identified several sources of pollution affecting soils and  groundwater at the site. One was a 3,000 gallon underground storage  tank that had two large rust holes. Another source was the fuel pump  island where stained soil was found when it was removed. In addition,  the soil below the 10,000 gallon above ground storage tank (which had  held diesel oil) was stained at the fill area from apparent spills during  filling operations. The above ground tank itself, however, showed no  evidence of leaks. Last, used motor oil was drained onto the ground near  the gasoline station building when it was being used as a truck repair  center. The area surrounding the site was surveyed for water wells,  public water supply intakes, and off-site monitoring wells for potential  receptors and migration pathways. Sixteen private water supply wells  and another 32 “suspected” water wells were observed within a 1,500  feet radius of the site. There were no public water supply intakes  identified within one-half mile of the site and no off-site monitoring  wells were found within 1,000 feet of the site.
November – December 1993: Excavation and treatment began in  1993. A smaller (530 gallon) underground gasoline storage tank was  discovered during excavation of contaminated soil and removed. While  the tank was located in an already contaminated area of the site and was  rusted, it showed no sign of leaks, according to the consultant. A closure  report on this tank dated the end of December was filed with the Raleigh  Office of DEHNR.
January – December 1994: A second round of soil excavation with on- site bioremediation procedures was performed in 1994. In early March,  the environmental consultant completed a Corrective Action Plan that  included the excavation and treatment of contaminated soils and an air  sparging and pump and treat facility for groundwater remediation.  Under the plan (1) soil treatment was to be completed by August 1994;  (2) a groundwater treatment system was to be installed by January 1995,  and operated for 5 to 15 years; and (3) system shut-down and project  completion dates would be based upon monitoring test results and state  approvals. In late March, DEHNR approved the Comprehensive Site  Assessment. In July, the Raleigh Office of DEHNR issued a soil  contaminant and treatment permit. During 1994, soil excavation and on- site bioremediation procedures were performed on approximately 6,400  tons of contaminated soil at the site. An estimated total of 11,792 tons of  soil were excavated and treated on-site   January – December 1995: Following completion of the soil  treatment, the environmental consultant monitored groundwater quality  at the site and reported results on an approximate quarterly basis. The  samples taken in October continue to show groundwater contamination.  The contamination plume was estimated at approximately 230 feet by  210 feet and expected to migrate slowly to the northeast. The reports  continued to recommend the design and installation of a groundwater  remediation system to remove the contamination present.
January 1996 – January 2003: Groundwater monitoring continued on  a semi-annual basis. In 1996, North Carolina enacted a law temporarily  suspending remediation work for low-priority underground storage tank  release sites. The R.C. Anderson Trust site was initially given a low- priority ranking and, therefore, remediation work at the site stopped.  However, primarily because of the site’s threat to uncontaminated  private domestic water supply wells, its ranking was changed to high  priority in July 1997 and remediation activities resumed. The  Containment and Treatment of Contaminated Soil permit originally  issued In July 1994 by the Raleigh Office of DEHNR was renewed in  1998. A groundwater remediation system using pump and treat with air  sparge technologies was installed and began operation in late May 2002.  Groundwater at the site was sampled 10 times through January 2003.  According to the consultant’s Groundwater Monitoring Report dated  September 12, 2003, as of January 2003, benzene, lead, MTBE, and 1,2- dichloroethane were still present at on- and off-site monitoring wells in  concentrations above North Carolina groundwater quality standards.
However, according to DEHNR officials, benzene was not detected in  any off-site monitoring well during that monitoring event and lead was  detected in an off-site monitoring well but not above the NC  groundwater standards.
Status as of August 2005: According to state officials, North Carolina  State Session Law 2004-124 suspended further work on most high risk  sites due to constrained state funds. As a result, the state is now  prioritizing sites based on relative risk and directing work only to  emergency releases and those releases that pose the highest risks that  can be funded with available resources. Initial treatment work was  completed at the Anderson Trust site and the recovery system remains  on-site but is currently shut down.

		Summary of Key Information from the Case Files

Contaminants and compounds of concern: Benzene, toluene, ethyl  benzene, xylenes, MTBE, Naphthalene, and lead.
Size of leak: Unknown.
Impact of contamination: One residential drinking water well adjacent  to the site was contaminated and abandoned. A potential threat of  contamination exists for 17 additional residential wells within 1,500 feet  of the site.
Remediation cost: According to state officials, the North Carolina  Commercial Fund has reimbursed the owner (including consultants) for  $943,407.93 of reasonable and necessary expenses performed to  remediate the site. In addition, total reimbursable expenses to complete  cleanup and close the site are estimated by these officials at $1.1 million.  However, this estimate does not include deductible amounts and other  expenses not approved by the fund or otherwise deemed ineligible for  reimbursement, such as contamination from the above ground tank or  used motor oil paid by the R.C. Anderson Trust.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: None.
Communication between responsible agencies and the public: No  evidence of formal public meetings was identified.
Litigation: No information on lawsuits was found in the case files.

	Tranguch Tire Service, Inc., Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

The Tranguch site was a gasoline and tire retreading service station in a  mixed commercial and residential area of northeastern Pennsylvania that  was abandoned in 1995. Several operating gasoline service stations as well  as numerous abandoned or removed underground storage tank systems lie  within the vicinity of the site. A residential neighborhood, part of which is  built over an abandoned coal mine, surrounds the site. While it is unknown  exactly when the underground storage tanks at the site began to leak,  residents’ complaints of gasoline odors in their homes suggest that leaks  may have begun sometime in the late 1980s to early 1990s. By 1993, the  Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (PADER)  determined that gasoline vapors from the sewer system were affecting  homes. Although PADER found contamination at four other facilities in the  vicinity of the Tranguch site, the department determined that the Tranguch  facility was primarily responsible for the leak impacting the residential  area. EPA estimated that the facility had released an estimated 25,000 to  50,000 gallons of gasoline. The resulting gasoline plume contaminated soil  and groundwater, and spread generally northeastward through the  adjoining community to encompass about a 70-acre area, including 11  businesses, two doctor’s offices, two churches, two parks, 26 vacant lots,  and 359 residential properties and impacted the lives of up to a reported  1,500 neighborhood residents.

		Chronology of Key Site Events from the Case Files

Prior to 1990: Neighborhood residents near the Tranguch facility had  complained of an odor from the facility that smelled like automobile or  truck emissions as early as August 1976. However, an investigation  conducted at the Tranguch facility at that time did not reveal any  problems. Case files do not contain any additional complaints about this  site until February 1990.
February 1990 – April 1993: Over the three-year period, PADER  investigated complaints of gasoline or other odors in residences in the  area of the Tranguch facility, including one home on three separate  occasions. In March 1993, a local Department of Public Safety  environmental protection specialist performed an investigation at this  residence and verified the presence of strong gasoline odors. Because of  the saturated condition of the soil, he was able to trace gasoline residue  to a nearby abandoned underground storage tank facility. The  environmental specialist referred the matter to PADER for follow-up. In  April 1993, PADER took a water sample from the basement sump of this  residence that tested positive for the presence of gasoline, and began  efforts to determine whether nearby underground gasoline storage  tanks were the source of the contamination. Out of eleven commercial  locations in the vicinity, PADER identified four operating facilities— including the Tranguch facility—and one abandoned underground  storage tank facility as potential contamination sources.
May 1993 – June 1993: PADER directed the owner of the abandoned  facility to register and either properly close (remove) or upgrade the  tanks at that site. At this time, PADER also asked the owners of the  Tranguch facility and the other two operating facilities to either provide  the department with proof that their tanks passed tank tightness tests or  conduct the tests. The abandoned site owner notified PADER that he  intended to close the site and PADER directed him to submit and  implement a site characterization plan. Because none of the three  operating facilities responded to the PADER request, it asked for this  information a second time.
July 1993: The owner of one of the three operating facilities submitted  a report to PADER showing that, in June 1993, tanks at the site had  passed a tightness test. However, PADER discovered that the owner had  installed this facility’s current tanks in 1991 to replace older tanks and,  at that time, 1,042 tons of fuel-contaminated soil had been removed from  the site. The older unregistered tanks remained in operation until they  were replaced in 1991. The owner filed a closure report for these tanks  in October 1993. PADER documentation indicates that the report lacked  some of the required sampling and soil analysis information.
Also in July 1993, the owner of another of the three operating facilities  admitted to having had an unreported release in April 1993. Tanks at this  site were subsequently removed. Three of these tanks had never been  registered. Soil contamination was evident during excavation, and  during the removal process an abandoned heating oil underground  storage tank was also discovered at the site. Also, when the owner of the  facility removed his tanks, PADER observed contamination at the site  and the owner arranged for a site investigation/characterization.
August 1993: PADER requested a third time that the owner of the  Tranguch facility provide tank tightness test information and submit and  implement site assessment and remedial action plans. PADER surveyed  leak detection methods used at the Tranguch site and the owner stated  that the facility was performing these methods. These methods were  required to be performed under the state’s applicable rules and  regulations in force at that time. PADER also requested that the owners  of the other two operating facilities and the abandoned facility submit  and implement site assessment and remedial action plans.
September 1993: The owner of the Tranguch facility submitted  information to PADER indicating that tanks at the site had passed a  tightness test. PADER again requested that the Tranguch owner perform  a site characterization and report the results to the department within 14  days. Also, the local fire department received two additional complaints  of gasoline-like fumes in area residences. PADER Emergency Response  Program personnel also began regularly monitoring vapor levels in area  homes.
October - November 1993: Beginning in October, the PADER  Emergency Response Program started to install interim remedial  systems designed to prevent gasoline vapors from entering affected  homes and, by mid-May 1994, had installed thirteen. Also in October,  PADER identified a fourth operating facility as a potential contributor to  the area’s contamination and asked the owner of that facility to perform  a site characterization. Through late November 1993, the owner of this  fourth facility took no action in this regard, but requested to review any  PADER documentation indicating that this facility had contributed to  pollution in the area, as well as files regarding the other facilities in the  area. Although PADER arranged for access to these files, the owner  never reviewed them.
PADER confirmed the presence of gasoline-like fumes in six area  residences and arranged to have a preliminary subsurface investigation  performed on the area impacted by the contamination. The investigation  revealed that gasoline had contaminated the groundwater at several  locations down-slope from the Tranguch site and that gasoline  contamination had spread to the neighborhood sewer system. The  gasoline contamination was also found to stop up-slope of the location  of the Tranguch tanks, within the property boundary. PADER officials,  representatives of the city of Hazleton, and the city fire chief met with  the owner of the Tranguch site and requested that he immediately  remove all gasoline from his tanks. The following day, the owner  informed PADER that he had discovered that 375 gallons of gasoline had  been lost from his tanks early in November. The owner admitted to  PADER officials that—contrary to what he had told PADER in August  1993—he had just started to comply with the required leak detection  methods the previous day. Accordingly, PADER issued a second  compliance order to the Tranguch site owner, requiring him to, within 24  hours, remove all gasoline from the underground storage tanks on-site,  begin cleaning up the leaked gasoline, and take steps to monitor and  mitigate vapors in area homes. Although the owner appealed this order,  he had his tanks and lines drained and began monitoring wells to  recover gasoline. Furthermore, although the Tranguch site owner made  inquiries regarding homes impacted by vapors, he took no action to  monitor or mitigate vapors in area homes.
City personnel began venting the neighborhood sewer system.
December 1993 – February 1994: PADER held a public meeting with  area residents, city and township representatives, and state legislators  regarding the spill. School district officials, city and township  representatives, and a state legislator were also contacted during  subsequent site activities.
In December, PADER issued a compliance order to the owner of the  fourth operating facility suspected of contributing to the contamination.  The order required a complete site investigation, including tank system  tightness testing, a review of leak detection and inventory records, and  sub-surface sampling and analysis of soil and groundwater at the site.  The owner’s attorney responded with a letter stating his client’s intent to  appeal the order, and included attachments with information in defense  of his decision. From the information presented in the attachments,  PADER determined that the owner had not employed any type of  automatic leak detection devices on the two underground gasoline  storage tanks installed at his site in 1962, and that he might not have complied with applicable federal and state leak detection regulations.  In January 1994, the legal counsel for PADER informed the owner that  the information he had submitted was incomplete and did not satisfy  the compliance order’s requirements. Later in January, the owner  formally appealed the December compliance order.
PADER documents indicate that problems with gasoline-like vapors  entering neighborhood homes and commercial establishments grew  progressively worse through the end of 1993 and, by early 1994, 28  residences and 1 commercial building had been impacted. The Hazleton  City Health Officer determined that a neighborhood home was unfit for  human habitation and the owner temporarily relocated because of the  presence of potentially harmful gasoline vapors and the explosion  potential from the collected gasoline vapors in the basement of his  home. (This homeowner had previously reported gasoline-like odors in  his residence in February 1990, March 1992, August 1992, and March  1993).
In January 1994, all product recovery efforts at the Tranguch site ceased  because of the owner’s failure to pay his environmental consultant, but  resumed after he was able to secure a loan.
March – April 1994: Local residents formed an organization called the  Group Against Gas (GAG) at about this time and announced plans for a  class action lawsuit against parties responsible for the contamination.  PADER received from the owner’s consultant a proposed Tranguch site  characterization plan that included monitoring well locations. Upon  review, PADER requested that the consultant perform additional site  characterization work, including the installation of additional  monitoring wells. Also, PADER notified the owner of the fourth  operating facility of a June 1994 hearing date and the owner wrote to his  state senator in an unsuccessful attempt to stay the PADER compliance  order.
May – August 1994: In May, PADER held a second public meeting with  area residents, city and township representatives, and state legislators  regarding the spill. Also in May, to avoid compliance proceedings, the  owner of the fourth operating facility conducted a site investigation and  found gasoline in the groundwater near his underground storage tank  systems. He withdrew his appeal of the compliance order, voluntarily  removed all fuel from his underground gasoline storage tank systems,  and sent a summary report of the investigation to PADER. In August,  this owner notified PADER of his intent to conduct and complete a site  characterization by the end of September 1994.
An August court order required the Tranguch facility owner to take  interim remedial actions to recover leaked fuel, monitor and mitigate  vapors in area homes, and complete and report on site characterization  by mid-October 1994.
PADER obtained funds from the state Leaking Underground Storage  Tank fund to conduct an extensive characterization study of the  impacted area.
February 1995 – September 1995: The owner had all six tanks at the  Tranguch facility removed. Tanks were found to be perforated with “fist- sized holes,” and gasoline contamination was evident at the site. The  owner of the Tranguch facility declared bankruptcy. In addition, in May,  the owner of the fourth operating facility had two tanks removed. Both  tanks were found to be deeply pitted and the fill end of one tank had  pinholes and corrosion that extended through the steel. Evidence of  gasoline contamination was observed during the excavation.
November 1995 - December 1995: The Pennsylvania Department of  Environmental Protection (PADEP, formerly PADER) issued another  compliance order to the owner of the Tranguch facility, who again  appealed it.
March – July 1996: PADEP’s environmental consultant issued a report  on, among other things, the sources of contamination in the area. While  the consultant found contamination at all 5 of the sites, it found that the  Tranguch facility was primarily responsible for the leak impacting the  residential area. According to the consultant’s report, the contamination  at the other four facilities did not significantly contribute to the  contamination plume that was affecting the area residences.
Although PADEP continued to monitor conditions in the area, it no  longer had the funds necessary to mitigate the contamination threat.  Therefore, PADEP asked EPA to lead the remediation of the Tranguch  site and the impacted area. EPA took over as lead agency for the site,  while PADEP continued to work with EPA by providing technical  support.
EPA entered into an Interagency Agreement with the U.S. Army Corps  of Engineers (USACE) for contracting services for the site. The first  phase of a two-phase remedial action plan developed for the site,  included soil vapor extraction of the source area and passive oil  skimmers for collection of petroleum products.
August – October 1996: EPA confirmed PADEP’s findings regarding  the contamination plume. The EPA On-Scene Coordinator (OSC)  determined that (1) gasoline contamination at the Tranguch site  impacted surface waterways as well as groundwater at the site, (2) site  conditions met or exceeded removal criteria described in the National  Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), and  (3) the site posed an imminent and substantial threat to the public  health of residents in the area of the plume because of the threat of fire,  explosion, and direct inhalation of benzene. The OSC estimated that  over 900,000 gallons of gasoline leaked from the tanks. EPA requested  remediation funds under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and received an  initial $180,000 to begin removal actions, including installation and  maintenance of two underflow dams on Black Creek to reduce the  gasoline contamination which was entering the creek.
EPA sampled and tested air quality in 53 of 362 homes in the area. The  gasoline vapors detected in 52 of the 53 homes were below EPA’s  benzene action level of 21.5 µg/m(micrograms per cubic meter). (The  state action level at that time was 32 µg/m was below 32 µg/m January – February 1997: A passive basement air filtration system in  a home was changed to an active system because of a health threat.
October 1997: EPA received approval to discharge treated  groundwater from the Tranguch site remediation plant into the Hazelton  sewer system.
November - December 1999: USACE constructed a soil vapor  extraction system on the Tranguch site.
EPA identified the Tranguch facility and three other businesses as  parties responsible for the contamination based on a USACE  groundwater flow model developed to predict the flow of spilled  gasoline. According to the model, while much of the spilled material  would have come from the Tranguch facility, some material from three  other operating facilities would have mingled with the plume from the  Tranguch leak and subsequently be transported to Black Creek.  Furthermore, for part of the year, spilled material from one of the  operating facilities would flow directly to the creek. However, EPA’s  Region 3 General Counsel recommended that the agency not issue  removal enforcement orders to these parties because it considered them  to be “de minimis” (small volume) contributors to the contamination. In  addition, since the Tranguch facility was in bankruptcy, EPA believed  that Tranguch would not be able to comply with the order and,  therefore, did not issue one. Consequently, Oil Pollution Act funds  continued to be used to clean up the site.
February 2000 - September 2000: The Pennsylvania Department of  Health, concerned over air sample results, asked EPA to install  ventilation and continue testing air quality in 9 homes. EPA began  installing sewer vents at homes.
EPA, USACE, state agencies and a state Representative held public  meetings with area residents in July and August to discuss what  corrective actions EPA would take at the Tranguch facility. An  additional 72 residents (32 in July and 40 in August) requested sampling  of the air in their homes.
October 2000: A public meeting was held to discuss site sampling,  health issues, and  site history for the Tranguch site and affected area.  Officials from the (1) Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry  (ATSDR), (2) PADEP, (3) Pennsylvania Department of Health, (4) U.S.
Coast Guard, (5) USACE, and (6) EPA were present, among others.  More than 150 Tranguch area residents were also present. The USACE  official stated that the site was complex because of the existence of an  underground coal mine. During the meeting, residents voiced concerns  about health and property values, ATSDR stated that long-term  exposure to benzene (a gasoline component) had been connected to  cases of leukemia, and officials agreed to look into the impacts of the  contamination on property values in the area and the EPA  representative noted that potential buyers of homes in the immediate  area had to be informed about the contamination. Also, based on leak  data from Tranguch’s tank tightness tests, he stated that 50,000 gallons  or less of gasoline had leaked at the Tranguch site rather than the  900,000 gallons originally estimated.
December 2000: The EPA Office of Inspector General received a  hotline complaint alleging EPA mismanagement of the Tranguch site  cleanup.
January 2001: Throughout Pennsylvania, the action level for benzene  is 32 µg/m. However, according to EPA Region 3 officials, citing  concerns over the limited information on the extent of the  contamination, PADOH set a more conservative level for the Tranguch  site of “non-detect”. In response, EPA identified 8.3 µg/mEPA continued to sample air in area homes and, as of February 2001,  had sampled 308 of approximately 350 homes within the contaminated  area.
Luzerne County Commissioners adopted a resolution urging the Board  of Assessment Appeals to eliminate property taxes for two years for  properties determined by the federal government and appropriate  agencies to be eligible for relief.
According to a local newspaper article, one of the state’s U.S. senators  wrote to the EPA Administrator and asked the agency to buy the homes  of the area’s residents and the other U.S. Senator agreed to meet with  the Administrator about the spill.
March 2001: EPA implemented weekly “Unified Command” meetings  to keep all interested parties up to date and to provide EPA an  opportunity to address issues and/or questions any of the attending  representatives might have. While the primary members of these  meetings were federal, state, and local officials, representatives from  the Group Against Gas participated in the meetings as ex officio  members.
EPA requested and received an additional $11,500,000 in funding from  the U.S. Coast Guard to install groundwater collection and soil gas  extraction systems, as well as groundwater and soil gas treatment  systems. This funding brought the Tranguch site cleanup ceiling to  $25,698,188.
The mayor of Hazelton, Pennsylvania declared the area affected by the  Tranguch leak a local disaster emergency and Luzerne County  Commissioners declared the area in a state of emergency. In addition,  the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency was asked to  determine if the area met criteria for being declared a disaster area.
April 2001: On behalf of EPA, the USACE completed a remediation  plan for the area sewer system and began work on a groundwater  collection system, a soil vapor extraction/biovent system, and new  storm and sanitary sewer lines.
A public meeting was held with affected Tranguch site residents.  Officials from EPA, ATSDR, Pennsylvania Department of Health, and  PADEP attended the meeting.
A state elected official introduced a resolution in the state House of  Representatives to declare the affected area a national disaster area and  to purchase the homes of citizens within the affected area. The  resolution was unanimously approved.
In a letter to the Governor of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Emergency  Management Agency (PEMA) stated that the impacted area did not meet  the eligibility criteria to obtain disaster assistance from the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). PEMA recommended that the  Governor not certify that a major disaster or emergency existed in order  to request assistance from FEMA. Further, PEMA determined that the  hazard-mitigation funding needed to “buy-out” (purchase the homes of)  affected residents would be inadequate, based on eligible costs, to  address this situation. Based on PEMA’s review, the governor denied a  state buy-out for residents.
May 2001: The local board of supervisors again declared a state of  emergency for the area affected by the leak and granted property tax  relief for the affected property owners.
PADEP approved EPA’s permit to discharge treated contaminated  groundwater into Black Creek.  However, some residents questioned  EPA’s remediation strategy. EPA and city, township, and school district  attorneys met concerning Tranguch site cleanup.
The Pennsylvania Department of Health began conducting a health  study of area residents impacted by the leak.
June 2001: An environmental consulting company retained by EPA  completed a report on subsurface airflow modeling for the soil vapor  extraction/biovent system.
EPA saw to the installation of 288 sewer vents in area homes and  allowed residents to use a suite and hotel amenities, such as the pool, at  a local lodge to get away from the site construction noise.
August 2001: EPA’s Inspector General reported that (1) EPA managed  the cleanup of contamination from the Tranguch leak adequately, but  the agency could have better communicated with the local community  and the Pennsylvania Department of Health; (2) a federal buyout was  not warranted and that residents’ desire for a buy-out was based on an  inaccurate perception of the threat posed by the leak; and (3) about $2.8  million in remediation costs might not have been warranted.
The University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health  completed a “Preliminary Findings” report that examined whether Hazle  Township residents were at increased risk for cancer compared to that  of Luzerne County residents and residents of Pennsylvania as a whole.  The authors of the study stated that “these findings suggest that the  incidence of leukemia and prostate cancer in the Hazle Township is  increased compared to Luzerne County and the state of Pennsylvania”.  While prostate cancer has been linked to such factors as age, race,  family history and high intake of dietary fat, research literature has  linked leukemia—in particular, acute myelogenous leukemia—to  benzene exposure. However, the study authors could not definitively  identify the gasoline leak as the source of the excess leukemia.
December 2001: EPA completed replacement/repair of the sewer lines  in and around the plume of contamination. PADOH issued its health  study report, which provided its recommendations for determining  when indoor air monitoring would no longer be necessary. In effect, it  reset the site-specific action level for benzene of 8.3 µg/m back to the  statewide action level of 32µg/minvestigations of the spill and its potential impacts. In response to a  question on how long residents with carbon filters in their homes to  purify their indoor air should run them, the EPA representative said  “…based on the sampling that we’ve done throughout the community,  there’s no reason to run those filters”. Following the meeting, according  to a newspaper account, the EPA representative said that as long as  environmental officials are capable of eliminating potential chemical  exposure for residents, federal officials would not consider options to  relocate affected area residents.
The University of Pittsburgh completed data collection efforts for its  health study, which was funded by a $100,000 grant from the  Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development.
August 2002: The Luzerne County Board of Commissioners  unanimously approved a resolution requesting the Luzerne County  Board of Assessment Appeals to approve requests to reduce to zero  value, for January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003, the real estate  assessments of those properties that were adversely affected by the  Tranguch gasoline leak, as determined by the federal government.
September 2002: EPA requested and received an additional $600,000 in  funding from the U.S. Coast Guard. This funding brought the Tranguch  site cleanup cost ceiling to $26,298,188.
November 2002: A PADEP report on an evaluation of the abandoned  mine under the area concluded that it had no significant environmental  impact on the community.
January 2003: Under contract with EPA, USACE found small amounts  of petroleum contamination in one tunnel of the abandoned coal mine.
PADEP discontinued support for the air filters in residences.
The local school district sent a letter to EPA asking for $44,000 in  compensation for the economic loss resulting from not having use of  the athletic field.
The University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health staff  presented their preliminary findings of the Hazleton Health Effects  study to the mayor of the city and the community at a public meeting.  According to a local newspaper article, this study (1) included more  individuals (451 compared to 207) and more households (190 compared  to 84) than in the earlier “Preliminary Findings” study; and (2) found no  statistically significant increase in overall cancer or leukemia incidence  for the Laurel Gardens community of Hazleton residents in the area of  the Tranguch site compared to the county and state populations. The  study team, however, did stress that further investigation was  warranted for both thyroid and brain cancer, according to the  newspaper account.
February 2003 – March 2003: The local Board of Supervisors  extended the state of emergency for the area impacted by the leak  through March 10, 2003, and supported a “buyout” of affected homes by  the federal government. The Luzerne County Board of Commissioners  also declared that a state of emergency continued to exist.
GAG wrote to the governor asking that PEMA reevaluate the designation  of the area as a disaster area, which had been denied earlier.
April 2003: Local and national elected officials representing the area  sent letters to the new governor, requesting a reevaluation of the  previous governor’s determination on the area’s eligibility for being  declared a disaster area.
The Hazelton city council gave a property tax break to area residents  impacted by the leak for the third consecutive year.
According to EPA officials, the local school district verbally requested  that an athletic field in the affected area be restored. In addition, the  local school district sent a letter to EPA requesting a meeting in May  with the EPA on-site coordinator and USACE to discuss (1)  compensation for loss of use of the athletic field, and (2) a lack of  communication between EPA and the school district over the issue.
May 2003: The federal government agreed to pay the local school  district $120,000 for the restoration of the athletic field.
EPA held a public meeting with attendees expressing concerns about  the cleanup.
July 2003 - September 2003: Citing health and property concerns,  more than 250 Hazleton and Hazle Township residents petitioned for a  congressional hearing into EPA’s response to and management of the  leak impacting their community.
October 2003: PADOH completed a study showing that, of the twenty- two types of cancers and total cancers considered, only the incidence of  leukemia and all cancers was significantly higher in the affected  community than would be expected. However, according to the PADOH  study, the relationship of leukemia incidence to the environment was  unclear, only in rare circumstances can an occurrence be causally linked  to a specific agent with certainty, and the mechanisms for the induction  of cancer from benzene exposure are not clear.
The University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health  completed a health study providing its final “Summary of Primary  Findings” on area residents’ increased risk of developing cancer. This  report summarized the university’s two previous studies that separately  examined residents in the affected area of Hazle Township and the City  of Hazelton. In addition, the study examined the total population of  affected area residents by combining the Township and the City. The  study also examined affected residents living in both locations classified  into three potential exposure categories (high, medium, and low) based  on the proximity of their residence to the underground gasoline plume.  Most notably was the high exposure category of those living directly  over or adjacent to the projected contamination plume. The study  investigators concluded that while the combined population did not  experience an excess of all cancers, a statistically significant excess of  leukemia was observed. For the high exposure category, the study  investigators concluded that the observed versus expected cases of  leukemia was statistically significant, but that, because of the small size  in this subgroup, these results should be interpreted with some caution.  The study investigators made a number of recommendations including  long-term systematic surveillance and screening for members of the  potentially higher risk population.
The University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health staff  completed their final report of the Hazleton Health Effects Study 1990- 2000. The study’s findings suggest that from 1990 to 2000 no statistically  significant increase in overall cancer or leukemia incidence in the  affected area of Hazleton with the exception of brain cancer in white  males compared to the county and state populations for the period 1990  through 2000.
December 2003: According to a local newspaper article, Laurel Garden  residents impacted by the gasoline leak asked the Luzerne County  District Attorney to investigate the case. In the request letter, the  residents said that they believe they were “needlessly and recklessly  endangered” by the owners of fuel stations in the vicinity of the  impacted area, EPA, and PADEP.
March 2004: In a letter to local officials, EPA stated that no further  action would be taken to address contamination from the abandoned  mine based on three factors: (1) the contamination did not appear to be  from the Tranguch property, (2) the contamination did not have a  pathway to surface waters, and (3) due to the small amount of  contamination present, the vapors were not migrating from the mine  location and therefore did not threaten nearby residents.
July 2004: EPA remained the lead agency responsible for the Tranguch  site, while PADEP agreed to provide operation and maintenance  services for the groundwater and soil vapor extraction treatment  systems.
Status as of September 2005: All leaking underground storage tanks  had been removed from the Tranguch site and only residual  contamination required remediation. In addition, cleanup efforts at all  affected residential homes had been completed and well over 95 percent  of total costs to clean up and monitor the site had been expended.  Remediation activities to remove residual contamination are expected  to continue for another 4 to 5 years, costing about $100,000 per year. The  remediation system will be shut down periodically to monitor its  effectiveness and determine whether mitigation goals for groundwater  and soil contamination have been reached. This monitoring is expected  to cost about $30,000 to $40,000 per year.  The remediation system might  need to be shut down a few times before the contamination threat can  be considered mitigated and the removal project completed. However,  once this determination is made, groundwater and soil gas (vapor)  monitoring will permanently stop, all remaining monitoring wells  (currently approximately 80 but likely will be less because some are  expected to close every year depending on sampling results) will be  closed (costing about $1,000 per well), the treatment system removed,  and the underground piping abandoned in place.

		Summary of Key Information From the Case Files

Contaminants and compounds of concern: Benzene, toluene, ethyl  benzene, and xylenes (BTEX). According to EPA officials, some methyl- tertiary butyl-ether (MTBE) was identified but was never considered a  contaminant of concern.
Size of leak: An estimated 25,000 to 50,000 gallons of gasoline was  released into the soil.
Impacts of contamination: The leaking gasoline contaminated soil and  groundwater, entered into the sewer system through cracked pipes, and  further spread generally northeastward through the adjoining  community to encompass an area of about 70-acres, including 11  businesses, two doctor’s offices, two churches, two parks, 26 vacant  lots, and 359 residential properties.
Remediation cost: According to EPA officials, about $25.2 million of Oil  Spill Liability Trust Fund monies have been spent to date to clean up the  contamination resulting from the Tranguch leak. In addition, according  to state officials, Pennsylvania spent about $2 to $3 million in cleanup  funds. The site owner spent an unknown additional—but relatively  small amount—on cleanup.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: EPA assumed  responsibility for cleaning up the site at the request of PADER in 1996.
Communication between responsible agencies and the public:  Pennsylvania state agencies and EPA either held or participated in at  least nine public meetings and other forums regarding the Tranguch leak  from 1993—when the leak was first confirmed—through 2003. In  December 1993 and May 1994, PADER held public meetings with area  residents, city and township representatives, and state legislators  regarding the contamination. According to EPA officials, beginning in  July 1996, EPA held meetings with local officials and public meetings  with area residents and others to discuss plans for remediating the  contamination at and around the Tranguch site and to update the status  of the cleanup. Through May 2003, EPA held at least five such meetings  and participated in at least one meeting sponsored by GAG. The  meetings often included representatives from the state and other federal  agencies—such as USACE—involved in cleanup operations, among  others.
Litigation: Nearby residents affected by the contamination sued  numerous parties, including the owners of the gas stations in the vicinity  of the leak as well as certain oil companies, asserting that the  contamination had caused personal injury and property damage, among  other things. These lawsuits are still pending.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this review were to identify (1) information available on  the number and cleanup status of leaking underground storage tanks, (2)  existing sources of funding for cleanups at contaminated tank sites, and (3)  processes used to identify, assess, and clean up sites in 5 states with large  numbers of leaking tanks—California, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina,  and Pennsylvania.  In addition, to provide some perspective on how leaking  underground storage tank sites are identified and cleaned up, we are  providing information on the history and cleanup status of one leaking tank  site in each of these 5 states.
To identify information available on the number and cleanup status of  leaking underground storage tanks, we reviewed and evaluated data from  EPA’s underground storage tank program semi-annual activity reports for  the period from March 31, 2001 through March 31, 2004.  Each activity  report contains data on the number of active and closed tanks, confirmed  releases, cleanups initiated and completed, and cleanup backlog for the 50  states, 5 territories, and the District of Columbia, arranged by EPA region.   To assess the reliability of the EPA data, we interviewed EPA program  officials at headquarters and in Regions 3, 4, 5, and 9; conducted electronic  (logic and other) reliability testing of the data itself; and obtained and  reviewed EPA’s responses to questions designed to determine the reliability  of the data.  In addition, we compared the semiannual data reported by EPA  with data provided by the states we visited.  In general, we found only  minor discrepancies during our reliability testing of the data.  For example,  the Maine and Massachusetts semi-annual data for the period ending March  31, 2002, were inadvertently switched.  Once we brought this to EPA’s  attention, it was immediately corrected.  We also found that EPA reported  1,000 less closed tanks and 1,000 more active tanks than reported by the  state of Pennsylvania.  The state had initially provided EPA data on the  number of closed tanks as of September 30, 2004 but the following day  provided EPA a correction to this amount.  However, EPA inadvertently did  not update its records to reflect this correction.  While acknowledging  these problems, we have determined that the reliability of the semi-annual  data is adequate for the purposes used in this report.
To identify funding options available for cleaning up contaminated tank  sites and the processes used for identifying, assessing, and cleaning up  leaking tanks by 5 states with large numbers of leaking tanks, we discussed  possible funding options with EPA officials, conducted structured  interviews with state program officials, and reviewed documents provided  by these officials or located on their internet sites.  To select which states  to include in our review, we used data from EPA’s semi-annual activity  report and applied it to our selection criteria and picked the five states  having the highest combined score. Our selection criteria consisted of the  following five quantitative indicators:   states with the largest average number of active tanks for the last 3   states with the largest average number of confirmed releases for the last   states with the largest average number of backlogs for the last 3 years;  states with the largest increase in backlogs during the last year divided  by the number of active tanks for that state; and   states with the largest increase in new tank releases for the last year  divided by the number of active tanks for that state.
Three of the five indicators used 3-year average data to minimize the  impact of single-year fluctuations and to reduce the effect of state officials’  periodic revisions to the data.  Two of the five indicators included  adjustments for the number of active tanks in the state so as to reduce the  possible selection bias in favor of states that have large numbers of active  tanks.
For each indicator, we assigned a numerical score corresponding to its  ranking compared to the other states.  For example, because EPA data  indicated that California averaged the most releases over the last three  years, we assigned it a score of 56 out of a possible 56 points; alternatively,  because American Samoa averaged the least number of releases over the  last three years, we assigned it a score of one. To determine a state’s total  ranking for all five indicators, we added the scores for each state across all  indicators and ranked each from highest to lowest.
As a final step in our state selection process, we reviewed the 5 states with  the highest quantitative score to ensure that, taken as whole, these states  (1) were geographically diverse, (2) had different EPA regional offices  overseeing their LUST programs, (3) included states with and without EPA- approved LUST programs, and (4) included states with and without LUST  assurance funds.  This process resulted in our including California rather  than Ohio.  While both states had the same quantitative score, including  California, in our opinion, increased geographic diversity and added a  different regional office to our selected states.
To provide information on the history and cleanup status of one leaking  underground storage tank site in each of the 5 states, we identified the 5  sites—Coca-Cola Enterprises, Yuba County, California; Henry Fruhling  Food Store, Harford County, Maryland; Bob's Marathon, Grand Ledge,  Michigan; R.C. Anderson Trust, Nash County, North Carolina; and Tranguch  Tire Service, Incorporated, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania—interviewed  state program officials responsible for overseeing or managing the cleanup  at these sites, reviewed case files, and visited each site.  In identifying these  sites, we first selected the Tranguch site because of congressional interest.   For comparison with Tranguch, we selected the remaining 4 sites primarily  on the basis of the following similarities to that site: Cleanup was either completed in 2004 or is relatively close to  completion based on total estimated costs;   Remediation costs significantly exceeded the average cost of cleanup of  about $125,000; and   The risk priority ranking for remediation was above normal.
Specifically, we selected each of the 4 remaining sites as follows:  Coca-Cola Enterprises n Yuba County, California:  From California’s  GeoTracker database, we obtained a list of about 3,400 closed sites— that is, sites where cleanup has been completed—and identified the 10  most expensive cleanup sites for further investigation.  The Coca-Cola  site had the highest risk rating among those sites closed since January  2004, and while all of the remaining 9 sites were more costly than the  Coca-Cola site, the cost differential was not significant and all had the  same or lower risk ratings.
Henry Fruhling Food Store in Harford County, Maryland:  For site  selection, we obtained a list of 39 sites from Maryland’s Oil Control  Program, administrating the state’s underground storage tank program.   Because Maryland does not track cleanup costs for sites being  remediated by responsible parties, these were all sites with state-lead  cleanups.  In addition, they were sites still undergoing remediation,  because the state has not closed a site within the last 2 years.  From this  list we selected the Fruhling Food Store site primarily based on its high  cost and high risk.  This site was the most costly to clean up and had a  high risk ranking, having impacted residential water supplies.
Bob's Marathon in Grand Ledge, Michigan: We obtained a list of 68  sites with remediation costs of at least $250,000 from Michigan’s  Department of Environmental Quality, administrating the state’s  underground storage tank program.  Because Michigan does not track  cleanup costs for sites being remediated by responsible parties, these  were all sites with state-lead cleanups.  We selected the Bob’s Marathon  site primarily based on its high cost and high risk.  Bob’s Marathon was  the most costly of sites that were either completed or nearly completed  and was high risk because it impacted municipal water supplies and the  community.
R.C. Anderson Trust in Nash County, North Carolina:  We obtained a  list of 108 sites with remediation costs of at least $250,000 from North  Carolina’s Department of Environment and Natural Resources,  administrating the state’s underground storage tank program.  We  selected the 4 sites with the highest remediation costs for further  analysis.  From these 4, we selected the R.C. Anderson Trust site  primarily based on high risk and high cost.  This site was the only site  ranked high risk because of its potential impact on nearby water wells  and on the community.  While this site was the least costly of the four  high-cost sites, the cost differential between this site and the highest  cost one was only about $24,000.
We conducted our review from August 2004 through November 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contacts

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition, Vincent P. Price, Michael J. Rahl, and Michael S. Sagalow made  key contributions to this report.  Important contributions were also made  by John W. Delicath, Wilfred B. Holloway, and Richard P. Johnson.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

Leaking underground storage tanks that contain hazardous products, primarily gasoline, can contaminate soil and groundwater. To address this problem, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under its Underground Storage Tank (UST) Program, required tank owners to install leak detection equipment and take measures to prevent leaks. In 1986, the Congress created a federal trust fund to assist states with cleanups. Cleanup progress has been made, but, as of early 2005, cleanup efforts had not yet begun for over 32,000 tanks, many of which may require state and/or federal resources to address. GAO identified (1) data on the number and cleanup status of leaking tanks, (2) funding sources for tank cleanups, and (3) processes used by five states with large numbers of leaking tanks--California, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania--to identify, assess, and clean up sites.

What GAO Found

Data submitted to EPA by the states show that, as of March 31, 2005, more than 660,000 tanks were in use and about 1.6 million were no longer in use. In addition, states identified about 449,000 tank releases (leaks) and about 416,000 initiated cleanups, with almost 324,000 of those cleanups completed. States also compile limited data on abandoned tanks--tanks whose owners are unknown, or unwilling or unable to pay for their cleanup--but EPA does not require states to provide separate data on all of their known abandoned tanks. Without this separate data, EPA cannot effectively determine the number and cleanup status of these tanks, or how to most efficiently and effectively allocate federal cleanup funds to the states. Tank owners and operators are primarily responsible for paying to clean up their own sites, but abandoned tanks are cleaned up using state resources, that may be limited, and federal trust funds. EPA estimates that the average remediation costs per site have been about $125,000, but costs sometimes have exceeded $1 million. Officials from two of the five states we contacted reported that their state funds may be inadequate to address contamination at abandoned tank sites. In this regard, Michigan and North Carolina officials told GAO that, because of resource constraints, they let contamination at abandoned tank sites attenuate (diminish) naturally once immediate threats are addressed. Furthermore, due to limited resources, states must sometimes find other options for cleaning up sites. For example, Pennsylvania officials asked EPA to take over the cleanup work at the abandoned Tranguch site in 1996 because the owner was bankrupt and the state could not pay the expected cleanup costs. The five states that GAO contacted identify, assess, and clean up leaking tank sites using similar processes. Generally, owners and operators are responsible for conducting these activities under state oversight. Leaking tanks are identified when tank owners report leaks; land redevelopment activities uncover unknown tanks; or state agencies investigate contamination complaints or inspect tanks for regulatory compliance. While regular tank inspections can detect new leaks and potentially prevent future ones, as of early 2005, only two of the five states GAO contacted--California and Maryland--consistently inspected all the state's tanks at least once every 3 years, the minimum rate of inspection that EPA considers adequate. The Energy Policy Act, enacted in August 2005, among other things, requires inspections at least once every 3 years and provides federal trust funds for this and other leak prevention purposes. EPA and some state officials told GAO that increasing inspection frequency could require additional resources. Being able to use trust fund allocations for this purpose will help in this regard. The five states GAO contacted, once they become aware of leaking tanks, identify responsible parties and require them to hire consultants to conduct site assessments and plan and implement cleanup work. The states generally prioritize sites for cleanup according to the immediate threat they pose to human health, safety, and/or the environment.