Background

Government officials are concerned about attacks from individuals  and groups with malicious intent, such as criminals, terrorists, and  adversarial foreign nations. For example, in February 2009, the  Director of National Intelligence testified that foreign nations and  criminals have targeted government and private sector networks to  gain a competitive advantage and potentially disrupt or destroy  them, and that terrorist groups have expressed a desire to use cyber  attacks as a means to target the United States. The director also  discussed that in August 2008, the national government of Georgia’s  Web sites were disabled during hostilities with Russia, which  hindered the government’s ability to communicate its perspective  about the conflict.
The federal government has developed a strategy to address such  cyber threats. Specifically, President Bush issued the 2003 National  Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and related policy directives, such as  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, that specify key  elements of how the nation is to secure key computer-based  systems, including both government systems and those that support  critical infrastructures owned and operated by the private sector.  The strategy and related policies also establish the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) as the focal point for cyber CIP and  assign the department multiple leadership roles and responsibilities  in this area. They include (1) developing a comprehensive national  plan for CIP, including cybersecurity; (2) developing and enhancing  national cyber analysis and warning capabilities; (3) providing and  coordinating incident response and recovery planning, including  conducting incident response exercises; (4) identifying, assessing,  and supporting efforts to reduce cyber threats and vulnerabilities,  including those associated with infrastructure control systems; and  (5) strengthening international cyberspace security. In addition, the  strategy and related policy direct DHS and other relevant  stakeholders to use risk management principles to prioritize  protection activities within and across the 18 critical infrastructure  sectors in an integrated, coordinated fashion.
Because the threats have persisted and grown, President Bush in  January 2008 began to implement a series of initiatives—commonly  referred to as the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative  (CNCI)—aimed primarily at improving DHS and other federal  agencies’ efforts to protect against intrusion attempts and anticipate  future threats. While these initiatives have not been made public,  the Director of National Intelligence stated that they include  defensive, offensive, research and development, and  counterintelligence efforts, as well as a project to improve  public/private partnerships. Subsequently, in December 2008, the  Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency reported,  among other things, that the failure to protect cyberspace was an  urgent national security problem and made 25 recommendations  aimed at addressing shortfalls with the strategy and its  implementation. Since then, President Obama (in February 2009)  initiated a review of the cybersecurity strategy and supporting  activities. The review is scheduled to be completed in April 2009.

	GAO Has Made Recommendations to Address Shortfalls with Key Aspects of National Cybersecurity Strategy and its Implementation

Over the last several years we have reported on our nation’s efforts  to fulfill essential aspects of its cybersecurity strategy. In particular,  we have reported consistently since 2005 that DHS has yet to fully  satisfy its cybersecurity responsibilities designated by the strategy.  To address these shortfalls, we have made about 30  recommendations in key cybersecurity areas including the 5 listed in  table 1. DHS has since developed and implemented certain  capabilities to satisfy aspects of its cybersecurity responsibilities,  but the department still has not fully satisfied our recommendations,  and thus further action needs to be taken to address these areas.
In July 2008, we reported that DHS’s United States Computer  Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) did not fully address 15 key  cyber analysis and warning attributes related to (1) monitoring  network activity to detect anomalies, (2) analyzing information and  investigating anomalies to determine whether they are threats, (3)  warning appropriate officials with timely and actionable threat and  mitigation information, and (4) responding to the threat. For  example, US-CERT provided warnings by developing and  distributing a wide array of notifications; however, these  notifications were not consistently actionable or timely. As a result,  we recommended that the department address shortfalls associated  with the 15 attributes in order to fully establish a national cyber  analysis and warning capability as envisioned in the national  strategy. DHS agreed in large part with our recommendations.
In September 2008, we reported that since conducting a major  cyber attack exercise, called Cyber Storm, DHS had demonstrated  progress in addressing eight lessons it had learned from these  efforts. However, its actions to address the lessons had not been  fully implemented. Specifically, while it had completed 42 of the 66  activities identified, the department had identified 16 activities as  ongoing and 7 as planned for the future. Consequently, we  recommended that DHS schedule and complete all of the corrective  activities identified in order to strengthen coordination between  public and private sector participants in response to significant  cyber incidents. DHS concurred with our recommendation. To date,  DHS has continued to make progress in completing some identified  activities but has yet to do so for others.
In a September 2007 report and an October 2007 testimony, we  reported  that consistent with the national strategy requirement to  identify and reduce threats and vulnerabilities, DHS was sponsoring  multiple control systems security initiatives, including an effort to  improve control systems cybersecurity using vulnerability  evaluation and response tools. However, DHS had not established a  strategy to coordinate the various control systems activities across  federal agencies and the private sector, and it did not effectively  share information on control system vulnerabilities with the public  and private sectors. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS  develop a strategy to guide efforts for securing control systems and  establish a rapid and secure process for sharing sensitive control  system vulnerability information. DHS recently began developing a  strategy and a process to share sensitive information.
We reported and later testified in 2006 that the department had  begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility, as called for  by the national strategy, for developing an integrated public/private  plan for Internet recovery. However, we determined that these  efforts were not comprehensive or complete. As such, we  recommended that DHS implement nine actions to improve the  department’s ability to facilitate public/private efforts to recover the  Internet in case of a major disruption. In October 2007, we testified  that the department had made progress in implementing our  recommendations; however, seven of the nine have not been  completed. To date, an integrated public/private plan for Internet  recovery does not exist.
In 2007, we reported that public and private entities faced a  number of challenges in addressing cybercrime, including ensuring  adequate analytical and technical capabilities for law enforcement  and conducting investigations and prosecuting cybercrimes that  cross national and state borders.

	Cybersecurity Experts Highlighted Key Improvements Needed to Strengthen the Nation’s Cybersecurity Posture

In addition to our recommendations on improving key aspects of the  national cybersecurity strategy and its implementation, we also  obtained the views of experts (by means of panel discussions) on  these and other critical aspects of the strategy, including areas for  improvement. The experts, who included former federal officials,  academics, and private sector executives, highlighted 12 key  improvements that are, in their view, essential to improving the  strategy and our national cybersecurity posture. These  improvements are in large part consistent with our above mentioned  reports and extensive research and experience in this area. They  include:   1.  Develop a national strategy that clearly articulates  strategic objectives, goals, and priorities—The strategy  should, among other things, (1) include well-defined strategic  objectives, (2) provide understandable goals for the government  and the private sector (end game), (3) articulate cyber priorities  among the objectives, (4) provide a vision of what secure  cyberspace should be in the future, (5) seek to integrate federal  government capabilities, (6) establish metrics to gauge whether  progress is being made against the strategy, and (7) provide an  effective means for enforcing action and accountability when  there are progress shortfalls. According to expert panel  members, the CNCI provides a good set of tactical initiatives  focused on improving primarily federal cybersecurity; however,  it does not provide strategic objectives, goals, and priorities for  the nation as a whole.   2.  Establish White House responsibility and accountability  for leading and overseeing national cybersecurity policy— The strategy makes DHS the focal point for cybersecurity;  however, according to expert panel members, DHS has not met  expectations and has not provided the high-level leadership  needed to raise cybersecurity to a national focus. Accordingly,  panelists stated that to be successful and to send the message to  the nation and cyber critical infrastructure owners that  cybersecurity is a priority, this leadership role needs to be  elevated to the White House. In addition, to be effective, the  office must have, among other things, commensurate authority— for example, over budgets and resources—to implement and  employ appropriate incentives to encourage action.   3.  Establish a governance structure for strategy  implementation—The strategy establishes a public/private  partnership governance structure that includes 18 critical  infrastructure sectors, corresponding government and sector  coordinating councils, and cross-sector councils. However,  according to panelists, this structure is government-centric and  largely relies on personal relationships to instill trust to share  information and take action. In addition, although all sectors are  not of equal importance in regard to their cyber assets and  functions, the structure treats all sectors and all critical cyber  assets and functions equally. To ensure effective strategy  implementation, experts stated that the partnership structure  should include a committee of senior government  representatives (for example, the Departments of Defense,  Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury and the  White House) and private sector leaders representing the most  critical cyber assets and functions. Expert panel members also  suggested that this committee’s responsibilities should include  measuring and periodically reporting on progress in achieving  the goals, objectives, and strategic priorities established in the  national strategy and building consensus to hold involved parties  accountable when there are progress shortfalls.  4.  Publicize and raise awareness about the seriousness of the  cybersecurity problem—Although the strategy establishes  cyberspace security awareness as a priority, experts stated that  many national leaders in business and government, including in  Congress, who can invest resources to address cybersecurity  problems are generally not aware of the severity of the risks to  national and economic security posed by the inadequacy of our  nation’s cybersecurity posture and the associated intrusions  made more likely by that posture. Expert panel members  suggested that an aggressive awareness campaign is needed to  raise the level of knowledge of leaders and the general populace  that our nation is constantly under cyber attack.   5.  Create an accountable, operational cybersecurity  organization—DHS established the National Cyber Security  Division (within the Office of Cybersecurity and  Communications) to be responsible for leading national day-to- day cybersecurity efforts; however, according to panelists, this  has not enabled DHS to become the national focal point as  envisioned. Panel members stated that currently, DOD and other  organizations within the intelligence community that have  significant resources and capabilities have come to dominate  federal efforts. They told us that there also needs to be an  independent cybersecurity organization that leverages and  integrates the capabilities of the private sector, civilian  government, law enforcement, military, intelligence community,  and the nation’s international allies to address incidents against  the nation’s critical cyber systems and functions. However, there  was not consensus among our expert panel members regarding  where this organization should reside.   6.  Focus more actions on prioritizing assets and functions,  assessing vulnerabilities, and reducing vulnerabilities than  on developing additional plans—The strategy recommends  actions to identify critical cyber assets and functions, but  panelists stated that efforts to identify which cyber assets and  functions are most critical to the nation have been insufficient.  According to panel members, inclusion in cyber critical  infrastructure protection efforts and lists of critical assets are  currently based on the willingness of the person or entity  responsible for the asset or function to participate and not on  substantiated technical evidence. In addition, the current  strategy establishes vulnerability reduction as a key priority;  however, according to panelists, efforts to identify and mitigate  known vulnerabilities have been insufficient. They stated that  greater efforts should be taken to identify and eliminate common  vulnerabilities and that there are techniques available that  should be used to assess vulnerabilities in the most critical,  prioritized cyber assets and functions.  7.  Bolster public/private partnerships through an improved  value proposition and use of incentives—While the strategy  encourages action by owners and operators of critical cyber  assets and functions, panel members stated that there are not  adequate economic and other incentives (i.e., a value  proposition) for greater investment and partnering in  cybersecurity. Accordingly, panelists stated that the federal  government should provide valued services (such as offering  useful threat or analysis and warning information) or incentives  (such as grants or tax reductions) to encourage action by and  effective partnerships with the private sector. They also  suggested that public and private sector entities use means such  as cost-benefit analyses to ensure the efficient use of limited  cybersecurity-related resources.   8.  Focus greater attention on addressing the global aspects  of cyberspace—The strategy includes recommendations to  address the international aspects of cyberspace but, according to  panelists, the U.S. is not addressing global issues impacting how  cyberspace is governed and controlled. They added that, while  other nations are actively involved in developing treaties,  establishing standards, and pursuing international agreements  (such as on privacy), the U.S. is not aggressively working in a  coordinated manner to ensure that international agreements are  consistent with U.S. practice and that they address cybersecurity  and cybercrime considerations. Panel members stated that the  U.S. should pursue a more coordinated, aggressive approach so  that there is a level playing field globally for U.S. corporations  and enhanced cooperation among government agencies,  including law enforcement. In addition, a panelist stated that the  U.S. should work towards building consensus on a global cyber  strategy.   9.  Improve law enforcement efforts to address malicious  activities in cyberspace—The strategy calls for improving  investigative coordination domestically and internationally and  promoting a common agreement among nations on addressing  cybercrime. According to a panelist, some improvements in  domestic law have been made (e.g., enactment of the PROTECT  Our Children Act of 2008), but implementation of this act is a  work in process due to its recent passage. Panel members also   stated that current domestic and international law enforcement  efforts, including activities, procedures, methods, and laws are  too outdated and outmoded to adequately address the speed,  sophistication, and techniques of individuals and groups, such as  criminals, terrorists, and adversarial foreign nations with  malicious intent. An improved law enforcement is essential to  more effectively catch and prosecute malicious individuals and  groups and, with stricter penalties, deter malicious behavior.   10. Place greater emphasis on cybersecurity research and  development, including consideration of how to better  coordinate government and private sector efforts—While  the strategy recommends actions to develop a research and  development agenda and coordinate efforts between the  government and private sectors, experts stated that the U.S. is  not adequately focusing and funding research and development  efforts to address cybersecurity or to develop the next  generation of cyberspace to include effective security  capabilities. In addition, the research and development efforts  currently underway are not being well coordinated between  government and the private sector.   11. Increase the cadre of cybersecurity professionals—The  strategy includes efforts to increase the number and skills of  cybersecurity professionals but, according to panelists, the  results have not created sufficient numbers of professionals,  including information security specialists and cybercrime  investigators. Expert panel members stated that actions to  increase the number of professionals with adequate cybersecurity  skills should include (1) enhancing existing scholarship  programs (e.g., Scholarship for Service) and (2) making the  cybersecurity discipline a profession through testing and  licensing.   12. Make the federal government a model for cybersecurity,  including using its acquisition function to enhance  cybersecurity aspects of products and services—The  strategy establishes securing the government’s cyberspace as a  key priority and advocates using federal acquisition to  accomplish this goal. Although the federal government has taken  steps to improve the cybersecurity of agencies (e.g., beginning to  implement the CNCI initiatives), panelists stated that it still is  not a model for cybersecurity. Further, they said the federal  government has not made changes in its acquisition function and  the training of government officials in a manner that effectively  improves the cybersecurity capabilities of products and services  purchased and used by federal agencies.
In summary, our nation is under cyber attack, and the present  strategy and its implementation have not been fully effective in  mitigating the threat. This is due in part to the fact that there are  further actions needed by DHS to address key cybersecurity areas,  including fully addressing our recommendations. In addition,  nationally recognized experts have identified improvements aimed  at strengthening the strategy and in turn, our cybersecurity posture.  Key improvements include developing a national strategy that  clearly articulates strategic objectives, goals, and priorities;  establishing White House leadership; improving governance; and  creating a capable and respected operational lead organization.  Until the recommendations are fully addressed and these  improvements are considered, our nation’s most critical federal and  private sector infrastructure systems remain at unnecessary risk to  attack from our adversaries. Consequently, in addition to fully  implementing our recommendations, it is essential that the Obama  administration consider these improvements as it reviews our  nation’s cybersecurity strategy and begins to make decisions on  moving forward.
Madam Chair, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittee  may have at this time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,  please contact me at (202) 512-9286, or by e-mail at  pownerd@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include  Bradley Becker, Camille Chaires, Michael Gilmore, Nancy Glover,  Kush Malhotra, Gary Mountjoy, Lee McCracken, and Andrew  Stavisky.

Appendix I: Cybersecurity Expert Panel Participants

Steve D. Crocker, Chair, Security and Stability Advisory Committee,  Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
Robert Dix, Vice President of Government Affairs, Juniper  Networks, Inc.
Martha Stansell-Gamm, (Retired) Chief, Computer Crime and  Intellectual Property Section, Department of Justice.
Dr. Lawrence Gordon, Ernst & Young Alumni Professor of  Managerial Accounting and Information Assurance, Robert H. Smith  School of Business, University of Maryland.
Tiffany Jones, Director, Public Policy and Government Relations,  Symantec.
Tom Kellerman, Vice President of Security Awareness, Core  Security.
Dr. Kathleen Kiernan, Chief Executive Officer, The Kiernan Group,  and Chairman of the Board, InfraGard.
Cheri McGuire, Principal Security Strategist, Microsoft Corporation,  and former Acting Director, National Cyber Security Division, U.S.  Department of Homeland Security.
Allan Paller, Director of Research, SANS Institute.
Andy Purdy, President, DRA Enterprises, Inc., and former Acting  Director, National Cyber Security Division, U.S. Department of  Homeland Security.
Marcus Sachs, Executive Director of Government Affairs for  National Security Policy, Verizon Communications; and Director,  SANS Internet Storm Center.
Howard Schmidt, President and Chief Executive Officer,  Information Security Forum.
David Sobel, Senior Counsel, Electronic Frontier Foundation.
Amit Yoran, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, NetWitness  Corporation; former Director, National Cyber Security Division, U.S.  Department of Homeland Security.
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Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

Pervasive and sustained computerbased (cyber) attacks against federal and private-sector infrastructures pose a potentially devastating impact to systems and operations and the critical infrastructures that they support. To address these threats, President Bush issued a 2003 national strategy and related policy directives aimed at improving cybersecurity nationwide. Congress and the Executive Branch, including the new administration, have subsequently taken actions to examine the adequacy of the strategy and identify areas for improvement. Nevertheless, GAO has identified this area as high risk and has reported on needed improvements in implementing the national cybersecurity strategy. In this testimony, you asked GAO to summarize (1) key reports and recommendations on the national cybersecurity strategy and (2) the views of experts on how to strengthen the strategy. In doing so, GAO relied on its previous reports related to the strategy and conducted panel discussions with key cybersecurity experts to solicit their views on areas for improvement.

What GAO Found

Over the last several years, GAO has consistently reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has yet to fully satisfy its responsibilities designated by the national cybersecurity strategy. To address these shortfalls, GAO has made about 30 recommendations in key cybersecurity areas. While DHS has since developed and implemented certain capabilities to satisfy aspects of its cybersecurity responsibilities, it still has not fully satisfied the recommendations, and thus further action needs to be taken to fully address these areas. In discussing the areas addressed by GAO's recommendations as well as other critical aspects of the strategy, GAO's panel of cybersecurity experts identified 12 key areas requiring improvement. GAO found these to be largely consistent with its reports and its extensive research and experience in the area. Until GAO's recommendations are fully addressed and the above improvements are considered, our nation's federal and private-sector infrastructure systems remain at risk of not being adequately protected. Consequently, in addition to fully implementing GAO's recommendations, it is essential that the improvements be considered by the new administration as it begins to make decisions on our nation's cybersecurity strategy.