Background

Within CBP, the SBI Program Executive Office, referred to in this report as  the SBI program office, has overall responsibility for overseeing all SBI  activities for acquisition and implementation, including establishing and  meeting program goals, objectives, and schedules for overseeing  contractor performance; and for coordinating among DHS agencies.   However, the tactical infrastructure portion of the program is managed on  a day-to-day basis by CBP’s Office of Finance Facilities Management and  Engineering division.  Among other things, CBP’s Border Patrol has  responsibility for detecting and preventing the illegal entry of aliens into  the United States between designated ports of entry.
DHS began funding the SBI program in fiscal year 2005 at a level of $38  million, which it increased to $325 million in fiscal year 2006.  Starting in  fiscal year 2007, DHS’s annual appropriations acts have included specific  SBI appropriations.  Since fiscal year 2005, SBI’s funding has amounted to  over $3.7 billion (see table 1).  DHS has requested $779 million in SBI  funding for fiscal year 2010.
The primary focus of the SBI program is on the southwest border areas  (see fig. 1) between the ports of entrythat CBP has designated as having  the greatest need for enhanced border security because of serious  vulnerabilities.  Although some tactical infrastructure exists in all the  southwest border sectors, most of what has been built through the SBI  program is located in the San Diego, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, and Rio  Grande Valley sectors.  SBInet technology is to be initially deployed in the  Tucson sector.
SBInet is the program for acquiring, developing, integrating, and deploying  an appropriate mix of surveillance technologies and command, control,  communications, and intelligence (C3I) technologies. SBInet surveillance  technologies are to include sensors, cameras, and radars.  Additional  technologies, such as aerial assets (e.g., helicopters and unmanned aerial  surveillance aircraft) and Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS) may be  added in the future, but as of August 2009, whether and to what extent the  additional technologies would be included in the configuration of the long- term SBInet systems solution had not been determined, according to SBI  officials.
The C3I technologies are to include software and hardware to produce a  Common Operating Picture (COP)—a uniform presentation of activities  within specific areas along the border.  The sensors, radars, and cameras  are to gather information along the border and the system is to transmit  this information to the COP terminals located in command centers to  provide CBP agents with border situational awareness. The COP  technology is to allow agents to (1) view data from radars and sensors that  detect and track movement in the border areas, (2) control cameras to  help identify and classify illegal entries, (3) correlate entries with the  positions of nearby agents, and (4) enhance tactical decision making  regarding the appropriate response to apprehend an entry, if necessary.
In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract for SBInet development  to the Boeing Company for 3 years, with three additional 1-year options.  As of July 2009, CBP was in the process of completing action to extend its  contract with Boeing for the first option year. As the prime contractor,  Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and sustaining selected SBI  technology, deploying selected tactical infrastructure projects, and  providing supply chain management for some tactical infrastructure  projects. In this way, Boeing has extensive involvement in the SBI  specifications development, design, production, integration, testing, and  maintenance and support of SBI projects. Moreover, Boeing is responsible  for selecting and managing a team of subcontractors that provide  individual components for Boeing to integrate into the SBInet system. The  SBInet contract is largely performance-based—that is, CBP has set  requirements for the project and Boeing and CBP coordinate and  collaborate to develop solutions to meet these requirements—and is  designed to maximize the use of commercial off-the-shelf technology.  CBP’s SBI program office oversees and manages the Boeing-led SBI  contractor team.  CBP is completing its part of its SBI activities through a  series of task orders to Boeing for individual projects.  As of July 8, 2009  CBP had awarded 13 task orders to Boeing for a total amount of  approximately $1.1 billion.  See appendix II for a summary of the task  orders awarded to Boeing for SBI projects.
The first SBInet deployment task order was for an effort known as Project  28.  The scope of Project 28, as described in an October 2006 task order to  Boeing, was to provide a system with the capabilities required to control  28 miles of border in Arizona.  Project 28 was accepted by the government  for deployment in February 2008—8 months behind schedule. This delay  occurred because the contractor-delivered system did not perform as  intended.  For example, Boeing was unable to integrate components, such  as towers, cameras, and radars with the COP software. Project 28 is  currently operating along 28 miles of the southwest border in the Tucson  sector of Arizona (see fig. 2).
Future SBInet capabilities are to be deployed in “blocks.” For example,  Block 1 is described as the first phase of an effort to design, develop,  integrate, test, and deploy a technology system of hardware, software, and  communications. Each block is to include a release or version of the COP.  According to the Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, Block 1 is to  include the Tucson and Yuma sectors and Block 2 is to include the sectors  of El Paso, Rio Grande Valley, Laredo, Del Rio, San Diego, and El Centro.
While the SBI program office is responsible for deploying SBInet  technology, the tactical infrastructure program office, which was realigned  to the Office of Finance, Facilities Management and Engineering in March  2009, is responsible for deploying tactical infrastructure—pedestrian and  vehicular fencing, roads, and lighting—along the southwest border to  deter smugglers and aliens attempting illegal entry.  The Secure Fence Act  of 2006, as amended, required DHS to construct not less than 700 miles of  reinforced fencing along the southwest border where fencing would be  most practical and effective, and to provide for the installation of  additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors to gain  operational control of the southwest border. Although the act did not  impose any statutory deadlines with respect to the deployment of SBInet  technology, it did require DHS to complete a portion of the required 700  miles of reinforced fencing by December 31, 2008.  This interim  construction deadline applied to 370 of the required 700 miles of  reinforced fencing, to be located wherever the Secretary determined it  would be most practical and effective in deterring smugglers and aliens  attempting illegal entry.
The Secure Fence Act of 2006, as amended, provided the Secretary of  Homeland Security with some discretion regarding its mileage  requirements. Notwithstanding the total mileage requirement of 700 miles,  the act stated that the Secretary was not required to install fencing,  physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors in a particular  location “if the Secretary determines that the use or placement of such  resources is not the most appropriate means to achieve and maintain  operational control over the international border at such location.”  According to DHS, under this authority, the Secretary determined that  fencing was the most appropriate means to achieve and maintain  operational control over 670 miles, rather than 700 miles, of the border.  Furthermore, the act also gave the Secretary discretion, through  December 31, 2008, to set an alternative mileage goal for the interim  construction deadline of 370 miles. Pursuant to this authority, the  Secretary committed to complete all 670 miles of fencing by December 31,  2008.  Of these miles, DHS planned about 370 miles of pedestrian  fencing—fencing that prevents people on foot from crossing the border,  and about 300 miles of vehicle fencing—barriers used primarily in remote  areas to prohibit vehicles engaged in drug trafficking and alien smuggling  operations from crossing the border.  In September 2008, DHS revised its  goal of completing the full 670 miles of fencing by December 31, 2008. As  an interim step, DHS committed to have 661 miles either built, under  construction, or under contract by December 31, 2008, but did not set a  goal for the number of miles it planned to complete by December 31, 2008.  As of December 31, 2008, DHS had completed 578 miles of fencing,  meeting the interim statutory goal to complete 370 miles of fencing by that  time. (See fig. 3 for examples of fencing.)

	SBInet Deployment Delays Require Border Patrol to Rely on Existing Technology Which Has Limitations That Newer Technology Is Planned to Overcome

SBInet technology deployments continue to experience delays due to  flaws found in testing and potential environmental impacts.  User  evaluations by Border Patrol agents found that improvements to the new  technology that would correct inconsistent system performance needed to  be made.  SBI officials believed that some issues raised about the  technology during user evaluation were a result of the Border Patrol  agents’ unfamiliarity with the equipment; however, Border Patrol officials  said that they selected agents who were familiar with existing technology  and that some training was provided to these agents before testing took  place.  Until SBInet is deployed, Border Patrol agents continue to rely on  existing technology that has limitations such as performance shortfalls  and maintenance issues.  CBP cannot determine what operational changes  it will need to make as a result of the new technology, and Border Patrol  will not be able to realize the potential of this technology until it is  deployed.

		SBInet Deployment Delays Continue Due to Flaws Found in Testing and Environmental Considerations

Our previous work has shown that CBP’s efforts to deploy SBInet  technology across the southwest border have fallen behind its planned  schedule.  For example, according to the Boeing contract signed in  September 2006, an initial set of operational capabilities was planned to be  deployed along the entire southwest border in early fiscal year 2009, and a  full set of operational capabilities along the southern and northern borders  was planned by later in fiscal year 2009.  As of the December 2006, the  SBInet Expenditure Plan reported that the schedule had changed such that  all deployments in the Yuma and Tucson sectors were estimated to be  complete by October and December 2008, respectively and the entire  southwest border by October 2011.  The Expenditure Plan did not provide  a time frame for deployment to the northern border.  By October 2007, SBI  program officials expected to complete all of the first planned deployment  of southwest border technology projects in the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso  sectors by the end of calendar year 2008, and deployments in Rio Grande  Valley, Laredo, and Del Rio by the end of calendar year 2009.  In February  2008, the SBI program office again modified its deployment plans, and  reported that the first deployment of technology projects within Block 1  were to take place in two geographic areas within the Tucson sector — designated as Tucson-1 and Ajo-1—by the end of calendar year 2008, with  the remainder of deployments to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors to  be completed by the end of calendar year 2011.  Other than the dates for  the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors, no other deployment dates were  established for the remainder of the southern or northern borders at that  time.
We reported in September 2008 on SBInet program uncertainties,  including that the program remained ambiguous and in a continued state  of flux making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities are to  be delivered, when and where they are to be delivered, and how they will  be delivered.  We recommended, among other things, that the CBP  Commissioner establish and baseline the specific program commitments,  including the specific system functional and performance capabilities,  which are to be deployed to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors, and  establish when these capabilities are to be deployed and are to be  operational.  Partially in response to our recommendations, in September  2008, the DHS Acquisition Review Board—a departmental executive board  that reviews certain acquisitions—required a re-plan of the program.  The  re-plan was to include, among other things, a revised and detailed program  schedule with key milestones.  In addition, during the re-plan, a portion  of SBInet technology funds were reallocated to fund cost increases  associated with the higher priority vehicle and pedestrian fencing.  The  Acquisition Review Board noted that this reallocation of funds and the  desire to include additional field testing would result in a delay of the  Tuscon-1 and Ajo-1 deployments.  SBI program office officials said that the  reallocation of funds was made possible because the program was in the  middle of the re-plan which required additional field testing prior to the  start of construction in Tucson-1.  By December 2008, the SBI program  office’s revised schedule showed final acceptance of Tuscon-1 in  September 2009, and final acceptance of Ajo-1 in December 2009.  By  February 2009, the schedule had slipped and final acceptance of Tucson-1  was expected in November 2009 and Ajo-1 in March 2010.  Further, our  assimilation of available information from multiple program sources,  including the Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, indicated that  deployments throughout the rest of the Tucson and Yuma sectors were to  be completed by 2011; deployments in El Paso, Rio Grande Valley, Laredo,  Del Rio, San Diego, and El Centro sectors between 2012 and 2015; and  deployments in the Marfa sector by 2016.  Nevertheless, the timing of  planned SBInet deployments continued to slip.  As of April 2009, Tuscon-1  was scheduled for final acceptance by December 2009 and Ajo-1 had  slipped to June 2010.  Our previous work emphasizes that a key aspect of  managing large programs like SBInet is having a schedule that defines the  sequence and timing of key activities.  In addition, our research has  identified best practices associated with effective schedule estimating.    We have an ongoing review to report separately on SBInet and whether  DHS has established a comprehensive, accurate, and realistic schedule  that reflects the scope, timing, and sequencing of the work needed to  achieve commitments, and which provides key information to DHS and  congressional decisionmakers.  Figure 4 shows the changes in the planned  deployment schedule over time.
According to SBI program office officials, the results of testing activities  are contributing to the recent delays of Tucson-1 and Ajo-1.  For example,  one of the changes that resulted from the re-plan was a requirement for  additional testing of SBInet technology, which SBI addressed through  additional testing performed at a test facility intended to emulate  deployment conditions at project sites.  SBI program office officials  emphasized, and we agree, that testing is a necessary step of deployment  and ensures that the technology capabilities perform as required.  By  February 2009, preliminary results of testing revealed problems that would  limit the usefulness of the system for Border Patrol agents, including the  instability of the camera under adverse weather conditions, mechanical  problems with the radar at the tower, and issues with the sensitivity of the  radar.  In March 2009, CBP’s Acting Commissioner testified on the testing  activity, among other things, stating that although the system did not meet  all testing objectives during the December testing, CBP did not perceive  “any show-stopper issues.”  Based on the testing results, the DHS  Acquisition Review Board deferred approval of Tucson-1 equipment  installation and Ajo-1 site preparation and equipment installation until the  successful resolution of testing objectives which contributed to an Ajo-1  schedule delay of 30 days from April to May 2009.  The SBI program office  oversaw Boeing’s efforts to re-work and re-test these issues, but as of May  2009, the SBI program office reported that they were still working to  address some issues such as difficulties aligning the radar.

		Border Patrol Agents Are Providing User Feedback on Block 1 Development, and Have Noted That Some Improvements Could Be Made

While involvement was limited for Project 28, SBI program office officials  recognized the need to involve intended operators—Border Patrol  agents—in Block 1 development, including testing activities.  For example,  CBP reported using feedback and input from Border Patrol agents to  complete detailed plans for tower locations and access roads to support  SBInet deployment to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors.  In addition,  from March 27 to April 4, 2009, Border Patrol agents had an opportunity to  operate Block 1 technology in a test environment and participate in an  early assessment of the suitability and effectiveness of the SBInet  technology.  The operators’ initial observations included insight comparing  the performance capabilities of existing technology—Project 28 and  MSS—and new technology—SBInet Block 1 (see fig. 5).  For example,  the operators indicated that on windy days the Block 1 radar had issues  that resulted in an excessive number of false detections and that the  capability was not adequate for optimal operational effectiveness.  The  operators also compared the Project 28, MSS, and Block 1 cameras and  indicated that the features of the Block 1 camera were insufficient in  comparison to features of the Project 28 and MSS cameras.  Overall, the  feedback from operators indicated “the need for a number of relatively  small, but critical enhancements” to the COP and overall concerns about  inconsistent system performance.
SBI program officials explained that this assessment was an initial user  evaluation.  The officials also said that in reviewing the results, they  determined that some of the issues raised by the Border Patrol operators  occurred because the operators were not familiar with and had not been  trained to use the equipment; other issues, such as those with the radar  were likely due to incorrect settings across all radars in the test  configuration.  The Border Patrol said that it selected agents to participate  who had experience with the MSSs and/or Project 28 and that the COP  operators were given a 2-day course provided by agents familiar with the  Block 1 COP prior to the assessment.  However, the Border Patrol agreed  that the lack of experience with the Block 1 system may have led to some  of the issues found during the user evaluation.  Nonetheless, because of  the agents’ experience with the MSS and Project 28 systems, the Border  Patrol said that the issues and concerns generated should be considered  operationally relevant.  SBI program officials said that operator training is  to take place before all Block 1 capabilities are deployed and that  additional emphasis is to be placed on ensuring the operators’ familiarity  with the equipment.  Once all Block 1 capabilities are deployed in Tucson- 1, the Border Patrol is to perform and complete operational testing.  This  testing is to include insights from the operators’ initial evaluations of the  system’s capabilities.  Provided there are no additional schedule changes,  this testing of Tucson-1 is scheduled to begin in January 2010.

		Until SBInet Technology Is in Place, Border Patrol Agents Continue to Use Existing Equipment and CBP Is Limited in Its Ability to Fully Implement the Objectives of the Border Patrol Strategy

Until SBInet capabilities are deployed across the southwest border,  Border Patrol agents are using existing capabilities, including Project 28  and legacy equipment supplemented by more recently procured MSS, but  all have limitations.  As stated previously, Project 28 encountered  performance shortfalls and delays. During our site visit to the Tucson  sector in March 2009, Border Patrol agents told us, as they had during our  previous visits, that the system had improved their operational  capabilities, but that they must continue to work around ongoing  problems, such as finding good signal strength for the wireless network,  remotely controlling cameras, and modifying radar sensitivity.  Furthermore, they said, and we observed, that few of the agents were  currently using the mobile data terminals installed in 50 of the sector’s  vehicles, instead relying on agents operating the COP to relay information  about the whereabouts of suspected illegal migrants.  One reason agents  do not use the mobile data terminals is that it can take up to an hour to log  into the system depending on signal strength and because the signal, once  gained, is sometimes lost multiple times during a shift.  In all southwest  border sectors, Border Patrol relies on legacy equipment, such as cameras  mounted on towers.  In the Tucson and San Diego sectors, Border Patrol  agents rely on cameras that have been in place since before calendar year  2000.  Border Patrol officials told us that in the three sectors, the cameras  have intermittent problems, including signal loss and problems with power  and weather.  In the Tucson sector, officials noted that the legacy cameras  should be updated to gain compatibility with SBInet.  To fill gaps or  augment the legacy equipment, the SBI program office procured and  delivered a total of 40 MSSs.  These units were delivered to the Border  Patrol’s Tucson sector (23 units), Yuma sector (7 units), and, El Paso  sector (8 units) in fiscal year 2008.  In addition, a total of 4 units are  planned for delivery to the San Diego sector (1 unit) and the northern  border (3 units) in fiscal year 2009.  During our visit to the Tucson sector  in March 2009, we observed a Border Patrol agent using a MSS unit.  The  agent showed us the radar capabilities including the maximum range, the  ability to minimize the range and limit the speed of the radar and cameras,  which have a 360 degree view.  According to Border Patrol officials, the  MSS represents increased operational capabilities for the Border Patrol.   However, SBI program officials and Border Patrol noted that at any given  time, a unit may not be operational because of the need for repairs.  As of  April 2009, 15 of the 23 units at the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector were  operational.  At that time, in the Yuma sector, 4 of the 7 units were  operational, although during our visit to the Yuma sector 1 unit was  operational.  Border Patrol officials explained that in the Yuma sector  these units have not worked well because of extreme heat issues.  Despite  these performance shortfalls, and maintenance issues, agents continue to  use existing technology while waiting for the SBInet deployment which  will supplement the existing technology.
The initial deployment of SBInet technology in the Tucson-1 and Ajo-1  project sites is intended to provide CBP agents and officers a greatly  enhanced ability to detect, identify, and classify illegal cross-border  activity, as well as facilitate a coordinated response to the activity.  These  goals directly support the broader SBI goal and Border Patrol strategy to  gain effective control of the nation’s borders.  While Border Patrol agents  have been stakeholders in the development and testing of SBInet  technology, Border Patrol officials said that a full assessment of SBInet  technology’s impact cannot be made until the technology is in use.  Therefore, until technology is in place, CBP is limited in its ability to fully  identify and implement operational changes in methods, tactics and  approaches, and resources needed to address objectives of the Border  Patrol Strategy, and will not be able to realize the potential of this  technology in its efforts to secure the border.

	Tactical Infrastructure Deployments Are Almost Complete, but Their Impact on Border Security Has Not Been Measured

The deployment of 661 miles of tactical infrastructure projects along the  southwest border is nearing completion, but delays persist, due mainly to  property acquisition issues.  In addition, per mile costs, which had climbed  substantially, are now less likely to change because contracts for the 661  miles of fence have been awarded. CBP plans to complete 10 more miles  of fencing using fiscal year 2009 funds, and fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funds  are to be used primarily for supporting infrastructure.  A life cycle cost  study has been completed which estimates deployment, operations, and  future maintenance for the tactical infrastructure will total $6.5 billion.  Despite the investment in tactical infrastructure, its impact on securing the  border has not been measured because DHS has not assessed the impact  of the tactical infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of effective  control.

		CBP Is Close to Completing Initially Planned Tactical Infrastructure, but Delays Persist

CBP is close to accomplishing its goal to build 661 miles of fencing along  the southwest border.  As of June 2009, 633 miles had been completed (see  table 2).  CBP was scheduled to complete the remaining 28 miles by  November 2009.  However, fence deployment continues to face delays due  to challenges in constructing tactical infrastructure on difficult terrain and  acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners.  For example, in  the San Diego sector, one 3.6 mile tactical infrastructure project previously  scheduled to be completed by December 2008 and now due to be  completed by October 2009, involves construction on rugged mountainous  terrain that is not easily accessible.  According to tactical infrastructure  officials, they realized before December 2008 that it would not be possible  to complete this segment until October 2009 because of these factors.  In  addition, as of June 29, 2009, fence projects totaling about 20 miles in the  Rio Grande Valley sector with originally planned completion dates of  December 2008 are now scheduled for completion by October 2009, with  the exception of one segment, because of litigation related to property  acquisition that was not resolved in time to meet the original dates.  The  segment that will not be complete by October 2009 was delayed due to  difficulties obtaining materials for the bridge construction associated with  the segment.  As a result, this segment is anticipated to be completed in  November 2009.  As of June 29, 2009, of an estimated 96 cases where the  government sued to acquire property through condemnation proceedings  because the landowner would not voluntarily sell to the government, the  property associated with 39 of those cases had yet to be acquired.  However, of the 39 cases, 7 are required to be settled to complete fence  construction.  The remaining 32 properties are being sought in anticipation  of future fencing needs and for other purposes, such as operations and  maintenance of the fence.  Nonetheless, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  (USACE) officials said that completion of fencing construction projects  usually takes 90 to 120 days.  Because the properties have yet to be  acquired, the October 2009 projected completion date is likely to slip.
While fencing costs increased over the course of construction, because all  construction contracts have been awarded, cost estimates are less likely to  change.  Fencing miles completed as of October 31, 2008, cost an average  of $3.9 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $1.0 million per mile for  vehicle fencing.  However, once contracts were awarded, the average per  mile costs had increased to $6.5 million per mile for pedestrian fencing  and $1.8 million per mile for vehicle fencing.  Tactical infrastructure  program officials said the per mile costs increased over time due to  various factors, such as property acquisition costs incurred for these miles  that were not a factor for many of the previous miles and costs for labor  and materials increased.  Also, as we reported in September 2008, as  tactical infrastructure officials were in the process of finalizing  construction contracts, cost estimates for pedestrian fencing in Texas  began to increase.  Tactical infrastructure program office officials  attributed the cost increases to a short supply of labor and materials, as  well as the compressed timeline.  For example, the officials said that as a  result of a construction boom in Texas, labor was in short supply and  contractors reported that they needed to provide premium pay and  overtime to attract workers.  In terms of materials, USACE officials stated  that the price of cement and steel had increased and in some areas within  Texas obtaining cement near the fence construction site was difficult.  Tactical infrastructure program office officials said that they worked to  mitigate the cost increases where possible.  For example, they said that  although their decision to purchase steel in bulk was made to ensure its  availability, the purchase also resulted in savings.  Tactical infrastructure  program office officials said that based on data showing that the price of  steel products almost doubled from January 2008 through August 2008,  they estimate that they saved over $72 million with the bulk steel  purchase.  However, due to the construction delays, the tactical  infrastructure program office has had to extend the contract for storage of  the steel, and is to soon begin negotiations for a long-term storage  contract.  The need to continue to store the leftover steel will result in  increased costs.  Despite these additional costs, tactical infrastructure  program office officials said that, according to their estimates, they will  still realize cost savings on their bulk steel purchase. In addition, the  officials estimated that there will be approximately 25,000 tons of steel  remaining after all fencing segments are built.  They said it will be used if  additional fencing is built and will be used to maintain the fencing already  deployed.

		Few Miles of Fencing Are to Be Built with Fiscal Year 2009 Funds and Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011 Funds Are to Be Used Primarily for Supporting Infrastructure

Ten miles of additional fencing is scheduled to be built with fiscal year  2009 funds, and fiscal years 2010 and 2011 funds are planned to be used  primarily for supporting infrastructure.  For fiscal years 2009 and 2010,  $110 million has been allocated to tactical infrastructure.  With the fiscal  year 2009 funding, the tactical infrastructure program office plans to  construct approximately 3 miles of vehicle fence in the Tucson sector and  about 7 miles of pedestrian fence in the Marfa, Rio Grande Valley, and El  Paso sectors.  The program office also plans to use the funding for  enhancements to existing fencing, such as gates and canal crossovers, and  real estate planning and acquisition for fiscal year 2010 projects.  Due to  the long lead time associated with real estate acquisition, DHS also plans  to use fiscal year 2009 funds to conduct real estate planning and  acquisition activities for projects slated for completion in fiscal years 2010  and 2011.  By conducting real estate activities 1 to 2 years in advance, CBP  seeks to limit construction delays due to lack of real estate.  Also, as of  June 2009, the program office had obligated about $21 million of its fiscal  year 2009 funds for additional costs caused by construction delays and  changes on projects under way.  With fiscal year 2010 funds, plans as of  June 2009 include replacing surf fencing and constructing all-weather  roads and lighting in the San Diego sector; constructing bridges, a third  layer of fencing and lighting in the El Centro sector; and clearing brush in  the Yuma sector.  For fiscal year 2011, plans as of June 2009 were to,  among other things, construct all-weather roads in the El Paso and Del Rio  sectors; and construct roads, bridges, and low-water crossings and to clear  brush in the Laredo sector.

		A Tactical Infrastructure Life-Cycle Cost Study Has Been Completed

The summary of a life-cycle cost study prepared by a contractor for CBP  shows that total life-cycle costs for all tactical infrastructure constructed  to date, including pre-SBI infrastructure as well as that planned for fiscal  years 2009, 2010, and 2011, are estimated at about $6.5 billion.  The life- cycle cost estimates include deployment and operations and future  maintenance costs for all tactical infrastructure, including the fence,  roads, and lighting, among other things.  Previously, CBP had reported that  the fence is to have a lifespan of approximately 20 years, and plans to  obligate $75 million to operations and maintenance of the fence for fiscal  year 2009, and again requested $75 million for fiscal year 2010.  A  significant use of the operations and maintenance funding is to repair  breaches in the fence.  According to tactical infrastructure program office  data, as of May 14, 2009, there had been 3,363 breaches in the fence, with  each breach costing an average of $1,300 to repair.  Because of its  construction, the older pre-SBI fencing is easier to breach and most  breaches occurred in these types of fencing.  Of the newer fencing, the  fewest breaches occurred in the bollard-style fencing, while more  occurred in the wire mesh fence.  Examples of breaches are shown in  figure 6.

		The Number of Southwest Border Miles That CBP Reports as Being under Effective Control Has Increased, but the Impact of Tactical Infrastructure Has Not Been Measured

CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained  Border Patrol agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border  under effective control, but despite a $2.4 billion investment, it cannot  account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure.  DHS defines  effective control of the U.S. borders as the ability to consistently (1) detect  illegal entries into the United States between the port of entry, (2) identify  and classify these entries to determine the level of threat involved, (3)  effectively respond to these entries, and (4) bring events to a satisfactory  law enforcement resolution.  Border Patrol personnel, technology, and  tactical infrastructure are the contributing elements to effective control.  CBP measures miles under effective control through Border Patrol’s  quarterly assessments using information on apprehensions; vehicle drive- through traffic; and, intelligence, operational reports, and the experience  and expertise of senior Border Patrol agents, among other things.  CBP  recognizes that its measure of effective control is limited in that its source  relies partially on subjective information and it does not reflect all CBP  efforts along the border.  CBP officials report that they are working to  create a CBP-wide border control measure to inform resource decision  making, but are having difficulty determining appropriate data sources and  the appropriate measure and, therefore, have not set a date for completion  of this measure.
According to CBP’s Fiscal Year 2008 Performance and Accountability  Report, 757 of the 8,607 miles the Border Patrol is responsible for were  under effective control, increasing the miles under effective control by 158  over those miles controlled in fiscal year 2007.  According to the Fiscal  Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, an  additional 36 miles in the Tucson sector were under effective control  partially as a result of added tactical infrastructure.  In the Yuma sector  where some of the early SBI fencing was constructed, apprehensions were  down 78 percent in fiscal year 2008 compared with fiscal year 2007. CBP  reported that apprehensions declined partially because of the fencing and  also because of non-fencing reasons, such as the increase in Border Patrol  agents during fiscal year 2008.  In addition, CBP reported that as a direct  result of increased tactical infrastructure, vehicle drive-through traffic  declined from 213 incursions in fiscal year 2007 to 2 in fiscal year 2008.  Overall, the Yuma sector’s vehicle drive-through traffic declined by 50  percent and the number of miles under effective control for the sector  climbed from 70 in fiscal year 2007 to 118 of the sector’s 125 miles in fiscal  year 2008. In the San Diego sector, 3 miles of effective control were gained  between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and apprehensions were up 7 percent.   Table 3 shows the changes in effective control for these three sectors from  fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2008.
However, Border Patrol data show that apprehensions for all southwest  border sectors except San Diego also declined between fiscal years 2006  and 2007, before the majority of the tactical infrastructure was deployed.   Therefore, the impact of tactical infrastructure on apprehensions is  unclear as there are other factors that could contribute to the decline.  For  example, in its Fiscal Year 2008 4th Quarter Congressional Status Report  on Border Security and Resources, CBP stated that the end of “catch and  release,” increases in Border Patrol agents, more tactical infrastructure on  the border, expanded use of expedited removal, and support from the  National Guard during Operation Jump Start have had a significant  deterrent effect, contributing to the marked decline in apprehensions.  Other factors, such as the decreasing number of migrants attempting to  cross the border due to the economy may also have impacted  apprehensions.
CBP has not systematically evaluated the impact of tactical infrastructure  on gains or losses in the level of effective border control, controlling for  the influences of other potential factors on border control efforts.  The  current performance measure for tactical infrastructure is miles  constructed.  While this measure provides useful information it does not  demonstrate the program’s discrete contribution to effective control.  In  addition, CBP has, as part of its Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan,  completed an analysis of each tactical infrastructure segment to be built  compared to other, alternative means of achieving effective control such  as investments in technology and enforcement personnel.  This analysis  was intended to show where physical fencing was most appropriate given  cost, level of effective control, possible unintended effects on  communities, and other critical factors.  However, these analyses were  largely subjective because they were based primarily on the experience  and expertise of senior border patrol agents.
Federal agencies are increasingly expected to focus on achieving results  and to demonstrate, in annual performance reports and budget requests,  how their activities help achieve agency or governmentwide goals.  The  Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) requires federal  agencies to report annually on their achievement of performance goals,  explain why any goals were not met, and summarize the findings of any  program evaluations conducted during the year.  For programs that have  readily observable results or outcomes, performance measurement may  provide sufficient information to demonstrate program results. In some  programs, however, outcomes are not quickly achieved or readily  observed, or their relationship to the program is uncertain.  In such cases,  program evaluations may be needed, in addition to performance  measurement, to examine the extent to which a program is achieving its  objectives.  Our previous work identified program evaluations as a way for  agencies to explore the benefits of a program as well as ways to improve  program performance.
An evaluation of the tactical infrastructure already deployed along the  southwest border would help demonstrate its contribution to effective  control of the border and help CBP to determine whether more tactical  infrastructure would be appropriate, given other alternatives and  constraints.  For instance, a statistical analysis could be conducted to  show the effect of tactical infrastructure within each sector and  throughout the southwest border, controlling for other potential factors.  This analysis could include, among other data, apprehension data and data  on illegal migrants’ and smugglers’ methods, routes, and modes of  transportation before and after tactical infrastructure deployment.  CBP  could use the information collected during program evaluations to  complement its performance measurement data and thereby more fully  assess these often difficult-to-measure activities and to inform its efforts to  improve its performance measures.  Our work has shown that analyses  such as these further complement performance management initiatives  and are useful to inform resource decision making and in helping to  effectively implement performance measures.
CBP officials said that they would like to conduct a study, but lack the  resources.  In our previous work, we found that through a number of  strategies, agencies developed and maintained a capacity to produce and  use evaluations.  First, to leverage their evaluation resources and  expertise, agencies engaged in collaborations or actively educated and  solicited the support and involvement of their program partners and  stakeholders.  Second, agency managers sustained a commitment to  accountability and to improving program performance.  Third, they  improved administrative systems or turned to special data collections to  obtain better quality data.  Finally, they sought out—through external  sources or development of staff—whatever expertise was needed to  ensure the credibility of analyses and conclusions.  Furthermore, in our  efforts to assist agencies’ program evaluation efforts, we identified  agencies that initiated evaluation studies resulting in recommendations to  address program performance and a strategy for the future.  The  evaluations conducted by these agencies helped them improve their  measurement of program performance or understanding of performance  and how it might be improved, or both.  Accordingly, information gained  through an evaluation may help CBP more effectively allocate its limited  resources, inform its future decisions about investing in tactical  infrastructure, and ensure that existing tools are adequately supported and  maintained.  Such an evaluation would also help CBP determine whether  the tactical infrastructure it has deployed meets the mandate in the Secure  Fence Act of 2006, as amended, to use physical infrastructure  enhancements to help prevent unlawful U.S. entries; facilitate access by  CBP personnel to enable a rapid and effective response to illegal activities;  and help DHS and CBP achieve and maintain operational control of U.S.  borders.  Until CBP determines the contribution of tactical infrastructure  to border security beyond a measure of miles covered by tactical  infrastructure, it is not positioned to address the impact this costly  resource has had in each sector or might have if deployed in other  locations across the southwest border.

	Conclusions

While the SBInet program continues to test and evaluate potential  technology applications, a major part of DHS’s effort to secure the nation’s  borders from the illegal entry of aliens and contraband has been the  deployment of tactical infrastructure.  Along with technology and  additional Border Patrol personnel, CBP relies on tactical infrastructure to  help gain and maintain effective control of the border.  Controlling,  managing, and securing the border were the principal purposes of the  mandate to construct fencing along the southwest border.  Deploying this  infrastructure has been expensive and costs have risen during its  construction.  However, despite a $2.4 billion investment in this  infrastructure, its contribution to effective control of the border has not  been measured because CBP has not evaluated the impact of tactical  infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of effective control.  Given the  large investment made in tactical infrastructure and to help CBP more  effectively allocate its limited resources, inform future decisions about  whether to build more fencing, and ensure that existing tools are  adequately supported and maintained, it is important that CBP assess the  impact of tactical infrastructure on effective control as it examines the  costs and benefits of different methods of deterrence.

	Recommendation for Executive Action

To improve the quality of information available to allocate resources and  determine tactical infrastructure’s contribution to effective control of the  border, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP conduct a cost- effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure on effective  control of the border.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security  for its review and comment.  In an August 31, 2009, letter, the Department  of Homeland Security provided written comments, which are summarized  below and included in appendix III.  The department stated that it agrees  with our recommendation and generally concurred with our report, but  said that the report does not acknowledge some of the significant factors  that have contributed to program volatility and delays.
With respect to our recommendation, DHS concurred and described  actions recently completed, underway, and planned that it said will  address our recommendation to conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the  impact of tactical infrastructure on effective control of the border.  DHS  commented that its Office of Border Patrol was already committed to  examining evaluation options, as evidenced by the Office of Border  Patrol’s completion of analyses of alternatives to guide field personnel  through the process of considering and determining what and how much  infrastructure would be most effective.  We discuss the analyses of  alternatives in our report, as well as the fact that they are largely  subjective because they were based primarily on the experience and  expertise of senior Border Patrol agents.  DHS also commented that it is  considering using independent researchers to conduct evaluations and  using modeling and simulation technology to gauge the effects of resource  deployments.  We believe that such efforts would be consistent with our  recommendation, further complement performance management  initiatives, and be useful to inform resource decision making.
In its technical comments, DHS elaborated on some of the significant  factors that have contributed to program volatility and delays.  DHS stated  that although SBI has experienced performance issues that have delayed  Block 1 deployment, there have been other significant factors that have  had an impact on the program schedule, such as their decision to  reallocate funds to higher priority fencing projects, and external  pressures—such as the need to obtain environmental clearances for tower  placement.  Our report included the environmental issues as a contributing  factor to the delays.  We have added information to our report to reflect  the decision to reallocate funds.  These reallocations and environmental  issues notwithstanding, SBI program office officials told us that the  program was not ready to use the funding that was reallocated in fiscal  year 2008 due to the additional testing that needed to take place before  deployment.  We were unable to reprint DHS’s technical comments in this  report because they contain sensitive information; however, we have  incorporated them into the report, as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the date of this  report.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Senate and  House committees and subcommittees that have authorization and  oversight responsibilities for homeland security.  We will also send copies  of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of  U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Office of Management and  Budget.  In addition, this report will be available at no cost on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should your offices have any questions on matters discussed in this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at stanar@gao.gov.  Contact points  for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report.  Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.

Appendix I: The Status of SBI Program Office Staffing and the Progress the Office Reports in Achieving Its Human Capital Goals

The SBI program office has been reorganized, developed new staffing  goals, and completed a new human capital plan for fiscal years 2009  through 2010; however, meeting the plan’s revised human capital goals  may be difficult. Under the new organizational structure, the tactical  infrastructure program office has moved to the CBP Office of Finance’s  Facilities Management and Engineering division and the SBI program  office has been restructured.  The restructuring of the SBI program office  involved placing a greater emphasis on contractor oversight and creation  of offices of operational integration, business management operations, and  systems engineering, in addition to the SBInet program office.  The SBI  program’s Executive Director’s goal is to have a total of 236 employees— 181 full-time government employees and 55 contractors—in place by  March 2010.  He said that the goal to have 236 employees represents the  number needed to move forward with the program based on his previous  experience and the need to have government employees representing key  procurement competencies, meaning an increase in the ratio of  government employees to contractors.  For example, as of May 31, 2009,  SBI program office staffing consisted of a total of 167 employees—72  government and 95 contractors, or a ratio of 1.3 contractors to each  government employee. The new staffing goal calls for a ratio of 3.3  government employees to each contractor. The SBI Executive Director  said that having more government employees is important because he  wants more in-house expertise to oversee the contractors.  According to  the SBI Executive Director, increasing the ratio of government employees  to contractors in the SBI program office may be difficult because of a  shortage of some personnel, such as systems engineers.  He said he  anticipates hiring 8 government employees a month, but acknowledges  that it may take between 4 and 6 months to bring new hires on board. In  the meantime, he said the SBI office will continue to supplement its  workforce with contract support staff.
In December 2008, the second version of its Strategic Human Capital  Management Plan was provisionally certified and as of June 2009, the SBI  program office continued to implement the plan.  The new version of the  human capital plan spans 2 fiscal years, reflecting a longer-term staffing  vision for SBI.  The SBI program office’s plan outlines seven main goals for  the office and includes planned activities to accomplish those goals, which  align to federal government best practices.  As of May 2009, the SBI  program office had taken several steps to implement the plan.  For  example, the SBI program office had completed a training plan which was  undergoing review and had tentatively selected 43 candidates to fill 70  vacancies.  In addition, the program office had finalized an awards and  recognition policy and had implemented the policy.  However, the SBI  program office had deferred completion of its succession management  plan until the final quarter of fiscal year 2009.
To implement and review the human capital plan, the SBI program office  is partnering with the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer’s office as well as  CBP’s Office of Human Resources.  In a December 8, 2008, letter that  accompanied CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, the Chief  Human Capital Officer noted that the SBI human capital plan provided  specific initiatives to address hiring, development, and retention of  employees, and described metrics to measure progress and results of  these initiatives.  However, the Chief Human Capital Officer also noted  that human capital management challenges remain.  For example,  according to the letter, competition for qualified employees could present  staffing challenges for SBI in achieving its goals to hire additional program  managers, auditors, engineers, and environmental specialists and to shift  the current ratio of contractors to federal employees and hire more federal  employees and fewer contractors.  Furthermore, still to be determined  succession management plans and finalization of the training plan reflect  unfinished human capital planning efforts.  This gap in planning could  present challenges in training employees and preparing for a longer-term  SBI vision.  The letter noted that the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer  planned to reevaluate SBI’s human capital plan in May 2009 to ensure that  SBI was on track to achieve its staffing goals.  According to the SBI  Executive Director, this review is ongoing through a series of meetings  and data exchanges.  Table 4 summarizes the seven human capital goals,  and the SBI program office’s planned activities and steps taken to  accomplish these activities, as of May 2009.

Appendix II: Task Orders Awarded to Boeing for SBI Projects as of July 8, 2009

	Northern Border Project Task Order: Provides for the design, installation, and deployment of surveillance technology capabilities in the Detroit and Buffalo Border Patrol sectors.

This is the maximum value of the task order.  For example, the Integrated Logistics Support task  order has a “ceiling” of $35.3 million; however, at this time, obligations under the task order are only  $26.7 million because the project is being incrementally funded to complete work in periods.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Susan Quinlan, Assistant  Director, and Jeanette Espinola, Assistant Director, managed this  assignment.  Sylvia Bascopé, Claudia Becker, Frances Cook, Christine  Davis, Katherine Davis, Jeremy Rothgerber, Erin Smith, and Meghan  Squires made significant contributions to the work.

Related GAO Products

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal  Year 2009 Expenditure Plan.  GAO-09-274R. Washington, D.C.: April 30,  2009.
Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs. GAO-09-244R.  Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in  Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1086. Washington, D.C.:  September 22, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges.  GAO-08-1141T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in  Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1148T. Washington, D.C.:  September 10, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan Shows  Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and DHS  Accountability. GAO-08-739R. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Oversight  Needed to Improve Complex Service Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-08-765T.  Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment  Needed to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions  GAO-08-263. Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying  Lessons Learned to Future Projects. GAO-08-508T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet  Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T. Washington, D.C.: October 24,  2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management  Improvements Needed to Control Risks. GAO-07-504T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better  Support Oversight and Accountability. GAO-07-309. Washington, D.C.:  February 15, 2007.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS, U.S. Custom and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure--fencing, roads, and lighting. GAO was asked to provide periodic updates on the status of the program. This report addresses (1) the extent to which CBP has implemented SBInet and the impact of delays that have occurred, and (2) the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed its results. To do this work, GAO reviewed program schedules, status reports, and previous GAO work; interviewed DHS and CBP officials, among others; and visited three SBI sites where initial technology or fencing had been deployed at the time of GAO's review.

What GAO Found

SBInet technology capabilities have not yet been deployed and delays require Border Patrol, a CBP component, to rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than using newer technology planned to overcome the existing technology's limitations. Flaws found in testing and concerns about the impact of placing towers and access roads in environmentally sensitive locations caused delays. As of September 2006, SBInet technology deployment for the southwest border was planned to be complete by early fiscal year 2009. When last reported in February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016. As a result of such delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology that has limitations, such as performance shortfalls and maintenance issues. For example, on the southwest border, Border Patrol relies on existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers that have intermittent problems, including signal loss. Border Patrol has procured and delivered some new technology to fill gaps or augment existing equipment. However, incorporating SBInet technology as soon as it is operationally available should better position CBP to identify and implement operational changes needed for securing the border. Tactical infrastructure deployments are almost complete, but their impact on border security has not been measured. As of June 2009, CBP had completed 633 of the 661 miles of fencing it committed to deploy along the southwest border. However, delays continue due mainly to challenges in acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners. While fencing costs increased over the course of construction, because all construction contracts have been awarded, costs are less likely to change. CBP plans to use $110 million in fiscal year 2009 funds to build 10 more miles of fencing, and fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funds for supporting infrastructure. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.4 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. CBP measures miles of tactical infrastructure constructed and has completed analyses intended to show where fencing is more appropriate than other alternatives, such as more personnel, but these analyses were based primarily on the judgment of senior Border Patrol agents. Leading practices suggest that a program evaluation would complement those efforts. Until CBP determines the contribution of tactical infrastructure to border security, it is not positioned to address the impact of this investment.