Background

Securing transportation systems and facilities is complicated, requiring  balancing security to address potential threats while facilitating the flow of  people and goods. These systems and facilities are critical components of  the U.S. economy and are necessary for supplying goods throughout the  country and supporting international commerce. U.S. transportation  systems and facilities move over 30 million tons of freight and provide  approximately 1.1 billion passenger trips each day. The Ports of Los  Angeles and Long Beach estimate that they alone handle about 43 percent  of the nation’s oceangoing cargo. The importance of these systems and  facilities also make them attractive targets to terrorists. These systems and  facilities are vulnerable and difficult to secure given their size, easy  accessibility, large number of potential targets, and close proximity to  urban areas. A terrorist attack at these systems and facilities could cause a  tremendous loss of life and disruption to our society. An attack would also  be costly. According to recent testimony by a Port of Los Angeles official,  a 2002 labor dispute led to a 10-day shutdown of West Coast port  operations, costing the nation’s economy an estimated $1.5 billion per  day. A terrorist attack to a port facility could have a similar or greater  impact.
One potential security threat stems from those individuals who work in  secure areas of the nation’s transportation system, including seaports,  airports, railroad terminals, mass transit stations, and other transportation  facilities. It is estimated that about 6 million workers, including  longshoreman, mechanics, aviation and railroad employees, truck drivers,  and others access secure areas of the nation’s estimated 4,000  transportation facilities each day while performing their jobs. Some of  these workers, such as truck drivers, regularly access secure areas at  multiple transportation facilities. Ensuring that only workers that do not  pose a terrorist threat are allowed unescorted access to secure areas is  important in helping to prevent an attack. According to TSA and  transportation industry stakeholders, many individuals that work in secure  areas are currently not required to undergo a background check or a  stringent identification process in order to access secure areas. For  example, according to stakeholders at several ports, truck drivers need  only present a driver’s license, which can be easily falsified and obtained,  to access secure areas of the nation’s ports. In addition, without a standard  credential that is recognized across modes of transportation and facilities,  many workers must obtain multiple credentials to access each  transportation facility they enter. For example, in Florida, truck drivers  who deliver goods to multiple ports in the state must obtain credentials for  as many as 13 individual ports. With so many different credentials in use, it  may be difficult to verify the authenticity of all of them.

		TWIC Program History

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Aviation  and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) was enacted in November 2001.  Among other things, ATSA required TSA to work with airport operators to  strengthen access control points in secure areas and consider using  biometric access control systems to verify the identity of individuals who  seek to enter a secure airport area. In response to ATSA, TSA established  the TWIC program in December 2001 to mitigate the threat of terrorists  and other unauthorized persons from accessing secure areas of the entire  transportation network, by creating a common identification credential  that could be used by workers in all modes of transportation. In November  2002, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) was  enacted and required the Secretary of Homeland Security to issue a  maritime worker identification card that uses biometrics, such as  fingerprints, to control access to secure areas of seaports and vessels,  among other things.
The responsibility for securing the nation’s transportation system and  facilities is shared by federal, state, and local governments, as well as the  private sector. At the federal government level, TSA, the agency  responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, has taken the  lead in developing the TWIC program, while the Coast Guard is  responsible for developing maritime security regulations and ensuring that  maritime facilities and vessels are in compliance with these regulations. As  a result, TSA and the Coast Guard are working together to implement  TWIC in the maritime sector. According to TSA officials, TWIC is being  implemented in the maritime sector first to meet MTSA requirements and  because the aviation sector already has established systems to control  access to secure areas. According to TSA, the agency is considering  extending the program to other modes of transportation. Most seaports,  airports, mass transit stations, and other transportation systems and  facilities in the United States are owned and operated by state and local  government authorities and private companies. As such, certain  components of the TWIC program, such as installing access control  systems, such as card readers, will be the responsibility of these state and  local governments and private industry stakeholders. For example, at most  seaports, the private companies that operate the terminal are responsible  for controlling access to secure areas, while at other ports, local  governments handle this responsibility. As a result, the responsibility for  implementing certain components of the TWIC program at each facility  will be shared between local governments and the private sector.
TSA—through a private contractor—tested the TWIC program from  August 2004 to June 2005 at 28 transportation facilities around the nation,  including 22 port facilities, 2 airports, 1 rail facility, 1 maritime exchange,   1 truck stop, and a U.S. postal service facility. In August 2005, TSA and the  testing contractor completed a report summarizing the results of the TWIC  testing. TSA also hired an independent contractor to assess the  performance of the TWIC testing contractor. Specifically, the independent  contractor conducted its assessment from March 2005 to January 2006,  and evaluated whether the testing contractor met the requirements of the  testing contract. The independent contractor issued its final report on  January 25, 2006.
Since its creation, the TWIC program has received about $90 million in  funding for program development and testing. Table 1 provides a summary  of TWIC program funding since fiscal year 2003.
In December 2004, we reported on the challenges TSA faced in  implementing the TWIC program, such as developing regulations and a  comprehensive plan for managing the program. We also reported on  several factors that caused TSA to miss its initial August 2004 target date  for issuing TWIC cards, including (1) difficulty obtaining approval from  DHS to test the TWIC program; (2) delays in developing cost-benefit and  alternative analyses for the program; and (3) difficulty determining which  TWIC card technologies were best suited for the port environment. We  recommended that TSA employ industry best practices for project  planning and management by developing a comprehensive project plan for  managing the program and specific detailed plans for risk mitigation and  cost-benefit and alternatives analyses. DHS generally agreed with these  recommendations and subsequently developed plans to help them manage  the TWIC program, ensure quality, and assess and mitigate the risks to the  program. According to TSA, the agency also developed a cost model to  assist in developing program budget estimates.

		Key Components of TWIC Program

According to TSA, the TWIC program, under the proposed rule issued in  May 2006, is to consist of key components designed to enhance security  (see fig. 1). These include:    Enrollment: Transportation workers are to be enrolled in the TWIC  program at enrollment centers by providing personal information, such  as a social security number and address, digital photographs, and  fingerprints. Workers who are unable to provide quality fingerprints are  to provide an alternate authentication mechanism, such as a digital  photograph.
Background checks: TSA is to conduct background checks on each  worker to ensure that individuals do not pose a threat. These are to  include several components. First, TSA is to conduct a security threat  assessment to make sure that the worker is not listed in any terrorism  databases or on a terrorism watch list, such as TSA’s No-fly and  selectee list. Second, a Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal history  records check is to be conducted to identify if the worker has any  disqualifying criminal offenses. Third, workers immigration status is to  be checked by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service. Workers  are to have the opportunity to appeal the results of the background  check or request a waiver if they do not pass the check.
TWIC card production: After TSA determines that a worker has  passed the background checks, the agency provides transportation  worker information to a federal card production facility where the  TWIC card is to be personalized for the worker, manufactured, and  then sent back to the enrollment center.
Card issuance: Transportation workers are to be informed when their  cards are ready to be picked up at enrollment centers.
Privilege granting: TWIC cards are to be activated at enrollment  centers and workers will choose a personal identification number.  Transportation facility security officials will then grant workers access  to secure areas on an individual basis. Workers are to then use their  TWIC cards to match the card to the card holder when accessing  secure areas through biometric access control systems.
Card Revocation: Local facilities can download or receive real-time  lists of workers deemed to pose a threat or whose cards have been lost  or stolen from TSA. Facilities can then remove these workers’ access  privileges to secure areas. TWIC cards are to be renewed and  background checks repeated every 5 years. Cards will be re-issued to  workers if ever lost or stolen.

		TWIC Proposed Rule for Maritime Sector

In May 2006, DHS issued a proposed rule that describes the requirements  of the TWIC program that the owners and operators of maritime facilities  and vessels would be required to implement. Table 2 provides an  overview of the requirements in the TWIC proposed rule.
In the TWIC proposed rule, TSA and the Coast Guard present cost  estimates for implementing the TWIC program. According to the  estimates, the cost of the TWIC program to the federal government and the  maritime industry could range from about $777 million to $829 million  over the next 10 years. About 40 percent of these costs—$355 million to  $378 million—would be incurred in the initial program start up. According  to TSA and the Coast Guard’s cost estimate, about 48 percent of the total  cost of the TWIC program will be incurred by the owners and operators of  port facilities and vessels. TSA and the Coast Guard estimate that the total  cost to these facilities and vessel owners and operators will be about $467  million over 10 years, mostly for the installation of access control systems  and other technology to operate these systems. In addition to these costs,  TSA and the Coast Guard estimate that they will charge a fee of $149 to  produce and issue each TWIC card for the estimated 750,000 workers that  will need to receive a card. According to TSA, this fee will cover the cost  of the background checks and card production and issuance. This fee is to  be collected from the applicant at the enrollment center when applying for  a TWIC.
In August 2006, DHS decided that the TWIC program would be  implemented in the maritime sector using two separate rules, one for  enrolling workers and issuing cards and the second for implementing  TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric card readers. DHS  made the decision to use two separate rules in response to numerous  maritime industry concerns about whether the access control technologies  necessary to operate the TWIC program will work effectively in the  maritime sector. DHS plans to finalize the first TWIC rule, which is  expected to cover enrolling workers, conducting background checks, and  issuing TWIC cards, by the end of calendar year 2006. TWIC access control  technology requirements are expected to be addressed in a second TWIC  proposed rule, to be issued after DHS finalizes the first TWIC rule.

	DHS and Industry Stakeholders Face Challenges in Addressing Testing Problems and Ensuring Key Components of the TWIC Program Work Effectively

DHS and industry stakeholders face three major challenges in addressing  problems identified during TWIC program testing and ensuring that key  components of the TWIC program can work effectively. The first challenge  is enrolling and issuing TWIC cards to a significantly larger population of  workers in a timely manner than was done during testing of the TWIC  program. The second challenge will be ensuring that the technology  required to operate the TWIC program, such as biometric card readers,  works effectively in the maritime sector. The third challenge DHS faces is  balancing the added security benefits of the TWIC program in preventing a  terrorist attack that could result in a costly disruption in maritime  commerce with the impact that the program could have on the daily flow  of maritime commerce. TSA and Coast Guard officials told us they are  taking steps to improve the enrollment and card issuance process, and  plan to obtain additional comments on the access control technology  requirements for the TWIC program and the potential impact that the  program could have on the flow of maritime commerce as part of a second  rulemaking on the TWIC program. Given the large investment required by  the federal government and maritime industry to implement the TWIC  program, it is important that solutions to these problems are developed  and tested prior to implementation to help ensure that the program meets  its intended goals without further delays and that government and  maritime industry resources are used efficiently.

		TSA Has Improved TWIC Enrollment and Card Issuance Processes, but Faces Challenges in Enrolling Significant Numbers of Workers During Implementation

TSA had difficulty in meeting its goals for enrolling workers and issuing  TWIC cards during testing. Specifically, TSA’s goal was to enroll and issue  TWIC cards to 75,000 workers at 28 transportation facilities. However,  only about 12,900 workers were enrolled and only about 1,700 TWIC cards  were issued to workers at 19 facilities. According to TSA officials and the  testing contractor, these problems were caused by difficulties finding  volunteers to enroll in the TWIC program during testing and technical  problems, such as collecting fingerprints from workers at certain testing  locations and enrolling large numbers of workers at one time. TSA  officials stated that during implementation the agency will use a faster and  easier method of collecting fingerprints and will enroll workers  individually. While these actions should address the problems that  occurred during testing, during implementation, TSA faces the challenge  of enrolling and issuing TWIC cards to 750,000 workers at 3,500 maritime  facilities and 10,800 vessels—a significantly larger population of workers  than were included in TWIC program testing.
Another challenge TSA faces is ensuring that workers are not providing  false information and counterfeit identification documents when they  enroll in the TWIC program. This step is of critical importance in ensuring  that a person being issued a TWIC card does not pose a security threat.  Since social security cards, immigration documents, passports, and other  forms of identification can be obtained from fraudulent identity providers,  the authenticity of these documents must be verified and personnel that  enroll workers must be trained to identify fraudulent documents. During  TWIC testing, enrollment personnel were provided some training in  identifying fraudulent documents. According to TSA, the TWIC enrollment  process to be used during implementation will include using document  scanning and verification software to help determine if identification  documents are fraudulent and training personnel to identify fraudulent  documents. While it is important that the enrollment process include the  capability to prevent workers from using fraudulent identification  documents to obtain a TWIC card, details on the approach that TSA will  use during implementation are not yet available.
In addition, TSA is taking steps to address other problems regarding  enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards in a timely manner that were  encountered during testing. Specifically, TSA has eliminated approaches  used at certain locations to collect fingerprints and enroll large groups of  workers at one time, which caused problems during testing, and kept  approaches to enrolling workers and issuing cards that worked  successfully at other locations. While these actions appear to address  these problems, TSA could not provide us the results of how these  successful approaches worked at other testing locations.
Figure 2 is an example of an enrollment station used during testing of the  TWIC program.

		Industry Stakeholders Face Obstacles in Implementing TWIC Access Control Technology and Ensuring That It Works Effectively during Implementation

The TWIC proposed rule would require each facility and vessel to (1)  install and use biometric card readers in the maritime environment to  control access to secure areas, (2) link these card readers to the individual  facility or vessel access control system, or use hand held card readers, and  (3) routinely connect to TSA’s national TWIC database and incorporate  updates on TWIC cards that should be revoked because a worker poses a  security threat or a TWIC card has been lost or stolen. Our analysis of the  results of TWIC program testing and visits to 15 of the 28 testing sites, as  well as the concerns expressed by industry stakeholders at public  meetings on the TWIC proposed rule, suggest that it may be difficult to  implement each of these steps. Furthermore, industry stakeholders are  concerned about the cost of implementing and operating biometric card  readers, linking the readers to their local access control system, and  connecting to TSA’s national TWIC database. TSA’s recent decision to  implement the TWIC program by issuing two separate rules will give the  agency more time to consider maritime industry concerns regarding the  TWIC access control technology and develop solutions that will help  ensure that TWIC will work effectively in the maritime environment. TSA  is also working with the National Institute of Standards and Technology  (NIST) to ensure that the biometric identification cards and card readers  to be used for the TWIC program meet federal standards for identification  and access controls.

			Problems with Installing and Using Biometric TWIC Card Readers

Industry stakeholders will be required to install biometric TWIC card  readers capable of reading a worker’s fingerprint and matching that  fingerprint to a worker’s TWIC card in order for the worker to gain  unescorted access to secure areas of a facility or vessel. While TSA was  able to provide us the total number of card readers installed at each  testing location, they could not tell us which or how many of these card  readers were biometric or non-biometric. According to TWIC testing  contractor officials, less than half of the 99 card readers installed during  TWIC testing were biometric. In addition, only 8 of the 15 testing facilities  that we visited tested biometric card readers, and officials at only 2 of  these 8 facilities told us that their biometric card readers functioned  effectively. For example, at one testing facility, six biometric card readers  were installed, but were never operational because the testing contractor  had difficulty installing the infrastructure to provide electrical power and  communications capability to the readers themselves. As a result, the  biometric card readers were never used by workers at this facility.  According to TSA officials, the agency and the testing contractor did not  have the authority or responsibility for installing or repairing facility  access control systems and infrastructure during TWIC testing, other than  what was agreed to in the initial memorandum of understanding with  those facilities.
In addition, TSA did not test the use of biometric card readers on vessels  at all during testing of the TWIC program, although the TWIC proposed  rule requires the use of biometric card readers on vessels during  implementation of the program. An independent assessment of TWIC  testing also found that 10 of the 18 TWIC testing sites they visited  encountered problems installing TWIC technologies. Although the  independent assessment does not specify the problems encountered, TSA  and the TWIC testing contractor confirmed that some sites had problems  installing the infrastructure necessary to operate the TWIC card readers  and others had problems effectively interfacing card readers with existing  facility access control systems. Figure 3 provides an example of biometric  card readers used during testing of the TWIC program.
In commenting on the TWIC proposed rule, industry stakeholders  expressed concerns regarding TSA’s limited testing of biometric card  readers and the challenges of using these readers in the harsh outdoor  maritime environment. Stakeholders that have already installed biometric  fingerprint-based card readers in the outdoor maritime environment stated  that these readers did not work effectively in the maritime environment  where they were often damaged and affected by dirt, wind, salt, and water.  Several stakeholders also provided comments about the design of TWIC  card readers to ensure that these readers were less susceptible to the  elements in the maritime environment, such as salt and water. In addition,  the TWIC testing contractor recommended that contactless card readers  be used during implementation of the TWIC program to more quickly  process workers into secure areas and better withstand the harsh  maritime environment. According to TSA, the agency will consider these  and other industry stakeholder comments regarding TWIC access control  technologies as part of the second rulemaking.
Several industry stakeholders proposed that TSA conduct additional  maritime testing of biometric card readers, including their use on vessels,  to provide assurance that the TWIC program technology works effectively  before it is implemented nationwide and ensure that their investments in  this technology and infrastructure would be worthwhile. Stakeholders also  suggested that TSA and the Coast Guard closely coordinate with maritime  stakeholders that have implemented or are currently using biometric  access control systems. For example, Florida is currently implementing a  statewide uniform port access biometric credential program, similar to the  TWIC program. Coordinating with Florida and other stakeholders could  enable TSA and the Coast Guard to learn from these stakeholders’  experiences and potentially test key components of the TWIC program  and develop solutions to the various implementation challenges identified  during testing.
As discussed earlier, in August 2006, DHS decided that the TWIC program  would be implemented using two separate rules, one for enrolling workers  and issuing cards and the second for implementing TWIC access control  technologies, such as biometric card readers. DHS made this decision  following numerous maritime industry comments about whether the  access control technologies necessary to operate the TWIC program will  work effectively. According to TSA, the agency is working with NIST to  ensure that the biometric identification cards and card readers to be used  for the TWIC program meet federal standards for identification and access  controls. We requested additional information from TSA on the time  frames on the second TWIC rulemaking and how this rulemaking will  ensure that TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric card  readers, will work effectively in the maritime environment. TSA officials  told us that they could not provide us any details about the second  rulemaking. As a result, it is not clear how the TWIC cards will initially be  used to permit workers to enter secure areas without requirements for  TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric card readers.

			Difficulties in Linking Biometric Card Readers to Facility Access Control Systems

Under the TWIC proposed rule, maritime facility and vessel owners and  operators would be responsible for installing biometric card readers and  linking them to individual facility or vessel access control systems, to  ensure that only those with valid TWIC cards, who have been granted  access rights by the facility, have unescorted access to secure areas.  According to the TWIC testing contractor’s report, only 10 of the 28 TWIC  testing facilities linked card readers to the local facility access control  system. The report did not specifically discuss the effectiveness of the link  between card readers and the facility access control system at these   10 locations. TSA said it was unable to identify the specific testing  locations where card readers were linked to local access control systems  or any additional results regarding the link between card readers and  access control systems. According to TSA and the testing contractor, they  encountered difficulties in linking card readers to access control systems  during testing because many facilities lacked the infrastructure necessary  to do so. For example, TSA and testing contractor officials told us that at  most maritime facilities participating in testing, electrical power supplies  and high-speed communications lines were not available at all of the  access control points where card readers were needed, especially those  far away from the facility’s central access control system. As a result,  linking card readers to the access control system would have been too  difficult and costly to perform during testing. In addition, because TSA did  not install TWIC card readers on vessels during testing, the agency did not  test the link between card readers and vessel access control systems.
Industry stakeholders have expressed concern that TSA conducted only  limited testing of the link between biometric card readers and local facility  access control systems. In addition, the difficulties encountered by the  TWIC testing contractor in establishing this link raises questions about the  difficulty in doing so during TWIC implementation. For example, some  stakeholders stated that they tried but were unable to link biometric card  readers to the computers and computer software running their current  access control systems. An official at one testing facility told us that his  facility spent its own money to hire a technology integrator to link TWIC  card readers to the facility access control system because TSA and the  testing contractor did not do so during testing of the TWIC program.  Stakeholders also expressed concerns that the new biometric TWIC card  readers will not be compatible with their existing access control systems  and as a result, they will incur additional costs if they are required to  purchase new access control systems. According to TSA, while facility and  vessel owners and operators will be required to install TWIC card readers,  it is up to these facilities and vessels whether they want to link these card  readers to their access control systems. TSA recently announced that  requirements for purchasing and installing card readers will not be  implemented until the public is afforded additional time to comment on  that aspect of the TWIC program and the details of this approach will be  explained in the next rulemaking.

			TSA Did Not Test the Connection of Local Facilities to the National TWIC Database

A key security component of the TWIC program is the ability to quickly  revoke a worker’s unescorted access privileges to secure areas if TSA  identifies a worker as a security threat or if the worker’s TWIC card is lost  or stolen. This requires that (1) TSA identify that a worker is a threat to  security or that their card has been lost or stolen and invalidate their TWIC  card from the national TWIC database; (2) TSA quickly communicates  information to facilities regarding those workers whose TWIC cards have  been invalidated; and (3) the facility removes a worker’s access privileges  to secure areas from their local access control system. However,  according to TSA, the testing contractor encountered problems in  connecting the national TWIC database to local facilities’ access control  systems during testing of the TWIC program. As a result, TSA did not test  this connection at any of the 28 testing locations. Several TWIC testing  facilities that we visited lacked the technology, such as computer systems  and high-speed communications lines, to connect with TSA’s national  TWIC database to obtain information on workers that may pose a potential  threat or whose TWIC cards had been lost or stolen. An independent  contractor’s assessment of the testing also found that TSA did not test the  connection between the national TWIC database and local facility access  control systems. The independent assessment characterized this as a  critical failure because a worker posing a threat could access secure areas  of a facility if that facility had not been informed that TSA revoked his or  her TWIC card. TSA officials stated that, while they did not test the  connection between the national TWIC database and facilities in the field,  they tested this component in a laboratory. However, TSA officials said  they were unable to provide any reports on this laboratory testing.  According to TSA officials, under the TWIC proposed rule, this problem  will be resolved because facilities and vessels can download updates from  the national TWIC database on a regular basis regarding workers who  pose a threat as an alternative to directly connecting with the national  database. Since this approach was not used during TWIC program testing,  it is important that it be tested to ensure that it works effectively during  implementation.
The TWIC proposed rule requires that each facility and vessel have the  capability to verify that a worker that has been issued a TWIC card has not  subsequently been identified by TSA as a threat and that a TWIC card has  not been lost or stolen. The proposed rule allows facilities and vessels the  option of directly interfacing with TSA’s national TWIC database or  routinely downloading a list of invalid TWIC cards from TSA through a  secure Web site. In commenting on the TWIC proposed rule, numerous  stakeholders expressed confusion about how to connect to TSA’s national  TWIC database and what technology they will need to do so.  Stakeholders participating in TWIC program testing also expressed  concern that TSA did not test this connection at any of the TWIC testing  locations. In addition, some stakeholders were concerned about how  vessels at sea without internet or satellite service would connect with the  national TWIC database to get updates regarding workers who pose a  threat or whose TWIC cards have been lost or stolen because TSA also did  not test this connection. According to TSA, these issues will be addressed  as part of the second rulemaking on TWIC access control technologies.

			Industry Stakeholders Concerned about the Cost and Security of TWIC Program Technology

In addition to concerns about whether or not the access control  technology will work effectively in the maritime environment, facility and  vessel owners and operators are also concerned about the cost and  security of technology necessary to implement the TWIC program. TSA  and the Coast Guard estimate that, on average, a maritime facility will  spend $90,000 per facility to upgrade or install access control systems,  including biometric card readers. However, in commenting on the TWIC  proposed rule, stakeholders stated that they believe that upgrading and  installing access control systems at maritime facilities will cost much more  than the TSA and the Coast Guard estimate. For example, one port facility  has 37 individual terminals, several of which could require 20 or more card  readers for entry and exit lanes at one terminal alone. Port officials  estimated that it could cost up to $300,000 per terminal to install the  necessary TWIC card readers. Several stakeholders are also concerned  that TSA and the Coast Guard cost estimates do not take into account the  facilities’ costs to maintain equipment and technology, such as card  readers, or the cost to hire additional staff needed to perform such  maintenance. Facility and vessel owners also stated that the cost of  installing TWIC card readers and other equipment necessary to use TWIC  may be a hardship for smaller facilities and vessel operators. We requested  additional information on how TSA and the Coast Guard developed the  cost estimates in the proposed rule, however, DHS could not provide this  information. As a result, we were unable to determine if these estimates  were reasonable.
Further, industry stakeholders are concerned about the security of the  personal information given to TSA to conduct TWIC background checks.   For example, stakeholders commenting on the TWIC proposed rule  questioned how TSA will ensure the security of workers’ information in  light of the fact that other government agencies have mishandled and lost  private personal information. In an August 2006 report, the DHS Inspector  General highlighted shortcomings in information security for the TWIC  program.  According to the report, TSA faces numerous challenges in  ensuring that security vulnerabilities—which could compromise the  confidentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive TWIC data—are  remedied and key program policies, regulatory processes, and other work  are completed to support the full implementation of the TWIC program.  According to the report, TSA agreed with these findings and plans to take  steps to correct the security concerns identified.

			DHS Recognizes Stakeholder Concerns Regarding TWIC Implementation, but Plans No Further Program Testing

DHS officials acknowledged that there are challenges in ensuring that the  TWIC technology works effectively in a maritime environment.  Accordingly, DHS decided in August 2006 that it will not require maritime  facilities and vessels to implement TWIC card readers and other TWIC  access control technologies until the maritime industry has additional time  to comment on these aspects of the program. However, TSA is not  planning to conduct any additional testing of TWIC program technologies.
TSA officials said that the agency is working with NIST to ensure that the  biometric identification cards and card readers to be used for the TWIC  program meet federal standards for identification and access controls.  Specifically, these standards concern the use of biometric identification  and access control systems for federal employees and contractors.  According to TSA, although these standards are not specifically directed at  the TWIC program, the agency believes it is important for the program to  comply with these standards. However, NIST’s review of the TWIC  program does not involve any actual testing of the TWIC program  technology, such as the use of biometric card readers in a maritime  environment.

		Ensuring That the TWIC Program Balances Security and the Flow of Maritime Commerce May Be Difficult

In addition to ensuring that key components of the TWIC program work  effectively, another challenge DHS faces is balancing the added security  components of the TWIC program with the potential effect that the  program could slow the daily flow of maritime commerce. If implemented  effectively, the security benefits of the TWIC program in preventing a  terrorist attack could save lives and avoid a costly disruption in maritime  commerce. Alternatively, if key components of the TWIC program, such as  biometric card readers, do not work effectively, it could slow the daily  flow of maritime commerce. Our discussions with industry stakeholders at  facilities that participated in TWIC testing and stakeholder comments on  the TWIC proposed rule identified four concerns about the potential  impact of TWIC on maritime commerce.

			Wait Times to Receive TWIC Cards

According to stakeholders, for the TWIC program to work effectively in  the maritime environment without slowing commerce, TWIC cards must  be issued within a few days after enrollment, or workers should be  allowed interim access to secure areas to perform their job duties while  they wait to receive a TWIC card. Several maritime facility officials stated  that without quick issuance or interim access, they will have difficulty in  staffing and performing operations. Some passenger vessel owners and  operators stated that waiting 30 to 60 days to receive a TWIC card could  hinder their ability to allow workers to access secure areas to perform  their job duties while they are waiting to receive their TWIC cards.  According to the TWIC proposed rule, it could take 30 to 60 days for TSA  to perform background checks, produce the TWIC cards, and issue these  cards to workers. TSA said that they are considering adding a provision to  the proposed rule to allow workers temporary access to secure areas  while they wait to receive their TWIC cards. Adding such a provision to  the rule would address maritime industry concerns. According to TSA  officials, the agency hopes to issue TWIC cards sooner than 30 days after a  worker enrolls.

			Potential Delays in Accessing Secure Areas

According to several industry stakeholders, the use of biometric card  readers could disrupt the flow of commerce entering and exiting a port if  each person or vehicle is not processed in a few seconds or if the readers  experience technical problems. Specifically, if a worker or truck driver has  problems with their fingerprint verification on a biometric card reader,  they could create a long queue delaying several other workers and trucks  waiting in line trying to enter secure areas of a port. According to the  testing contractor’s report, TWIC card readers rejected workers’ access to  secure areas in 4.8 percent of total access attempts during testing. These  reject rates were comprised of two types. First, legitimate rejects were  workers not allowed access to secure areas because they were not  authorized to do so. Second, false rejects were workers not allowed to  access secure areas although they were authorized to do so. According to  TSA officials, the testing contractor did not determine what percentage of  the total 4.8 percent reject rate was legitimate versus false rejects. In  addition, neither the testing contractor’s report nor TSA provided any  information regarding wait times or delays experienced due to these reject  rates at access control points during TWIC testing. The TWIC testing  contractor attributed the cause of the reject rates during testing to  transportation workers having rougher fingerprints than the average  population, making it more difficult for card readers to verify their  fingerprints. However, neither TSA nor the testing contractor developed  solutions to the problem of reject rates that can be used during  implementation of the TWIC program.
Several port officials we spoke with told us that delaying cargo entering  and exiting a port could result in thousands of dollars lost by port terminal  operators in the short term and millions in the long term. Stakeholders  have suggested that TSA and the Coast Guard address concerns about  delays by conducting additional testing of the TWIC program at a limited  number of maritime facilities and vessels. Figure 4 shows a line of trucks  transporting cargo into a large port facility through an access control  point.
TSA and the Coast Guard officials stated that they recognize stakeholders’  concerns regarding the potential impact of access control technology on  the flow of commerce and, as a result, plan to obtain additional  stakeholder input and comments as part of the second rulemaking to help  address these concerns. We requested additional information from TSA on  this rulemaking and how it would address concerns regarding the impact  on commerce, however, TSA could not provide us any details.

			Stringency of Background Checks

Industry stakeholders have stated that they generally support the TWIC  program and its requirement that background checks be conducted on  workers with unescorted access to secure areas to help ensure that these  individuals do not pose a security threat. However, the stakeholders have  also expressed some concern that certain disqualifying offenses may be  too stringent and could lead to workers unnecessarily losing their jobs.  For example, stakeholders stated that the disqualifying offenses should be  terrorism related and not include lesser felonies currently in the TWIC  proposed rule, such as fraud. In addition, stakeholders expressed concern  that according to the TWIC proposed rule, being found guilty of certain  disqualifying criminal offenses, such as racketeering, will disqualify a  person from receiving a TWIC card for their whole life, regardless of how  long ago the worker committed the crime. The TWIC proposed rule would  permit workers that do not pass the background check to appeal or  request a waiver to obtain a TWIC card.

			Impact on Small Maritime Facilities and Vessels

Under the TWIC proposed rule, all Maritime Transportation Security Act  (MTSA) regulated facilities and vessels would be required to use a TWIC  card to control unescorted access to secure areas. Some industry  stakeholders, however, disagree with applying uniform standards to all  facilities and vessels in the maritime sector, regardless of size. Small  facility and vessel officials providing comments on the TWIC proposed  rule stated that if they are required to implement these requirements, they  will have to conduct unnecessary checks of workers entering secure areas.  For example, smaller vessels may have crews of less than 10 people, and  checking TWIC cards each time a person enters a secure area is not  necessary. In addition, stakeholders suggested that there should be  flexibility in the final TWIC rule to exempt smaller facilities and vessels  from requirements more applicable to large facilities and vessels. TSA and  Coast Guard officials acknowledge the difficulties in applying the TWIC  regulation to the entire maritime sector, and stated that they will obtain  additional comments from stakeholders as part of the rulemaking process  regarding the potential impact that the TWIC program could have on the  flow of maritime commerce.

	Problems in Planning for and Overseeing the Contract to Test the TWIC Program

TSA experienced problems in planning for and overseeing the contract to  test the TWIC program. Specifically, poor planning for the contract to test  the TWIC program resulted in significant contract changes shortly after  TSA awarded the contract, which contributed to a doubling of contract  costs. According to TSA officials, delays in program development and  pressure to begin TWIC testing caused the agency to award the contract  before they had sufficient time to plan for and identify all of the  requirements necessary to test the TWIC program in the initial contract. In  addition, while the contract required testing certain key components of the  TWIC program, TSA did not ensure that these key components were tested  by the contractor. In addition to poor oversight, stakeholders told us that  TSA did not effectively communicate and coordinate with them regarding  any problems that arose during testing at their facility. TSA officials stated  that the agency lacked adequate personnel to provide effective oversight  of the contract to test the TWIC program and thus relied on the contractor  to provide oversight of its own work and the work of its sub-contractors.  Our previous reports have identified similar contract planning and  oversight problems at TSA that led to increased contract costs.  Specifically, in reports issued in 2004 and 2005, we found that both TSA  and DHS contract policies did not adequately ensure that contract  requirements and deliverables were clearly defined, and did not provide  adequate oversight of contractor performance. Since TSA will rely  heavily on a private contractor to implement the TWIC program, it is  important that comprehensive and clearly defined requirements are  included in the implementation contract and contractor performance is  closely monitored to help ensure effective and efficient accomplishment of  contract purposes and to hold down costs.

		Poor Planning by TSA in the Initial TWIC Testing Contract Contributed to a Doubling of Costs

TSA awarded the contract to test key components of the TWIC program in  August 2004 for about $12 million. By the end of the testing phase, the total  cost of the TWIC testing contract increased to over $27 million. According  to the testing contractor, the cost increased because TSA added several  key requirements that were necessary for testing the TWIC program to the  contract after it was awarded. TSA officials confirmed that the addition of  these key requirements caused the contract cost to increase.
First, according to TSA and the testing contractor, although the initial  contract did not stipulate a date to begin program testing, they initially  agreed that the contractor should begin testing the TWIC program in April  2005. However, TSA officials moved up the start date to November 2004 to  try to complete testing sooner. According to TSA and the testing  contractor, the contractor incurred additional costs to move up the  schedule. Second, TSA’s initial testing contract was amended to require  the contractor to install infrastructure necessary to test the TWIC program  at transportation facilities. TSA added this requirement right after it  awarded the contract because the agency learned that many testing  facilities needed additional infrastructure to support testing the TWIC  program and lacked the necessary funding to pay for it. According to TSA  and the testing contractor, requiring the contractor to install infrastructure  further increased the cost of the contract. Lastly, TSA changed the  requirements after it awarded the testing contract to facilitate the  enrollment of all port workers that were already enrolled in Florida’s  uniform port access credential program. This required the testing  contractor to use a different approach to enrolling workers in Florida than  was used at other TWIC testing locations. TSA did not include this  approach in the original contract. According to TSA officials, these  modifications were not included in the initial TWIC testing contract  because TSA officials were under pressure to begin TWIC testing and did  not have sufficient time to ensure that the contract included  comprehensive and clearly defined requirements. TSA officials also stated  that they knew they could modify the contract after it was awarded.
TSA is required to use the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA)  acquisition management system to guide government procurements,  including contract planning and oversight, rather than the Federal  Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which applies to most other federal  agencies. Although TSA is not subject to the requirements of the FAR, the  FAR’s requirements are designed to help ensure adequate contract  planning. Specifically the FAR states that government personnel should  avoid issuing contract requirements on an urgent basis, as was done  during the TWIC testing contract, since this could increase contract prices.  In addition, best practices for contract planning include defining key  contract requirements and making critical decisions before moving  forward and committing funds or resources to a major system, or  acquisition, such as the TWIC program. We have also previously reported  that the development of any new system should follow a knowledge-based  approach, including clearly defining system requirements through  advanced planning, to achieve successful outcomes. Adequate planning  also includes making decisions before moving forward and taking action  to prevent increases in cost, schedule delays, and degradations in  performance and quality. Although contract requirements are often  amended or added after initial contracts are awarded, the failure to  consider and include critical requirements necessary to fully test the TWIC  program and the resulting cost increases encountered is reflective of poor  contract planning.
According to TSA, the agency is taking steps to address contract planning  problems experienced during TWIC testing. Specifically, TSA officials told  us that the TWIC program office has hired additional certified program  managers and staff with technical expertise to assist in developing  comprehensive and clearly defined requirements for the future contract to  implement the TWIC program. However, it is not clear to what extent  these actions will ensure that the contract to implement the TWIC  program will include comprehensive and clearly defined contract  requirements.

		TSA Did Not Ensure That Key Components of the TWIC Program Were Tested

The TWIC testing contract required the contractor to test key components  of the TWIC program and detect and resolve weaknesses identified during  testing. TSA was responsible for ensuring that the contractor met all  contract requirements. However, TSA did not effectively oversee the  contractor’s performance to ensure that key components of the program  were tested. For example, the contractor was required to test the  capability of the TWIC program to communicate information from a  central database, such as TWIC cards that should be revoked if a worker is  identified as a threat to security, to local facilities. However, TSA did not  ensure that the contractor tested this capability. The independent  contractor’s assessment confirmed this component was not tested. The  assessment also found that the testing contractor did not fulfill 25 percent  of the TWIC operational and performance contract requirements, such as  the requirement that lost or stolen TWIC cards be revoked prior to issuing  a new card. The independent assessment characterized the failure to meet  this requirement during testing as a critical problem, as a terrorist could  potentially use the lost or stolen card to access secure areas.
In addition, TSA officials did not perform certain tasks that are included in  the agency’s guidelines for contract oversight. TSA officials acknowledged  that these functions were not performed because they lacked the oversight  resources necessary to perform all of these tasks. For example, TSA  officials acknowledged that the agency did not follow its contract  oversight guidance in the following areas:    Performance and cost efficiency reporting. A contracting officer  technical representative (COTR) is a federal employee with technical  knowledge of a specific program appointed by the contracting officer  to ensure that contract requirements are met and to monitor the  performance of the contractor. TSA’s COTR guidelines state that one of  the primary responsibilities of the COTR is to identify and report  opportunities to improve contractor performance or cost efficiency to  the contracting officer. However, according to TSA officials, no such  performance reports were submitted by the COTR during the testing of  the TWIC program.
Quality assurance planning. The COTR guidelines require that the  COTR follow a quality assurance plan for monitoring contractor  performance. However, TSA officials stated that, although some limited  monitoring and surveillance of the TWIC testing took place, they did  not develop a quality assurance plan for the TWIC testing.
Evaluating contractor performance. The COTR guidelines also state  that the COTR is required to write their own evaluation of the  contractor’s technical performance. However, over 1 year after the  completion of TWIC testing, TSA officials told us that an evaluation of  the TWIC testing contractor’s technical performance will be completed  after the TWIC testing contractor completes transitional tasks.
According to TSA officials, the lack of TWIC program personnel as well as  an over-reliance on the testing contractor to provide oversight of its own  work and that of subcontractors caused inadequate oversight of the TWIC  testing contract. The TWIC program office within TSA had seven  individuals on staff and one person, the COTR, directly responsible for  contract oversight. According to the COTR, more staff were needed to  provide adequate oversight of nearly 30 TWIC testing locations and  multiple testing subcontractors. The COTR also stated that the TWIC  testing contract was just one of several contracts that she was responsible  for overseeing. As a result, the COTR visited only one location during  TWIC program testing. According to TSA officials, the agency is taking  steps to improve contract oversight practices. Specifically, TSA officials  stated that the agency hired additional certified program managers, staff  with technical expertise, and a new COTR to provide oversight of the  future contract to implement the TWIC program. In addition, these  officials told us that TSA has established a special office dedicated to  managing TWIC contracts. However, until TSA develops its plans for  monitoring contractor performance, it is not clear to what extent these  actions will ensure that contractor performance and costs will be closely  monitored.
In addition to oversight problems, stakeholders at all 15 TWIC testing  locations we visited told us that TSA did not effectively communicate and  coordinate with them regarding any problems that arose during testing at  their facility. For example, at two maritime facilities we visited, officials  told us that communication and coordination with TSA was the most  significant problem they encountered during TWIC program testing. These  officials stated that all communications from TSA and the testing  contractor would stop for months during TWIC testing and that questions  to TSA regarding the status of testing and various problems encountered  often went unanswered. Another example of poor communication and  coordination cited by stakeholders was that TSA never provided any  results of the TWIC testing, including the final testing report, to the  facilities that participated in the testing. According to TSA, the agency did  not provide the final testing report to stakeholders because the report  contained sensitive security information. Stakeholders stated that if TSA  had an effective stakeholder feedback mechanism in place, TSA may have  learned of testing problems and contractor performance issues sooner. In  addition, an independent contractor’s assessment of the TWIC testing also  identified communication and coordination problems during their own site  visits to 18 of the 28 TWIC testing locations. The independent contractor  recommended that TSA develop procedures to provide more open and  timely communication to stakeholders. TSA officials acknowledged that  the agency could have better communicated with stakeholders at the  TWIC testing locations.
We have previously highlighted the importance of effective  communication and coordination between TSA and industry stakeholders  to ensure that the agency is able to test and deliver programs that work  effectively. As a result, we recommended that TSA better communicate  and coordinate with industry stakeholders and create a formal mechanism  to ensure this communication and coordination takes place. According to  TSA officials, the agency recognizes that stakeholders involved in the  TWIC testing should have been provided results of testing at their facilities  and acknowledges that the agency did not establish a means of  communicating and coordinating with stakeholders as part of the  oversight process.
Another issue that arose during TWIC testing concerned TSA’s decision to  contract with the same company that was conducting the TWIC testing to  provide the agency’s TWIC program office management support, technical  expertise, and assistance in providing contract oversight. The program  management contractor staff worked in TSA’s TWIC program office and  helped evaluate contract deliverables submitted by its own company, such  as the final report summarizing the results and conclusions of the TWIC  testing. Although TSA said that the two contracts involved separate teams  from the same company, conflict of interest concerns in this particular  situation were such that TSA required the contractor to address  organizational conflict of interest concerns in a mitigation plan and paid  an independent contractor to review the TWIC testing.
Further, the independent assessment contractor found that there were  problems with the testing contractor’s report, such as inaccurate and  missing information. The assessment also stated that TSA did not  adequately (1) define testing contract requirements, (2) develop a  comprehensive implementation plan to secure adequate stakeholder  involvement, or (3) monitor TWIC program schedules and costs. As a  result, the independent assessment recommended that the contractor’s  final report not be relied upon when making decisions about the  implementation of TWIC until these problems were corrected.
In previous reports, we identified problems with TSA’s contracts and  contractor oversight practices, including contracts without clearly defined  requirements and inadequate oversight that caused initial TSA contract  costs to increase. We have also reported on TSA and DHS’s lack of  policies that provide clear guidance on defining contract requirements or  contract oversight. For example, the report notes that clearly defining  requirements allows more precise cost estimates for specific contracts as  well as better approximations of the timelines for completion. In addition,  inadequate oversight increases the risk that costs will increase in a labor  hour and cost reimbursement contract as used here.

	Conclusions

The TWIC program was established in response to congressional direction  to mitigate the threat of terrorists and other unauthorized persons from  accessing the nation’s ports and other transportation facilities. The  maritime industry and other transportation stakeholders are generally  supportive of the TWIC program as a means to strengthen access control  security and establish a national standard for worker identification  credentials. TSA tested the TWIC program at a select number of  transportation facilities to identify problems, develop solutions to these  problems, and help determine how TWIC can be effectively implemented  across the nation. However, the TWIC testing fell short of meeting its  goals. Specifically, during testing, TSA issued cards to only about   1,700 workers and tested card readers at 19 facilities, a much smaller  population than planned, and TSA did not fully test all key components of  the TWIC program, such as biometric card readers. As a result, TSA faces  the challenge of transitioning from this limited testing to successful  implementation of the program on a much larger scale covering   750,000 workers at over 3,500 maritime facilities and 10,800 vessels. While  TSA has taken some actions to address problems identified during TWIC  program testing, the agency and the maritime industry still face key  challenges in ensuring that the program will meet its intended goal of  providing an effective means of preventing unauthorized access to secure  areas.
TSA has recently announced that it will use two separate rulemakings to  implement the TWIC program. The first will provide the requirements for  enrolling workers, conducting background checks, and issuing TWIC  cards. A subsequent rule will include requirements for purchasing and  installing TWIC access control technologies. Postponing the issuance of  requirements for TWIC access control technologies will afford the  maritime industry additional time to comment on these requirements.  However, it is not clear what, if any, additional testing of the TWIC access  control technologies will be conducted as part of this subsequent  rulemaking to ensure that they work effectively. Moreover, TSA’s decision  to issue two TWIC rules poses an additional challenge in that TSA will  need to ensure that the TWIC cards issued to workers enrolled under the  first rule will be compatible with the card reader technologies that will be  part of the second rule. TSA’s decision to rapidly move forward with  implementation of the TWIC program without developing and testing  solutions to identified problems could lead to additional problems,  increased costs, and further program delays without achieving the  program’s intended goals. Considering the large investment that the  federal government and maritime industry will be required to make to  implement the TWIC program, it is particularly important that solutions to  the problems and challenges facing the program be developed and tested  before implementation to avoid wasting resources. We have found during  prior work that in a rush to implement programs quickly, TSA has not  always followed a disciplined development process, including conducting  appropriate systems testing, and did not always follow their own systems  development guidance when developing programs. As a result, they  experienced program delays and cost overruns, and lacked assurance that  the programs would meet their intended goals.
TSA’s lack of contract planning, oversight, and communication and  coordination with stakeholders during testing of the TWIC program, and  past contract planning and oversight problems, raise questions about  whether TSA can ensure that the contract to implement the TWIC program  will include comprehensive and clearly defined requirements or that the  agency will provide adequate oversight of contractor performance. TSA  officials stated that the agency has taken steps to address these problems  by hiring additional staff with technical and program management  expertise to assist in developing contract requirements and providing  oversight. While these actions may address problems that occurred during  TWIC program testing, whether they will resolve all of the contract  planning and oversight problems will not be clear until TSA develops and  awards the contract to implement the TWIC program and develops plans  for overseeing and evaluating contractor performance and communicating  and coordinating with maritime industry stakeholders.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that the TWIC program can be implemented as efficiently  and effectively as possible, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the  Transportation Security Administration, in close coordination with the  Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, to take the following two actions:  1.  Before TWIC is implemented in the maritime sector, develop and test  solutions to the problems identified during TWIC program testing, and  raised by stakeholders in commenting on the TWIC proposed rule, to  ensure that all key components of the TWIC program work effectively.  In developing and testing these solutions, TSA should:    ensure that the TWIC program will be able to efficiently enroll and  issue TWIC cards to large numbers of workers;    ensure that the technology necessary to operate the TWIC program  will be readily available to industry stakeholders and will function  effectively in the maritime sector, including biometric card readers  and the capability to link facility access control systems with the  national TWIC database;    ensure that the TWIC program balances the added security it  provides with the potential effect that the program could have on  the flow of maritime commerce; and    closely coordinate with maritime industry stakeholders— particularly those that are currently implementing or using  biometric access control systems—to learn from their experiences.  2.  Strengthen contract planning and oversight practices before awarding  the contract to implement the TWIC program to achieve the following  purposes:    ensure that the contract to implement the TWIC program contains  comprehensive and clearly defined requirements;    ensure that resources are available and measures are in place to  provide effective government oversight of the contractor’s  performance; and    establish a communication and coordination plan to capture and  address the views and concerns of maritime industry stakeholders  during implementation.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On  September 22, 2006, we received written comments on the draft report,  which are reproduced in full in appendix II. DHS concurred with the  findings and recommendations and stated that the report will help  improve TSA’s management of the TWIC program and strengthen  oversight of contractor performance. DHS further stated that the report’s  recommendations will help facilitate the nationwide implementation of the  TWIC card and thus, the agency has already taken steps to implement  them.
Regarding our recommendation to develop and test solutions to the  problems identified during TWIC program testing, and raised by  stakeholders in commenting on the TWIC proposed rule, DHS stated that it  is taking a number of actions. Specifically, to ensure that the TWIC  program will be able to efficiently enroll and issue TWIC cards to large  numbers of workers, TSA is using experience gained during TWIC testing  to improve the enrollment and card issuance process, which should  address the problems encountered during testing. For example, TSA plans  to use an easier and faster form of scanning to capture workers’  fingerprints and is taking additional steps to ensure that the process for  enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards is efficient. In addition,  according to DHS, TSA is seeking an experienced and capable contractor  to enroll workers and operate the information technology systems  necessary to support the program. Taking these steps should help TSA to  address the problems experienced during testing regarding enrollment and  card issuance. Nevertheless, TSA will face the challenge of enrolling and  issuing TWIC cards to a significantly larger population of workers than  was enrolled during testing.
Concerning our recommendation that DHS ensure that the technology  necessary to operate the TWIC program will be readily available to  industry stakeholders and will function effectively in the maritime sector,  including biometric card readers and the capability to link facility access  control systems with the national TWIC database, DHS stated that TSA  and the Coast Guard will not require maritime facilities and vessels to  purchase or install card readers as part of the first rulemaking process.  Instead, requirements for biometric card readers and access control  technologies will be part of a subsequent rulemaking. According to DHS,  the two-phased rulemaking process allows more time for maritime facility  and vessels owners and operators to plan for the installation of biometric  card readers and access control infrastructure and allows the public  additional opportunity to comment on this aspect of the program. In  addition, TSA is considering additional field testing of biometric card  readers within the funding and schedule parameters of the TWIC program  and has already solicited stakeholders’ involvement in these tests.  Furthermore, according to DHS, the General Services Administration  (GSA) and NIST are currently testing products, including biometric card  readers, for compliance with FIPS 201 standards. GSA is also developing a  list of qualified access control technology products and vendors that will  be available for purchase by maritime facilities and vessels to implement  the TWIC program in the future. Obtaining additional comments from the  public regarding TWIC access control technology requirements,  conducting additional testing of TWIC program technologies in the  maritime environment, and ensuring that access control technologies are  compliant with FIPS 201 standards are important steps for ensuring that  the TWIC program works effectively in the maritime environment. In  regard to linking facility access control systems with the national TWIC  database, DHS stated that facilities and vessels will be provided secure  web access to a list of TWIC cards that are lost, stolen, expired, or belong  to individuals found to pose a threat to security.
In addressing our recommendation that TSA and the Coast Guard ensure  that the TWIC program balances the added security it provides with the  potential effect that the program could have on the flow of maritime  commerce, DHS stated that TSA and the Coast Guard have reviewed  industry comments, are cognizant of stakeholder concerns, and  acknowledge the potential impact that the TWIC program could have on  the flow of maritime commerce. As a result, TSA and Coast Guard plan to  obtain additional comments on this issue from industry stakeholders in  the second rulemaking pertaining to access control technology. Soliciting  additional comments from maritime industry stakeholders should help  TSA and the Coast Guard balance the added security of the TWIC program  with the potential affects on the flow of maritime commerce. Conducting  additional testing of TWIC in the maritime environment would further help  TSA and the Coast Guard determine how to balance security and the flow  of maritime commerce.
With regard to our recommendation that DHS closely coordinate with  maritime industry stakeholders—particularly those that are currently  implementing or using biometric access control systems—to learn from  their experiences, DHS stated that the TWIC program is considering field  testing of biometric card reader technology to support the second phase of  the TWIC program within the funding and schedule parameters of the  program. According to DHS, multiple TWIC stakeholders have expressed  an interest in participating in this field testing. In addition, TSA and the  Coast Guard plan an upcoming conference of TWIC qualified contractors  and TWIC stakeholders to discuss experiences during TWIC testing. DHS  also stated that the agency has invited other stakeholders to provide  feedback on the TWIC program. Taking action to better coordinate with  maritime stakeholders are steps in the right direction and will be essential  to effectively implementing the TWIC program.
In response to our recommendation that TSA strengthen contract planning  and oversight practices before awarding the contract to implement the  TWIC program, DHS stated that it is taking several actions to implement  this recommendation. Specifically, to ensure that the contract to  implement the TWIC program contains comprehensive and clearly defined  requirements, TSA has recently selected qualified contractors and released  the request for proposal (RFP) to implement the TWIC program. The TWIC  RFP includes a detailed requirements document that identifies the  performance outcomes expected to be met by the contractor selected to  implement the TWIC program. According to DHS, any future changes to  the TWIC requirements will be managed under a formal change control  process. If properly implemented, these actions should better position TSA  to ensure that the TWIC implementation contract contains comprehensive  and clearly defined requirements.
Regarding our recommendation that TSA ensure that resources are  available and measures are in place to provide effective government  oversight of the contractor’s performance, DHS stated that the TWIC  program has recently established a Program Control Office to help oversee  contractor performance and deliverables. In addition, the TWIC program  has developed a Quality Assurance and Surveillance Plan and acceptable  quality levels of performance in the TWIC RFP to provide a foundation for  contract management and oversight. TSA has also hired additional staff to  provide better program management and improved oversight of TWIC  contracts. Allocating additional resources and taking steps to ensure that  TSA provides effective oversight of the TWIC implementation contract are  important steps toward improving contract oversight. If properly  implemented, these actions should address the intent of this  recommendation.
Concerning our recommendation that TSA establish a communication and  coordination plan to capture and address the views and concerns of  maritime industry stakeholders during implementation, DHS stated that  the TWIC program has increased its communication and coordination  efforts with stakeholders during the TWIC rulemaking process and plans  to continue these activities during implementation of the program.  According to DHS, the TWIC program office has developed a  communication strategy and plan and the TWIC RFP requires the TWIC  implementation contractor to establish a communications plan to provide  information to stakeholders and address their concerns during  implementation. Developing plans to better communicate and coordinate  with stakeholders will be key to the success of the TWIC program.
DHS also offered technical comments and clarifications, which we have  considered and incorporated where appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 21 days after its  issue date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to the  Secretary of Homeland Security, Assistant Secretary of the Transportation  Security Administration, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and other  interested congressional committees as appropriate. We will also make  copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or you staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3404 or at berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to answer the following questions: (1) What problems,  if any, did testing of the TWIC program identify and what challenges, if  any, do DHS and industry stakeholders face in implementing the program?  and (2) To what extent, if at all, did TSA experience problems in planning  for and overseeing the contract to test the TWIC program?
To address our first objective, to identify the problems, if any, during  testing of the TWIC program and the challenges, if any, DHS and industry  stakeholders face in implementing the program, we interviewed TSA and  Coast Guard officials regarding the development of the TWIC program,  results of TWIC program testing, and challenges identified with  implementing the program. To determine the status of the TWIC program,  goals, and requirements of TWIC testing and testing results, we obtained  and analyzed TWIC program documents, including program management  plans, the final report on TWIC testing, an independent contractor’s  assessment of TWIC testing, the TWIC proposed rule, and the TWIC  regulatory impact analysis. We also reviewed applicable laws, regulations,  policies, and procedures to determine the requirements for implementing  the TWIC program. We attended public meetings held by TSA and the  Coast Guard in Newark, New Jersey; Tampa, Florida; and Long Beach,  California; to obtain industry comments on the TWIC proposed rule. We  also reviewed stakeholder comments submitted to TSA and the Coast  Guard during the rulemaking process. We conducted site visits to 15 of the  28 facilities that participated in testing the TWIC program in California,  Delaware, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania to obtain  information on stakeholder experiences regarding the TWIC testing,  observe the operation of the TWIC program at these facilities, and discuss  any challenges associated with implementing TWIC. We visited testing  facilities in each of the three testing regions—East Coast, West Coast, and  Florida—as well as locations representing the maritime, aviation, and rail  modes of transportation. We selected the 15 facilities based on geographic  location, mode of transportation, and diversity of facility size and area of  business operations.  Table 3 lists the 15 facilities we visited that  participated in TWIC testing.
To address our second objective, to determine to what extent, if at all, the  contract to test the TWIC program identified contract planning and  oversight problems that should be addressed before implementing the  program, we interviewed TSA officials regarding the planning for and  oversight of the contract to test the TWIC program. We obtained and  analyzed TWIC program documents, including the TWIC testing contract  and report, an independent contractor’s assessment of TWIC testing, and  TSA’s internal contract planning and oversight guidance. We interviewed  TWIC contractor officials regarding contract requirements, testing results,  and TSA’s planning for and oversight of the testing contract. We also  interviewed officials from the independent contractor that assessed the  TWIC testing to discuss the results of this assessment. Further, we  reviewed the methodology of the independent contractor’s assessment by  examining documents, interviewing contractor officials, and performing  internal analyses to help ensure data reliability.  Our work was also  informed by our prior reports and testimony related to TWIC, maritime  and transportation security, and TSA and DHS contracting practices.
We conducted our work from August 2005 through September 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

	GAO Contact

	Acknowledgements

In addition to the contact above, John Hansen, Assistant Director, Chris  Currie, Nicholas Larson, Michele Mackin, Geoff Hamilton, Katherine  Davis, Chuck Bausell, Michele Fejfar, Richard Hung, and Pille Anvelt made  key contributions to this report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to ensure that only workers that do not pose a terrorist threat are allowed to enter secure areas of transportation facilities. TSA completed TWIC program testing in June 2005 and is moving forward with implementing the program in the maritime sector by the end of this year. To evaluate the status of the TWIC program, GAO examined (1) what problems, if any, were identified during TWIC program testing and what key challenges, if any, do the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and industry stakeholders face in implementing the program; and (2) to what extent, if at all, did TSA experience problems in planning for and overseeing the contract to test the TWIC program. To address these issues, GAO interviewed DHS officials and industry stakeholders, reviewed documentation regarding TWIC testing, and conducted site visits to testing locations.

What GAO Found

DHS and industry stakeholders face three major challenges in addressing problems identified during TWIC program testing and ensuring that key components of the TWIC program can work effectively in the maritime sector. First, enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards in a timely manner to a significantly larger population of workers than was done during testing of the TWIC program. Second, ensuring that the TWIC technology, such as biometric card readers, works effectively in the maritime sector. TSA has obtained limited information on the use of biometric readers in the maritime sector because most facilities that tested the TWIC program did not use these types of readers. Thirs, balancing the added security components of the TWIC program with the potential impact that the program could have on the flow of maritime commerce. An independent contractor's assessment found deficiencies with TWIC program testing and recommended that additional testing be conducted to determine its effectiveness. TSA has acknowledged that there are challenges to implementing the TWIC program and has taken some actions to address these issues, including allowing more time to consider requirements for installing TWIC access control technologies. However, TSA plans no additional testing of the TWIC program. Rapidly moving forward with implementation of the TWIC program without developing and testing solutions to identified problems to ensure that they work effectively could lead to further problems, increased costs, and program delays without achieving the program's intended goals. TSA experienced problems in planning for and overseeing the contract to test the TWIC program. Specifically, TSA made a number of changes to contract requirements after the contract was awarded, contributing to a doubling of contract costs, and TSA did not ensure that all key components of the program were tested. TSA has acknowledged that problems with contractor oversight occurred because the agency did not have sufficient personnel to monitor contractor performance. TSA has taken some actions to address this problem. However, until TSA issues the contract for TWIC implementation and develops its plans for monitoring contractor performance, it is not clear to what extent these actions will ensure that the contract to implement the TWIC program will include comprehensive and clearly defined requirements and that contractor performance will be closely monitored to ensure that the program is implemented successfully and costs are controlled.