Background

A federal position dedicated to overseeing security at commercial airports  was first established in 1990 under the Federal Aviation Administration  and was later transferred to TSA. The Federal Aviation Administration  established the position of Federal Security Manager pursuant to a  mandate in the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. Federal  Security Managers, responsible for security at the nation’s largest airports,  developed airport security plans in concert with airport operators and air  carriers; provided regulatory oversight to ensure security measures were  contained in airport plans and were properly implemented; and  coordinated daily federal aviation security activities, including those with  local law enforcement. According to TSA officials, regional civil aviation  security field offices, headed by Civil Aviation Security Field Officers and  staffed with security inspectors, had been in place at commercial airports  since the mid-1970s and eventually covered the more than 440 commercial  airports required to have security programs. In practice, the field office  staff performed compliance and enforcement inspections and assessed  penalties, while the Federal Security Managers served in a liaison and  coordination role as on-site security experts. To avoid duplication of  effort, Civil Aviation Security Field Officers were not assigned  responsibilities at airports where Federal Security Managers were  designated or stationed.
In November 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, the President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act  (ATSA) into law, shifting certain responsibilities for aviation security from  air carriers to the federal government and the newly created TSA.  Specifically, ATSA created TSA and granted it direct operational  responsibility for, among other things, passenger and checked baggage  screening. On February 17, 2002, pursuant to ATSA, TSA assumed  responsibility from FAA for security at the nation’s commercial airports,  including FAA’s existing aviation security programs, plans, contracts,  regulations, orders, directives, and personnel. On February 22, 2002, FAA  and TSA jointly published a final rule transferring the civil aviation  security regulations from FAA to TSA and amending those rules to  comport with ATSA and enhance security as required by the act.  According to TSA officials, DOT and TSA leadership administratively  changed the name of the Federal Security Manager to Federal Security  Director to avoid confusion with the liaison role of the Federal Security  Manager prior to September 11. The FSD role was more comprehensive  and had responsibilities that included overseeing passenger and baggage  screening. Airport operators retained responsibility for the security of the  airport operating environment, that is, perimeter security, access control  to secured areas, and other measures detailed in the approved airport  security plan, while the FSD provided regulatory oversight over these  efforts.
FSDs report to one of five Area Directors, based on their geographic  regions, on administrative matters. However, they report to TSA  headquarters (the Aviation Security Program Office and Transportation  Security Operations Center) on operational issues, such as reporting  security incidents. FSDs are part of the Aviation Security Program Office  within TSA’s Office of Intermodal Programs, as shown in figure 1. The  Aviation Security Program Office focuses on specific functions related to  TSA’s Aviation Security Program, including staffing, training, and  equipping the federal security work force. The Transportation Security  Operations Center serves as a single point of contact for security-related  operations, incidents, or crises in aviation and all surface modes of  transportation. FSDs are to report any security incident at their airport  immediately to the center, which is to provide guidance, if needed, as well  as look for patterns among all incidents that occur throughout the country.  The center provides FSDs daily intelligence briefings based on incident  information from FSDs and information from TSA’s Transportation  Security Intelligence Service. The Transportation Security Intelligence  Service provides FSDs, Deputy FSDs, and Assistant FSDs with a classified  Daily Intelligence Summary containing the most current threat information  from the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and  stakeholders and provides the FSD staff with an unclassified TSA Field  Intelligence Summary to be used in briefing screeners and screening  management about current threats and other issues related to aviation  security.
TSA’s Area Directors are responsible for monitoring and annually  assessing the performance of FSDs. FSD performance is to be assessed in  terms of successful accomplishment of organizational goals as well as  specific performance metrics associated with aviation security within the  FSD’s area of responsibility. Area Directors are required to follow DHS’s  performance management guidance for FSDs who are part of the  Transportation Senior Executive Service (TSES) and TSA’s performance  management guidance for FSDs who are not part of the TSES (non-TSES).  According to TSA Human Resources officials, about one-third of the FSDs  are part of the TSES, and they are generally assigned to larger airports.
FSDs are responsible for overseeing security operations at the nation’s  commercial airports—443 airports as of January 2005—which TSA  classifies in one of five airport security categories (X, I, II, III, IV). These  categories are based on various factors such as the total number of  takeoffs and landings annually, the extent to which passengers are  screened at the airport, and other special security considerations. In  general, category X airports have the greatest number of passenger  boardings and category IV airports have the fewest. These airports can  vary dramatically, not just in passenger and flight volume, but in other  characteristics, including physical size and layout. Figure 2 identifies the  number of commercial airports by airport security category, as of January  2005.
TSA had 157 FSD positions at commercial airports nationwide, as of  January 2005. Although an FSD is responsible for security at every  commercial airport, not every airport has an FSD dedicated solely to that  airport. Most category X airports have an FSD responsible for that airport  alone. Other airports are arranged in a “hub and spoke” configuration, in  which an FSD is located at or near a hub airport but also has responsibility  over one or more spoke airports of the same or smaller size that are  generally located in geographic proximity. At spoke airports, the top- ranking TSA official located at that airport might be a Deputy FSD,  Screening Manager, or even Screening Supervisor, although the FSD has  overall responsibility for the airport. Figure 3 identifies the number of  FSDs responsible for specific numbers of airports. For example, figure 3  shows that 44 FSDs are responsible for a single airport, 37 are responsible  for two airports (one hub and one spoke), and 1 is responsible for nine  airports (one hub and eight spokes).
A Screening Manager is responsible for individuals at screening checkpoints and  maintains communication with supervisors regarding any issues that might reveal a  weakness or vulnerable area of security screening that is discovered during the course of  screening duties. A Screening Supervisor is responsible for supervising personnel  performing preboard security screening of persons and their carry-on and checked  baggage. with, approved security plans and directives pertaining to airport and  aviation security. These responsibilities include a key function of the  oversight of airport compliance with regulatory requirements and security  measures contained in approved security plans and security directives.  Assistant FSDs for Screening are responsible for passenger and baggage  screening and managing all screener staff, and Assistant FSDs for  Operations are responsible for managing nonscreening operations (e.g.,  exercise planning and execution, crisis management, and vulnerability  assessments) and designated aspects of administrative support. An FSD  responsible for a large airport may also have a Deputy FSD, and that  position could be located at a hub airport where the FSD is located or at a  spoke airport. Other FSD management staff positions vary by airport and  airport size, but may include a Stakeholder Manager, Customer Support  Manager, Training Coordinator, Human Resource Specialist, Financial  Specialist, Scheduling Operations Officer, Screening Supervisors and  Managers, administrative support personnel, as well as other positions.

	Federal Security Directors Have a Range of Responsibilities, but TSA’s Guidance Regarding FSDs’ Authority Is Unclear

TSA developed guidance that describes the many roles and responsibilities  of the FSD position, most of which is associated with securing commercial  airports from terrorist threats. However, its guidance addressing FSD  authority is outdated and does not clearly describe the FSDs’ authority  relative to other airport stakeholders during a security incident.  Furthermore, some of the stakeholders at airports we visited said that the  FSDs’ authority relative to others was not always clear during a security  incident, and that the FSDs’ authority in such cases had not been  communicated to them. Most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed by telephone  said that TSA needed to do more to clarify the roles and responsibilities of  the FSD position for the benefit of FSDs and stakeholders, with the  majority of these FSDs stating that their authority needed further  clarification.

		FSDs Have a Range of Responsibilities Related to Airport Security

The FSD is the ranking TSA authority responsible for the leadership and  coordination of TSA security activities at the nation’s commercial airports.  As such, the FSD is responsible for providing day-to-day operational  direction for federal security at the airport or airports to which the FSD is  assigned. ATSA established broad authorities of the FSD, while specific  responsibilities of the FSD are laid out in TSA Delegation Orders, the FSD  position description, and TSA’s 2004 Executive FSD Guide, and include  the following:  Overseeing security screening of passengers, baggage, and air cargo.  FSDs are responsible for providing direct oversight of passenger and  baggage screening by managing the local screening force, which is  typically composed of federal employees. To carry out this responsibility,  FSDs engage in activities that include ensuring implementation of required  screener-training programs, anticipating and preparing for training on new  screening technologies and procedures, and developing local training  initiatives to test and improve screener performance. In accordance with  regulations, aircraft operators perform their own security screening of air  cargo, and FSDs are responsible for overseeing operators’ performance in  implementing required security measures.
Providing regulatory oversight of all U.S. air transportation facilities  and operations. FSDs are responsible for ensuring that airports, airlines  (foreign and domestic), air cargo carriers, and indirect air carriers comply  with TSA regulations and security directives governing such things as  perimeter security, access controls, procedures for challenging  questionable identification documents, aircraft searches, and general  security procedures. This is accomplished through administering  appropriate compliance and enforcement actions with the goal of  discovering and correcting deficiencies and vulnerabilities in aviation  security. FSDs oversee civil enforcement activities at their airports  involving findings of noncompliance with security requirements by  airlines, airports, and individuals, including passengers. To carry out their  regulatory oversight responsibilities, FSDs and staff engage in activities  that include conducting stakeholder meetings with all regulated parties to  discuss regulatory changes or educate them on current aviation threats.
Analyzing and addressing security threats. FSDs are responsible for  conducting analyses of security threats and vulnerabilities in and around  their airports. To carry out this responsibility, FSDs seek intelligence from  sources external to TSA, build systems to analyze the information received  from intelligence organizations and apply it to the local airport security,  and direct TSA regulatory agents to test security measures and procedures  and identify potential security weaknesses.
Building and managing relationships with airport stakeholders. FSDs  are responsible for building and managing relationships with local  stakeholders (e.g., airport management, airlines, and concessionaires) to  ensure that security operations run smoothly. To carry out this  responsibility, FSDs engage in activities that include collaborating with  airlines to identify and resolve issues of efficient passenger flow and  customer service while maintaining security standards. FSDs also  coordinate with airport and airline management; federal, state, and local  governments; law enforcement agencies; and relevant private sector  entities to organize and implement a Federal Security Crisis Management  Plan at each airport. The plan is essentially a protocol for what TSA  employees and airport stakeholders should do in the event of an  emergency, including a terrorist incident, within the airport.
Other FSD responsibilities include communicating information received  from TSA headquarters to appropriate stakeholders, maintaining quality  customer service for airlines and passengers, providing leadership to the  TSA employee population, managing and coordinating their direct staff,  and overseeing management of TSA facilities and equipment resources. In  addition, TSA has directed FSDs to conduct outreach and liaison with the  general aviation community in their areas, although it has not given FSDs  regulatory oversight responsibility over general aviation airports.

		TSA’s Guidance Regarding Aspects of FSDs’ Authority Is Outdated, Lacks Clarity, and Has Not Been Adequately Communicated to Stakeholders

FSDs’ roles and responsibilities have been fairly well documented, but  their authority relative to other airport stakeholders during security  incidents has not been clearly defined. Section 103 of ATSA addressed  FSD authority at the broadest level by giving FSDs responsibility for  overseeing the screening of passengers and property and for carrying out  any other duties prescribed by the TSA Administrator. TSA’s Executive  FSD Guide, discussed earlier, describes FSD responsibilities, but it does  not address the FSDs’ authority in security incidents. That authority is  addressed more specifically in TSA’s June 2002 Delegation of Authority to  Federal Security Directors (Delegation Order), which gives FSDs the  authority to provide for overall security of aviation, including the security  of aircraft and airports and related facilities to which they are assigned.
The Delegation Order is outdated in that it gives FSDs the authority to  train, supervise, equip, and deploy a TSA law enforcement force that was  never established. Officials from TSA’s Aviation Security Program Office  acknowledged that the document is outdated and has not been updated  since FSDs were first assigned to airports. According to officials from  TSA’s Office of Law Enforcement, TSA originally envisioned that all FSDs  would be federal law enforcement officers (e.g., GS-1811—criminal  investigators) and would command a TSA police force. However, the force  was never established, and FSDs were not given federal law enforcement  status. TSA has assigned an Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement to about  half the FSDs in the country, but this is the only law enforcement position  on their staff.  Instead, airport police or state or local law enforcement  agencies primarily carry out the law enforcement function at airports.
Furthermore, the Delegation Order does not clearly address the extent of  FSD authority relative to other parties with responsibilities related to  airport security, including law enforcement agencies. For example, the  Delegation Order gives the FSD authority to clear, close, or otherwise  secure facilities under certain circumstances, and after taking such action,  requires the FSD to provide feedback to the airport operator on the  reasons the security action was taken. The document also provides that,  under certain circumstances, the FSD has the authority to cancel, delay,  return, or divert flights and search and detain persons or property.   However, it does not clearly address what authority, if any, FSDs have  over other parties, such as airport law enforcement personnel, on which it  would need to rely to take these actions. In August 2005, TSA officials told  us that they had drafted a revised Delegation Order that clarified the  authority of FSDs and that it is was being reviewed internally. They stated  that the revised document restates some of the FSDs’ previous authority  and provides for some new ones, such as entering into interagency  agreements.
Stakeholders at some of the airports we visited told us that the FSDs’ role,  particularly regarding their authority relative to other parties, was not  sufficiently clear, and at least one stakeholder at every airport we visited  said such information had never been communicated to them.  At three of  the seven airports, stakeholders said that aspects of the FSD’s authority  during a security incident lacked clarity. For example, at two airports,  confusion or conflicting opinions developed over whether the FSD had the  authority to take certain actions during particular security incidents.  Furthermore, six stakeholders at two of the airports we visited were also  unclear about the FSD’s authority regarding control over airport law  enforcement personnel and canine teams, access to secured information,  and specific operational changes. Additionally, at least one stakeholder at  each of the seven airports we visited said he or she had never been briefed  or given information on the role of the FSD. Among these stakeholders  was an airport manager who said he had specifically sought out  documents detailing the FSD’s roles and authority, including how the FSD  would fit into the airport’s incident command system. At another airport,  airport management officials said they had to take the initiative, in  conjunction with the FSD and law enforcement stakeholders, to develop a  matrix identifying first responders and the lead agency for various types of  incidents after a potential hijacking situation highlighted the need to  document and share such guidance.
Several stakeholders at the national level also raised questions regarding  the clarity of the FSD’s authority relative to that of other parties, including  FSDs’ authority in particular security incidents. Specifically, FBI  headquarters officials and representatives of two industry associations  representing airports and airport law enforcement officials voiced concern  about the clarity of FSDs’ authority, noting that initially some of the first  FSDs attempted to assert control over airport stakeholders, such as the  airport police department. FBI headquarters officials were concerned, on  the basis of past airport exercises, that relationships between FSDs and  the FBI had not been explicitly delineated. Officials stated that if a conflict  with local FBI authorities occurred during an actual security incident, it  might create confusion and result in a longer response time. As of October  2004, FBI headquarters officials informed us that the FBI was attempting  to enter into a memorandum of understanding with TSA to clarify certain  aspects of each agency’s authority. TSA officials said that, as of August  2005, TSA and the FBI had not entered into a memorandum of  understanding and were not able to provide us any additional information  on this issue.
Our telephone interviews with selected FSDs also indicated a need for a  clearer statement of their authority. Most (18) of the 25 FSDs we  interviewed said, to varying degrees, that TSA needed to do more to clarify  the role and responsibilities of the FSD position—not just for the benefit  of FSDs and their staff, but for the benefit of airport stakeholders as well.  (These and other responses to selected questions we posed during our  interviews with 25 FSDs are contained in app. II.) More specifically, when  we asked those 18 FSDs what needed further clarification, 11 said that  their authority needed to be further defined. Among these 11 were 6 FSDs  who believed TSA should develop a document that delineates the  authority of the position or update the Delegation Order. For example,  FSDs told us that other agencies do not understand the authority of the  FSD or TSA, and have asked for a document to be made widely available  to federal agencies, state and local law enforcement, emergency  responders, and other airport stakeholders. Four FSDs explained that  clarification of the FSDs’ authority is needed with respect to critical  incident response.

	TSA Provided Opportunities for Some FSDs to Participate in Developing TSA Aviation Security Policy

TSA does not charge FSDs with responsibility for developing TSA aviation  security policy. However, TSA does expect FSDs to provide input on draft  policy from TSA headquarters when called upon and to recommend  policies and procedures for addressing emerging or unforeseen security  risks and policy gaps. According to TSA officials, the agency provides  several opportunities for some FSDs to be involved in developing some  TSA aviation security policies through the FSD Advisory Council, ad hoc  consultation groups, and the piloting of new security procedures and  technology.
The FSD Advisory Council provides a mechanism for selected FSDs to be  involved in TSA’s efforts to develop aviation security policy, according to  TSA officials. The FSD Advisory Council was originally established as a  way for the Aviation Security Program Office to conduct outreach among  the FSDs. However, in May 2004, the TSA Administrator recast the council  as an advisory board reporting directly to him and, for the most part,  responding to his agenda items. The council consists of 22 FSDs who the  Administrator selects based on factors such as geographic location, airport  security category, and strong FSD leadership, according to a TSA official  responsible for council coordination. Most FSDs do not serve on the  council for more than 1 year, but their term is ultimately left to the  Administrator’s discretion. Council meetings occur over a 3-day period in  Washington, D.C., generally on a monthly basis. According to TSA  officials, during council meetings, the FSDs provide the Administrator  their opinions and guidance on establishing and modifying TSA policies  and procedures and have opportunities for input in other areas. Four of  the five FSDs at airports we visited, including two who were council  members, saw the council as an effective way for the Administrator to  gather input on new TSA policy initiatives and issues confronting FSDs.  The fifth FSD commented that most of the issues discussed by the council  appeared to be more relevant to airports larger than his.
On occasion, some FSDs have the opportunity to provide input on draft  TSA aviation security policy through ad hoc consultation groups organized  by the Aviation Security Program Office, according to TSA officials. For  instance, when TSA establishes a new standard operating procedure, it  typically consults a selected group drawn from, perhaps, 9 or 10 airports.  These groups are ad hoc and may include different combinations of FSDs,  FSD staff, and airport stakeholders. For example, TSA formed a group of  FSDs, screeners, and airport and air carrier staff from multiple airports to  address anticipated increases in the 2004 summer travel season. According  to the TSA officials, TSA typically consults such groups on most significant  policy developments. However, the more urgent or sensitive a new policy,  the less likely TSA will have time to obtain input outside of headquarters.  The official stated that TSA does not involve every FSD in every policy it  develops but added that he could not think of any policy in the last 6  months that had not involved at least some FSDs in its development.
Participating in pilots of new technology and procedures at their airports  is another way FSDs can be involved in developing TSA aviation security  policy. TSA has a variety of ongoing pilot programs that it generally  characterizes as either technology- or procedure-based. For example, TSA  has tested and evaluated at multiple airports a technology pilot—the  Explosive Trace Detection Portal Program—that is designed to analyze the  air around a passenger for traces of explosive material. TSA’s procedure- based pilots include the Registered Traveler Program, which identifies  participating travelers through biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints,  and helps to expedite these passengers through required security  screening for weapons and explosives. In addition, TSA has piloted other  program initiatives, such as its Next Generation Hiring Program, which  TSA reported provides a more localized approach to screener hiring that  enables FSDs to influence the hiring process for their airports. TSA first  piloted this initiative at Boston Logan International Airport and gradually  expanded testing to other airports, continuing to make changes before  implementing the program nationwide.
Not all FSDs or their airports have been involved in piloting new  technologies and procedures. According to TSA headquarters officials,  TSA decided to limit the airports at which it conducts these types of pilots  to a selected group of “model” airports, although it does conduct pilots not  involving technology or procedures at other airports. As such, in  December 2004, in an effort to streamline the airport selection process for  technology pilots, TSA identified 15 airports and recommended they be  used for such pilots on an ongoing basis. According to these officials, the  selected airports provide diversity in geography, demographics, and  baggage and materials to be screened. Ten of the 25 FSDs we interviewed  said TSA had offered their airports opportunities to pilot a new program or  technology (collectively, more than 20 such opportunities), and all of them  subsequently participated.
Although TSA officials told us that opportunities exist for some FSDs to be  involved in developing TSA aviation security policy, most of the FSDs (21  of 25) who we interviewed characterized themselves as not involved in  developing such policy. Three of the five FSDs at airports we visited  suggested that TSA should consult FSDs on security policies before  issuing them, although some noted time may not permit this on urgent  security measures. Two of these FSDs said it would be helpful if TSA  allowed FSDs a comment period for new policy, and another said that  because TSA does not involve FSDs in developing policy, its weekly  national conference calls with FSDs are filled with questions and  discussions about new security directives.

	FSDs Formed Partnerships with Key Stakeholders and Participated in Communication and Coordination Efforts

FSDs reported they entered into these partnerships at the seven airports  we visited, and FSDs and stakeholders stated that these partnerships were  generally working well. Furthermore, FSDs initiated communication and  coordination efforts with stakeholders or were involved in efforts already  established—such as meetings and briefings—to address a range of issues,  including airport security, operations, and coordination.

		TSA Views Stakeholder Partnerships with FSDs as Essential

As discussed earlier, TSA has given FSDs responsibility for building and  managing relationships with airport stakeholders and has generally left it  to the FSDs to determine how to develop effective stakeholder  relationships. According to TSA’s Executive FSD Guide, building and  maintaining stakeholder partnerships is a major responsibility of FSDs,  and these partnerships can create capabilities at airports where the sum is  greater than the parts. TSA further reinforces the importance of FSDs’  building and managing partnerships by including this activity as a standard  rating element on their annual performance assessments. TSA addressed  the importance of partnerships in connection with planning for increased  passenger traffic during the summer months of 2004 in its best practice  guide—the Aviation Partnership Support Plan. This document recognized  the need for FSDs and airport stakeholders to work together toward  achieving security and customer service. For example, the plan addressed  the importance of TSA and air carrier station managers working together  to identify a process for communicating, handling, and destroying  sensitive passenger load data, and it encouraged FSDs to develop formal  working groups to bring together local stakeholders.
According to parties at the airports we visited and TSA guidance,  developing partnerships with airport stakeholders is essential for FSDs to  effectively do their job. First, according to FSDs, FSD staff, and law  enforcement stakeholders at the airports we visited, FSDs lack law  enforcement personnel to respond to a security incident and, therefore,  must rely on federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in these  instances. TSA also recognizes that, for example, FSDs would have to  work with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to respond to a  security incident on an aircraft where the door has been closed for  embarkation, because FSDs do not have the resources needed to respond  to such an incident. Second, developing partnerships can provide benefits  to FSDs and airport stakeholders. For example, FSDs need air carrier data  on the number of passengers transiting airport checkpoints to  appropriately schedule screeners. At the same time, air carriers seek an  efficient screening process to minimize wait times for their customers.  Various parties we interviewed, including airport stakeholders, BTS and  FBI officials, and an industry representative, recognized the importance of  partnerships in helping the airport operate smoothly. For example, one  industry representative said that airport management needs security and  threat information from the FSD, and the FSD needs to understand  nonsecurity issues that affect the FSD’s job, such as an upcoming local  event that may increase passenger traffic.

		FSDs and Stakeholders Reported Partnerships Were Generally Working Well

FSDs and most of the stakeholders at the seven airports we visited said  that they had developed partnerships, and they described these  partnerships as generally working well. The FSDs responsible for these  airports reported having positive partnerships with airport stakeholders.  More specifically, one FSD said that having common goals with  stakeholders, such as ensuring security, enhanced their partnerships.  Another FSD saw himself as a catalyst for partnerships at his airport and  as a facilitator among stakeholders who did not always get along. At most  of these airports, stakeholders also reported that FSD-stakeholder  partnerships were working well and identified examples of successful  practices. Some spoke of the value of an FSD being accessible to  stakeholders to help resolve problems by, for example, being visible at the  airport and maintaining an open-door policy. Seven stakeholders stated  that the FSDs at their airports discussed TSA security directives and  worked with them when it was not clear how to interpret or implement  them. At one airport, the FSD, airport management, and air carriers  teamed together to look for opportunities to enhance security and  customer service. To this end, they formed a working group and developed  a proposal for TSA that addressed issues involving technology,  infrastructure, transportation assets, and local budgetary control for the  FSD. Finally, at another airport, in an effort to manage stakeholders’  concerns about wait times and customer service, the FSD arranged for  staff to help screen all of the airport vendors and concessionaires, as  required, but at an established time to ensure passengers were minimally  affected.
Partnerships at airports across the country were generally working well or  better at the time of our review than when TSA first assigned FSDs to  airports, according to several federal agency officials and industry  representatives at the national level. Some airport stakeholders and  industry representatives stated that some FSDs’ authoritative management  style and lack of airport knowledge contributed to tensions in earlier FSD- stakeholder relationships. However, during the course of our review, TSA  officials said they received very few complaints about FSDs from airport  stakeholders, and industry representatives and officials from BTS (which  oversees CBP and ICE), and the FBI said that partnerships were generally  working well or had improved. For example, FBI officials had queried 27  of their Airport Liaison Agents in October 2004 about their relationships  with FSDs, and 20 of the 22 agents who responded characterized these  relationships as generally good. FBI officials told us that at one airport  where coordination and partnerships stood out as being particularly  strong, the FSD met with stakeholders every morning.
TSA established 80 Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement positions across  the country to help FSDs partner and act as liaison with law enforcement  stakeholders and to conduct certain criminal investigations. This position  is always filled by a federal law enforcement officer (a criminal  investigator), and is the only law enforcement officer assigned to an FSD.  Office of Law Enforcement officials stated that this position is essential  for interacting with local law enforcement stakeholders, and they would  like to see every FSD have at least one Assistant FSD for Law  Enforcement and more than one at larger airports. Assistant FSDs for Law  Enforcement report directly to their respective FSDs, and at smaller  airports without this position, the FSD takes on responsibility for  coordinating with law enforcement stakeholders. Given the number of  positions authorized, not all FSDs have Assistant FSDs for Law  Enforcement on their staff. Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed, 13 reported  having this position on their staff, and 12 reported not having this position.  Regardless of whether these FSDs had this position, almost all (23) said it  was important to have the position on their staff to coordinate with the  law enforcement and intelligence community and perform criminal  investigations. An Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement explained during  one airport visit that his familiarity with legal processes and procedures  facilitated his working relationship with the FBI and U.S. Attorneys. FBI  headquarters officials also reported that the Assistant FSD for Law  Enforcement position has helped improve coordination between TSA and  the FBI at airports. TSA did not provide an agency-level position on  whether every FSD needs an Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement.
Although most of our contacts reported that partnerships between FSDs  and airport stakeholders were generally working well, about half (13) of  the 25 FSDs we interviewed said that it is challenging to foster  partnerships with the parties they are responsible for regulating. Several  FSDs stated that while it may be hard to partner with those one regulates,  having good communication and relationships with stakeholders and a  mutual understanding of the responsibility of regulating airport security  makes such partnering possible. According to officials from TSA’s Office  of Compliance Programs, the office has articulated a policy of compliance  through cooperation, which has helped FSDs foster partnerships with  airport stakeholders while achieving TSA’s regulatory oversight mission.  For example, TSA established a Voluntary Disclosure Program that allows  stakeholders to forgo civil penalty actions by bringing violations to the  attention of TSA and taking prompt corrective action. The philosophy  behind this program is that aviation security is well served by providing  incentives to regulated parties to identify and correct their own instances  of noncompliance and to invest more resources in efforts to preclude their  recurrence. According to Office of Compliance Program officials, 75  percent of issues of noncompliance were closed by administrative action  rather than civil enforcement during the past 2 fiscal years. Furthermore,  in half the cases reported, FSDs were able to address the discovered  security gaps and close the issue with a note to the inspection files, instead  of writing a formal investigation report.
At one airport we visited, not all stakeholders agreed that partnerships  with the FSD were working well. Airport management, airport law  enforcement, and air carriers at this airport said the FSD was not  accessible, often did not attend meetings to which he had been invited,  and sometimes did not send FSD staff to meetings in his place. These  stakeholders also criticized the FSD for not distributing security directives  and meeting to discuss their implementation. However, local federal  stakeholders at this airport (representing the FBI, CBP, and ICE) said that  the FSD had established positive partnerships with them and had  communicated well.

		FSDs and Stakeholders Said They Participated in Many Communication and Coordination Efforts

According to TSA’s Executive FSD Guide, FSDs are responsible for  conducting group or one-on-one meetings with airport managers and air  carriers. FSDs and stakeholders at all seven of the airports we visited told  us that they were involved with these and other communication and  coordination efforts. FSDs and stakeholders described a variety of such  mechanisms, including meetings and training exercises, noting that many  of these were in place before FSDs were assigned to airports. A BTS  official explained that at larger airports, FSDs inherited coordination  mechanisms and relationships established between federal agencies and  other stakeholders. In contrast, at smaller airports, FSDs had to educate  stakeholders on involving and communicating more with federal officials.  At two of the larger airports we visited, stakeholders said that the FSDs  initiated communication and coordination efforts on their own, such as  holding routine intelligence briefings and meetings with law enforcement  agencies and representatives of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. Aside from the  more formal communication and coordination mechanisms, FSDs and  some of the stakeholders at all seven airports we visited said they  frequently shared information and developed partnerships informally  through telephone calls, e-mails, and face-to-face interactions.
At all of the airports we visited, FSDs and stakeholders reported that  meetings to discuss improvements to airport security and operations and  coordination meetings were held, although the type of participants and  frequency of these meetings varied. FSDs and stakeholders reported that  some of these meetings were held on a weekly, monthly, or quarterly  basis, while others were held on an impromptu basis when FSDs or  stakeholders had an issue to discuss. According to an FBI official, most of  the Airport Liaison Agents they had queried were having monthly meetings  with their FSDs. Similarly, a BTS official said that all FSDs had monthly  meetings with representatives from other BTS agencies (ICE and CBP) to  improve coordination of law enforcement and security efforts among  these agencies at airports. Although five of the seven airports we visited  had standing formal meetings, two of the smaller airports did not. Rather,  at these airports, the FSD and stakeholders reported interacting daily and  holding meetings on an as-needed basis.
In addition to meetings, incident debriefings and training exercises to  ensure a coordinated response in the event of a security incident were  conducted at most of the airports we visited.  Stakeholders at three of the  airports mentioned that debriefings occurred after an actual incident to  address questions and discuss how the incident had been handled. For  example, at one airport, a stakeholder explained that a debriefing helped  alleviate concerns he had regarding his lack of involvement during a  particular incident. According to TSA, response to an actual event is  typically only as good as the training for it; hence, TSA requires FSDs to  hold quarterly training exercises at their airports. Training exercises  included tabletop simulation exercises, hijacking scenarios, and Man  Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) vulnerability assessments to  identify areas where a MANPADS attack could be launched. Sometimes  protocols or security directives are written as a result of airport incidents  and debriefings. At all seven airports we visited, protocols for responding  to incidents existed, according to FSDs, their staff, or stakeholders, and at  most of these airports, protocols were written into the Airport Security  Plan. However, a TSA headquarters official explained that a protocol  cannot exist for every possible incident, given that security incidents are  often unique.

	TSA Made Changes to Better Support or Empower the FSD Position and Was Planning Additional Changes

TSA has made a number of changes intended to provide FSDs with more  authority and flexibility in carrying out their responsibilities, and most  FSDs we interviewed responded favorably to these changes.  In addition,  TSA was planning additional efforts during our review that could affect  FSDs, and the majority of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said they were not  involved in these efforts.

		Most FSDs We Interviewed Viewed the Changes TSA Made Favorably

To further support or empower the FSD position, TSA increased FSDs’  authority to address performance and conduct problems, established a  local hiring initiative, increased flexibility to provide screener training,  relocated Area Director positions to the field, and established a report  group and a mentoring program. The majority of FSDs we interviewed had  positive views of most of these changes.
Local hiring initiative. TSA developed a local screener hiring initiative  that, among other things, vested more hiring authority with FSDs to  address airport staffing needs. To meet a post-September 11 statutory  deadline, TSA brought a workforce of 57,000 federal screeners on board  within 6 months using a highly centralized approach of recruiting,  assessing, hiring, and training. With this accomplished, TSA began  piloting a reengineered local hiring initiative, called Next Generation  Hiring, in June 2004. Its goal was to ensure the involvement of FSDs and  their staff in the hiring process, streamline the process, and make the  process more responsive to the full range of airport needs. The program  was designed to give FSDs and their staff the flexibility to determine  which aspects, or phases, of local hiring they wish to participate in, and  how much contractor support they need. TSA incorporated modifications  as a result of lessons learned from its pilot and initial implementation sites  as it gradually rolled out this initiative to additional locations. By March  2005, TSA had established 12 fully operational local hiring centers around  the country, with locations based on various factors, including geography  and operational need.
When we asked all 155 FSDs in our March 2004 survey if they wanted more  authority in selecting screeners, 136 (88 percent) said they wanted more  authority to do this to a great or very great extent, and another 9 percent  said they wanted more authority in this area to a moderate extent. When  we interviewed 25 FSDs during this review, approximately 1 year after  TSA began rolling out the Next Generation Hiring program, 12 reported  that they wanted more authority in selecting screeners to a great or very  great extent, even given their participation options under Next Generation  Hiring, and another 8 said they wanted more authority in this area to a  moderate extent.
Nevertheless, 18 of the 25 FSDs stated that Next Generation Hiring  provided for their airports’ screener staffing needs better than TSA’s  former hiring process to a very great, great, or moderate extent. In  addition, 14 of the 25 FSDs stated that, overall, they were satisfied with the  new program’s ability to meet their screener staffing needs, but 7 said they  were not satisfied. Comments from those dissatisfied FSDs included  statements that the contractor had not done a good job in the recruiting  aspect of the process and that the new hiring process still takes too long— a comment echoed by some FSDs we interviewed during our airport visits  earlier in the program’s rollout.
TSA officials stated that the goal of Next Generation Hiring was not  necessarily to reduce the time it takes to bring a new screener on board at  every airport. Rather, the goal was to be more responsive to all local hiring  needs—not just the needs of the largest airports. According to a program  official, early data on Next Generation Hiring have been positive, though  limited. For example, data from a nonscientific sample of several airports  showed that under Next Generation Hiring, fewer screeners resigned  within their first month than before the program was in place (about 18  percent resigned in the first month before Next Generation Hiring; about  7.5 percent resigned in the first month after the program was initiated at  those airports). Officials also concluded, on the basis of their limited data  and anecdotal information, that candidates selected at airports where the  FSD and staff were conducting the hiring process were more selective in  accepting offers because they had more knowledge of what the job would  entail than contractors did when they handled the hiring process.
Increased flexibility to provide screener training. TSA expanded FSDs’  flexibility to offer training locally to screeners in two respects in April  2004. First, TSA developed and implemented a new basic screener training  program to cover the technical aspects of both passenger and checked  baggage screening, and allowed FSDs to choose whether new screeners  would receive instruction in one or both of these screening functions  during initial training. According to TSA officials, this approach provides  the optimum training solution based on the specific needs of each airport  and reflects the fact that, at some airports, the FSD does not need all  screeners to be fully trained in both passenger and checked baggage  screening. Second, TSA offered FSDs the flexibility to deliver basic  screener training using either contractors or local TSA employees as  instructors, provided they have experience as instructors and are  approved by TSA.
Prior to TSA providing FSDs with more training flexibility, 110 of the 155  FSDs (71 percent) who responded to our March 2004 survey said that they  wanted more flexibility to design and conduct local training to a great or  very great extent. A year later, when we asked 25 FSDs during this review  about their satisfaction with the flexibility they had in offering training  locally to screeners, 21 said they were satisfied. Several noted this was an  area where they had seen improvement in the flexibility TSA had given  them.
Increased authority to address performance and conduct problems. TSA  expanded FSDs’ authority to address employee performance and conduct  problems over time, beginning in 2003 when FSDs were delegated  authority to suspend employees for up to 3 days. In July 2004, FSDs were  delegated the authority to take the full range of disciplinary actions,  including removal, in accordance with TSA policy. In September 2004, TSA  again increased the authority of FSDs by allowing them to use a  streamlined, one-step process in taking certain disciplinary actions, such  as the termination of employment for screeners involved in theft or the use  of drugs or alcohol. During our telephone interviews with FSDs,  conducted more than 6 months after the last of these increases in FSD  authority, 24 of the 25 FSDs said they were satisfied with their current  authority to address employee performance and conduct problems.
Moreover, 2 of the 5 FSDs we interviewed during our airport visits said  that their increased authority in this area was an important change that  exemplified TSA’s efforts to further empower FSDs.
Relocation of Area Director positions. In September 2004, as part of an  overall reorganization effort, TSA physically relocated its five Area  Director positions from the Aviation Security Program Office in  headquarters to the field. According to TSA headquarters officials, the goal  was to move more TSA authority and decision making from headquarters  to the field and to create efficiencies in TSA’s processes and procedures.  In making this change, TSA named five existing FSDs—one in each of  TSA’s five geographic areas—to assume the responsibility of being Area  Directors in addition to continuing to serve as FSDs of major airports.  FSDs in each of the new Area Directors’ geographic regions report to their  respective Area Director on administrative matters. However, they report  to TSA headquarters (the Aviation Security Program Office and  Transportation Security Operations Center) on operational issues, such as  reporting security incidents. To support these “dual hatted” FSDs with  their additional Area Director responsibilities, TSA authorized each to hire  five additional staff.
The 25 FSDs we interviewed were divided on whether they thought having  Area Directors in the field was helpful—12 said it was helpful and 12 said  it was not helpful—and some offered comments. On one hand, several  FSDs said that field-based Area Directors who were also FSDs had a much  better understanding of what FSDs encounter each day. On the other  hand, several said that FSDs were better served by Area Directors located  at headquarters because they were more aware of everything that was  taking place and had more staff to support them. Views on this topic were  also mixed among the five FSDs we interviewed during our airport visits.
Two Area Directors were among the 25 FSDs we interviewed, and both  thought the change to field-based Area Directors was helpful but thought  that the position should be further empowered. One explained that the  Area Directors should be involved in operational issues in addition to  administrative matters, although he would need additional staff if he also  had this responsibility. The other Area Director said that, as one of only  five Area Directors, he is responsible for too many airports.
Report Group. In conjunction with moving the Area Director positions  out of headquarters, TSA established this group in September 2004 to  conduct some of the duties previously performed by Area Directors when  at headquarters. It was also intended to provide operational support and a  communication link between TSA headquarters and field-based Area  Directors, and in turn, FSDs and their staff. The group manages and  standardizes communications (including sending daily recaps of each  day’s business), continually updates point-of-contact lists that identified  who FSDs and their staff should contact when a problem arises, and  serves as a troubleshooter for unresolved issues. For example, FSDs and  their staff may call the Report Group for assistance if they have already  contacted the appropriate headquarters contacts and their issue or  question was not resolved.
Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed, 16 considered the Report Group to be a  valuable resource, and 7 said they did not consider it valuable. Although  TSA established the group just prior to our airport visits, FSDs we  interviewed at that time saw the potential value of the group and noted  that its daily recaps were already helpful in consolidating and sharing  consistent information, as were the point-of-contact lists.
Mentoring Program. TSA began offering an optional mentoring  experience to newly appointed FSDs and Deputy FSDs in April 2004 to  support their transition into their new positions. Under this program,  mentor coordinators match new FSDs and Deputy FSDs (mentoring  colleagues) with more experienced counterparts (mentors) at other  airports somewhat comparable in size and complexity. As TSA names new  FSDs and Deputies, the coordinators offer them a choice of prescreened  volunteer mentors, give participants suggested steps for proceeding with  the mentoring relationship, and provide a list of frequently asked questions  and answers about the program.
Only 2 of the 5 FSDs we visited and 4 of the 25 FSDs we interviewed had  participated in the Mentoring Program—either by being a mentor or by  being mentored—and all but one saw it as having value. One FSD, who  had been mentored, explained that having a mentor helped him learn a  very challenging job and provided the opportunity to bounce ideas off of  an experienced FSD. About half (13) of the 25 FSDs said that they were  not familiar with TSA’s mentoring program.

		TSA Was Planning Additional Initiatives That Could Affect FSDs

At the time we interviewed FSDs, TSA was planning the following three  additional initiatives that could affect at least some FSDs.  The majority of  the 25 FSDs we interviewed said they were not involved in these efforts.
TSA’s Screening Allocation Model. TSA has been developing a model for  determining screener staffing levels after initially deploying its federal  screener workforce in 2002 based on estimates of screeners performing  screening functions under privatized agencies, instead of a model. In  September 2003, in an effort to right-size and stabilize its screener  workforce, TSA hired a consultant to conduct a study of screener staffing  levels at the nation’s commercial airports. Among other things, the  consultant was tasked with (1) developing a comprehensive modeling  approach with appropriate details to account for the considerable  variability that occurs among airports, (2) creating a staffing analysis  model to be used as a management tool to determine daily and weekly  staffing levels and deploying the model to commercial airports nationwide,  and (3) developing user-friendly simulation software to determine  optimum screener staffing levels for each commercial airport with federal  screeners. In March 2004, while awaiting the completion of this model,  TSA established specific airport staffing limits to meet a congressionally  mandated cap for screeners set at the level of 45,000 full-time-equivalent  positions. In the summer of 2004, the model was selected, developed, and  deployed for airport data input. That fall, TSA officials told us they  expected the model, which was being validated with airports at the time,  would demonstrate TSA’s need for screeners beyond the mandated cap.  FSDs we interviewed during our airport visits shared this view and the  expectation that many airports would see increases in their screener  allocations. In July 2005, TSA finalized and submitted to Congress its  standards for determining aviation security staffing for all airports at  which screening is required.
The Screening Allocation Model does not give FSDs the authority to  determine the number of screeners authorized for their airports, nor was it  intended to do so. When asked if they would like to have greater authority  in determining screener staffing levels for the airports they oversee, 23 of  the 25 FSDs we interviewed answered that, to a great or very great extent,  they would like greater authority. One FSD commented, for example, that  there will always be a need for FSDs to have a way to adjust screener  numbers and that the screener staffing system needs to have sufficient  flexibility to address sudden changes in screening demands. This view was  fairly consistent with what FSDs had said a year earlier in our March 2004  survey, when we posed the same question to all FSDs. At that time, 145 of  154 FSDs (94 percent) answered in the same way when asked if they  wanted more authority in determining the number of screeners for their  airports.
Although TSA officials said that they had obtained a variety of data from  FSDs during the course of the development of its Screening Allocation  Model, not all of the FSDs we contacted saw themselves as having been  involved in the model’s development. Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed, 14  said that TSA had not involved them or provided them with the  opportunity to have input into the development of the model. Of the 14  FSDs who said they were not involved, 11 were dissatisfied regarding their  lack of involvement. Furthermore, among the 11 FSDs who said they were  involved in developing the model, 5 were dissatisfied regarding their level  of involvement. According to TSA officials, FSDs provided information  for the model regarding their respective airports, and headquarters  validated the numbers the model generated for each airport.
Reassessments of airport hub and spoke configurations and FSD  management staff. TSA began two related reviews in June 2004: (1) a  reassessment of the hub and spoke configurations of commercial airports  and (2) a reassessment of the number of management and administrative  positions allocated to each FSD. The hub and spoke reassessment could  result in changes to the number or the specific airports for which some  FSDs are responsible. According to TSA headquarters officials, TSA  undertook this reassessment because some FSDs had airports in more  than one state, and complexities arose when working with multiple state  laws and regulations, as well as U.S. Attorneys and police departments  from multiple state jurisdictions. Officials anticipated that after TSA  completes its review, a few situations will continue in which FSDs have  responsibility for airports in more than one state, but only when the  distance between certain airports necessitates.
Related to its review of hub and spoke configurations, TSA undertook a  reassessment of FSD management staff levels, recognizing that some  airports—typically smaller ones—were overstaffed, while others— typically larger airports—were understaffed. According to TSA officials,  TSA initially distributed FSD staff based on the security classification of  the airport and, to a lesser extent, the size or annual number of aircraft  boardings. This, coupled with resource constraints that resulted in fewer  positions being authorized than were needed, resulted in an imbalance in  FSD staff among airports. Authorizations for the FSD staff positions  ranged from 1 position at category III and IV airports with a minimum  threshold of boardings, to 16 positions at category X and large category I  airports. TSA made decisions regarding some of these positions (e.g.,  whether a particular FSD should be assigned a Deputy FSD or an Assistant  FSD for Law Enforcement), while FSDs were left to make decisions about  other positions (e.g., whether to include a Training Coordinator or a  Human Resources Specialist as one of the FSD’s management staff).  Although TSA made adjustments to some FSDs’ staff levels over time,  officials recognized that an across-the-board reassessment was needed.
The majority of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said that they were not  involved in either of these two reassessment efforts, and most who were  not involved were dissatisfied with their lack of involvement. Fourteen of  the 25 FSDs said they had not been involved in TSA’s reassessment of  airport hub and spoke configurations, and 19 of the 25 FSDs said they had  not been involved the reassessment of FSD management staff levels. TSA  headquarters officials said that they acknowledge the importance of FSDs’  involvement in agency planning efforts, and when practical and  appropriate, TSA has attempted to obtain a broad spectrum of FSD input.  They said that in conducting these two particular reassessments, they  formed a team that included three FSDs and three Deputy FSDs.

	Conclusions

For FSDs to carry out their responsibilities effectively, FSDs, their staff,  and airport stakeholders need a clear statement of the FSDs’ authority,  relative to other stakeholders, in the event of security incidents. TSA’s  primary document outlining FSDs’ authority is outdated, and neither it,  nor other statements TSA has issued, delineates the authority of the FSD  in various security situations relative to other parties. The absence of a  clear understanding of the authority of the position has reportedly resulted  in confusion during past security incidents and has raised concerns among  some stakeholders at both the national and airport levels about possible  ambiguity regarding FSDs’ authority during future incidents. Updating  TSA’s Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clarify their authority relative to  others and developing other documents, as warranted, would benefit FSDs  by further enabling them to communicate and share consistent  information about their authority with their staff and airport stakeholders,  including law enforcement agencies. Stakeholders need to be clear on  which agency has authority or lead responsibility in the event of various  types of security incidents to reduce the likelihood of confusion or a  delayed response.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To clarify the authority of the Federal Security Director during various  security incidents and help ensure a consistent understanding of the  authority of FSDs among FSDs, their staff, and airport stakeholders, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant  Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security  Administration to take the following two actions:    update TSA’s Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clearly reflect the  authority of FSDs relative to other airport stakeholders during security  incidents and    communicate the authority of the FSD position, as warranted, to FSDs  and all airport stakeholders.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. On  September 15, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report,  which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS, in its written comments,  generally concurred with our findings and recommendations, and agreed  that efforts to implement these recommendations are critical to enable  FSDs to effectively oversee security at the nation’s commercial airports.  Regarding our recommendation that TSA update its Delegation of  Authority to FSDs and communicate this information to FSDs and relevant  stakeholders, DHS stated that a new restatement of the Delegation Order  has been drafted by a working group composed of FSDs from the FSD  Advisory Council and the Office of Chief Counsel. The Delegation Order  has a new concise format that restates some of the FSDs’ previous  authorities and proposes some new authorities, such as entering into  interagency agreements and administering oaths, consistent with the  evolving operational requirements in the field. DHS further stated that the  Delegation Order is being internally coordinated for comment and  clearance and will be presented for consideration of senior leadership and  the Administrator. At that time, FSDs and airport stakeholders will be  notified of their responsibilities under the new Delegation Order.
TSA also provided additional technical comments on our draft report,  which we have incorporated where appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  date of this report. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate  congressional committees and subcommittees, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA, and other  interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3404 or at berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of   Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

To examine the role of the Federal Security Director (FSD), we addressed  the following questions: (1) What are the roles and the responsibilities of  FSDs and how clear is their authority relative to that of other airport  stakeholders during security incidents? (2) To what extent are FSDs  involved in the development of federal aviation security policy? (3) How  have FSDs at selected airports formed and facilitated partnerships with  airport stakeholders, and how are these partnerships working? (4) What  key changes has the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) made  or planned to make to better support or empower the FSD position, and  how have selected FSDs viewed these efforts?
To address aspects of each of these objectives, we interviewed TSA’s Chief  Operating Officer and other TSA officials from headquarters offices,  including the Aviation Security Program Office, Office of Law  Enforcement, Office of Compliance Programs, and Office of Human  Resources. We reviewed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and  other relevant laws, as well as TSA documents related to the FSD position,  including delegations of authority, position descriptions, the Executive  FSD Guide, performance management guidance, and the FSD Advisory  Council Charter. We also reviewed TSA documents related to its recent  operational changes, such as the Next Generation Hiring Guide,  Communication Liaison Group Mission Statement, and the TSA  Management Directive on Addressing Performance and Conduct  Problems. We met with Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  headquarters officials from the Border and Transportation Security  Directorate, which oversees TSA, and Counter-Terrorism Division and  Criminal Investigations Division officials within the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) headquarters. To address all but the fourth objective,  we also met with representatives of four national associations—the  American Association of Airport Executives, Airports Council  International, Air Transport Association, and Airport Law Enforcement  Agencies Network.
In addition, to address all of this report’s objectives, we conducted field  visits to seven airports. We selected these airports because they were  close to our staff and incorporated all five airport security categories— three airports with an FSD dedicated to a single airport and two sets of  airports where the FSD was responsible for at least two airports.  Specifically, we visited three category X airports (Los Angeles  International Airport, California; Washington Dulles International Airport,  Virginia; and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Virginia); Bob  Hope Airport, California (category I); Long Beach-Daugherty Field Airport,  California (category II); Charlottesville-Albemarle Airport, Virginia  (category III); and Shenandoah Valley Airport, Virginia (category IV).
At each airport we visited, we met with local TSA officials and key airport  stakeholders to discuss the role of the FSD and FSD-stakeholder  partnerships and communication mechanisms. We met with the FSD (at  the three airports with dedicated FSDs and the two hub airports) or the  top-ranking TSA official (at the two spoke airports), as well as the  Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement and Regulatory Inspection, where  these positions existed. During our meetings with FSDs, we also obtained  their views on changes TSA had made or planned to make to enhance the  FSD position. We also met with key airport stakeholders, including airport  managers, airport law enforcement officials, station managers  representing selected air carriers (15 representatives of 12 air carriers and,  additionally, two air carrier representative groups specific to two airports  we visited), and FBI Airport Liaison Agents and officials from DHS’s  Customs and Border Protection as well as Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (at the two international airports we visited). At each airport,  we conducted a single joint interview with representatives from multiple  air carriers, and we selected air carriers through different means. At  airports with an air carrier council, we asked the council head to identify  approximately three carriers. Although we left the final decision to the  council head, we suggested that he or she include the largest or one of the  largest carriers (according to the percentage of the airport’s passenger  travel) at the airport, an independent air carrier, and an international  carrier, if it was an international airport. At airports without an air carrier  council, the Air Transport Association or the airport operator  recommended the air carriers. At the smallest airports, we met with all air  carriers because of the small numbers. Because we selected a  nonprobability sample of airports to visit, the information we obtained  during these visits cannot be generalized to all airports or FSDs across the  nation.
To corroborate what we learned from the five FSDs during our field visits,  we telephoned 25 additional FSDs to obtain their views on a range of  topics including recent TSA initiatives and federal aviation security policy.  We also included selected questions—regarding their need for greater  authority and flexibility—that we had posed in our March 2004 Web-based  survey of all 155 FSDs, conducted to support other GAO aviation security  reviews. This allowed us to make a rough comparison between the 2004  responses and 2005 responses to these questions. We selected a random  sample of FSDs in place since September 1, 2004, to ensure they had an  experience base from which to answer our questions. We excluded from  the list the five FSDs we interviewed during our airport visits and  individuals who were no longer FSDs. TSA reviewed our selection  procedures but did not know the identities of the specific 25 FSDs we  interviewed. The 25 FSDs were from a cross section of all five airport  security categories. A GAO survey specialist who was involved in  designing the Web-based survey, along with GAO staff knowledgeable  about issues facing FSDs developed the structured telephone interview  instrument. We conducted pretest interviews with 3 FSDs to ensure that  the questions were clear and concise, and subsequently conducted the 25  telephone interviews from late April to early May 2005. Although the  telephone interviews were conducted with a random sample of FSDs, the  sample is too small to generalize the interview results to all FSDs across  the nation with reliable statistical precision.
The practical difficulties of conducting interviews may introduce errors,  commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in  how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources of information that  are available to respondents, or in how the data were analyzed can  introduce unwanted variability into the results. We took steps in the  development of the questions, the data collection, and the data analysis to  minimize these nonsampling errors. For example, a survey specialist  helped develop the interview questions in collaboration with GAO staff  with subject matter expertise. Then, as mentioned earlier, the draft  questions were pretested to ensure that the questions were relevant,  clearly stated, and easy to comprehend. Interviews were conducted by  GAO staff familiar with the subject matter and proper interviewing  procedures. Finally, when the data were analyzed, a second, independent  analyst checked to make sure that the results were correct.
We conducted our work from August 2004 through September 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25 Federal Security Directors

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact mentioned above, Glenn Davis, Assistant  Director; David Alexander; Grace Coleman; Tracey Cross; Wayne Ekblad;  David Hancock; Stuart Kaufman; Janice Latimer; Thomas Lombardi; and  Lori Weiss made key contributions to this report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assigned Federal Security Directors (FSD) to oversee security, including the screening of passengers and their baggage, at the nation's more than 440 commercial airports. FSDs must work closely with stakeholders to ensure that airports are adequately protected and prepared in the event of a terrorist attack. This report addresses (1) the roles and responsibilities of FSDs and the clarity of their authority relative to that of other airport stakeholders during security incidents, (2) the extent to which FSDs formed and facilitated partnerships with airport stakeholders, and (3) FSDs' views of key changes TSA made to better support or empower the FSD position.

What GAO Found

TSA has issued guidance that clearly defines FSDs' roles and responsibilities. However, TSA's guidance related to FSDs' authority is outdated and lacks clarity regarding FSD authority relative to other airport stakeholders. TSA's document that delegates authority to FSDs gives them authority to supervise and deploy a TSA law enforcement force that was never established. Also, it does not clearly address FSD authority during a security incident relative to other parties with airport security responsibilities. At airports GAO visited, stakeholders said that this information had never been communicated to them and they were not always clear on the FSDs' authority in such situations. For example, confusion arose at one airport over whether the FSD had the authority to take certain actions during a security incident. In August 2005, TSA officials stated that they were updating guidance on FSDs' authority but had not finalized their revisions prior to this report's issuance. All of the FSDs and most stakeholders at the airports GAO visited reported developing partnerships that were generally working well. Communication and coordination were taking place among stakeholders at these airports, including meetings, briefings, and training exercises. According to TSA, partnerships with airport stakeholders are essential to FSDs' success in addressing aviation security and customer service needs. For example, FSDs rely on law enforcement stakeholders during security incidents since they do not have their own law enforcement resources. FSDs also rely on air carriers for passenger volume information to schedule screeners, and air carriers rely on FSDs for efficient screening that minimizes passenger wait times. TSA made changes in 2004 to better support or empower the FSD position, and most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed generally viewed these changes favorably. For example, most of the FSDs we interviewed were satisfied with TSA's new local hiring process that provided more options for FSDs to be involved in hiring screeners, and most said that the new process was better than the more centralized hiring process it replaced. Most FSDs we interviewed also saw value in the headquarters group TSA established to provide operational support to the field and a communication link among headquarters, field-based Area Directors, and FSDs.