Background

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall  responsibility for the Training Transformation Program and, through the  use of the Training Transformation Executive Steering Group and the  Training Transformation Senior Advisory Group, oversees the execution of  three capabilities or initiatives: JNTC, the Joint Knowledge Development  and Distribution Capability, and the Joint Assessment and Enabling  Capability. According to the 2006 Training Transformation  Implementation Plan, these 3 initiatives are designed to prepare  individuals, units, and staff for the new strategic environment and to  provide enabling tools and processes to carry out joint missions.  Specifically:   The JNTC, focusing on collective training, is expected to prepare forces  by providing units and command staff with integrated live, virtual, and  constructive training environments. This initiative would add enhanced  service and combatant command training that emphasizes jointness  and enables global training and mission rehearsal in support of  combatant command operations.
The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, which  focuses on individual training, is intended to prepare future decision  makers and leaders to better understand joint operations and the  common operational picture, as well as to respond innovatively to  adversaries. It develops and distributes joint knowledge via a dynamic,  global-knowledge network that provides immediate access to joint  education and training resources.
The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability is expected to assist  leaders in assessing the value of transformational training initiatives to  individuals, organizations, and processes, and to link the impact of the  Training Transformation Program to combatant commanders’  readiness requirements.  This initiative is also supposed to provide the  processes and tools to continuously improve joint training.
The JNTC initiative, the leading initiative for training transformation, is  managed by a Joint Management Office within the Joint Forces  Command’s Joint Trainer Directorate. This Joint Management Office,  which was established in 2003, manages the operational, technical and  program resources necessary to implement the initiative. The Joint  Management Office coordinates its management efforts of the initiative  with the Office of the Secretary of Defense through senior and executive  advisory groups. The overall purpose of the JNTC initiative is to provide a  persistent capability to combatant command and service training  programs to create an appropriate, realistic joint operating environment  within their existing training activities. To accomplish this, DOD plans to  spend about $1.5 billion on the JNTC initiative through fiscal year 2011, or  84 percent of training transformation total funding. The JNTC initiative  was deemed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness to  be operationally capable in October 2004—indicating that the initial  infrastructure of networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint  environment of training exercises was in place. During fiscal year 2005, 16  combatant command and service training events were selected by the  Joint Forces Command to enhance their joint training environment  through the JNTC initiative.
The JNTC initiative includes several key efforts to enhance the joint  training environment of combatant commands and services. These efforts  include the following:   Development of joint task articles. This is an effort to enhance the  level of details associated with joint mission essential tasks that are  identified by the combatant commands as critical to joint operations,  and to provide joint trainers specific guidance for developing exercises  and other joint training activities. These task articles are a set of  processes, procedures, or actions that address critical horizontal  (actions between services) and vertical (actions between a service and  a higher joint force command) elements of interoperability for specific  joint mission essential tasks. Currently, the JNTC initiative has  developed 156 approved articles and has 88 under various stages of  development.
Joint training and experimentation network. The joint network is  intended to be a large-capacity communications network that will  provide persistent support to joint training exercises, service stand- alone events, exercise preparation and rehearsal, experimentation,  evaluation of advanced training technologies, and evaluation of new  warfighting concepts. The network, when complete, will enable the  Joint Forces Command to use live, virtual, and constructive  simulations in concert to enhance the joint training environment for  combatant commands and services. By the end of fiscal year 2005, the  joint network had been expanded to 33 sites, including one in Hawaii  and one in Germany.
Accreditation and certification programs. The JNTC accreditation  program works toward ensuring that combatant command and service  joint training programs include the appropriate joint environment for  the joint tasks being trained. Accreditation is program-centric, whereby  entire service and combatant command training programs are  evaluated and accredited for training selected joint tasks in a joint  environment that meets specific joint standards or conditions. The  intent of this effort is to establish a process that ensures delivery of a  recurring, consistent, realistic training environment for all units  participating in joint training, regardless of the locations from which  they are participating. The Joint Forces Command accredited 4 training  programs during fiscal year 2005 and is expecting to accredit 23 more  programs during 2006. JNTC’s certification effort concurrently ensures  that the technical aspects of the training programs—the sites and the  systems comprising the training infrastructure, networks, and ranges— support the accredited training program.
The JNTC initiative, now 1 year after being deemed initially operational  capable, is expected to reach full operational capability in 2010 when it  will provide a global joint training network that allows live, virtual, and  constructive participation by services, combatant commands, and  coalition and interagency partners in accredited training programs.

	DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements

The full extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of the  services and combatant commands to train jointly is not clear because  DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of the JNTC initiative efforts on  joint training or developed a strategy for conducting such an assessment.  Based on our examination of 5 of the 16 fiscal year 2005 exercises that the  Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC  initiative, we found indications that the JNTC initiative has begun to  improve joint training. Examples we found include increases in the use of  joint objectives and increases in participation by other services. Without a  comprehensive assessment of the JNTC initiative’s enhancement of joint  training programs, DOD has no assurance that its investment in the  initiative will produce the desired results.

		DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on Training Programs

DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of JNTC efforts on joint training;  therefore both the overall impact the JNTC initiative is having on joint  training programs and the extent to which it is achieving the program’s  goals are unclear. The Training Transformation Implementation Plan does  not include a requirement for the JNTC Joint Management Office to assess  whether the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of the services and  combatant commands to train jointly. The JNTC Joint Management Office  receives feedback through working with the services and combatant  commands, but no formal evaluation of JNTC efforts has been conducted.  The individual services and combatant commanders are aware of JNTC  enhancements to their specific training programs and resulting  improvements and are documenting some of these enhancements in after  action reports and lessons learned reports. For example, the Navy’s  preliminary assessment of its Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint 05-2  exercise stated that the value added through rapid delivery and improved  interoperability and repeatability of the Fleet Synthetic training capability  and the joint network will save operating costs while providing quality  joint and coalition training to the warfighter. Additionally, as a result of a  lesson learned during Terminal Fury 05, JNTC funds were used to develop  an analytical tool that enabled analysts to search through recorded  exercise model data and replay selected training exercises, which helped  explain to the exercise control group and the training audience how and  why a particular event occurred. However, these types of reports do not  provide an overall assessment of the collective impact JNTC efforts are  having on joint training.
DOD’s most recent assessment of its training transformation efforts,  conducted by the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability in support of  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  is known as the training transformation block assessment. This block  assessment, conducted for the first time in 2005, is the primary mechanism  for providing feedback to senior DOD leadership on how well DOD is  meeting its training transformation goals. The block assessment is to  provide an assessment every 2 years that measures, guides, and evaluates  the progress of the training transformation initiatives, including the JNTC  initiative. These evaluations are intended by DOD to be an innovative use  of performance assessment tools, techniques, and policies, using well- defined metrics to provide a feedback capability to the leadership.  Additionally, DOD recently announced its plans to conduct a Joint  Training Program Review during mid-2006 to examine training  transformation efforts and to realign these efforts with the recent  Quadrennial Defense Review Report and program strategic guidance.
Our prior work, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and  DOD’s Training Transformation Implementation Plan emphasize the  importance of establishing performance metrics that set up time frames  and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program  implementation. GAO’s Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic  Training Programs and Development Efforts in the Federal Government  emphasizes the importance of using program performance information to  assess the progress that training and development programs make toward  achieving results. The guide states that agencies should keep in mind that  they need to collect data corresponding to established training objectives  throughout the implementation process to refine and continually improve,  deliver, and enhance learning. Furthermore, the guide asserts that it is  important for agencies to develop and use outcome-oriented performance  measures to ensure accountability and to assess progress toward  achieving results aligned with the agencies’ missions and goals. The  Quadrennial Defense Review Report emphasizes that each initiative is  accountable for measuring performance and delivering results that  support the departmentwide strategy. DOD’s Training Transformation  Implementation Plan requires periodic reviews to assess the success of  its Training Transformation Program. According to the plan, every 2 years,  a formal program assessment should be conducted to measure the impact  of training transformation initiatives on joint force readiness. The results  of those assessments are intended to help leaders decide strategy  modifications and subsequent investments.
DOD’s initial 2005 training transformation block assessment did not  evaluate the JNTC initiative’s collective impact on joint training.  According to DOD officials, this assessment was not expected to provide a  comprehensive evaluation of the JNTC initiative’s impact on joint training  because the initiative is still early in its implementation. Instead, it served  as a baseline or framework for identifying joint training measurements for  future assessments, and provided a status of the JNTC initiative’s efforts  implemented to date. However, the 2005 assessment did not address  training efficiency measured by specific cost, schedule, and outcome- oriented performance metrics. Specifically, the 2005 assessment  highlighted some progress: (1) the JNTC initiative is providing more joint  training through accreditation and certification; (2) combatant command  joint mission essential tasks are addressed in events and integrated into  training objectives for each event; and (3) rapidly configurable, persistent  training networks, such as the Joint Training and Experimentation  Network, are a current reality and are being improved. However, the 2005  Training Transformation Assessment Report noted that because of a  wide variation of joint training activities, the task of developing metrics  that supported effective assessment and corresponding program status  progress was unduly complicated.
The 2005 block assessment did identify 10 metrics DOD is considering for  its future assessments, such as the 2007 block assessment. These metrics  include the percentage of combatant command joint mission essential  tasks trained in the joint exercise; the number of programs accredited and  certified; and the number of participants using JNTC resources. However,  many of these metrics are output oriented and not outcome performance  measures, which are necessary to gauge the success of program  implementation. Additionally, one of the block assessment’s  recommendations is to institutionalize a process to develop metrics for  training transformation exercises for use in future assessments. However,  it has not finalized its plans for which metrics are to be assessed or  identified the time frames and processes it will employ for obtaining data.  Because DOD has not finalized its metrics or identified a process to collect  the data, training transformation officials stated that it may be difficult to  show the impact of JNTC efforts on joint training even in the 2007 block  assessment. Without a comprehensive assessment of JNTC’s enhancement  of joint training programs, DOD has no assurance that the money invested  in the JNTC initiative will produce the desired results of providing  combatant commanders with better prepared forces aligned with their  joint operational needs or maximize the benefit for DOD’s investment.

		Indications Are That the JNTC Initiative Has Begun to Improve Joint Training

Even though DOD has yet to assess the overall impact of the JNTC  initiative on joint training, our analysis found indications of potential  improvements, such as events that include more joint objectives and allow  for more joint participation.
According to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, joint training  is defined as “Military training based on joint doctrine or joint tactics,  techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces and/or joint staff to  respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by  combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. Joint training  involves forces of two or more Military Departments interacting with a  combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander; involves  joint forces and/or joint staffs; and is conducted using joint doctrine or  joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.”
Based on this definition, we selected several attributes to evaluate the  effect the JNTC initiative had on joint training. Specifically, we determined  whether selected JNTC events conducted in 2005 reflected the following: persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC  increased use of joint training objectives,  increased use of joint task articles,  increased involvement of other services,  increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities, and  initiative.
DOD officials reviewed the attributes listed above and agreed their use  was appropriate in evaluating the effect of the JNTC initiative on joint  training.
We analyzed 5 of 16 exercises conducted in fiscal year 2005 that the Joint  Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC initiative.  Table 1 describes the exercises selected for our analysis.
Enhancements to the exercises brought about by the JNTC initiative were  many and varied. Some of the improvements purchased with JNTC funds  included radios, aircraft instrument pods, threat emitters that imitated  ground base enemy radar, and cruise missile simulators. The Air Force  used JNTC funds to help establish an Air Support Operations Center that  improved the realism of the Air Warrior I exercise by including real-world  joint operational organizations. The Joint Forces Command also used  JNTC funds to make improvements in computer models used in the  Terminal Fury exercise. Aircraft, including former Russian aircraft, were  obtained with JNTC funds to act as opposing forces in the Weapons and  Tactics Instructor course. JNTC funds were also used to hire personnel  and place them at service and combatant command headquarters to assist  in improving the joint environment of existing exercises. Finally, the joint  network is supported and funded by JNTC funds, allowing a large number  of simulators and constructive models from around the country to connect  and interact in support of training programs.
To analyze the exercises, we developed a comparative analysis based on  the attributes discussed above. This practice allowed us to determine the  measure of change in attributes for each selected training exercise prior to  fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained and reviewed exercise  documentation, such as exercise planning documents and after action  reports for selected exercises to determine the measure of change in the  exercise based on our attributes. Our analysis revealed indications that  some joint training improvements were made in each of the exercises we  assessed. Table 2 summarizes the results of our analysis.
Our analysis of the five exercises and discussions held with exercise  planners at two of these exercises revealed several key areas in which  indications exist that the JNTC initiative has begun to improve joint  training.
Increased use of joint training objectives. Our analysis found  that for four of the five exercise events we reviewed, the services  increased the number of joint training objectives to which they trained.  For example, prior to being enhanced by the JNTC initiative, Air  Warrior I’s exercise objectives were determined by the squadron  commanders and were focused on achieving service-specific  objectives. After JNTC, service-specific training objectives were  modified to include some joint training objectives, such as conducting  a joint, live-fire event within a realistic combat scenario and employing  real-time joint and combined fires. In another exercise, according to  the exercise planner, JNTC efforts enabled the Navy Fleet Synthetic  Training — Joint exercise to include Army and Air Force units in its  exercise. Through the participation of the Army and Air Force units,  the Navy began including joint interoperability training objectives in  exercise planning documents for both Navy Fleet Synthetic Training —  Joint 05-2 and 06-1. The National Training Center’s primary focus, both  before and after the JNTC initiative, has been on accomplishing  service-specific training objectives. However, after the JNTC initiative’s  involvement, the National Training Center has added some joint and  interoperability tasks in its exercises, although these tasks are  subordinate to the service-specific training objectives. Prior to the  JNTC initiative, the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor  course trained to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, which had  some joint aspects. After JNTC designation, the Marine Corps  continued to train to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, but it  began using several joint tactical tasks and joint training objectives in  the exercise.
Increased use of joint task articles. The Air Force and the Navy  used joint task articles in enhancing their Air Warrior I and Fleet  Synthetic Training — Joint exercises. Joint task articles detail the  integrated tasks and steps necessary to provide a specific warfighting  capability to a joint force commander and are based on the joint  mission essential tasks. Air Force officials compared the task article  for close air support with current practices at Air Warrior I and  identified deficiencies in the procedures used during these exercises  prior to 2005. Steps were then taken to correct the deficiencies which  included adding an Air Support Operations Center. Consequently, Air  Warrior I exercises are now conducted more in line with close air  support joint doctrine. The Navy also made extensive use of the task  articles in preparing for its accreditation review.
Increased involvement of other services. Four of the five  exercises we examined showed that participation had expanded to  include more services when compared to years before the JNTC  enhancements were included. The fifth exercise was a combatant  command exercise that was already joint and did not show an increase  in the participation of other services as a result of JNTC efforts. Joint  training requires the involvement of two or more services; therefore the  JNTC initiative used a variety of means, such as additional funding and  the Joint Training and Experimentation Network, to increase the  participation of other services in an exercise. As a result, Navy and  Marine air units and the staff of the Commander, Third Fleet,  participated in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises in  2005. Army and Air Force units participated in the Navy’s Fleet  Synthetic Training — Joint in 2005 and 2006. A NATO Airborne  Warning and Control aircraft joined the Marine Corps Weapons and  Tactics Instructor course exercise in 2005, and a similar unit from the  United Kingdom plans to participate in 2006.
Increased use of virtual and constructive training  capabilities. Our analysis showed that key virtual and constructive  training capabilities made possible by the use of the Joint Training and  Experimentation Network have had a positive impact on three of the  five exercises we examined. The joint network is a persistent, rapidly  reconfigurable communications network that connects multiple  training sites. According to Navy training exercise planners, the joint  network is what allowed the Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercises  to include Army and Air Force simulators to participate in the exercise.  For example, we observed during a recent Fleet Synthetic Training —  Joint exercise, Army and Navy operators, using virtual and constructive  capabilities, track an incoming missile attack and coordinate a joint  response. Without the joint network, the Fleet Synthetic Training —  Joint exercises would likely have remained solely a Navy exercise.  According to Terminal Fury exercise planners, the joint network  improved Terminal Fury by increasing the capacity to include a larger  number of constructive models in the exercise. For example, Tactical  Simulation is a very large intelligence model used to simulate the entire  spectrum of intelligence operations. Prior to the joint network, the  Tactical Simulation model was not included in the exercise because the  model was too large to transport to Hawaii. The joint network provided  the means to connect the Tactical Simulation model to the exercise  from its home station in the continental United States. In addition,  Terminal Fury participants are spread out over a wide area, including  several sites in Hawaii and the continental United States. According to  Terminal Fury exercise planners, two tools made possible by the joint  network, Video Teleconferencing and Voice Over Internet Protocol,  provided the means by which these geographically separated sites  could coordinate the execution of the exercise. Finally, according to a  Marine Corps official, the joint network has aided the Marine Corps  Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course in developing exercise  scenarios, executing the exercise, and connecting a virtual Unmanned  Aerial Vehicle to the exercise.
Persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC  initiative. All five exercises reviewed received enhancements that will  continue to benefit these exercises into the future. Each exercise  received a persistent link to the joint network and embedded Support  Element staff hired to assist service and combatant command  headquarters in adding joint capabilities to their exercises. In addition,  the Air Force received radios and aircraft instrument pods for Air  Warrior I, computer model improvements were made for Terminal  Fury, and the National Training Center received surrogate weapons for  its opposing force. All these persistent capabilities were procured with  JNTC funds.
In addition to the improvements noted above, we also found that the JNTC  initiative has reduced some of the travel and transportation costs  associated with one of the five exercises we examined. Specifically, a  number of the constructive models used in the Terminal Fury exercise are  based in the continental United States. In prior years, the hardware and  supporting personnel would have to travel to Hawaii to participate in the  exercise. Since the joint network connected these models to the exercise  from their home stations, there was no need to move the hardware and  support staff to Hawaii for the exercise.
Finally, there are a number of JNTC efforts under way to further improve  joint training. For example, in future iterations of the National Training  Center/Air Warrior I exercise, the Air Force would like to use the joint  network to include a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System  aircraft simulator to create a realistic joint environment. Due to their  limited number and the high demand for these aircraft, the planes are not  always available to participate in the exercises. The joint network will  allow the use of these aircraft simulators in the National Training  Center/Air Warrior I exercise by having them participate virtually from  their home stations. In addition to increasing the availability of these  aircraft virtually in future exercises, the joint network will also reduce the  travel, transportation, and fuel costs of deploying and using the actual  aircraft in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises.

	Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint Forces Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves’ Unique Training Needs

Reserve component members have benefited from JNTC-enhanced  training events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components  have not been fully considered because the Joint Forces Command has not  established an ongoing working relationship with them.

		Reserve Units Have Participated in JNTC Training Events

Members of the reserve components have potentially benefited from  JNTC-enhanced training when they participate in active service- and  combatant command-sponsored combat training programs enhanced by  the JNTC initiative, such as predeployment and mission rehearsal exercise  programs. For example, based on our analysis of five training events  enhanced by the JNTC initiative, reserve and guard units and individuals  have participated to a limited extent in all but one of the five events.  Specifically, Air National Guard personnel participated in a fiscal year  2005 Air Warrior I exercise, Army reservists participated in a fiscal year  2005 National Training Center exercise, Navy reservists participated in a  fiscal year 2005 Fleet Synthetic Training—Joint exercise, and Marine  Corps reservists participated in a fiscal year 2006 Weapons and Tactics  Instructor Course exercise. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,  Reserve Affairs officials stated that reserve participation in many of these  events occurred, in part, because active duty units were unavailable to  fully participate and reserve units were asked to fill in. According to JNTC  and service officials, reserves participating in these events may benefit  from many of the same JNTC enhancements to the joint training  environment as do active forces. To date, Joint Forces Command officials  said they have relied on active service components and combatant  commands to involve the reserve components in JNTC-enhanced training.

		Joint Forces Command Has Not Established a Working Relationship with the Reserve Components

In an effort to develop and manage active service and combatant  command training programs, the Joint Forces Command has developed  formal coordination mechanisms, including liaison officers, planning  conferences, and process action teams that involve numerous participants  from various organizations within the active service and combatant  commands, but these coordination mechanisms do not include reserve  personnel. For example, the Joint Forces Command has established on- site liaison officer positions to serve as the active service representative  on a daily basis to communicate with the JNTC officials and aid in the  development of the business and operational processes related to the  JNTC initiative. Currently, all liaison officer positions include  representatives from the active services with no representatives from the  reserve components. According to Joint Forces Command officials and  service liaison officers, these active service liaison officers primarily  represent their respective active service components’ needs and issues  and do not specifically communicate the needs of the reserve component  to Joint Forces Command officials.
Active services and combatant command personnel also regularly attend  planning conferences to organize upcoming training exercises. These  meetings occur periodically throughout the initial, middle, and final  planning stages of an exercise, and to date, the Joint Forces Command has  not reached out specifically to the reserve components to include them in  these planning conferences. The Joint Forces Command has also  established nine process action teams organized by functional areas in  operations, technical, and program management to discuss JNTC  implementation and development. These process action teams perform a  vast array of responsibilities, such as   developing JNTC event requirements and timelines;     defining required operational capabilities in order to fully coordinate  live, virtual, and constructive opposition forces into joint training;    defining technical goals for data systems that will enable joint    selecting advanced training technologies to ensure integration of live,  virtual, and constructive components into a seamless joint training  environment; and     developing all JNTC budget and program activities.
According to Joint Forces Command officials, the reserve components are  not formally invited to participate in these process action teams.
DOD guidance regarding reserve components and joint training requires  full integration of the reserve components into every aspect and each  stage of the overall process in developing a joint training initiative. For  example, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report specifically  highlights the need for joint training to include the reserve components in  ensuring the readiness of the total force. In addition, the Training  Transformation Strategic Plan identifies that the reserve components face  several unique training requirements and circumstances that must be  considered at each step of this process, from strategic planning through  implementation. Further, the 2005 training transformation block  assessment calls for including the reserve components’ training in  transformation training events. Specifically, the assessment states that the  reserve components (1) should participate in training transformation  events in order to integrate the reserve component with the active  component and (2) may have special needs for training, and training  events should be tailored to meet these needs.
During discussions with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,  Reserve Affairs, officials, they noted the following unique reserve training  circumstances that should be considered when developing the JNTC  enhancements:   Geography. Since members of the National Guard and reserves are  often not physically located at their respective home duty stations, the  scheduling of training is more complex.
Limited training time. Reservists are constrained to 39 training days  per year. Only if a reservist is activated or volunteers can he/she  exceed this limitation.
Competing requirements. Reservists must complete training  requirements similar to the active core training requirements, such as  general military training and physical training, as well as satisfying any  other reserve requirements. Reservists must also consider and manage  their civilian careers along with their military obligations.
Limited training assets. Resources, such as classrooms and  computer simulation systems and networks for joint training (such as  those that enable live, virtual, and constructive participation), are not  readily available to National Guard members and reservists.
Lack of training predictability. Since reserve components are  currently not included in the scheduling of joint training events,  planning for joint training opportunities is much more difficult and  erratic.
Along with these unique training requirements, National Guard Bureau  officials stated that some of the National Guard’s missions, such as  homeland defense and responding to natural disasters, should be included  as a part of the JNTC initiative that currently are not.
As a result of the absence of formal reserve component representation in  the development of the JNTC initiative, the unique characteristics of the  reserve component have not been incorporated into the initiative’s  development of joint training requirements. According to Joint Forces  Command officials, the inclusion of unique reserve component training  needs into the JNTC initiative is a long-term goal. To date, there has been  no specific effort made by the Joint Forces Command to develop joint  tasks or technical enhancements associated with the needs and missions  of the reserve components.
The JNTC initiative’s priority remains on active services and combatant  commands, as the development of joint tasks and technical enhancements  has been primarily for existing active service and combatant command  training programs. According to Joint Forces Command officials, the  process for the development of joint articles has involved the active  services and combatant commands and focused on developing tasks for  combat missions, such as close air support, joint force targeting, and joint  fires. Although reserve members deploying to overseas operations are  expected to perform these combat tasks as appropriate, Joint Forces  Command officials have stated that the development of joint articles has  not significantly focused on tasks unique to the reserve components, such  as disaster relief and homeland defense. Further, the reserve components  were not included in the team responsible for the development of joint  articles. Additionally, the development of the Joint Training and  Experimentation Network has established permanent capability  throughout the continental United States at active service and combatant  command facilities. The joint network has been coordinated with existing  active training networks, such as the Navy’s Continuous Training  Environment, according to Navy officials, and the Air Force’s Distributed  Mission Operations Center. According to Office of the Assistant Secretary  of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials, interfaces with reserve and guard  networks have not yet occurred. The continued lack of focus on the joint  training needs of the reserve components will limit their ability to enhance  their joint training skills.

	JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to New and Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities, or Include the National Guard

The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process of accrediting  training programs and joint tasks to facilitate the JNTC goals. However,  the command has not (1) placed priority on accrediting training programs  related to new and emerging missions, as highlighted in the most recent  Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2) taken steps to ensure that  accredited joint training will continue to occur after initial accreditation;  and (3) accredited any National Guard-specific training programs.

		Joint Forces Command Has Begun an Accreditation Process

In fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command began a process of  accrediting active services’ and combatant commands’ training programs  on specific joint tasks, in an effort to facilitate the goals of the JNTC  initiative. The intent of the accreditation process is to validate that the  training programs can provide the training audience, regardless of  location, with a recurring, consistent, realistic environment for the joint  tasks being trained. An accreditation review is not an inspection or a  report card, but can be compared to accrediting a university, where  individual courses of instruction are officially approved. Initially, the  JNTC initiative used an event-centric approach that focused on enhancing  single designated training events. Starting in fiscal year 2005, the Joint  Forces Command began employing a program-centric approach that  focused on establishing permanent joint capabilities, which can be used  for all rotations of active service and combatant command training  programs. Previously, the event-centric approach only provided a limited  number of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines with an opportunity to  experience a JNTC-enhanced joint training event. Specifically, one  rotation of the Navy’s Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercise would  have been enhanced by the JNTC initiative, and the one event would have  incorporated enhanced joint capabilities. However, in the program-centric  approach, the number of training opportunities using JNTC enhancements  significantly increases. Now, every rotation of the Fleet Synthetic Training  — Joint exercise has the opportunity to include enhanced joint training.
The accreditation process involves several steps, beginning with the  nomination process and ending with the Joint Forces Command’s  recommendation. The key steps of the accreditation process are  summarized below:     The Joint Forces Command sends a message to the active services and  combatant commands, requesting that they nominate training programs  and joint tasks to be accredited.
Once the active services and combatant commands submit their  training programs for nomination, the Joint Forces Command reviews  and selects these programs, and consolidates and prioritizes a master  schedule of those nominated programs to include joint tasks to be  performed by each program.
To familiarize the active services and combatant commands with the  accreditation process, the Joint Forces Command’s Accreditation  Review Team develops a Web site for each training program and  provides training for the services and combatant commands.
The Joint Forces Command schedules site visits with cognizant active  service and combatant command officials to perform its accreditation  review.
The Joint Forces Command team conducts the review and makes a  recommendation to the Commander, who will grant the appropriate  level of accreditation status to that training program on specific joint  tasks, in the final accreditation report.

		JNTC Nomination Guidance for Accreditation Does Not Emphasize Priorities Identified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Although the Joint Forces Command has begun its accreditation process  to facilitate the JNTC goals, it has not emphasized nominating training  programs that place a priority on new and emerging missions as stressed  in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. These new and  emerging mission areas include irregular warfare, complex stabilization  operations, combating weapons of mass destruction, and information  operations, which may emphasize additional skill sets than offensive  combat operations, such as cultural awareness training and coordination  with other agencies. In the past nomination cycles, there has been no  guidance that provides criteria for nominating training programs and joint  tasks. In lieu of established nomination guidance, we found that the active  services nominated training programs based on several reasons. For  example, Army and Marine Corps officials told us they selected programs  based on their need to enhance joint tasks for the maximum number of  participants. The Navy nominated programs based on their ability to  provide joint and coalition training. The Air Force nominated programs  based on their perceived gains from adding jointness to the training  environment. While there have been no specific nomination criteria, the  Joint Forces Command has established criteria it uses for selecting  programs once nominated. These criteria focus on (1) programs that  address critical joint training issues that are affecting warfighting  capabilities; (2) the mission of organizations that will receive joint  training; (3) programs that provide predeployment training; and (4) joint  throughput, or the number of multi-service and joint units that can be  trained on required joint training. These criteria do not emphasize skill  sets required for new and emerging mission areas.
Currently, the Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing  guidance for future use that will provide criteria for nominating programs.   These criteria ask active services and combatant commands to nominate  programs that have the following traits: (1) primary training audience  composed of units or staff; (2) established system for providing training  feedback; (3) established training cadre and/or exercise control structure;  and (4) realistic threat portrayal (i.e., opposing forces) within the training  programs. Additionally, it provides nomination criteria for accrediting the  joint tasks within the program. The criteria requires that the joint tasks   (1) come from the Universal Joint Task List or the latest approved list of  joint tasks, and (2) fall within the normal core competencies and normal  training environment of the nominated training programs. Although the  Joint Forces Command has proposed nomination guidance, its draft  guidance still has not emphasized the need to accredit tasks within active  service and combatant command training programs that will improve  proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Until DOD establishes  such nomination guidance, new and emerging missions will not be given  priority in the accreditation process and thus be able to incorporate the  JNTC enhancements.
By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command had  conditionally accredited joint tasks in 4 programs and plans to grant  accreditation to joint tasks in as many as 23 additional programs by the  end of 2006. Most of these training programs focus primarily on traditional  combat missions. For example, the Navy’s Fleet Synthetic Training —  Joint program has been conditionally accredited on seven joint tasks,  including developing and sharing intelligence, conducting joint fires,  conducting air and missile defense operations, and conducting defensive  counter air operations. Additionally, the Joint Forces Command  anticipates that the active services and combatant commands will  nominate 3 or 4 additional programs for accreditation in 2007. Table 3  shows the total nominated programs, including the 4 programs  conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005 and the 23 programs planned to  be accredited for 2006.

		Accreditation Process Has No Mechanism to Ensure Recurring Use of JNTC Capabilities

The Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that accredited  joint training will consistently reoccur in active service and combatant  command training programs. As previously noted, the intent of the  accreditation process is to ensure that all units participating in joint  training, regardless of location, experience a recurring, consistent,  realistic joint environment. In addition, DOD has directed the services to  conduct joint training to the maximum extent possible in accredited  exercises. As previously noted, in fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces  Command began to transition its JNTC initiative from an event-centric  approach to a broader program-centric approach, focusing on establishing  permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all rotations of training  events, not just a single designated training event.
However, the Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that  joint tasks previously accredited will consistently be incorporated in  future service and combatant commander training events. According to  DOD officials, the services and combatant commands should participate in  the accreditation process in order to obtain JNTC funding for their  nominated training programs. However, according to a Joint Forces  Command official, the command cannot require the services and  combatant commands to train to the joint tasks that have been accredited.  Service officials we spoke with stated that currently there are no  consequences for them not continuing to include accredited joint tasks in  future training rotations. While service officials recognized the value of  training to accredited joint tasks, they also recognized that there are  competing demands for their time and resources that may preclude them  from training to joint tasks. Situations that compete for their time and  resources include service-specific unit training requirements, shortage of  training funds, and the deployment of personnel and equipment to  overseas operations. While the Joint Forces Command provides financial  contributions to the services to help offset the costs associated with  incorporating the JNTC enhancements, it is not clear if the JNTC  initiative’s financial contributions are significant enough to function as  leverage to encourage the repeated training of accredited joint tasks. For  example, an Army official stated that the Army has budgeted $640 million  to support its combat training centers in fiscal year 2006, and that the Joint  Forces Command’s support for the Army’s combat training centers  amounts to $11.6 million.
The Joint Forces Command is taking a proactive step to help support the  active services and combatant commands in embedding JNTC  enhancements in their training programs. It is hiring Support Elements— JNTC representatives placed permanently at service and combatant  command training programs—to help ensure that the program officials  implement the JNTC initiative by creating a supporting relationship  between organizations. Additionally, the Support Elements are to assist  program officials with joint training planning and executions at their  locations and ensure that standards are maintained in accreditation  reviews. However, according to JNTC officials, these individuals alone  may not be able to ensure that accredited joint training will continue to  occur. Furthermore, it is too early to determine if the services will  continue to include joint tasks on a regular basis, since the Joint Forces  Command only began the accreditation process in 2005 and only recently  established positions to be filled by Support Element representatives.
The Joint Force Commander plans to reaccredit training programs every 3  years but has not established criteria for their reaccreditation process that  would ensure that services and combatant commanders continue to  incorporate and expand on previously accredited joint tasks. According to  the JNTC Accreditation Concept of Operations, a reaccreditation process  will be used to reaffirm accredited status upon expiration (following 3  years) or determine the status of a training program that has undergone  such significant change that the existing program is considerably different  from the program that last received accreditation status. However, this  concept of operations does not address what standard of training needs to  be accomplished or what level of accredited tasks should be trained to  receive reaccreditation. Without providing adequate reaccreditation  guidance, the Joint Forces Command may risk not accomplishing the  intent of JNTC’s accreditation efforts. Moreover, until DOD establishes  standards for reaccrediting training programs that ensure the consistent  incorporation of JNTC enhancement in future training rotations, DOD  risks not maximizing its investment in the JNTC initiative.

		No National Guard Training Programs Have Been Considered for JNTC Accreditation

DOD encourages the integration of the reserve components into joint  training. Specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report  reinforces the need for joint training to include the reserve components in  ensuring the readiness of the total force, and a DOD directive on military  training says that to the maximum extent possible, all components shall  conduct joint training in accredited events. Our analysis found that the  National Guard has developed joint training exercise programs dealing  with missions involving homeland defense and security. However, no  National Guard training programs have currently been considered for  JNTC accreditation. Joint Forces Command officials stated they have not  placed a priority on involving the National Guard in the JNTC  accreditation process, and incorporating the National Guard into the JNTC  initiative is still a long-term goal for the Joint Forces Command. The Joint  Forces Command has not sent request messages seeking nominations for  joint training accreditation to the National Guard as it has done for the  active services and combatant commands. In addition, we found that the  Joint Forces Command has not established a process for nominating and  accrediting National Guard-specific training programs.
The National Guard Bureau has approached the Joint Forces Command  about considering the Vigilant Guard training program—a series of  training exercises that will further enhance the preparedness of the  National Guard to perform roles and responsibilities related to homeland  defense and defense support to civil authorities—for the JNTC  accreditation process. The training program involves 4 to 6 states per  event with a focus on the training and coordination of the newly  established state joint force headquarters and state joint task forces.  Vigilant Guard provides the National Guard the opportunity to execute  core joint tasks, such as (1) acquire and communicate operational-level  information and maintain status; (2) establish, organize, and operate a  joint force headquarters; and (3) provide theater support to other DOD  and government agencies. However, National Guard officials stated that  Vigilant Guard has not yet been considered for accreditation by the Joint  Forces Command.
National Guard Bureau officials have also recently discussed with the  Joint Forces Command officials the potential for linking the National  Guard’s GuardNet network to JNTC’s joint network. GuardNet is a  network for delivering telecommunications services to National Guard  users in 54 U.S. states and territories, providing persistent connectivity. It  consolidates video and data functions to support simulation, training,  mobilization command and control, and computer emergency response, in  addition to operational missions assigned to the National Guard. These  telecommunications capabilities have helped to reduce stress on the  National Guard force by decreasing personnel travel and increasing home  station time available for training. To date, National Guard officials stated  that GuardNet has not been integrated into JNTC’s joint network design.  Although Joint Forces Command and National Guard officials have had  meetings regarding the inclusion of both Vigilant Guard and GuardNet into  the JNTC joint network, National Guard Bureau officials stated that no  action has yet been taken. Without specific JNTC-accredited training  programs and linkages with JNTC’s joint network, National Guard training  programs may not be able to take full advantage of JNTC resources, such  as participation from other components, access to new technologies and  modeling, and training environments that realistically portray overseas  and domestic joint operations.

	Conclusions

In the new security environment, U.S. forces are conducting significantly  more complex operations requiring increased joint interoperability among  participants in the theater and on the battlefield. DOD’s JNTC initiative is  designed to help the services and combatant commands meet these  challenges. Without thoroughly assessing the progress of the Joint Forces  Command’s training transformation efforts, DOD does not know the value  added to the readiness of services and combatant commands resulting  from the significant investment of resources devoted to the JNTC  initiative. Furthermore, recent domestic events and ongoing overseas  operations have placed extremely high demands on the reserve  components, which play a critical role in executing our national defense  strategy. Once mobilized, reservists and National Guard members operate  in the same joint environment as active service members. Unless the  reserve components receive the training necessary to allow them to  operate seamlessly in this environment, reservists may be unprepared to  face the full range of responsibilities they are called upon to perform both  at home and abroad. Until the Joint Forces Command embraces the  reserve components, incorporating their unique training needs into the  development of the JNTC initiative’s joint training enhancements, the  reserve and the National Guard forces will not be able to take full  advantage of the enhanced joint training offered through this initiative.  Additionally, without clear criteria to guide the accreditation and  reaccreditation process, DOD will have no assurance that the joint training  initiative reflects DOD’s training priorities on new and emerging threats or  that the services and combatant commands will continually take  advantage of the resources and capabilities provided by the JNTC  initiative. Without consistently training its forces in a recurring, realistic,  joint operating environment, DOD will lack assurance that forces deployed  to its theaters will have the necessary skills to operate effectively in  today’s complex, multinational, interagency operations. Also, without  incorporating the National Guard into the accreditation process, DOD has  no assurance that the National Guard will experience realistic overseas  and domestic joint operational training environments portrayed by JNTC  enhancements. Furthermore, DOD needs to address the issues highlighted  above in order to ensure that the joint training benefits from its $1.5 billion  investment in the JNTC initiative are being optimized.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To further enhance the quality of joint training and to increase the benefits  of the JNTC initiative for the reserve components, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:   direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  fully develop a strategy for the next training transformation assessment  to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative’s implementation  on joint training, including time frames, outcome-oriented performance  metrics, roles and responsibilities, and outcomes;    direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers for the  reserve components and include representatives from the reserve  components as active participants in JNTC working groups and  planning sessions;    direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  establish guidelines for the services and combatant commands to  follow when nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect  the importance of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by  DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report;    direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that will ensure that a  recurring, consistent, realistic joint training environment exists for all  units participating in accredited joint training programs; and    direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training  programs.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with four  recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation to  establish reserve liaisons. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II.  Specifically, DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department  develop a strategy for evaluating the overall impact of the JNTC initiative  as part of its 2007 training transformation assessment. DOD stated that it  is in the process of developing a plan for its 2007 assessment that will  include detailed metrics and roles and responsibilities and will address the  impact of transformation initiatives on DOD-wide training.
DOD also agreed with our recommendations to (1) establish guidelines  that emphasize the need for the services and combatant commands to  consider new and emerging issues when nominating programs for  accreditation, (2) establish reaccreditation standards and criteria, and  (3) expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training  programs. DOD stated that its accreditation guidance will be refined to  include consideration of new and emerging missions during the next phase  of accreditation reviews. Additionally, DOD stated that the Joint Forces  Command will ensure that the accreditation concept of operations is  strengthened to include specific reaccreditation standards. Further, DOD  stated it will add National Guard training programs with the appropriate  joint environment to the accreditation nomination list. Moreover, it noted  that the JNTC Joint Management Office is actively discussing this action  with National Guard leadership to develop a plan for inclusion of National  Guard joint training programs.
Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Joint  Forces Command establish liaison officers for the reserve components  and include reserve component representatives as participants in JNTC  working groups and planning sessions. The department agreed it should  establish liaison officers for the National Guard and include Guard  representatives as participants in JNTC working groups and planning  sessions. However, DOD stated that the joint training requirements of the  other reserve components are adequately addressed through the current  service liaison officer structure within JNTC and the assigned reserve  Joint Warfighting Center.  DOD’s approach would require that the Army,  Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corp reserves continue to voice their training  needs indirectly through their respective service headquarters rather than  through direct participation. However, as discussed in this report, Training  Transformation documents and officials from the Assistant Secretary of  Defense’s Office of Reserve Affairs have recognized that the reserve  components have some unique training requirements and that these  requirements have yet to receive priority in the Joint Forces Command’s  JNTC initiative. We continue to believe that all reserve components would  benefit if the Joint Forces Command would establish liaison officers for  both the National Guard and the service reserve components and include  them as active participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions  to allow them to voice their unique training needs and enhance their  awareness of new developments and opportunities in joint training.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Commander of  the U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report.  Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Joint National Training Capability  (JNTC) initiative has improved the ability of the services and combatant  commands to train jointly, we analyzed 5 of the 16 training exercises  selected by the Joint Forces Command to incorporate JNTC  enhancements in fiscal year 2005. We reviewed relevant exercise planning  documents pertaining to the exercises and JNTC enhancements. We also  discussed the impact of the JNTC initiative with a variety of officials in the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, combatant  commands, and Joint Chiefs of Staff who were involved in this effort.  Additionally, we discussed our methods, the attributes to be assessed, and  the information collected with agency officials and determined that they  were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Results from nonprobability  samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population, because  some elements of the population have no chance of being selected.  Specifically, we did the following:     To select the five exercises, we reviewed the descriptions and training  profiles provided by JNTC initiative officials, and in consultation with  these officials, we identified one event selected by the Joint Forces  Command to be enhanced by the JNTC initiative from each of the  military services and one sponsored by a combatant command.
To analyze the exercises, we identified attributes that would allow us  to quantitatively discern the differences in selected exercises prior to  their JNTC designation and afterwards. We then developed a detailed  data collection instrument to precisely and consistently gather attribute  information for comparative analysis. Our analysis of these attributes  allowed us to determine the measure of change in a selected fiscal year  2005 training exercise prior to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We  obtained and reviewed exercise documentation, such as exercise  planning documents, and after action reports for selected exercises to  determine the measure of change in the exercises based on our  attributes.
To augment our documentation review of the JNTC initiative’s impact  on existing service and combatant exercises, we met with service,  combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss their perspectives  on the overall value added to joint training by the JNTC initiative. We  then visited and observed 2 of the 5 exercises to obtain a real-time  assessment of the past and planned evolution of the exercises and  feedback from exercise participants, including the planners.
To determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) had assessed the  full impact of the JNTC effort on joint training through its first training  transformation assessment, we reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC  documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006 revised  Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2005 Training  Transformation Assessment Report, and the JNTC initiative’s strategic  plan. Additionally, we met with Office of the Secretary of Defense officials  directly involved in conducting the training transformation assessment to  discuss the methodology for the current assessment and plans for future  assessments.
To determine the extent to which the reserve components are benefiting  from the JNTC initiative, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC  documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006  revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the JNTC strategic and  implementation plans, to identify program guidance on the inclusion of the  reserve components in training transformation initiatives and assess the  level of coordination established between the JNTC initiative and the  reserve components. We also examined the extent to which the reserve  components participated in JNTC current events and formal collaboration  mechanisms to further evaluate the effectiveness of the program to benefit  the reserve components. Additionally, we conducted interviews with key  reserve, National Guard, Office of the Secretary of Defense, service, and  JNTC representatives to discuss the overall impact of the JNTC initiative  on the reserve components.
To determine the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has  developed an accreditation process that facilitates program goals, we  obtained and reviewed key accreditation documentation, such as the  Accreditation Concept of Operations, JNTC accreditation program briefing  slides, the draft accreditation handbook and DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial  Defense Review Report. We also reviewed and analyzed key DOD and  JNTC documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006  revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC  strategic plan, to identify program guidance and critical milestones.  Additionally, we reviewed selected training programs’ JNTC accreditation  reports. To augment our documentation review, we met with service,  combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss the status and intent of  the accreditation process. Specifically, we inquired about the status of the  accreditation effort, the nomination process, and the reaccreditation  process. We also examined to what extent the reserve components  participated in the JNTC initiative’s accreditation process. Table 4 lists the  organizations and locations we visited during the course of this review.
We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant Director;  Fred Harrison; Joe Faley; Bonita Anderson; Angela Watson; Yong Song;  Kevin Keith; Susan Ditto; and Rebecca Shea also made major  contributions to this report.

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Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) established its Training Transformation Program to ensure combatant commanders that forces deploying to their theaters have had experience operating jointly. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which accounts for 84 percent of the $2 billion the department plans to invest by 2011 to provide a persistent global network that will increase the level of joint training. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) JNTC has improved the ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly, (2) the reserve components are benefiting from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the Joint Forces Command has developed an accreditation process to facilitate program goals. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents. GAO also reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 events selected in 2005 as JNTC training events, and observed 2 of those events firsthand.

What GAO Found

The extent to which the JNTC initiative is improving joint training overall is unclear because DOD has not yet assessed the program's results; however, GAO's review of five JNTC-enhanced training events found indications of some joint training improvements. Prior GAO work and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report have stressed the importance of performance metrics to gauge program success. While DOD's initial training transformation assessment set a basic framework for measuring future program performance, DOD has not developed a strategy to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative that includes metrics, time frames, and processes for gathering data. Without such a plan, DOD will not know whether the money invested in the initiative will produce desired results or maximize the benefit for the investment. Reserve units have participated in JNTC training events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered because Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working relationship with them. The Training Transformation Strategic Plan recognizes that the reserve components face unique training requirements and circumstances that must be considered. However, the command has not established a liaison position for any of the reserve components and has not included the reserve components in working groups and planning sessions, as it has done with the active service components and the combatant commands. Until the command incorporates the reserves more fully into the JNTC initiative, the reserve components will continue to have limited ability to enhance their joint training skills. The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop an accreditation process to facilitate the JNTC initiative's goals, but it has not emphasized new and emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks will continue in future training rotations, or incorporated the National Guard. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares that training transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission areas, such as irregular warfare and combating weapons of mass destruction. The Joint Forces Command has allowed services and combatant commands to nominate existing training programs to be accredited, but these programs may not reflect the priorities established in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report because nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Further, no training programs specific to the National Guard are currently being considered for accreditation. Until the department establishes nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards and includes the National Guard in the accreditation process, JNTC events may not reflect DOD's training priorities, the services may not continually incorporate JNTC enhancements into their training exercises, and the National Guard will continue to have limited ability to enhance its joint training skills.