Background

Investigations and arrests are core functions of all federal law  enforcement agencies. According to BJS, as of June 2000 (the latest  available information), 69 federal agencies employed 88,000 full-time law  enforcement officers. Of these, Justice employed more than half (58  percent) and the Department of the Treasury employed 21 percent. During  fiscal year 2001, according to BJS, these two agencies accounted for the  highest percentage of arrests for federal offenses, with 71 percent made by  Justice components and 12 percent by Treasury components. In addition,  state and local agencies made 4 percent of the arrests, and 7 percent of the  arrests were made after the suspects voluntarily reported to the Marshals  Service following a summons. The remaining 6 percent of the arrests were  made by other agencies or were undesignated in the statistics.
Suspects arrested by federal agencies for federal crimes are transferred to  the custody of the Marshals Service for processing, transportation,and  detention. According to BJS, in 2001 the Marshals Service received 118,896  suspects from federal law enforcement agencies, including those the  Marshals arrested themselves. Of these arrests, 28 percent were for drug  offenses; 21 percent for immigration offenses, 16 percent for supervision  violations; 14 percent for property offenses (such as embezzlement,  forgery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft); 8 percent were for public-order  offenses; 5 percent for weapons offenses; 4 percent for violent offenses;  and 3 percent to secure and safeguard a material witness.
Figure 1 shows the number of suspects arrested only for federal offenses  for the agencies we reviewed. Some suspects arrested by federal agents  are transferred to state and local jurisdictions for prosecution for  nonfederal crimes. For example, according to BJS, in fiscal year 2001 DEA  arrested 11,778 suspects for federal offenses who were booked by the  Marshals Service. However, DEA’s statistical reporting system recorded  over 35,000 arrests that same year; the additional suspects were turned  over to state and local authorities and were not booked through the  Marshals Service, according to BJS.  Similarly, BJS reported that USPIS  arrested 1,226 suspects for federal offenses who were booked by the  Marshals Service in fiscal year 2001, while USPIS told us that they had  made 4,698 federal arrests that same year.

	Results

		Guidance and Procedures for Counting Investigations and Arrests Are Generally Consistent among Agencies

The guidance and procedures for counting investigations, or “cases” as  they are sometimes referred to, are generally consistent among the six  agencies we reviewed. Agencies pursue investigations into crimes that  have a nexus to their respective missions, such as drug trafficking for  DEA, mail theft for USPIS, and illegal aliens for INS. Generally, according  to their guidance and procedures, agencies open cases that result from tips  or leads received from confidential informants or other sources, they may  be invited to help in other agencies’ cases, or they may participate in task  force investigations. Once the agents have made the decision to open a  case, the cases are to be reviewed and approved by a supervisor, and  details of the case are then entered into the agencies’ case management  tracking systems and counted.
We also found agency guidance and procedures for counting arrests to be  generally consistent among all six agencies. That is, agents must be  directly involved in the arrest, assist other law enforcement personnel in  making the arrest, or provide information that leads to an arrest. For  example, according to DEA’s Agents Manual, agents are to count drug- related arrests only when DEA is directly involved in the arrest. Similarly,  USPIS inspectors are to count arrests when physically present or  providing assistance. According to USPIS’s Inspection Service Manual,  inspectors are to count an arrest when    an inspector participated personally in making an arrest or contributed  significantly to an investigation resulting in an arrest made by another law  enforcement agency;   an inspector’s investigative efforts with another law enforcement agency  motivate and materially contribute to the identity and arrest of a person  for a postal crime event though the inspector was not present at the time;  or   an inspector’s investigation of a postal offense develops additional,  significant evidence that is brought to the prosecutor’s attention that leads  to prosecution for an additional offense.
The determination of material contribution, as used in the Inspection  Service Manual, is left to the judgment of a supervisor. For example,  according to USPIS officials, if a postal inspector alerted the highway  patrol to an individual suspected of mail theft, or if the inspector was  conducting an ongoing investigation on the suspect and the highway patrol  made the arrest, the arrest would be claimed by USPIS even though the  postal inspectors did not make the physical arrest.
The other agencies in our review used similar criteria for counting arrests.  In addition, the agencies required supervisory review of the justifications  for the arrests before they were entered into the agencies’ data tracking  systems and officially counted.
In addition to their guidance and procedures for counting investigations  and arrests, three of the agencies in our review—DEA, FBI, and USPIS— have an inspection process to, among other things, review the  appropriateness of investigations and arrests that are made. DEA, for  example, told us that its Inspections Division periodically validates a  sample of arrests and screens them for any type of questionable activity,  such as “piggy backing” arrests. According to a DEA official, piggy backing  is when state and local law enforcement agencies perform the  investigative work and a DEA agent goes along for the arrest, writes it up,  and claims credit for the arrest. The official said that the Inspections  Division has consistently found a very low percentage of questionable  arrests, but that a database of questionable arrests has not been  accumulated. The official gave one example from DEA’s New York Field  Office, where 2 or 3 questionable arrests out of over 8,000 were found. The  official indicated that questionable arrests are mostly isolated incidents  and are not part of any systemic problems. The official concluded that if  questionable arrests were found, those arrest statistics would be removed  from the agency database. FBI and USPIS officials said that no  questionable arrests were found during their reviews.

		Investigation and Arrest Statistics Are Used for a Variety of Purposes

Agency officials with whom we spoke told us that investigation and arrest  statistics are used for many purposes, depending on the circumstances. In  general, the officials said that statistics serve as indicators of agency work  and as output measures in performance plans, budget justifications,  testimonies, and for some agencies, are considered in making promotion,  bonus, and award determinations. Officials at the agencies we reviewed  said that investigation and arrest statistics are not emphasized in any of  these activities, but are one of many factors that are considered when  reporting agency results or when making personnel decisions.

			Agencies Reported Investigation and Arrest Statistics in Their Budget Justifications, Congressional Testimonies, and Other Public Documents

We found that agencies generally reported investigation and arrest  statistics in their budget justifications, congressional testimonies, and/or  other public documents. These statistics, however, were not the only  criteria used as indicators of agency workload and productivity.
We reviewed FBI budget requests for fiscal years 2003 and 2004, for  example, and found numbers of investigations and arrests listed in the  documents, as well as numbers of indictments and convictions. DEA’s  budget requests to Congress also included investigation and arrest  statistics. For example, in its fiscal year 2003 budget request, DEA  reported on an operation that resulted in 38 arrests, and a table in DEA’s  fiscal year 2004 budget request entitled “Domestic Enforcement” showed  the number of national/local investigations, investigations completed, and  total investigations.
Conversely, INS did not cite investigation and arrest statistics in its budget  justification documents. Investigation and arrest activities were discussed,  however, in the very broadest terms. For example, in its 2003 budget  justification documentation, INS indicated that it would initiate high- priority investigations, conduct asset seizures, and present individuals for  prosecution for alien smuggling-related violations to disrupt the means  and methods that facilitate alien smuggling. And, in its 2002  documentation, INS noted that, as a result of its efforts, many alien  smugglers, fraud organizations, and facilitators were arrested and  presented for prosecution; assets were seized; and aliens with a nexus to  organized crime, violent gangs, drug trafficking gangs, or who have  terrorist-related affiliations, were apprehended.
Concerning inclusion of arrest statistics in congressional testimony, DEA’s  Administrator’s testimonies to Congress on the agency’s budget requests  often contained references to successful cases that resulted in arrests. For  example, in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Administrator said that  an operation resulted in 14 arrests. The Administrator’s testimony for  fiscal year 2004 also included similar examples, such as DEA disrupting 30  drug trafficking organizations and dismantling 15 others. In addition, in  congressional testimony on the fiscal year 2002 budget request, the FBI  Director said that overall, during fiscal year 2000, FBI investigations  contributed to the indictment of over 19,000 individuals, the conviction of  over 21,000 individuals, and the arrest of more than 36,000 individuals.
As an example of using investigation statistics in public documents, on  September 2, 2003, DEA listed on its Web site 37 major operations that it  had been involved in from 1992 to 2003. Many of these listings detailed  major investigations involving joint operations with other federal, state,  and local law enforcement agencies that resulted in disruptions and  dismantlement of narcotics trafficking operations and in numerous  arrests. In addition, many of the listings gave credit to the other  participating agencies for their work on the same cases.
Agency officials said, however, that the investigation and arrest statistics  are only one of many factors used as indicators of agency workload and  productivity and are not emphasized in reporting results of agencies’  workload performance. For example, DEA officials told us that instead of  pursuing numbers of investigations and arrests, their focus is on  targeting, disrupting, and dismantling major drug trafficking organizations;   working cooperatively and closely with other federal, state, and local law    making an impact on reducing the flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs  into the United States.

			Numbers of Investigations and Arrests Are Used as Workload Indicators and, to a Limited Extent, Used in Promotion, Bonus, and Award Decisions

Agency officials with whom we spoke told us that investigation and arrest  statistics are used as measures of productivity and indicators of workload  activity, but only to a limited extent in personnel management activities  such as promotions, bonuses, and awards. USPIS officials, for example,  said that investigation and arrest statistics are only one of many indicators  of an individual’s performance and are not required for making promotion  and other personnel decisions. The knowledge, skills, and abilities for  promotion do not list “number of arrests” as a competency. For example  criteria for promotion to the manager level, GS-15, is based on  competencies including customer focus, interpersonal skills, problem  identification and analysis/decision making, strategic leadership, and oral  and written communication.
USPIS officials said that awards and bonuses are usually given for  performances above and beyond normal expectations, not just for making  arrests. An inspector or team, for example, that makes a large number of  arrests as culmination of an investigation could receive an award,  according to the officials.
The other agencies we reviewed generally followed similar criteria on the  use of investigation and arrest statistics in performance management  decisions as that described earlier by the USPIS officials. For example,  INS’s promotion criteria considered such factors as job experience,  decision-making, managerial writing, and job simulation.

		Multiple Agencies Count the Same Investigations and Arrests in Their Individual Agency Databases and Reports

All of the agencies we reviewed counted the same investigations and  arrests when more than one of them participated in the investigative and  arresting activities. In two of the three reviews of joint investigations that  we performed, agencies reported that they each counted some of the same  arrestees involved in the investigations. (See apps. VIII and IX.) Agency  officials told us that they believe that this practice is appropriate, because  in their opinion, many investigations and arrests would not have occurred  without the involvement and cooperation of all the agencies that  participated. If agencies were not allowed to count investigations and  arrests in which they participated, the officials said that agencies would be  less likely to work together, cases would be much smaller, and the desired  disruption of high-level criminal organizations would be hampered.
In general, the agency press releases and Web sites we reviewed gave  credit to one another when they jointly participated in major  investigations that resulted in a number of arrests. We found several  examples of this practice, but did not find any overall federal database that  would identify joint investigations and arrests that were conducted by  multiple federal law enforcement agencies. Several of the agencies’  internal databases, however, are capable of identifying joint investigations  and arrests, while others could possibly be so modified, according to  agency officials. For example, DEA’s statistical database was able to  identify arrests made by DEA unilaterally, as well as those made jointly  with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, as shown in  figure 3.

	Concluding Observations

Federal law enforcement agencies are in business to enforce the nation’s  law and regulations, investigate the activities of criminal organizations,  and arrest individuals suspected of criminal activity. Increasingly, federal  law enforcement agencies do not pursue these activities in a vacuum. All  involved agencies do count the same investigations and arrests resulting  from joint operations, present these statistics in their public documents  and budget justifications, and consider their actions justified. There is no  central federal repository of joint investigations and arrests conducted by  the agencies we reviewed. Moreover, not all of the agencies currently  distinguish between unilateral and joint arrests and investigations within  their databases. Making this distinction may help guide Congress when  making budget decisions about these agencies. Also, the agencies can  provide, or if instructed, modify their databases to reflect more refined  information. However, we did not evaluate what cost, if any, would be  associated with requiring agencies to do so.

	Agency Comments

We provided a draft copy of this report to Justice, DHS, and USPIS.   Justice and DHS indicated that they had no further comments on our draft;  however, technical clarifications were provided during our exit meetings.   USPIS agreed with our report’s overall finding that federal law  enforcement agencies are generally consistent in the way they report and  make use of investigation and arrest statistics.  However, USPIS provided  technical comments which we have incorporated, as appropriate.  USPIS’s  written comments are reproduced in appendix XI.
We are providing copies of this report to the Attorney General, the  Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Postmaster General. We will also  make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please  contact Darryl W. Dutton at (213) 830-1086 or me at (202) 512-8777. Key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix XII.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Overall, to address our objectives, we selected six federal agencies that  perform investigations and arrest suspects. The agencies selected were the  Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Marshals Service from the Department of  Justice (Justice); the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and  Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department  of Homeland Security (DHS); and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service  (USPIS). We selected DEA, FBI, Customs, INS, and the Marshals Service  because these agencies reported the highest number of federal arrests,  according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Compendium of  Federal Justice Statistics, 2000, the most recent data available at the time  of our selection. We selected USPIS because it reported the highest  number of federal arrests from non-Justice or non-Treasury agencies. In  addition, our review focused on fiscal years 1998 through 2001 as  mandated by the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act.  Our review focused on agencies’ policies and procedures used to count  investigations and arrests, not on the number of investigations conducted  and arrests made. Therefore, we did not perform reliability assessments of  data systems at the selected agencies.
To identify the guidance and procedures followed by federal law  enforcement agencies regarding counting and reporting investigation and  arrest statistics, we reviewed agency mission statements, policies, and  applicable manuals concerning investigations and arrests. We also  obtained information about agency investigation and arrest statistical  tracking systems –for example, DEA’s Case Status Subsystem; FBI’s  Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis database; and USPIS’s  Inspection Service Database Information System. We also obtained   (1) overall statistics of investigations and arrests by federal law  enforcement agencies compiled by BJS and used in its Compendium of  Federal Justice Statistics, for fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, the  latest Compendium available at the time of our review, and (2) selected  Office of Inspector General and internal agency inspection reports  concerning the use of investigation and arrest statistics. We also  interviewed officials from each agency who were responsible for  reporting, compiling, analyzing, and disseminating investigation and arrest  statistics.
To determine how investigation and arrest statistics are used, we reviewed  selected agency budget justifications that were submitted to the Congress,  congressional testimonies used to justify congressional appropriations,  and internal agency manuals and policies for use of investigation and  arrest statistics. We also reviewed guidance on issues such as promotion,  bonus, and award criteria for agents and interviewed officials who used  investigation and arrest statistics in their administrative and management  systems. Our review was performed primarily at the agencies’  headquarters office in Washington, D.C. However, to obtain the  perspective of field staff regarding the use of investigation and arrest  statistics for administrative and management purposes, we spoke with key  DEA, USPIS, Customs, and Marshals Service staff at their Los Angeles  offices.
To determine if multiple agencies are reporting the same investigations  and arrests, we obtained, when available, information from agency  statistical systems – such as DEA’s Defendant Statistical System. We  wanted to know whether (1) other law enforcement agencies were  involved in investigations or arrests as part of joint investigations, and   (2) the individual agencies could be distinguished from each other. We  searched for and obtained from congressional testimony and agencies’  Web sites examples of major investigations involving more than one  agency and analyzed selected agency budget justifications (e.g., FBI and  INS) and performance reports to determine how investigation and arrest  statistics were reported to the Congress. We also interviewed agency  officials and obtained documents to explain the reasons for either  counting or not counting investigations and arrests when other federal,  state, or local law enforcement agencies were involved in the  investigations.
We also conducted assessments of three joint investigations to determine  the extent to which agencies were or were not counting the same arrests: a  drug trafficking investigation, a child pornography investigation, and a  counterterrorism investigation. For the drug trafficking investigation, we  searched our selected agencies’ Web sites, where available, for joint  operations and found Operation Marquis on DEA’s Web site. Operation  Marquis was a DEA-led investigation that involved the FBI and several  other federal law enforcement agencies. We subsequently asked DEA and  FBI for lists of arrestees from Operation Marquis and matched them to  determine whether both agencies were counting the same arrestees. (See  app. VIII for additional information on Operation Marquis.) For the child  pornography case, we asked Customs whether it had a joint investigation  that included one of the other federal agencies among our selected  agencies. Customs recommended that we use Operation Bayou Blaster,  which also involved USPIS. Again, we asked both Customs and USPIS to  provide us with lists of arrestees associated with Operation Bayou Blaster.  Customs provided us with a list, but USPIS was unable to generate a list.  Consequently, we asked USPIS to crosscheck its database to the list of  arrestees provided by Customs. (See app. IX for additional information on  the child pornography investigation.) For the counterterrorism joint  investigation, we discussed a Joint Terrorism Task Force operation with  FBI and INS officials. The FBI and INS provided us with names of  arrestees associated with the operation and included in agency arrest  statistics for comparison purposes. (See app. X for additional information  on the Counterterrorism Joint Task Force investigation.)
We conducted our work at selected agency headquarters in Washington  D.C., and at DEA, USPIS, Customs, and Marshals Service offices in Los  Angeles, California.

Appendix II: Drug Enforcement Administration Profile

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) mission is to, among other  things,    enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United  investigate and prepare for the prosecution of major violators of  controlled substance laws operating at interstate and international levels.
To perform its mission, in fiscal year 2003, DEA had a total of 9,629  employees including 4,680 special agents operating in 225 offices in the  United States and in 80 other offices throughout the world. DEA’s budget  was $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2003.

	Counting Investigations and Arrests

A DEA investigation is referred to as a “case,” and involves targeting  organizations or businesses suspected of illegal narcotics trafficking. Any  given case can include one or multiple organizations or individuals, but it  is counted only as one case.
DEA’s Case Status Subsystem (CAST) is the system used to track cases.
CAST identifies, among other things, the target (e.g., criminal  organization) of the case and whether other agencies are involved.  When  an agent has sufficient cause to open a case, he or she enters general  information about the case into CAST, such as the file number, agent’s  name, entity under investigation, date opened, and identification number.
DEA pursues investigations into drug trafficking organizations in several  ways. DEA special agents may open cases that result from tips or leads  received from confidential informants or other sources, may be invited to  help in other agencies’ cases, and may participate in interagency task force  investigations. When DEA agents initiate their own cases, they may also  elicit help from other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.  Agents’ cases are approved by a supervisor and are entered into CAST.
DEA officials told us that their emphasis, instead of pursuing numbers of  investigations and arrests, is on  targeting, disrupting, and dismantling major drug trafficking  organizations;   working cooperatively and closely with other federal, state, and local law    making an impact on reducing the flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs  into the United States.
On September 2, 2003, DEA listed on its Web site 37 major operations that  it had been involved in from 1992 to 2003. Many of these listings detailed  major investigations involving joint operations with other federal, state,  and local law enforcement agencies that resulted in disruptions and  dismantlement of narcotics trafficking operations and in numerous  arrests. In addition, many of the listings gave credit to the other  participating agencies for their work on the cases.
DEA provided us with the numbers of cases closed between fiscal years  1998 and 2001, including DEA unilateral cases and those performed jointly  with other law enforcement agencies as shown in figure 2.
According to DEA’s Agents Manual, agents are to claim (i.e., count) drug- related arrests only when DEA is directly involved in the arrest. DEA’s  process for counting and recording arrests also includes having a  supervisory agent review and sign each Form 202, Personal History  Report, used to document personal information on each person arrested.  By signing the form, the DEA supervisor attests that DEA directly  participated in the arrest or, in the case of a foreign arrest, provided  substantial assistance. An Associate Deputy Chief, Office of Inspections,  said that DEA’s decision about whether to count an arrest is contingent on  several factors, including a clear nexus to a drug offense, involvement of a  DEA informant or DEA monies, or the physical presence of DEA agents at  the time of the arrest, and/or a significant role by DEA agents.
DEA’s Defendant Statistical System (DSS) tracks the number of arrests  counted by DEA. Each Form 202—there is one Form 202 for each person  arrested—is completed and the information entered into the DSS. An  arrest can only be entered in DSS once. When the Form 202 information is  entered into DSS, duplicate arrests, if any, will be identified and  appropriate divisions will be notified to fix the problems. In addition, DEA  has a manual system, the Drug Enforcement Arrest Log, which is used as a  check against arrests entered into DSS.
As with investigation statistics, DEA was able to provide us with numbers  of unilateral and joint arrests by fiscal year from 1998 to 2001. Figure 3  shows numbers of arrests and agencies that were involved in the arrests  but does not identify the agency(s) making the actual physical arrest.
According to an Associate Deputy Chief, Office of Inspections, DEA  conducts on-site inspections about every 3 years in its domestic offices. As  part of the inspection, the division or office is assessed to determine if it is  successfully achieving DEA’s objectives and priorities, including a  validation of claimed arrests.
Field Management Plans (FMP) are used in the inspections process. FMPs  describe the priorities set by the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of a field  division to counter the field office’s unique drug threats and delineate the  methods for accomplishing the agency’s mission and priorities. The FMP  outlines major operations in the field division that have been completed,  the number of major drug trafficking organizations disrupted or  dismantled, and other field division highlights. The Office of Inspections  assesses the field division’s adherence to the FMP and its success in  achieving the goals in the FMP. Case files and the “appropriateness” of  arrests are also reviewed.
A DEA Office of Inspections official told us that periodically a sample of  arrests are validated and screened for appropriateness and for any type of  questionable activity, such as “piggy backing” arrests. Piggy backing is  when a state or local law enforcement agency does the investigative work  and DEA goes along for the arrest, writes it up, and claims credit for the  arrest. The official said that Inspections has consistently found a very low  percentage of questionable arrests at the offices reviewed, but they do not  accumulate or maintain a database of questionable arrests. The official  gave one example of the New York office, where 2 or 3 questionable  arrests out of over 8,000 were found. The official indicated that  questionable arrests are mostly isolated incidents, and are not part of any  systemic problems. If questionable arrests are found, the officials said that  the arrest statistics would be removed from the agency database.
In another example, out of approximately 2,200 arrests made by the Los  Angeles office in 1999, the Office of Inspections found 16 that were  questionable. The Los Angeles SAC said the arrests were questionable  because the agents had not adequately documented DEA’s participation in  the arrests to qualify for counting them. The Office of Inspections finally  judged only 3 of the 16 as not being justified. These 3 involved cases where  the Highway Patrol found drugs in suspects’ vehicles and called DEA out  to establish probable cause to make the arrest. This is a gray area,  according to the SAC, and DEA must show significant participation in  order to claim the arrest. In the 3 cases, significant participation was not  shown, and the arrests were not allowed, according to the SAC.
The SAC also said that in addition to the periodic Office of Inspection  evaluations, the Los Angeles office conducts its own yearly self- inspections, including reviews of the appropriateness of claimed arrests.
DEA officials also told us that it is appropriate for each participating  agency to claim the investigations and arrests that result from joint  operations. The officials said that if only one agency could claim the  investigations and arrests, agencies would not work together, cases would  be much smaller, and the desired outcome of disrupting major drug  trafficking organizations would not happen.

	Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics

Overall, DEA officials said that investigation and arrest statistics serve as  indicators of agency work, to help determine whether or not something is  being accomplished. DEA Domestic Operations officials said that from a  managerial standpoint, DEA’s focus is more on who and what priority  target organizations have been disrupted or dismantled. Statistical data are  useful, the Domestic Operations officials said, because they provide a  picture of activity; they are the evidence that validates the work  performed. DEA officials from the Evaluation and Planning Section said  investigations are DEA’s top output measure and provide basic  information on workload. For example, if a group of 10 DEA agents and a  supervisor had only 7 arrests for a year, management would want to look  at the group to question its level of activity. It could be that the group was  engaged in a very long, complicated wiretap case, which would not lend  itself to many arrests. Arrests, however, would only be used as an  indicator of activity, according to a SAC and Assistant Special Agents in  Charge (ASACs).
Investigation and arrest statistics are not used as performance indicators  in various DEA-related materials. For example, in Department of Justice  Performance Reports, we were unable to find any investigation and arrest  statistics related to DEA. DEA, however, did use numbers of investigations  and arrests in its budget justifications and congressional testimonies. For  example, in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, DEA reported on an  operation that resulted in 38 arrests. For the fiscal year 2004 budget  request, DEA also provided tables that included numbers of national and  local investigations, investigations completed, and total investigations.
According to a SAC and ASACs, investigation and arrest statistics are not  used for making agent promotion, award, and performance  determinations. The officials said that promotions, awards, and  performance ratings are based on many factors, such as levels of violator  disruption; coordination efforts with interagency task forces; cooperative  activities with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies;  and furthering DEA’s mission. For example, two GS-14 field office group  supervisors told us that statistics, particularly arrest statistics, do not play  an important part in promotions, bonuses, or other awards.
Promotion criteria used to evaluate agents for promotion to GS-14 and   GS-15, for example, is based on the following competencies, which do not  include investigation and arrest statistics:    acting as a model,    gathering information and making judgments/decisions,  interacting with others,    monitoring and guiding,    oral communication, and    planning and coordinating.
A DEA Career Board official told us that when looking for the best- qualified applicant for a GS-14 or GS-15 position, a SAC could consider  investigation and/or arrest statistics. For example, if a reference for the  applicant is contacted, the reference may say that they highly recommend  the applicant because of the applicant’s work on a certain case.
A DEA official in Employee Relations said that awards and/or bonuses are  distributed based on performance or a special act. A special act could  include an agent’s involvement on a significant arrest or drug seizure. An  agent’s supervisor writes the justification for an award and/or bonus. The  division head and the Chief of Operations at DEA headquarters review the  justification.
DEA Domestic Operations officials said that performance evaluations that  are used as a basis for promotions may well indicate that an agent  “maintained a high level of cases” or “participated in several significant  cases,” but performance decisions are not justified based on sheer  numbers alone. The two field office group supervisors also said that if  DEA has successful investigations, arrests will naturally follow but are not  emphasized in promotion, bonus, and other award decisions. Domestic  Operations officials also said that management’s “tone at the top,” which is  emphasized throughout DEA, is not on how many people were arrested,  but on what drug trafficking organizations were disrupted and dismantled.

Appendix III: FBI Profile

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) mission is to    uphold the law through the investigation of violations of federal criminal    protect the United States from foreign intelligence and terrorist activities;    provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to federal, state, local,  and international agencies.
As of January 31, 2002, approximately 11,000 special agents and 16,000  professional support personnel were located at the FBI’s Washington,  D.C., headquarters and in 56 field offices, approximately 400 satellite  offices, 4 specialized field installations, and over 40 foreign liaison posts.  The FBI’s budget was $4.6 billion in fiscal year 2003.

	Counting Investigations and Arrests

An FBI investigation is referred to as either preliminary or full field.  Officials of the Inspection Division told us that facts and circumstances  have to rise to a certain level to justify opening either type of investigation  and that the determination is somewhat judgmental. Full field  investigations are initiated when there is information that raises a  reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. If the information  received is not deemed sufficient to predicate the opening of a full field  investigation, but is determined to warrant further inquiry on a limited  basis in order to determine the credibility of an allegation of criminal  activity and the need for a more in-depth investigative effort, a preliminary  investigation can be opened. The more sensitive investigations, such as  foreign counter intelligence, are usually opened as preliminary  investigations. Preliminary investigations can proceed to full field  investigations. The officials told us that the amount of information needed  to initiate an investigation is the same whether the FBI is working alone or  is involved in a joint investigation.
The Automated Case Support database is the FBI’s overall case  management system that is used to capture information and data  pertaining to each investigation. An agent initiates an investigation, either  an FBI investigation or a joint investigation, by opening a hard copy  investigative file, using an Investigative Summary Form 302. A supervisor  must then approve the initiation. Information pertaining to the  investigation is subsequently entered into database.
We asked the FBI to provide us with information on investigations closed  in fiscal years 1998-2001. The data provided included investigations  pertaining to drugs, violent crime, white-collar crime, counterterrorism,  counterintelligence, and cyber crime. These data are displayed in figure 4.  Finance Division officials were unable to distinguish between  investigations performed solely by the FBI and those performed jointly  with other agencies because this information is not captured in the  database.
The FBI counts an arrest when the subject is taken into custody with a  warrant, complaint, or indictment or, if arrested for probable cause, after  the judicial paperwork is obtained. The FBI reports the arrest as federal,  local, or international.
Federal arrests are those in which FBI agents acting alone or with other  law enforcement officers arrest the subject. The FBI does not count the  arrest if the subject of an FBI investigation is arrested by another law  enforcement agency without any assistance from the FBI. However, if the  arrest is part of an FBI-led task force, the FBI does count the arrest even if  no FBI agent is present.
Local arrests are those where the FBI supplied information or other  assistance to a local agency that significantly contributed to the probable  cause supporting an arrest warrant for an individual who was not the  subject of an FBI investigation, and FBI agents were not involved in  making the arrests.
International arrests are those where the FBI supplied information or  other assistance to another country that significantly contributed to the  probable cause supporting an arrest warrant for an individual who either  was or was not the subject of an FBI investigation, and FBI agents were  not involved in making the arrests.
Arrests are reported on the Form FD-515, “Accomplishment Report.” This  form captures such information as arrests, convictions, and the various  investigative techniques used in an investigation. The agent prepares the  FD-515; the supervisor reviews and approves the form, thereby attesting to  the arrest as a valid accomplishment. The field office then enters the  information into the Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis  Application (ISRAA) database. Arrests, as well as other accomplishments,  are to be entered into the system within 30 days. A variety of edit checks  are performed to help ensure the reliability of the data input into ISRAA,  and each field office completes an annual audit of the data.
We asked the FBI to provide us with information on arrests in fiscal years  1998-2001. These data are displayed in figure 5. While the participation of  other agencies is noted on the FD-515, this information is not entered into  ISRAA and, as a result, the FBI could not distinguish between arrests made  solely by the FBI and those made jointly with other agencies.
In addition to the supervisory reviews of investigations and arrests already  noted, supervisory agents are to perform periodic investigative file reviews  on all investigations being worked by their agents. These reviews occur  about every 90 days for investigations led by experienced agents and about  every 30 days for investigations led by less experienced agents. During  these file reviews, supervisors are to monitor the progress of  investigations by reviewing investigative work completed; verifying  compliance with any applicable policies and procedures, including those  pertaining to any arrests that have been made; and assessing the validity of  continuing with the investigation. FBI officials also told us that field  offices’ Assistant Special Agents-in-Charge periodically are to check  supervisory file reviews to ensure the adequacy of the review process.
In addition, the FBI’s Inspection Division is responsible for reviewing FBI  field offices and program divisions to ensure compliance with applicable  laws and regulations and the efficient and economical management of  resources. The Inspection Division is to inspect all FBI units at least once  every 3 years. An Inspection Division official told us that the division’s  reviews include information pertaining to arrests and that, if it were  determined that an arrest had been inappropriately counted, action would  be taken, including correction of the data in ISRAA. The officials also said  that they had not found evidence of the inappropriate counting of arrests  over the period of our review, fiscal years 1998-2001.
Inspections Division officials told us that all agencies involved in a joint  investigation count investigations and arrests and that this is a long- standing and accepted practice that is part of interagency cooperation. If  each agency involved could not count the statistics, there would be more  competition among agencies and less participation in joint investigations,  according to the officials.

	Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics

Investigation and arrest statistics are used as indicators of the FBI’s work  for a variety of purposes, including management of field offices. For  example, a field office’s numbers for a particular type of crime might spike  upward. Finance Division officials said that if a spike occurred, a  determination would be made about what happened to account for the  spike and changes might be made in how the office performs  investigations or where it focuses its resources. The officials told us that  field offices use numbers of investigations and arrests as part of  justifications for resources, along with other factors such as the type of  crimes investigated by the office and whether there has been continual  growth in the numbers. Numbers alone are not determinative, however,  according to Inspection Division officials. The officials said that FBI  headquarters also looks at trends, where agents are placing their  investigative emphasis, political factors such as what legislation might be  on the horizon, and problems agents are encountering that might indicate  a need for new technology.
Investigation and arrest statistics are also used as performance indicators  in various FBI-related materials. For example, in Department of Justice  Performance Reports, the number of terrorism investigations is reported,  along with the number of related convictions. The FBI has also used  numbers of investigations and arrests, as well as indictments and  convictions, in its budget requests and congressional testimonies. For  example, in the fiscal year 2003 request, fiscal years 2000 and 2001 actual  numbers of investigations pending, opened, and closed are given, along  with numbers of arrests, indictments, and convictions. In addition, in  congressional testimony on the fiscal year 2002 budget request, the FBI  Director said that overall, during fiscal year 2000, FBI investigations  contributed to the indictment of over 19,000 individuals, the conviction of  over 21,000 individuals, and the arrest of more than 36,000 individuals.
Concerning performance management measures, an official from the  Executive Development and Selection Program told us that certain  numbers of investigations and arrests are not required for promotions,  bonuses, or awards. The official told us that the statistics are used only as  indicators of an agent’s performance and that it is necessary to look at the  work behind the statistics. For example, an agent may have zero arrests  but be involved in a complex investigation that has not yet resulted in  arrests. Or, an agent may have a high number of arrests resulting from  relatively simple investigations.
Special agent promotions are scheduled at regular intervals from GS-10 or  GS-11 to GS-13 and are contingent upon the satisfactory work record of  the individual. Promotions to GS-14 and GS-15 are competitive, but the  official told us the vacancy announcements are not yet standardized.  Agents applying for promotion must describe how they meet each of the  qualifications listed on the announcement. A new system was  implemented in January 2004 that will emphasize competencies for each  vacancy. The first four competencies will be core competencies and the  last three will be specialized. For example, if the vacancy were in the  counterterrorism unit, experience with counterterrorism would be listed.  When applying for a promotion, an agent will complete a form and address  his or her education and training, pre-FBI experience, FBI background,  and give two examples of how he or she meets each of the required  qualifications.
The official from the Executive Development and Selection Program said  that the quality of work experience, rather than quantity, is emphasized in  the promotion process. There is no baseline for the number of  investigations or arrests that an agent must demonstrate. There is no place  provided on the application for investigation or arrest statistics, though  officials said that an agent could provide these in the narrative should he  or she choose to do so. For example, an agent could indicate that he or she  demonstrated leadership by being the agent on 25 investigations resulting  in 52 convictions; the agent could also discuss a specific investigation as  an example of leadership.
Agent performance is evaluated annually on seven critical elements  (which do not include investigation and arrest statistics) using a meets or  does not meet expectation system. A narrative justification is required  only if the agent does not meet expectations. The critical elements include  the following:  investigating, decision making, and analyzing;    organizing, planning, and coordinating;   relating with others and providing professional service;    acquiring, applying, and sharing job knowledge;    maintaining high professional standards; and    communicating orally and in writing.
An officer of the FBI Agents Association confirmed that investigation and  arrest statistics are not used in the performance appraisal process.
The official from the Executive Development and Selection Program told  us that a noteworthy accomplishment might be used as the basis for a  special award. The FBI uses its awards program to motivate employees to  increase productivity and creativity. To receive an award, an agent must  be shown to have significantly exceeded the requirements of his or her  position. Field offices can give awards differently. One office might give an  award for outstanding performance on one investigation. Another office  might give an award based on sustained success—for example,  continuous, outstanding performance with making arrests or obtaining  convictions.

Appendix IV: U.S. Postal Inspection Service Profile

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s (USPIS) mission is to protect the U.S.  Postal Service, its employees, and customers from criminal attack and to  protect the nation’s mail system from criminal misuse.
In fiscal year 2003, USPIS had 1,955 Postal Inspectors operating in 18 field  divisions in the United States with a budget of $521.7 million.

	Counting Investigations and Arrests

USPIS enforces over 200 federal laws in investigations of crimes that may  adversely affect or fraudulently use the U.S. mail, the postal system, or  postal employees. USPIS cases involve crimes that have a nexus to the  Postal Service. For example, postal-related violations including mail theft,  identity fraud, child exploitation, illegal drugs, and money laundering are  investigated by USPIS.
A USPIS investigation is referred to as a “case.” To open a case, an  inspector fills out a request for case, Form 623. A Form 623 must be  approved and signed by a supervisor before a case is opened. The case is  then entered into the Inspection Service Database Information System  (ISDBIS). In the narrative section of Form 623, inspectors at their  discretion may note whether the case is a joint investigation and whether  any other agencies are involved; however, indicating whether a case is a  task force operation or whether other agencies are involved is optional. A  data entry operator will enter this information into the narrative section of  the case in ISDBIS, which cannot currently be retrieved to identify USPIS  cases alone or USPIS as part of a joint operation.
A USPIS official in the Information Technology Division, however, told us  that USPIS plans to launch a new database, which will be fully operational  in Fall 2004 and will identify cases as joint task force operations when  applicable and the other law enforcement agencies involved. However, it  would still be optional for inspectors to indicate whether a case is a joint  task force operation. The new system will be able to run reports listing  how many cases are joint task force cases and identify the agencies that  are participating. For example, a report could be generated naming all  cases USPIS is working on with the FBI.
USPIS provided us with numbers of cases closed from fiscal years 1998 to  2001, as shown in figure 6.
According to USPIS’s Inspection Service Manual, inspectors are to claim  (i.e., count) an arrest when    an inspector participated personally in making an arrest or contributed  significantly to an investigation resulting in an arrest made by another law  enforcement agency;   an inspector’s investigative efforts with another law enforcement agency  motivate and materially contribute to the identity and arrest of a person  for a postal crime even though the inspector was not present at the time;  or   an inspector’s investigation of a postal offense develops additional,  significant evidence that is brought to the prosecutor’s attention.
The determination of material contribution is left to the supervisor’s  judgment. For example, if a postal inspector alerted the highway patrol to  an individual suspected of mail theft, or if the inspector was conducting an  ongoing investigation on the suspect and the highway patrol made the  arrest, the arrest would be claimed by USPIS even though postal  inspectors did not make the physical arrest.
An inspector fills out a Case Activity Report (CAR) to report case statistics  and to summarize significant developments in the case, including arrests.  A supervisor must approve each CAR and the arrests before entering into  ISDBIS. After a CAR is submitted and entered into ISDBIS by a data entry  operator, a Case Summary Report is printed and sent to the originating  inspector to be verified for accuracy. ISDBIS tracks the number of arrests  counted by USPIS. Arrests made as a result of joint operations are counted  the same as those that result from investigations involving USPIS only.  ISDBIS currently cannot sort arrests made as a result of joint operations  and those in which only USPIS was involved. According to an official in  the Information Technology Division, the new database, scheduled to be  implemented early next year, can separate arrests resulting from joint  operations from those involving USPIS alone.
USPIS provided us with the total number of arrests made from fiscal years  1998 to 2001 as shown in figure 7.
Prior to fiscal year 2003, USPIS had an Office of Inspections Division that  had overall responsibility for conducting quality assurance reviews of field  divisions and headquarters groups/divisions. As part of a USPIS  reorganization in fiscal year 2003, the quality assurance review  responsibility was assigned to the Strategic Planning and Performance  Management Group at USPIS headquarters. A USPIS official in the  Strategic Planning and Management Group told us that the group is to  review each field office every 3 years for compliance to USPIS policies and  procedures. In addition, according to a Deputy Chief Inspector, USPIS  field offices are to conduct annual comprehensive self-assessments and  that the contents of case files are to be reviewed for accuracy during that  process. For example, arrests counted and hours worked on an  investigation are two items that are reviewed for accuracy. The official  said that overall, USPIS has found minimal problems with the accuracy of  its case files and has not found any problems with a specific USPIS field  division counting incorrect case and arrest statistics.
A Deputy Chief Inspector and an Assistant Chief Inspector told us that  double counting investigation and arrest data is acceptable and vital in  showing the results of USPIS efforts. For example, the officials said that if  arrests generated by a joint operation could be claimed by only one of the  involved agencies, turf battles would result. In addition, one agency may  end up “looking better than another.” This would result in law  enforcement agencies refusing to work with one another and there would  be no more task forces, according to the officials. The officials also said  that task forces are needed because cases are often complex in nature,  and joining forces with other law enforcement agencies streamlines,  economizes, and makes operations more efficient.

	Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics

A Deputy Chief Inspector and an Assistant Chief Inspector told us that  Inspectors in Charge of field divisions determine where resources are  needed by several indicators, including case and arrest statistics. They told  us that a “briefing book” is prepared monthly using case and arrest data  from ISDBIS. The briefing book contains an overview of each functional  area (i.e., fraud, dangerous mailings, and child exploitation) and an  analysis on whether USPIS is meeting its goals. The data in the briefing  book are shared with all field offices. The officials said that looking at  indicators and determining where employees are assigned is a part of their  management system.
A Deputy Chief Inspector also told us that investigation and arrest  statistics are used as indicators in performance measurement and  planning. The performance plan provides the basis for performance  agreements, or field division contracts, and an annual performance report.  The performance plan is divided into operational objectives that support  USPIS’s strategic goals. Each operational objective has an indicator(s),  which measures how closely USPIS met the objective, and a target to meet  in the upcoming fiscal year. Each field division is evaluated on its results  as measured against its objectives for each fiscal year; for example:    Operational objective: Identify and resolve domestic and international  in-transit mail theft.
Indicators: Major domestic and international airport mail theft problems  resolved (arrests count towards resolving mail theft cases).
Target: Thirty major domestic and international airport mail theft  problems resolved.
USPIS also issues an annual report of investigations, which is a document  on the fiscal year’s activities, to the Postmaster General, the Postal Service  Board of Governors, and postal managers and employees. The report  details USPIS’s investigative activities in criminal areas, such as mail theft  and robbery. The number of arrests and convictions in each criminal area  are also listed in the report.
USPIS officials also told us that data on an inspector’s numbers of  investigations and arrests are not required for making promotion, bonus,  and award determinations. The knowledge, skills, and abilities  requirements for promotion to the GS-13 and GS-14 levels, for example, do  not list “number of arrests” as a competency. The officials said that  promotion criteria to the manager level, GS-15, is based on competencies,  including    customer focus,   interpersonal skills,    problem identification and analysis/decision making,    supervisory/management skills,    strategic leadership,    planning and organizing,    project/program management,    oral communication,    written communication,    ability to work autonomously, and    ability to be flexible in diverse situations.
USPIS officials said that awards and bonuses are usually given for  performances above and beyond normal expectations, not just for making  arrests. An inspector or team, for example, that makes a large number of  arrests as culmination of an investigation could receive an award for the  arrests, according to the officials.
Concerning inspector performance measurement, a Deputy Chief  Inspector and an Assistant Chief Inspector said that investigation and  arrest statistics are one of many indicators of an individual’s performance.  Performance management focuses on linking an inspector’s goals to  national goals, rather than on arrest quotas. Team leaders in the field are  responsible for helping individual inspectors set goals for the year through  creating a performance achievement plan.
A Deputy Chief Inspector told us that case and arrest data are not used in  their budget process. USPIS’s budget is historically based—meaning it is  based on the previous year’s budget. It is dependent on U.S. Postal Service  finances and is not subject to the congressional appropriations process.

Appendix V: U.S. Customs Service Profile

The U.S. Customs Service was responsible for ensuring that all goods and  persons entering and exiting the United States did so legally and was to,  among other things,    assess and collect Customs duties, excise taxes, fees, and penalties due on  interdict and seize contraband, including narcotics and illegal drugs; and   protect American business and labor and intellectual property rights by  enforcing U.S. laws intended to prevent illegal trade practices.
To accomplish its mission, in fiscal year 2002, Customs had a workforce of  over 20,754 employees, 3,031 of which were Special Agent Criminal  Investigators. Customs’ budget was $3.6 billion in fiscal year 2002.

	Counting Investigations and Arrests

From fiscal years 1998 to 2001, the terms investigations and cases meant  the same thing and were initiated by special agents working from  information received from various sources, tips, or confidential  informants. Cases could have also been initiated by other federal, state,  and local law enforcement agencies requesting assistance or through joint  task force operations. Customs could also have requested other agencies’  assistance on its cases, and most cases did involve other federal, state, and  local law enforcement agencies, according to Customs Office of  Investigation officials.
Customs officials also said that in fiscal years 1998 to 2001, cases were  entered into the Case Management System within the Treasury  Enforcement Communications System (TECS) when agents, with first line  supervisor’s approval, originated them. A case number was created, which  included the office identifier (e.g., Los Angeles), the type of case (e.g.,  money laundering, narcotics, etc.), and information on how the case got  started and who originated it. Other federal agency participation was  usually mentioned in the case summary, but was not identified in a  separate TECS field used for generating case statistics, according to the  officials.
As shown in figure 8, Customs provided us with the numbers of cases  closed between fiscal years 1998 and 2001.
According to Customs officials, Customs agents could have counted an  arrest if they    physically made the arrest;    assisted in making the arrest; or    discovered the violation, but the arrest was made by other law  enforcement officers.
During fiscal years 1998 to 2001, numbers of arrests were captured in  TECS when agents filled out Reports of Investigation and entered the  details into the system. Customs officials said that agents were to provide  details of their participation in the arrests in the case file. The narrative  was to be reviewed and approved by a first line supervisor before the  arrests would be counted. TECS data fields required agents to record  whether they were the arresting officers, and if a Customs agent was not  the arresting officer, then the arresting officer’s name and agency was to  be input into the system. Customs agents would not count as an arrest the  stopping or detaining of an individual for questioning. Numbers of arrests  were not formally audited for questionable claims, and it was up to the  first and second line supervisors to check the integrity of the  investigations and subsequent arrests that were counted. Figure 9 shows  numbers of arrests and agencies that were involved in the arrests.
Customs officials said that TECS data entry systems are to preclude two or  more Customs offices from claiming the same investigations or arrests, so  there was no double counting within Customs. Whether other agencies  counted investigations and arrests that they worked on with Customs was  not clear to the officials, but they assumed that they did, and rightfully so.  The officials said that cooperation and trust in working together would be  destroyed if participating agencies were not allowed to count  investigations and arrests in which they participated.

	Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics

From fiscal years 1998 to 2001, Customs officials told us that investigation  and arrest statistics were used as one way to measure productivity. The  officials said, however, that arrests were only one element in a number of  performance management measures, including numbers of cases, seizures,  indictments, prosecutions, and successful wiretaps, for example, that were  used to gauge an office’s or agent’s performance throughout the year.  Officials said that numbers of arrests were reported from the field to  headquarters twice a year as one way of showing what had been  accomplished. The statistics were readily available, according to the  officials, but special agents were not told that they did not have enough  arrests or would need to increase the number of their arrests.
According to Customs Human Resources officials, investigation and arrest  statistics were not used for special agent promotion purposes. The  officials said that promotions up to the journeyman level were based  primarily on the recommendation of first line supervisors. The journeyman  level was to the GS-12 level through 2000, but was raised to the GS-13 level  beginning in 2001.
Before 2000, promotions beyond the journeyman level were competitive  and were based on applicants responding to a series of set questions  regarding the type, complexity, and variety of investigations, not the  quantity of investigations and arrests. The questions were weighted, a  score was generated, and a roster of applicants eligible for promotion was  developed. Beginning in 2000, Customs initiated the SA14 Promotion Test  System. This system was for promotion to the GS 14 level and included  three tests—critical thinking skills, job knowledge, and an assessment of  administrative and planning skills. Once the applicants had passed these  tests, they were further assessed through a structured interview, which  assessed additional leadership skills via situational questions about how  the applicants would handle the various situations. Customs officials said  that promotion to GS-15 is based on a merit promotion system, which used  knowledge, skills, and abilities that were developed for the specific  position.
Also in fiscal years 1998 to 2001, Customs officials said that investigation  and arrest statistics were used to some degree in award and bonus  decisions, but so were other factors, such as successful court appearances  and prosecutions.

Appendix VI: Immigration and Naturalization Service Profile

The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) primary mission was  to administer and enforce the nation’s immigration laws. Among other  things, INS activities included    determining the admissibility of persons seeking to enter the United States  through an inspections process,  facilitating entry    processing and granting immigration-related benefits,    patrolling the borders,    deterring and investigating illegal employment,    providing information to employers and benefit providers to prevent illicit  employment or benefit receipt, and    disrupting and dismantling organizations engaging in document and  benefit fraud and alien smuggling.
In addition, INS apprehended, detained, and removed aliens present in the  United States without lawful status and/or those who have violated U.S.  criminal laws. As individual aliens engaging in criminal activity and  organizations facilitating illegal immigration are often associated with  other criminal activity, INS also played a role in enforcing U.S. criminal  laws. To perform its mission, in fiscal year 2002, INS had a total of 36,117  employees with a budget of $6.2 billion. The mission was accomplished  through INS’s operational offices located on the border, in the interior, and  overseas and through numerous special facilities (e.g., detention centers,  applications processing centers, and national records repository)  throughout the United States.

	Counting Investigations and Arrests

INS’s Investigations Division was the enforcement arm of the INS charged  with investigating violation of the criminal and administrative provisions  of the Immigration and Nationality Act and other related provisions of the  United States Code. For INS, the investigative case process began with the  receipt of a complaint or other lead by the Investigations Division that  provided a “reason to believe” that a violation of law may have occurred.  An investigation could have been opened as either a preliminary or a full  field investigation. In either case, supervisory approval was required to  initiate an investigation.
A preliminary investigation was opened when a lead or allegation was not  sufficient enough to warrant a full investigation. In those instances, limited  investigative activities would have been conducted solely for the purpose  of providing enough additional information on which to make an informed  judgment as to appropriate disposition of the matter at hand. Preliminary  inquiries were ordinarily assigned for a period not to exceed 30 days. At  the end of that period, a decision was to be made whether to    close the investigation without further action,    extend the inquiry for no more than an additional 30 days, or    assign the matter for a full field investigation.
A full field investigation may have been opened on the basis of sufficient,  articulable facts that were in existence at the time of initial review,  developed during the conduct of a preliminary inquiry, or assigned as a  headquarters-designated case. Full field investigations consisted of all  investigative or enforcement activities necessary to bring an investigation  to its logical conclusion.
Under INS’s Investigations Case Management System (ICMS), a   Form G-600 was prepared when an investigation was opened. The G-600  was basically an index card used to track and document the progress or  termination of investigations. Information about the investigation, such as  the case number, date opened, agent assigned, etc., was initially recorded  on the G-600. Additional information would have been added to the G-600  as the investigation progressed. First line supervisors maintained the   G-600s for the investigations by agents in their units.
Each investigative unit (e.g., field office, port of entry, or border patrol  office) prepared a detailed monthly report, called an Investigations  Activity Report of Field Operations (G-23 Report). The G-23 Report was a  record of the number of cases opened or completed, the number of hours  worked, and the results of the investigations. The report was a matrix of  rows and columns, with the columns showing the number of cases  received, opened, completed, etc., and the rows showing the category of  cases, for example, trafficking, criminals, or employers. Hard copies of the  G-23 Reports were maintained at the unit level and required supervisory  signature.
At the beginning of each month, the data from the G-23s for the previous  month were keyed into the Performance Analysis System (PAS). Each  office was to close out its monthly statistical reporting on the last working  day of each month. They then had 8 working days to consolidate the unit  workload counts into office level totals and key the data into PAS. After  the eighth day, the PAS system was to be locked down and no further data  entry would have been possible by the field offices. The data were strictly  numbers of activities and did not identify individual investigations or  agents.
As shown in figure 10, INS provided us with the number of investigations  opened and closed for fiscal years 1998 through 2001.
According to INS’s manual, The Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure for  Immigration Officers, an arrest occurred when a reasonable person in the  suspect’s position would conclude that he or she was under arrest. An  arrest did not depend solely on whether the officer had announced that  the suspect was under arrest. An arrest was to be supported by probable  cause to believe that the person had committed an offense against the  United States. Probable cause is knowledge or trustworthy information of  facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable, prudent person to  believe that an offense had been committed or was being committed by  the person to be arrested.
An INS officer was authorized to make arrests for both administrative  (civil) and criminal violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  According to INS officials, a Form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien, was  to be completed to record administrative arrests, which were the bulk of  INS arrests. A Form G-166, Report of Investigation was to be completed  when a criminal arrest was made. Supervisory review and signature at the  bottom of the forms verified that the arrest occurred.
Arrests were counted and recorded into the PAS system in the same  manner as the investigations. That is, at the end of each month, a manual  count of the arrest forms would be made and then support staff would  enter the data into PAS.
Officials told us that INS’s Office of Internal Audits conducted reviews of  investigation files. Each district office was to be reviewed about every 3  years. For each district, a representative number of investigations would  be reviewed to determine whether INS policies and procedures were  followed and that all investigative documentation was complete. While the  purpose of these reviews was to ensure that INS procedures were  followed, an INS official said that the review could be considered as  verification that the documentation of the arrests were valid and proper.

	Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics

INS officials told us that, after the data have been entered into PAS, INS’s  Operational Analysis Branch (OAB) printed out a Monthly Statistics  Report, which was distributed to INS upper level management. OAB also  printed a Workload Summary Report on a quarterly basis. According to  INS officials, the reports were an accounting of the work INS performed  and could have been used to assist in making resource allocations and  staffing decisions. The officials said that the data could also have been  reviewed to see if there were any trend indicators about shifts in criminal  activity.
INS Human Resources officials said that INS employee performance  evaluations were not based on investigation and arrest statistics. Rather,  employees were evaluated on how well they performed their jobs. INS  agents were evaluated annually, and their supervisor wrote up narratives  about how well an agent was performing. There were no set job elements  that had to be covered, and the supervisor determined what should be  evaluated and how well the agent was performing.
Concerning promotions, the Human Resources officials said that  promotions up to the journeyman level were based primarily on the  recommendation of first line supervisors. Promotions beyond the  journeyman level were competitive and based on a scored assessment,  which covered the following four critical factors:    Job experience: This factor was worth 30 percent and described the  assignments the individual had had and other collateral duties.
Decision making: This factor was worth 30 percent and tested the  individual’s decision-making process and problem solving abilities by  asking a series of questions about hypothetical situations.
In-basket job simulation: This factor was worth 20 percent and tested  the individual’s administrative skills in organizing work, setting priorities,  delegating work, etc. Individuals were given 45 minutes to review a series  of documents and then given 45 minutes to answer 50 questions about  how to deal with certain events on the basis of the documents they  reviewed.
Managerial writing: This factor was worth 20 percent and tested the  individual’s writing skills and knowledge of proper grammar syntax,  paragraph structure, and report organization.
INS provided, via the Department of Justice, budget requests to Congress  each fiscal year. We reviewed INS’s budget requests for fiscal years 2003  and 2002 to determine the extent, if any, investigation and arrest statistics  were used as justification for increase resources. Investigation and arrest  statistics were not used, in either table or narrative forms, as a basis for  justifying an increase in resources. Investigation and arrest activities were  discussed, however, but in the very broadest terms, for example:  “Although an eventual reduction in arrests is a primary indicator of illegal  entry attempts (and therefore deterrence), other critical indicators include  decrease in border related crime, decrease in recidivism, shifting of illegal  activity to non-traditional points of entry and through non-traditional  methods, increase smuggling fees, increase in property values and  commercial and public development along the border, etc.”  “INS will initiate high priority investigations, conduct asset seizures, and  present individuals for prosecution for alien smuggling related violations  to disrupt the means and methods that facilitate alien smuggling.” “As a result of INS efforts, many alien smugglers, fraud organizations, and  facilitators were arrested and presented for prosecution; assets were  seized; and aliens with a nexus to organized crime, violent gangs, drug  trafficking gangs, or who have terrorist-related affiliations, were  apprehended.”

Appendix VII: U.S. Marshals Service Profile

The U.S. Marshals Service’s mission is to protect the federal courts and the  judicial system, apprehend federal fugitives, and manage seized assets.  Regarding federal fugitives, the Marshals Service’s responsibilities are to  locate and arrest federal fugitives, including prison escapees, bail jumpers,  and parole and probation violators;   enforce bench warrants issued by federal judges and warrants issued at  the request of other federal agencies; and   serve as the “booking agent” for suspects arrested for federal offenses.
To perform its mission, in fiscal year 2002, the Marshals Service had a total  of 4,134 employees, of which about 2,700 were U.S. Marshals and Deputy  U.S. Marshals. The Marshals Service’s budget was $676.5 million in fiscal  year 2002. The Director, Deputy Director, and 94 U.S. Marshals direct the  activities of 95 district offices and personnel stationed at more than 350  locations throughout the 50 states, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands,  Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

	Counting Investigations and Arrests

For the Marshals Service, an investigation consists of locating and  arresting a federal fugitive. The Marshals Service initiates fugitive  investigations in response to two basic scenarios. In the first, an individual  has already been in the federal criminal justice system and has  subsequently become a fugitive. The fugitive may have failed to make a  court appearance, escaped from custody, or violated the terms of parole or  supervised release. In each of these instances, the court issues a warrant  and the Marshals Service is responsible for investigating, apprehending,  and arresting the fugitive. In the second scenario, another law  enforcement agency has investigated an individual, the individual has been  indicted and a warrant issued, and the agency requests that the Marshals  Service make the apprehension. Unlike other law enforcement agencies  that investigate the commission of a crime, the Marshals Service  investigations primarily consist of locating (tracking down) and arresting  federal fugitives.
The Marshals Service uses its Warrant Information Network to track the  number of fugitive warrants received and closed. The network is a  computer-based automated system that manages records and information  collected during investigations of fugitives. The system can also provide  data for analyses that are used to report information to Congress or for  management purposes, for example, to provide a listing of active warrants  for a specific offense or for a district or suboffice. Figure 11 shows the  number of warrants closed for fiscal years 1998-2001.
The Marshals Service takes custody of all federal prisoners arrested by all  federal officials empowered to make arrests. The Marshals Service  Prisoner Tracking System (PTS) maintains a record of all suspects  arrested for federal offenses and booked by the Marshals Service. The  Marshals Service claims arrests on its workload statistics if a deputy  marshal actually makes the arrest, based on a federal fugitive warrant. If  another law enforcement agency brings a prisoner to the Marshals Service  for booking, that agency would be recorded as the arresting agency in the  PTS.
When either a deputy marshal or an agent from another federal agency,  such as the DEA, FBI, or Customs Service, presents a federal prisoner for  booking by the Marshals Service, the following procedures are followed:    A Marshals Service Form 312 (Prisoner Personal History) is filled out, and  the prisoner is fingerprinted and photographed. The form contains  background information on the prisoner, the charges, case number, and  which agency brought the prisoner in for booking.
The agent (e.g., DEA) that fills out the Marshals Service Form 312 is called  the lead agent and that agency will be credited with the arrest in the PTS.  Only one agency is listed as the arresting agency even though many  agencies may have participated in a joint operation through a task force.  However, there is a space for indicating whether the case was a joint  operation, but it is not mandatory to fill it out.
The Form 312 information is entered into the PTS.

	Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics

Marshals Service officials told us that investigation and arrest statistics are  used as workload measures; for example, to show how many prisoners  were produced for court appearances. With these statistics, they said that  they could show workload projections to justify budget requests. The  officials also said that investigation and arrest statistics are used to  manage programs, set policies, and allocate funds and positions. For  example, on the basis of an assessment of workload statistics, the number  of positions at a particular courthouse was decreased in fiscal year 2002.
Marshals Service officials also said that investigation and arrest statistics  are not used for making promotion, bonus, or award decisions. Criteria  that are considered for promotions, for example, include time in grade,  technical knowledge, analytical/problem solving ability, time management,  and interpersonal relationships. For higher grades, management skills--  including organization and planning, budget management, and human  resource management--are also considered for promotions.

Appendix VIII: Drug Trafficking Investigation

We found Operation Marquis on the Drug Enforcement Administration’s  (DEA) Web site when we searched for drug trafficking investigations  involving multiple federal law enforcement agencies. The Web site  indicated that Operation Marquis was coordinated by DEA’s Special  Operations Division (SOD)—a joint Department of Justice (Justice), DEA,  the Federal Bureaus of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Customs Service  (Customs), and the Internal Revenue Service program—and was  conducted in 1999, 2000, and 2001. Attorneys from Justice’s Criminal  Division, and agents and analysts from participating law enforcement  agencies staffed the investigation.
Operation Marquis targeted a Mexico-based drug trafficking organization  responsible for putting tens of millions of dollars worth of cocaine and  marijuana on the streets of at least a dozen U.S. cities. According to DEA’s  Web site, over 300 individuals were arrested as a result of the operation. In  addition to arrests, the investigation resulted in the seizure of 8,645  kilograms of cocaine, 23,096 pounds of marijuana, 50 pounds of  methamphetamine, and $13 million in U.S. currency.
On DEA’s Web site, several Justice and Customs officials commented on  the success of Operation Marquis, including:  “These law enforcement activities will have a measurable impact on drug  trafficking across our Southwest Border. The work completed in this case  emphasizes the importance of interagency cooperation in targeting and  investigating drug trafficking organizations.”—from an FBI assistant  director. “This investigation demonstrates what can be achieved when law  enforcement efforts are coordinated and resources are pooled. Operation  Marquis shut down a sprawling criminal network that plagued  communities throughout the country.”—from the then-Acting Customs  Commissioner.
We asked DEA and the FBI to provide us with the names of individuals  that they had counted in their arrest statistics for Operation Marquis. Both  agencies independently generated a list of individuals they counted as  having been arrested as part of Operation Marquis. Specifically, DEA  counted 331 arrests and the FBI counted 154 arrests. After comparing the  lists, we were able to match eight names as having been counted as arrests  by each agency.
We also asked DEA and FBI officials whether they had been designated as  the lead or assist agency, how many special agents they had assigned  throughout the investigation and at various times during the progress of  the investigation, and whether their agents were physically present during  the arrests. In addition, we asked if the amount of time their agents spent  on the investigation could be determined.
DEA officials told us that the investigation was initiated through its SOD  and that DEA was the lead agency. DEA told us that there were about 46  lead criminal investigators assigned to Operation Marquis; however,  because their statistical data systems do not record such information, DEA  officials could not tell us whether DEA agents were present at the arrests  counted by DEA. A DEA official, however, did tell us that agents logged  217,937 work hours on investigations that comprised Operation Marquis.
FBI Criminal Investigation Division officials also told us that Operation  Marquis was a DEA-initiated investigation and that DEA was the lead  agency. Seven FBI field offices were involved: San Antonio, Houston,  Dallas, Memphis, Charlotte, Kansas City, and Little Rock. Because their  statistical data systems do not record such information, the FBI officials  said that there is no way to determine exactly how many agents  participated in some manner with Operation Marquis. However, they said  SOD investigations typically have two FBI staff coordinators assigned to  an investigation. In addition, each field office typically assigns one lead  agent, who works an investigation full-time, and possibly a co-case agent,  who would work the investigation part-time. There also could have been  several agents in any given field office working on or assisting with parts  of the investigation on a part-time basis, for example, helping to setup or  monitor a wiretap.
Also, because their statistical data systems do not record information by  operation, FBI officials said that there is no way to tell how many agents  participated in the physical arrest of individuals for Operation Marquis..  Usually, at least one or two FBI agents make or assist in an arrest, but the  officials could not tell us the role played by their agents with regard to any  of the individual arrests. Moreover, FBI officials could not tell us how  many hours agents spent on the investigation because agents do not  record their time by case number, but rather by the type of work  performed, such as bank robbery  We asked DEA and FBI officials whether, as a result of the numbers of  arrests, special agents were given awards, promotions, bonuses, etc. DEA  officials said that they did not know how many, if any, agents received  awards, promotions, or bonuses for their work on Operation Marquis. The  FBI Criminal Investigation Division officials said they knew of no awards,  promotions, or bonuses given as a result of Operation Marquis.

Appendix IX: Child Pornography Investigation

A U.S. Customs Service (Customs) Special Agent in Lake Charles,  Louisiana, initiated Operation Bayou Blaster on October 1, 1994. The  Customs agent developed a plan to set up an undercover operation that  targeted individuals involved in the sexual exploitation of children via the  Internet. Customs and U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) officials told  us that a fake child pornography Web site was used to arrest individuals  who ordered material from the Web site. USPIS was asked to participate  by making some of the deliveries of the pornographic material, but not all.
All operational and undercover activity related to Operation Bayou Blaster  ceased on February 23, 2001. Customs arrested 100 individuals through the  efforts of more than 400 special agents who were involved at various times  over the 6-year duration of the operation.
We asked Customs and USPIS to provide us with the names of individuals  included in agency arrest statistics for Operation Bayou Blaster. Customs  provided us with a list of the 100 individuals that were arrested, but USPIS  was not able to generate a list of arrests that resulted from Operation  Bayou Blaster. However, at our request, USPIS crosschecked its database  with the 100 names provided by Customs. USPIS was able to match 30  arrestees, who had the same dates of birth, year arrested, and location  arrested, in their database as the Customs list. USPIS officials noted that  USPIS was asked to assist on only 30 of the deliveries.
We also asked Customs and USPIS officials whether they had been  designated as the lead or assist agency, how many special agents they had  assigned throughout the operation and at various times during the  progress of the operation, whether their agents were physically present  during the arrests, and their roles in the arrests. In addition, we asked if  the amount of time their agents spent on the operation could be  determined.
Customs officials said that Customs was the lead agency for the operation.  They told us that of the over 400 agents involved through the more than 6  years of the operation, many of them participated in the arrests. However,  because their statistical data systems do not capture such information,  they were unable to tell us whether the agents were physically present at  the arrests, or what exactly were their roles in the arrests. The officials  provided a list showing that Customs agents had charged over 78,000  hours to this operation.
USPIS officials told us that Customs was the lead agency for the operation,  and USPIS had no lead special agent for Operation Bayou Blaster. The  officials said that Customs calls on USPIS all the time to assist in the  delivery of pornographic materials. A USPIS official said 20 inspectors  were involved with the 30 arrests claimed by USPIS; however, because  their statistical data systems do not capture such information, the official  was unable to say whether the inspectors were physically present at the  arrests or what role the inspectors played in the arrests. The official told  us that inspectors logged over 1,700 hours on Operation Bayou Blaster.
We asked Customs and USPIS officials whether, as a result of the arrests,  special agents were given awards, promotions, bonuses, etc. As far as  Customs officials knew, there were no awards, promotions, or bonuses  given to the agents as a result of the Operation. The officials also said that  with the large number of Customs agents involved in the Operation, it  would be difficult to determine whether any awards, bonuses, or  promotions were a direct result of the Operation. USPIS officials could not  tell us if inspector participation in Operation Bayou Blaster resulted in any  awards, bonuses, or promotions.

Appendix X: Counterterrorism Investigation

We discussed a closed counterterrorism operation with Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)  officials. Between October 11, 2001, and April 17, 2002, the Joint Terrorism  Task Force (JTTF) in New Orleans conducted this operation based on  information that a telephone number associated with one subject in the  United States had been contacted by a pay phone known to be used by the  Taliban/al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Shortly after the operation began, an INS agent assigned to the JTTF was  asked to obtain INS files on six subjects to determine their immigration  status in the United States. It was found that the six subjects had been  released from INS custody while seeking asylum. As a result of reports of  suspicious activity, the INS district director decided to revoke their  paroles and, on January 12, 2002, the six individuals were taken back into  custody while their asylum applications or appeals were pending. At the  conclusion of their cases, four of the individuals were removed from the  country, and, as of February 6, 2004, two were being held for removal.
We asked the FBI and INS to provide us with the names of individuals  included in agency arrest statistics for this investigation. The FBI provided  us with a list of the six individuals whose arrests were included in its  statistics. INS provided us with a list of the six individuals, but told us that  even though these six individuals were taken into custody, INS did not  include them in agency arrest statistics because INS had previously  arrested these individuals in 1999; these arrests were counted for  statistical purposes at that time. Comparison of the lists of names provided  by the FBI and INS revealed that the six individuals arrested by INS in  1999 and taken back into custody in 2002, and the six individuals counted  as arrests by the FBI in 2002, were the same six individuals.
While apprehending these individuals, FBI and INS agents encountered  and arrested two other aliens whose immigration documents were no  longer valid. INS counted these two subjects as arrests for, respectively, a  nonimmigrant overstaying his or her visa and illegal entry into the United  States.
We asked FBI and INS officials whether they had been designated as the  lead or assist agency, how many special agents they had assigned  throughout the operation and at various times during the progress of the  operation, and whether their agents were physically present during the  arrests. In addition, we asked if the amount of time their agents spent on  the operation could be determined.
FBI Counterterrorism Division officials told us that both the FBI and INS  initiated the operation, with the FBI taking the lead in the operation. FBI  officials said two FBI agents were assigned full-time and numerous others  helped with such matters as surveillance. The officials could not tell us  how many hours agents spent on the operation, since agents do not record  their time by operation, but rather by the type of work performed, such as  bank robbery.
INS officials also told us that the FBI initiated the operation and that INS  became involved when the FBI asked INS agents on the JTTF for their  assistance. INS officials told us that no INS agents were specifically  assigned to the operation; one of the two INS agents in the JTTF assisted  in this operation. After the apprehensions on January 12, 2002, the INS  agent assisted the FBI in the continued operation—checking the status of  other aliens whose names appeared in records, reviewing INS files,  assisting with interviews, etc. INS officials could not tell us how many  hours agents spent on the operation because agents do not record their  time by operation, but rather by the type of work performed.
FBI Counterterrorism Division officials said that both the FBI and INS  participated in the physical arrest of the six individuals; however, they  could not tell us the exact number of FBI agents present at the arrests. INS  officials also told us the same thing; that both the FBI and INS participated  in the apprehension of the six individuals. Specifically, seven INS agents,  two INS supervisory special agents, and four INS deportation officers  participated in the apprehension, according to the officials.
We asked FBI and INS officials whether, as a result of the arrests, special  agents were given awards, promotions, bonuses, etc. FBI  Counterterrorism Division officials said two agents received $500 awards  for their performance on this operation. INS officials told us no INS agents  received awards for their participation in the operation.

Appendix XI: Comments from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contacts

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to those named above, the following individuals contributed to  this report: Tim Outlaw, Doris Page, Carolyn Ikeda, Alison Heafitz,  Christine Davis, and Amy Bernstein.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act (P.L. 107-273) requires GAO to report on how investigation and arrest statistics are reported and used by federal law enforcement agencies. This report provides information on (1) the guidance and procedures followed by federal law enforcement agencies regarding counting investigations and arrests, (2) how investigation and arrest statistics are used, and (3) whether multiple agencies are counting and reporting the same investigations and arrests. GAO selected six agencies for review: the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the U.S. Marshals Service, the former U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).

What GAO Found

Guidance and procedures for counting investigations, or cases, are generally consistent among the six agencies GAO reviewed. Agencies pursue investigations into crimes that have a nexus to their missions, such as drug trafficking for the DEA, mail theft for USPIS, and illegal aliens for the former INS. Once agents have made the decision to open a case, the cases are to be reviewed and approved by a supervisor, and details of the case are then entered into the agencies' case management tracking systems. GAO also found agency guidance and procedures for counting arrests to be generally consistent among all six agencies. In addition, the agencies required supervisory review of the justifications for the arrests before they were entered into the agencies' data tracking systems and officially counted. In general, agencies use investigation and arrest statistics as indicators of agency work and as output measures in performance plans, budget justifications, and testimonies. In some cases, these data are considered in making promotion, bonus, and award determinations. However, investigation and arrest statistics are not emphasized in any of these activities, but are one of many factors that are considered. ll of the agencies GAO reviewed counted the same investigations and arrests when more than one of them participated in the investigative and arresting activities. This practice seems appropriate because many investigations and arrests would not have occurred without the involvement and cooperation of all the agencies that participated. If agencies were not allowed to count investigations and arrests in which they participated, agencies would be less likely to work together, cases would be much smaller, and the desired disruption of high-level criminal organizations would be hampered. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and USPIS reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with GAO's findings. Technical comments were incorporated as appropriate.