Background

The use of information technology has created many benefits for agencies  such as IRS in achieving their missions and providing information and  services to the public, but extensive reliance on computerized information  also creates challenges in securing that information from various threats.  Information security is especially important for government agencies,  where maintaining the public’s trust is essential.
Without proper safeguards, computer systems are vulnerable to  individuals and groups with malicious intentions who can intrude and use  their access to obtain sensitive information, commit fraud, disrupt  operations, or launch attacks against other computer systems and  networks. The risk to these systems are well-founded for a number of  reasons, including the increase in reports of security incidents, the ease of  obtaining and using hacking tools, and steady advances in the  sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology. The Federal Bureau  of Investigation has identified multiple sources of threats, including  foreign entities engaged in intelligence gathering and information warfare,  domestic criminals, hackers, virus writers, and disgruntled employees or  contractors working within an organization. In addition, the U.S. Secret  Service and the CERT® Coordination Center studied insider threats in the  government sector and stated in a January 2008 report that “government  sector insiders have the potential to pose a substantial threat by virtue of  their knowledge of, and access to, employer systems and/or databases.”  Insider threats include errors or mistakes and fraudulent or malevolent  acts by insiders.
Our previous reports, and those by federal inspectors general, describe  persistent information security weaknesses that place federal agencies,  including IRS, at risk of disruption, fraud, or inappropriate disclosure of  sensitive information. Accordingly, we have designated information  security as a governmentwide high-risk area since 1997, most recently in  2011.
Information security is essential to creating and maintaining effective  internal controls. The Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982  requires us to issue standards for internal control in federal agencies. The  standards provide the overall framework for establishing and maintaining  internal control and for identifying and addressing major performance and  management challenges and areas at greatest risk of fraud, waste, abuse,  and mismanagement. The term internal control is synonymous with the  term management control, which covers all aspects of an agency’s  operations (programmatic, financial, and compliance). The attitude and  philosophy of management toward information systems can have a  profound effect on internal control. Information system controls consist of  those internal controls that are dependent on information systems  processing and include general controls at the entitywide, system, and  business process application levels (security management, access  controls, configuration management, segregation of duties, and  contingency planning); business process application controls (input,  processing, output, master file, interface, and data management system  controls); and user controls (controls performed by people interacting  with information systems).
Recognizing the importance of securing federal agencies’ information  systems, Congress enacted the Federal Information Security Management  Act (FISMA) in December 2002 to strengthen the security of information  and systems within federal agencies. FISMA requires each agency to  develop, document, and implement an agencywide information security  program for the information and information systems that support the  operations and assets of the agency, using a risk-based approach to  information security management. Such a program includes assessing risk;  developing and implementing cost-effective security plans, policies, and  procedures; providing specialized training; testing and evaluating the  effectiveness of controls; planning, implementing, evaluating, and  documenting remedial actions to address information security  deficiencies; and ensuring continuity of operations.

		IRS Is the Tax Collector for the United States

IRS has demanding responsibilities in collecting taxes, processing tax  returns, and enforcing federal tax laws, and relies extensively on  computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related  operations. In fiscal year 2010, IRS processed hundreds of millions of tax  returns, collected about $2.3 trillion in federal tax payments, and paid  about $467 billion in refunds to taxpayers. Further, the size and  complexity of IRS add unique operational challenges. IRS employs over  100,000 people in its Washington, D.C., headquarters and over 700 offices  in all 50 states and U.S. territories and in some U.S. embassies and  consulates. To manage its data and information, the agency operates three  enterprise computing centers located in Detroit, Michigan; Martinsburg,  West Virginia; and Memphis, Tennessee. IRS also collects and maintains a  significant amount of personal and financial information on each  American taxpayer. Protecting the confidentiality of this sensitive  information is paramount; otherwise, taxpayers could be exposed to loss  of privacy and to financial loss and damages resulting from identity theft  or other financial crimes.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has overall responsibility for  ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information  and information systems that support the agency and its operations.  FISMA requires the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or comparable official  at federal agencies to be responsible for developing and maintaining an  information security program. IRS has delegated this responsibility to the  Associate Chief Information Officer for Cybersecurity, who heads the  Office of Cybersecurity. The Office of Cybersecurity’s mission is to protect  taxpayer information and the IRS’s electronic system, services, and data  from internal and external cyber security-related threats by implementing  security practices in planning, implementation, risk management, and  operations. IRS develops and publishes its information security policies,  guidelines, standards, and procedures in the Internal Revenue Manual  and other documents in order for IRS divisions and offices to carry out  their respective responsibilities in information security. In October 2010,  the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) stated  that security, including computer security, was the top priority in its list of  top 10 management challenges for IRS in fiscal year 2011.

	Significant Weaknesses Continue to Place Financial and Taxpayer Information at Risk

Although IRS has made progress in correcting information security  weaknesses that we have reported previously, many weaknesses have not  been corrected and we identified many new weaknesses during fiscal year  2010. Specifically, 65 out of 88 previously reported weaknesses—about  74 percent—have not yet been corrected. In addition, we identified 37  new weaknesses. These weaknesses relate to access controls,  configuration management, and segregation of duties. Weaknesses in these  areas increase the likelihood of errors in financial data that result in  misstatement and expose sensitive information and systems to  unauthorized use, disclosure, modification, and loss. An underlying reason  for these weaknesses—both old and new—is that IRS has not yet fully  implemented key components of a comprehensive information security  program. These weaknesses continue to jeopardize the confidentiality,  integrity, and availability of the financial and sensitive taxpayer  information processed by IRS’s systems and, considered collectively, are  the basis of our determination that IRS had a material weakness in internal  control over its financial reporting related to information security in fiscal  year 2010.

		IRS Did Not Sufficiently Control Access to Information Resources

A basic management objective for any organization is to protect the  resources that support its critical operations from unauthorized access.  Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and implementing  controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized  access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities.  Access controls include those related to user identification and  authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring, and  physical security. However, IRS did not fully implement effective controls  in these areas. Without adequate access controls, unauthorized individuals  may be able to login, access sensitive information, and make undetected  changes or deletions for malicious purposes or personal gain. In addition,  authorized individuals may be able to intentionally or unintentionally add,  modify, or delete data to which they should not have been given access.

			Controls Were Not Consistently Implemented for Identifying and Authenticating Users

A computer system needs to be able to identify and authenticate each user  so that activities on the system can be linked and traced to a specific  individual. An organization does this by assigning a unique user account to  each user, and in so doing, the system is able to distinguish one user from  another—a process called identification. The system also needs to  establish the validity of a user’s claimed identity by requesting some kind  of information, such as a password, that is known only by the user—a  process known as authentication. The combination of identification and  authentication—such as user account/password combinations—provides  the basis for establishing individual accountability and for controlling  access to the system. The Internal Revenue Manual requires the use of a  strong password for authentication (defined as a minimum of eight  characters, containing at least one numeric or special character, and a  mixture of at least one uppercase and one lower case letter). Furthermore,  the Internal Revenue Manual states that database account passwords are  not to be reused within 10 password changes and that the password  grace time for a database—the number of days an individual has to change  his or her password after it expires—should be set to 10.
IRS properly configured password complexity on its servers used to  manage access to network resources. In addition, IRS made progress in  correcting a previously identified weakness by restricting remote login  access. However, IRS did not consistently implement strong  authentication controls on certain systems, as required by the Internal  Revenue Manual. For example:    Databases that support IRS administrative accounting and procurement  systems had a certain password control set to “null.” This password  control verifies certain password settings, such as password complexity  and minimum password length, to ensure the user’s password complies  with IRS policy. By configuring this control to “null,” no password  verifications are performed.
Seventeen of 90 network devices we reviewed had a password length of 6  characters.
Databases that support the IRS’s administrative accounting and  procurement systems contained several password resource values that  were not set to the settings required by IRS policy. For example, the  password reuse and password grace time values were set to “unlimited.”
As a result of these weaknesses, increased risk exists that an individual  with malicious intentions could gain inappropriate access to these  sensitive IRS applications and data, and potentially use the access to  attempt compromises of other IRS systems.

			Users Have More System Access than Needed to Perform Their Jobs

Authorization is the process of granting or denying access rights and  permissions to a protected resource, such as a network, a system, an  application, a function, or a file. A key component of granting or denying  an individual access rights is the concept of “least privilege.” Least  privilege, which is a basic principle for securing computer resources and  information, means that a user is granted only those access rights and  permissions needed to perform official duties. To restrict legitimate users’  access to only those programs and files needed to do their work,  organizations establish access rights and permissions to users. These “user  rights” are allowable actions that can be assigned to one user or to a group  of users. File and directory permissions are rules that regulate which users  can access a particular file or directory and the extent of that access. To  avoid unintentionally authorizing a user access to sensitive files and  directories, an organization should give careful consideration to its  assignment of rights and permissions. IRS policy states that access control  measures based on least privilege and that provide protection from  unauthorized alteration, loss, unavailability, or disclosure of information  should be implemented. Additionally, the Internal Revenue Manual  requires that the guest account be disabled to prevent any user from being  authenticated as a guest.
Although IRS had taken steps to control access to systems, it continued to  permit excessive access. For example, IRS had corrected a previously  identified weakness by limiting access to certain key financial documents  used for input into the administrative accounting system. However, it  continued to permit excessive access to several systems by granting rights  and permissions that gave users more access than they needed to perform  their assigned functions. For example, IRS granted excessive privileges to  a database account on the online system used to support and manage its  computer access request, approval, and review process. In addition, the  agency allowed some individuals to manually enter commands that would  permit them to bypass the application programs intended to be used to  access the data. Also, all database users had unnecessary execute  permissions on several sensitive database packages that allowed them to  manipulate data and gain access to sensitive files and directories on IRS’s  access authorization, administrative accounting, electronic tax payment,  and procurement systems. Furthermore, while IRS made progress in  correcting a previously identified weakness by disabling the guest account  on some SQL servers, IRS had not disabled the SQL server guest account  on its real property management system, increasing the risk that  unauthorized users could use this account to gain system access. These  excessive access privileges can provide opportunities for individuals to  circumvent security controls.

			Sensitive Data Is Sent across the IRS Network Unencrypted

Cryptography underlies many of the mechanisms used to enforce the  confidentiality and integrity of critical and sensitive information. A basic  element of cryptography is encryption, which is used to transform plain  text into cipher text using a special value known as a key and a  mathematical process known as an algorithm. According to IRS policy, the  use of insecure protocols should be restricted because its widespread use  can allow passwords and other sensitive data to be transmitted across its  internal network unencrypted.
Although IRS discontinued the use of unencrypted protocols on the  servers supporting the procurement system, its network devices were  configured to use protocols that allowed unencrypted transmission of  sensitive data. For example, 37 of the 90 network devices we reviewed and  a server supporting the IRS’s tax payment system used unencrypted  protocols to transmit sensitive information. In addition, IRS had not  corrected previously identified weaknesses, such as weak encryption  controls over user login to its administrative accounting system and  transmission of unencrypted mainframe administrator login information  across its network. By not encrypting sensitive data, IRS is at increased  risk that an unauthorized individual could view and then use the data to  gain unwarranted access to its system and/or sensitive information.

			IRS Did Not Consistently Audit and Monitor Security-Relevant Activity on Certain Systems

To establish individual accountability, monitor compliance with security  policies, and investigate security violations, it is crucial to determine what,  when, and by whom specific actions have been taken on a system.  Organizations accomplish this by implementing system or security  software that provides an audit trail—a log of system activity—that they  can use to determine the source of a transaction or attempted transaction  and to monitor users’ activities. The way in which organizations configure  system or security software determines the nature and extent of  information that can be provided by the audit trail. To be effective,  organizations should configure their software to collect and maintain audit  trails that are sufficient to track security-relevant events. The Internal  Revenue Manual states that IRS should enable and configure audit logging  on all systems to aid in the detection of security violations, performance  problems, and flaws in applications. Additionally, IRS policy states that  security controls in information systems shall be monitored on an ongoing  basis.
IRS is currently utilizing a commercial off-the-shelf audit trail solution  allowing the agency to review audit log reports and analyze audit data. In  addition, IRS has established the Enterprise Security Audit Trails Project  Management Office, which is responsible for managing all enterprise audit  initiatives and identifying and overseeing deployment and transition of  various audit trail solutions. Despite these steps forward, IRS did not  enable certain auditing features on three systems we reviewed. For  example, IRS did not enable security event auditing or system privilege  auditing features on databases that support its access authorization,  administrative accounting, and procurement systems. In addition, IRS had  not corrected a previously identified weakness in which certain servers  were not configured to ensure sufficient audit trails. As a result, IRS’s  ability to establish individual accountability, monitor compliance with  security policies, and investigate security violations was limited.

			Physical Access Controls Were Not Consistently Implemented

Physical security controls are important for protecting computer facilities  and resources from espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. These  controls involve restricting physical access to computer resources, usually  by limiting access to the buildings and rooms in which they are housed  and periodically reviewing access granted, in order to ensure that access  continues to be appropriate. At IRS, physical access control measures,  such as physical access cards that are used to permit or deny access to  certain areas of a facility, are vital to safeguarding its facilities, computing  resources, and information from internal and external threats. The  Internal Revenue Manual requires access controls to protect employees  and contractors, information systems, and the facilities in which they are  located. The policy also requires that entry to restricted areas should be  limited to only those who need it to perform their job duties. It also  requires department managers of restricted areas to review, validate, sign,  and date the authorized access list for restricted areas on a monthly basis  and then forward the list to the physical security office for review of  employee access.
Although IRS had implemented numerous physical security controls,  certain controls were not working as intended, and the agency had not  consistently applied the policy in others. IRS has a dedicated guard force  at each computing center visitor entrance. These guards screen every  visitor that enters these facilities. The agency had also corrected a  previously identified weakness by consistently reviewing the images  displayed on x-ray machines while screening employees, visitors, and  contractors entering restricted areas. However, visitor physical access  cards to restricted areas at one computing center provided unauthorized  access to other restricted areas within the center—a weakness previously  reported in 2010. In addition, IRS had not consistently applied its  processes for reviewing access to restricted areas within its computing  centers. For example, effective procedures were not in place at two of the  three computing centers to ensure that individuals with an ongoing need  to access restricted areas within the center were reviewed regularly in  order to assess whether the access was warranted to perform their job.  Although one computing center regularly reviewed the visitor access list, it  did not review the list of individuals who had ongoing access. The other  center only reviewed access based on the number of times in a given week  the individual entered certain areas within the center, rather than based on  the individual’s need to perform job duties. Further, at the third data  center, IRS was unable to provide evidence that the physical security  office had addressed a prior recommendation to remove employee access  to restricted areas when a manager indicated access was no longer  needed.
Because employees and visitors may have unnecessary access to  restricted areas, IRS has reduced assurance that its computing resources  and sensitive information are adequately protected from unauthorized  access.

		Weaknesses in Other Information Security Controls Increase Risk

In addition to access controls, other important controls should be in place  to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an organization’s  information. These controls include policies, procedures, and techniques  for securely configuring information systems, and segregating  incompatible duties. However, IRS has weaknesses in these areas, thus  increasing its risk of unauthorized use, disclosure, modification, or loss of  information and information systems.

			Outdated and Unsupported Software Exposes IRS to Known Vulnerabilities

Configuration management involves, among other things, (1) verifying the  correctness of the security settings in the operating systems, applications,  or computing and network devices and (2) obtaining reasonable assurance  that systems are configured and operating securely and as intended. Patch  management, a component of configuration management, is an important  element in mitigating the risks associated with software vulnerabilities.  When a software vulnerability is discovered, the software vendor may  develop and distribute a patch or work-around to mitigate the  vulnerability. Without the patch, an attacker can exploit a software  vulnerability to read, modify, or delete sensitive information; disrupt  operations; or launch attacks against systems at another organization.  Outdated and unsupported software is more vulnerable to an attack and  exploitation because vendors no longer provide updates, including  security updates. Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Manual states that  IRS will manage systems to reduce vulnerabilities by promptly installing  patches. In addition, the manual states that system administrators will  ensure the operating system version is a version for which the vendor still  offers standardized technical support.
Although IRS made progress in updating certain systems, it did not always  apply critical patches to its databases that support two financial  applications. For example, the agency made major upgrades to key servers  supporting the administrative accounting system; however, databases  supporting this and another administrative accounting application had not  been updated with the latest critical patches. In addition, patches had not  been applied since 2006 for at least four other database installations on  servers supporting the agency’s general ledger system for tax-related  activities. IRS had also not corrected previously identified weaknesses  related to outdated and unsupported software on domain name servers. As  a result, the agency has limited assurance that its systems are protected  from known vulnerabilities.

			Incompatible Duties Were Not Appropriately Segregated on Certain Financial Management Systems

Segregation of duties refers to the policies, procedures, and organizational  structures that help ensure that no single individual can independently  control all key aspects of a process or computer-related operation and  thereby gain unauthorized access to assets or records. Often,  organizations achieve segregation of duties by dividing responsibilities  among two or more individuals or organizational groups. This diminishes  the likelihood that errors and wrongful acts will go undetected, because  the activities of one individual or group will serve as a check on the  activities of the other. Inadequate segregation of duties increases the risk  that erroneous or fraudulent transactions could be processed, improper  program changes implemented, and computer resources damaged or  destroyed. The Internal Revenue Manual requires that IRS divide and  separate duties and responsibilities of incompatible functions among  different individuals so that no individual shall have all of the necessary  authority and system access to disrupt or corrupt a critical security  process. Furthermore, the manual specifies that the primary security role  of any database administrator is to administer and maintain database  repositories for proper use by authorized individuals and that database  administrators shall not have system administrator access rights.
IRS did not always appropriately segregate certain duties. Specifically, on  its general ledger system for tax-related activities, IRS granted certain  database administration privileges to at least 25 database users with no  database administration duties. These privileges allowed them to grant  other users access to tables within the database, including the ability to  add, change, or delete important accounting data. In addition, IRS had not  corrected a previously identified weakness related to permitting an  individual the ability to execute the roles and responsibilities of both a  database and system administrator for the procurement system. By not  properly segregating incompatible duties in these financial management  systems, IRS reduces the effectiveness of its internal controls over  financial management and increases the likelihood of errors and  misstatements. Additionally, these weaknesses increase the potential for  unauthorized use or disclosure of sensitive information or disruption of  systems.

		IRS Has Not Fully Implemented Key Components of Its Information Security Program

An underlying reason for the information security weaknesses in IRS’s  financial and tax processing systems is that it has not yet fully  implemented key components of its comprehensive information security  program. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and  implement an information security program that, among other things,  includes:    periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result  from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or  destruction of information and information systems;   policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3)  ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of  each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements;   plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities,    security awareness training to inform personnel of information security  risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and  procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security  responsibilities for information security;    periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security  policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency  depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of  management, operational, and technical controls for every system  identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems;   a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting  remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security  policies, procedures, or practices; and   plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information  systems that support the operations and assets of the agency.
IRS has made progress in developing and documenting elements of its  information security program. To bolster security over its networks and  systems and to address its information security weaknesses, IRS has  developed various initiatives. For example, IRS has created a detailed  roadmap to guide its efforts in targeting critical weaknesses. The agency is  in the process of implementing this comprehensive plan to mitigate  numerous information security weaknesses, such as those associated with  access controls, audit trails, contingency planning, and training. According  to the plan, the last of these weaknesses is scheduled to be resolved in the  first quarter of fiscal year 2014. In addition, IRS has developed metrics to  measure success in complying with guides, policies, and standards in the  areas of inventory management, configuration management, access  authorizations, auditing, and change management. As long as these efforts  remain flexible to address changing technology and evolving threats,  include our findings and those of TIGTA in measuring success, and are  fully and effectively implemented, they should improve the agency’s  overall information security posture.
Although the agency has a framework in place for its comprehensive  information security program, as demonstrated below, key components of  IRS’s program have not yet been fully implemented.

			Although IRS Had Documented Risk Assessments, One Had Not Been Updated and Another Was Not Comprehensive

According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),  risk is determined by identifying potential threats to the organization and  vulnerabilities in its systems, determining the likelihood that a particular  threat may exploit vulnerabilities, and assessing the resulting impact on  the organization’s mission, including the effect on sensitive and critical  systems and data. Identifying and assessing information security risks are  essential to determining what controls are required. Moreover, by  increasing awareness of risks, these assessments can generate support for  the policies and controls that are adopted in order to help ensure that the  policies and controls operate as intended. Consistent with NIST guidance,  IRS requires its risk assessment process to detail the residual risk  assessed, as well as potential threats, and to recommend corrective  actions for reducing or eliminating the vulnerabilities identified. IRS policy  also requires system risk assessments to be updated a minimum of every 3  years or whenever there is a significant change to the system, the facilities  where the system resides, or other conditions that may affect the security  or status of system accreditation.
Although IRS had implemented a risk assessment process, which includes,  among other things, threat and vulnerability identification, impact  analysis, risk determination, and recommended corrective actions, certain  risks may not have been identified. For the six systems that we reviewed,  five of the risk assessments were up-to-date, documented, and formally  approved by IRS management. However, IRS’s general ledger system for  tax-related activities was moved from one mainframe environment to  another at a different facility; yet, the risk assessment had not been  updated. Further, IRS’s risk assessment of the mainframe environment  supporting its general ledger for tax-related activities and tax processing  applications was not comprehensive. Specifically, the assessment did not  consider all potential threats and vulnerabilities for portions of the system;  IRS considered the test and development environment of the system as out  of scope although these portions could affect the system’s security. As a  result, potential risks to this system may not be fully known and  associated controls may not be in place.

			Policies and Procedures Were in Place, but Some Were Inconsistent and Others Lacked Specificity

Another key element of an effective information security program is to  develop, document, and implement risk-based policies, procedures, and  technical standards that govern security over an agency’s computing  environment. If properly developed and implemented, policies and  procedures should help reduce the risk associated with unauthorized  access or disruption of services. In addition, technical security standards  can provide consistent implementation guidance for each computing  environment. Developing, documenting, and implementing security  policies and standards are the important primary mechanisms by which  management communicates its views and requirements; these policies also  serve as the basis for adopting specific procedures and technical controls.  In addition, agencies need to take the actions necessary to effectively  implement or execute these procedures and controls. Otherwise, agency  systems and information will not receive the protection that the security  policies and controls should provide.
IRS had generally developed, documented, and approved information  security policies and procedures, and had corrected a previously identified  weakness by enhancing its policies and procedures related to password  age and configuration settings to comply with federal guidance. However,  some policies were inconsistent and some were lacking specifics about  administering, managing, and monitoring certain controls. For example,  the agency’s overall policy on password management requires that  systems be configured such that passwords cannot be reused within 24  password changes; another policy specified 3 in one section and 10 in  another. Inconsistent policies can lead to less stringent implementation of  controls, such as those for password management. In addition, specific  policy and procedures for a key access control were lacking. Although IRS  relies on system-managed storage as a key access control to prevent  unauthorized access between logical partitions that have different  mission support functions and different security requirements, the agency  did not document in its policy or related procedures how this control  environment should be administered, managed, and monitored. As a  result, IRS does not have processes in place to verify that system-managed  storage controls are implemented, administered, and monitored in a  manner that provides necessary access controls. Further, in an August  2010 report, TIGTA reported that IRS had not documented all IT security  roles and responsibilities in the Internal Revenue Manual and had not  developed day-to-day IT security procedures and guidelines. Without  having fully documented, approved, and implemented policies and  procedures, IRS cannot ensure that its information security requirements  are applied consistently across the agency.

			Security Plans Were Documented, but One Plan Did Not Describe Controls in the Current Environment

An objective of system security planning is to improve the protection of  information technology resources. A system security plan provides an  overview of the system’s security requirements and describes the controls  that are in place or planned to meet those requirements. OMB Circular A- 130 requires that agencies develop system security plans for major  applications and general support systems, and that these plans address  policies and procedures for providing management, operational, and  technical controls. Furthermore, IRS policy requires that security plans  describing the security controls in place or planned for its information  systems be developed, documented, implemented, reviewed annually, and  updated a minimum of every 3 years or whenever there is a significant  change to the system.
Although IRS documented its management, operational, and technical  controls in system security plans for the six systems we reviewed, one  plan did not reflect the current operating environment. IRS used OMB  Circular A-130 as guidance to develop system security plans for the  respective systems. In addition, IRS documented the review of its system  security plans through certification and accreditation memos, which  provide IRS with the authorization to operate systems. These memos were  formally approved by key officials. Further, all the plans reviewed were  within the 3-year time frame. However, one application’s system security  plan did not describe controls in place in the current environment. IRS had  moved this application from one mainframe to another, but the plan still  reflected controls from the previous environment. Without a specific and  accurate security plan for this key financial system, IRS cannot ensure that  appropriate controls are in place to protect the critical information this  system stores.

			Security Awareness and Specialized Training Was Provided to All Employees Reviewed

Individuals can be one of the weakest links in securing systems and  networks. Therefore, a very important component of an information  security program is providing sufficient training so that users understand  system security risks and their own role in implementing related policies  and controls to mitigate those risks. IRS policy requires that personnel  performing information technology security duties meet minimum  continuing professional education hours in accordance with their roles.  Individuals performing security roles are required by IRS to have 12, 8, or 4  hours of specialized training per year, depending on their specific role.
IRS had processes in place for providing employees with security  awareness and specialized training. For the employees with specific  security-related roles and the newly-hired employees that we reviewed, all  met the required minimum security awareness and specialized training  hours.

			Tests and Evaluations of Policies, Procedures, and Controls Were Not Always Effective

Another key element of an information security program is to test and  evaluate policies, procedures, and controls to determine whether they are  effective and operating as intended. This type of oversight is a  fundamental element because it demonstrates management’s commitment  to the security program, reminds employees of their roles and  responsibilities, and identifies and mitigates areas of noncompliance and  ineffectiveness. Although control tests and evaluations may encourage  compliance with security policies, the full benefits are not achieved unless  the results improve the security program. FISMA requires that the  frequency of tests and evaluations be based on risks and occur no less  than annually. The Internal Revenue Manual also requires periodic testing  and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies and  procedures.
Although IRS has processes in place intended to monitor, test, and  evaluate its security policies and procedures, these processes were not  always effective. For example, IRS did not:    Detect many of the readily identifiable vulnerabilities we are reporting. We  previously recommended that IRS expand the scope for testing and  evaluating controls to ensure more comprehensive testing.
Perform comprehensive testing within the past year for one of its key  network components that it considered to be a high-risk system.
Test application security over its general ledger system for tax-related  activities in its current production environment. This general ledger  system was moved from one mainframe environment to another at a  different facility; yet, the test and evaluation had not been updated to  reflect the current operating environment. We tested access controls in the  current environment and identified weaknesses in the general ledger  system’s controls that compromised segregation of duties and jeopardized  the integrity of the application’s data.
Comprehensively test security controls over the mainframe environment  supporting its general ledger for tax-related activities and tax processing  applications. For example, the test was limited to a portion of the  operating environment and, therefore, did not test all of the relevant  controls.
In addition, in an August 2010 report, TIGTA reported that IRS did not  properly conduct compliance assessments to test the implementation of  day-to-day IT procedures. Because of the lack of comprehensive testing,  IRS may not be fully aware of vulnerabilities that could adversely affect  critical applications and data.

			Remedial Action Plans Were Complete, but Corrective Actions Were Not Fully Validated

A remedial action plan is a key component of an agency’s information  security program as described in FISMA. Such a plan assists agencies in  identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and monitoring progress in correcting  security weaknesses that are found in information systems. In its annual  FISMA guidance to agencies, OMB requires agency remedial action plans,  also known as plans of action and milestones, to include the resources  necessary to correct identified weaknesses. According to the Internal  Revenue Manual, the agency should document weaknesses found during  security assessments, as well as planned, implemented, and evaluated  remedial actions to correct any deficiencies. IRS policy further requires  that IRS track the resolution status of all weaknesses and verify that each  weakness is corrected.
IRS had a process in place for evaluating and tracking remedial actions.  The agency developed remedial action plans for the systems that we  reviewed and implemented a remedial action process to address  deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, and practices.  These plans documented weaknesses and included planned actions that  were tracked by IRS. In addition, during fiscal year 2010, IRS made  progress toward correcting previously reported information security  weaknesses, correcting or mitigating 23 of the 88 previously identified  weaknesses that were unresolved at the end of our prior audit. However,  at the time of our review, 65 of 88—about 74 percent—of the previously  reported weaknesses remained unresolved or unmitigated. According to  IRS officials, the agency is continuing actions toward correcting or  mitigating previously reported weaknesses.
However, the agency’s process for verifying whether an action had  corrected or mitigated the weakness was not working as intended. The  agency informed us that it had corrected 39 of the 88 previously reported  weaknesses, but we determined that IRS had not fully implemented the  remedial actions for 16 of the 39 weaknesses that it considered corrected.  We previously recommended that IRS implement a revised verification  process that ensures remedial actions are fully implemented. Until the  agency takes additional steps to implement a more effective verification  process, it will have limited assurance that weaknesses are being properly  mitigated or corrected and that controls are operating effectively.

			IRS Documented Contingency Plans for Major Systems and Made Efforts to Mitigate Previous Weaknesses

Continuity of operations planning, which includes contingency planning, is  critical to protecting sensitive information. To ensure that mission-critical  operations continue, organizations should be able to detect, mitigate, and  recover from service disruptions while preserving access to vital  information. Organizations should prepare plans that are clearly  documented, communicated to staff who could be affected, and updated  to reflect current operations. In addition, testing contingency plans is  essential in determining whether the plans will function as intended in an  emergency situation. FISMA requires that plans and procedures be in  place to ensure continuity of operations for agency information systems.  IRS policy states that individuals with responsibility for disaster recovery  should be provided with copies of or access to agency disaster recovery  plans.
IRS had appropriately documented and communicated the four  contingency plans we reviewed. In addition, IRS had resolved prior  weaknesses by updating disaster recovery and business resumption plans  to include UNIX and Windows mission-critical systems and ensuring the  availability of a disaster recovery keystroke manual for its administrative  accounting system.

	Conclusions

Although IRS continues to make progress in correcting or mitigating  previously reported weaknesses, implementing controls over key financial  systems, and developing and documenting a framework for its  comprehensive information security program, information security  weaknesses—both old and new—continue to jeopardize the  confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IRS’s systems. An underlying  reason for the information security weaknesses in IRS’s financial and tax  processing systems is that it has not yet fully implemented key  components of its comprehensive information security program. The  financial and taxpayer information on IRS systems will remain particularly  vulnerable to insider threats until the agency (1) addresses newly  identified and previously reported weaknesses pertaining to identification  and authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring,  physical security, configuration management, and segregation of duties;  and (2) fully implements key components of a comprehensive information  security program that ensures risk assessments are conducted in the  current operating environment; policies and procedures are appropriately  specific and effectively implemented; security plans are written to reflect  the current operating environment; processes intended to test, monitor,  and evaluate internal controls are appropriately detecting vulnerabilities;  comprehensive testing is conducted on key networks on an at least annual  basis; and tests and evaluations are conducted in the current operating  environment.
Until IRS takes these further steps, financial and taxpayer information are  at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction;  financial data is at increased risk of errors that result in misstatement; and  the agency’s management decisions may be based on unreliable or  inaccurate financial information. These weaknesses, considered  collectively, were the basis of our determination that IRS had a material  weakness in internal control over financial reporting related to  information security in fiscal year 2010.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

In addition to implementing our previous recommendations, we are  recommending that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the  following eight actions to fully implement key components of the IRS  comprehensive information security program:    Update risk assessments whenever there is a significant change to the  system, the facilities where the system resides, or other conditions that  may affect the security or status of system accreditation.
Update the risk assessment for the mainframe environment supporting the  general ledger for tax-related activities and tax processing applications to  include all portions of the environment that could affect security.
Update policies and procedures pertaining to password controls to ensure  they are consistent.
Document and implement policy and procedures for how systems- managed storage as an access control mechanism should be administered,  managed, and monitored.
Update the application security plan to describe controls in place in its  current mainframe operating environment.
Perform comprehensive testing of the key network component considered  to be a high-risk system, at least annually.
Test the application security for the general ledger system for tax-related  activities in its current operating environment.
Perform comprehensive testing of security controls over the mainframe  environment to include all portions of the operating environment.
We are also making 32 detailed recommendations in a separate report with  limited distribution. These recommendations consist of actions to be taken  to correct specific information security weaknesses related to  identification and authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and  monitoring, physical security, configuration management, and segregation  of duties identified during this audit.

	Agency Comments

In providing written comments (reprinted in app. II) on a draft of this  report, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated that the security and  privacy of taxpayer and financial information is of the utmost importance  to the agency and that he appreciated that the draft report recognized the  progress IRS has made in improving its information security program and  that numerous initiatives are underway. He also noted that IRS is  committed to securing its computer environment and will continually  evaluate processes, promote user awareness, and apply innovative ideas to  increase compliance. The Commissioner stated that IRS is steadily  progressing toward eliminating the material weakness in information  security by establishing enterprise repeatable processes, which are  overseen by an internal team that performs self-inspections, identifies and  mitigates risk, and provides executive governance over corrective actions.  Further, he stated that IRS will provide a detailed corrective action plan  addressing each of our recommendations.
This report contains recommendations to you. As you know, 31 U.S.C. §  720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement of  the actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on  Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and to the House Committee  on Oversight and Government Reform not later than 60 days from the date  of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations  with the agency’s first request for appropriations made more than 60 days  after the date of this report. Because agency personnel serve as the  primary source of information on the status of recommendations, we  request that the agency also provide us with a copy of the agency’s  statement of action to serve as preliminary information on the status of  open recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Treasury Inspector  General for Tax Administration. The report also is available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Nancy R.  Kingsbury at (202) 512-2700 or Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244. We  can also be reached by e-mail at kingsburyn@gao.gov and  wilshuseng@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The objective of our review was to determine whether controls over key  financial and tax processing systems were effective in protecting the  confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive  taxpayer information at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To do this, we  examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested  controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency  officials in order to (1) assess the effectiveness of corrective actions taken  by IRS to address weaknesses we previously reported and (2) determine  whether any additional weaknesses existed. This work was performed in  connection with our audit of IRS’s fiscal year 2010 and 2009 financial  statements for the purpose of supporting our opinion on internal control  over the preparation of those statements.
To determine whether controls over key financial and tax processing  systems were effective, we considered the results of our evaluation of  IRS’s actions to mitigate previously reported weaknesses, and performed  new audit work at the three enterprise computing centers located in  Detroit, Michigan; Martinsburg, West Virginia; and Memphis, Tennessee, as  well as an IRS facility in New Carrollton, Maryland. We concentrated our  evaluation on threats emanating from sources internal to IRS’s computer  networks. Considering systems that directly or indirectly support the  processing of material transactions that are reflected in the agency’s  financial statements, we focused on eight critical applications/systems as  well as the general support systems.
Our evaluation was based on our Federal Information System Controls  Audit Manual, which contains guidance for reviewing information  system controls that affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of  computerized information; National Institute of Standards and Technology  guidance; and IRS policies and procedures. We evaluated controls by  reviewing the complexity and expiration of password settings to  determine if password management had been enforced;   analyzing users’ system access to determine whether they had been  granted more permissions than necessary to perform their assigned  functions; reviewing configuration files for servers and network devices to determine  if encryption was being used for transmitting data;   assessing configuration settings to evaluate settings used to audit security- relevant events and discussing and observing monitoring efforts with IRS  officials;    observing and analyzing physical access controls to determine if computer  facilities and resources had been protected; inspecting key servers to determine whether critical patches had been  installed or software was up-to-date; and   examining user access and responsibilities to determine whether  incompatible functions had been segregated among different individuals.
Using the requirements in the Federal Information Security Management  Act that establish elements for an effective agencywide information  security program, we reviewed and evaluated IRS’s implementation of its  security program by    analyzing IRS’s risk assessments for six IRS financial and tax processing  systems that are key to supporting the agency’s financial statements, to  determine whether risks and threats had been documented;   comparing IRS’s policies, procedures, practices, and standards to actions  taken by IRS personnel to determine whether sufficient guidance had been  provided to personnel responsible for securing information and  information systems;    analyzing security plans for six systems to determine if management,  operational, and technical controls had been documented and if security  plans had been updated;   verifying whether new employees had received system security orientation  within the first 10 working days;    verifying whether employees with security-related responsibilities had  received specialized training within the year;   analyzing test plans and test results for six IRS systems to determine  whether management, operational, and technical controls had been tested  at least annually; reviewing IRS’s system remedial action plans to determine if they were  complete; reviewing IRS’s actions to correct weaknesses to determine if they had  effectively mitigated or resolved the vulnerability or control deficiency;  reviewing system backup and recovery procedures to determine if they  had adequately provided for recovery and reconstitution to the system’s  original state after a disruption or failure; and   examining contingency plans for six IRS systems to determine whether  those plans had been tested or updated.
In addition, we discussed with management officials and key security  representatives, such as those from IRS’s Computer Security Incident  Response Center, Office of Cybersecurity, as well as the three computing  centers, whether information security controls were in place, adequately  designed, and operating effectively.

Appendix II: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contacts

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individuals named above, David Hayes (assistant  director), Jeffrey Knott (assistant director), Angela Bell, Mark Canter,  Sharhonda Deloach, Nancy Glover, Nicole Jarvis, George Kovachick,  Sylvia Shanks, Eugene Stevens, Michael Stevens, and Daniel Swartz made  key contributions to this report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the nation's tax laws. It relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations and on information security controls to protect financial and sensitive taxpayer information that resides on those systems. As part of its audit of IRS's fiscal years 2010 and 2009 financial statements, GAO assessed whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems are effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. To do this, GAO examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials at four sites.

What GAO Found

Although IRS made progress in correcting previously reported information security weaknesses, control weaknesses over key financial and tax processing systems continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. Specifically, IRS did not consistently implement controls that were intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to its financial systems and information. For example, the agency did not sufficiently (1) restrict users' access to databases to only the access needed to perform their jobs; (2) secure the system it uses to support and manage its computer access request, approval, and review processes; (3) update database software residing on servers that support its general ledger system; and (4) enable certain auditing features on databases supporting several key systems. In addition, 65 of 88--about 74 percent--of previously reported weaknesses remain unresolved or unmitigated. An underlying reason for these weaknesses is that IRS has not yet fully implemented key components of its comprehensive information security program. Although IRS has processes in place intended to monitor and assess its internal controls, these processes were not always effective. For example, IRS's testing did not detect many of the vulnerabilities GAO identified during this audit and did not assess a key application in its current environment. Further, the agency had not effectively validated corrective actions reported to resolve previously identified weaknesses. Although IRS had a process in place for verifying whether each weakness had been corrected, this process was not always working as intended. For example, the agency reported that it had resolved 39 of the 88 previously identified weaknesses; however, 16 of the 39 weaknesses had not been mitigated. IRS has various initiatives underway to bolster security over its networks and systems; however, until the agency corrects the identified weaknesses, its financial systems and information remain unnecessarily vulnerable to insider threats, including errors or mistakes and fraudulent or malevolent acts by insiders. As a result, financial and taxpayer information are at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction; financial data is at increased risk of errors that result in misstatement; and the agency's management decisions may be based on unreliable or inaccurate financial information. These weaknesses, considered collectively, are the basis for GAO's determination that IRS had a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting related to information security in fiscal year 2010.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that IRS take eight actions to fully implement key components of its comprehensive information security program. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is recommending 32 specific actions for correcting newly identified control weaknesses. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed to develop a detailed corrective action plan to address each recommendation.