DOD’s Efforts to Address Our Recommendations from 2008 Reflect Varying Levels of Progress

DOD has taken steps to implement our August 2008 recommendations to  improve its sexual assault prevention and response program; however, its  efforts reflect various levels of progress, and opportunities exist for  further program improvements. To its credit, DOD has implemented four  of the nine recommendations in our August 2008 report. First, the Office of  the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established a working group to address  our recommendation to evaluate the adequacy of DOD policies for  implementing its sexual assault prevention and response program in joint  and deployed environments. Based on the working group’s findings, OSD  suggested revisions to joint policy, which a Joint Staff official told us they  are using to modify related publications. Second, the military service  secretaries have each taken a variety of steps to address our  recommendation to emphasize responsibility for program support at all  levels of command. The most notable examples of this support include the  U.S. Navy’s recent establishment of a sexual assault prevention and  response office that will report directly to the Secretary of the Navy, and  the Army’s incorporation of a sexual assault program awareness  assessment into promotional boards for its noncommissioned officers.  Third, OSD chartered the Health Affairs Sexual Assault Task Force to  address our recommendation to evaluate and address factors that may  prevent or discourage servicemembers from seeking health services.  Specifically, the task force evaluated and subsequently issued a number of  recommendations that are intended to improve access to health care  following a sexual assault, including chartering a Sexual Assault Health  Care Integrated Policy Team to review department-level policies regarding  clinical practice guidelines, standards of care, personnel and staffing,  training requirements and responsibilities, continuity of care, and in- theater equipment and supplies. Fourth, in August 2008, the Defense Task  Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services began its examination of  matters related to sexual assault, as we recommended, and on  December 1, 2009 the task force released a report with its findings and  recommendations.
However, DOD’s actions toward implementing the other five  recommendations from 2008 reflect less progress. For example, although  OSD has drafted an oversight framework, that framework does not contain  all the elements necessary for effective strategic planning and program  implementation, such as criteria for measuring progress to facilitate  program evaluation and to identify areas needing improvement. However,  according to OSD officials, they plan to develop these within the next 2  years. Further, the draft oversight framework does not include information  on how OSD plans to use or report the results of its performance  assessments, does not identify how program resources correlate to its  achievement of program objectives, and does not correlate with the  program’s two strategic plans. Therefore, to improve oversight of the  department’s sexual assault prevention and response programs, in our  February 2010 report we recommend that OSD strengthen its oversight  framework by identifying how the results of performance assessments will  be used to guide the development of future program initiatives, identifying  how program resources correlate to its achievement of strategic program  objectives, and correlating the oversight framework with the program’s  two strategic plans. In written comments on our draft report, DOD  concurred and noted that it has already taken steps toward implementing  these recommendations. For example, DOD stated that it currently has  efforts underway to establish criteria for measuring its progress and  expects to have a plan in early 2010 for tracking the department’s progress  toward performance objectives. DOD also noted that it plans to align its  budget categories with specific performance objectives, starting with the  2012 budget cycle. Further, DOD noted that the process it plans to use to  track its progress toward performance objectives will also allow the  department to synchronize the objectives, timelines, and strategies of its  two strategic plans. We commend DOD for taking immediate steps in  response to our recommendations, and encourage the department to  continue taking positive actions toward fully implementing them.
Further, while OSD has introduced some changes in DOD’s annual report  to Congress, it has not completed the process of developing a standardized  set of sexual assault data elements and definitions. OSD officials noted  that the standardization of data definitions is something they expect to  accomplish in the near term, while standardizing data elements will take  longer as it is a task that will be completed in conjunction with their  development of a centralized sexual assault database. However, we note  that in the meantime, information in DOD’s annual report still cannot be  compared across the military services, and it may not be effectively  characterizing incidents of sexual assault in the military services. Thus, to  enhance visibility over the incidence of sexual assaults involving DOD  servicemembers, and to improve the department’s sexual assault  prevention and response programs and the pending implementation of the  Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database, in our February 2010 report we  recommend that DOD standardize the type, amount, and format of the  data in the military services’ report submissions. In written comments on  our draft report, DOD stated that it is working to achieve complete data  uniformity among the military services, but that this will ultimately be  accomplished once the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database—which  we will discuss next—has been established. While we recognize the  complexity of this task, we continue to assert that the full establishment  and implementation of standardized data elements and definitions will  facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of DOD’s sexual assault  prevention and response programs.
We also found that OSD cannot assess training programs as we  recommended, because OSD’s strategic plans and draft oversight  framework do not contain measures against which to benchmark  performance, and DOD has not implemented our recommendation to  evaluate processes for staffing key installation-level positions because,  according to OSD officials, they were advised that the Defense Task Force  on Sexual Assault in the Military Services would be making related  recommendations. Finally, OSD officials stated that they will not address  our recommendation to collect installation-level data—despite its  availability and the military services’ willingness to provide them—until  they have implemented the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database to  maintain these data. We did not make any new recommendations to DOD  in our February 2010 report regarding these findings however, we continue  to assert that until these recommendations are fully implemented, OSD  cannot be sure that the programs are improving the department’s  prevention of and response to sexual assault incidents.

	DOD Has Yet to Establish A Centralized Sexual Assault Incident Database

DOD has taken preliminary steps to establish the centralized, case-level  Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database that Congress directed it to  implement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,  but it did not meet the statutorily mandated January 2010 deadline for  implementing the database. Instead, only general milestones for acquiring  the database have been set, and DOD cannot currently commit to when  the system will be implemented because it does not have a reliable  acquisition and implementation schedule. Further, a range of key  information technology management practices that are essential to  successfully acquiring and implementing a system remain to be  accomplished. Our research and evaluations of information technology  programs across the federal government have shown that adherence to  such practices—including assessing a program’s overlap with related  programs and using reliable estimates of life cycle costs and benefits to  justify investment in the system—is essential to delivering promised  system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. However,  more remains to be accomplished before these disciplines will be  effectively implemented. For example, while DOD developed a business  case for the database in June 2009 that includes a cost estimate of  $12.6 million, the cost estimate does not include all costs over the system’s  life cycle, has not been adjusted to account for program risks, and does  not include a comparison of alternatives on the basis of net present value.  To increase the chances of the database being successfully acquired and  implemented, in our February 2010 report we recommend that DOD  adhere to key system acquisition management processes and controls,  including, but not limited to developing a reliable integrated master  schedule, assessing the program’s overlap with related programs, and  justifying the investment based on reliable estimates of life cycle costs and  benefits. In written comments on our draft report, DOD agreed with these  recommendations but noted that doing so depends in part on hiring a  system development contractor. In this regard, DOD expects to release the  Request for Proposals for a system developer soon, and award a contract  sometime between April and June 2010.

	Coast Guard Has Partially Implemented One of Our Two Recommendations from 2008

While the Coast Guard has partially implemented one of our  recommendations to further develop its sexual assault prevention and  response program, it has not implemented the other. In August 2008, we  reported that the Coast Guard’s sexual assault prevention and response  program was hindered by several issues, and we made two  recommendations to strengthen its program’s implementation. In  response to these recommendations, the Coast Guard has established a  headquarters-level program manager position to oversee its sexual assault  prevention and response program, and it has initiated an assessment of the  current workload requirements and resource allocations for its Sexual  Assault Response Coordinators. In written comments on our draft report,  the Coast Guard stated that it had recently completed its assessment of the  workload requirements and resource allocations for its Sexual Assault  Response Coordinators, and upon release of the final report the Coast  Guard plans to review and analyze the recommendations and as  appropriate, incorporate additional resource requirements into its annual  budget process.
Further, the Coast Guard lacks a systematic process to collect, document,  and maintain its sexual assault data and related program information, and  it lacks quality control procedures to ensure that program data being  collected are reliable. For example, Coast Guard officials noted that in  fiscal year 2008, the Coast Guard Investigative Service documented 78  reports of alleged sexual assault, while Coast Guard Headquarters, using  its hard copy log of reports from its coordinators, had documented only  30. Therefore, in our February 2010 report we recommend that the Coast  Guard improve the oversight and accountability of its sexual assault  prevention and response program by establishing a systematic process for  collecting, documenting, and maintaining sexual assault incidence data,  and by establishing quality control processes to ensure that program  information collected is reliable. In written comments on our draft report,  the Coast Guard noted that it is currently developing a prototype of an  electronic database to track sexual assault reports and that it expects to  complete the database in 2010.
Additionally, while the Coast Guard’s instruction requires that all Coast  Guard Sexual Assault Response Coordinators be trained to perform  relevant duties, officials stated that they have not developed a curriculum  or implemented training for the Coast Guard’s 16 Sexual Assault Response  Coordinators, as they had elected alternatively to develop a training  curriculum for other program personnel. Thus, to ensure that the Coast  Guard can provide proper advice to its personnel, in our February 2010  report we recommend that it establish and administer a curriculum for all  key program personnel. In written comments on our draft report, the  Coast Guard noted that it has scheduled training in May 2010 for all of its  personnel performing Sexual Assault Response Coordinator duties. We  commend the Coast Guard for the steps it has taken and its plans for  further developing its sexual assault prevention and response program,  and we encourage the service to continue taking positive actions toward  fully implementing our recommendations.
In summary, we want to reiterate our recognition that both DOD and the  Coast Guard have taken a number of positive steps toward addressing our  recommendations from 2008 to further strengthen their respective sexual  assault prevention and response programs. Additionally, each service has  proactively developed and implemented a variety of initiatives—beyond  what we recommended—to increase program awareness and to improve  prevention of and response to occurrences of sexual assault. While such  progress is noteworthy, DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s efforts have not fully  established sound management frameworks that include a long-term  perspective and clear lines of accountability—all of which are needed to  withstand the administrative, fiscal, and political pressures that confront  federal programs on a daily basis. Further, successful program  implementation will require the personal involvement of top DOD and  Coast Guard leadership in order to maintain the long-term focus on and  accountability for program objectives. Without such support, DOD’s and  the Coast Guard’s programs will not be able to maximize the benefits of  their respective prevention and response initiatives, and they may not be  able to effect the change in military culture that is needed to ensure that  their programs are institutionalized.
Chairman Tierney and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our  prepared statement. We would be pleased to answer any questions you  may have at this time.

	Contacts and Acknowledgments

If you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this  statement, please contact Brenda Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or  farrellb@gao.gov or Randolph Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors  to this statement include Marilyn K. Wasleski, Assistant Director; Neelaxi  Lakhmani, Assistant Director; Divya Bali; Stacy Bennett; K. Nicole Harms;  Jim Houtz; Ron La Due Lake; Kim Mayo; Adam Vodraska; and Cheryl A.  Weissman.
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Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

This report discusses our efforts to evaluate the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the U.S. Coast Guard's oversight and implementation of their respective sexual assault prevention and response programs. Our findings build upon our previous work related to sexual assault in the military services. DOD and the Coast Guard have taken a number of positive steps to increase program awareness and to improve their prevention and response to occurrences of sexual assault, but additional actions are needed to strengthen their respective programs. As we have previously reported, sexual assault is a crime with a far-reaching negative impact on the military services in that it undermines core values, degrades mission readiness and esprit de corps, subverts strategic goodwill, and raises financial costs. Since we reported on these implications in 2008, incidents of sexual assault have continued to occur; in fiscal year 2008, DOD reported nearly 3,000 alleged sexual assault cases, and the Coast Guard reported about 80. However, it remains impossible to accurately analyze trends or draw conclusions from these data because DOD and the Coast Guard have not yet standardized their respective reporting requirements.

What GAO Found

DOD has taken steps to implement our August 2008 recommendations to improve its sexual assault prevention and response program; however, its efforts reflect various levels of progress, and opportunities exist for further program improvements. To its credit, DOD has implemented four of the nine recommendations in our August 2008 report. Further, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has introduced some changes in DOD's annual report to Congress, it has not completed the process of developing a standardized set of sexual assault data elements and definitions. We also found that OSD cannot assess training programs as we recommended, because OSD's strategic plans and draft oversight framework do not contain measures against which to benchmark performance, and DOD has not implemented our recommendation to evaluate processes for staffing key installation-level positions because, according to OSD officials, they were advised that the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services would be making related recommendations. Finally, OSD officials stated that they will not address our recommendation to collect installation-level data--despite its availability and the military services' willingness to provide them--until they have implemented the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database to maintain these data. While the Coast Guard has partially implemented one of our recommendations to further develop its sexual assault prevention and response program, it has not implemented the other. In August 2008, we reported that the Coast Guard's sexual assault prevention and response program was hindered by several issues, and we made two recommendations to strengthen its program's implementation. Further, the Coast Guard lacks a systematic process to collect, document, and maintain its sexual assault data and related program information, and it lacks quality control procedures to ensure that program data being collected are reliable. Additionally, while the Coast Guard's instruction requires that all Coast Guard Sexual Assault Response Coordinators be trained to perform relevant duties, officials stated that they have not developed a curriculum or implemented training for the Coast Guard's 16 Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, as they had elected alternatively to develop a training curriculum for other program personnel. Thus, to ensure that the Coast Guard can provide proper advice to its personnel, in our February 2010 report we recommend that it establish and administer a curriculum for all key program personnel.