Background

The use of information technology has created many benefits for  agencies such as IRS in achieving their missions and providing  information and services to the public, but extensive reliance on  computerized information also creates challenges in securing that  information from various threats. Information security is especially  important for government agencies, where maintaining the public’s trust is  essential.
Without proper safeguards, computer systems are vulnerable to  individuals and groups with malicious intentions who can intrude and use  their access to obtain sensitive information, commit fraud, disrupt  operations, or launch attacks against other computer systems and  networks. Cyber-based threats to information systems and cyber-related  critical infrastructure can come from sources internal and external to the  organization. Internal threats include errors or mistakes, as well as  fraudulent or malevolent acts by employees or contractors working within  an organization. External threats include the ever-growing number of  cyber-based attacks that can come from a variety of sources such as  hackers, criminals, and foreign nations. Our previous reports, and those  by federal inspectors general, describe persistent information security  weaknesses that place federal agencies, including IRS, at risk of  disruption, fraud, or inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information.  Accordingly, we have designated information security as a  governmentwide high-risk area since 1997, a designation that remains in  force today.
Information security is essential to creating and maintaining effective  internal controls. The Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982  requires the Comptroller General to prescribe standards for internal  control in federal agencies. The standards provide the overall framework  for establishing and maintaining internal control and for identifying and  addressing major performance and management challenges and areas at  greatest risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The term  internal control is synonymous with the term management control, which  covers all aspects of an agency’s operations (programmatic, financial,  and compliance). The attitude and philosophy of management toward  information systems can have a profound effect on internal control.  Information system controls consist of those internal controls that are  dependent on information systems processing and include general  controls (security management, access controls, configuration  management, segregation of duties, and contingency planning) at the  entity, system, and business process application levels; business process  application controls (input, processing, output, master file, interface, and  data management system controls); and user controls (controls  performed by people interacting with information systems).
Recognizing the importance of securing federal agencies’ information  systems, Congress enacted the Federal Information Security  Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) to strengthen the security of  information and systems within federal agencies. FISMA requires each  agency to develop, document, and implement an agencywide information  security program for the information and information systems that support  the operations and assets of the agency, using a risk-based approach to  information security management. Such a program includes assessing  risk; developing and implementing cost-effective security plans, policies,  and procedures; providing security awareness and specialized training;  testing and evaluating the effectiveness of controls; planning,  implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address  information security deficiencies; and ensuring continuity of operations.  The act also assigned to the National Institute of Standards and  Technology (NIST) the responsibility for developing standards and  guidelines that include minimum information security requirements.

		IRS Is the Tax Collector for the United States

IRS collects taxes, processes tax returns, and enforces federal tax laws.  In fiscal years 2012 and 2011, IRS collected about $2.5 trillion and $2.4  trillion, respectively, in federal tax payments, processed hundreds of  millions of tax and information returns, and paid about $373 billion and  about $416 billion, respectively, in refunds to taxpayers. Further, the size  and complexity of IRS add unique operational challenges. IRS employs  more than 100,000 people in its Washington, D.C., headquarters and  more than 650 offices in all 50 states and U.S. territories and in some  U.S. embassies and consulates. IRS relies extensively on computerized  systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. To  manage its data and information, the agency operates three enterprise  computing centers located in Detroit, Michigan; Martinsburg, West  Virginia; and Memphis, Tennessee. IRS also collects and maintains a  significant amount of personal and financial information on each U.S.  taxpayer. Protecting the confidentiality of this sensitive information is  paramount; otherwise, taxpayers could be exposed to loss of privacy and  to financial loss and damages resulting from identity theft or other  financial crimes.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has overall responsibility for  ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information  and information systems that support the agency and its operations.  FISMA requires the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or comparable official  at a federal agency to be responsible for developing and maintaining an  information security program. IRS has delegated this responsibility to the  Associate CIO for Cybersecurity, who heads the Office of Cybersecurity.  The Office of Cybersecurity’s mission is to protect taxpayer information  and the IRS’s systems, services, and data from internal and external  cybersecurity-related threats by implementing security practices in  planning, implementation, risk management, and operations. IRS  develops and publishes its information security policies, guidelines,  standards, and procedures in its Internal Revenue Manual and other  documents in order for IRS divisions and offices to carry out their  respective responsibilities in information security. In October 2012, the  Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) stated that  security of taxpayer data, including securing computer systems, was the  top priority in its list of top 10 management challenges for IRS in fiscal  year 2013.

	IRS Has Made Progress, but Control Weaknesses Continue to Place Financial and Taxpayer Information at Risk

IRS had implemented numerous controls over its systems, including  controls for identification and authentication, authorization, cryptography,  audit and monitoring, physical security, configuration management, and  contingency planning. However, it had not always effectively implemented  access and other controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and  availability of its financial systems and information. These weaknesses  and others in IRS’s security program increase the risk that taxpayer and  other sensitive information could be disclosed or modified without  authorization.

		Access Control Deficiencies Reduced Security over Systems

A basic management objective for any organization is to protect the  resources that support its critical operations from unauthorized access.  Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and implementing  controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized  access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities.
Access controls include those related to user identification and  authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring, and  physical security. However, IRS did not fully implement effective controls  in these areas. Without adequate access controls, unauthorized  individuals may be able to log in, access sensitive information, and make  undetected changes or deletions for malicious purposes or personal gain.  In addition, authorized individuals may be able to intentionally or  unintentionally view, add, modify, or delete data they should not have  been given access to.
A computer system needs to be able to identify and authenticate each  user or system so that activities can be linked and traced to a specific  individual or system. An organization does this by assigning a unique  account to each user or process, and in so doing, the system is able to  distinguish one user or process from another—a process called  identification. The system also needs to establish the validity of a claimed  identity by requesting some kind of information, such as a password—a  process known as authentication. NIST also recommends using  multifactor authentication to access user accounts via a network.  Multifactor authentication involves using two or more factors to achieve  authentication. Factors include something you know (e.g., password or  personal identification number), something you have (e.g., cryptographic  identification device or token), or something you are (e.g., biometric). The  combination of identification and authentication—such as user account- password combinations—provides the basis for establishing  accountability and for controlling access to the system. IRS’s Internal  Revenue Manual specifies security configurations for its database  systems and network support systems that cover how authentications are  to be performed and how passwords are to be configured. The manual  also requires the use of a strong password for authentication (defined as  a minimum of eight characters, containing at least one numeric or special  character, and a mixture of at least one uppercase and one lowercase  letter), and that passwords be set to expire every 90 days.
IRS improved identification and authentication controls for certain  databases, one of their major operating systems, and network  infrastructure systems. Specifically:  some database configurations were more securely configured such  that the source of user logins was more restrictive and password  controls were strengthened;  improved password controls were implemented for servers using the  UNIX operating system; and  important data transmissions used to operate their network  infrastructure were authenticated.
However, a number of identification and authentication control  weaknesses continued to reduce IRS’s ability to effectively control access  to systems and data. For example: authentication controls for certain databases were not set to prevent passwords were stored without adequate controls to prevent them  from being disclosed; and  controls over complexity and age of passwords for some databases  were not adequate.
Further, the agency sometimes used passwords that could be easily  guessed and had not changed some passwords in nearly 2 years. In  addition, the username and password for a database was stored in clear  text in a file that was named so that its contents were easy to guess.  Unauthorized use of this username and password would expose system  information and render sensitive data vulnerable to unauthorized access.  The vulnerability was compounded by the fact that the unauthorized  access would be virtually undetectable since no unusual system activity  would be involved—the unauthorized access would be via a valid  username and password. As a result of these weaknesses, IRS had  reduced ability to control who was accessing its systems and data.
Authorization is the process of granting or denying access rights and  permissions to a protected resource, such as a network, a system, an  application, a function, or a file. A key component of granting or denying  an access right is the concept of least privilege. Least privilege is a basic  principle for securing computer resources and data. It means that users  are granted only those access rights and permissions that they need to  perform their official duties. According to NIST, access control policies  and access enforcement mechanisms are employed by organizations to  control access between users (or processes acting on behalf of users)  and objects in the information system. Furthermore, it notes that access  enforcement mechanisms are employed at the application level, when  necessary, to provide increased information security for the organization.  According to the Internal Revenue Manual, the agency should implement  access control measures that provide protection from unauthorized  alteration, loss, unavailability, or disclosure of information. The manual  also requires that system access be granted based on the principle of  least privilege, which allows access at the minimum level necessary to  support a user’s job duties.
IRS had strengthened several authorization controls, including: eliminating certain database vulnerabilities that had previously  reduced the agency’s ability to enforce least privilege;  improving isolation of mainframe processing environments to more  effectively restrict access;  strengthening an application login process to prevent users from  exceeding their approved access levels; and  restricting privileges to important files stored on a network server.
However, numerous authorization control weaknesses existed in IRS’s  computing environment, including:
Access privileges allowed all users of IRS’s internal network to read  and write files containing sensitive system information, including  passwords, that were used to support automated data transfer  operations between numerous systems. Unauthorized access  privileges to these files jeopardized the integrity of the data and the  availability of applications.
Administrators had more access than needed in certain instances. On  one server, IRS had configured multiple databases supporting  different business units to operate using the same username. As a  result, any administrator with access to the username could have  access to all databases, exceed his or her job duties, and affect IRS’s  ability to control the integrity of the data.
For one system reviewed, database administrators were inadvertently  granted privileges to administer the servers used by the database.
Although IRS had recently tested an application, and contrary to least  privilege principles, users of that application could view sensitive  system information by using unintended capabilities in the user  interface of the application. Subsequent to our site visit, IRS officials  advised us that corrective actions had been taken in the form of  programming changes to the next version of the application. However,  we have not verified that these actions have been completed.
Until IRS appropriately controls users’ access to its systems and  effectively implements its procedures for authorization, the agency has  limited assurance that its information resources are being protected from  unauthorized access, alteration, and disclosure.
Cryptography underlies many of the mechanisms used to enforce the  confidentiality and integrity of critical and sensitive information. A basic  element of cryptography is encryption, which is used to transform plain  text into cipher text using a special value known as a key and a  mathematical process known as an algorithm. According to IRS policy,  the confidentiality of transmitted data must be protected by encrypting the  data to prevent unauthorized disclosure. In addition, the policy states that  the use of insecure protocols should be restricted because their  widespread use can allow passwords, taxpayer information, and other  sensitive data to be transmitted unencrypted across its internal network.
IRS has made progress in its implementation of data encryption controls,  particularly in protecting sensitive information transmitted across its  internal network. However, user IDs, passwords, and data continued to  be transmitted frequently without encryption. Further, many of IRS’s  servers were configured to weakly encrypt passwords in a manner that  did not effectively prevent the passwords from being disclosed during  transmission. IRS officials advised us that the weak server password  encryption configuration was the result of incompatibilities between some  systems that had to decrypt passwords and was expected to be resolved  soon after the conclusion of our audit. Until the existing weaknesses and  the newly-identified weakness are corrected, IRS’s ability to reliably  control access to some systems and data is undermined.
To establish individual accountability, monitor compliance with security  and configuration management policies, and investigate security  violations, it is crucial to determine what, when, and by whom specific  actions have been taken on a system. Agencies accomplish this by  implementing system or security software that provides an audit trail—a  log of system activity—that it can use to determine the source of a  transaction or attempted transaction and to monitor user activity. The way  in which organizations configure system or security software determines  the nature and extent of information that can be provided by the audit  trail. To be effective, agencies should configure their software to collect  and maintain audit trails that are sufficient to track security-relevant  events. The Internal Revenue Manual requires that audit logging be  enabled and configured on all systems to aid in the detection of security  violations, performance problems, and flaws in applications. Additionally,  the manual states that security controls in information systems shall be  monitored on an ongoing basis.
To enhance its auditing and monitoring capabilities, IRS established  several activities designed to support detection of questionable or  unauthorized access to financial applications and data and to support its  response. The Enterprise Security Audit Trails (ESAT) Project  Management Office is designed to assist in audit and monitoring activities  by detecting questionable or unauthorized access to financial applications  and data. For fiscal year 2012, this office continued to implement new  procedures building on its initiatives. For example, at the time of our  review, the office had enabled and configured audit logging in place for 23  systems. In addition, for a key financial system, the Office of the Chief  Financial Officer documented monitoring procedures, which staff used to  review the key financial system’s ESAT audit logs.
However, IRS did not always effectively implement audit and monitoring  controls on internal systems. Specifically, the agency did not have  controls in place to detect inappropriate access between the mainframe  systems used for tax processing and financial management. Data stored  on disks in these systems could be accessed by a user who had been  allowed access to one or more processing environments, such as  development, test, or production. In addition, two of IRS’s testing  environments that share disk storage with the tax and financial  management processing environments did not have routine monitoring  oversight. The agency had also not enabled logging for a database  supporting an important tax-processing application. IRS had detected this  shortcoming; however, corrective actions are not scheduled to be  completed for more than 2 years. Further, IRS was not consistently  logging administrator activity, and certain production files on the  mainframe could be changed without these changes being logged.
Without effective audit and monitoring, IRS’s ability to establish individual  accountability, monitor compliance with security and configuration  management policies, and investigate security violations is limited.
Physical security controls are important for protecting computer facilities  and resources from sabotage, theft, accidental or deliberate damage, and  unauthorized access. These controls involve restricting physical access to  computer resources, usually by limiting access to the buildings and rooms  in which they are housed and periodically reviewing the access granted in  order to ensure that access continues to be appropriate. At IRS, physical  access control measures, such as physical access cards that are used to  permit or deny access to certain areas of a facility, are vital to  safeguarding facilities, computing resources, and information from  internal and external threats. The Internal Revenue Manual requires an  inventory of nonphoto ID cards at least once every 24 hours, including a  signature on the inventory form to verify that the inventory has been  completed. In addition, it requires access controls that safeguard assets  against possible theft and malicious actions and requires department  managers of restricted areas to review, validate, sign, and date the  authorized access list for restricted areas on a monthly basis and then  forward the list to the physical security office for review.
IRS implemented numerous physical security controls at its enterprise  computing centers to safeguard assets against possible theft and  malicious actions. For example, IRS ensured guard personnel  consistently conducted inventories of nonphoto ID cards, and directed the  guard personnel at enterprise computing centers to sign the inventories in  accordance with policy. In addition, the agency sufficiently restricted  access to unattended consoles within the computing centers.
However, physical security controls were not always effectively  implemented. For example, visitor physical access cards to restricted  areas at one computing center provided unauthorized access to other  restricted areas within the center, and regular reviews of individuals with  an ongoing need to access restricted areas at one of the three computing  centers were not being conducted monthly to ensure that such access  was still appropriate. We previously made recommendations in fiscal year  2011 to address both of these issues. Because employees and visitors  may be allowed inappropriate access to restricted areas, IRS has  reduced assurance that its computing resources and sensitive information  are being adequately protected from unauthorized access.

		IRS Had Contingency Plans in Place but Weaknesses in Other Information Security Controls Introduce Risk

In addition to access controls, other controls should be in place to ensure  the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an organization’s  information. These controls include policies, procedures, and techniques  for securely configuring information systems and planning for continuity of  operations. Weaknesses in system configurations have increased the risk  of unauthorized use, disclosure, modification, or loss of information to  financial and tax processing systems and taxpayer data.
Configuration management involves, among other things, (1) verifying the  correctness of the security settings in the operating systems, applications,  or computing and network devices and (2) obtaining reasonable  assurance that systems are configured and operating securely and as  intended. Patch management, a component of configuration  management, is an important element in mitigating the risks associated  with software vulnerabilities. When a software vulnerability is discovered,  the software vendor may develop and distribute a patch or work-around to  mitigate the vulnerability. Without the patch, an attacker can exploit a  vulnerability not yet mitigated, and read, modify, or delete sensitive  information; disrupt operations; or launch attacks against systems at  another organization. Outdated and unsupported software is more  vulnerable to attack and exploitation because vendors no longer provide  updates, including security updates. Change control procedures, yet  another component of configuration management, are important to  ensure that only authorized and fully tested systems are placed in  operation. To ensure that changes to systems are necessary, work as  intended, and do not result in the loss of data or program integrity, such  changes should be documented, authorized, tested, and independently  reviewed. Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Manual states that IRS will  manage systems to reduce vulnerabilities by promptly installing patches.  Specifically, it states that security patches should be applied within 30  days, and hardware and software on network devices should be promptly  maintained and updated in response to identified vulnerabilities. The  manual also states that system administrators should ensure the version  of the operation system being used is one for which the vendor continues  to offer standardized technical support.
IRS did not always ensure its systems were securely configured, as  illustrated in the following examples:
Servers were not consistently configured to have strong controls.
Eight of 19 servers reviewed lacked a security setting to enforce  standard configuration updates, resulting in weaker controls for these  servers.
The agency’s automated change management process could be  circumvented because individuals had privileges that allowed them to  make changes to mainframe applications.
IRS has made progress in replacing outdated systems but did not always  apply patches to its systems in a timely manner. During fiscal year 2012,  the agency replaced older systems to ensure ongoing vendor technical  support. However, as we have previously reported, it did not patch its  systems within 30 days.account processing had not been patched for several months despite the  issuance of critical patches and another database used for operations  support was missing key patches. IRS officials stated that these situations  resulted from restrictions on making changes to systems during the tax  filing season. Other servers were also not patched due to system  performance problems. According to IRS, these systems were patched  subsequent to our site visits, but we have not yet verified this information.  The agency also has an initiative underway to resolve its lack of patch  management during tax filing season.
For example, a database supporting tax  Until IRS more completely follows its change management policies and  improves the timeliness of applying patches, the agency will continue to  face an increased risk that unauthorized and/or unintended system  changes may not be prevented, detected, or corrected in a timely  manner.
Contingency planning, which includes developing contingency and  business continuity plans, should be performed to ensure that when  unexpected events occur, essential operations can continue without  interruption or can be promptly resumed, and that sensitive data are  protected. NIST guidance states that agencies should develop and  implement contingency plans that describe activities associated with  backing up and restoring a system after a disruption or failure. The plans  should be updated and include information such as contacts, resources,  and description of files in order to restore the application in the event of a  disaster. In addition, the plans should be tested to determine their  effectiveness and the agency’s readiness to execute the plans. In  addition, conducting a business impact analysis is a key step in the  contingency planning process. A business impact analysis is an analysis  of information technology system requirements, processes, and  interdependencies used to characterize system contingency requirements  and priorities in the event of a significant disruption. Moreover, it  correlates the system with the critical mission/business processes and  services provided and, based on that information, characterizes the  consequences of a disruption. The Internal Revenue Manual requires the  agency to develop, test, and maintain information system contingency  plans for all systems, and to review and update these plans. The manual  also requires a business impact analysis for each system, and includes  steps for completing this process. In addition, according to the manual,  IRS shall implement and enforce backup procedures for all systems and  information.
IRS had processes in place to ensure recovery of their information  system resources through continuity of operations, which included  contingency plans and their associated test plans, as well as business  impact analyses. The agency had appropriately documented and  maintained current contingency plans and business impact analyses, and  had tested the contingency plans for each of the six major systems we  reviewed, and had the appropriate back-up procedures in place to ensure  recovery of its data and information system resources.

		IRS Had Developed an Information Security Program but Had Not Always Effectively Implemented Elements of the Program

A key reason for the information security weaknesses in IRS’s financial  and tax-processing systems was that, although the agency has  developed and documented a comprehensive agencywide information  security program, it had not effectively implemented certain elements of  its information security program.
An entitywide information security management program should establish  a framework and continuous cycle of activity for assessing risk,  developing and implementing effective security procedures, and  monitoring the effectiveness of these procedures. FISMA requires each  agency to develop, document, and implement an information security  program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could  result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,  modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2)  cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable  level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the  life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable  requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks,  facilities, and systems;  security awareness training to inform personnel of information security  risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies  and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security  responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information  security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a  frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that  include testing of management, operational, and technical controls for  every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major  information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting  remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security  policies, procedures, or practices; and procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security  incidents.
Further, the current administration has made continuous monitoring of  federal information systems a top cybersecurity priority. Continuous  monitoring of security controls employed within or inherited by the system  is an important aspect of managing risk to information from the operation  and use of information systems. Conducting a thorough point-in-time  assessment of the deployed security controls is a necessary but not  sufficient practice to demonstrate security due diligence. An effective  information security program also includes a rigorous continuous  monitoring program integrated into the system development life cycle.  The objective of continuous monitoring is to determine if the set of  deployed security controls continue to be effective over time in light of the  inevitable changes that occur. Such monitoring is intended to assist in  maintaining an ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities,  and threats to support agency risk management decisions. The  monitoring of security controls using automated support tools facilitates  near real-time risk management. As described by NIST, the information  security continuous monitoring process for developing a continuous  monitoring strategy and implementing a continuous monitoring program  consists of the following steps: define a continuous monitoring strategy; establish a continuous monitoring program that determines metrics analyze security-related information and report findings; and the frequency of monitoring and assessments;  implement the monitoring program;  respond with mitigation actions or reject, avoid, transfer, or accept  risk; and  review and update the monitoring strategy and program.
According to NIST, effective continuous monitoring begins with  development of a strategy that addresses requirements and activities at  each organizational tier. Each tier monitors security metrics and assesses  security control effectiveness with established monitoring and  assessment frequencies and status reports customized to support tier- specific decision making. The Internal Revenue Manual states that the  agency should document its continuous monitoring strategy as defined by  NIST guidance.
IRS had implemented a comprehensive information security program, as  illustrated by the following examples:  IRS had developed and documented an IT security risk management  policy that required all sensitive applications to be periodically  assessed for the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from  vulnerabilities and potential threats.
The agency had developed policies and procedures that considered  risk, appropriately addressed purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,  and compliance, and were approved by management.  IRS had developed and documented security plans for all of the major  systems we reviewed that addressed policies and procedures for  providing management, operational, and technical controls.  IRS had processes in place for providing employees with security  awareness and specialized training. All employees with specific  security-related roles and newly-hired employees that we reviewed  met or exceeded the required minimum security awareness and  specialized training hours.
The agency had implemented numerous processes for testing and  evaluating the effectiveness of controls, and told us that it had  previously identified many of the issues we raised in this report. IRS  also tested its general ledger system for tax transactions in its current  operating environment.  IRS had completed actions to address 61 of the 118  recommendations we reported in fiscal year 2011 that were still  unresolved at the time of our last review.  IRS had a process in place to ensure that Computer Security Incident  Response Center incident tickets were opened, managed, and closed  in accordance with IRS’s policies and procedures governing incident  detection, handling, and response.
IRS had also started numerous initiatives that covered various control  areas, such as addressing weak passwords, restricting network access,  improving security for shared services, and ensuring regular penetration  testing and vulnerability scans.
However, not all elements of IRS’s information security program had been  effectively implemented, as illustrated in the following examples:
Although IRS had developed and documented information security  policies and procedures covering key topics such as risk  assessments, security awareness training, testing and evaluation of  security controls, configuration management, continuity of operations,  and incident response, shortcomings existed with policies and  procedures.
Although IRS has a specific policy limiting global access privilege  assignments in a manner that allows all users to access specific  files on their mainframe systems, that policy only covered one of  the two methods available for granting all users access.  IRS’s audit and monitoring policies and procedures did not  comprehensively address users accessing files used by one  processing environment from a different environment.  IRS’s policies and procedures for installing Oracle databases  allowed for all of the databases operating on a single server to be  configured such that they all run under the same system account,  potentially allowing users more access than needed to perform  their jobs.  IRS’s policies did not cover situations where data storage is  shared between systems, which creates potential for changes  made in one system to affect other systems.  IRS’s security standards for systems that support tax processing  and financial management contained information that was several  years out of date, which had resulted in less secure system  configurations.
The agency did not have a procedure in place to reconcile certain  access privileges.
Although IRS had processes in place for providing employees with  security awareness and specialized training, the agency did not  always ensure that contractors received security awareness training.  The Internal Revenue Manual requires that all new employees and  contractors receive security awareness training within the first 10  working days. For fiscal year 2012, more than half of the contractors  we evaluated were not in compliance with IRS’ security awareness  training requirement. In addition, the agency allowed contractors to  complete the required training within 6 months of their start date  rather than within the first 10 working days, as required. We have  previously made a recommendation to address contractor security  awareness training.IRS’s procedures for testing and evaluating controls were not always  effective. A key element of an information security program is  conducting tests and evaluations of policies, procedures, and controls  to determine whether they are effective and operating as intended.  However, for one financial reporting system that we reviewed, the  testing methodology did not always determine whether required  authentication controls were operating effectively. Testers did not  verify that controls required by policy were actually implemented on  the system. Consequently, we identified control weaknesses that had  not been detected by IRS. Also, IRS had not identified some of the  other issues raised in this report, including weaknesses involving  passwords and excessive access privileges, although they were  readily detectable. Additionally, IRS’s mainframe security monitoring  had not detected several instances of noncompliance with its policies.
Although IRS had a process in place for evaluating and tracking  remedial actions, it did not always effectively validate that corrective  actions had been taken, or whether the actions addressed the  weakness. The Internal Revenue Manual requires that IRS track the  status of resolution of all weaknesses and verify that each weakness  has been corrected before closing it. During the audit period, IRS  informed us that it had addressed 58 of the 118 previous information  system security-related recommendations we had made that  remained unresolved at the end of our prior audit. However, we  determined that 13 (about 22 percent) of the 58 had actually not yet  been fully resolved. We previously made a recommendation to  address this issue.  IRS has not fully documented its continuous monitoring strategy. The  agency created a diagram that logically depicts certain information  security continuous monitoring data flows and activities, had  developed various standard operating procedures, and is collecting,  analyzing, and reporting on certain data. However, it does not have a  strategy that defines requirements and activities at each  organizational tier, mission/business processes, and information  systems, nor does it define monitoring and assessment metrics and  frequencies.
Until IRS effectively implements all key elements of its information  security program, the agency will not have reasonable assurance that  computing resources are consistently and effectively protected from  inadvertent or deliberate misuse, including fraud or destruction.

	Conclusions

IRS has continued to make important progress in addressing information  security control weaknesses, and in improving its internal control over  financial reporting. During fiscal year 2012, IRS management devoted  attention and resources to addressing information security controls, and  resolved a significant number of the information security control  deficiencies that we have previously reported. Nevertheless, information  security weaknesses remain in access and other information system  controls over IRS’s financial and tax-processing systems, affecting the  confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer  data. The financial and taxpayer information on IRS systems will remain  particularly vulnerable to internal threats until the agency (1) addresses  weaknesses pertaining to identification and authentication, authorization,  cryptography, audit and monitoring, physical security, and configuration  management and (2) effectively implements key components of its  comprehensive information security program that ensure processes  intended to test, monitor, and evaluate internal controls are appropriately  detecting vulnerabilities, including developing and implementing a  strategy for continuous monitoring efforts and improving validation of  corrective actions; and policies are up-to-date, and reflect the current  operating environment. These deficiencies are the basis of our  determination that IRS had a significant deficiency in internal control over  financial reporting related to information security in fiscal year 2012.  Continued and consistent management commitment and attention to an  effective information security program will be essential to the  maintenance of, and continued improvements in, the agency’s information  security controls.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

In addition to implementing our previous recommendations, we are  recommending that the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue take  the following four actions to effectively implement key components of the  IRS information security program:
Update policies and procedures to ensure that they address (1) both  methods available for granting all users access to mainframe  resources, (2) audit and monitoring of access from one processing  environment to another, (3) use of appropriate accounts by multiple  databases on a single server, (4) data storage shared between  systems, (5) out-of-date security standards, and (6) reconciliation of  access privileges; update test and evaluation methodology to ensure that it determines  whether authentication controls are operating effectively; update mainframe test and evaluation processes to improve periodic  monitoring of compliance with IRS policies; and  fully document a continuous monitoring strategy that includes  requirements and activities definitions at each organizational tier.
We are also making 30 detailed recommendations in a separate report  with limited distribution. These recommendations consist of actions to be  taken to correct specific information security weaknesses related to  identification and authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and  monitoring, and configuration management.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In providing written comments (reprinted in app. II) on a draft of this  report, the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated that the  security and privacy of taxpayer and financial information is of the utmost  importance to the agency and that IRS will provide a detailed corrective  action plan addressing each of our recommendations. Further, the Acting  Commissioner stated that the integrity of IRS’s financial systems  continues to be sound. However, as we noted in this report, although IRS  has continued to make important progress in addressing information  security control weaknesses, it had not always effectively implemented  access and other controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and  availability of its financial systems and information. The effective  implementation of our recommendations in this report and in our previous  reports will assist IRS in protecting taxpayer and financial information.
This report contains recommendations to you. As you know, 31 U.S.C.   § 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement  of the actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee  on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and to the House  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform not later than 60 days  from the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on  Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made  more than 60 days after the date of this report. Because agency  personnel serve as the primary source of information on the status of  recommendations, we request that the agency also provide us with a  copy of the agency’s statement of action to serve as preliminary  information on the status of open recommendations.
We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the  Treasury, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, and  interested congressional parties.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Nancy R.  Kingsbury at (202) 512-2700 or Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244.  We can also be reached by e-mail at kingsburyn@gao.gov and  wilshuseng@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The objective of our review was to determine whether controls over key  financial and tax-processing systems were effective in protecting the  confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer  information at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To do this, we  examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested  controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency  officials in order to (1) assess the effectiveness of corrective actions taken  by IRS to address weaknesses we previously reported and (2) determine  whether any additional weaknesses existed. This work was performed in  connection with our audit of IRS’s fiscal years 2012 and 2011 financial  statements for the purpose of supporting our opinion on internal control  over the preparation of those statements and may not be sufficient for  other purposes.
To determine whether controls over key financial and tax-processing  systems were effective, we considered the results of our evaluation of  IRS’s actions to mitigate previously reported weaknesses, and performed  new audit work at the three enterprise computing centers located in  Detroit, Michigan; Martinsburg, West Virginia; and Memphis, Tennessee,  as well as IRS facilities in New Carrollton, Maryland; Beckley, West  Virginia; Ogden, Utah; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Washington, D.C.  We concentrated our evaluation on threats emanating from sources  internal to IRS’s computer networks. Considering systems that directly or  indirectly support the processing of material transactions that are  reflected in the agency’s financial statements, we focused our technical  work on the general support systems that directly or indirectly support key  financial and taxpayer information systems such as, the Integrated  Financial System; Account Management System; Graphic Data Interface;  Electronic Federal Payment Posting System; Online 5081; Web  Requesting Tracking System and Integrated Procurement System;  Custodial Detail Database—including the Net Tax Refund Report;  Automated Trust Fund Recovery Systems, Automated Interface to the  National Finance Center; Redesign Revenue Accounting Control System;  Customer Account Data Engine; Individual Masterfiles and Business  Masterfiles; and the Integrated Data Retrieval System.
Our evaluation was based on our Federal Information System Controls  Audit Manual, which contains guidance for reviewing information system  controls that affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of  computerized information; National Institute of Standards and Technology  guidance; and IRS policies, procedures, practices, and standards. We  evaluated controls by  testing Domain Name Servers to determine if unnecessary services  were running and if operating systems and software were current; examining IRS’s implementation of encryption to secure transmissions  on its internal network;  reviewing physical security processes and procedures at each of the  enterprise computing centers;  reviewing access control/privileges of user accounts to determine if  system access was assigned based on least privilege and  consideration of incompatible duties;  testing the complexity, expiration, and policy for passwords on  databases to determine if strong password management was being  enforced;  testing servers and network devices to determine if adequate control  configurations were in place; evaluating the mainframe operating system controls that support the  operation of applications and databases that support revenue  accounting; evaluating the controls of mainframe configurations that shared disk  storage with multiple mainframe processing environments;  reviewing access configurations on selected systems and database  configurations; examining the status of patching for selected databases and system  components to ensure that patches are up to date;  reviewing IRS’s process for reviewing risk assessments to determine  if risk assessments were being reviewed at least annually; examining documentation to determine the extent to which IRS was  performing internal controls reviews of key financial systems; and  testing the design of two key applications to determine if the  applications’ access controls were effective.
Using the requirements in the Federal Information Security Management  Act of 2002, which established elements for an effective agencywide  information security program, we reviewed and evaluated IRS’s  implementation of its security program by analyzing IRS’s process for reviewing risk assessments to determine  whether the assessments were up to date, documented, and  approved;  reviewing IRS’s policies, procedures, practices, and standards to  determine whether its security management program was  documented, approved, and up to date;  reviewing IRS’s system security plans for specified systems to  determine the extent to which the plans were reviewed, and included  information as required by NIST;  verifying whether employees with security-related responsibilities had  received specialized training within the year; analyzing documentation to determine if the effectiveness of security  controls is periodically assessed;  reviewing IRS’s actions to correct weaknesses to determine if they  had effectively mitigated or resolved the vulnerability or control  deficiency;  reviewing IRS’s Computer Security Incident Response Center incident  tickets to determine if security violations and activities were reported  and investigated; and  reviewing continuity-of-operations planning documentation for six  systems to determine if such plans were appropriately documented  and tested.
In addition, we discussed with management officials and key security  representatives, such as those from IRS’s Computer Security Incident  Response Center and Office of Cybersecurity, as well as the three  computing centers, whether information security controls were in place,  adequately designed, and operating effectively.
We performed our audit from March 2012 to March 2013 in accordance  with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. We believe  our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinions and other  conclusions in this report.

Appendix II: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contacts

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individuals named above, David Hayes and Jeffrey  Knott (assistant directors), Bruce Cain, Mark Canter, Kristi Dorsey,  Jennifer R. Franks, Nancy Glover, Mickie Gray, J. Andrew Long, Linda  Kochersberger, Kevin Metcalfe, Eugene Stevens, Michael Stevens, and  Daniel Swartz made key contributions to this report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the nation's tax laws. It relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations and on information security controls to protect the financial and sensitive taxpayer information that resides on those systems.
As part of its audit of IRS's fiscal years 2012 and 2011 financial statements, GAO assessed whether controls over key financial and tax-processing systems are effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. To do this, GAO examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials at eight sites.

What GAO Found

IRS continued to make progress in addressing information security control weaknesses, improving its internal control over financial reporting. During fiscal year 2012, IRS management devoted attention and resources to addressing information security controls, and resolved a significant number of the information security control deficiencies that GAO previously reported. Notable among these efforts were the (1) formation of cross-functional working groups tasked with the identification and remediation of specific at-risk control areas, (2) improvement in controls over the encryption of data transferred between accounting systems, and (3) upgrades to critical network devices on the agency's internal network system. However, serious weaknesses remain that could affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer data. For example, the agency had not always (1) implemented effective controls for identifying and authenticating users, such as enforcing password complexity on certain servers; (2) appropriately restricted access to its mainframe environment; (3) effectively monitored the mainframe environment; or (4) ensured that current patches had been installed on systems to protect against known vulnerabilities.
An underlying reason for these weaknesses is that IRS has not effectively implemented portions of its information security program. The agency has established a comprehensive framework for the program, and continued to make strides with various initiatives designed to improve its controls; however, certain components of the program did not always function as intended. For example, IRS's testing procedures over a financial reporting system that GAO reviewed did not always determine whether required controls were operating effectively and consequently, GAO identified control weaknesses that had not been detected by IRS. In addition, the agency had not updated an important policy concerning security standards for IRS's main tax processing environment to include current software versions and control capabilities. Further, although IRS indicated that it had addressed 58 of the previous information system security-related recommendations GAO made, 13 (about 22 percent) of the 58 had actually not yet been fully resolved. Continued and consistent management commitment and attention to an effective information security program will be essential to the maintenance of, and continued improvements in, its information system controls. Until IRS takes additional steps to (1) more effectively implement its testing and monitoring capabilities, (2) ensure that policies and procedures are updated, and (3) address unresolved and newly identified control deficiencies, its financial and taxpayer data will remain vulnerable to inappropriate use, modification, or disclosure, possibly without being detected. These deficiencies, along with shortcomings in the information security program, were the basis of GAO's determination that IRS had a significant deficiency in its internal control over financial reporting systems for fiscal year 2012.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that IRS take four actions to more effectively implement portions of its information security program. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is recommending that IRS take 30 specific actions to address newly identified control weaknesses. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed to develop a detailed corrective action plan to address each recommendation.