Background

Definition: When ll people ll timeve  oth phyicnd economic ccess to  sufficient food to meet their dietry need for   prodctive nd helthy life.
Food ilability—chieved when sufficient  uantitie of food (supplied throgh household prodction, other dometic otpt,  commercil import, or food assnce) re  contently ilable to ll individua within   contry.
Food insecurity—the lack of access of all people at all times to sufficient,  nutritionally adequate, and safe food, without undue risk of losing such  access—results in hunger and malnutrition, according to FAO. FAO  estimates that 90 percent of the hungry suffer from chronic malnutrition.  About 80 percent of the hungry worldwide live in rural areas—about half  of them are smallholder peasants; 22 percent are landless laborers; and   8 percent live by using natural resources, such as pastoralists. Inadequate  food and nutrition have profound impacts. Undernourished children have  a smaller chance of survival and suffer lasting damage to their mental and  physical development. In addition, work productivity is often impaired  among undernourished adults. Food aid has helped to address the  immediate nutritional requirements of some vulnerable people in the short  term, but food aid has not addressed the underlying causes of persistent  food insecurity.
Food ccess—ensured when household  nd ll individua within them hve dequate  rerce to oin pproprite food for tritious diet.
World leaders have agreed upon two different goals to halve world hunger  by 2015: the first, established at the 1996 WFS in Rome, is to halve the total  number of undernourished people worldwide; while the second, the first  of eight UN MDGs set in 2000, also referred to as MDG-1, aims to eradicate  extreme poverty and hunger by halving the proportion of undernourished  people from the 1990 level by 2015. Both of these goals apply not only  globally but also at the country and regional levels. Although both the WFS  and MDG targets to cut hunger are based on FAO’s estimates of the  number of undernourished people, because the MDG target is defined as  the ratio of the number of undernourished people to the total population,  it may appear that progress is being made when population increases even  though there may have been no reduction in the number of  undernourished people, according to FAO. Figure 1 is a timeline of some  of the key events related to food security and the WFS and MDG targets.
To reach the goal set at the 1996 WFS, world leaders approved a Plan of  Action, the focus of which is to assist developing countries in becoming  more self-reliant in meeting their food needs by promoting broad-based  economic, political, and social reforms at the local, national, regional, and  international levels. The WFS participants endorsed various actions but  did not enter into any binding commitments. They agreed to review and  revise their national plans, programs, and strategies, where appropriate, to  achieve food security that is consistent with the WFS Plan of Action.  Participants also agreed to submit periodic reports to FAO’s Committee on  World Food Security (CFS) on the implementation of the Plan of Action to  track progress on food security.
To monitor progress toward the target of halving the number of  undernourished people worldwide, FAO periodically updates its estimates  of the undernourished population at the global level as well as at the  country level. FAO publishes these estimates in its annual report on The  State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI), which was first issued in  1999. The same estimates are used by the UN to track progress toward the  MDG hunger goal.

		Sub-Saharan Africa Has Made Little or No Progress in Achieving WFS and MDG Goals

As shown in figure 2, food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa is severe and  widespread. According to FAO’s estimates, one out of every four  undernourished people in the developing countries lives in sub-Saharan  Africa. This region also has the highest prevalence of food insecurity, with  one out of every three people considered undernourished. In April 2008,  FAO reported that 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, out of 37 countries  worldwide, were critically food-insecure and required external assistance.
Sub-Saharan Africa has not made much progress toward the WFS and  MDG hunger goals to halve, respectively, the total number of and the  proportion (or the percentage) of undernourished people by 2015.  Between the periods of 1990 to 1992 and 2001 to 2003, the number of  undernourished people in the region increased from 169 million to 206  million, and decreased in only 15 of the 39 countries for which data were  reported. The prevalence of hunger, or the proportion of undernourished  people in the population, has declined slightly, from 35 percent in 1990 to  1992 to 32 percent in 2001 to 2003—but this change is due to population  growth. According to FAO’s projections, the prevalence of hunger in sub- Saharan Africa will decline by 2015, but the number of hungry people will  not fall below the 1990 to 1992 levels. By 2015, FAO estimates that sub- Saharan Africa will have 30 percent of the undernourished population in  developing countries, compared with 20 percent in 1990 to 1992. These  data suggest that sub-Saharan Africa needs to substantially accelerate  progress if it is to meet the WFS and MDG targets by 2015. Figure 2 shows  the prevalence of undernourishment around the world and also shows, for  each of the four selected countries in East Africa and southern Africa that  we focused on in our review, the progress needed to reduce the number of  undernourished people to meet the WFS and MDG targets by 2015.

		Multiple Development Partners Implement Programs to Advance Agriculture and Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa

The principal development partners that implement programs to advance  agriculture and food security in sub-Saharan Africa are as follows:    Regional organizations and host governments: At the regional level, the  primary vehicle for addressing agricultural development in sub-Saharan  Africa is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and its  Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). The  African Union (AU) established NEPAD in July 2001 as a strategic policy  framework for the revitalization and development of Africa. In 2003, AU  members endorsed the implementation of CAADP, a framework that is  aimed to guide agricultural development efforts in African countries, and  agreed to allocate 10 percent of government spending to agriculture by  2008. Subsequently, member states established a regionally supported,  country-driven CAADP roundtable process, which defines the programs  and policies that require increased investment and support by host  governments; multilateral organizations, including international financial  institutions; bilateral donors; and private foundations. According to USAID  officials, the CAADP roundtable process is designed to increase  productivity and market access for large numbers of smallholders and  promote broad-based economic growth. At the country level, host  governments are expected to lead the development of a strategy for the  agricultural sector, the coordination of donor assistance, and the  implementation of projects and programs, as appropriate.
Multilateral organizations: Several multilateral organizations and  international financial institutions implement programs that contribute to  agricultural development and food security—providing about half of the  donor assistance to African agriculture in 2006. These entities include the  following Rome-based UN food and agriculture agencies: FAO, whose  stated mandate is to achieve food security for all and lead international  efforts to defeat hunger; WFP, which is the food aid arm of the UN; and  IFAD, which finances (through loans and grants) efforts in developing  countries to reduce rural poverty, primarily through increased agricultural  productivity, with an emphasis on food production. IFAD and other  international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the African  Development Bank, play a large role in providing funding support for  agriculture. For example, the World Bank also provides Secretariat  support for the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research  (CGIAR), a partnership of countries, international and regional  organizations, and private foundations supporting the work of 15  international agricultural research centers, whose work has played an  important role in improving agricultural productivity and reducing hunger  in the developing countries. Together, the World Bank, IFAD, and the  African Development Bank account for about 73 percent of multilateral  ODA to agriculture for Africa from 1974 to 2006. In addition, the New  York-based UNDP is responsible for supporting the implementation of the  MDG targets and houses the UN MDG Support Team.
Bilateral donors, including the United States: The major bilateral donors  have focused on issues of importance to Africa at every Group of Eight  (G8) summit since the late 1990s. In 2005, these donors reiterated their  commitment to focus on Africa as the only continent not on track to meet  the MDG targets by 2015 and further committed themselves to supporting  a comprehensive set of actions to raise agricultural productivity,  strengthen urban-rural linkages, and empower the poor, based on national  initiatives and in cooperation with NEPAD, CAADP, and other African  initiatives. At that time, the commitments of the G8 and other donors were  expected to lead to an increase in ODA to Africa of $25 billion a year by  2010, more than twice the amount provided in 2004. (See app. V for a  summary discussion of the role of other development partners, such as  NGOs and private foundations.)
In the wake of the 1996 WFS, the United States adopted a number of  development initiatives for Africa. These initiatives—including the Africa  Food Security Initiative in 1998, the Africa Seeds of Hope Act in 1998, and  the African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000—reflect U.S. efforts to  improve the deteriorating food security situation in sub-Saharan Africa.  The consistent U.S. positions at the summit were that the primary  responsibility for reducing food insecurity rests with the host  governments, and that it is critical that all countries promote self-reliance  and facilitate food security at all levels. (See app. II for a summary of U.S.  participation in the 1996 summit.)
In 2002, the United States launched IEHA, which represents the U.S.  strategy to help fulfill the MDG of halving hunger in Africa by 2015. In  2005, USAID, the primary agency that implements IEHA, committed to  providing an estimated $200 million per year for 5 years through the  initiative, using existing funds from Title II of Public Law 480 food for  development and assorted USAID Development Assistance and other  accounts. IEHA is intended to build an African-led partnership to cut  hunger and poverty by investing in efforts to promote agricultural growth  that is market-oriented and focused on small-scale farmers. IEHA is  currently implemented in three regional missions in Africa as well as in  eight bilateral missions: Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa;  Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia in southern Africa; and Ghana and Mali  in West Africa.

	Food Insecurity Persists in Sub- Saharan Africa Due to Several Factors, Including Low Agricultural Productivity

Low agricultural productivity, limited rural development, government  policy disincentives, and poor health are among the main factors  contributing to persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa.  Additional factors, including rising global commodity prices and climate  change, will likely further exacerbate food insecurity in the region (see   fig. 3).  (For further discussions of factors and interventions affecting food  security, including a framework for addressing food security issues, see  table 2 in app. III. Additional examples of the interventions, as well as the  summary results of our structured panel discussions with donors and  NGOs during fieldwork, are discussed in app. IV.)

		Low Agricultural Productivity

One of the most important factors that contribute to food insecurity in  sub-Saharan Africa is its low agricultural productivity. Raising agricultural  productivity is vital to all elements of food security: food availability, food  access, and food utilization. Although imports can be used to supplement  domestic agricultural production in some countries, importing staple  foods may not be practical because some main staples, such as cassava,  are generally not traded in the international market. In addition, poor  infrastructure in many African countries makes it extremely costly to  transport imported foods to remote areas. Furthermore, because the  income of the majority of people in developing countries depends directly  or indirectly on agriculture, growth in this sector would have widespread  poverty-reducing benefits and improve food access for the poor. The  World Bank pointed out in its 2008 World Development Report that  agriculture’s ability to generate income for the poor, particularly for  women, is more important for food security than its ability to increase  local food supplies. According to FAO, poverty is a main immediate cause  of food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. Agriculture can also help enhance  diet quality and diversity through new and improved crop varieties,  thereby improving food utilization and nutritional status.
Sub-Saharan Africa has lagged behind other developing countries in  improving agricultural productivity. Since the early 1960s, grain yield in  the rest of the world has increased almost 2.5 percent annually (see fig. 4).  In contrast, grain yield in sub-Saharan Africa has stagnated, with an annual  increase of only approximately 1 percent. As a result, yield of basic food  staples in sub-Saharan Africa, such as maize, is much lower than that of  other countries. For example, Zambia produces about 1,800 kilograms of  maize on a hectare of land, while China produces almost 3 times as much  on the same amount of land. Overall, the gap between the average grain  yield in sub-Saharan Africa compared with the rest of the world’s  developing countries has widened over the years. By 2006, the average  grain yield in sub-Saharan Africa was only about 40 percent of the rest of  the world’s developing countries. Research has also shown that the  expansion of food production has taken a very different course in Asia  than in sub-Saharan Africa, where increases in food staples were achieved  largely by expanding the area cultivated, not by increasing the yield on  existing acreage.
Low agricultural productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa is partially due  to inadequate investment and the limited use of modern inputs and  farming practice. Panelists in all four countries we visited reported  difficulty in accessing critical inputs, such as land, seed, fertilizer, and  water, due to their high costs and limited availability. The panelists also  noted that farm management practices were weak in all four countries.  FAO data show that the investment per hectare of land in sub-Saharan  Africa is about one third of the world’s average. Less than 1 percent of the  agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated, thereby making  agricultural production prone to natural disasters, such as droughts. Sub- Saharan Africa uses far less inputs, such as fertilizer and pesticide, than  other parts of the world. For example, its pesticide use is only about 5  percent of the world’s average, which was 0.39 kilograms per hectare in  1998 to 2000 (see table 1). The World Bank reports that while scientific  plant breeding has improved agricultural production throughout much of  the world, sub-Saharan Africa lags behind in adoption of these new  varieties. For example, while at least 80 percent of the crop area in Asia  was planted with improved varieties of rice, maize, sorghum, and potatoes,  only about 20 percent to 40 percent of the crop area in sub-Saharan Africa  used new varieties in these categories. According to several USAID  officials, agricultural productivity has also lagged in sub-Saharan Africa, in  part because innovations in science and technologies, such as improved  seed and soil fertility systems, have not been transferred and adapted to  each country’s unique agro-ecosystem.

		Limited Rural Development

Limited rural development has also been a primary factor aggravating food  insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of the population, as well as  the majority of the poor, lives in the rural areas of the region. Weak rural  infrastructure and lack of rural investment, among other factors, limit the  potential for agricultural development and opportunities for nonfarm  income. Panels in all four countries we visited cited poor infrastructure  and farmers’ lack of access to microcredit as challenges.
Rural development in sub-Saharan Africa has suffered from weak  infrastructure, such as lack of rural telecommunications, electricity, and  roads. Although the development community has recognized the  importance of improving rural infrastructure for poverty reduction and  agricultural growth, infrastructure in the region is generally in a frail  condition. For example, IFPRI reported that progress in paved roads is  almost nonexistent in sub-Saharan Africa, and the World Bank reported  that less than half of the rural population in this region lives next to an all- season road. The lack of adequate rural roads increases distribution costs,  adds to postharvest food spoilage, and inhibits the development of local  and regional markets as well as access to those markets. Many rural  households also do not have access to safe drinking water, electricity,  modern communication services, or good transportation. For example, in  Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Zambia, walking is the principal means of  transportation for 87 percent of rural residents. IFPRI concluded that it is  the poor households within the rural areas that have the least access to  infrastructure.
Farmers’ lack of access to credit also hinders rural development. The  World Bank noted that almost all countries in Africa have a large unmet  demand for agricultural credit and rural finance. With inadequate  financing in the short term, farmers find it difficult to buy inputs and  seeds. In the long term, they are unable to invest in land improvement,  better technology, or irrigation development. The International Monetary  Fund (IMF) noted that rural credit in sub-Saharan Africa is hampered by  land tenure systems that prevent the use of land as collateral, the absence  of physical collateral, the high risk associated with rain-fed agriculture and  sharp commodity price fluctuations, and poor transport and  communication facilities. Banks that specialize in agricultural lending have  become insolvent in many sub-Saharan African countries, or have had to  be rescued at large public cost, with many of these banks collapsing  through the 1980s.

		Government Policy Disincentives

Each of the panels we conducted in the four countries we visited cited  weak governance or deficient agricultural policies as challenges, with one  panelist noting that government policies can be a disincentive to  agricultural growth. These policies can have a detrimental impact on the  rural poor. While Asia has fostered growth in agriculture by providing  credit to support prices and input subsidies to farmers, sub-Saharan  African governments have taxed agriculture more than the governments of  other regions. For example, according to the government of Tanzania’s  2007/2008 Agricultural Sector Review, Tanzanian farmers must pay  about 55 taxes, levies, and fees to sell their agricultural products, which is  equivalent to 50 percent of the products’ price. The World Bank noted that  efforts by local governments to raise local revenue in Tanzania have  occasionally added a significant tax burden to agriculture, with little  benefit. A World Bank study found that of the 18 countries studied, the 3  with the highest tax rates on the agricultural sector were all in sub- Saharan Africa—Côte d’Ivoire (49 percent), Ghana (60 percent), and  Zambia (46 percent).
While progress has been made over the past two decades by numerous  developing countries in reducing these policy biases, many welfare- and  trade-reducing price distortions remain. These policies continue to provide  disincentives for agricultural development and investment. Other  government policies, such as subsidies to agriculture, if used improperly,  can also negatively affect agriculture and food security. For example, a  World Bank report notes that the government of Zambia’s policy of  subsidizing smallholders’ maize production has had a number of long-term  effects, including a loss of farmers’ skills and knowledge and increased  dietary concentration on subsidized maize meal among Zambian people.  We met with officials in Zambia who also expressed concern that Zambian  maize subsidies led to overreliance on maize meal for nutrition and  underreliance on other sources of food, such as vegetables.

		Poor Health

Poor health also exacerbates food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa,  according to panels in the four countries we visited, through its adverse  impact on the agricultural workforce. For example, HIV has taken a heavy  toll on the population and agricultural production of sub-Saharan Africa,  because two thirds of those in the world who have HIV live in that region.  HIV is concentrated in the most economically productive groups, those  aged 15 to 45 years, with slightly more women infected than men. UNDP  noted that more than one quarter of Africans are directly affected by the  HIV epidemic. HIV/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) has a  profound impact on poverty by reducing adults’ capability to work and  raising mortality among young adults. In addition, malaria kills over 1  million people each year, according to the World Health Organization  (WHO), mostly in Africa. The World Bank notes that there is a two-way  relationship between malaria and agriculture. Specifically, on one hand,  when farmers become ill or die from malaria, agricultural production  decreases because of lost labor, knowledge, and assets. On the other hand,  some methods that farmers use to increase agricultural production, such  as increased irrigation, can increase the risk of malaria by increasing the  population of mosquitoes. Furthermore, WHO estimates that there were  14.4 million cases of tuberculosis worldwide in 2006, and that Africa has  the highest incidence of the disease—363 cases per 100,000 people.  Tuberculosis spreads particularly rapidly in areas with high  concentrations of livestock.

		Rising Global Commodity Prices

Global prices for fuel and agricultural commodities have been rising  significantly due to various factors, further exacerbating food insecurity.  From 2000 to 2008, oil prices are estimated to increase by 238 percent,  grain prices by 175 percent, and vegetable oil prices by 184 percent (see  fig. 5). The growing use of agricultural products, such as soybeans and  corn, for biofuels has raised the price of these commodities and reduced  the amount of land available for production of other food commodities.  (See app. VI for further discussion of biofuels and their impacts on food  security.) Economic growth in large countries, such as China and India,  has also raised demand for food—through both increased incomes and  shifting dietary patterns. Droughts in major grain-producing countries,  such as Australia, and record-low grain reserves have further constrained  world supplies and increased the prices of agricultural goods.
Experts suggest that rising fuel and commodity prices are negatively  impacting African food security efforts through several channels, as  follows:    Higher fuel prices increase the prices of fertilizer and other inputs for  farmers and make harvesting, storage, and transportation of agricultural  production more expensive. Higher fuel import costs also limit available  foreign exchange for imports of food. USDA reports that official  development assistance has fallen well short of rising energy import bills.  Twenty-two countries—15 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa—depend on  imported fuel, import grain, and report a prevalence of undernourishment  exceeding 30 percent, according to FAO.
Higher agricultural prices hurt many of Africa’s food-insecure, including  low-income consumers who spend a large share of their income on grains  and farmers who buy more food than they produce. Food-insecure  populations are likely to be net buyers of food, and many sub-Saharan  African countries are, in fact, net importers of food. In February 2008,  FAO announced that 21 African countries are in crisis as a result, in part,  of higher food prices, while nutritional studies estimate that 16 million  additional people would be affected by food insecurity for every 1 percent  increase in staple food prices, with many of these people being in Africa.  In the long term, while higher grain prices provide incentives to expand  agricultural production, complementary policies and investments in  technology and market development may be required.
Higher fuel and commodity prices increase delivery costs for emergency  food aid programs to Africa’s most food-insecure. For the largest U.S.  emergency food aid program, USAID has reported that commodity costs  increased by 41 percent and transportation costs increased by 26 percent  in the first half of fiscal year 2008. As a result, USAID projects a $265  million shortfall in this year’s food aid budget. According to our estimates,  that $265 million could provide enough food aid to reach about 4.5 million  vulnerable people in sub-Saharan Africa during a typical peak hungry  season lasting 3 months. Similarly, in March 2008, WFP appealed to the  international community, including the United States, to compensate for  the growing shortfall in its food aid budget.

		Climate Change

Climate change is also an important emerging challenge that is expected to  worsen African food insecurity. Key climate change models conclude that  global warming has occurred and, since the mid-twentieth century, has  been largely attributable to human activities, such as the burning of fossil  fuels and deforestation. Several models predict further global warming,  changed precipitation patterns, and increased frequency and severity of  damaging weather-related events for this century. IFPRI reports that sub- Saharan Africa may be hardest hit by climate change, with one estimate  predicting that temperature increases for certain areas may double those  of the global average. Since sub-Saharan African countries have a lower  capacity to adapt to variable weather, models also predict that climate  change will further reduce African agricultural yields and will increase the  number of people at risk of hunger. Climate change affects agriculture in  several ways: higher temperatures shorten the growing season and  adversely affect grain formation; reduced precipitation levels limit the  availability of water to grow rain-fed crops; variable climates shift  production to marginal lands and intensify soil erosion; rising sea levels  threaten coastal agricultural land; and climate extremes, such as floods  and droughts, result in crop failure and livestock deaths. Accounting for  these effects, numerous studies seek to estimate the impact of climate  change on African agricultural yields. By 2060, for example, the United  Nations Environment Program projects a 33 percent reduction in grain  yield in sub-Saharan Africa, while FAO predicts that the number of  Africans at risk of hunger will increase to 415 million. (For further  discussion of climate change, see app. VI, which also includes a  compendium of the results of several studies that project adverse impacts  from climate change on African agriculture.)

	Efforts of Host Governments and Donors, Including the United States, Toward Halving Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 Have Been Insufficient

Despite their commitment to halve hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015,  efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to  accelerate progress toward that goal have been insufficient. First, host  governments have not prioritized food security as a development goal, and  few have met their 2003 pledge to direct 10 percent of government  spending to agriculture. Second, donors reduced the priority given to  agriculture, and their efforts have been hampered by difficulties in  coordination and deficiencies in estimates of undernourishment used to  measure progress toward attaining the goals to halve hunger by 2015.  Third, limited agricultural development resources, increased demand for  emergency food aid, and a fragmented approach impair U.S. efforts to end  hunger in sub-Saharan Africa.

		Limited Prioritization, Low Agricultural Spending, and Weak Capacity of Government Institutions Hamper Host Government Efforts

Host government efforts in sub-Saharan Africa have been hampered by  limited prioritization of food security in poverty reduction strategies and  slow follow-through on CAADP goals, low agricultural spending levels,  and weak capacity of government institutions to sustain food security  interventions and to report on progress toward goals to halve hunger by  2015.

			Achieving Food Security Has Not Been Prioritized by Some Host Governments

Despite their commitment in the November 1996 Rome Declaration on  World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action to  achieve food security for all, some host governments have not prioritized  food security in their strategies and use of resources. An FAO- commissioned review of the PRSP process found a lack of consistency  among policies, strategies, and interventions for alleviating food insecurity  and poverty. Developing countries prepare a PRSP every 3 to 5 years  through a participatory process with civil society and donors. As   country-owned documents that establish development priorities and serve  as the basis for assistance from the World Bank and other donors, PRSPs  are to include a country poverty assessment and clearly present the  priorities for macroeconomic, structural, and social policies. Of 10 African  PRSPs reviewed in the FAO-commissioned review, only half included  policies to address food insecurity and less than half included interventions  to address food insecurity. Furthermore, several delegates who attended the  2004 Committee on World Food Security meeting expressed concern that  food security and rural development issues were not adequately reflected in  PRSPs of many countries. Similarly, our analysis of World Bank and IMF  joint assessments of current PRSPs for eight countries in East Africa and  southern Africa found that food security and agricultural development  require greater prioritization in more than half of the strategies examined.
Although African leaders pledged their commitment to prioritize  agricultural development in the CAADP framework, both the initial  planning process and the actual implementation of the CAADP framework  at the country level have been slow. According to a World Bank official,  CAADP’s initial planning process did not begin until 2005, 2 years after  the framework was developed, because it involved (1) forming  stakeholder groups at the regional and continental levels and   (2) establishing credibility within the development community. Thus,  country-level implementation did not start until 2007. Regional entities  representing 40 countries in East Africa, West Africa, and southern Africa  have continued to encourage the implementation and acceleration of  CAADP. However, by the end of 2008, only 13 of the 40 countries are  expected to have completed the initial planning process and organized a  roundtable to formally adopt a CAADP compact. The remaining 27  countries are scheduled to complete the entire process by the summer of  2009. However, for those countries that will formally adopt a CAADP  compact, it is unclear whether concrete results will follow. According to  an IFPRI official, because CAADP is still in the early stages of  implementation, it is difficult to demonstrate the impact of CAADP efforts  to date.

			Low Agriculture Spending Levels Remain a Significant Challenge

Although African leaders in 2003 pledged to devote 10 percent of  government spending on agriculture, according to an IFPRI study issued in  2008, most countries in Africa—with the exception of four countries:  Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, and Burkina Faso—had not reached this goal as of  2005. Of the four countries we reviewed—Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania,  and Zambia—none had met the goal as of 2005. Mozambique was close to  reaching the goal, and government spending for agriculture in Zambia has  shown an upward trend since 2002. However, as shown in figure 6,  government spending for agriculture in Kenya and Tanzania from 2002 to  2005 was well below the CAADP goal.
According to estimates by several research organizations, the total  financial investment required for agricultural development and to halve  hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 is significant, and experts conclude  that the majority of African countries will need to substantially scale up  spending for their agricultural sectors. IFPRI estimated that annual  investments of $32 billion to $39 billion per year would be required for  agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa, more than 3 to 4 times the level in 2004.  Specifically, Kenya’s spending would need to increase by up to 12 times its  2004 levels; Mozambique spending would need to double; Tanzania would  need to triple its 2004 spending levels; and Zambia would need to spend up  to 9 times its 2004 total. (See fig. 6 for a comparison of actual 2004  agricultural sector spending and the annual agricultural sector spending  required under different scenarios to halve hunger by 2015 in Kenya,  Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.)

		Weak Capacity of Host Government Institutions Hinders Long-term Sustainability of Interventions and Reporting on Progress

			Some Food Security Interventions Are Unsustainable Due to a Lack of Host Government Capacity

Host governments’ institutional capacity affects whether they can  eventually take over development activities at the conclusion of donor  assistance, and some lack the capacity to sustain donor-assisted food  security interventions over time. In a 2007 review of World Bank  assistance to the agricultural sector in Africa, the World Bank Independent  Evaluation Group reported that only 40 percent of the bank’s agriculture- related projects in sub-Saharan Africa had been sustainable, compared  with 53 percent for its projects in other sectors. For example, the World  Bank found the expected sustainability of two agriculture projects in  Tanzania to be unrealistic, given the government’s limited capacity to  generate the projected public sector resources. Similarly, IFAD maintains  that sustainability remains one of the most challenging areas that require  priority attention. An annual report, issued by IFAD’s independent Office  of Evaluation, on the results and impact of IFAD operations between 2002  and 2006 rated 45 percent of its agricultural development projects  satisfactory for sustainability.
Donors’ exit strategies vary depending on host governments’ capacity to  continue their assistance activities. For some sub-Saharan African  countries, the handover may be progressive—that is, a relevant  government ministry gradually takes over the responsibilities of certain  food security interventions in specific geographic regions as the  government’s capacity improves. For example, because the government of  Lesotho currently lacks the capacity to run the WFP-funded school-feeding  program throughout the country, WFP has targeted schools in remote,  inaccessible mountainous areas and expects to hand over full  responsibility to the government by 2010. Political instability can also  impact the sustainability of food security, even when the handover is  expected to be successful. For example, although the director of the UN  Millennium Village in Sauri, Kenya, has been relying on effective  coordination with several Kenyan government ministries to enable the  village to continue its operations after the UN’s departure, recent  postelection turmoil in the country has raised uncertainties about the  project’s long-term sustainability.

			Weak Reporting on Progress Toward Hunger Goals

All participating governments and international organizations agreed to  submit a biannual national progress report to FAO’s Committee on World  Food Security on the implementation of the WFS Plan of Action. However,  many governments have not submitted reports, and the quality of the  reports that have been submitted has varied. Successful reporting requires  a lengthy consultation process with government officials and other  stakeholders to answer several questions about indicators of progress that  cover 7 commitments and 27 objectives. To make the process easier, FAO  revised its reporting requirements in 2004, but the reporting rate has  remained low. In 2006, the last time that the reports were due, only 79  member states and organizations, such as the World Bank and WFP, had  submitted progress reports on the WFS Plan of Action to FAO’s  Committee on World Food Security, according to FAO. Of these 79  member states and organizations, only 17 were from sub-Saharan Africa.
FAO cited the limited capacity of government institutions as one of the  main reasons for low reporting rates on progress toward hunger targets.  According to FAO, government officials working within ministries of  agriculture are responsible for reporting on their country’s national food  security action plan. However, some government ministries that are  responsible for reporting lack the capacity to prepare a comprehensive  report on all seven commitments because they do not have the support  they require from other domestic institutions and agencies.
According to FAO, the poor quality and inconsistency of the national  progress reports have not allowed FAO to draw general substantive  conclusions. While most national progress reports provide information on  policies, programs, and actions being taken to reduce undernourishment,  few of the reports provide information on the actual results of actions  taken to reduce the number of undernourished people. In addition, the  content of the reports varies. Specifically, some countries either   (1) provide only selective information on certain aspects of food security  that they consider most relevant, such as food stocks or reserve policies;  (2) provide variable emphasis on past, ongoing, and future food security  plans and programs; (3) focus on irrelevant issues; or (4) provide more  description than analysis. Despite these concerns, providing feedback or  critical assessments on the submitted reports is beyond the mandate and  the staff capacity of the Committee on World Food Security Secretariat,  according to FAO officials. As a result, the usefulness of the information  submitted and the potential to improve the quality of reporting are limited.  FAO officials acknowledged these limitations and the usefulness of the  information submitted for monitoring and is investigating ways to improve  the WFS monitoring process.

		Declining Resources, Difficulties in Coordination, and Deficiencies in Undernourishment Estimates Limit Donor Efforts

			Multilateral and Bilateral Aid to African Agriculture Has Declined

For some sub-Saharan Africa countries, a large portion of food security  assistance comes from multilateral and bilateral donors through ODA  provided to the country’s agriculture sector. However, the share of  multilateral and bilateral ODA provided to agriculture for Africa has  declined steadily since peaking in the 1980s. Specifically, ODA data show  that the worldwide share of ODA to the agricultural sector for Africa has  significantly declined, from about 15 percent in the early 1980s to about 4  percent in 2006. According to a World Bank official, in the 1980s, the bank  directed considerable funding toward agricultural development programs in  sub-Saharan Africa that ultimately proved unsustainable. In the 1990s, the  World Bank prioritized health and sanitation programs in the region over  agricultural development programs. By 2005, the bank had started shifting  its priorities back to African agricultural development, investing  approximately $500 million per year in the sector. Bank officials expect that  total to increase by 30 percent by the end of 2008. According to the UN, the  international community needs to increase external financing for African  agriculture from the current $1 to $2 billion per year to about $8 billion by  2010. Figure 7 shows the overall declining trend of multilateral and bilateral  ODA to agriculture for Africa and the percentages of bilateral and  multilateral donor contributions from 1974 to 2006.
The decline of donor support to agriculture in Africa is due to competing  priorities for funding and a lack of results from past unsuccessful  interventions. According to the 2008 World Development Report, many of  the large-scale integrated rural development interventions promoted  heavily by the World Bank suffered from mismanagement and weak  governance and did not produce the claimed benefits. In the 1990s, donors  started prioritizing social sectors, such as health and education, over  agriculture. For example, one of the United States’ top priorities for  development assistance is the treatment, prevention, and care of HIV/AIDS  through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which is  receiving billions of dollars every year. The increasing number of  emergencies and response required from international donors has also  diverted ODA that could have been spent on agricultural development.  (See fig. 8 for the increasing trend of ODA to Africa for emergencies  compared with ODA to agriculture for Africa.)
Donor and NGO panels that we convened in the four countries we  visited—Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia—reported a general  lack of donor coordination as a challenge, despite efforts to better align  donor support with national development priorities, such as those that the  international community agreed upon in the Paris Declaration on Aid  Effectiveness in March 2005. Improved donor coordination was  recommended seven times in four panels that we convened during our  fieldwork.
Coordination of agricultural development programs has been difficult at  the country level due, in part, to the large number of simultaneous  agricultural development projects that have not been adequately aligned.  According to the 2008 World Development Report, in Ethiopia, almost 20  donors were supporting more than 100 agriculture projects in 2005.  Similarly, government efforts in Tanzania have been fragmented among  some 17 multilateral and bilateral donors in agriculture. A study of the  United Kingdom National Audit Office reported that British country teams  are not sure about specific activities, geographical focus, and donors’  comparative advantage due, in part, to the large number of donors and  projects ongoing at the country level. In addition, bilateral donor  assistance is often not adequately aligned with the strategies and programs  of international financial institutions and private foundations. Specifically,  according to the UN Millennium Project, UN agencies are frequently not  well-linked to the local activities of the large financial institutions and  regional development banks that tend to have the most access in advising  a government, since they provide the greatest resources. The World Bank  in its 2008 World Development Report was critical of the lack of  complementary investments made by other donors at different stages of  the food production and supply process.
In an attempt to address inadequate division of labor among donors, the  UN agencies have established new coordination mechanisms. In  September 2007, the UN Secretary-General first convened the UN MDG  Africa Steering Group to identify strategic ways in which the international  community could better coordinate and support national governments’  implementation of MDG programs, including the implementation of  agriculture and food security. The steering group met again in March 2008,  where it identified the unpredictability of aid, poor alignment with country  systems, and inadequate division of labor among donors as major  challenges to African food security. The group expects to publish its  recommendations for achieving MDGs in Africa by the end of May 2008. In  addition, the UN has recently established the One UN initiative at the  country level to facilitate coordination. The purpose of this initiative is to  shift from several individual agency programs to a single UN program in  each country with specific focus areas, one of which could be food  security. Two countries we visited—Tanzania and Mozambique—were  among the eight countries worldwide to pilot the One UN initiative in  2007 and 2008. In addition, to accelerate progress toward MDGs— particularly MDG-1—WFP, FAO, and IFAD recently agreed to establish  joint Food Security Theme Groups at the country level. The main purpose  of these groups is to enhance interagency collaboration and coordination  to support countries’ development efforts in the areas of food security,  agriculture, and rural development. Between June 2007 and August 2007, a  review of the status of the Food Security Theme Groups showed that they  are present in 55 countries (29 in sub-Saharan Africa). However, according  to the UN Millennium Project, efforts through UN country teams are more  of a forum for dialogue, rather than a vehicle for real coordination.

			FAO Estimates of Undernourishment Have Deficiencies

It is difficult to accurately assess progress toward the hunger goals  because of deficiencies in FAO’s estimates of undernourishment, which  are considered the authoritative statistics on food security. These  deficiencies stem from methodological weaknesses and poor data quality  and reliability, as follows:    Weaknesses in methodology: FAO’s methodology has been criticized on  several grounds. First, FAO relies on total calories available from food  supplies and ignores dietary deficiencies that can occur due to the lack of  adequate amounts of protein and essential micronutrients. Second, FAO  underestimates per capita food availability in Africa, and, according to  several FAO officials in Rome, coverage of noncereal crops, such as  cassava—a main staple food for sub-Saharan Africa—has been inadequate.  Third, FAO estimates are more subject to changes in the availability of  food and less so to changes in the distribution of food, which leads to the  underestimation of undernourishment in regions with relatively better  food availability but relatively worse distribution of food, such as South  Asia. Even when food is available, poor people may not have access to it,  which leads to undernourishment. Lastly, FAO relies on food consumption  data from outdated household surveys to measure inequality in food  distribution. According to FAO, some of these surveys are over 10 years  old.
Poor data quality and reliability: According to FAO officials, the quality  and reliability of food production, trade, and population data, which FAO  relies on for its estimates of undernourishment, vary from country to  country. For many developing countries, the data are either inaccurate or  incomplete, which directly impacts FAO’s final estimate of  undernourishment. For example, FAO officials told us that the estimated  prevalence of undernourishment in Myanmar was 5 percent, but the  officials questioned the reliability and accuracy of the data reported by the  government of Myanmar. In addition, FAO lacks estimates of  undernourishment for some countries to which a substantial amount of  food aid has been delivered, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. Since  data on production, trade, and consumption of food in some countries are  not available, FAO makes one undernourishment estimate for these  countries as a group and takes this estimate into account to determine  total undernourishment worldwide.
Furthermore, FAO’s undernourishment estimates are outdated, with its  most recent published estimates covering the 3-year period of 2001 to  2003. In 2007, FAO suspended publication of The State of Food Insecurity  in the World (SOFI) report, which it had been issuing annually since 1999.  FAO also did not submit hunger data for the UN Millennium Development  Report in 2006, and, according to an official from the UN Statistics  Division, FAO is unlikely to do so for 2007 as well. FAO did not publish the  2007 SOFI report or contribute data for the Millennium Development  Report because it is presently revising the minimum caloric requirements,  a key component in FAO’s methodology for estimating undernourishment  to measure progress toward the 2015 hunger goals.
FAO has acknowledged that it needs to improve its methodology and  consider other indicators to accurately portray progress toward hunger  targets. As part of this effort, FAO sponsored an “International Scientific  Symposium” in 2002 for scientists and practitioners to discuss various  measures and assessment methods on food deprivation and  undernourishment. According to FAO, efforts to improve food security  and nutrition measures are a continuous activity of the agency, which has  also been involved in strengthening data collection and reporting capacity  at the regional and country levels. FAO is also developing a new set of  indicators for measuring food security and nutrition status.

		Limited Agricultural Development Resources and a Fragmented Approach Impair U.S. Efforts to End Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa

			USAID’s Food Aid Funding for Emergencies Has Increased Substantially, While Its Food Aid Funding for Development Has Not Changed Significantly

In recent years, the levels of USAID funding for development in   sub-Saharan Africa have not changed significantly compared with the  substantial increase in funding for emergencies (see fig. 9). Funding for  the emergency portion of Title II of Public Law 480—the largest U.S. food  aid program—has increased from about 70 percent a decade ago to over  85 percent in recent years. After rising slightly from 2003 to 2005, the  development portion of USAID’S food aid funding fell below the 2003 level  in 2006 and 2007.
While emergency food aid has been crucial in helping to alleviate the  growing number of food crises, it does not address the underlying factors  that contributed to the recurrence and severity of these crises. Despite  repeated attempts from 2003 to 2005, the former Administrator of USAID  was unsuccessful in significantly increasing long-term agricultural  development funding in the face of increased emergency needs and other  priorities. Specifically, USAID and several other officials noted that budget  restrictions and other priorities, such as health and education, have  limited the U.S. government’s ability to fund long-term agricultural  development programs in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States,  consistent with other multilateral and bilateral donors, has steadily  reduced its ODA to agriculture for Africa since the late 1980s, from about  $500 million in 1988 to less than $100 million in 2006 (see fig. 10).
The U.S. Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA)—the  principal U.S. strategy to meet its commitment toward halving hunger in  sub-Saharan Africa—has undertaken a variety of efforts that, according to  USAID officials, aim to increase rural income by improving agricultural  productivity, increasing agricultural trade, and advancing a favorable  policy environment, including building partnerships with donors and  African leaders. However, USAID officials acknowledged that IEHA lacks  a political mandate to align the U.S. government food aid, emergency, and  development agendas to address the root causes of food insecurity.  Despite purporting to be a governmentwide presidential strategy, IEHA is  limited to only some of USAID’s agricultural development activities and  does not integrate with other agencies in terms of plans, programs,  resources, and activities to address food insecurity in Africa. For example,  because only eight USAID missions have fully committed to IEHA and the  rest of the missions have not attributed funding to the initiative, USAID  has been unable to leverage all of the agricultural development funding it  provides to end hunger in Africa. This lack of a comprehensive strategy  has likely led to missed opportunities to leverage expertise and minimize  overlap and duplication. Our meetings with officials of other agencies  demonstrated that there was no significant effort to coordinate their food  security programs. A U.S. interagency working group that had attempted  to address food security issues since the mid-1990s disbanded in 2003. In  April 2008, USAID established a new Food Security and Food Price  Increase Task Force, but it is not a governmentwide interagency working  group.
Although both MCC and USDA are making efforts to address agriculture  and food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa, IEHA’s decision-making process  does not take these efforts into consideration. In addition, IEHA does not  leverage the full extent of the United States’ assistance to African  agriculture through its contributions to multilateral organizations and  international financial institutions, which are managed by State and  Treasury. Some of the U.S. agencies’ plans and programs for addressing  food insecurity in Africa involve significant amounts of assistance. For  example, as of June 2007, MCC had committed $1.5 billion for multiyear  compacts in sub-Saharan Africa, of which $605 million (39 percent) was  for agriculture and rural development programs and another $575 million  (37 percent) was for transportation and other infrastructure. Only  recently, USAID has provided MCC with assistance in the development  and implementation of country compacts. USDA, which administers  several food aid programs, also administers a wide range of agricultural  technical assistance, training, and research programs in sub-Saharan  Africa to support the African Growth and Opportunity Act,  NEPAD/CAADP, and the regional economic organizations. However,  according to USAID Mission officials in Zambia, coordination difficulties  arise when U.S.-based officials from other government agencies, such as  USDA, plan and implement food security projects at the country level with  little or no consultation with the U.S. Mission staff.

	Conclusions

Most donors, including the United States, have committed to halving  global hunger by 2015, but meeting this goal in sub-Saharan Africa is  increasingly unlikely. Although host governments and donors share  responsibility for this failure, especially with regard to devoting resources  to support sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural sector, host governments play  a primary role in reducing hunger in their own countries. Without  adequate efforts by the host governments coupled with sufficient donor  support, it is difficult to break the cycle of low agricultural productivity,  high poverty, and food insecurity that has contributed to an increase in  emergency needs. The United States’ approach to addressing food  insecurity has traditionally relied on the U.S. food aid programs. However,  in recent years, the resources of these programs have focused on the rising  number of acute food and humanitarian emergencies, to the detriment of  actions designed to address the fundamental causes of these emergencies,  such as low agricultural productivity. Moreover, IEHA does not  comprehensively address the underlying causes of food insecurity, nor  does it leverage the full extent of U.S. assistance to sub-Saharan Africa.  Consequently, the U.S. approach does not constitute an integrated  governmentwide food security strategy. In implementing its food security  efforts, the United States has not adequately collaborated with host  governments and other donors, which has contributed to further  fragmentation of these efforts. Finally, without reliable data on the nature  and extent of hunger, it is difficult to target appropriate interventions to  the most vulnerable populations and to monitor and evaluate their  effectiveness. Sustained progress in reducing sub-Saharan Africa’s  persistent food insecurity will require concerted efforts by host  governments and donors, including the United States, in all of these areas.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance efforts to address global food insecurity and accelerate  progress toward halving world hunger by 2015, particularly in sub-Saharan  Africa, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the following  two actions:    work in collaboration with the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, and the  Treasury to develop an integrated governmentwide U.S. strategy that  defines each agency’s actions and resource commitments toward  achieving food security in sub-Saharan Africa, including improving  collaboration with host governments and other donors and developing  improved measures to monitor and evaluate progress toward the  implementation of this strategy, and   prepare and submit, as part of the annual U.S. International Food  Assistance Report, an annual report to Congress on progress toward the  implementation of the first recommendation.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

USAID and the Departments of Agriculture and State provided written  comments on a draft of our report. We have reprinted these agencies’  comments in appendixes VII, VIII, and IX, respectively, along with our  responses to specific points. In addition to these agencies, several other  entities—including MCC, Treasury, FAO, IFAD, IFPRI, UNDP, and WFP— provided technical comments on a draft of our report, which we have  incorporated as appropriate.
USAID concurred with our first recommendation—noting that the  responsibility for halving hunger by 2015 lies with the respective countries  while mentioning activities that the United States, through efforts such as  IEHA, and the international community are undertaking to address the  issue of food security. However, USAID expressed concern with our  conclusion that the shift in its focus from emergency food aid to long-term  agricultural development has not been successful. We recognize the  challenges of addressing an increasing number of emergencies within tight  resource constraints. However, it is equally important to recognize that  addressing emergencies—to the detriment of long-term agricultural  development—does not break the cycle of low agricultural productivity,  high poverty, and food insecurity that has persisted in many sub-Saharan  African countries. Regarding our second recommendation, USAID  asserted that the International Food Assistance Report (IFAR) is not the  appropriate vehicle for reporting on progress on the implementation of  our first recommendation. USAID suggested that a report such as the  annual progress report on IEHA (which is not congressionally required)  would be more appropriate. We disagree. We believe that the  congressionally required annual IFAR, in fact, would be an appropriate  vehicle for reporting on USAID’s and other U.S. agencies’ implementation  of our first recommendation. Public Law 480, section 407(f) (codified at 7  U.S.C. 1736a(f)) requires that the President prepare an annual report that  “shall include. . .an assessment of the progress toward achieving food  security in each country receiving food assistance from the United States  Government.” This report is intended to contain a discussion of food  security efforts by U.S. agencies.
In addition, USDA stated that our report was timely and provided useful  information and recommendations. Noting its participation in an  interagency food aid policy coordinating process, USDA reaffirmed its  commitment to using its full range of authorities and programs to address  the need for and improve the effectiveness of global food assistance and  development. Although we recognize that an interagency Food Assistance  Policy Council provides a forum for the discussion and coordination of  U.S. food aid programs, a similar forum to address food security issues  had not been established until May 2008 following the release of a draft of  this report. Finally, although USDA administers food assistance programs,  including food aid programs for development, we note that these are not  included in IEHA.
State identified additional issues for consideration, which we have  addressed as appropriate. Specifically, State disagreed with our statement  that U.S. agencies had made no significant effort to coordinate their food  security programs, citing its ongoing coordination with USAID and USDA  on food security issues. For example, State indicated that several of its  offices and bureaus—such as as the Office of the Director of Foreign  Assistance; the Bureaus of Population, Refugees, and Migration;  Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs; African Affairs; International  Organization Affairs, and others—work closely with USAID and USDA to  coordinate food security issues. However, as we noted in this report, these  efforts, to date, have been focused primarily on food aid, as opposed to  food security, and there is no comprehensive U.S. governmentwide  strategy for addressing food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa.
Treasury generally concurred with our findings and provided additional  comments for consideration, which we have addressed as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested Members of Congress;  the Administrator of USAID; and the Secretaries of Agriculture, State, and  the Treasury. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix X.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to examine (1) factors that contributed to persistent  food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and (2) the extent to which host  governments and donors, including the United States, are working toward  halving hunger in the region by 2015.
To examine factors that have contributed to continued food insecurity in  sub-Saharan Africa, we relied on the United Nations (UN) Food and  Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) estimates on the number of  undernourished people, and the prevalence of undernourishment, which is  one of two progress indicators in the Millennium Development Goals  (MDG) target of halving hunger, to illustrate the lack of progress in  reducing hunger in sub-Saharan Africa as compared with other parts of the  developing world. Although we recognize the limitations of FAO’s  estimates (such as the lack of up-to-date information), they are the official  basis of the World Food Summit (WFS) and MDG targets and are largely  consistent with the trends reported by other sources, such as the U.S.  Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) estimates on global hunger. We  discussed the reliability of FAO’s undernourishment data with several  cognizant FAO officials and various U.S. government officials in  Washington and in sub-Saharan Africa. We determined that these  estimates are sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which is to show overall  trends over time at the aggregate level. We also analyzed FAO’s data on  input use, grain production, and grain planting areas to compare  agricultural input use and productivity in sub-Saharan Africa with that of  other parts of the world. We determined that these data are sufficiently  reliable for our purposes. To assess the reliability of the International  Monetary Fund (IMF) data on commodity prices, we reviewed (1) existing  documentation related to the data sources and (2) documents from other  agencies reporting on commodity prices and found collaborating support.  Accordingly, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report.
We selected four countries for fieldwork—Kenya and Tanzania in East  Africa, and Mozambique and Zambia in southern Africa—on the basis of  geographic region, data on undernourished people, and U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) programs in-country. We selected  countries in east and southern Africa because those regions have high  prevalence rates of undernourishment and excluded countries with  current conflict. While this selection is not representative in any statistical  sense, it ensured that we had variation in the key factors we considered.  We do not generalize the results of our fieldwork beyond that selection,  using fieldwork primarily to provide illustrative examples.
In addition, we reviewed economic literature on the factors that influence  food security and recent reports, studies, and papers issued by U.S.  agencies, multilateral organizations, and bilateral donors. We reviewed the  Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit  Plan of Action, which included 7 commitments, 27 objectives, and 181  specific actions. We recognize the multifaceted nature of factors affecting  food security, but some of them, such as conflict and trade reforms, were  beyond the scope of our study. We reviewed economic studies and recent  reports on the factors that influence food security. These included articles  from leading authors published in established journals, such as World  Development. We also included studies by such organizations as the  International Food Policy and Research Institute (IFPRI), FAO, IMF,  USDA’s Economic Research Service, World Food Program (WFP), and the  World Bank. These sources were chosen because they represent a wide  cross section of the discussion on food security and are written by the  leading authorities and institutions working in the field. To summarize and  organize meaningfully the many factors and interventions that impact and  can address global food security, we created a framework. To ensure that  the framework was comprehensive and rigorous, we based it on relevant  literature and the input of practitioners and experts. Specifically, our first  step was to review relevant research on global food security from  multilateral institutions and academia and consider key policy documents,  such as the Rome Declaration. We presented the first draft of the  framework to a panel of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and  government representatives in Washington, D.C., and subsequently used  the framework during our panels in the four African countries to help  stimulate discussion. We refined the framework on the basis of  preliminary analysis of the panel results and finalized it on the basis of the  input of a roundtable of food security experts in Washington, D.C.
In the four African countries that we selected for fieldwork, we conducted  structured discussions with groups of NGOs and donors, organizing them  into 9 panels with about 80 participants representing more than 60 entities.  To identify the panelists’ views on key recommendations for improvement  and lessons learned, we posed the same questions to each of the 9 panels  and recorded their answers. Subsequently, we coded their  recommendations and lessons according to the factors that were further  refined and are shown in figure 3. We also coded some recommendations  and lessons according to a few additional topics that occurred with some  frequency in the panels but that fell outside the scope of our framework,  such as donor coordination and the targeting of U.S. food aid. Two staff  members performed the initial coding independently and then met to  reconcile any differences in their coding. These lessons and  recommendations that we coded represent the most frequently expressed  views and perspectives of in-country NGOs, donors, and regional  representatives that we met with, and cannot be generalized beyond that  population.
To examine the extent to which host governments and donors, including  the United States, are working toward halving hunger by 2015, we  analyzed data on official development assistance (ODA) to developing  countries published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and  Development (OECD), Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  Specifically, we analyzed the trends in the share of ODA going to  agriculture and to emergencies from multilateral and bilateral donors,  from 1974 to 2006. The DAC Secretariat assesses the quality of aid activity  data each year by verifying both the coverage (completeness) of each  donor’s reporting and the conformity of reporting with DAC’s definitions  to ensure the comparability of data among donors. These data are widely  used by researchers and institutions in studying development assistance  resource flows. OECD’s classification of agriculture may underreport  funding to agriculture. OECD’s ODA to agriculture excludes rural  development and development food aid. For example, the International  Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) believes that some of its  multisectoral lending may not have counted as ODA to agriculture.  However, since OECD has consistently used the same classification, we  determined that the data are sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which is  to track trends over time. To determine whether African governments  have fulfilled their pledge to devote 10 percent of their budgets to  agriculture, we relied on the government expenditure data provided by  IFPRI, which is the same data source on which USAID relies. We  determined that these data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of a  broad comparison of countries’ agricultural spending to the  Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) targets  in the aggregate. IFPRI recognizes that data on government sectoral  spending are weak in many developing countries and is working with  some of these countries to improve data quality. We also analyzed USAID  budget for the Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA). We  determined that these data are sufficiently reliable for our purposes. The  information on foreign law in this report does not reflect our independent  legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary sources.
In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, including  USAID, USDA, the Departments of State and the Treasury, and the  Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). We also met with IFPRI and the  World Bank. In New York, we met with UNDP, the Rockefeller  Foundation, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and  Columbia University; and in Seattle, Washington, we met with the Bill and  Melinda Gates Foundation. In Rome, we met with FAO, WFP, IFAD, and  the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).  We also met with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Rome and  several bilateral donors’ permanent representatives to the Rome-based UN  food and agriculture agencies. In addition, in Washington, D.C., we  convened a roundtable of 12 experts and practitioners—including  representatives from academia, research organizations, multilateral  organizations, NGOs, and others—to further delineate, on the basis of our  initial work, some of the factors that have contributed to food insecurity in  sub-Saharan Africa and challenges that hamper accelerating progress  toward food security.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2007 to May 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: U.S. Participation in the 1996 World Food Summit

As a major participant in the 1996 WFS, the United States supported the  summit’s goal of halving the number of undernourished people in the  world by 2015. During the summit and over the last decade, the U.S.  position on global food security has been predicated on a strong belief that  the primary responsibility for reducing food insecurity rests with each  country, and that it is critical that all countries adopt policies that promote  self-reliance and facilitate food security at all levels, including food  availability, access, and utilization. U.S. policy as represented at the  summit advocated the following national policies and actions to improve  food security:    Governments should act as facilitators rather than intervenors. National  policies that facilitate the development of markets and expand the  individual’s freedom of action are the best guarantor of food security.  Emphasis is placed on democratic institutions, transparency in  government, opposition to graft and corruption, and full participation by  the private sector.
All countries should work to promote liberalized trade to maximize the  potential for economic growth (within the context of sustainable  development) and realize the benefits of comparative advantage.
Governments should invest in a public goods infrastructure that includes  transportation, communication, education, and social safety nets; and  governments should provide basic health and sanitary services, maintain  basic levels of nutrition, and facilitate the stabilization of vulnerable  populations.
Governments should ensure a political system that does not discriminate  against women. All countries must recognize the essential role of women,  who work to produce more than half of the food in developing countries.
Governments should establish a general development policy that   (1) neither discriminates against agricultural or fisheries sectors nor  against rural or coastal areas and (2) recognizes that poverty alleviation  requires an integrated approach to rural development.
All countries should promote the critical role of sustainable development  in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors, and these policies must be  environmentally sound.
Greater emphasis needs to be placed on agricultural research and  extension services. Governments should emphasize investment in  agricultural research and technical education.
During negotiations on the summit policy statement and Plan of Action,  the United States opposed any agreement that supported additional  resource pledges by the developed countries or the creation of new  financial mechanisms, institutions, or bureaucracies. Although the United  States was not prepared to commit increased resources for food security,  U.S. government representatives at the summit indicated that the United  States intended to play a major role in promoting food security around the  world. According to a U.S. position paper, the United States planned to  accomplish this objective by    enhancing U.S. government support for research and technology  development in agriculture and related sectors;   employing an integrated approach to sustainable development, with a  strong emphasis on those countries that show a good-faith willingness to  address policy reforms;   continuing support for food security through the use of agriculture  programs, development assistance, and food aid;   continuing support for international efforts to respond to and prevent  humanitarian crises that create a need for emergency food;   continuing efforts to encourage and facilitate implementations of food  security-related actions adopted at international conferences or agreed-to  conventions;   working within the multilateral system to enhance global approaches to    working with all countries to achieve freer trade and ensure that the  benefits are equitably realized, and urging all countries to open their  markets in the interest of achieving greater stability and participation in  the world market.
An interagency governmentwide Working Group on Food Security that  was established to prepare for the 1996 summit continued to operate until  2003, issuing two annual reports on a U.S. Food Security Plan of Action in  1999 and 2000. This group was assisted by a Food Security Advisory  Committee composed of representatives from the private agribusiness  sector, NGOs, and educational institutions. (These groups were disbanded  in 2003.) These reports indicated some limited progress in addressing food  security, primarily through the use of existing U.S. food aid and limited  agricultural development and trade initiatives. The establishment of the  African Food Security Initiative in 1998, the Greater Horn of Africa  Initiative, the Africa Seeds of Hope Act in 1998, and the African Growth  and Opportunity Act of 2000 all reflected some limited U.S. government  initiative to improve a deteriorating food security situation in sub-Saharan  Africa.

Appendix III: Factors and Interventions Affecting Food Security

This appendix provides greater detail and explains the importance of the  factors we used to develop a framework to evaluate findings obtained  during the in-country interviews in Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and  Zambia and the literature on food security, including the 2008 World Bank  Development report and the Rome Declaration. The factors listed in the  framework shown in table 2 are areas on which development efforts can  be focused. They include such areas as agricultural productivity and  development; rural development; governance; and health, education, and  social welfare. All of these factors contribute to food security. For  example, actions to improve agricultural productivity are most effective in  conjunction with rural development, good governance, and good health  and welfare. The framework also identifies actions or interventions that  can be taken to address these development factors. They include such  actions or interventions as increasing access to inputs, improving  infrastructure, and strengthening rural communities. Successful  agricultural development requires coordination of these interventions  across a range of activities. For example, farmers cannot buy inputs unless  there are functioning credit institutions. Also, farmers cannot access  markets if there are no roads. Given that achieving food security is an  extremely difficult and complex process and that there are many different  ways in which to categorize these factors, this list should not be construed  as exhaustive. Nonetheless, this categorization provides a framework with  which to identify the issues on which to base discussion on food security  and summarize the range of programs implemented in various African  countries.

Appendix IV: Summary Results of GAO’s Structured Panel Discussions with Donors and NGOs, with Examples of Interventions

On the basis of a content analysis of the results from our nine structured  panel discussions in Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, we  identified key recommendations for improving food security (see table 3).  For example, the first row of this table indicates that all 9 panels  mentioned the recommendation to improve marketing, and that the  recommendation was mentioned 35 times across all 9 panels.
The next several sections of this appendix provides some examples of  interventions that governments, research organizations, NGOs, private  foundations, and other donors have undertaken to address the factors  underlying food insecurity.

	Interventions to Improve Access to Markets

Our panelists noted that improving markets and farmers’ access to them is  key to improving their food security. Well-functioning markets at all levels  of the marketing chain, among other things, provide accurate price  information, buyer contacts, distribution channels, and buyer and  producer trends. They can be facilitated by encouraging private  investment and establishing private/public partnerships and developing  the capacity of agrobusiness and processing focused on value-added  production. As an early action under CAADP, an Alliance for Commodity  Trade in East and Southern Africa is being developed to open up national  and regional market opportunities for staple foods produced by millions of  smallholder farmers. Agribusiness, in particular, has an economic interest  in a vibrant agricultural sector. For this reason, USAID supports private  agribusiness development in Africa, working directly with about 900  public/private partnerships to build capacity and leverage additional  resources in 2006. These include producers, exporters, and their  associations, such as the East African Fine Coffees Association, which is  linking buyers from companies like Starbucks in the United States with  producers and exports of high-value coffee, and the African Cotton and  Textile Industry Federation, which is improving the links of African  farmers to the U.S. market through the African Growth and Opportunity  Act. To facilitate market access in arid and semi-arid areas, USAID’s  Famine Fund has been supporting a pastoral livelihood program.

	Interventions to Strengthen Rural Communities and Economies

Weak rural development contributes to food insecurity throughout sub- Saharan Africa. Agricultural productivity growth requires fostering  linkages between the agricultural and nonagricultural sections. Growth in  agriculture is more effective if the proper infrastructure is in place, rural  communities are strong and effective and financial systems are able to  provide credit to producers to buy, among other things, inputs for  production. The experts we interviewed noted that efforts to strengthen  rural communities and economies are essential to increasing food security.  Interventions that help to increase rural farmers’ incomes help to  strengthen rural economies. We observed the UN Millennium Villages  helping farmers increase their incomes by using the value chain approach  to link farmers to markets. For example, in Kenya, a local business called  HoneyCare Africa trained farmers in beekeeping. The farmers were  financed to start beekeeping, provide honey, and ensure quality control  and collection. Beekeepers bring their honey to the company’s collection  center where the honey is weighed and is prepared for shipment from  Nairobi. After being processed and packaged in a Nairobi facility,  HoneyCare Africa products are sold in Kenyan and overseas retail outlets.
The program trained 44 farmers, who produced an average of 800  kilograms of honey, generating $1,500 per farmer per year.

	Interventions to Better Target or Manage Nonemergency Food Aid

The focus of U.S. assistance on commodities creates some problems for  NGOs and donors that would like to see U.S. Title II assistance better  managed. The panelists noted that this food aid can be better managed by  targeting those communities that can absorb the commodities that are  provided by the United States, so that the commodities do not distort  markets. Despite the inherent inefficiency of monetization, there are some  examples of the successful use of monetized Title II funding for food  security. An external evaluation of IEHA’s use of food aid noted that Title  II monetization proceeds have a large realm of possible uses, including  financing small business start-ups; paying the costs of training programs;  locally purchasing commodities, rather than using imported food in  particular situations, where there is a particularly high potential for  disincentives for local producers; and providing start-up capital for  initiating farmer association-based thrift and savings societies.

	Interventions to Invest in and Improve Infrastructure

As we have previously noted, improving infrastructure, such as roads and  power, is key to helping rural farmers. Investment in infrastructure links  the local economy to broader markets. Infrastructure, particularly roads, is  important in making technology available to farmers and is key to getting  commodities to markets. Good roads and port facilities reduce the costs of  moving products to markets. Telecommunications bring consumers and  farmers into contact and transmit market signals on prices helping  markets operate efficiently. MCC provides funding to African countries to  improve their infrastructure. As of February 2008, MCC had signed 16  compacts totaling $5.5 billion. Nine of the 16 compacts were with African  countries, and about 70 percent of MCC compacts ($3.8 billion) funded  projects in Africa. This includes two of the four countries that we  reviewed—Tanzania and Mozambique. MCC signed a compact with  Tanzania in 2008 that will provide $698 million in funding for  infrastructure investments in energy, water, and transportation, with the  largest portion (about half) dedicated to transportation. In Mozambique,  the MCC compact signed in July 2007 will include funds to improve water  systems, sanitation, agribusiness, roads, land tenure, and agriculture. In  addition, according to State, while the short-term goal of a WFP road- building operation was to facilitate food aid delivery in southern Sudan, it  also helped contribute to the long-term food security by reducing the cost  of access to food and markets.

	Interventions to Improve Natural Resource Management Systems

Sustainable production increases require resource management. Soil  fertility, water management, and water use efficiency are important for  raising agriculture productivity in a sustainable manner. Natural resource  management, particularly water resources, is key to helping farmers  maintain productivity, even during times of drought and flood. The  Ethiopian government’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) provided  food and cash assistance to 7.2 million people in 2006, and includes water  resources development projects. In Tigray, Ethiopia, we visited a program  focusing on the construction of deep hand-dug wells that provide  accessible and safe water for rural communities. An irrigation program  also focuses on harvesting methods and irrigation development activities.  An IFPRI evaluation of PSNP found that while there were some delays in  payments made to beneficiaries, the well construction and soil and water  conservation projects were valuable.

	Interventions to Increase Access to Inputs

Increasing access to inputs, such as improved seed and fertilizer, helps  farmers boost their productivity, which is essential for food security. A  number of research organizations support African agricultural  development, including CGIAR, which was established in 1971 to help  achieve sustainable worldwide food security by promoting agricultural  science and research-related activities. CGIAR has 15 research centers  under its umbrella, including IFPRI, the International Livestock Research  Institute, and the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA).  IITA and 40 NGO partners, including Catholic Relief Service, worked on a  U.S. government-funded $4.5 million, 19-month project in 6 countries  called the Crop Crisis Control Project (C3P). Officials from this program  said that they have introduced 1,400 varieties of cassava and provided  5,000 farmers with seeds for growing banana trees. In Kenya, beneficiaries  of the C3P project, especially women, said that the project has directly led  to more profitable cassava growth and increased banana production. In  addition, USAID, USDA, and other donors have also been providing direct  support to African Research Institutions at both the national and regional  levels, promoting collective action on problems that cut across borders,  like pests and diseases.

	Participants in GAO’s Structured Panel Discussions and Roundtable

Appendix V: Additional Development Partners That Implement Food Security Interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa

In addition to the efforts of host governments, multilateral organizations,  and bilateral donors, NGOs and private foundations play an active role in  advancing food security in sub-Saharan Africa.
Nongovernmental organizations. NGOs or not-for-profit organizations  may design and implement development-related projects. They are  particularly engaged in community mobilization activities and extension  support services. NGOs include community-based self-help groups,  research institutes, churches, and professional associations. Examples  include implementing partners for USAID and USDA, such as Cooperative  for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.; Catholic Relief Services; and  Land O’Lakes International Development. Additional examples also  include advocacy groups such as the International Alliance Against  Hunger, founded by the Rome-based food and agriculture agencies and  international NGOs in 2003 to advocate for the elimination of hunger,  malnutrition, and poverty; the National Alliances Against Hunger,  including a U.S. alliance, which brings together civil society and  governments in developed and developing countries to raise the level of  political commitment to end hunger and malnutrition; and the Partnership  to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, which is a coalition of U.S. and  African organizations formed in 2000 to advocate support for efforts to  end hunger and poverty in Africa.
Private foundations. A number of philanthropic private organizations,  such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates  Foundation, provide support for African agricultural development. The  Gates Foundation recently became one of the largest funding sources for  agriculture in Africa, announcing in January 2008 a $306 million package  of agricultural development grants to boost the productivity and incomes  of farmers in Africa and developing countries in other parts of the world.  Among the most prominent efforts funded by philanthropic private  organizations is AGRA, headquartered in Nairobi (Kenya) and established  in 2007 with an initial grant of $150 million from the Gates Foundation and  the Rockefeller Foundation to help small-scale farmers lift themselves out  of hunger and poverty through increased farm productivity and incomes.

Appendix VI: New Food Security Challenges: Rising Demand for Biofuels and Climate Change

Rising global commodity prices and climate change are emerging  challenges that will likely exacerbate food insecurity in sub-Saharan  Africa. Rising commodity prices are in part due to the growing global  demand for biofuels, and this appendix provides further information on  how biofuels impact food security. This appendix also provides further  information on how climate change is predicted to affect food security in  sub-Saharan Africa, primarily through its impact on agricultural yields.

	Growing Biofuel Demand Projected to Increase African Food Insecurity

Driven by environmental concerns and the high price of oil, global demand  for biofuels is rapidly rising. Total biofuel production has been recently  growing at a rate of about 15 percent per year, such that, between 2000  and 2005, production more than doubled to nearly equal 650,000 barrels  per day or about 1 percent of global transportation fuel use. In the United  States, ethanol production will consume more than one third of the  country’s corn crop in 2009, according to USDA. The United States and  other key producers of biofuels have pledged to pursue further growth in  production. In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, the  United States pledged to increase ethanol production nearly five-fold over  current levels by 2022. Similarly, the European Commission has  announced its intentions to expand biofuel production to 10 percent of its  transportation fuel use by 2020. Although potential growth in biofuel  production is uncertain, various estimates suggest that global biofuel  production could grow to supply over 5 percent of the world’s  transportation energy needs.
Growth in biofuel demand potentially creates both positive and negative  impacts for African agriculture and food security. For example:    Rural development opportunities could exist for African communities that  are able to produce biofuels. Countries with biofuel production could also  qualify for emission-reduction credits through the international market for  greenhouse gas emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. Such  credits would allow these countries to attract additional investment  through the Clean Development Mechanism that could assist them in  further developing their biofuel industries. However, while several African  countries are pursuing biofuel production, commercial production is not  yet widely developed and experts suggest that such production risks  excluding smallholder farmers.
African biofuel production may compete with food production through  competition for land, water, and other agricultural inputs. The UN reports  concern that commercial biofuel production in sub-Saharan Africa will  target high-quality lands and push food production to less productive  lands. The World Bank reports that 75 percent of the farmland in sub- Saharan Africa is already characterized by soils that are degraded and lack  nutrients.
Rapid growth in demand for grains to produce biofuels has contributed to  rising agricultural prices. Between 2005 and 2007 alone, world prices of  grains rose 43 percent. Biofuel growth has also triggered increases in the  prices of other agricultural commodities as the use of land to grow  biofuels has decreased land available for other crops. Higher grain prices  reduce resources for low-income consumers who spend a large share of  their income on food, farmers who buy more food than they produce, and  food aid programs. In the long term, while higher grain prices provide  incentives to expand agricultural production, complementary policies and  investments in technology and market development may be required.
On a net basis, IFPRI has concluded that current growth in biofuels will  result in an increase in African food insecurity. Using their IMPACT model,  IFPRI projects that world prices for maize will rise 26 percent and world  prices for oilseeds will rise 18 percent by 2020 under the assumption that  current biofuel investment plans are realized. In this case, total net calorie  availability in sub-Saharan Africa will decline by about 4 percent.  Worldwide, FAO projects a 15 percent net increase in the 2007 grain  import bills of developing countries, partly as a result of growing biofuel  demand. Concern over the negative impacts of biofuels has also been  widely noted by organizations such as FAO; the World Bank; and the UN  Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, who has called for a 5-year  moratorium on the production of biofuels.

	Climate Change Predicted to Increase African Food Insecurity

Although global temperatures have varied throughout history, key  scientific studies have found that higher temperatures during the past  century are largely attributable to human activities, and that, as such,  temperatures are likely to rise further during this century. The National  Academy of Sciences has found that global temperatures have been  warmer during the last few decades of the twentieth century than during  any comparable period of the preceding 400 years. These assessments  also predict rising global temperatures for this century, resulting in  changed precipitation patterns and increased frequency and severity of  damaging weather-related events. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate  Change (IPCC), for example, has predicted a rise in global mean  temperatures of between 1.8 and 4.0 degrees Celsius, depending upon  human and economic behavior. Assuming no fundamental change in that  behavior, a comprehensive review of climate change models finds a 77 to  99 percent likelihood that global average temperatures will rise in excess  of 2 degrees Celsius.
Regarding climates in Africa, key studies also conclude that warming has  taken place. For example, according to the IPCC, southern Africa has had  higher minimum temperatures and more frequent warm spells since the  1960s, as well as increased interannual precipitation variability since the  1970s. The IPCC also reports that both East Africa and southern Africa  have had more intense and widespread droughts. In the future, IFPRI  reports that Africa may be the continent hardest hit by climate change,  with one estimate predicting temperature increases for certain areas in  Africa that are double those of the global average. One climate study  predicts future annual warming across the continent ranging from 0.2 to  0.5 degrees Celsius, per decade.
Climate is an important factor affecting agricultural productivity and  experts report that Africa’s agricultural sector is particularly sensitive to  climate change due, in part, to low adaptive capacity. Experts find that  climate change will likely significantly limit agricultural production in sub- Saharan Africa in various ways:    Higher temperatures shorten the growing season and adversely affect  grain formation at night. As a result of climate change, FAO states that the  quantity of African land with a growing season of less than 120 days could  increase by 5 to 8 percent and the World Resources Institute describes  projected future declines in the length of the growing season by 50 to 113  days in certain areas in Africa.
Reduced precipitation limits the availability of water to grow crops. The  World Wildlife Fund reports that water constraints have already reduced  agricultural productivity, as 95 percent of cropland in sub-Saharan Africa  is used for low-input, rain-fed agriculture rather than for irrigated  production. Models referenced by the United Nations Framework on  Climate Change (UNFCC) estimate that more than an additional 600,000  square kilometers of agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa will become  severely water-constrained with global climate change.
Variable climates lead farmers to shift agricultural production sites, often  onto marginal lands, exacerbating soil erosion. According to the World  Bank’s 2008 World Development Report, soil erosion can result in  agricultural productivity losses for the east African highlands of 2 to 3  percent a year.
Rising sea levels threaten coastal agricultural land. In its national  communication to the UNFCC, for example, Kenya predicted losses of  more than $470 million for damage to crops from a 1-meter rise in sea  levels.
Climate extremes aggravate crop diseases and result in crop failures and  livestock deaths. FAO reports that both floods and droughts have  increased the incidence of food emergencies in sub-Saharan Africa.
To quantify expected climate change impacts on African agricultural  production and food security, a number of studies employ climate models  that estimate changes in temperature, precipitation, and agricultural  yields. Results vary widely due to the large degree of uncertainty entailed  in climate modeling, as well as differences in assumptions about adaptive  capacity. Despite the wide variation in results, these studies generally  conclude that climate change will increase African food insecurity in both  the short and long term. For example, one study predicts that agricultural  revenues in Kenya could decline between 27 and 34 percent by 2030. FAO  reports a projected increase in the number of Africans at risk of hunger  from 116 million in 1980 to 415 million in 2060. To illustrate potential food  security impacts from climate change, results from several studies are  shown in table 4. (The full citation of the sources in table 4 follow the  table.)

	Additional Source Information

Agoumi, Ali. Vulnerability of North African Countries to Climatic  Changes: Adaptation and Implementation Strategies for Climate  Change. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2003.
Arnell, N.W, M.G.R. Cannell, M. Hulme, R.S. Kovats, J.F.B. Mitchell, R.J.  Nicholls, M.L. Parry, M.T.J. Livermore, and A. White. “The Consequences  of COMaddison, David, Marita Manley, and Pradeep Kurukulasuriya. The Impact  of Climate Change on African Agriculture: A Ricardian Approach.  CEEPA Discussion Paper No. 15, Centre for Environmental Economics  and Policy in Africa, University of Pretoria, July 2006.
Tubiello, Francesco N. and Günther Fischer. “Reducing Climate Change  Impacts on Agriculture: Global and Regional Effects of Mitigation, 2000- 2080.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 74, 2007.
United Nations Environment Programme. African Regional  Implementation Review for the 14th Session of the Commission on  Sustainable Development: Report on Climate Change. Nairobi, Kenya,  2006.
Warren, Rachel, Nigel Arnell, Robert Nicholls, Peter Levy, and Jeff Price.  Understanding the Regional Impacts of Climate Change: Research  Report Prepared for the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate  Change. Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research Working Paper 90,  September 2006.

Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development

Following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. Agency for International  Development letter dated May 16, 2008.

	GAO Comments

1.  Although some African countries have had robust economic growth in  recent years, to achieve the WFS and MDG-1 goals, the growth,  especially in agriculture, needs to be sustained. As we note in our  report, concerted efforts and sustained growth are needed for many  years to overcome the numerous challenges facing host governments  and donors to halve hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015.  2.  While GAO recognizes the various ongoing coordination efforts at the  international and U.S. government level, our work revealed that  coordination on improving food security in sub-Saharan Africa has  thus far been insufficient. In May 2008, following the release of a draft  of this report, USAID initiated the creation of a sub-Principals  Coordinating Committee on Food Price Increases and Global Food  Security to help facilitate interagency coordination. In addition to  USAID, USDA, State, and Treasury, participating agencies include the  Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce, MCC, the  National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, the  Peace Corps, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and the U.S.  Trade Representative.  3.  As we note in our report, while IEHA has undertaken a variety of  efforts to address food insecurity in Africa, these efforts have thus far  been limited in scale and scope. IEHA does not integrate with other  agencies in terms of plans, programs, resources, and activities. In  addition, many IEHA projects are limited in their impact because they  may not necessarily address the root causes of food insecurity. For  example, projects distributing treadle pumps benefit only the farmers  who receive them, but do not address the larger issue of the  underdevelopment of agricultural input markets.  4.  While we recognize that clean water and sanitation are important to  nutrition and food utilization, these issues were outside the scope of  our study.  5.  We recognize the importance of emergency assistance. However, to  break the cycle of poverty, food insecurity, and emergencies,  agricultural development needs to increase in priority. We agree with  USAID that a shift in focus from relief to development should not  translate into reduced emergency food aid in the short term.  6.  We disagree with USAID’s comment that a report such as the annual  progress report on IEHA (which is not congressionally required),  instead of the congressionally required International Food Assistance  Report (IFAR), be used to report on USAID’s and other agencies’  implementation of our first recommendation. Public Law 480, section  407 (f)(codified at 7.U.S.C. 1736a(f) requires that the President prepare  an annual report that “shall include…an assessment of the progress  toward achieving food security in each country receiving food  assistance from the United States Government.” Expanding the scope  of current reporting to include progress on achieving food security  would enhance the usefulness of IFAR, while making it unnecessary to  recommend the promulgation of a separate report.

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture

Following is GAO’s comment on the U.S. Department of Agriculture letter  dated May 14, 2008.

	GAO Comment

1.  We acknowledge the role that USDA plays in meeting short- and long- term food needs in sub-Saharan Africa. Although an interagency Food  Assistance Policy Council provides a forum for the discussion and  coordination of U.S. food aid programs, a similar forum to address  food security issues had not been established until May 2008 after the  issuance of a draft of this report. Finally, although USDA administers  food assistance programs, including food aid programs for  development, we note in this report that these are not included in  IEHA.

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of State

Following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State letter dated  May 16, 2008.

	GAO Comments

1.  We maintain that U.S. agencies’ efforts to coordinate food security  programs have thus far been insufficient. Efforts to date are focused  primarily on food aid, as opposed to food security, and there is no  comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for addressing food  insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa.  2.  A major reason for food spoilage and poor market delivery is poor  infrastructure, as we note in our discussion of rural development.  3.  As we note in our discussion of our objectives, scope, and  methodology (see app. I), although we recognize the multifaceted  nature of factors affecting food security, we excluded some factors,  such as international trade, from the scope of our study. While  international trade is important to global food security, its relative  importance to sub-Saharan Africa is considerably lower. Many  smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa are not in a position to  benefit from international trade due to high transaction costs, and they  generally produce products, such as cassava, that are not traded  internationally.  4.  We did not generate data from FAO’s original estimates of  undernourishment. We relied on FAO’s estimates to assess progress  toward the WFS and MDG goals. As we note in our previously  mentioned objectives, scope, and methodology, we discussed the  reliability of FAO’s undernourishment estimates with cognizant FAO  and U.S. government officials in Washington and in sub-Saharan  Africa, and we determined that these estimates are sufficiently reliable  for our purpose, which is to show overall trends over time at the  aggregate level.  5.  FAO’s estimates are the official indicators used to track progress  toward the WFS and MDG-1 goals. In addition, they are the only  estimates available to assess undernourishment at the global level.  Other UN agencies, such as WFP, conduct assessments and collect  other data on food supply and nutrition for their respective missions.  However, they do not do so at the global level, and their data cannot  replace FAO’s estimates on undernourishment to track long-term  progress toward the WFS and MDG-1 goals.  6.  We added language in appendix IV to reflect the recent experiences in  southern Sudan.  7.  As we previously mentioned in our objectives, scope, and  methodology, although we recognize the multifaceted nature of factors  affecting food security, some factors, such as conflicts, were excluded  from the scope of our study. We disagree with State’s assertion that we  did not adequately address host government issues. Our report points  out that host government policy disincentives are a main factor in food  insecurity. We also note that the lack of the sufficient investment in  agriculture by the host government is one of the challenges hindering  progress to halving hunger by 2015.  8.  In May 2008, the President announced a $770 million initiative that  aims to (1) increase food assistance to meet the immediate needs of  the most vulnerable ($620 million); (2) augment agricultural  productivity programs, especially in Africa and other key agricultural  regions, to boost food staple supplies ($150 million); and (3) promote  an international policy environment that addresses the systemic  causes of the food crisis. However, as of the time of this report,  Congress had not passed legislation implementing this proposal.

Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Phillip J. Thomas (Assistant  Director), Carol Bray, Ming Chen, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis,   Leah DeWolf, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Melinda Hudson, Joy Labez,   Julia A. Roberts, Kendall Schaefer, and Elizabeth Singer made key  contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International Stabilization,  Humanitarian, and Development Efforts. GAO-08-351. Washington, D.C.:  February 19, 2008.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic Assessment Is Needed  to Determine Agencies’ Progress Toward U.S. Policy Objectives.   GAO-08-188. Washington, D.C.: December 14, 2007.
Foreign Assistance: Various Challenges Limit the Efficiency and  Effectiveness of U.S. Food Aid. GAO-07-905T. Washington, D.C.: May 24,  2007.
Foreign Assistance: Various Challenges Impede the Efficiency and  Effectiveness of U.S. Food Aid. GAO-07-560. Washington, D.C.: April 13,  2007.
Foreign Assistance: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges to Improving the  Efficiency and Effectiveness of Food Aid. GAO-07-616T. Washington,  D.C.: March 21, 2007.
Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by  Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges. GAO-07-9. Washington,  D.C.: November 9, 2006.
Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to  Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability. GAO-03-607.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Foreign Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa  Recover from Food Crisis. GAO-03-644. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2003.
Food Aid: Experience of U.S. Programs Suggest Opportunities for  Improvement. GAO-02-801T. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2002.
Foreign Assistance: Global Food for Education Initiative Faces  Challenges for Successful Implementation. GAO-02-328. Washington, D.C.:  February 28, 2002.
Foreign Assistance: U.S. Bilateral Food Assistance to North Korea Had  Mixed Results. GAO/NSIAD-00-175. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2000.
Foreign Assistance: Donation of U.S. Planting Seed to Russia in 1999  Had Weaknesses. GAO/NSIAD-00-91. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2000.
Food Security: Factors That Could Affect Progress toward Meeting World  Food Summit Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-15. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 1999.
Food Security: Preparations for the 1996 World Food Summit.  GAO/NSIAD-97-44. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 1996.
International Relations: Food Security in Africa. GAO-T-NSIAD-96-217.  Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1996.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

In 1996, the United States and more than 180 world leaders pledged to halve the number of undernourished people globally by 2015 from the 1990 level. The global number has not decreased significantly--remaining at about 850 million in 2001-2003--and the number in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from about 170 million in 1990-1992 to over 200 million in 2001-2003. On the basis of analyses of U.S. and international agency documents, structured panel discussions with experts and practitioners, and fieldwork in four African countries, GAO was asked to examine (1) factors that contribute to persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and (2) the extent to which host governments and donors, including the United States, are working toward halving hunger in the region by 2015.

What GAO Found

Chronic undernourishment (food insecurity) in sub-Saharan Africa persists primarily due to low agricultural productivity, limited rural development, government policy disincentives, and the impact of poor health on the agricultural workforce. Additional factors, including rising global commodity prices and climate change, will likely further exacerbate food insecurity in the region. Agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa, as measured by grain yield, is only about 40 percent of that of the rest of the world's developing countries, and the gap has widened over the years. Low agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa is due, in part, to the limited use of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer and improved seed varieties, and the lack of modern farming practices. The efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to achieve the goal of halving hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 have thus far been insufficient. First, some host governments have not prioritized food security as a development goal, and, according to a 2008 report of the International Food Policy Research Institute, as of 2005, only a few countries had fulfilled a 2003 pledge to direct 10 percent of government spending to agriculture. Second, donors have reduced the priority given to agriculture, and their efforts have been further hampered by difficulties in coordination and deficiencies in measuring and monitoring progress. Third, limited agricultural development resources and a fragmented approach have impaired U.S. efforts to reduce hunger in Africa. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding to address food insecurity in Africa has been primarily for emergency food aid, which has been crucial in helping to alleviate food crises but has not addressed the underlying factors that contributed to the recurrence and severity of these crises. Also, the United States' principal strategy for meeting its commitment to halve hunger in Africa is limited to some of USAID's agricultural development activities and does not integrate other U.S. agencies' agricultural development assistance to the region.