Background

FPS was created in 1971 and located within GSA until, under the  Homeland Security Act of 2002, it was transferred to DHS and placed  within ICE, effective March 1, 2003. Under the act, FPS is authorized to  protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are under the control and  custody of GSA and the persons on the property. FPS is authorized to  enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting GSA buildings  and persons on the property and to investigate offenses against these  buildings and persons. DHS and GSA developed an MOA to set forth roles,  responsibilities, and operational relationships between FPS and GSA  concerning the security of GSA buildings. In accordance with the MOA,  FPS inspectors are responsible for performing a range of law  enforcement and security duties at GSA buildings, including    patrolling the building perimeter,  responding to incidents and demonstrations,    completing risk assessments for buildings and space that GSA is    participating in meetings with GSA property managers and tenant    overseeing contract guard operations.
The level of physical protection services FPS provides at each of the 9,000  GSA buildings varies depending on the building’s security level. To  determine a building’s security level, FPS uses the Department of Justice  (DOJ) vulnerability assessment guidelines, which categorize federal  buildings into security levels I through V based on factors such as building  size and number of employees. The DOJ standards recommend minimum  security measures for each of the five levels and FPS uses these standards  and other information to recommend countermeasures. The DOJ  standards also require FPS to complete BSAs every 2 to 4 years,  depending on the security level of the building. For example, a BSA is to  be completed every 2 years for a level IV building and every 4 years for a  level I building. As part of each assessment, the inspector is required to  conduct an on-site physical security analysis using FPS’s risk assessment  tool, known as Federal Security Risk Manager, and interview tenant  agency security representatives, GSA realty specialists, site security  supervisors, and building managers. After completing their assessments,  inspectors make recommendations to GSA and tenant agencies for  building security countermeasures, including security equipment and  security fixtures. Tenant agencies decide whether to fund  countermeasures recommended for security equipment and FPS is  responsible for acquiring, installing, and maintaining approved equipment.  GSA and tenant agencies determine whether to fund recommended  security fixtures and GSA is responsible for acquiring, installing, and  maintaining approved fixtures. In some cases, and in accordance with its  policies, FPS has delegated the protection of buildings to tenant agencies,  which may have their own law enforcement authority or may contract  separately for guard services.
FPS is a fully reimbursable agency—that is, its services are fully funded by  security fees collected from tenant agencies. FPS charges each tenant  agency a basic security fee per square foot of space occupied in a GSA  building. In fiscal year 2009, the basic security fee is 66 cents per square  foot and covers services such as patrolling the building perimeter,  monitoring building perimeter alarms, dispatching law enforcement  officers through its control centers, conducting criminal investigations,  and performing BSAs. FPS also collects an administrative fee that it  charges tenant agencies for building-specific security services, such as  controlling access to building entrances and exits and checking employees  and visitors. In fiscal year 2009, the fee rate for building-specific expenses  is 8 percent. In addition to these security services, FPS provides tenant  agencies with additional services upon request, which are funded through  reimbursable security work authorizations (SWA) for which FPS charges  an administrative fee. For example, tenant agencies fund FPS’s security  equipment countermeasure recommendations that they approve through  SWAs. In fiscal year 2009, the SWA fee rate is 8 percent.
Since transferring to DHS, FPS’s mission has expanded beyond solely  protecting GSA buildings to include homeland security activities, such as  implementing homeland security directives, and providing law  enforcement, security, and emergency response services during natural  disasters and special events. For example, FPS serves as the sector- specific agency for the Government Facilities critical infrastructure sector  under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7).
Additionally, DHS has authority under the Homeland Security Act to  engage FPS in activities DHS deems necessary to enhance homelandsecurity. For example, FPS can be called upon to assist the Federal Emergency Management Agency in responding to natural disasters, a provide backup to other DHS law enforcement units during special events,  such as political demonstrations. According to FPS, it is reimbursed fo these supportive services.
We have previously identified challenges that raised concerns about FPS’s  protection of GSA buildings and tenants. In 2004, we reported on the  challenges FPS faced in transitioning from GSA to DHS, including issues  related to expanding responsibilities and funding. In June 2008, we  reported on a range of operational and funding challenges facing FPS. We  found that the operational challenges we identified hampered FPS’s ability  to accomplish its mission of protecting GSA buildings and the actions it  took may not have fully resolved the challenges. For example, the number  of FPS staff decreased by about 20 percent between fiscal year 2004 and  fiscal year 2007. We found that FPS managed these decreases in staffing  resources in a way that diminished security and increased the risk of crime  and terrorist attacks at many GSA buildings. We further reported that the  actions FPS took to address its funding challenges had some adverse  implications. For example, during fiscal years 2005 and 2006, FPS’s  projected expenses exceeded its collections, and DHS had to transfer  funds to make up the difference. We also found that although FPS had  developed output measures, it lacked outcome measures to assess the  effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA buildings. Moreover, FPS lacked  a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance  measures. “Nothing in this chapter may be construed to affect the functions or authorities of the  Administrator of General Services with respect to the operation, maintenance, and  protection of buildings and grounds owned or occupied by the Federal Government and  under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the Administrator. Except for the law  enforcement and related security functions transferred under section 203(3) of this title,  the Administrator shall retain all powers, functions, and authorities vested in the  Administrator under chapter 1, except section 121(e)(2)(A), and chapters 5 to 11 of Title  40, and other provisions of law that are necessary for the operation, maintenance, and  protection of such buildings and grounds.”
In response to a 2005 GAO recommendation and to enhance coordination  with FPS, GSA established the Building Security and Policy Division  within the Public Buildings Service (PBS)—where FPS once resided—in  2006. This division has three primary branches:    Building Security Policy—develops GSA security policies.
Building Security Operations—interfaces with FPS and monitors the  services FPS provides to GSA and tenant agencies.
Physical Security—provides physical security expertise, training, and  guidance to GSA leadership, regional staff, and tenant agencies.
During 2006, the division developed the Regional Security Network, which  consists of several staff per GSA region to further enhance coordination  with FPS at the regional and building levels, and to carry out GSA security  policy in collaboration with FPS and tenant agencies.
In 1995, Executive Order 12977 established the ISC to enhance the quality  and effectiveness of security in, and protection of, nonmilitary buildings  occupied by federal employees in the United States. ISC has  representation from all federal cabinet-level departments and other  agencies and key offices, including GSA and FPS. Furthermore, ISC was  established as a permanent body to address continuing government  security issues for federal buildings. Under the order, ISC became  responsible for developing policies and standards, ensuring compliance  and overseeing implementation, and sharing and maintaining information.  Executive Order 13286 transferred the ISC Chair from GSA to DHS. In  2004, we assessed ISC’s progress in fulfilling its responsibilities.
We have identified a set of key facility protection practices from the  collective practices of federal agencies and the private sector to provide a  framework for guiding agencies’ protection efforts and addressing  challenges. We focused on the following three key practices for this  report: (1) allocating resources using risk management; (2) leveraging  technology; and (3) information sharing and coordination. We have used  the key practices to evaluate the efforts of the Smithsonian Institution to  protect its assets, of DHS to protect its facilities, and of federal entities  to protect icons and facilities on the National Mall. Moreover, ISC is  using our key facility protection practices as key management practices to  guide its priorities and work activities.  For example, ISC established  subcommittees for technology best practices and training, and working  groups in the areas of performance measures and strategic human capital  management.  ISC also issued performance measurement guidance in  2009.

	FPS’s Risk Management Approach Is Inadequate, but Improvements Are in Development

FPS is limited in its ability to influence the allocation of resources using  risk management because security funding decisions are the responsibility  of GSA and tenant agencies. Moreover, FPS uses an outdated risk  assessment tool, a subjective approach, and a time-consuming process to  conduct BSAs. GSA and tenant agencies have concerns about the quality  and timeliness of FPS’s risk assessment services and in some cases, are  assuming these responsibilities. Although FPS is taking steps to implement  a new risk management program, it is unclear when all program  components—such as risk assessment tools—will be fully implemented as  FPS has extended initial implementation from fiscal year 2009 into fiscal  year 2010. FPS’s new risk management program could help GSA and  tenant agencies refine their resource allocation decisions if risk  assessments are enhanced and FPS can help GSA and tenant agencies  prioritize risks among all buildings. Until the risk management program is  implemented, FPS will continue to use its current approach, which may  leave some buildings and tenants vulnerable to terrorist attacks and crime.

		FPS’s Ability to Influence Resource Allocation Based on Risk is Limited

FPS’s ability to influence the allocation of resources based on the results  of its risk assessments is constrained because GSA and tenant agencies  must agree to fund recommended countermeasures, and we found that  tenant agencies were sometimes unwilling to fund recommended security  equipment. We have reported that a risk management approach to building  protection generally involves identifying potential threats, assessing  vulnerabilities, and evaluating mitigation alternatives for their likely effect  on risk and their cost. Incorporating information on these elements, a  strategy for allocating security-related resources is developed,  implemented, and reevaluated over time as conditions change. Through  the risk assessment process, FPS inspectors make recommendations for  security fixtures and equipment which they include in BSA executive  summaries that FPS is required to share with GSA and tenant agencies.  GSA and tenant agencies determine whether to fund recommended  security fixtures and GSA is responsible for acquiring, installing, and  maintaining approved fixtures. Tenant agencies determine whether to fund  recommended security equipment and FPS is responsible for acquiring,  installing, and maintaining security equipment. However, tenant agencies  may be unwilling to approve FPS’s security equipment countermeasure  recommendations, in which case FPS views them as choosing to accept  the risk. According to officials we spoke with from FPS, GSA, and tenant  agencies, tenant agencies may not approve FPS’s security equipment  countermeasure recommendations for several reasons:    Tenant agencies may not have the security expertise needed to make  risk-based decisions.
Tenant agencies may find the associated costs prohibitive.
The timing of the BSA process may be inconsistent with tenant  agencies’ budget cycles.
Consensus may be difficult to build among multiple tenant agencies.
Tenant agencies may lack a complete understanding of why  recommended countermeasures are necessary because they do not  receive BSAs in their entirety.
For example, in August 2007, FPS recommended a security equipment  countermeasure—the upgrade of a surveillance system shared by two  locations that, according to FPS officials, would cost around $650,000.  While members of one BSC told us they approved spending between  $350,000 and $375,000 to fund their agencies’ share of the countermeasure,  they said that the BSC of the other location would not approve funding;  therefore, FPS could not upgrade the system it had recommended. In  November 2008, FPS officials told us that they were moving ahead with  the project by drawing on unexpended revenues from the two locations’  building-specific fees and the funding that was approved by one of the  BSCs. In May 2009, FPS officials told us that all cameras had been repaired  and all monitoring and recording devices had been replaced, and that the  two BSCs had approved additional upgrades and that FPS was  implementing them. As we reported in June 2008, we have found other  instances in which recommended security countermeasures were not  implemented at some of the buildings we visited because BSC members  could not agree on which countermeasures to implement or were unable  to obtain funding from their agencies.

		FPS’s Current Approach to Risk Management Is Outdated, Subjective, and Time-consuming

Complicating the issue of FPS’s limitations in influencing risk-based  resource allocation decisions, FPS inspectors use an outdated risk  assessment tool, known as Federal Security Risk Manager, to produce  BSAs which are also vulnerable to inspector error and subjectivity and can  take a considerable amount of time to complete. GSA originally developed  the risk assessment tool in the late 1990s when FPS was a part of GSA and  updated it in 2002, and it moved with FPS when it was transferred to DHS  in 2003. FPS has identified problems with the risk assessment tool and  overall approach to developing BSAs, including    The risk assessment tool contributes to BSA subjectivity because it  lacks a rigorous risk assessment methodology. For example, the tool  does not incorporate ISC standards or the National Infrastructure  Protection Plan (NIPP) framework, therefore, inspectors must apply  ISC standards during their reviews of BSAs produced from the risk  assessment tool and modify these reports in accordance with the  standards.
Inspectors’ compliance with BSA policies and procedures is  inconsistent and inspectors must search for risk information from  different sources and perform duplicative data entry tasks making it  difficult for inspectors to focus fully on the needs of GSA and tenant  agencies. Additionally, inspectors record risk assessment findings on  paper-based forms and then transfer data to the risk assessment tool  and other systems manually, potentially introducing errors during the  transfer.
We concur with FPS’s findings and also believe the discretion given to  inspectors in FPS’s risk assessment approach provides less assurance that  vulnerabilities are being consistently identified and mitigated. Without  consistent application of risk assessment procedures, FPS cannot assure  GSA and tenant agencies that expenditures to implement its  recommendations are necessary. Furthermore, FPS’s reliance on an  outdated risk assessment tool provides less assurance that risks and  mitigation strategies are adequately identified.
We have previously reported on other concerns about FPS’s risk  assessment tool. For example, the tool does not allow FPS to compare  risks from building to building so that FPS, GSA, and tenant agencies can  prioritize security improvements among the nearly 9,000 buildings within  GSA’s inventory. The ability to compare risks among all buildings is  important because it could allow FPS, GSA, and tenant agencies to  comprehensively identify and prioritize risks and countermeasure  recommendations at a national level and direct resources toward  alleviating them. We also reported that the risk assessment tool does not  allow FPS to further refine security improvement priorities based on more  precise risk categories—rather than the high, medium, or low categories  FPS inspectors use under the current system. Furthermore, we reported  that the risk assessment tool does not allow FPS to track the  implementation status of security recommendations based on  assessments. Without this ability, FPS has difficulty determining the  extent to which identified vulnerabilities at GSA buildings have been  mitigated.
Considering the steps involved, it can also take several months for FPS to  complete a BSA. Some of these steps include    conducting an on-site physical security survey,  interviewing representatives from GSA and tenant agencies (an  inspector may need to visit a site multiple times to meet with all  pertinent officials),    entering survey and interview results into the risk assessment tool and  other systems such as the Security Tracking System,    producing a BSA document that undergoes several layers of review and    briefing representatives of tenant agencies and GSA on the BSA results  and distributing the executive summary to them.
An FPS supervisory officer told us that it took an average of 3 months to  complete a BSA. The officer explained that it may take 2 to 5 weeks for an  inspector to complete a security survey, interviews, and a BSA document.  The officer gave an example that for one of the buildings within the region,  an inspector must interview representatives from 30 tenant agencies. In  another example, we found that an FPS inspector had completed a BSA  report for one location in April 2008, but at the time of our visit in August  2008 the document was still undergoing supervisory review and tenant  agency representatives and GSA had not yet been briefed on the results or  received a copy of the executive summary. Furthermore, inspectors are  responsible for conducting BSAs for multiple buildings. The inspectors we  interviewed were each responsible for conducting BSAs and overseeing  security operations at between 1 and 20 buildings.

		GSA and Tenant Agencies Are Assuming More Security Responsibilities

GSA security officials at the national and regional levels that we met with  were concerned about the quality and timeliness of the risk assessment  services that FPS provides. Officials explained that GSA created the  current risk assessment tool hastily following the 1995 bombing of the  Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and that FPS inherited a flawed tool  when it moved to DHS. GSA security officials expressed concerns over the  quality of FPS’s BSAs. For example, GSA regional security officials told us  that an FPS inspector recommended that GSA remove a structure from a  building, because the inspector thought it blocked the view of the security  guards. However, according to these officials, FPS had not cited this  blocked view as a vulnerability or recommended the structure’s removal in  previous BSAs, and to their knowledge, there had been no significant  changes in identified threats, the space, or the building’s tenant  composition. GSA security officials also told us that they have had  difficulties receiving timely risk assessments from FPS for space that GSA  is considering leasing. These risk assessments must be completed before  GSA can take possession of the property and lease it to tenant agencies.  An inefficient risk assessment process for new lease projects can add  costs for GSA and create problems for both GSA and tenant agencies that  have been planning for a move. ICE officials told us that there are many  occasions where FPS is not notified by GSA of the need for a new lease  assessment and in some cases, tenants have moved into leased space  without FPS’s knowledge. GSA is updating a tool —the Risk Assessment  Methodology Property Analysis and Ranking Tool (RAMPART)—that it  began developing in 1998, but has not recently used, to better ensure the  timeliness and comprehensiveness of these risk assessments. GSA expects  to test and implement the system during fiscal year 2009. GSA security  officials told us that they may use RAMPART for other physical security  activities, such as conducting other types of risk assessments and  determining security countermeasures for new facilities.
The tenant agency officials we spoke with at the five sites did not raise  concerns about FPS’s risk assessment process, but all of them told us that  at the national level, their agencies were taking steps to pursue their own  risk assessments for the exterior of their buildings, even though they pay  FPS for this service. GSA security officials said they have seen an increase  in the number of tenant agencies conducting their own risk assessments.  They told us that they are aware of at least nine tenant agencies that are  taking steps to acquire risk assessments for the exterior of their buildings.  Additionally, we have previously reported that some tenant agencies had  told us that they were using or planned to find contractors to complete  additional risk assessments because of concerns about the quality and  timeliness of FPS’s BSAs. We also reported that several DHS components  and other tenant agencies were taking steps to acquire their own risk  assessments because FPS’s assessments were not always timely or  adequate. Similarly, we also found that many facilities had received  waivers from FPS to enable the agencies to complete their own risk  assessments. While tenant agencies have typically taken responsibility  for assessing risk and securing the interior of their buildings, assessing  exterior risks will require additional expertise and resources. This is an  inefficient approach considering that tenant agencies are paying FPS to  assess building security. However, ICE officials stated that in many cases,  the agencies that are pursuing risk assessments are doing so to include  both GSA and non-GSA buildings that they occupy, and that in other  instances, agencies must adhere to other physical security standards and  thus conduct their own assessments.

		FPS Is Developing a New Risk Assessment Tool and Implementing Updated Security Standards

FPS recognizes the inadequacies of its risk assessment tool, methodology,  and process and is taking steps to develop a new risk management  program. Specifically, FPS is developing the Risk Assessment and  Management Program (RAMP) to improve the effectiveness of FPS’s risk  management approach and the quality of BSAs. According to FPS, RAMP  will provide inspectors with the information needed to make more  informed and defensible recommendations for security countermeasures.  FPS also anticipates that RAMP will allow inspectors to obtain  information from one electronic source, generate reports automatically,  enable FPS to track selected countermeasures throughout their life cycle,  address some concerns about the subjectivity inherent in BSAs, and  reduce the amount of time inspectors and managers spend on  administrative work. Additionally, FPS is designing RAMP so that it will  produce risk assessments that are compliant with ISC standards,  compatible with the risk management framework set forth by the NIPP,  and consistent with the business processes outlined in the MOA with GSA.  FPS expects that the first phase of RAMP will include BSA and  countermeasure management tools, among other functions. According to  FPS, RAMP will support all components of the BSA process, including  gathering and reviewing building information; conducting and recording  interviews; assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to develop  a detailed risk profile; recommending appropriate countermeasures; and  producing BSA reports. According to FPS, RAMP’s countermeasure  lifecycle management activities will include countermeasure design,  review, recommendation, approval, implementation, acceptance,  operation, testing, and replacement.
FPS began designing RAMP in early 2007 and expects to implement the  program in three phases, completing its implementation by the end of  fiscal year 2011. However, it is unclear whether FPS will meet the  implementation goals established in the program’s proposed timeline. In  June 2008, we reported that FPS was going to implement a pilot version of  RAMP in fiscal year 2009, but in May 2009, FPS officials told us they  intend to implement the first phase in the beginning of fiscal year 2010.
FPS officials also told us that RAMP training for inspectors will begin in  October 2009 and conclude in December 2009. Until RAMP components  are fully implemented, FPS will continue to rely on its current risk  assessment tool, methodology, and process, potentially leaving GSA and  tenant agencies dissatisfied. GSA security officials are aware that RAMP’s  development and implementation have run behind schedule and are  concerned about when improvements to FPS’s risk assessment processes  will be made. Under the 2006 MOA, FPS and GSA recognized that revisions  and enhancements would need to be made to the risk assessment process,  and FPS agreed it would work in consultation with GSA on any  modifications to risk assessment tools. FPS shared RAMP plans with GSA  in 2007 and solicited feedback, yet GSA security officials told us they think  collaboration could have been stronger and have concerns about RAMP’s  ability to meet their physical security needs. For example, as stated earlier,  GSA relies on FPS to provide it with risk assessments for buildings that it  wants to lease, but because FPS does not provide these assessments in a  timely manner GSA is taking steps to implement its own risk assessment  tool by the end of fiscal year 2009. According to FPS, RAMP will include a  risk assessment tool for new lease projects, but it did not include this  component in the first development phase and instead, this tool is  scheduled for rollout at the end of fiscal year 2010. FPS officials told us  that as they move forward with RAMP, they intend to ask GSA and tenant  agencies what risk assessment information they need from BSA reports.
Also, FPS officials told us they are reassessing building security levels  using ISC’s updated facility security level standards and a specialized  calculator tool. The updated ISC standards take factors other than a  building’s size and population into account, including mission criticality,  symbolism, threats to tenant agencies, and other factors such as proximity  to a major transportation hub. FPS is trying to meet ISC’s target date of  September 30, 2009, for finalizing updated building security levels for  nearly 9,000 GSA buildings. According to FPS, inspectors began  reassessing building security levels during June 2008 and as of May 2009,  FPS officials told us that inspectors had determined preliminary security  levels for all buildings, and finalized security levels for 3,100 buildings.
FPS officials told us inspectors have been following ISC guidance in  reassessing the facility security levels which require that the tenant  agencies make the final security level determination. However, GSA  security officials at the national office told us they were receiving  feedback from GSA security officials in the regions that some FPS  inspectors were presenting the updated security levels as mandatory and  final, not as preliminary results to be discussed.
Risk management practices provide the foundation of a comprehensive  protection program. Hence, efforts in the other key practice areas— leveraging technology and information sharing and coordination—are  diminished if they are not part of a risk management approach which can  be the vehicle for using these tools. It is critical that FPS—which is  responsible for assessing risk for nearly 9,000 GSA buildings and  properties that GSA may lease—replace its outdated, subjective, and time- consuming risk assessment tool and approach with the new program it has  been developing since fiscal year 2007, especially as the results of its risk  analyses lay the foundation for FPS, GSA, and tenant agencies’ security  efforts. DHS is the nation’s designated leader of critical infrastructure  protection efforts; therefore, it is critical that RAMP be developed in an  expeditious manner so that DHS can fulfill this mission with regard to  federal facilities that FPS protects. Furthermore, department level  attention in ensuring that FPS achieves success through regular updates to  the Secretary is warranted. This added oversight would enhance the  department’s ability to monitor RAMP development and make FPS  accountable for results, given the delays that RAMP has already  experienced.

	FPS Lacks a Systematic Approach for Leveraging Technology, but Is Developing a Technology Acquisition Program

FPS’s approach to leveraging technology does not ensure that the most  cost-effective technologies are being selected to protect GSA buildings.  Individual inspectors make technology decisions with limited training and  guidance, giving GSA and tenant agencies little assurance that  vulnerabilities have been systematically mitigated within and among all  buildings as cost-effectively as possible. Although FPS is developing a  program for technology acquisition, its implementation has been delayed  and it does not include an evaluative component to ensure cost- effectiveness.

		Inspectors Have Considerable Latitude in Determining Which Technologies to Pursue, but Receive Little Training and Guidance

As previously discussed, FPS inspectors recommend security fixtures to  GSA and security equipment to tenant agencies through the BSA process.  However, the training, guidance, and standards that FPS provides to  inspectors for selecting technologies are limited. As a result, GSA and  tenant agencies have little assurance that the countermeasures inspectors  recommend are cost-effective and the best available alternative. We have  previously reported that by efficiently using cost-effective technology to  supplement and reinforce other security measures, agencies can more  effectively apply the appropriate countermeasures to vulnerabilities  identified through the risk management process, and that linking the  chosen technology to countermeasures identified as part of the risk  management process provides assurance that factors such as purpose,  cost, and expected performance have been addressed. Furthermore, we  have recognized that having a method that allows for cost-effectively  leveraging technology to supplement and reinforce other measures  represents an advanced application of the key practice.
Through the BSA process, FPS recommends security fixtures to GSA, and  GSA has policies and procedures in place to guide its decisions about the  recommended investments and to identify and acquire cost-effective  fixtures through established contracts with vendors. FPS inspectors also  recommend technology-related security equipment through the BSA  process and acquire, install, and maintain the security equipment that  tenant agencies approve for purchase. FPS does not have a comprehensive  approach for identifying, acquiring, and assessing the cost-effectiveness of  the security equipment that its inspectors recommend. Instead, individual  FPS inspectors identify equipment for its purchase, installation, and  maintenance. FPS officials told us that inspectors make technology  decisions based on the initial training they receive, personal knowledge  and experience, and contacts with vendors. FPS inspectors receive some  training in identifying and recommending security technologies as part of  their initial FPS physical security training. Since FPS was transferred to  DHS in 2003, its refresher training program for inspectors has primarily  focused on law enforcement. Consequently, inspectors lack recurring  technology training. Supervisory officers and inspectors from two of the  five sites we visited told us that they learn about security technologies on  their own by reviewing industry publications and by attending trade shows  and security conferences but inspectors must have the time and funding to  attend. A supervisory officer from one FPS region told us the region has  sent some inspectors to security conferences sponsored by ASIS  International. Additionally, FPS does not provide inspectors with  specialized guidance and standards for cost-effectively selecting  technology. In the absence of specific guidance, inspectors follow the DOJ  minimum countermeasure standards and other relevant ISC standards  but these standards do not assist users in selecting cost-effective  technologies.
FPS’s devolution of responsibility for selecting technology to individual  inspectors, whose knowledge of existing and emerging technologies varies  because it is built on limited training and personal experience, results in  subjective equipment selection decisions. Additionally, the acquisition  process can be time-consuming for inspectors—many of whom have other  law enforcement and security duties for multiple buildings—because they  must search for equipment and vendors and facilitate the establishment of  installation and maintenance contracts. FPS’s process for acquiring,  installing, and maintaining technologies provides GSA and tenant agencies  with little assurance that they are getting the highest-quality, most cost- effective technology security solutions and that common vulnerabilities  are being systematically mitigated across all buildings. For example, an  explosives detection dog was used at one location to screen mail that is  distributed elsewhere. In 2006, FPS had recommended, based on the  results of its risk analysis, the use of this dog and an X-ray machine,  although at the time of our visit only the dog was being used. Moreover,  the dog and handler work 12-hour shifts Monday through Friday when  most mail is delivered and shipped, and the dog needs a break every 7  minutes. The GSA regional security officials we spoke with questioned  whether this approach was more effective and efficient than using an on- site enhanced X-ray machine that could detect biological and chemical  agents as well as explosives and could be used anytime. In accordance  with its policies, FPS conducted a BSA of the site in 2008 and determined  that using an enhanced X-ray machine and an explosives detection dog  would bring the projected threat rating of the site down from moderate to  low. FPS included estimated one-time installation and recurring costs in  the BSA and executive summary, but did not include the estimated cost  and risk of the following mail screening options: (1) usage of the dog and  the additional countermeasure; (2) usage of the additional countermeasure  only; and (3) usage of the dog only. Consequently, tenant agency  representatives would have to investigate the cost and risk implications of  these options on their own to make an informed resource allocation  decision.

		FPS Is Developing a Program to Standardize Equipment and Contracting

FPS is taking steps to implement a more systematic approach to  technology acquisition by developing a National Countermeasures  Program, which could help FPS leverage technology more cost-effectively.  According to FPS, the program will establish standards and national  procurement contracts for security equipment, including X-ray machines,  magnetometers, surveillance systems, and intrusion detection systems.  FPS officials told us that instead of having inspectors search for vendors  to establish equipment acquisition, installation, and maintenance  contracts, inspectors will call an FPS mission support center with their  countermeasure recommendations, and the center will procure the  services through standardized contracts. According to FPS, the program  will also include life-cycle management plans for countermeasures. FPS  officials explained that the National Countermeasures Program establishes  contractual relationships through GSA Schedule 84 to eliminate the need  for individual contracting actions when requirements for new equipment  or services are identified. FPS officials told us they worked closely with  GSA’s Federal Acquisition Service (FAS) to develop the program and FAS  officials concurred stating, for example, that the two agencies have  collaborated to ensure that GSA Schedule 84 has a sufficient number of  vendors to support FPS requirements for physical security services. FPS  officials said they established an X-ray machine contract through the  schedule and that future program contracts will also explore the use of the  schedule as a source for national purchase and service contracts.  According to FPS, the National Countermeasures Program should provide  the agency with a framework to better manage its security equipment  inventory; meet its operational requirement to identify, implement, and  maintain security equipment; and respond to stakeholders’ needs by  establishing nationwide resources, streamlining procurement procedures,  and strengthening communications with its customers. FPS officials told  us they believe this program will result in increased efficiencies because  inspectors will not have to spend their time facilitating the establishment  of contracts for security equipment because these contracts will be  standardized nationwide. Additionally, FPS officials told us that they  participate in the research and development of new technologies with  DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate.
Although the National Countermeasures Program includes improvements  that may enhance FPS’s ability to leverage technology, it does not  establish tools for assessing the cost-effectiveness of competing  technologies and countermeasures and implementation has been delayed.  Security professionals are faced with a multitude of technology options  offered by private vendors, including advanced intrusion detection  systems, biotechnology options for screening people, and sophisticated  video monitoring. Having tools and guidance to determine which  technologies most cost-effectively address identified vulnerabilities is a  central component of the leveraging technology key practice. FPS officials  told us that the National Countermeasures Program will enable inspectors  to develop countermeasure cost estimates that can be shared with GSA  and tenant agencies. However, incorporating a tool for evaluating the cost- effectiveness of alternative technologies into FPS’s planned improvements  in the security acquisition area would represent an enhanced application  of this key practice. Another concern is that FPS had planned to  implement the program throughout fiscal year 2009, but extended  implementation into fiscal year 2010 and thus it is not clear whether FPS  will meet the program’s milestones in accordance with updated timelines.  For example, FPS had anticipated that the X-ray machine and  magnetometer contracts would be awarded by December 2008, and that  contracts for surveillance and intrusion detection systems would be  awarded during fiscal year 2009. In May 2009, FPS officials told us that the  X-ray machine contract was awarded on April 30, 2009, and that they  anticipated awarding the magnetometer contract in the fourth quarter of  fiscal year 2009 and an electronic security services contract for  surveillance and intrusion detection systems during the second quarter of  fiscal year 2010. FPS had planned to test the program in one region before  implementing it nationwide, but after further consideration, FPS  management decided to forgo piloting the program in favor of rolling it out  nationally. Until the National Countermeasures Program is fully  implemented, FPS will continue to rely on individual inspectors to make  technology decisions. It would be beneficial for FPS to establish a process  for determining the cost-effectiveness of technologies considering the cost  and risk implications for the tenant agencies that determine whether they  will implement FPS’s countermeasure recommendations.

	FPS’s Information Sharing and Coordination Practices Lack Consistency

FPS, GSA, and tenant agencies share information and coordinate in a  variety of ways at the national, regional, and building levels; however, FPS  inspectors do not meet regularly with GSA property managers and tenant  agencies, FPS and GSA disagree over what threat and risk information  should be shared, and FPS faces technical obstacles to communicating  directly with other law enforcement agencies when responding to  incidents.

		Information Sharing and Coordination Practices Have Weaknesses

At the national level, FPS and GSA share information and coordinate in a  variety of ways. We have reported that information sharing and  coordination among organizations is crucial to producing comprehensive  and practical approaches and solutions to address terrorist threats  directed at federal buildings. FPS and the Building Security and Policy  Division within GSA’s PBS hold two biweekly teleconferences—one to  discuss building security issues and priorities and the other to discuss the  status of GSA contractor security background checks. FPS officials stated  that this regular contact with GSA has made their relationship more  productive and promotes coordination. GSA security officials also  recognize the importance of these teleconferences, although they would  like more involvement from FPS such as having better follow-through on  meeting action items.
Additionally, FPS and GSA are both members of ISC and serve together on  various subcommittees and working groups. The FPS Director and the  Director of the PBS Building Security and Policy Division participate in an  ISC executive steering committee, which sets the committee’s priorities  and agendas for ISC’s quarterly meetings. These activities could enhance  FPS’s and GSA’s collaboration in implementing ISC’s security standards  and potentially lead to greater efficiencies. According to FPS and ISC, FPS  has consistently participated in ISC working groups, but the staff assigned  to some of the groups changed from meeting to meeting. GSA security  officials also cited limitations with FPS’s staffing of ISC working groups.
FPS and GSA have also established an Executive Advisory Council to  enhance the coordination and communication of security strategies,  policies, guidance, and activities with tenant agencies in GSA buildings. As  the council’s primary coordinator, FPS convened the group for the first  time in August 2008, and 17 agencies attended. According to FPS, it  intends to hold semiannual council meetings, and as of May 2009, FPS had  not held a second formal meeting. This council could enhance  communication and coordination between FPS and GSA, and provide a  vehicle for FPS, GSA, and tenant agencies to work together to identify  common problems and devise solutions.
Furthermore, FPS and GSA are renegotiating the 2006 MOA between DHS  and GSA to, among other things, improve communication. However,  officials told us that this process has been time-consuming and the two  parties have different views on the outcomes. FPS and GSA began  renegotiating the MOA during fiscal year 2008 and expected to finalize it  during fiscal year 2009. However, in May 2009, FPS officials told us they do  not have an estimated date for finalizing the MOA and GSA officials told us  they do not anticipate reaching an agreement until fiscal year 2010. FPS  and GSA recognize that the renegotiation can serve as an opportunity to  discuss service concerns and develop mutual solutions. While FPS and  GSA concur that the MOA should be used as an accountability tool, FPS  thinks the document should offer general guidelines on the services it  provides, but GSA wants a more prescriptive agreement.
Overall, FPS and GSA regional officials told us that FPS shares some  information with GSA and that collaboration between the two agencies  has improved. However, the agencies’ satisfaction with this situation  differs. The FPS regional officials we spoke with said the agencies’  information sharing and coordination procedures work well, while GSA  regional security officials told us that communication should be more  frequent and the quality of the information shared needs to be improved.
Moreover, according to the GSA officials, FPS’s sporadic and restricted  sharing of threat information limits GSA’s ability to protect its properties.  We have reported that by having a process in place to obtain and share  information on potential threats to federal buildings, agencies can better  understand the risks they face and more effectively determine what  preventive measures should be implemented. Additionally, we have  reported that sharing terrorism-related information that is critical to  homeland security protection is important, and agencies need to develop  mechanisms that support this type of information sharing. The 2006 MOA  between DHS and GSA requires FPS to provide GSA with quarterly  briefings at the regional level. However, GSA regional security officials  told us that they were not receiving related threat information as part of  these updates until October 2008, when the FPS Director—in response to  feedback from GSA—instructed regional personnel to share threat  information. The FPS Director advised Regional Directors to meet  quarterly with their respective GSA regional administrators, regional  commissioners, or security representatives to discuss and share  information on regional security issues. The Director further stated that  briefings should include unclassified intelligence information concerning  threats against GSA buildings and updates to the regional threat  assessment, as well as information and analysis on protecting the regions’  most vulnerable facilities. Moreover, in its strategic plan, FPS recognizes  the importance of ensuring that policies and procedures are being  established and followed consistently across the country, and asserts that  effective communication between headquarters and regional personnel at  all levels will aid in this effort. GSA officials also told us that they are  taking steps to replicate headquarters structures in their regions to ensure  consistent applications of policies and to standardize communication  practices.
While FPS’s action to share threat information is a positive step, GSA  security officials at the national office told us they received feedback from  security staff in the regions that threat briefings were not uniform across  regions and varied in their usefulness. The majority of the briefings, the  officials said, communicated information about crime incidents and did  not, in their view, provide threat information. In May 2009, FPS officials  told us that regions gave briefings during the second quarter of fiscal year  2009, but GSA security officials told us that some regions reported that  they had not received these second quarter briefings. To improve  information sharing and coordination at the regional level, FPS  standardized its quarterly threat briefing format. FPS officials told us that  they partnered with GSA to create a sensitive but unclassified (SBU)  facility-specific companion document to the BSA called the “Facility  Security Assessment Threat Summary.” According to FPS, this quarterly  threat briefing will contain facility-specific information on security  performance measures, criminal activity, unclassified intelligence  regarding threats, significant events, special FPS law enforcement  operations, and potential threats, demonstrations, and other events. FPS  officials told us that this quarterly threat briefing format is a positive step  in providing a briefing document that GSA can use in evaluating threat  information that is germane to its property portfolio. FPS officials told us  that they finalized the briefing format and that the Director signed the  General Services Administration Threat Briefing Policy directive in June  2009. In contrast, in June 2009, GSA security officials told us that they  believe they had little involvement in developing FPS’s threat briefing  format explaining that although FPS asked GSA to comment on its  proposed format—which, according to GSA, it did in March 2009—FPS  had not discussed GSA’s comments with them or updated GSA on the  content or status of the format. GSA security officials told us they have  representation on an ISC working group that is developing a standardized  design basis threat template to support risk assessment threat ratings.
According to the 2006 MOA, FPS is to meet with GSA property managers  and tenant agency representatives when it discusses the results of its  BSAs. Depending on the building’s security level, the BSA may occur every  2 to 4 years. Apart from these briefings, FPS, GSA, and tenant agencies  choose how frequently they will all meet. An information sharing best  practice that we have reported on is holding regularly scheduled meetings  during which participants can, for example, share security management  practices, discuss emerging technologies, and create committees to  perform specific tasks, such as policy setting. It is critical that FPS, as the  provider of law enforcement and related security services for GSA  buildings, and GSA, as the manager of these properties, have well- established lines of communication with each other and with tenant  agencies to ensure that all parties are aware of the ever-changing risks in a  dynamic threat environment and that FPS and GSA are taking appropriate  actions to reduce vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, we identified information  sharing gaps at all the sites we visited, and found that in some cases these  deficiencies led to decreased security awareness and increased risk.
At one location, we observed during our interview with the building  security committee (BSC) that the committee members were confused  about procedures for screening visitors who are passengers in  employees’ cars that enter the building via the parking garage. One of  the tenants recounted an incident in which a security guard directed  the visitor to walk through the garage to an appropriate screening  station. According to the GSA property manager, this action created a  safety hazard. The GSA property manager knew the appropriate  screening procedure, but told us there was no written policy on the  procedure that members could access. Additionally, BSC members told  us that the committee met as needed.
At one location, FPS had received inaccurate square footage data from  GSA and had therefore overcharged the primary tenant agency for a  guard post that protected space shared by all the tenants. According to  the GSA property manager, once GSA was made aware of the problem,  the agency obtained updated information and worked with the tenant  agencies to develop a cost-sharing plan for the guard post, which made  the primary tenant agency’s security expenses somewhat more  equitable. BSC members told us that the committee met regularly.
At one location, members of a BSC told us that they met as needed,  although even when they hold meetings, one of the main tenant  agencies typically does not participate. GSA officials commented that  this tenant adheres to its agency’s building security protocols and does  not necessarily follow GSA’s tenant policies and procedures which  GSA thinks creates security risks for the entire building.
At one location, tenant agency representatives and officials from FPS  told us they met regularly, but GSA officials told us they were not  invited to these meetings. GSA officials at this location told us that they  invite FPS to their property management meetings for that location, but  FPS does not attend. GSA officials also said they do not receive timely  incident information for the site from FPS and suggested that increased  communication among the agencies would help them be more effective  managers of their properties and provide tenants with better customer  service.
At one location, GSA undertook a major renovation project beginning  in April 2007. FPS, GSA, and tenant agency representatives did not all  meet together regularly to make security preparations or manage  security operations during construction. FPS officials told us they had  not been invited to project meetings, although GSA officials told us that  they had invited FPS and that FPS attended some meetings. In May  2008, FPS discovered that specific surveillance equipment had been  removed. As of May 2009, FPS officials told us they did not know who  had removed the equipment and were working with tenant agency  representatives to recover it. However in June 2009, tenant agency  representatives told us that they believed FPS was fully aware that the  equipment had been removed in December 2007.
To improve information sharing and coordination at the building level,  FPS and GSA plan to implement ISC’s facility security committee  standards at all multitenant and single-tenant buildings and campuses after  ISC issues them. FPS and GSA could leverage these standards to establish  consistent communications and designate the roles and responsibilities of  FPS, GSA, and tenant agencies. FPS and GSA have had representation on  the ISC working group that is developing the standards.  ISC intends to  issue the standards in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, but it is unclear  when FPS and GSA will implement them.
GSA security officials also told us that FPS does not consistently or  comprehensively inform GSA of changes to services or provide GSA with  contingency plans when FPS deploys inspectors and other personnel to  provide law enforcement, security, and emergency response services for  special events in support of broader homeland security goals. For  example, GSA security officials cited some instances in which FPS  reduced its services during the 2009 Presidential Inauguration. They noted,  for example, that FPS inspectors did not attend BSC meetings and said  that FPS did not inform GSA of all service changes. FPS’s response to  special events and critical incidents is governed by the FPS Interim  Critical Incident Response Plan issued by the Director in September  2007. This plan does not include procedures for notifying GSA and tenant  agencies of expected service changes, restrictions, and modifications  at  the national, regional, and building levels. FPS officials told us that FPS  notified tenant agencies in the National Capital Region of expected servi changes, restrictions, and modifications during the 2009 inauguration.  Officials also said that, when possible, inspectors personally contacted GSA building managers and tenant agency representatives in the region. However, FPS personnel were deployed from all regions in accordance  with the critical incident response plan and FPS officials did not tell us  that regions other than the National Capital Region were notified. Becau GSA and tenant agencies rely on FPS to provide critical law enforcement  and security services and tenant agencies pay for these services, we  believe it is important for FPS to notify these entities in advance of se changes and provide for interim coverage.

		FPS and GSA Disagree Over Sharing Informatio from the BSA

While FPS and GSA acknowledge that the two organizations are partners  in protecting and securing GSA buildings, FPS and GSA fundamentally  disagree over how much of the information in the BSA should be shared Per the MOA, FPS is required to share the BSA executive summary with  GSA and FPS believes that this document contains sufficient information for GSA to make decisions about purchasing and implementing FPS’s  recommended countermeasures. However, GSA officials at all levels ci limitations with the BSA executive summary saying, for example, that it  does not contain enough contextual information on threats and  vulnerabilities to support FPS’s countermeasure recommendatio justify the expenses that GSA and tenant agencies would incur by  installing additional countermeasures. Moreover, GSA security officials  told us that FPS does not consistently share BSA executive summaries  across all regions. Instead, GSA wants to receive BSAs in their entirety s that it can better protect its buildings and the tenants who occupy them.  The BSA executive summary includes  . a brief description of the building;    an overview of the risk assessment methodology;  types of threats that the building is exposed to and their risk ratings;    countermeasure recommendations, estimated installation and  gs after countermeasure implementation.
In contrast, a complete BSA includes    a detailed description of the physic al features of the building and its  terviewees and contact information;    a profile of occupants and agency missions;  recent losses, crimes, and security violations   previous security surveys, inspections, and rela investigations, and studies;    descriptions of threats and risk ratings;  installation and recurring costs; and    projected threat ratings after counter measure implementation.
When FPS was housed within GSA and PBS, GSA security officials  that FPS shared BSAs in their entirety with GSA, but now at the national  level, GSA can request full BSAs from FPS, and FPS makes determinations  on a case-by-case basis by following and interpreting DHS information  sharing policies. However, GSA security officials told us that the process  for requesting BSAs is informal and that FPS has not been responsive to  these requests overall. Furthermore, considering there are nearly 9,000  buildings in GSA’s inventory, this may be an inefficient approach to obtain  key facility protection information. We have found that information  sharing and coordination are important at the individual building level and  that protecting federal buildings requires building security managers to  told us  involve multiple organizations to effectively coordinate and share  information to prevent, detect, and respond to terrorist attacks.
According to GSA, building protection functions are an integral part of its  property preservation, operation, and management responsibilities. In  2000, when FPS was still a part of GSA, Congress considered removing  FPS from PBS. At that time, GSA opposed such action asserting that it  would divorce security from other federal building functions when  security considerations needed to be integrated into decisions about the  location, design, and operation of federal buildings. GSA was concerned  that separating FPS from PBS would create an organizational barrier  between protection experts and PBS asset managers, planners, project  managers, and building managers who set PBS budgets and policies for  the GSA inventory as a whole and oversaw day-to-day operations in GSA  buildings. However, Congress did not remove FPS from PBS, and FPS  remained within GSA and PBS until it was transferred to DHS and ICE  under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Prior to the creation of DHS, we  expressed concern about separating security from other real property  portfolio functions, such as site location, design, and construction for new  federal buildings, because decisions on these factors have implications for  what types of security will be necessary and effective. We concluded that  if DHS was given the responsibility for securing GSA facilities, the role of  integrating security with other real property functions would be an  important consideration, especially since GSA would still be the caretaker  of these buildings.
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, FPS was transferred to DHS  and retained responsibilities for law enforcement and related security  functions for GSA buildings and grounds. However, except for law  enforcement and related security functions transferred to DHS, under the  act, GSA retained all powers, functions, and authorities in law, related to  the operation, maintenance, and protection of its buildings and grounds.  As a result of the act, GSA and DHS both have protection responsibilities  for GSA-controlled buildings and grounds. DHS and GSA developed an  MOA to address roles, responsibilities, and operational relationships  between FPS and GSA concerning the security of GSA-controlled space.  Through this agreement, DHS and GSA determined that FPS would  continue to conduct BSAs for GSA. GSA security officials told us that GSA  staff at the national, regional, and building levels need the information  contained in the BSA to cost-effectively manage their buildings to ensure  that they are secure and that their customers, or tenant agencies, are  adequately protected. Because GSA personnel do not receive the entire  BSA, they must decide on the basis of incomplete information how to use  funds to implement countermeasures and mitigate vulnerabilities.  Furthermore, GSA property managers are responsible for coordinating and  maintaining emergency management plans, such as evacuation and  continuity of operations plans, and when a safety or security incident  arises at a GSA building, GSA assumes a lead role in the incident  command. Without complete risk information, GSA is challenged to  maintain appropriate situational awareness and preparedness to protect  buildings, especially during emergencies.
Although the Director of FPS recognizes that FPS and GSA have common  interests in protecting GSA buildings and the federal employees who work  in them, the Director has determined that GSA does not meet the  standards under which FPS shares BSAs and maintains that BSA executive  summaries provide GSA with sufficient information. FPS designates the  SBU information contained in BSAs as “law enforcement sensitive” (LES)  in accordance with DHS and ICE policies. FPS considers the BSA to be an  LES document because it incorporates all aspects of a location’s physical  security into one document whose release outside of the law enforcement  arena could adversely impact the conduct of law enforcement programs.  According to FPS, the BSA can include LES information such as:  information, details, or criminal intelligence data indicating why a  threat is deemed credible;  information and details relating to any ongoing criminal investigations,  law enforcement operations, or both; and    detailed analysis of why the lack or inadequacy of a countermeasure  creates an exploitable vulnerability.
According to FPS, LES information is safeguarded and determinations to  disseminate LES information are made in accordance with a DHS  information safeguarding management directive and an ICE directive for  safeguarding LES information. FPS maintains that GSA does not need to  know the LES information that is contained in the BSA and that if the BSA  is released to GSA, the risk of unscrupulous or criminal use of the  information would increase significantly. According to FPS, the  information contained in the BSA is not critical to GSA’s performance of  its authorized, assigned mission. FPS further maintains that GSA retains  no legal responsibility for the physical protection and law enforcement  operations within GSA buildings because the Homeland Security Act of  2002 transferred FPS’s law enforcement and related security functions  from GSA to DHS and that under the act it is responsible for protecting the  buildings, grounds, and property under GSA’s control or custody.
We have reported on the importance of sharing terrorism-related  information that is critical to homeland security protection and have  identified a need for agencies to develop mechanisms that support this  information sharing. Other federal agencies have found ways to share  sensitive information with other entities. For example, in response to a  GAO recommendation, the Transportation Security Administration  established regulations that allow for sharing sensitive security  information with persons covered by the regulations who have a need to  know, including airport and aircraft operators, foreign vessel owners, and  Transportation Security Administration employees. The ICE directive for  safeguarding LES information states that an information sharing and  access agreement in the form of a memorandum of understanding or  agreement may formalize LES information exchanges between DHS and  an external entity. Moreover, according to standard language in FPS’s  BSAs, a security clearance is not required for access to LES information; a  criminal history check and a national fingerprint check—performed in  accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12)  investigative requirements—is required. According to GSA, it follows these  requirements. Moreover, GSA has an information safeguarding policy in  place to protect SBU building information which can include:  the location and details of secure functions or space in a building such  as secure routes for prisoners and judges inside courthouses;  the location and details of secure functions or secure space such as  security and fire alarm systems;  the location and type of structural framing for the building including  any information regarding structural analysis, such as counterterrorism  methods used to protect the building and occupants; and  risk assessments and information regarding security systems or  strategies of any kind.
In the 2006 MOA, FPS and GSA agreed that shared SBU information would  be handled in accordance with each agency’s information safeguarding  policies. Furthermore, one of FPS’s strategic goals is to foster  relationships to increase the proactive sharing of information and  intelligence. In its strategic plan, FPS states that it will use efficient  information sharing and information protection processes based on  mutually beneficial, trusted relationships to ensure the implementation of  effective, coordinated, and integrated infrastructure protection programs  and activities.
When we spoke with FPS and GSA officials in 2008, they thought the MOA  renegotiation could serve as a platform for determining what BSA  information should be shared. However, when we spoke with FPS and  GSA officials in 2009, they did not know when the MOA would be  renegotiated and FPS determined it would not change BSA sharing  procedures during the renegotiation. Therefore, GSA will continue to  receive BSA executive summaries and the individual BSAs that FPS  approves for sharing, but it will not have access to other BSA information  that it could use to make risk-based decisions to protect its buildings, the  federal employees who work in them, and visitors to these buildings.
In a post-September 11 era, it is crucial that federal agencies work  together to share information to advance homeland security and critical  infrastructure protection efforts. Information is a crucial tool in fighting  terrorism, and the timely dissemination of that information to the  appropriate government agency is absolutely critical to maintaining the  security of our nation. The ability to share security-related information can  unify the efforts of federal agencies in preventing or minimizing terrorist  attacks. However, in the absence of comprehensive information-sharing  plans, many aspects of homeland security information sharing can be  ineffective and fragmented. In 2005, we designated information sharing for  homeland security as a governmentwide high-risk area because of the  significant challenges faced in this area—challenges that are still evident  today. It is critical that FPS and GSA—which both have protection  functions for GSA buildings, their occupants, and those who visit them— reach consensus on sharing information in a timely manner to support  homeland security and critical infrastructure protection efforts. GSA  raises strong arguments for having this information and FPS could do  more to resolve this situation.

		FPS’s and Other Law Enforcement Organizations’ Communication Systems Lack Interoperability

FPS provides the law enforcement response for incidents at GSA  buildings, during which it may need to communicate with other first  responders. Additionally, DHS can call upon FPS to provide law  enforcement and security services at natural disasters or special events  such as political demonstrations, and FPS must then communicate with  other federal, state, and local first responders. For these situations, having  an interoperable communication system is desirable. However, first  responders continue to use various, and at times incompatible,  communications technologies, making it difficult to communicate with  neighboring jurisdictions or other first responders to carry out the  response. We noted during our review that FPS radios lack  interoperability, meaning they are unable to communicate with the  equipment used by other law enforcement agencies—federal, state, and  local. Delayed communications with area first responders during  emergencies could curtail the timeliness and effectiveness of FPS’s law  enforcement services.
FPS officials at one location told us that only new FPS vehicles have  had radio upgrades, some FPS personnel have new hand-held radios,  and other handheld radios have not been changed in 6 years. Changes  in radio technology can inhibit interoperability among first responders  who upgrade equipment as possible.
FPS officials at one location told us that FPS can use the same radio  frequency as the local police department, but the two organizations’  radio systems are not fully interoperable because the police use a  digital system and FPS does not. Therefore, communication between  these entities can be limited.
FPS officials at one location told us that federal and local law  enforcement agencies communicate with FPS via telephone or through  the area FPS MegaCenter, instead of directly through radios, because  the organizations’ radio systems are not interoperable. Therefore,  communication among these entities can be limited.
FPS officials at one location told us that FPS’s handheld radios are not  interoperable with those of area federal and local law enforcement  personnel, because FPS does not use the same radio band spectrum  other federal law enforcement agencies use and instead uses its own  ultra-high-frequency band. As a result, communication among these  entities is limited.
FPS officials at one location told us that their radios are not  interoperable with those of the local police department. Therefore,  communication between the two entities can be limited. FPS is  exploring whether it can connect to the police department through a  local interagency communications system.
FPS is developing a National Radio Program that includes a component  intended to make FPS’s radios interoperable with those of other federal,  state, and local law enforcement organizations. FPS began planning this  initiative in 2008, was working to fill the program manager position by the  end of June 2009, and expects to achieve full implementation by 2013.  According to FPS officials, they have established a branch under the FPS  MegaCenter program specifically dedicated to enhancing and supporting  the National Radio Program. Consistent with establishing this new branch,  FPS officials said they are working to fill contract positions in each region  for radio technicians to support the technical requirements associated  with mobile radios, portable radios, programming, and the radio network  infrastructure. According to FPS, they are working to contract for a survey  and design team to coordinate with FPS’s regional offices, the National  Radio Program, and the MegaCenter program to standardize and enhance  the national radio infrastructure.
According to FPS officials, the enhancements to FPS’s communications will  provide solutions for newer technologies and will meet national  communications standards and DHS standards for advanced encryption.  FPS officials said they are beginning an internal evaluation of FPS’s existing  communications capabilities, which should allow future enhancement  efforts to be prioritized as part of an overall effort to enhance national radio  coverage. FPS officials said they are working to procure, program, and issue  more than 2,900 new radios that conform to new equipment standards and  will eventually phase out older equipment used by FPS officers and guards.  FPS officials said that all future radios issued will conform to updated  standards to promote uniformity and enhanced support capabilities. While  FPS officials think interoperability will be improved under this initiative,  they cautioned that their law enforcement counterparts’ communication  equipment must meet DHS’s advanced encryption standard which can be a  challenge for state and local partners.

	Conclusions

FPS has a number of improvements planned or in development that, if  fully incorporative of the key practices, will provide greater assurance that  FPS is effectively protecting GSA buildings and maximizing security  investment dollars. The key practices we examined vis-à-vis FPS— allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, and  information sharing and coordination—are critical components to an  effective and efficient physical security program. However, FPS’s  application of these practices had limitations and as a result, there is a  lack of assurance that federal buildings under the control and custody of  GSA, the employees who work in them, and visitors to them are being  adequately protected. Related to allocating resources using risk  management, FPS’s assessment of risks at buildings is a critical  responsibility considering the results lay the foundation by which GSA and  tenants make resource allocation decisions. However, FPS’s current risk  assessment process is inadequate and its efforts to improve it through the  development of RAMP have been delayed. Related to leveraging  technology, planned improvements to the way inspectors acquire security  equipment through the National Countermeasures Program have also  experienced delays and knowing the cost implications of different  alternatives is the foundation of this key practice, although FPS is not  directly addressing this critical element. Continued delays in the  implementation of improvements in these critical areas—risk management  and leveraging technology—are of concern and deserving of greater  attention by DHS management. Furthermore, related to information  sharing and coordination, FPS’s communications with GSA and tenants  could benefit from more clearly defined parameters for consistency,  frequency, and content, and issues related to interoperability with other  law enforcement agencies surfaced as a concern that FPS is trying to  address. Without a greater focus on the key practices, FPS will be ill- equipped to sufficiently manage security at GSA buildings, and assist with  broader homeland security efforts as the security landscape changes and  new threats emerge.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making three recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland  Security aimed at moving FPS toward greater use of the key practices we  assessed. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary instruct the  Director of FPS, in consultation, where appropriate, with other parts of  DHS, GSA, and tenant agencies to take the following three actions:  1.  Provide the Secretary with regular updates, on a mutually agreed-to  schedule, on the status of RAMP and the National Countermeasures  Program, including the implementation status of deliverables, clear  timelines for completion of tasks and milestones, and plans for  addressing any implementation obstacles.  2.  In conjunction with the National Countermeasures Program, develop a  methodology and guidance for assessing and comparing the cost- effectiveness of technology alternatives. 3.  Reach consensus with GSA on what information contained in the BSA  is needed for GSA to fulfill its responsibilities related to the protection  of federal buildings and occupants, and accordingly, establish internal  controls to ensure that shared information is adequately safeguarded;  guidance for employees to use in deciding what information to protect  with SBU designations; provisions for training on making designations,  controlling, and sharing such information with GSA and other entities;  and a review process to evaluate how well this information sharing  process is working, with results reported to the Secretary regularly on  a mutually agreed-to schedule.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of the sensitive but unclassified report to DHS and  GSA for review and comment. DHS agreed with our assessment that  greater attention to key practices would improve FPS’s approach to  facility protection and agreed with the report’s recommendations.  Furthermore, DHS stated that FPS will continue to work with key  stakeholders to address other security issues that were cited in our report,  for which specific recommendations were not made. With respect to the  first recommendation—to provide the Secretary of Homeland Security  with regular updates on the status of RAMP and the National  Countermeasures Program—DHS stated that FPS will submit a  consolidated monthly report to the Secretary.
Although DHS agreed with our second and third recommendations, we are  concerned that the steps it described are not comprehensive enough to  address the intent of the recommendations. For the second  recommendation—to develop a methodology and guidance for assessing  and comparing the cost-effectiveness of technology alternatives—DHS  commented that such efforts will be a part of FPS’s development of RAMP  and that future phases of RAMP will include the ability to evaluate  countermeasure alternatives based on cost and the ability to mitigate  identified risks. However, RAMP has experienced delays and it is unclear  when this future component of RAMP will be developed and implemented.  Moreover, as we reported, FPS inspectors have considerable latitude in  determining which technologies and other countermeasures to  recommend, but receive little guidance to help them assess the cost- effectiveness of these technologies. Until the cost-analysis component of  RAMP is implemented, it will be important for inspectors to have guidance  they can use to make cost-effective countermeasure recommendations so  that GSA and tenant agencies can be assured that their investments in  FPS-recommended technologies and other countermeasures are cost- effective, consistent across buildings, and the best available alternatives.
Regarding the third recommendation—to reach consensus with GSA on  what information contained in the BSA is needed for GSA to fulfill its  protection responsibilities and to establish information sharing and  safeguarding procedures—DHS responded that FPS is developing a facility  security assessment template as a part of RAMP to produce reports that  can be shared with GSA and other agencies. However, DHS did not  explicitly commit to reaching consensus with GSA in identifying building  security information that can be shared, or to the steps we outlined in our  recommendation—steps that in our view comprise a comprehensive plan  for sharing and safeguarding sensitive information. As we reported, FPS  and GSA fundamentally disagree over what BSA information should be  shared and FPS has decided not to discuss this matter with GSA as part of  the MOA renegotiation. Furthermore, RAMP continues to experience  delays and it is unclear when it will produce facility security assessments  than can be shared with GSA. Therefore, it is important that FPS engage  GSA in identifying what building security information can be shared and  follow the information sharing and safeguarding steps we included in our  recommendation to ensure that GSA acquires the information it needs to  protect the 9,000 buildings under its control and custody, the federal  employees who work in them, and those who visit them.
GSA agreed with our findings concerning the challenges that FPS faces in  delivering security services for GSA buildings. GSA indicated that it will  continue to work closely with FPS to ensure the protection of GSA  buildings, their tenants, and visitors to these buildings. GSA stated that it  will work with FPS to address our recommendation that the two agencies  reach a consensus on the sharing and safeguarding of information  contained in BSAs. DHS also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated where appropriate. DHS’s comments can be found in  appendix II and GSA’s comments can be found in appendix III.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary  of Homeland Security, the Acting Administrator of General Services,  appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objective of this report was to determine whether the Federal  Protective Service’s (FPS) approach to security for buildings under the  control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA) reflects  key facility protection practices. Through previous work, we identified a  set of key practices from the collective practices of federal agencies and  private sector entities that can provide a framework for guiding agencies’  protection efforts and addressing challenges. These key practices form  the foundation of a comprehensive approach to building protection. We  used our key facility protection practices as criteria to evaluate the steps  that FPS has taken. We used the following key practices as criteria:  allocating resources using risk management; leveraging technology; and  information sharing and coordination. For the purposes of this review, we  did not consider three other key practices for varying reasons:  performance measurement and testing, because we reported on the  limitations FPS faces in assessing its performance in 2008; aligning assets  to mission, because GSA, not FPS, controls the asset inventory; and  strategic management of human capital, because we are currently  reviewing FPS’s management of human capital.
To examine FPS’s application of key practices at the building level, we  selected five sites, basing our selection on factors that included  geographical diversity, high occupancy, the building’s designated security  level, other potential security considerations such as new or planned  building construction, and recent and ongoing work. Selected sites  included three multitenant level IV buildings, one single-tenant level IV  campus, and one single-tenant level III campus.
Collectively, the sites we selected illustrate the range of building  protection practices applied by FPS. At each site, we interviewed FPS,  GSA, and tenant agency officials with primary responsibility for security  implementation, operation, and management. We toured each site and  observed the physical environment, the buildings, and the principal  security elements to gain firsthand knowledge of the building protection  practices. We collected documents, when available, that contained site- specific information on security risks, threats, budgets, and staffing for  analysis. Because we observed FPS’s efforts to protect GSA buildings at a  limited number of sites, our observations cannot be generalized to all the  buildings that FPS is responsible for securing. To supplement these site  visits, we interviewed FPS and GSA security officials from the four regions  where we had visited buildings—regions 2, 4, 7, and 11. We also  interviewed FPS and GSA security officials at the national level and  collected supporting documentation on security plans, policies,  procedures, budgets, and staffing for analysis. For example, we reviewed  the 2006 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) and GSA that sets forth the security  responsibilities of FPS and GSA at federal buildings. We also interviewed  the executive director of the Interagency Security Committee (ISC), and  we analyzed ISC’s Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal  Facilities, Security Design Criteria for new Federal Office Buildings  and Major Modernization Projects, and Security Standards for Leased  Space. We also analyzed the facility security level standards and minimum  security requirements set forth by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)   DOJ Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities. We analyzed FPS  planning documents, including FPS’s 2008-2011 Strategic Plan and the Risk  Assessment and Management Program Concept of Operations. We  analyzed laws that described FPS and GSA’s protection authorities  including the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and Title 40 of the United  States Code. We also analyzed laws and internal documents that govern  FPS’s information safeguarding practices including DHS Management  Directive 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified Information  and ICE Directive 73003.1, Safeguarding Law Enforcement Sensitive  Information.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to September  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objective.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: Comments from the General Services Administration

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, David Sausville, Assistant  Director; Denise McCabe, Analyst-in-Charge; Anne Dilger; Elizabeth  Eisenstadt; Brandon Haller; Robin Nye; Susan Michal-Smith; and Adam Yu  made key contributions to this report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

There is ongoing concern about the security of federal buildings and their occupants. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing law enforcement and related security services for nearly 9,000 federal buildings under the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). In 2004, GAO identified a set of key protection practices from the collective practices of federal agencies and the private sector that included: allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, and information sharing and coordination. As requested, GAO determined whether FPS's security efforts for GSA buildings reflected key practices. To meet this objective, GAO used its key practices as criteria, visited five sites to gain firsthand knowledge, analyzed pertinent DHS and GSA documents, and interviewed DHS, GSA, and tenant agency officials.

What GAO Found

FPS's approach to securing GSA buildings reflects some aspects of key protection practices, and FPS has several improvements underway such as a new risk assessment program and a countermeasure acquisition program. While FPS's protection activities exhibit some aspects of the key practices, GAO found limitations in each of the areas. FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to GSA and tenant agencies; however, FPS's ability to influence the allocation of resources using risk management is limited because resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies, which may be unwilling to fund FPS's countermeasure recommendations. Moreover, FPS uses an outdated risk assessment tool and a subjective, time-consuming process. As a result, GSA and tenant agencies are uncertain whether risks are being mitigated. Concerned with the quality and timeliness of FPS's risk assessment services, GSA and tenant agencies are pursuing some of these activities on their own. Although FPS is developing a new risk management program, full implementation is not planned until the end of fiscal year 2011 and has already experienced delays. With regard to leveraging technology, FPS inspectors have considerable latitude for selecting technologies and countermeasures that tenant agencies fund, but FPS provides inspectors with little training and guidance for making cost-effective choices. Additionally, FPS does not provide tenant agencies with an analysis of alternative technologies, their cost, and associated reduction in risk. As a result, there is limited assurance that the recommendations inspectors make are the best available alternatives and tenant agencies must make resource allocation decisions without key information. Although FPS is developing a program to standardize security equipment and contracting, the program has run behind schedule and lacks an evaluative component for assessing the cost-effectiveness of competing technologies and countermeasures. FPS has developed information sharing and coordination mechanisms with GSA and tenant agencies, but there is inconsistency in the type of information shared and the frequency of coordination. Lack of coordination through regular contact can lead to communication breakdowns. For example, during a construction project at one location, the surveillance equipment that FPS was responsible for maintaining was removed from the site during 2007. FPS and tenant agency representatives disagree over whether FPS was notified of this action. Furthermore, FPS and GSA disagree over what building risk assessment information can be shared. FPS maintains that the sensitive information contained in the assessments is not needed for GSA to carry out its mission. However, GSA maintains that restricted access to the risk assessments constrains its ability to protect buildings and occupants.