Agencies Have Improved Sharing as They Build the ISE, but a Better Roadmap and System of Accountability Could Guide Future Development

		ISE Has Improved Sharing By Advancing Goals and Priority Programs

In our July 2011 report, we noted that the Program Manager for the ISE  and key security agencies have continued to make progress in  addressing issues that keep terrorism-related information sharing on our  high-risk list. For example, they developed a corrective action plan—or  framework—to implement a set of initial goals and priority programs that  help to establish the ISE, partly responding to recommendations we made  in 2008. Goals included reducing barriers to sharing and improving  information sharing practices with federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign  partners. Priority programs included developing common information  sharing standards; building a national integrated network of fusion  centers; implementing a system whereby state and local partners can  report suspicious activity; and controlling and handling sensitive but  unclassified information. Activities under the framework also included  establishing information sharing incentive programs for federal employees  and strengthening privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties considerations.  The administration has recognized, however, that the framework was  useful in promoting this initial set of programs and activities, but it did not  define what the fully functioning ISE is to achieve and include. Therefore,  as discussed in the following sections, the framework does not provide  the comprehensive roadmap that is needed to further develop and  implement the ISE going forward.

		More Fully Defining the ISE, Related Costs, and What Work Remains Would Help Provide a Roadmap and Accountability for Results

			Defining an End State Vision

The Program Manager has acknowledged the importance of defining  what the ISE is intended to achieve and include—or the “end state”  vision—and noted that he is doing so as part of ongoing efforts to update  the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing. He said that this  update will drive future ISE implementation efforts and will help individual  agencies adapt their information sharing policies, related business  processes, architectures, standards, and systems to effectively operate  within the ISE. The Program Manager also noted that after development  of the end state vision is completed, supporting implementation plans will  be needed to help guide achievement of the vision, including plans that  define what activities and initiatives will be needed to achieve the end  state and guide ISE development and implementation. Such plans would  be consistent with our recommendation for a roadmap if they contain key  elements such as roles, responsibilities, and time frames for these  activities, among other things.
Consistent with the Intelligence Reform Act, the ISE is to provide the  means for sharing terrorism-related information across five  communities—homeland security, law enforcement, defense, foreign  affairs, and intelligence—in a manner that, among other things, leverages  ongoing efforts. As we reported in July 2011, the ISE has primarily  focused on the homeland security and law enforcement communities and  related sharing between the federal government and state and local  partners, in part to align with information sharing priorities outlined by the  administration. We recognize that recent homeland security incidents and  the changing nature of domestic threats make continued progress in  improving sharing between federal, state, and local partners critical.  However, consistent with the Intelligence Reform Act, the ISE is intended  to provide the means for sharing terrorism-related information across all  five communities.
The Program Manager and ISE agencies have not yet ensured that  initiatives within the foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence communities  have been fully leveraged by the ISE to enhance information sharing  within and across all communities. For example, according to Department  of State (State) officials, the department shares terrorism-related  information with other agencies through a variety of efforts and initiatives  related to national and homeland security, but State initiated these efforts  independently and not through the Office of the Program Manager.  According to the Program Manager, State also possesses information  about entrants to the country that could be valuable to the ISE. However,  in April 2011, State officials said that the Office of the Program Manager  had not contacted the department’s coordinator for the ISE to request  information on programs or initiatives related to people entering the  country to determine if this information could be useful to the broader ISE  communities. Further, intelligence agencies have technology initiatives— including new ways of ensuring that authorized users have access to, and  are able to search across, classified systems and networks to facilitate  information sharing—but it is not clear to what extent transferring this best  practice to non-classified information is being considered under the ISE.
The Program Manager also noted that his office has engaged all five  communities in ISE activities. For example, in addition to working with the  homeland security and law enforcement communities, he said his office  has worked with State to standardize terrorism-related information  sharing agreements with foreign governments; with the Department of  Defense to develop information technology standards that allow different  agencies to exchange information; and the intelligence community to  develop terrorism-related information products for state, local, and tribal  governments. He also noted that all five communities have been afforded  opportunities to help set ISE programmatic priorities. However, the  Program Manager and agencies had not yet taken actions to ensure that  all relevant information sharing initiatives across the five communities are  fully leveraged, which could help enhance information sharing  government-wide. In our July 2011 report, we recommended that they  take such actions. They generally agreed and have started to address  this issue.
The Program Manager and agencies have not yet identified the  incremental costs necessary to implement the ISE, as envisioned by the  Intelligence Reform Act. Our prior work shows that cost information can  help agencies allocate resources and investments according to priorities  and constraints, track costs and performance, and shift such investments  and resources as appropriate. We recognize that developing accurate  and reliable incremental cost estimates for the ISE is a difficult  undertaking, complicated further by the fact that the Program Manager  and agencies are still defining what the ISE is, is to include, and is to  attain. In our July 2011 report, we recommended that the Program  Manager—in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget— task the key ISE agencies to define, to the extent possible, the  incremental costs needed to help ensure successful implementation of  the ISE. The Program Manager acknowledged the importance of  identifying incremental costs and noted that the Office of the Program  Manager will continue to work directly with the Office of Management and  Budget to provide agencies with budget guidance that calls for them to  identify their costs to implement the ISE.
The Intelligence Reform Act requires the Program Manager to, among  other things, monitor implementation of the ISE by federal departments  and agencies to ensure adequate progress is being made and regularly  report the findings to Congress. In June 2008, we reported that the Office  of the Program Manager was monitoring ISE implementation—as  demonstrated through its annual report to Congress—but that such  monitoring did not include an overall assessment of progress in  implementing the ISE and how much work remained. Thus, we  recommended, among other things, that the Program Manager develop a  way to measure and demonstrate results and to show the extent to which  the ISE had been implemented, as well as more fully define the key  milestones needed to achieve the ISE. The Program Manager generally  agreed and in January 2011, the Information Sharing and Access  Interagency Policy Committee (ISA IPC) and the Office of the Program  Manager initiated an effort to make ISE priority programs and related  goals more transparent and to better monitor progress. Specifically,  according to the Deputy Program Manager, agencies that are responsible  for implementing ISE priority programs are leading efforts to establish 3-,  6-, and 12-month goals for these programs. Information on progress  made in reaching these goals may be included in future ISE annual  reports. In addition he explained that the Office of the Program Manager  is working with agencies to develop a performance management  framework that will be linked to the updated national strategy. These  actions should help to provide an accurate accounting for progress to  Congress and other stakeholders and would be consistent with the  criteria we use to evaluate a program’s risk, which calls for a way to  demonstrate progress and results.
Our prior work on high-risk issues shows that a strong commitment from  top leadership to address problems and barriers to sharing terrorism- related information is important to reducing related risks. In July 2009, the  White House established the ISA IPC to subsume the role of its  predecessor interagency body—the Information Sharing Council. The  Program Manager at that time cited concerns about the Program  Manager’s authority and provided recommendations intended to help  strengthen the ISE effort. For example, among other things, he  recommended that the Program Manager be appointed by the President  and serve as co-chair of the ISA IPC. Subsequently, both changes were  implemented, which were intended to bring high-level policy decision  making and oversight to the development of the ISE. At the time of our  review, it was too early to tell how the new structure would impact the  continued development and implementation of the ISE and if the Program  Manager’s new role would provide him sufficient leverage and authority to  ensure that agencies fully participate in the ISE.

		The Enterprise Architecture Management Foundation for Supporting ISE Implementation Could Be Improved

In our July 2011 report, we noted that the process of defining an  enterprise architecture (EA) for the ISE could help the Program Manager  and agencies in their efforts to define the current operational and  technological capabilities within the ISE, the future capabilities needed,  and a plan to transition between the two. Under an EA approach,  agencies are to define the business processes involved in information  sharing, map out the exchange of information to be achieved, and build  the technology and other resources they need to accomplish the sharing  in their EA plans and budget requests, among other things. Doing so  could help the government more fully define the necessary components  of the ISE. We reported that agencies had begun to build ISE initiatives,  such as suspicious activity reporting, into their EAs. To better define ISE  EA guidance and effectively manage EA architecture, we recommended  that the Program Manager, ISA IPC, and agencies establish an EA  management plan for the ISE to improve ISE EA management practices  and address missing architecture content and a mechanism to ensure  implementation. The Program Manager and the Office of Management  and Budget generally agreed and are taking steps to address the intent of  this recommendation.

	Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion Centers Build Capabilities, but Have More Work to Help Them Sustain Operations and Measure Their Value

		Federal Agencies Have Provided Resources to Develop a National Fusion Center Network, but Centers Are Concerned about Sustaining Operations

The federal government recognizes that fusion centers represent a critical  source of local information about potential threats, including homegrown  terrorism, and a means to disseminate terrorism-related information and  intelligence from federal sources. DHS, which has a statutory lead for  state and local information sharing, in collaboration with the Department  of Justice (DOJ) and the Program Manager for the ISE, has taken steps  to partner with and leverage fusion centers—a top priority for the ISE. In  accordance with the 9/11 Commission Act, over the years, DHS has  provided centers with a variety of support, including personnel assigned  to centers, access to classified and unclassified homeland security and  terrorism information and systems, training and technical assistance, and  federal grant funding. For instance, as of July 2010, DHS had deployed  74 intelligence officers to fusion centers. In addition, states have reported  to DHS that they have used about $426 million in grant funding from fiscal  year 2004 through 2009 to support fusion-related activities nationwide.
In September 2010, we reported that fusion centers cited federal funding  as critical to their long-term sustainability and to achieving and  maintaining a set of baseline capabilities. These baseline capabilities  were defined by the federal government and fusion centers as being  necessary for centers to be considered capable of performing basic  functions in the national information sharing network. They include, for  example, capabilities related to information gathering, recognition of  indicators and warnings, and intelligence and information dissemination.  According to a survey of all fusion centers conducted by DHS and the  Program Manager for the ISE, of the 52 fusion centers that responded, on  average, over half of their 2010 budgets were supported by federal  funding.
Concerns about and challenges related to funding for sustainability are  long-standing issues. Fusion centers do not have their own federal  funding source but must compete each year with other state homeland  security, law enforcement, and emergency management agencies and  missions for a portion of the total federal homeland security grant funding  awarded to each state. We and others have reported on the centers’  concerns about the lack of a predictable funding source. For example, in  September 2010 we reported that officials in all 14 fusion centers we  contacted stated that without sustained federal funding, centers could not  expand operations to close the gaps between their current operations and  the baseline capabilities, negatively impacting their ability to function as  part of the national network.
Senior DHS officials have acknowledged the fusion centers’ concerns and  in an effort to further prioritize the development of the national network of  fusion centers, DHS revised fiscal year 2011 grant guidance. It now  requires, among other enhancements, that (1) each state submit a fusion  center investment justification and (2) the justification must be related to  mitigating capability gaps. Nevertheless, concerns about federal funding  could be exacerbated given that overall homeland security grant funding  of $2.1 billion for fiscal year 2011 is $780 million less than the previous  year.

		Federal Agencies Plan to Assess Centers’ Capabilities and Develop Performance Metrics to Determine Centers’ Value to the ISE

Consistent with efforts to develop this national network of fusion centers,  federal agencies have also issued a series of guidance documents,  including the baseline capabilities, to support fusion centers in  establishing their operations. The baseline capabilities are intended to  help ensure that a fusion center will have the necessary structures,  processes, and tools in place to support the gathering, processing,  analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, homeland security, and law  enforcement information.
As a first step, the Program Manager for the ISE, DHS, and DOJ  conducted a systematic assessment of centers’ capabilities in 2010 and  analyzed results to identify strengths, gaps, and weaknesses across the  national network of fusion centers. The assessment specifically focused  on four operational capabilities identified as critical which are generally  defined as a fusion center’s ability to receive, analyze, disseminate, and  gather information. The assessment also focused on centers’ progress  in implementing privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. The  results of this assessment and a subsequent survey effort conducted in  January 2011 showed that over half of the 72 fusion centers had  developed and implemented a final written plan, policy, or standard  operating procedure to achieve three of the four capabilities—receive (44  centers), disseminate (46 centers), and gather (42 centers). However, 37  centers indicated that they had not implemented a plan related to  developing capabilities to analyze time sensitive information.
According to DHS officials who oversee the fusion center initiative, using  the results of the 2010 assessment, along with feedback obtained from  fusion center directors, DHS developed and implemented a Fusion  Center Assessment Process in 2011. This process will be conducted  annually to identify capability gaps, enable gap mitigation planning, and  continue to drive the allocation of resources to mitigate those gaps. DHS  expects to release the results of the 2011 assessment in January 2012,  according to DHS officials.
We also reported in September 2010 that if centers are to receive  continued federal financial support, it is important that they are also able  to demonstrate their impact and value added to the national network and  the nation’s overall information sharing goals. However, the federal  government had not established standard performance measures that it  could use across all fusion centers to assess their contributions. We  recommended that DHS define the steps it needed to take to design and  implement a set of measures and commit to a target timeframe for their  completion. According to senior DHS officials overseeing the office, in  March 2011, the State and Local Program Office and a representative  group of fusion center directors began developing an overarching strategy  document to define the vision, mission, goals, objectives, and specific  outcomes that fusion centers will be expected to achieve, and associated  performance measures for the national network of fusion centers.  According to these officials, such performance measures are to be in  place by the end of 2011.

		DHS and DOJ Are Helping Centers Develop Privacy and Civil Liberties Policies and Protections but Monitoring Implementation Will Be Important

Because fusion centers collect, analyze, and disseminate information on  potential criminal and terrorist threats, some entities, such as the  American Civil Liberties Union, have raised concerns that centers are  susceptible to privacy and civil liberties violations. We reported in  September 2010 that consistent with federal requirements, DHS and DOJ  have provided technical assistance and training to help centers develop  privacy and civil liberties policies and protections. For example, DHS and  DOJ provided fusion centers with guidance and technical assistance,  including a template on which to base a privacy policy and a process for  reviewing centers’ policies to ensure they are consistent with federal  requirements. DHS reported that all operational fusion centers now have  a final, approved privacy policy in place that is at least as comprehensive  as the ISE Privacy Guidelines. With respect to training, we reported that  DHS, in partnership with DOJ and other entities, has implemented a  three-part training and technical assistance program in support of fusion  centers’ efforts to provide appropriate privacy, civil rights, and civil  liberties training for personnel. We also reported that DHS, in conjunction  with DOJ and the Program Manager for the ISE, was taking steps to  assess the implementation of centers’ privacy protections to ensure that  the protections described in centers’ policies were implemented in  accordance with all applicable privacy regulations, laws, and  constitutional protections. Federal agencies are also encouraging centers  to assess their own protections to identify any existing privacy and civil  liberties risks and to develop strategies to mitigate the risks. Continuous  assessment and monitoring are key steps to help ensure that fusion  centers are implementing privacy and civil liberties protections and that  DHS, and other federal agencies, are supporting them in their efforts.

	DHS Has Enhanced Support to State and Local Partners but Could Better Define the Actions It Will Take to Meet This Mission and Measure Progress

In addition to supporting fusion centers, DHS is responsible for sharing  terrorism-related information with its state and local partners, and within  DHS, I&A is the designated lead component for this mission. In  December 2010, we reported that I&A had initiatives underway to identify  state and local information needs, developing intelligence products to  meet these needs, and obtaining more detailed feedback on the  timeliness and usefulness of these products, among other things. I&A  also provided a number of services to its state and local partners— primarily through fusion centers—that were generally well received by the  state and local officials we contacted. For example, in addition to  deploying personnel and providing access to networks disseminating  classified and unclassified information, I&A provides training directly to  state and local personnel and operates a 24-hour service to respond to  state and local requests for information and other support.
We also reported that a Congressional committee that had been trying to  hold I&A accountable for achieving its state and local mission was  concerned about I&A’s inability to demonstrate the priority and level of  investment it is giving to this mission compared to its other functions, as  evidenced by hearings conducted over the past several years. We  reported that, historically, I&A had focused its state and local efforts on  addressing statutory requirements and responding to I&A leadership  priorities. However, I&A had not yet defined how it plans to meet its state  and local information-sharing mission by identifying and documenting the  specific programs and activities that are most important for executing this  mission. Our prior work has found that successful organizations clearly  articulate the programs and activities that are needed to achieve specified  missions or results, and the organization’s priorities, among other  things.
Further, we reported that I&A had not defined what state and local  information-sharing results it expected to achieve from its program  investments and the measures it would use to track the progress it is  making in achieving these results. For example, all of I&A’s state and  local measures provided descriptive information regarding activities and  services that I&A provided, such as the percentage of fusion centers with  I&A personnel and the number of requests for support. However, none of  these measures accounted for the actual results, effects, or impacts of  programs and activities or the overall progress I&A is making in meeting  its partners’ needs. For example, the personnel measure did not provide  information related to the effectiveness of the I&A personnel or the value  they provide to their customers, such as enhanced information sharing,  analytic capabilities, and operational support.
To help I&A strengthen its efforts to share information with state and local  partners, we recommended, among other things, that I&A (1) identify and  document priority programs and activities related to its state and local  mission, and (2) take actions to develop additional performance  measures that gauge the results that I&A’s information-sharing efforts  have achieved and how they have enhanced homeland security. By  taking these steps, I&A could potentially increase the usefulness of its  products and services; the effectiveness of its investments; and the  organization’s accountability to Congress, key stakeholders, and the  public. DHS agreed with these recommendations and expects to address  them as part of new strategic planning efforts.

	Agencies Are Addressing Watchlisting Gaps but Could Benefit from Assessing Impacts of Changes

The Executive Office of the President’s review of the December 2009  attempted airline bombing found that the U.S. government had sufficient  information to have uncovered and potentially disrupted the attack, but  shortcomings in the nominations process resulted in the failure to  nominate the attempted bomber for inclusion in the Terrorist Screening  Database. Thus, screening agencies that could have identified him as a  potential threat were unable to identify him and take action. The  Executive Office of the President tasked departments and agencies to  undertake a number of corrective actions to help address such gaps.  We have ongoing work to assess the changes implemented and their  impacts. This work is assessing (1) the actions the federal government  has taken since the attempted attack to strengthen the watchlist  nominations process, as well as any resulting challenges and impacts; (2)  how the composition of the TSDB changed as a result of agency actions;  and (3) how screening agencies are addressing vulnerabilities exposed  by the attempted attack, the outcomes of related screening, and the  extent to which federal agencies assessing the impacts of this screening.
Our preliminary observations show that federal agencies have made  progress in implementing corrective actions to address problems in  watchlist-related processes that were exposed by the December 2009  attempted attack. These actions are intended to address problems in the  way agencies share and use information to nominate individuals to the  TSDB, and use the watchlist to prevent persons of concern from boarding  planes to the United States or entering the United States at a port of  entry. For example, according to TSA, the agency’s assumption of the  screening function from air carriers—under the Secure Flight program— has improved the government’s ability to correctly determine whether  passengers are on the No Fly or Selectee lists and has resulted in more  individuals on these lists being identified and denied boarding an aircraft  or subjected to additional physical screening before they board, as  appropriate. Also, in April 2011, TSA began screening airline passengers  against a broader set of TSDB information, which has helped mitigate  risks. As part of its border and immigration security mission, CBP  implemented the Pre-Departure Targeting Program to expand its practice  of identifying high-risk and improperly documented passengers— including those in the TSDB—before they board flights bound for the  United States, and recommending that air carriers deny boarding to  individuals that the agency would likely deem inadmissible upon arrival at  a U.S. airport. This program has resulted in more known or suspected  terrorists being denied boarding.
Our preliminary work also suggests that the outcomes of these DHS  programs demonstrate the homeland security benefits of terrorist-related  screening, but such screening could have impacts on agency resources  and the traveling public. For example, new or expanded screening  programs have could require agencies to dedicate more staff to check  traveler information against watchlist information and take related law  enforcement actions. Also, new or expanded screening programs could  result in more individuals misidentified as being in the TSDB, which can  cause traveler delays and other inconvenience. It will be important for  agencies to monitor and address these impacts as appropriate moving  forward. We plan to issue a report with the final results or our work later  this year.
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my statement for the record.

	Contacts and Acknowledgments

For additional information regarding this statement, please contact Eileen  R. Larence at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. In addition, Eric  Erdman, Mary Catherine Hult, Thomas Lombardi, Victoria Miller, and  Hugh Paquette made key contributions to this statement. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this statement.

Related GAO Products

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining  in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11.  GAO-11-881. Washington, D.C: September 7, 2011.
Information Sharing Environment: Better Road Map Needed to Guide  Implementation and Investments. GAO-11-455. Washington, D.C: July  21, 2011.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  2011.
Information Sharing: DHS Could Better Define How It Plans to Meet Its  State and Local Mission and Improve Performance Accountability.  GAO-11-223. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.
Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion Centers Build  and Sustain Capabilities and Protect Privacy, but Could Better Measure  Results. GAO-10-972. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2010.
Terrorist Watchlist Screening: FBI Has Enhanced Its Use of Information  from Firearm and Explosives Background Checks to Support  Counterterrorism Efforts. GAO-10-703T. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2010.
Homeland Security: Better Use of Terrorist Watchlist Information and  Improvements in Deployment of Passenger Screening Checkpoint  Technologies Could Further Strengthen Security. GAO-10-401T.  Washington, D.C.: January 27, 2010.
Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism  Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but  Additional Efforts Are Needed. GAO-10-41. Washington, D.C.: December  18, 2009.
Information Sharing Environment: Definition of the Results to Be  Achieved in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed  to Guide Implementation and Assess Progress. GAO-08-492.  Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2008.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some  Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects  on the Public. GAO-06-1031. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish  Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but  Unclassified Information. GAO-06-385. Washington, D.C.: March 17,  2006.
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Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

A breakdown in information sharing was a major factor contributing to the failure to prevent the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since then, federal, state, and local governments have taken steps to improve sharing. This statement focuses on government efforts to (1) establish the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), a government-wide approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism-related information; (2) support fusion centers, where states collaborate with federal agencies to improve sharing; (3) provide other support to state and local agencies to enhance sharing; and (4) strengthen use of the terrorist watchlist. GAO's comments are based on products issued from September 2010 through July 2011 and selected updates in September 2011. For the updates, GAO reviewed reports on the status of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts to support fusion centers, and interviewed DHS officials regarding these efforts. This statement also includes preliminary observations based on GAO's ongoing watchlist work. For this work, GAO is analyzing the guidance used by agencies to nominate individuals to the watchlist and agency procedures for screening individuals against the list, and is interviewing relevant officials from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, among other things..

What GAO Found

The government continues to make progress in sharing terrorism-related information among its many security partners, but does not yet have a fully-functioning ISE in place. In prior reports, GAO recommended that agencies take steps to develop an overall plan or roadmap to guide ISE implementation and establish measures to help gauge progress. These measures would help determine what information sharing capabilities have been accomplished and are left to develop, as well as what difference these capabilities have made to improve sharing and homeland security. Accomplishing these steps, as well as ensuring agencies have the necessary resources and leadership commitment, should help strengthen sharing and address issues GAO has identified that make information sharing a high-risk area. Federal agencies are helping fusion centers build analytical and operational capabilities, but have more work to complete to help these centers sustain their operations and measure their homeland security value. For example, DHS has provided resources, including personnel and grant funding, to develop a national network of centers. However, centers are concerned about their ability to sustain and expand their operations over the long term, negatively impacting their ability to function as part of the network. Federal agencies have provided guidance to centers and plan to conduct annual assessments of centers' capabilities and develop performance metrics by the end of 2011 to determine centers' value to the ISE. DHS and the Department of Justice are providing technical assistance and training to help centers develop privacy and civil liberties policies and protections, but continuous assessment and monitoring policy implementation will be important to help ensure the policies provide effective protections. In response to its mission to share information with state and local partners, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has taken steps to identify these partner's information needs, develop related intelligence products, and obtain more feedback on its products. I&A also provides a number of services to its state and local partners that were generally well received by the state and local officials we contacted. However, I&A has not yet defined how it plans to meet its state and local mission by identifying and documenting the specific programs and activities that are most important for executing this mission. The office also has not developed performance measures that would allow I&A to demonstrate the expected outcomes and effectiveness of state and local programs and activities. In December 2010, GAO recommended that I&A address these issues, which could help it make resource decisions and provide accountability over its efforts. GAO's preliminary observations indicate that federal agencies have made progress in implementing corrective actions to address problems in watchlist-related processes that were exposed by the December 25, 2009, attempted airline bombing. These actions are intended to address problems in the way agencies share and use information to nominate individuals to the watchlist, and use the list to prevent persons of concern from boarding planes to the United States or entering the country, among other things. These actions can also have impacts on agency resources and the public, such as traveler delays and other inconvenience. GAO plans to report the results of this work later this year.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new recommendations, but has made recommendations in prior reports to federal agencies to enhance information sharing. The agencies generally agreed and are making progress, but full implementation of these recommendations is needed.