Background

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, by 12 European  and North American countries to provide collective defense against the  emerging threat that the Soviet Union posed to the democracies of  Western Europe. Since its inception, NATO’s key objective has been to  achieve a lasting peace in the North Atlantic area that is based on the  common values of democracy, rule of law, and individual liberty.
Currently, 28 countries are members of NATO. Article 10 of the treaty  permits accession of additional European states if they are in a position  to further the treaty’s principles and contribute to North Atlantic  security. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, members of NATO  agree that an armed attack against any member is considered to be an  attack against them all.
The NATO PfP program was launched at the January 1994 NATO summit  in Brussels as a way for the alliance to engage the former members of the  Warsaw Pact and other former communist states in Central and Eastern  Europe. Currently, 22 countries from Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia  are in the PfP program. The objectives of the partnership are to (1)  facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting  processes; (2) ensure democratic control of defense forces; (3) maintain  the capability and readiness to contribute to crisis response operations  under the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations; (4)  develop cooperative military relations with NATO for the purposes of  joint planning, training, and exercises for peacekeeping; search and  rescue; and humanitarian operations; and (5) develop forces that are  better able to operate with NATO members. NATO also uses the PfP to  support countries interested in NATO membership, although it does not  promise eventual membership. NATO does not extend Article 5  protection to PfP countries or any country other than NATO members.
In addition to the PfP program, NATO has established partnerships with  other groups of countries located beyond Europe, Eurasia, and Central  Asia to build security relationships and maintain dialogue with countries  in other regions of the world. NATO established the MD partnership in  1994—the same year as the PfP. As of September 2010, it includes seven  African and Middle Eastern countries. At the June 2004 NATO Summit  in Istanbul, NATO established the ICI, and invited six countries of the  Gulf Cooperation Council to participate. NATO has also established  formalized partnership relationships with additional countries, referring  to them as “Partners across the Globe.”
Since the mid-1990s, NATO has initiated several military operations, most  notably the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in  Afghanistan. Initially, ISAF was a coalition of volunteering countries  deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council. In August  2003, the Alliance assumed strategic command, control, and coordination  of the mission and established a permanent ISAF headquarters in Kabul.  Since then, the operation has grown to about 120,000 troops from 47  countries, including all NATO members, as of August 2010. NATO also  intervened militarily in the aftermath of the disintegration of the former  Yugoslavia to halt conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Kosovo in 1999,  and Macedonia in 2001. Since December 2004, the NATO-led Kosovo  Force (KFOR) has been the only remaining large-scale Allied force  deployment in the Balkans, although NATO maintains headquarters in  Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Skopje, Macedonia; to assist the host  governments in defense reform and NATO integration. In addition,  NATO’s naval forces lead Operation Active Endeavour, a maritime  surveillance operation, launched after the September 11, 2001, terrorist  attacks, to detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity in the  Mediterranean. NATO vessels started patrolling the Eastern  Mediterranean in October 2001 and eventually expanded to the entire  Mediterranean in March 2004. NATO also has a noncombat training  mission in Iraq, begun in 2004; and a counterpiracy mission off the Horn  of Africa, known as Operation Ocean Shield, begun in 2009.
DOD launched the WIF program in July 1994 to support countries that are  members of the PfP program. DOD uses defense-wide Operation and  Maintenance, and Research and Development funds for the WIF program  according to the laws and policies governing these types of funds. The  WIF program’s goals include:    assisting PfP partners in building defense institutions that are  transparent, accountable, and professional; improving U.S./NATO-PfP partner interoperability to enhance partner  contributions to coalition operations;   supporting PfP partner integration with NATO; and    ensuring democratic control of the armed forces.
WIF funding supports the participation of PfP countries in bilateral and  multilateral military exercises and military contact programs, including  seminars, workshops, conferences, exchanges, and visits. Within DOD,  different components are responsible for the implementation of the WIF  program. Appendix II provides descriptions of these components and the  level of WIF funding allocated to them in the fiscal year 2010 budget. WIF  funding may also be used in conjunction with other security cooperation  programs that support the goals of the WIF and PfP programs. Appendix  III provides descriptions of these related programs and the level of  funding they provided to PfP countries in fiscal year 2009. DOD relies on  other funding, such as the Coalition Support Fund, to cover the cost of  partner countries’ participation in NATO operations.

	The PfP Has Evolved in Several Key Ways Due to Changing Political Circumstances and Security Threats

The PfP program has evolved in four key ways since July 2001, when we  last reported on the program. First, several PfP countries from Central  and Eastern Europe have become members of NATO, resulting in a  decline in the total number of PfP countries and the number of PfP  countries aspiring to NATO membership. Second, NATO has developed  additional mechanisms for engaging with PfP countries, allowing partners  additional opportunities to tailor their participation in the PfP based upon  their individual objectives and capacities. Third, the growing size and  significance of the NATO operation in Afghanistan has increased NATO’s  emphasis on developing PfP countries’ capabilities for participating in  NATO military operations and the strategic importance of the Caucasus  and Central Asian PfP countries to NATO, given their proximity to  Afghanistan. Fourth, as NATO has taken steps to wind down its  peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, it has increasingly used the PfP to  build cooperative relationships with countries in the region, marking a  shift in its role in stabilizing that part of Europe.

		The Number of PfP Countries Aspiring to Membership Has Declined

Since 2001, several PfP countries from Central and Eastern Europe have  become members of NATO, resulting in a decline in the total number of  PfP countries and the number of PfP countries aspiring to NATO  membership. While NATO has utilized the PfP for a variety of purposes,  historically, NATO’s primary focus for the program has been to assist  interested countries in preparing to become NATO members. However,  the PfP’s function as a pathway to membership has diminished as the  composition of countries in the program has changed. As figure 1 shows,  12 former PfP countries have joined NATO since the PfP’s establishment  in 1994, including 9 countries since our previous report on the PfP in  2001.
While 9 countries have left the PfP since 2001, 5 new countries have also  joined—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Malta, Montenegro, Serbia, and  Tajikistan—bringing the total number of current PfP members to 22 (see  fig. 2).
While the PfP has always included some countries that did not aspire to  join NATO, NATO and U.S. officials with whom we spoke noted that the  number of PfP countries seeking NATO membership has declined as the  majority of those countries interested in joining have already done so. Of  the 22 countries currently in the PfP, only 4 are actively pursuing NATO  membership: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro.  Ukraine had previously pursued NATO membership, but is no longer  doing so, given the outcome of the country’s February 2010 presidential  elections.
Three of the countries aspiring to membership—Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Montenegro, and Macedonia—have been offered a MAP, the final step  that countries complete before NATO offers membership. Nine of 26 PfP  countries had MAPs at the time of our previous report in 2001. During the  MAP process, countries are required to undertake an intensive set of  reforms that extend beyond their defense institutions, in order to bring  the countries in line with NATO standards. Macedonia has had a MAP  since 1999, and NATO has committed to offering it membership as soon  as it resolves its dispute with Greece over its constitutional name. NATO  has offered the other two countries a MAP only within the last year.  NATO’s Foreign Ministers offered Montenegro a MAP in December 2009.  In April 2010, the NATO Foreign Ministers voted to offer Bosnia- Herzegovina a MAP; however, the Foreign Ministers decided that Bosnia- Herzegovina can only fully participate in MAP once it takes the necessary  steps to transfer ownership of various immovable military assets (such as  bases) from its two entity governments to the central government.
Most current PfP countries have not indicated an interest in joining  NATO, or, in the case of the five Central Asian PfP countries, are not  eligible for NATO membership because of their geographic location  outside of Europe. According to NATO, U.S., and PfP country officials,  these countries participate in the PfP for a variety of reasons including  the opportunity for dialogue with NATO on security issues, the ability to  access NATO training and technical assistance to support reform efforts  and build interoperability with NATO, the opportunity to contribute to  NATO operations, and the desire to counter external pressures from  other countries.

		NATO Has Created a Range of Partnership Mechanisms in which PfP Countries Can Participate Based upon Their Differing Needs

Since our report in 2001, NATO has created a variety of new partnership  mechanisms and modified existing mechanisms to allow PfP countries to  tailor their participation in the program based upon their unique  capacities and objectives. With nine PfP countries having joined NATO  since 2001, leaving fewer countries aspiring to membership, these  mechanisms enable current PfP countries to structure their cooperation  with NATO in ways other than the MAP process. The 22 countries  currently in the PfP differ significantly in terms of geographic location,  military capabilities, political systems, and economic development,  ranging from developed Western European democracies, such as  Switzerland, to developing, authoritarian states in Central Asia, such as  Turkmenistan. These mechanisms allow this diverse group of PfP  countries the flexibility to shape their participation in the PfP based upon  their unique needs (see table 1). Three of the mechanisms in table 1, the  Individual Partnership Programme, the Planning and Review Process, and  the Operational Capabilities Concept focus primarily on PfP countries’  defense and military goals. The three other mechanisms in figure 3, the  Individual Partnership Action Plan, the Annual National Programme, and  the MAP, also allow PfP countries to establish defense and military goals.  However, these mechanisms are broader in scope with countries also  identifying political, legal, economic, security, and other goals they would  like to work with NATO to achieve.
Individual Partnership Programme. Since NATO established the PfP  program in 1994, all participating countries prepare, at a minimum,  Individual Partnership Programme documents. Individual Partnership  Programmes identify each country’s national policy for participating in  the PfP, the forces and assets they are willing to make available for PfP  activities, and the areas in which they would like to pursue cooperation  with NATO. In developing Individual Partnership Programmes, countries  select partnership activities and events in which they would like to  participate. To improve this process, NATO developed the Euro-Atlantic  Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP) in 2004. The EAPWP, which is  developed for a 2-year period, lists activities and events offered by NATO,  as well as by individual NATO members and other PfP countries. In the  2010-2011 EAPWP, there are over 1,200 activities sorted into 34 areas of  cooperation (for more details about these areas of cooperation, see app.  IV).
Planning and Review Process. NATO established the Planning and  Review Process in 1994, and modeled it on NATO’s own force planning  system. The Planning and Review Process allows PfP countries to work  more closely with NATO to enhance their interoperability with NATO  forces and strengthen their defense institutions. The 18 countries  participating in the Planning and Review Process work with NATO to  assess their defense capabilities, identify potential contributions to NATO  exercises and operations, and select specific goals for developing their  defense capabilities and building interoperability (see app. V for further  information on partnership goals participating countries have selected  through the Planning and Review Process). NATO has made  modifications to the Planning and Review Process over time. For  instance, in 2004, NATO modified the Planning and Review Process’ goals  to further support defense reform, defense institution building, and the  fight against terrorism.
Operational Capabilities Concept. In 2004, NATO introduced the current  version of the Operational Capabilities Concept to assist PfP countries in  improving their ability to work effectively with NATO forces during  military operations. Thirteen countries participate in the Operational  Capabilities Concept. Through this process, countries identify specific  military units that they want to develop to NATO standards. NATO then  evaluates and certifies these units as ready to participate in NATO  operations.
Individual Partnership Action Plan. NATO created the Individual  Partnership Action Plan mechanism in 2002 to allow PfP countries to  develop deeper and more individualized cooperation with NATO than the  Individual Partnership Programme, without having to commit to pursuing  NATO membership. The Individual Partnership Action Plan process is a 2- year cycle in which participating partners identify specific goals for  cooperation with NATO related to political, economic, and other reforms  in addition to their defense and military goals. As part of the Individual  Partnership Action Plan process, NATO also conducts assessments of the  progress participating partners are making toward meeting these goals.  Of the five countries currently with Individual Partnership Action Plans,  only Bosnia-Herzegovina aspires to become a NATO member.
Annual National Programme and MAP. Annual National Programmes  are associated with countries aspiring to become NATO members. The  Annual National Programme process is similar to that for the Individual  Partnership Action Plan and they address similar types of issues;  however, Annual National Programmes are updated every year and NATO  expects participating countries to establish more ambitious reform  objectives that will bring their institutions in line with NATO standards.  Additionally, NATO assesses participating countries’ progress in  achieving reform objectives annually instead of biennially and places  greater scrutiny on the extent and pace of progress. In the past, only  countries in the MAP process completed Annual National Programmes.  However, in 2008, NATO offered Georgia and Ukraine Annual National  Programmes, but not MAPs, to acknowledge their membership  aspirations, reward them for the progress they had already demonstrated  in undertaking reforms, and encourage them to set goals and undertake  additional reforms consistent with NATO standards. When NATO’s  Foreign Ministers voted to offer Bosnia-Herzegovina a MAP in April 2010,  they decided that NATO would not accept Bosnia-Herzegovina’s first  Annual National Programme until it had taken the necessary steps to  transfer ownership of its immovable military assets from its two entity  governments to the central government.

		NATO Has Placed an Increased Emphasis on Obtaining Support from PfP Countries for Its Operation in Afghanistan

The growing size and significance of the NATO operation in Afghanistan  has increased both NATO’s emphasis on developing PfP countries’  capabilities for participating in NATO military operations and the  strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asian PfP countries to  NATO, given their proximity to Afghanistan. In recent years, NATO has  made the operation in Afghanistan its top priority and ISAF has grown  from 5,000 to approximately 120,000 troops since NATO assumed  command of the force in August 2003. Consequently, NATO has placed an  increased emphasis on obtaining support from PfP countries for this  operation. This focus has been highlighted in NATO summit statements.  For instance, at their 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO Heads of State  declared their intention to provide partners with increased opportunities  to enhance their contributions to NATO-led operations, and to help  transform their defenses in keeping with NATO’s own evolving  operational roles and capabilities. At their 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO  Heads of State affirmed the high value they place on partners’  contributions to NATO operations and stated they would continue to  strive to increase interoperability between NATO and partner forces. The  importance of PfP countries to NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan has also  been emphasized by various NATO and NATO member country officials.  For instance, during a 2010 speech on NATO’s partnerships, the U.S.  Ambassador to NATO stated that partner assistance to NATO’s operation  in Afghanistan is the best example of what partnerships can accomplish.
As shown in figure 3, a range of PfP countries have contributed troops for  ISAF. NATO reports that 11 PfP countries had almost 2,000 troops  deployed in Afghanistan, as of August 2010. None of the Central Asian  countries, or Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Malta contribute troops to  ISAF. Eight additional NATO partner countries that are not in the PfP  program also contribute troops to ISAF, including Australia, which  contributes approximately 1,450 troops.
Some PfP countries that do not provide troop contributions to NATO  operations offer other types of support, such as overflight access, land  access, or basing rights. Four of the five Central Asian PfP countries  provide logistic and/or host nation support to ISAF. For instance, in May  2009, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with NATO that allowed for the  rail transit of nonmilitary goods through its territory to Afghanistan to  support NATO operations. Turkmenistan is the only Central Asian  country that has not provided such support. In addition to contributing  troops to ISAF, two Caucasus countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan, also  provide logistic support, including allowing overflight rights and the rail  transit of nonmilitary goods. NATO and U.S. officials with whom we met  stated that this type of assistance from the Caucasus and Central Asian  PfP countries is critical to NATO’s execution of the war in Afghanistan.  Additionally, NATO has noted that the relationships developed through  the PfP have laid the basis for many of these agreements.
In addition to ISAF, NATO has looked to partners to provide troop  contributions to KFOR. As figure 4 shows, six PfP countries contributed  troops to NATO’s operation in Kosovo, as of February 2010. These six  countries include five Western European partners and Ukraine. Morocco,  an MD partner, also contributed 213 troops to KFOR, as of February 2010.  82.2% NATO has noted that partners’ contributions to ISAF and KFOR have  helped ease the burden on its members from conducting multiple  operations.

		NATO Has Utilized the PfP to Increase Stability in the Balkans as NATO Forces Have Drawn Down

A fourth key way the PfP has evolved since our previous report on the  PfP centers on NATO’s efforts in the Balkans. As figure 5 shows, NATO  has established several peacekeeping missions in the Balkans since the  mid-1990s. However, as NATO has taken steps to wind down its  peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, it has increasingly used the PfP to  build cooperative relationships with countries in the region, marking a  shift in its role in stabilizing that part of Europe. NATO has relied on the  promise of these cooperative relationships and eventual NATO  membership to encourage reforms in the Balkan countries designed to  reduce the risk of future violence.
Since our report in 2001, NATO has continued to invite additional  countries in the Balkans to participate in the PfP. As of 2010, NATO has  invited all the Balkan countries to participate in the PfP, with the  exception of the newly independent Kosovo. Before inviting Bosnia- Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia to join the PfP in 2006, NATO  placed various requirements on the three countries. For instance, NATO  required the countries to cooperate fully with the International Criminal  Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, NATO required that  Bosnia-Herzegovina eliminate its two entities’ parallel defense structures  and develop a unified command and control structure.
Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina have progressed in their  membership aspirations since joining the PfP in 2006. Montenegro joined  the MAP process in December 2009 and NATO invited Bosnia- Herzegovina to do so in April 2010; however, it must resolve the issue of  transferring its immovable defense property, such as military bases, to  state control before it can fully participate. The two countries have also  cooperated with NATO on various reforms. For instance, a representative  from Montenegro’s delegation to NATO noted that his country has  worked closely with NATO to complete a Strategic Defense Review and  has made significant progress in tailoring the size and composition of its  military to its actual needs. A representative from Bosnia-Herzegovina’s  delegation to NATO stated that his country has made strides in ensuring  civilian control over the military through Bosnia-Herzegovina’s  participation in the PfP. A NATO official based in Sarajevo also noted that  Bosnia-Herzegovina has almost completed the process of unifying its  military under state control. While Serbia has not engaged with NATO to  the same extent as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Montenegro, it has also taken  steps to further its participation in the PfP. For instance, it joined the  Planning and Review Process in 2007. Additionally, NATO and Serbia  created a Serbia-NATO Defense Reform Group in 2006 to support Serbia’s  efforts to reform and modernize its military.
Two Balkan countries—Albania and Croatia—became NATO members in  April 2009. A year earlier at NATO’s Bucharest summit, the heads of state  from NATO countries noted that the two countries had demonstrated  their commitment to the promotion of collective security among the  NATO countries and had embraced NATO’s shared values. The  President’s Report to Congress on the Future of NATO Enlargement in  2009 highlighted the role the PfP had played in preparing the two  countries to assume the responsibilities of membership. For instance, the  report noted that the PfP had assisted the two countries in making  significant progress in reforming their militaries and developing forces  that were interoperable with NATO. In addition, NATO has determined  that Macedonia has also successfully met the requirements for  membership and will be admitted into NATO once it has resolved its  dispute with Greece over its name.

	NATO Is Considering Ways to Strengthen Its Partnerships as Part of the Development of Its New Strategic Concept

NATO’s new Strategic Concept is expected to highlight the importance of  the PfP and other NATO partnerships and discuss ways to strengthen  these partnerships further. Specifically, NATO is debating how to (1)  strengthen its partnerships with countries outside of the PfP, (2) enhance  routine and crisis consultations with PfP countries on security issues, (3)  more effectively engage with PfP countries, such as those in Central Asia,  that are not seeking membership, and (4) balance PfP countries’  aspirations for membership with Russian concerns about NATO  expansion.

		NATO Is Considering How to Strengthen Partnerships with Countries outside the PfP

NATO’s new Strategic Concept is expected to highlight the importance  of the PfP and NATO’s other partnerships, given the widespread  acknowledgment among NATO members that partnerships are critical to  NATO’s ability to address many of the security challenges it faces,  including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass  destruction. The Group of Experts’ May 2010 report to NATO’s  Secretary General highlighted the importance of partnerships, citing the  strengthening of partnerships as one of NATO’s four core tasks for the  next 10 years. As figure 6 shows, NATO’s partnerships extend beyond  the PfP and include countries from around the world that fall into various  partnership groupings including the MD, the ICI, and Partners across the  Globe.
Some NATO members, including the United States, have advocated for  NATO to pursue a more global partnership agenda. According to a U.S.  mission to NATO official, the United States had previously proposed  eliminating the distinctions between NATO’s various partnership  programs and creating one consolidated, global partnership program.  Some NATO stakeholders have argued that NATO is an organization  facing global security threats and that by strengthening partnerships with  key countries around the world, it will allow NATO to better draw upon  these partnerships as such threats arise. However, some NATO members,  such as France and Germany, have been reluctant to make these  partnerships a key focus for NATO, believing that it pushes NATO away  from its traditional focus on Europe. These NATO members believe that  NATO should continue to place the PfP above its other partnership  efforts, given the PfP countries’ geographic proximity to NATO territory.  Various NATO stakeholders have also raised concerns that if NATO  increases its engagement with partners outside of the PfP it will result in  declining NATO resources for PfP countries, given NATO’s expected  budget shortfalls in upcoming years.
As the scope of NATO’s partnerships is debated, NATO is also  considering steps to work more effectively with its partners in the MD  and the ICI. The Group of Experts noted in its report that the  accomplishments of the MD and ICI programs have been relatively  modest to date. Accordingly, various NATO stakeholders have  recommended that NATO focus its efforts on areas of mutual concern  such as nonproliferation, terrorism, missile defense, and Iran. To this end,  the Group of Experts recommends that NATO develop a statement of  shared interests with the two partnerships to further cooperation in such  areas. Additionally, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation  recommends that NATO should seek to review and reenergize its  relationships with partners in the two programs in order to increase the  scope and frequency of both its formal and informal engagements with  these partners. One option NATO is considering is to increase MD and ICI  countries’ access to partnership mechanisms that are currently only  available to PfP countries. For example, these countries do not have  access to all of the activities in the EAPWP. They are also not entitled to  participate in the Planning and Review Process or develop Individual  Partnership Action Plans.
Unlike the MD and ICI, NATO has not developed a formal partnership  structure for cooperation and dialogue with its Partners across the Globe;  however, it is assessing ways to deepen its partnership with these  countries. Several of these partners are key contributors to NATO’s  operation in Afghanistan. For example, Australia has contributed more  troops than many NATO members. Japan, while not contributing troops,  has funded billions of dollars in reconstruction projects. Both NATO’s  Allied Command Transformation and the Group of Experts have  recommended that NATO provide mechanisms to enable global partners  to have a meaningful role in shaping strategy and decisions on missions  to which they contribute. U.S. officials with whom we spoke noted that  these countries are not seeking formalized partnerships with NATO, but  are seeking such mechanisms to allow for better coordination with NATO  on joint efforts.

		NATO Is Seeking to Strengthen Routine and Crisis Consultations with PfP Countries

NATO stakeholders have cited the need for NATO to strengthen its  existing commitments to PfP countries to hold consultations with those  countries facing security threats. The PfP Framework Document states  that, “NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if  that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political  independence, or security.” Some NATO stakeholders view NATO’s  failure to hold such consultations with Georgia during the August 2008  Russia-Georgia war as evidence that NATO’s current commitments to  hold consultations with PfP countries in such situations are insufficient.  In recognition of such concerns, the Group of Experts recommended that  NATO strengthen crisis consultations, as provided for in the PfP  Framework Document. However, a U.S. official with whom we spoke  noted that some NATO members are reluctant to strengthen such  commitments due to concerns that it may involve NATO in conflicts that  are not in NATO’s best interests or create unrealistic expectations among  PfP countries regarding potential NATO assistance.
Revitalizing existing NATO-PfP councils may also be needed to improve  ongoing dialogue between NATO and the PfP countries. The Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is the forum in which all NATO  members and PfP countries come together to discuss relevant political  and security issues. NATO and the PfP countries are currently  considering various proposals to make the EAPC more dynamic and  relevant, including linking the agenda more closely with that of the North  Atlantic Council and focusing more on practical issues, such as energy  security, where there is opportunity for mutual cooperation. Some NATO  stakeholders with whom we met noted that the diversity of countries in  the PfP has made substantive and frank discussion at the EAPC  challenging, because some PfP countries are reluctant to discuss their  security concerns, given other countries that attend. Additionally,  stakeholders noted that because the EAPC is not a decision-making body,  its meetings seldom result in specific outcomes.
Some NATO stakeholders have also cited the need for NATO to revitalize  its commitment to conduct routine and crisis consultations with the  priority countries of Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia through existing  bilateral councils or commissions. For instance, NATO leaders noted at  their 2009 summit that the NATO-Russia Council has not always been  adequately utilized and recommended that NATO use the Council to  focus on areas where there are opportunities for cooperation, such as  nonproliferation, arms control, and counterterrorism. The Group of  Experts recommended that NATO regularly make use of the NATO- Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions to discuss mutual security  concerns and foster practical cooperation in areas such as defense  reform. Other NATO stakeholders have called for NATO to ensure that it  honors its commitments to Ukraine and Georgia to, through the two  commissions, provide the countries with additional assistance in  implementing political and defense reforms.

		NATO Is Seeking More Effective Engagement with PfP Countries Not Aspiring to NATO Membership

NATO is also considering how it might increase the effectiveness of its  efforts to encourage reforms in PfP countries that are not aspiring to  NATO membership. In particular, NATO has cited Central Asia, which has  no PfP countries aspiring to membership, as a key area of focus for the  PfP since 2004; however, it has struggled to effectively engage with the  five countries in the region. For instance, only one of the five countries in  the region, Kazakhstan, has elected to develop an Individual Partnership  Action Plan. NATO has identified various challenges in engaging these  partners, including their reluctance to have their defense ministries  scrutinized, their limited financial resources and personnel available for  participation in NATO activities, their close relationship with Russia, and  their distance from Europe.
To enhance engagement with Central Asian countries, NATO is seeking  better coordination among members’ bilateral assistance programs. One  initiative centers on NATO’s clearinghouse mechanisms. These  clearinghouses are designed to bring together PfP country  representatives and security cooperation officials from NATO countries.  Through the clearinghouses, partners can discuss their needs and then  NATO members are able to volunteer to provide assistance to meet those  needs. NATO has already established such clearinghouses for some PfP  countries, such as those in the Caucasus, and is considering establishing  one for Central Asia. A NATO official noted that NATO should do a better  job of leveraging the types of assistance that individual members can  provide that NATO itself cannot, such as the provision of equipment. As  an example, the official noted that a Central Asian country has requested  radar equipment to support border security requirements. The official  noted that if a NATO member would commit to providing this equipment,  NATO could use this as an opportunity to encourage the country to take  certain actions, including providing additional support for its operation in  Afghanistan. As part of its strategy, NATO intends to place a liaison  officer in Central Asia to assist in the coordination of NATO members’  bilateral assistance and to increase communication between NATO and  Central Asian government officials.

		NATO Is Debating How to Support PfP Countries’ Membership Aspirations, while Not Escalating Tensions with Russia

Various NATO stakeholders have stated that NATO needs to maintain a  credible “Open Door Policy” that supports the aspirations of those PfP  countries that are seeking NATO membership. Some NATO members and  PfP countries have expressed concern that NATO has allowed Russia  undue influence in enlargement decisions, particularly for Georgia. In  February 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that NATO  membership should be a process between the country and NATO, with no  outside party being able to adversely influence the outcome. In addition,  the Group of Experts report emphasized the need for a strong Open Door  policy stating that NATO should ensure consistency with Article 10 of the  North Atlantic Treaty and its principles for enlargement by allowing  states interested in joining NATO to move forward as they fulfill their  requirements for membership. Certain NATO members have advocated  for a slower approach to the prospective membership of some PfP  countries to avoid antagonizing Russia. At NATO’s January 2010 Strategic  Concept seminar, some participants stated that Russian concerns about  enlargement should be taken into account. Additionally, some  stakeholders have noted that, while NATO should reaffirm its  commitment to maintain an open door policy, a slow path to membership  for Georgia, would help ease tensions with Russia and provide greater  possibilities for NATO-Russia cooperation.

	Although Eligible Countries and the Focus of the WIF Program Have Changed, DOD Has Not Evaluated the Program since 2001

As a result of the changing composition of countries in the PfP program,  total WIF funding dropped significantly in 2006, and the majority of funds  are no longer distributed to countries aspiring to join NATO. DOD also  established the DIB program in 2006 as a key focus of the WIF program;  however, this relatively new program has faced challenges with its  implementation. DOD last formally evaluated the WIF program in 2001  before key changes to both the WIF and PfP programs were implemented.

		Amount and Distribution of WIF Funding Reflect Changing Composition of Countries in PfP Program

Since 1999, 12 PfP countries have become NATO members. As a result,  fewer PfP countries remain eligible for WIF funding. In 2001, when we  last reported on the WIF program, 21 countries were eligible for WIF  funding; in 2010, 16 are eligible. According to DOD officials, the decline  in the number of WIF-eligible countries contributed to the decreases in  WIF budgets. From fiscal years 1996 through 2005, total annual WIF  funding averaged about $43 million. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010,  annual WIF funding has averaged about $29 million.
The distribution of WIF funding among eligible PfP countries also has  changed since the initial years of the program. In our 2001 report on the  WIF program, we found that WIF funding was primarily targeted to  countries aspiring to become members of NATO. From 1994 through  2000, about 70 percent of WIF funding was distributed to 12 aspiring  countries, according to the 2001 report. With the exception of Macedonia,  these countries became NATO members and lost WIF funding. As of  September 2010, only four countries aspire to join NATO. As a result, as  table 2 shows, the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget only distributes about 20  percent of its funding to aspiring countries.
In addition, a significant share of the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget—about  35 percent—was devoted to supporting the participation of eligible PfP  countries in bilateral or multilateral military exercises. WIF funding was  budgeted to support the participation of PfP countries in a number of  exercises in fiscal year 2010 ranging from 10 for Georgia to 2 for  Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. DOD views these exercises, which are  sponsored by the United States, NATO, or other countries, as a key means  of building participating countries’ military capability and interoperability  with U.S. and NATO forces. According to DOD officials, WIF provides a  key source of funding to enable PfP developing countries to participate in  these exercises.
According to DOD officials, exercises are occasionally cancelled due to  political factors in host countries. In fiscal year 2009, four exercises were  cancelled, according to DOD. For example, a U.S.-sponsored multilateral  exercise, known as Sea Breeze, hosted by Ukraine was cancelled in 2009  when the Ukrainian Parliament failed to authorize foreign troops to enter  the country to participate. Consequently, the actual number of exercises  WIF supports and amount of WIF funding devoted to exercises are likely  to be lower than the budget reflects.

		DIB Program is Key Focus of WIF Program, but Has Faced Implementation Challenges

DOD established the DIB program in 2006 as a key focus of the WIF  program. The DIB program, which received about 20 percent of the fiscal  year 2010 WIF budget, is designed to help eligible PfP countries develop  accountable, professional, and transparent defense establishments. The  DIB program is also intended to complement NATO’s Partnership Action  Plan on Defense Institution Building, which NATO established with  similar objectives in 2004.
Approved activities in the fiscal year 2010 budget for the DIB program  included assisting with strategic defense reviews; developing defense  planning, budgeting, and resource management systems; developing  professional military education programs; improving human resource  management systems; and preparing countries to contribute to  peacekeeping operations. In its initial years, the DIB program conducted  surveys of PfP countries’ defense institutions and developed “roadmaps”  to outline key steps the countries needed to take to achieve required  reforms. According to DOD, the program has surveyed 11 PfP countries.
The DIB program has faced a variety of challenges in its first few years,  which have contributed to frequent cancellations of DIB-sponsored  activities. In fiscal year 2009, the DIB program executed only about  $650,000 in originally approved activities in its $6.4 million budget. We  also found that the DIB program did not execute any of its five originally  approved activities in the fiscal year 2010 budget for Georgia and only  one of seven for Bosnia-Herzegovina. DOD officials attributed the lack of  execution to the existence of similar assistance provided through FMF- funded contracts in some countries and limited interest in DIB program  activities in others.
First, DOD officials told us that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia were  already receiving similar assistance funded through the FMF program.  For example, the DIB program included activities in its fiscal year 2010  budget to help Bosnia-Herzegovina implement its strategic defense  review and create a human resource management system. However, FMF- funded advisors were already embedded in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Ministry  of Defense and Joint Staff assisting with these efforts. In Georgia, both  FMF and DIB funding were directed to help Georgia with its “defense  transformation,” according to DOD documents. FMF funding provided  $3.8 million in fiscal year 2009 and $2.5 million in fiscal year 2010 for a  contract that provides advice and assistance to Georgia’s Ministry of  Defense and Air Force for defense sector transformation, according to  DOD. This included the building of institutions and systems, the  development of doctrine and curricula, the conduct of a National Security  Review, and the training of Ministry of Defense and Air Force personnel  to improve professionalism and NATO interoperability. At the same time,  the DIB program included $750,000 for defense transformation in its fiscal  year 2010 budget for Georgia. According to a DOD official, the DIB  program did not implement this assistance, primarily because of  Georgia’s preference to work through the FMF-funded advisors, who  were available to provide full-time assistance, rather than intermittent  guidance visits offered through the DIB program.
Second, DOD officials noted that some PfP countries have been unwilling  to participate in the DIB program’s surveys of their defense institutions or  have lost interest in participating in follow-up activities after the surveys  were completed. For example, according to a DOD official at the U.S.  post in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Ministry of Defense and Joint Staff  were not receptive to findings from a DIB assessment, which contributed  to their decision to pursue reforms through FMF-funded advisors instead.  DOD officials also noted that the PfP countries from Central Asia resist  outside assessments of their defense institutions or undertaking reforms  to increase transparency and accountability of these institutions. As  shown in figure 7, the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget indicates that the DIB  program planned limited assistance for Central Asian countries compared  to countries in other regions.
DOD officials noted that the DIB program is still relatively new, although  it was first developed in 2006. The Office of the Secretary of Defense only  recently transferred management responsibility for the DIB program to  the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in  Monterey, California. The Center established a management team in  January 2010 and intends to develop a plan for evaluating the DIB  program, according to an official there.

		DOD Last Evaluated the WIF Program in 2001

Two DOD-commissioned assessments of the WIF program were  completed in 2000 and 2001. These assessments sought to analyze the  objectives, activities, and accomplishments of Warsaw Initiative  programs and identify the lessons learned from program implementation  and results. The assessments found that the majority of WIF activities  were successful in enhancing the ability of recipient countries’ militaries  to contribute to NATO operations and to operate with NATO forces. The  assessments also found that the WIF program should do a better job of  taking into account the recipient countries’ capacities to absorb or apply  the assistance provided. According to DOD officials, no formal  evaluations specifically of the WIF program have taken place since these  two assessments were conducted in 2000 and 2001. Federal standards  for internal controls indicate that U.S. agencies should monitor and  assess the quality of performance over time. Moreover, GAO’s Internal  Control Tool states that separate evaluations are often prompted by  events such as major changes in management plans or strategies. In  commenting on our draft of this report, DOD noted that the Department  has conducted periodic reviews of the WIF program and as a result, the  program has evolved over time to keep pace with changes in NATO.
WIF program managers conduct midyear budget reviews and program  management reviews each year. The budget review is designed primarily  to assess the execution of WIF funds for the first half of the year and  determine if any funds should be reallocated; however, the Defense  Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) did not have data readily available  on how funds were reprogrammed when events were cancelled.  According to DOD officials, the program management review is a forum  for program managers and stakeholders to discuss ways the program can  be improved and any lessons learned. Program implementers also  prepare after action reports on individual events supported by WIF  funding that include evaluations of results, according to DSCA officials.  In addition, DOD officials also noted that while the department does not  assess results of the WIF program specifically, it monitors progress  countries make in achieving broader U.S security cooperation goals,  which are supported by a variety of programs and funding streams,  including WIF.

	Conclusion

The WIF program provides a key source of DOD funding to support  eligible countries’ participation in NATO’s PfP program. NATO’s new  Strategic Concept, due at the end of 2010, will likely lead to further  changes to the PfP program and other partnerships that could have  implications for the WIF program. For example, DOD may need to  reconsider how it defines eligibility for WIF funding to complement  efforts by NATO to increase the level of cooperation activities with  partner countries outside of the PfP program. DOD’s current policy is that  WIF funding is only available to NATO partner countries in the PfP  program. While DOD officials noted that they have undertaken efforts to  periodically review and adapt the WIF program to changes in the PfP  program, the last formal evaluation of the WIF program took place in  2001. This was before the focus of the PfP and WIF programs changed in  response to the changing composition of participating countries and the  critical need for partner contributions to the NATO-led war in  Afghanistan. In addition, the challenges DOD has faced in implementing  the WIF-funded DIB program, including potential duplication of other  U.S.-funded assistance, heighten the need to assess whether the WIF  program is effectively supporting PfP countries’ goals for cooperation  with NATO and NATO’s efforts to deepen its relationships with partner  countries.

	Recommendation for Executive Action

We recommend that, following the establishment of NATO’s new  Strategic Concept, which could result in changes to NATO’s PfP program,  the Secretary of Defense conduct an evaluation of the U.S. WIF program  to ensure that it effectively supports the goals of NATO’s PfP program.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State  for their review and comment. DOD provided oral comments stating that  the Department concurs with our recommendation. In commenting on  our draft, DOD noted that the Department has conducted periodic  reviews of the WIF program and, as a result, the program has evolved  over time to keep pace with changes in NATO. DOD and State also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as  appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretaries of Defense and State and other interested congressional  committees. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VI.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) describe how the Partnership for Peace (PfP)  program has evolved since GAO last reported on it; (2) describe options  the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is considering for the  future of the PfP and other partnership programs under the new Strategic  Concept; and (3) analyze support to PfP countries through the U.S.  Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) program. To address these objectives, we  analyzed NATO, Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of State  (State) documents; academic literature related to PfP and WIF programs;  and WIF funding data for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. We met with DOD  and State officials in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Mission to NATO in  Brussels, Belgium. We also met with NATO officials at both NATO  Headquarters in Brussels and at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers  Europe in Mons, Belgium, as well as with representatives from five PfP  countries and one NATO member country. In addition, we conducted  phone interviews with geographic U.S. combatant command officials who  have PfP countries in their areas of responsibility—European Command  (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany, and Central Command (CENTCOM) in  Tampa, Florida. We also reviewed relevant GAO and Congressional  Research Service reports to obtain additional background information on  NATO, the PfP, and NATO and the United States’ security cooperation  relationships with PfP countries.
In addition, we selected three countries—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia,  and Kazakhstan—to examine NATO’s bilateral relationship with PfP  partners and U.S. support through the WIF program in greater depth. We  sought to pick countries that differed, among other things, in terms of their  geographic location, level of participation in the PfP, interest in NATO  membership, and contributions to NATO operations. We met with State  and DOD officials at the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia; Government of  Georgia officials; and NATO officials based in Tbilisi. We also conducted  telephone interviews with U.S. officials in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina;  and Astana, Kazakhstan; and with an official from NATO Headquarters,  Sarajevo. This sample of three countries is not intended to be  representative of all countries participating in the PfP program or  receiving WIF funding.
To describe how the PfP program has evolved since 2001 when GAO last  reported on it, we reviewed a variety of relevant NATO documents that  provided information on the PfP and analyzed how it has evolved over  time. These documents included background materials that NATO has  produced on the PfP generally and on specific PfP mechanisms. We also  reviewed materials NATO has produced describing NATO enlargement  since the PfP was created in 1994 and materials describing the  organization’s cooperative efforts with specific PfP countries.  Additionally, we assessed the results of NATO reviews of the PfP  conducted in 2002 and 2004 and reviewed NATO summit statements from  1999 through 2009 to identify decisions NATO leaders have made about  the PfP. We also reviewed NATO guidance on the PfP, such as NATO’s  Handbook, the 2009 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP)  Overarching Guidance, and the 2009 Planning and Review Process (PARP)  Ministerial Guidance. In order to assess PfP countries’ level of engagement  with NATO and their use of key mechanisms, we also reviewed examples  of Individual Partnership Action Plans, Annual National Programmes, and  PARP documents. We also reviewed corresponding assessments for these  documents that describe NATO’s findings about partners’ progress in  achieving these goals. To identify troop contributions to NATO’s  operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, we analyzed publicly available  NATO data that provided approximate figures of troop contributions by  participating countries. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for  presenting the extent to which countries are contributing troops to these  operations. To gather further information on how the PfP has changed  since 2001, we also assessed findings in State’s annual reports to Congress  on PfP developments for years 2007 through 2009. We also used  information gathered in our interviews with U.S., NATO, and PfP country  officials to further identify ways that the PfP program has changed since  2001.
To describe options NATO is considering for the future of the PfP and  other partnership programs under the new Strategic Concept, we reviewed  and synthesized findings from several NATO analyses, conducted in 2009  and 2010, including the Group of Experts’ final report, NATO’s Multiple  Futures Project Final Report, NATO Allied Command Transformation’s  report, “Building the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” and the NATO  Parliamentary Assembly’s recommendations regarding the new Strategic  Concept. We also reviewed summary reports from two NATO conferences  held in 2010 discussing the future of NATO’s partnership efforts.  Additionally, we reviewed proposals by some PfP countries regarding how  the Strategic Concept should address the issue of partnerships. To gain  further information on considerations about NATO’s Strategic Concept  and options for NATO’s partnerships, we reviewed academic articles,  Congressional testimonies by NATO experts, speeches by key U.S. and  NATO officials, and interviewed U.S., NATO, and PfP country officials  during our visit to NATO Headquarters.
To analyze support to PfP countries through the U.S. WIF program, we  discussed WIF-funded activities and program monitoring with DOD  officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Security  Cooperation Agency (DSCA), EUCOM, and CENTCOM. We also discussed  the WIF program with security assistance officers at U.S. embassies in  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. In addition, we discussed  the WIF program with an official from the Center for Civil-Military  Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, which  is responsible for managing the WIF-funded Defense Institution Building  (DIB) program. We also reviewed DSCA guidance on the WIF program,  and annual budget submissions and memos. In addition, to assess the  extent of DOD’s past evaluations of the WIF program, we reviewed the  findings of two independent assessments of the WIF program completed in  2000 and 2001, a July 2005 audit of the WIF program by the DOD Inspector  General, and our July 2001 report on the NATO PfP and WIF programs.
To present information on WIF funding priorities and the distribution of  funding among eligible countries, we analyzed WIF summary budget data  for fiscal years 2006 through 2010 from DSCA. According to DOD, no  reliable data showing the distribution of WIF budgets among eligible  countries were available before fiscal year 2006. We also analyzed all  approved activities in the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget to determine how  WIF funding was distributed among eligible PfP countries and by type of  activity. We focused on fiscal year 2010 budget data because, for fiscal  years 2006 through 2009, DOD grouped a significant share of the WIF  budget into a multiple country category. For example, in fiscal year 2009,  the WIF budget allocated about $11 million out of a total of about $30  million in WIF funding to the multiple country category. The fiscal year  2010 WIF budget attributed more of the funding to specific countries and  allocated only about $2 million to the multiple country category.  Consequently, country breakouts in the fiscal year 2010 budget are more  meaningful than in previous years. We also analyzed data on canceled  activities approved in the WIF budgets for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 from  DSCA and corroborated this information through interviews or emails  with officials from DSCA; combatant commands; and the U.S. posts in  Bosnia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.
To assess the reliability of DOD’s WIF budget data, we interviewed DSCA  officials about the data and reviewed all the approved activities in the WIF  budgets for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. We also discussed WIF funding  with security assistance officers at U.S. posts in Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Georgia, and Kazakhstan to help verify the accuracy of DSCA budget data  in these countries. We found the WIF budget data used in this report to be  sufficiently reliable to present the distribution of the fiscal year 2010 WIF  budget among eligible countries and specific types of activities, such as  support for PfP countries’ participation in military exercises and the DIB  program.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 to September  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Description of DOD Components Responsible for Executing the WIF Program

Within DOD, multiple components implement the WIF program. The  Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for the development,  coordination, and oversight of policy and other activities related to the  WIF program. DSCA manages the program and provides the funding to  different implementing components that are responsible for executing the  program. Table 3 describes these implementing components. The portion  of WIF funding that supports PfP countries’ participation in military  exercises comes from WIF budget allocations to the relevant combatant  commands. The combatant commands also use some of their WIF funding  for military contact programs.

Appendix III: Other U.S. Security Cooperation Programs Supporting WIF and PfP Goals

Table 4 describes U.S. security cooperation programs that provide  assistance related to the goals of the WIF program and NATO’s PfP  program. The relevant geographic combatant commands (COCOM) and  security assistance officers based at U.S. posts in recipient countries play  a key role in ensuring that the WIF program complements the other  available sources of funding in support of U.S. security cooperation goals.
Figure 8 shows the level of funding of these programs and the WIF  program to eligible PfP countries in fiscal year 2009.

Appendix IV: NATO Areas of Cooperation

PfP countries are able to select partnership activities and events in which  they would like to participate from the EAPWP. The EAPWP lists activities  and events offered by NATO, as well as by individual NATO members and  other PfP countries. It is revised every 2 years. In the 2010-2011 EAPWP,  there are over 1,200 activities sorted into 34 areas of cooperation. PfP  countries determine the areas of cooperation on which they wish to focus  and select relevant activities in each area. Table 5 lists these areas of  cooperation.

Appendix V: PfP Countries’ PARP Partnership Goals

Eighteen PfP countries participate in PARP. Russia, Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan, and Malta are the only four PfP countries that do not  currently participate in the PARP process. PARP is modeled on NATO’s  own force planning system and allows interested PfP countries to work  more closely with NATO to develop the interoperability of their forces and  strengthen their defense institutions. Countries participating in PARP  work with NATO to assess their defense capabilities, identify potential  contributions to NATO exercises and operations, and select specific  partnership goals for developing their defense capabilities and building  interoperability. There are over 150 partnership goals that partners can  choose from. There are general goals related to defense-wide issues, such  as defense planning and budgeting, as well as goals specific to countries’  land, maritime, and air forces. Table 6 shows the 14 partnership goals most  commonly selected by partners in 2008.
The 18 countries selected an average of 37 partnership goals in 2008.  Ukraine selected the most goals with 96, while Kyrgyz Republic selected  the least with 15. The types of goals selected by countries varied. For  instance, Western European partners’ goals for participation in the PfP  program focused primarily on improving military capabilities and  interoperability with NATO. The European Union (EU) and NATO have  committed to adhere to common standards in the development of their  armed forces, so PfP countries that are also EU members are fulfilling EU  requirements by developing interoperability with NATO. The Western  European PfP countries already have developed civilian-run defense  institutions and, therefore, do not generally pursue goals related to those  issues. Countries from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union selected  goals related to improving their military capabilities and interoperability  with NATO as well. However, many of these countries also identified  additional objectives related to defense institution building, including  goals focusing on civilian control of the military, defense budgeting and  planning, and effective personnel and resource management.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	Staff Acknowledgments

Key contributors to this report include Judith McCloskey, Assistant  Director; Ashley Alley; Debbie Chung; Howard Cott; David Dayton; David  Dornisch; Etana Finkler; and Ryan Vaughan.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to increase cooperation with former Warsaw Pact members and provide many of these countries with a path to NATO membership. As NATO confronts new security challenges, including the war in Afghanistan, its relationships with partner countries have grown in scope and importance. Additionally, NATO is developing a new Strategic Concept to clarify its mission and activities, including its relationship with PfP countries and other partners. The Department of Defense (DOD)-funded Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) supports the goals of the PfP program. GAO was asked to review (1) how the PfP program has evolved since GAO last reported on it in 2001; (2) options NATO is considering for the future of the PfP and other partnership programs; and (3) support to PfP countries through the U.S. WIF program. GAO analyzed NATO, DOD, and State Department (State) documents; and WIF funding data. GAO also interviewed DOD, State, NATO, and selected country officials.

What GAO Found

The PfP program has evolved in four key ways since July 2001, when GAO last reported on it. First, several former PfP countries from Central and Eastern Europe have become NATO members, resulting in both a decline in the number of countries participating in the PfP and in the number of PfP countries seeking NATO membership. Second, NATO has developed additional mechanisms for engaging with PfP countries, allowing partners additional opportunities to tailor their participation in the PfP based upon their individual objectives and capacities. Third, the growing size and significance of the NATO operation in Afghanistan has increased NATO's emphasis on developing PfP countries' capabilities for participating in NATO military operations and the strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asian PfP countries. Fourth, as NATO has taken steps to wind down its peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, it has increasingly used the PfP to build cooperative relationships with countries in the region, marking a shift in its role in stabilizing that part of Europe. NATO's new Strategic Concept is expected to highlight the importance of the PfP and other NATO partnerships, and discuss ways to strengthen them further. First, NATO is debating how to strengthen its partnerships with a growing number of countries outside of the PfP. Some NATO members disagree about the extent to which NATO should pursue a more global partnership agenda. Second, NATO is considering options to enhance its routine and crisis consultations with PfP countries on security issues. Third, NATO is evaluating how to more effectively engage with PfP countries, such as those in Central Asia, that are not seeking NATO membership. Fourth, NATO is debating how to best balance PfP countries' aspirations for membership with Russian concerns about NATO expansion. The changing composition of countries participating in the PfP program has affected the budget and focus of the WIF program, which supports the participation of PfP countries in military exercises and military contact programs. The decline in the number of countries in the PfP program contributed to a drop in average annual WIF funding from about $43 million in fiscal years 1996 through 2005 to about $29 million in fiscal years 2006 through 2010, according to a DOD official. Moreover, WIF funding is no longer concentrated on PfP countries aspiring to join NATO, as it was in the initial years of the program. In 2006, DOD established the Defense Institution Building program as a key focus of the WIF program to help PfP countries develop more professional and transparent defense establishments. Planned activities included assisting with strategic defense reviews; and developing defense planning, budgeting, and resource management systems, among others. DOD has encountered challenges implementing this program, including potential duplication with other U.S. assistance in some countries and limited interest from other countries, which have contributed to frequent cancellations of planned activities. DOD has not formally evaluated the WIF program since 2001, although there have been changes since then in the composition of participating countries and the focus of the WIF program.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that, following the establishment of NATO's new Strategic Concept, which could result in changes to NATO's PfP program, the Secretary of Defense conduct an evaluation of the U.S. WIF program to ensure that it effectively supports the goals of NATO's PfP program. DOD concurred with the recommendation.