Background

A severe drought in many Western states set the stage for an early and  intense fire season. By mid-June, several major fires were burning,  including the Rodeo-Chediski Fire in Arizona and the Hayman Fire in  Colorado. These fires siphoned both aerial and ground firefighting  resources from the Pacific Northwest, including helicopters, air tankers,  agency and contract fire engines, smoke jumpers, highly trained agency  crews (called “hot shot” crews), and contract firefighting crews. By June  21, the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise, Idaho, was  reporting a preparedness level of 5, the highest level, indicating that the  nation had the potential to exhaust all agency firefighting resources. When  lightning storms passed through California and Oregon on July 12 and 13,  igniting hundreds of fires, including the Biscuit Fire, more than 30 large  fires were already burning across the nation and firefighting resources  available for initial attack were limited.
The Biscuit Fire began as five separate fires in the Siskiyou National  Forest in southwest Oregon. The Siskiyou Forest, encompassing more  than 1 million acres, contains diverse topography, including the Siskiyou  Mountains, the Klamath Mountains, the Coast Ranges, and the 180,000-acre  Kalmiopsis Wilderness. Steep terrain, together with many roadless areas,  presented accessibility and logistical challenges for managers directing fire  suppression efforts at the Biscuit Fire. To complicate the situation, the fires  were also located almost 30 miles apart. As the fires rapidly grew during  late July and early August, the southern fire burned south and crossed the  state border into the Six Rivers National Forest in Northern California.  While the Biscuit Fire burned primarily federal forestland, by early August,  it threatened a number of communities in Oregon and California. Figure 2  shows Biscuit 1 burning on a steep hill on July 14, 2002.
To understand the response to the Biscuit Fire, it is important to  understand the phases of fire suppression efforts and the nature of  interagency wildland firefighting. On a large wildland fire, such as the  Biscuit Fire, fire suppression efforts generally fall into two phases. The  initial attack phase is defined as efforts to control a fire during the first  operational period, usually within 24 hours. Local fire managers direct  these initial firefighting efforts. In fiscal year 2002, firefighters were  successful in suppressing about 99 percent of wildland fires in federal,  state, and local jurisdictions during the initial attack phase. If a fire has not  been contained or will not be contained during this period or additional  firefighting resources are ordered, firefighting efforts move into the  extended attack phase. In this phase, key fire management officials  prepare a Wildland Fire Situation Analysis that describes the situation and  objectives, and compares multiple strategic wildland fire management  alternatives. Additional management and firefighting resources may be  requested. Figure 3 shows an example of a firefighting organization  involved in an extended attack, although the specific positions filled  depend on the complexity of the fire.
The Forest Service and its interagency firefighting partners employ an  incident management system that is designed to provide the appropriate  management and leadership team capabilities for firefighting efforts. The  complexity of the fire determines the type of leadership team and  firefighting resources assigned. There are five types of incidents—type 1  being the most complex (see table 1). For example, to manage a type 5  incident, the incident commander may be a local district employee with  adequate experience to direct initial attack efforts on a small fire with two  to six firefighters. In contrast, for a type 1 incident, such as the Biscuit Fire,  the incident commander is just one member of a highly qualified  management team. While both type 1 and type 2 incident management  teams have a standard composition of 28 members, type 1 team members  receive additional training and experience in handling the most complex  incidents.
Incident management teams manage a variety of firefighting resources.  These include highly trained “hot shot” crews, agency and contracted  crews, air tankers, helicopters, fire engines, and bulldozers. Federal  agencies, such as the Forest Service, provide a large number of the  personnel that work on fires. These federal agencies rely on a “militia”  strategy to fight wildland fires whereby personnel within each agency are  trained to serve in fire suppression or support roles, when needed and  requested, in addition to performing their normal day-to-day work  responsibilities. However, many factors, including past downsizing within  the federal government, have reduced the pool of employees qualified to  work on fires. Increasingly, private contractors provide crews and  firefighting equipment, including engines and helicopters.

	National Policies and Procedures Were in Place to Guide the Process for Acquiring Firefighting Resources

National policies and procedures were in place and provided the  framework to guide personnel in the local dispatch center in Grants Pass,  Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring firefighting resources for the  Biscuit Fire. Guided by these policies and procedures, dispatch centers use  a three-tiered dispatching system—local, regional, and national—to locate  and send resources to wildland fires. During the initial attack phase of a  fire, these policies also permit dispatch centers to contact neighboring  dispatch centers directly for resources, including resources in adjacent  regions, before elevating resource requests to a higher level. For the Biscuit  Fire, the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have sufficient resources  available and took steps to locate needed resources to fight what began as  five separate fires in the Siskiyou National Forest. Grants Pass dispatchers  contacted their regional dispatch center in Portland about the availability  of resources, including helicopters, on the first day of the Biscuit Fire. In  making resource inquiries, Grants Pass personnel did not request resources  from the Fortuna dispatch center, a neighboring center located in the  adjoining dispatch region in Northern California. Grants Pass personnel  believed that Fortuna had no available resources, based on daily fire  situation reports, because Northern California was also fighting numerous  fires. Concerns were later expressed by state and local officials in  California that a helicopter, under the control of the Fortuna dispatch  center, was fighting fires in Northern California, just across the border from  the first of the five Biscuit fires, and could have been provided to fight it.  Forest Service and state dispatchers working in the Fortuna dispatch  center expressed differing viewpoints on whether they could have provided  a helicopter for the Biscuit Fire, had Grants Pass requested it.

		National Policies and Procedures Provide the Framework for Acquiring Firefighting Resources

The National Interagency Mobilization Guide includes policies and  procedures to help ensure the timely and cost effective mobilization of  firefighting resources. Federal, state, tribal, and local firefighting agencies  share their firefighting personnel, equipment, and supplies, following a  standardized process to coordinate responses to fires and mobilize  resources. When local dispatch center personnel are notified of a fire, they  send available firefighting resources based on a preplanned response. If  fire managers need additional resources, they send a request to the local  dispatch center identifying the type and amount of resources needed. If the  dispatch center personnel cannot fill a request locally, they can forward the  request to the responsible regional dispatch center. If the regional center  cannot fill the request with resources from within the region, the request is  sent to the National Interagency Coordination Center in Boise, Idaho, the  primary support center for coordinating and mobilizing wildland  firefighting resources nationally. When requests exceed available  resources, the fires are prioritized, with those threatening lives and  property receiving higher priority for resources. To facilitate the swift  suppression of new fires—called the “initial attack” phase of a fire—local  dispatch center personnel can first contact neighboring dispatch centers  directly, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating resource  requests to the regional or national level. For resource sharing between  neighboring dispatch centers in adjoining regions, a formalized agreement,  such as a mutual aid agreement and local operating plan, is needed.
Existing policies and procedures encourage the sharing of resources  between local dispatch centers. The national guidance states that local  dispatch centers should use mutual aid agreements whenever possible to  obtain resources directly from neighboring units. In the case of the Biscuit  Fire, a regional mutual aid agreement between the state of California and  federal agencies in California, Nevada, and Oregon establishes the  protocols for interagency coordination and cooperation for wildland fire  protection in California, which includes the areas along the Nevada and  Oregon borders. Local, state, and federal agencies jointly develop local  operating plans that identify the specific resources that can be shared  under the mutual aid agreement and the provisions for cost sharing. One of  these plans allows the Grants Pass dispatch center in Oregon and the  Fortuna dispatch center, located in the neighboring region in Northern  California, to request resources directly from each other. (See fig. 4.)  The  Grants Pass dispatch center operates under a contract between the  Siskiyou National Forest and the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF).  ODF operates and staffs the center, and the Forest Service reimburses the  department for a portion of the center’s operating costs, according to a  Siskiyou official. The Fortuna dispatch center is operated by the Six Rivers  National Forest and the California Department of Forestry and Fire  Protection (CDF) and is staffed by personnel from both agencies.

		Grants Pass Dispatch Center Personnel Sought a Variety of Firefighting Resources for the Initial Attack of the Biscuit Fire

When the first two fires were found on the afternoon of July 13, 2002, the  Grants Pass dispatch center did not have the firefighting resources needed  locally to fight the fires. Many resources, including the helicopter normally  stationed at Grants Pass, had been sent to other higher priority fires that  were threatening lives and property. The fires, located in the Siskiyou  National Forest, were initially small—two trees and 1 acre. Biscuit 1 was a  few miles north of the California-Oregon border, and the Carter Fire was  about 12 miles north of Biscuit 1. Figure 5 provides information about the  initial attack on the fires.
Biscuit 1 was the first fire found. At 3:17 p.m. on July 13, a Siskiyou Forest  Service aircraft being used by ODF personnel to perform reconnaissance  spotted Biscuit 1. The aerial observer reported the fire to Grants Pass  dispatch. At 3:53 p.m., air reconnaissance spotted the Carter Fire 12 miles  north of Biscuit 1.
Soon after Grants Pass and Siskiyou officials became aware of the first fire,  firefighting personnel in California also spotted the fires. At 3:51 p.m., a  CDF reconnaissance airplane, assisting the Six Rivers National Forest,  spotted smoke columns to the north while circling a fire in Northern  California. The airplane was directing the activity of a CDF helicopter and  crew of six firefighters assigned to a fire in the Six Rivers National Forest in  Northern California, just south of the California-Oregon border. At the  request of a Six Rivers National Forest official, the CDF airplane flew north  to investigate the smoke in Oregon. Reconnaissance personnel reported  Biscuit 1 and the Carter Fire to the Six Rivers official and to the Fortuna  dispatch center—an interagency center staffed by CDF and Six Rivers  National Forest personnel. Since the helicopter and crew were close to  finishing up their assignment in California, the CDF reconnaissance  personnel suggested to Fortuna dispatch that the helicopter and crew  could next take action on the fire in Oregon. The Forest Service dispatcher  at Fortuna informed the reconnaissance airplane to continue patrolling  while, in accordance with normal dispatching protocol, Fortuna notified  the Grants Pass dispatch center about the fire. Grants Pass told Fortuna  that it already had reconnaissance aircraft in the area. Because of the lack  of communications between the CDF and Oregon aircraft, the Fortuna  dispatch center advised the CDF airplane to leave the area to ensure air  safety. At 4:15 p.m., CDF air reconnaissance reported another three  lightning-caused fires in Northern California, and at 4:36 p.m., the CDF  helicopter and crew were sent to fight these fires. Figure 6 shows the new  fires found in southern Oregon and Northern California on July 13 and 14.
At the request of Siskiyou National Forest officials, Grants Pass dispatch  personnel began to try to locate needed firefighting resources. At 4:30 p.m.,  Grants Pass dispatch personnel requested a helicopter (with a bucket for  water drops) from the dispatch center in Portland, Oregon. Shortly after 5  p.m., Siskiyou officials asked the Grants Pass dispatch center to check on  the availability of smoke jumpers, rappellers, helicopters, and air tankers.  Dispatchers checked with the regional dispatch center in Portland and  were told that no helicopters or air tankers were available. Dispatchers  contacted the Central Oregon dispatch center and were told that no smoke  jumpers or rappellers were available for the Biscuit Fire for 48 to 72 hours  because of higher priority fires elsewhere. Grants Pass personnel relayed  this information to Siskiyou officials.
By the next morning, July 14, the fires had grown. Shortly after 10:10 a.m.,  Siskiyou Forest officials directing firefighting efforts departed on a  reconnaissance flight. They flew over the Carter Fire and decided to staff  this fire as soon as possible because of its proximity to a trail that would  allow access to the fire and because there were natural safety zones for  firefighters. A type 2 crew began to hike to the Carter Fire later that  afternoon. Siskiyou officials next flew over Biscuit 1 and found it was  about 7 acres. They also spotted a third fire, named Biscuit 2, which was  about 20 acres and located about one-half mile from Biscuit 1. Siskiyou  Forest officials believed that the Biscuit 1 and 2 fires would burn together  in the afternoon and had a high probability of getting significantly larger.  Due to safety concerns, limited accessibility, wind and fire behavior, and  insufficient firefighting resources, forest officials decided not to staff  Biscuit 1 and Biscuit 2 at that time. Siskiyou officials requested that Grants  Pass dispatch personnel order additional firefighting resources, including a  type 2 incident management team, air tankers, and other equipment for the  fires. However, due to higher priority fires elsewhere, many of these  resource orders could not be filled by the regional dispatch center in  Portland for several days or longer, and the request for air tankers was  never filled.
Shortly before noon, a CDF helicopter and crew were on duty in Northern  California performing reconnaissance and responding to reported fires. A  Six Rivers Forest official helping to direct the helicopter crew’s activities  requested that the crew check the fire in Northern California they had  worked the previous day to ensure it was out. She also requested that the  crew, on the way, fly by a campground near the Biscuit 1 and Biscuit 2 fires  to ensure no campers were there. None were seen. The helicopter then  landed near the site of the fire they had worked the previous day in  Northern California, and the crew hiked to the fire to ensure it was  extinguished. At 2:17 p.m., the CDF helicopter reported the fire was cold,  and the helicopter was assigned to another incident in California.
At 6:40 p.m., in response to the July 13 request for a helicopter, a regional  dispatch official in Portland working with officials in the Northern  California regional dispatch center in Redding, the Fortuna dispatch center,  and the Grants Pass dispatch center arranged for a CDF helicopter with a  water bucket to respond to the Biscuit fires, as allowed under the  provisions of the mutual aid agreement. The helicopter had been working  on fires in Northern California. However, a few minutes later, as the  helicopter was en route to Oregon, Siskiyou officials canceled the request  because at that point the fires had spread to more than 300 acres, and  officials stated that the helicopter would have been of limited use on a fire  that size. Officials explained that without ground resources available to  fight the fire, water drops alone are usually of limited value.
On July 15, the last two fires that would make up the Biscuit Fire— Sourdough and Florence—were discovered. The Sourdough Fire was  found near Biscuit 1 and Biscuit 2. The Florence Fire was located almost 30  miles north of these fires. Siskiyou officials requested the Grants Pass  dispatch center to order numerous resources on July 15, including  helicopters, engines, and crews. Most of these requests were not able to be  filled for several days or longer. By July 16, the Northwest’s Multi-Agency  Coordination Group in Portland, Oregon, which is responsible for  prioritizing fires and allocating firefighting resources in the region, ranked  the Biscuit Fires as priority 12 out of 18 large fires in the region. The  Florence Fire went on to burn almost 250,000 acres before merging with  the other fires on August 7.
Concerns were later expressed by state and local officials in California that  a CDF helicopter, fighting fires in Six Rivers National Forest on July 13, just  across the state border from Biscuit 1, could have been provided earlier to  assist on the Biscuit Fire. Grants Pass personnel explained that they did not  request assistance from the Fortuna dispatch center on July 13 because,  based on the daily fire situation reports, they believed no resources would  be available due to the fires in Northern California. California was also  fighting numerous fires ignited by the same lightning storm that passed  through Oregon. When we asked the Fortuna dispatch center about this  issue, the Forest Service and state of California dispatchers working there  expressed differing viewpoints on whether they could have provided a  helicopter on the first day of the Biscuit Fire if such a request had been  made. A CDF dispatcher working at the Fortuna dispatch center said that if  the Grants Pass dispatcher had requested the helicopter at that time to  launch an initial attack on the Biscuit Fire, he believed he would have  provided it to them. However, a Forest Service official also working at  Fortuna to dispatch firefighting resources had a differing opinion, saying  that even if Fortuna had sent the helicopter to Oregon, he believes that it  likely would have been diverted back to California to suppress other higher  priority fires in Fortuna’s direct protection area. Because Grants Pass  dispatch did not request assistance from Fortuna on the first day of the  Biscuit Fire, there was no discussion at that time about whether this would  have been the best use of the helicopter. In the final analysis, it is unclear  what the outcome of such a request would have been.

	Reduced Availability of Key Personnel Hampered the Ability to Effectively Fight the Biscuit Fire

Following the initial attack of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining needed  personnel hampered efforts to effectively fight the Biscuit Fire in three key  ways. First, neither a management team with adequate experience to  strategically plan and manage firefighting efforts nor sufficient highly  trained crews to carry out the plans were initially available for the Biscuit  Fire due to their need on higher priority fires. By the time a highly  experienced management team became available and was assigned to the  Biscuit Fire in late July, the fire had increased from a few hundred acres to  almost 200,000 acres. Second, key supervisors needed to direct the tactical  efforts of firefighting crews and equipment were unavailable at critical  points in July and August as the fire was growing in size and intensity. As a  result, the ability to implement aggressive fire suppression tactics was  compromised due to concerns about the safety of fire crews. Finally, some  fire support positions, such as contracting technical representatives, also  were unavailable to play a key role in monitoring contracted crews.

		Delayed Availability of a Top Management Team Affected Initial Firefighting Efforts

Siskiyou Forest officials directing the firefighting effort had difficulty  obtaining both a highly trained incident management team with the  necessary level of experience to plan and direct firefighting efforts on the  Biscuit Fire, as well as needed crews to carry out such plans. Within one  day after the initial fires were discovered, Siskiyou district fire managers  determined that the fire would likely grow larger and require a more  experienced incident management team to direct the firefighting effort  than was currently available at the forest. They requested a type 2 team and  numerous type 1 crews and other firefighting resources during the initial  days. However, because of the high level of fire activity both in the Pacific  Northwest, as well as in other Western states, higher priority fires meant  that no type 2 incident management teams or highly experienced crews  were immediately available for assignment to the Biscuit Fire. Siskiyou  officials’ request for a team was not filled for 7 days, by which time the  acres burned had grown from about 700 to more than 5,000.
When a type 2 management team assumed command of the Biscuit Fire on  July 21, they quickly realized that the fire had grown beyond the scope of a  type 2 team and that a more experienced type 1 team was needed to handle  the increasingly complex situation. A type 1 team was ordered on July 22,  but the Northwest’s Multi-Agency Coordination Group in Portland  prioritized the Biscuit Fire, on this day, as priority 6 of 15 fires burning in  the region. This was largely because the Biscuit fires were not threatening  lives and property. As a result, most requests for management, crews, and  equipment for the Biscuit Fire went unfilled.
In the case of the management team, rather than assigning the type 1 team  requested, two other type 2 management teams were assigned in late July  to assist in managing firefighting efforts on the southern fire, including the  portion that had crossed into California. As these teams tried to direct the  firefighting efforts of crews and equipment, the fires—especially the  Florence Fire in the north—grew rapidly. Winds and low humidity  contributed to the fires’ intensity. Between July 27 and August 1, the size of  the Florence Fire grew from 18,000 acres to 164,000 acres, and the size of  the southern fire—the Sour Biscuit Fire—grew from 7,000 acres to 38,000  acres. Finally, on July 31, 9 days after first requested, two type 1  management teams arrived and assumed command of fighting the Biscuit  Fire. Type 1 firefighting crews and many other resources continued to be  listed as critical resource needs throughout August. Figure 7 shows the  dates management teams were requested or assumed command, the  personnel and equipment assigned to the fire, and the growth of the fires.
The first type 2 incident commander assigned to the Biscuit Fire said that  not having a type 1 management team and other needed resources slowed  the progress of the firefighting effort. He said that while he understood the  Portland group’s decision not to assign a type 1 team at that time, it  nonetheless was difficult to effectively fight fires located almost 30 miles  apart with the limited resources available. The available management and  other resources were split between the fires. He added that the type 2  team’s firefighting strategies were the same as those of a type 1 team— initially to improve access to the site of the fires. However, without needed  resources, tactics had to be modified, and progress was slower. His  operations section chief said that the complexity of the fire, coupled with the lack of a type 1 management team, type 1 crews, and equipment,  meant that firefighters could not attack the fire directly and had to use  more indirect methods, such as using bulldozers to build a firebreak, in an  effort to slow the spread of the fire. The incident commander and  operations section chief said that generally, when a fire is a high priority  and qualifies for a type 1 management team, it is also more likely to be  assigned other needed firefighting resources. In the case of the Biscuit Fire,  a type 1 team and additional type 1 crews and other resources might have  improved the chances of stopping the fire before it burned southeast to an  area called Oak Flat, according to the incident commander. However,  Forest Service headquarters officials said that in a severe fire season such  as 2002, difficult decisions have to be made about where to assign limited  resources. Fires are prioritized, and those presenting the greatest threat to  life and property receive firefighting resources first.

		Reduced Availability of Supervisors Slowed Biscuit Fire Suppression Efforts

Even as top management teams and increasing numbers of crews and  equipment were assigned to the Biscuit Fire, some critical supervisory  positions were not filled as quickly as needed or remained unfilled at the  end of the fire. In all, over 200 requests for supervisory positions were  never filled. The primary cause for reduced availability of supervisory  personnel was the demand for these staff to work more than 30 other large  fires throughout the nation, including other fires in Oregon. Fire managers  and a Forest Service review of the Biscuit Fire stated that delays in  obtaining needed supervisors affected their ability to implement aggressive  fire suppression tactics or use equipment until sufficient supervision  became available. Federal officials, however, did take some action to  mitigate these problems, including obtaining personnel from Australia and  New Zealand to fill certain supervisory positions. Officials emphasized that  the difficulties in obtaining personnel to serve as supervisors was not a  problem unique to the Biscuit Fire and that such issues have affected  numerous fires in recent years.
Biscuit Fire managers identified a number of key supervisory positions that  went unfilled for a period of time in July or August when the fire was  rapidly growing and that were critical for effective fire suppression efforts.  These included government managers of contracted helicopters and  bulldozers (known as helicopter managers and dozer bosses); government  supervisors directing tactical operations for a division or segment of crews  (known as strike team leaders); and government supervisors (known as  division supervisors) directing the activities of strike team leaders.
Although it was not possible to measure the specific effect on fire  suppression efforts, such as the number of additional acres burned, from  unfilled supervisory positions, Biscuit Fire managers provided a number of  examples to illustrate the difficulty they faced in carrying out plans without  sufficient supervisors for aircraft or for equipment and firefighting  personnel. For example, an incident commander and an incident business  advisor working at the fire said that some bulldozers sat idle for a few days  and could not be used on fire suppression efforts because of the lack of a  dozer boss to manage and direct the equipments’ use. Interagency  requirements state that one dozer boss is required to safely manage the  operations of each dozer. However, dozers and dozer bosses are ordered  separately and may arrive at a fire at different times. If a dozer arrives first,  it may sit idle until a dozer boss is available to supervise its operation.  According to an interagency Fire and Aviation Safety Team Review, it was  appropriate to not use all available resources, including dozers, if safety  would have been compromised because of insufficient supervision.
In the case of helicopters, fire officials told us that for one or two days  several helicopters may have sat idle due to insufficient helicopter  managers. However, fire records indicate, and agency officials agreed, that  the major reason helicopters did not fly was due to poor visibility as a  result of weather or smoke. To minimize the impact of helicopter manager  shortages, fire officials used a waiver system so that, under certain  circumstances, one helicopter manager could manage two type 1 or type 2  helicopters rather than only one, as permitted by interagency policy.  Using this waiver process, six waivers were granted for helicopter  managers working at the Biscuit Fire. In addition, National Interagency  Fire Center officials requested and received numerous supervisors from  Australia and New Zealand, including eight helicopter managers.
The inability to fill government strike team leader positions also resulted in  delays in fire suppression actions, according to a Biscuit Fire operations  manager. In one effort to mitigate this shortage, three qualified staff were  transferred from a hot shot crew to work as strike team leaders supervising  contracted crews, according to the division supervisor. The supervisor  said, however, this move lowered the firefighting effectiveness of the hot  shot crew. In another case, a shortage of division supervisors resulted in  the inability to provide adequate supervision in two of the four fire zones  for about one week, according to an operations section chief. The lack of  needed supervision resulted in the inability to use crews to carry out  planned actions, and as a result, fire suppression progress was delayed.
Our findings on the reduced availability of personnel to fill critical staff  positions were confirmed by an internal Forest Service review of the  Biscuit Fire as well as Forest Service reviews of other wildland firefighting  efforts. The Forest Service review of the Biscuit Fire concluded that  opportunities to halt the spread of the fire had to be abandoned because of  limited resources, and as a result, the fire grew larger and threatened more  communities on both the western and eastern perimeters. The Forest  Service’s January 2000 report, An Agency Strategy for Fire Management,  highlighted the shortage of federal staff for both fire suppression and fire  support positions. Also, during July 2002, the Northwest Multi-Agency  Coordination Group in Portland, Oregon, reviewed ongoing fires in the  Pacific Northwest, including the Biscuit Fire, and the effects of the reduced  availability of personnel to fill critical supervisory positions for fire  suppression. The group noted that some crews and equipment had been  suspended from fire suppression efforts because of a lack of appropriate  supervision.

		Shortage of Personnel to Effectively Monitor Contractors Working on the Biscuit Fire

Contracted resources played a key role in the Biscuit Fire—at its peak over  1,600 contracted firefighters and over 400 pieces of contracted equipment  and helicopters were assigned to the fire. Interagency fire managers  acknowledged, however, that there was little, if any, monitoring of private  contractors to ensure that contracted crews assigned to the Biscuit Fire  met established training and experience requirements. Instead, fire  managers generally relied on contractors to certify that their crews met  these requirements, as stated in their contract. Despite contractors’  assurances that their crew met all requirements, Biscuit Fire officials told  us that some insufficiently trained or inexperienced contracted crews  negatively impacted firefighting efforts because these crews were not  always able to carry out planned operations. In contrast, contracted  engines and other equipment had fewer problems.
Fire managers participating on the Biscuit Fire said that poorly trained and  inexperienced contracted crews presented significant operational  concerns. They cited examples of contracted crews that were unable to  carry out planned firefighting operations. Managers said that they  postponed or changed some tactical firefighting operations because it was  not safe using these crews in more aggressive fire operations. Crews that  could not be used as planned were assigned minimal firefighting  responsibilities, such as “mop up” activities at a considerable distance from  intensive fire activity. Although the limitations on how the crews could  safely be used likely affected progress of firefighting, the actual effect  cannot be measured.
Communication to and between crews also adversely impacted the use of  contracted crews on the Biscuit Fire. There were instances where crew and  squad bosses for contracted crews were unable to communicate in English  with government supervisors, as required in the interagency crew  agreement. The lack of fluency in English caused safety concerns and  resulted in crews being assigned to far less technical tasks than planned.  Fire managers told us that, even when assigned minimal fire tasks, some  private crews required above normal supervision, which in turn resulted in  supervisors having less time available to plan and implement higher  priority fire suppression tasks.
Under a cooperative arrangement between the federal government and the  states of Oregon and Washington, ODF has oversight responsibility for  private crew contractors in the Northwest. Typically, the monitoring of  crew qualifications should take place before the start of the fire season. An  ODF official, however, said that insufficient funding and personnel have  resulted in few, if any, evaluations of crews’ qualifications prior to the start  of the fire season. Alternatively, interagency support personnel, such as  contracting officers or their technical representatives, can perform  contract crew qualification assessments. We found that during the Biscuit  Fire, however, these key support positions were identified as a critical, but  unfilled, resource need. According to federal firefighting managers, about  90 individuals have been trained as technical representatives to work with  firefighting management teams, but at any given time during recent fire  seasons, only about 10 percent of these trained technical representatives  were available to serve on incident management teams. The ODF official  having oversight responsibility for contracted crews in the Northwest  concluded that because of these shortages and the significant numbers of  contracted crews, it is likely that there was minimal monitoring of contract  crews at the fire. Finally, we noted that these shortcomings in the  monitoring of contracted crews were not limited to the Biscuit Fire. The  importance of monitoring crew training and experience was also cited in an  interagency fire and aviation safety report issued in 2002. The review  stated that deficiencies in the physical fitness and job skills of crews raised  concerns about the validity of qualifications of some contracted resources.

	Some Differences in Certification Standards Exist between State and Federal Firefighting Agencies, but No Effect Was Identified

There are some differences in certification standards for personnel  between state and federal wildland firefighting agencies, but these  differences did not appear to have affected efforts to respond to the Biscuit  Fire.
In 1993, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)—an  interagency group comprising federal and state representatives— established minimum training and experience standards for personnel  assigned to fight interagency wildland fires outside their home region.  These standards, which were updated in 2000, have been adopted by five  federal land management agencies, including the Forest Service. Five of  the seven states that we contacted in and around the Northwest Region  have also adopted these standards as the minimum requirements for all  their firefighting personnel. The Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF)  meets these standards for personnel on interagency wildland fires outside  the Northwest Region. For fires under state management and for  interagency fires within the region, ODF has maintained its own  certification standards. These standards are nearly identical to the 1993  version of NWCG standards. In 2000, NWCG added some course and  experience requirements. ODF officials are currently working to  incorporate many, but not all, of these changes into state standards. For  example, ODF requirements for many positions rated type 2 or below will  meet NWCG standards. For type 1 positions, including incident  commander, some of the most advanced courses will not be required. An  ODF official explained that he believed, for state-managed fires, these  additional courses were not necessary. The California Department of  Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) has maintained its own firefighting  certification system for its firefighting personnel. CDF shares many of the  same standards as those established by NWCG, including the combination  of coursework and experience requirements for firefighting certification,  but requires state-specific courses for some positions. Under an agreement  with federal land management agencies, California state personnel  assigned to interagency fires in supervisory roles within the state are  required to be certified to a level equivalent to NWCG standards. For  national mobilization, NWCG requires that participating agencies certify  that their personnel meet the established interagency qualification  standards. In the case of California, CDF officials stated that state  certification requirements meet or exceed the standards established by  NWCG. In addition, National Interagency Fire Center officials said they  have no concerns about the adequacy of the standards used by CDF.
There was no apparent impact on the response to the Biscuit Fire as a  result of different agency firefighting certification standards. As with other  interagency fires, personnel that were dispatched to fight on interagency  fires outside their home region were required to meet these standards.  Within the Northwest Region, ODF maintains its own standards for state  fires and interagency fires, although only NWCG-qualified personnel were  dispatched to the Biscuit Fire, according to an ODF official. While CDF  utilizes an independent set of requirements, NIFC officials said they had no  concerns about the adequacy of the certification system used by CDF. In  addition, for the portion of the Biscuit Fire that was located in California,  CDF supervisory personnel assigned to the fire were required by agreement  to be certified to a level equivalent with NWCG standards. Finally, our  review of relevant documents and discussions with knowledgeable federal,  state, and local officials did not identify any evidence that the differences  between these systems created difficulties during the response to the  Biscuit Fire.

	Conclusions

The cornerstone of wildland fire policy is interagency cooperation and  coordination among federal, state, tribal, and local firefighting agencies.  Central to that cooperation and coordination is a system that includes  managers and personnel from many different agencies and that crosses  jurisdictional boundaries. Such a system is facilitated by good  communication between personnel at all levels to help ensure clarity of  firefighting goals, strategies, and tactics. Communication is also important  for those working in various dispatch centers to obtain firefighting  resources. These personnel must communicate in a timely—sometimes  immediate—fashion to other dispatch centers the resources they need to  fight new or ongoing fires in their area. In the case of the Biscuit Fire,  Grants Pass dispatch personnel did communicate resource needs to their  regional dispatch center in Portland, but no resources were immediately  available due to other higher priority fires in the region. However,  personnel did not communicate the need for initial attack resources to a  neighboring dispatch center in Fortuna, California, although this was an  option available to Grants Pass personnel. Whether this would have  resulted in any resources being provided for the initial attack of the Biscuit  Fire is unclear because personnel in the Fortuna dispatch center disagree  on whether any resources could have been spared, given that fires were  also burning in Northern California at the time. Since no request was made,  the priority of the Biscuit Fire relative to other ongoing fires within the  Fortuna dispatch center’s direct protection area was not discussed on the  first day of the Biscuit Fire, and the outcome of such a request, had it been  made, remains unclear.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture and of  the Interior for review and comment. The Forest Service commented that  the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with its  contents. The Forest Service’s comments are presented in appendix II. The  Department of the Interior did not provide comments.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the  date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other  interested congressional committees. We will also send copies to the  Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of the Interior; the Chief of the  Forest Service; the Directors of the Bureau of Land Management, the  National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of  Indian Affairs; and other interested parties. We will make copies available  to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about his report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Scope and Methodology

To determine whether policies and procedures were in place for acquiring  needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and  the extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when the  fire was first identified, we reviewed national policies and procedures that  included the National Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation  Operations and the National Interagency Mobilization Guide. We reviewed  the interagency mobilization guides in 9 of the 11 regions. We also  reviewed the local mobilization guide covering the Grants Pass dispatch  center and the mobilization guides for three other local dispatch centers.   We reviewed the mutual aid agreements governing resource sharing for the  Siskiyou National Forest. We spoke with officials at the National  Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise, Idaho; Forest Service  headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Forest Service Regions 5 and 6 regional  offices; Bureau of Land Management, Oregon State Office and the Medford  District Office; the Siskiyou and Six Rivers National Forests; the Oregon  Department of Forestry (ODF); and the California Department of Forestry  and Fire Protection (CDF). We visited three dispatch centers in Oregon  (the Grants Pass Interagency Fire Center, the Medford Interagency Fire  Center, and the Northwest Interagency Coordination Center in Portland)  and one in California (the Fortuna Interagency Emergency Command  Center) to discuss dispatch center operations. We also reviewed Biscuit  Fire records stored at Siskiyou National Forest headquarters in Medford,  Oregon, and records kept at Fortuna, including resource orders and  transcripts of key radio transmissions during the initial days of the Biscuit  Fire. The Forest Service provided the data used to generate the fire  progression maps. We took steps to assess the reliability of the mapping  data and determined that it was sufficiently accurate for our purposes.
To determine what resource management issues, if any, affected the ability  of firefighting personnel to effectively fight the Biscuit Fire, we reviewed a  variety of information, including resource orders and daily incident reports  showing firefighting resources requested and obtained, incident action  plans showing firefighting strategies and tactics, close-out reports  discussing firefighting progress and problems, and Forest Service reviews  of the Biscuit Fire. We interviewed a number of federal and state personnel  knowledgeable about the Biscuit Fire, including officials from the Siskiyou  and Six Rivers National Forests, ODF, and CDF, and the management teams  and other key support staff that were assigned to the Biscuit Fire. We  discussed resource management issues, their effect on the fighting of the  Biscuit Fire, and the reasons for these issues or problems. We also  reviewed assessments of other wildland fires to determine if the issues  identified were limited to the Biscuit Fire or were more widespread.
To determine what differences, if any, existed in key personnel certification  standards at federal and state agencies involved in fighting wildland fires— particularly in Oregon—we reviewed the interagency qualification  standards established by NWCG. We also contacted officials from Oregon  and California, where the Biscuit Fire burned, and five other states—Idaho,  Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Washington—to discuss the certification  standards they use, and whether they differ from those established by  NWCG. In addition, we reviewed state firefighting standards for ODF and  CDF and compared them with those established by NWCG. To determine  what effect any differences may have had on the response to the Biscuit  Fire, we spoke with federal officials with NIFC, the Forest Service, the  Bureau of Land Management, and the National Park Service; officials with  the National Association of State Foresters; and state and local officials in  Oregon and California, including officials from ODF, CDF, and the  California Office of Emergency Services.
We conducted our work from April 2003 through February 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Comments from the Forest Service

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

Andrea W. Brown, John Delicath, Cliff Fowler (retired), Janet Frisch, Molly  Laster, Paul E. Staley, Stanley G. Stenersen, Amy Webbink, and Arvin Wu  made key contributions to this report.

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Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland fire seasons in the past 50 years--almost 7 million acres burned. These fires included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in the past century--the Biscuit Fire. Following a lightning storm, five fires were discovered in the Siskiyou National Forest over a 3- day period beginning July 13. These fires eventually burned together to form the Biscuit Fire, which burned nearly 500,000 acres in southern Oregon and Northern California and cost over $150 million to extinguish. GAO evaluated (1) whether policies and procedures were in place for acquiring needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when the fire was first identified; (2) what resource management issues, if any, affected the ability of personnel to fight the fire; and (3) what differences, if any, existed in key certification standards for personnel among federal and state agencies and whether these differences affected efforts to respond to the fire. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service stated that the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with its contents. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments.

What GAO Found

National policies and procedures were in place and provided the framework to guide personnel in the local interagency dispatch center in Grants Pass, Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring resources to fight the Biscuit Fire. These policies and procedures provide for a multilevel dispatching system where, if sufficient firefighting personnel and equipment are not available locally, resource requests can be elevated to other dispatch centers at the regional and, if necessary, national level. To facilitate the swift suppression of new fires, local dispatch center personnel can contact neighboring centers directly, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating resource requests. When the first two fires were found on July 13, the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have sufficient firefighting resources available locally. Grants Pass personnel requested resources from the responsible regional center in Portland, as well as from a dispatch center in central Oregon, but no resources were immediately available in the region due to other higher priority fires that were threatening lives and property. Grants Pass personnel did not request resources from a neighboring interagency dispatch center in Fortuna, California, located in an adjoining dispatch region, because they believed the center had no available resources due to fire activity there. State officials working at the Fortuna dispatch center later said that a Fortuna-based helicopter fighting fires in Northern California near the first of the five Biscuit fires could have been made available to suppress this fire. However, Forest Service officials working with Fortuna personnel disagreed, saying that the helicopter had been needed to fight fires in California. Because no request was made, there was no discussion on that first day about whether the Biscuit Fire would have been the best use of the helicopter, and it is unclear, in any case, what the outcome of such a request would have been. Following the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining needed personnel hampered efforts to fight the rapidly growing fire. Specifically, officials faced problems obtaining (1) highly experienced management teams to direct suppression strategies and crews to carry the strategies out, (2) supervisors to manage crews and equipment, and (3) support staff to monitor the training and experience of contracted crews. An unusually severe fire season, with many other higher priority fires, affected the availability of personnel needed to fight the Biscuit Fire. Finally, while some differences exist in certification standards for personnel between federal and state agencies responsible for fighting wildland fires, these differences did not appear to affect efforts to respond to the Biscuit Fire.