Background

Calls to reform the UN began soon after its creation in 1945. Despite  cycles of reform, UN member states have had concerns about inefficient  management operations. As one of the 192 member states, the United  States played a significant role in promoting UN reform, calling for  financial and administrative changes. The United States, through the  Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, continues  to take measures to advance reform of UN management processes.
In 1997 and 2002, the Secretary-General proposed two separate sets of  management reform initiatives in the areas of human resources, budgeting,  and human rights. In July 1997, the Secretary-General proposed a broad  reform program to transform the UN into an efficient organization focused  on achieving results as it carried out its mandates. Although the Secretary- General does not have direct authority over specialized agencies and many  funds and programs, the reforms at the Secretariat were intended to serve  as a model for UN-wide reforms. In May 2000, we reported that while the  Secretary-General had substantially reorganized the Secretariat’s  leadership and structure, he had not yet completed reforms in human  resource management and planning and budgeting. In September 2002, to  encourage the full implementation of the 1997 reforms, the Secretary- General released a second set of reform initiatives with 36 reform actions,  some expanding on previous reform initiatives introduced in 1997 and  others reflecting new priorities for the organization. In February 2004, we  reported that 60 percent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda and  38 percent of the 66 initiatives in the 2002 agenda were in place.
In 2004-2005, a series of UN and expert task force reports recommended  the need for comprehensive reform of UN management and the UN human  rights apparatus. These studies included a 2004 report of a high-level panel  convened by the Secretary-General to recommend ways to strengthen the  UN, a March 2005 Secretary-General report to the General Assembly, a  June 2005 report by a task force mandated by the U.S. Congress to  recommend how to improve the effectiveness of the organization, as well  as several reports of the Independent Inquiry Committee established to  investigate the Oil for Food Program.
In September 2005, world leaders gathered at the UN World Summit in  New York City to discuss global issues such as UN reform, development,  and human rights, as well as actions needed in each of these areas. The  outcome document from the World Summit, endorsed by all members of  the UN, outlines broad UN reform efforts in areas such as oversight and  accountability, and human rights. The document also called for the  Secretary-General to submit proposals for implementing reforms to  improve the management functions of the Secretariat.
In April 2006, we reported on weaknesses in the UN’s internal oversight  unit and procurement system, both of which have been identified as  important areas for reform. In the internal oversight area, we found that  UN funding arrangements adversely affect OIOS’s budgetary independence  and compromise the office’s ability to audit high-risk areas. For example,  OIOS depends on the resources of the funds, programs, and other entities  it audits, and the managers of these programs can deny OIOS permission  to perform work or not pay OIOS for services. In the procurement area, we  found that UN procurement resources are vulnerable to fraud, waste, and  abuse because of weaknesses affecting the control environment. For  example, the UN has not established a single organizational entity or  mechanism capable of effectively and comprehensively managing  procurement. In addition, the UN has not demonstrated a commitment to  improving the professionalism of its procurement staff in the form of  training, a career development path, or other key human capital practices  critical to attracting, developing, and retaining a qualified professional  workforce.
The management reform decision-making process at the UN involves  multiple entities. Member states or the Secretary-General can introduce  management reform initiatives at the UN. The Secretary-General can  implement certain management improvements that are within his  authority. In addition, the Secretary-General submits proposals to the  General Assembly.  In these cases, the Advisory Committee on  Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), a subsidiary organ of  the General Assembly, reviews the proposal. The ACABQ then advises and  reports to the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (the Fifth  Committee), the General Assembly’s committee for administrative and  budgetary matters that is composed of all 192 member states. The Fifth  Committee holds discussions on the proposals and makes its  recommendation to the General Assembly. The General Assembly makes  the final decision.  For the past 20 years, most decisions in the Fifth  Committee and in the General Assembly have been made by consensus  among all the member state representatives.

	Management Reform Proposals in Five Areas Are Awaiting General Assembly Review or Have Been Recently Approved

The UN has initiated reforms in five key areas: (1) modernizing the  management operations of the Secretariat, (2) improving oversight, (3)  promoting ethical conduct, (4) reviewing and updating programs and  activities, and (5) creating a Human Rights Council. However, most efforts  are awaiting General Assembly review or have been recently approved. In  addition, many proposed or approved reforms do not have an  implementation plan that establishes time frames and cost estimates.  Appendix II summarizes the status of major management reforms.

		Reforms to Improve the Management Operations of the Secretariat Are Awaiting General Assembly Review or Have Been Recently Approved

Proposals to improve the management operations of the Secretariat have  either been approved or are awaiting General Assembly review. To  improve the management operations of the Secretariat, the September  2005 outcome document requested that the Secretary-General develop  proposals to ensure that the existing policies, regulations, and rules used  to manage budgetary, financial, and human resources are aligned with the  current needs of the UN. In response, the Secretary-General submitted a  report to the General Assembly in March that included 23 proposals to  improve the UN’s effectiveness. However, the ACABQ recommended that  the Secretary-General provide more details, including specific costs and  administrative implications, and time lines for implementation.
In April 2006, members of the Fifth Committee voted and approved a  proposal introduced by the G-77 countries that the Secretary-General  elaborate on the proposals and give concrete examples of how the  initiatives could correct deficiencies and make the organization’s work  more effective. The vote signified the breakdown of the policy of making  decisions by consensus, a practice used for 20 years. Further, the United  States expressed concern that the G-77’s proposal was a way to scale back  the reforms proposed in the Secretary-General’s March 2006 report. In May  2006, the General Assembly voted and approved a resolution that  incorporated the recommendations made by the Fifth Committee. See  figure 1 for key dates for reform initiatives related to improving the  management operations of the Secretariat.
In response to the General Assembly’s request for more information, the  Secretariat issued seven detailed reports in May and June 2006 that  included information on various initiatives, such as information and  communication technology, financial management practices, and  procurement reform. In July 2006, member states approved a resolution  that, according to UN officials and member state representatives, was a  positive step toward addressing several management reform initiatives.  The status of several reforms to improve the management operations of  the Secretariat is as follows:    Since the Secretary-General has limited authority to shift resources  between programs without the approval of the member states, the  Secretary-General in his March 2006 report noted that more flexibility in  this area could enable the Secretariat to respond more effectively to the  changing needs of the organization. In July 2006, the General Assembly  gave the Secretary-General, on an experimental basis, limited discretion  over budgetary commitments up to $20 million per biennium. The impact  of this reform will be reviewed in 2009.
According to the Secretary-General, the UN has outdated and fragmented  information technology systems that have limited capacity for processing  and sharing data. Moreover, at least six departments have disparate  information technology units with no integrating mechanism in place. The  Secretary-General’s March 2006 report recommended the creation of a  chief information technology officer position to oversee the creation and  implementation of an information management strategy for the  Secretariat. In July 2006, the General Assembly agreed to create the  position of a chief information technology officer and upgrade certain  elements of the UN’s computer systems. In addition, the Secretary- General’s information technology detailed report did not include a  comprehensive implementation plan for this proposal. According to State  and UN officials, the Secretary-General plans to submit a comprehensive  report that includes cost estimates in March 2007.
GAO and others have reported that UN procurement resources are  unnecessarily vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. The Secretariat’s June  2006 procurement report included several proposals that could be  implemented over an 18-month period to strengthen UN procurement  practices. However, the report does not specify milestones that need to be  completed during the 18 months. The General Assembly is expected to  discuss this report in fall 2006. In the meantime, in July 2006, the General  Assembly authorized funding of approximately $700,000, which UN  officials plan to use for six new temporary procurement positions for 6  months. However, according to a senior U.S. official, these temporary  posts are not sufficient to address weaknesses in the procurement system,  and qualified procurement officers are not likely to accept temporary jobs.  As of September 2006, one temporary procurement staff member had been  hired.
According to the Secretary-General, staff skills are not aligned with the  current needs of the organization. The Secretary-General’s March 2006  report included proposals to improve recruitment processes, facilitate  staff mobility between headquarters and field offices, and dedicate  resources to conduct a one-time staff buyout. In late September 2006, the  Secretary-General issued a detailed human resources report. The General  Assembly is expected to discuss the report in fall 2006.
Some of the proposed or approved reforms to improve the operations of  the Secretariat do not have an implementation plan that establishes time  frames and cost estimates. Of the Secretary-General’s seven detailed  reports issued in May and June 2006, only the proposal for adoption of the  International Public Sector Accounting Standards includes a detailed  timetable for implementation. The Secretary-General’s June 2006  procurement report included several proposals that could be implemented  over an 18-month period, but the report does not include specific  milestones.

		Oversight Reform Proposals Awaiting General Assembly Review in Fall 2006

Reforms proposed to create an independent oversight advisory committee  and to strengthen the capacity of OIOS are awaiting review by the General  Assembly in fall 2006. In the outcome document, member states agreed to  consider the creation of an independent oversight advisory committee. In  November 2005, the Secretary-General proposed the creation of the  Independent Audit Advisory Committee and drafted provisional terms of  reference for this entity. In December 2005, the General Assembly  approved the creation of the committee and requested an external  evaluation of the proposed terms of reference. In addition, in the  September 2005 outcome document, member states recognized the urgent  need to strengthen the expertise, capacity, and resources of OIOS’s  auditing and investigative functions We and others have reported that  OIOS’s independence and ability to perform as the principal auditing and  investigative body of the UN have been hampered by the UN’s funding  process and lack of resources. Moreover, in the outcome document,  member states requested an independent external evaluation of the UN’s  auditing and oversight system. The Secretary-General submitted the  external evaluation in July 2006. See figure 2 for key dates associated  with oversight reform initiatives.
The July 2006 external evaluation reviewed the draft terms of reference for  the Independent Audit Advisory Committee and recommended several  changes, specifically with respect to the number, appointment criteria,  terms, and compensation of members of the committee. The external  independent evaluation also recommended the complete and prompt  implementation of the committee. In addition, the evaluation  recommended that the committee be responsible for presenting the budget  for OIOS to the Fifth Committee, thereby relieving the ACABQ of its  advisory role in this regard.
The July 2006 external evaluation included a detailed review of OIOS that  found that OIOS is not able to function effectively under its current  mandate and made 23 recommendations in nine areas to strengthen its  capacity. The external review stated that OIOS’s current structure is  impeding its independence and reducing its effectiveness. It also stated  that OIOS should focus on internal auditing and recommended shifting  several OIOS functions, such as investigations, to departments in the  Secretariat. However, various UN and U.S. officials stated that a shift of  functions such as that proposed in the external review could significantly  diminish the UN’s oversight functions and the independence of its  investigations. For example, these officials said that moving investigations  to the Secretariat could create a potential conflict of interest. However,  according to UN Secretariat officials, the Secretariat has a positive view of  the results of the independent external review and supports most of the  recommendations, and not all UN Secretariat officials view the proposed  recommendation as a way to diminish the UN’s oversight functions or the  independence of its investigations. In addition, in a report submitted to the  Secretary-General in July 2006, OIOS strongly disagreed with the  restructuring proposals but recognized the need to reassess the functions  and work processes of its Investigations Division. OIOS indicated that it  will undertake a review of that division that will be completed by the end  of 2006.
OIOS’s July 2006 report included its own proposals for strengthening its  capacity. The OIOS report indicated that some recommendations of the  external review will require consideration by the General Assembly, but  that many are being considered for implementation under the authority of  the Under Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services. The OIOS  report discussed 14 of the recommendations made by the external review  and generally agreed with most of them, such as training of OIOS staff,  human resource management, and information and communications  technology. However, as discussed above, OIOS strongly disagreed with  the recommendations that would restructure it.

		Ethics Office Established, but It Is Too Early to Assess Its Impact

The UN established an ethics office in January 2006 but, as of September  2006 it continues to operate with interim staff, and some experts,  including a panel commissioned by a UN staff union to review the UN’s  internal justice system, have questioned the sufficiency of the number of  staff in the office. Since January 2006, the office’s six interim staff  members have developed and implemented activities associated with the  ethics office’s four areas of responsibility: (1) administering the UN’s  financial disclosure program, (2) implementing the new UN whistleblower  protection policy, (3) providing guidance to staff on ethics issues, and (4)  developing ethics standards and training. For example, the interim staff  members have undertaken preliminary reviews of claims of retaliation for  whistleblowing and have collected financial disclosure forms from UN  managers. As the office is new and in the process of hiring permanent  staff, it is too early to determine whether the office will be able to fully  carry out its mandate. See figure 3 for key dates associated with the  establishment of the ethics office.
Before creating the ethics office, the UN Secretariat did not have a way to  coordinate ethics-related initiatives within the organization and to ensure  that all staff are aware of and updated on ethics issues. The 2005 outcome  document specifically requested that the Secretary-General develop a  detailed proposal for an independent ethics office. The Secretary-General  developed and submitted this proposal in November 2005, and the General  Assembly approved it in December 2005. The ethics office began operating  in January 2006 as an independent entity reporting directly to the  Secretary-General and by March 2006 it was staffed with one director, four  staff members, and a consultant, all temporarily assigned to the office.  These staff have been establishing and documenting the procedures the  office follows in carrying out its duties. The UN is in the process of hiring  permanent staff to replace the interim staff. The office has four main areas  of responsibility and has made some progress in fulfilling each as follows:    The ethics office is responsible for administering the UN’s financial  disclosure program to ensure that staff comply with applicable conflict of  interest rules and standards of conduct. Designated UN staff— those at  and above the director level and all staff carrying out procurement and  investment functions—are required to file an annual confidential  statement of their financial interests. This policy applies to about 1,800 UN  staff and as of July 31, 2006, the ethics office had received 90 percent of  their financial disclosure statements. The ethics office is currently  reviewing bids from contractors to carry out the review and audit of these  forms. The Secretariat recommended that the review be conducted by  independent financial experts, as is the practice at the World Bank and the  International Monetary Fund (IMF), to safeguard the confidentiality of  senior officials’ private financial information. The ethics office will keep  these financial disclosure forms confidential, but a report by a panel of  experts reviewing the UN’s internal justice system recommended that the  office maintain the forms in a public register.
The ethics office is implementing the UN’s new whistleblower protection  policy, which took effect in January 2006. When a staff member contacts  the ethics office with a complaint that he or she has been retaliated against  for reporting misconduct, the office conducts a preliminary review to  determine if the case should move forward for formal investigation by  OIOS. The ethics office staff review the evidence presented by the  claimant, interview the party accused of retaliation, and talk to other staff  involved. If the ethics office determines that the case is an interpersonal  problem within a particular office, rather than a case of retaliation for  whistleblowing, it advises the staff member concerned of the existence of  the Office of the Ombudsman and other informal conflict resolution  mechanisms within the organization. If a case of retaliation is established  after investigation by OIOS, the ethics office takes into account any  recommendations made by OIOS and recommends appropriate measures  aimed at correcting the negative consequences suffered as a result of the  retaliatory action. As of July 31, 2006, the office had received 45  complaints of retaliation for reporting misconduct, one of which they  submitted for further investigation. Ethics office staff told us that they  track all whistleblowing complaints that are brought to their attention,  including those referred to other offices. Staff also said that the time they  spend on each case of whistleblower retaliation varies from several hours  to more than 45 days.
As part of its regular duties, the ethics office provides confidential  guidance to staff on ethics issues. To fulfill this responsibility, the ethics  office operates an ethics helpline to answer questions from and provide  advice to UN staff. UN staff have used the helpline to make whistleblower  retaliation complaints. Staff can also contact the office in person, by mail  or e-mail, or by fax.
The ethics office is responsible for developing ethics standards and  content for training, which all UN staff will be expected to take annually,  and it is working to provide clear guidance to staff on ethics regulations,  rules, and standards. The Office of Human Resources Management, in  consultation with the ethics office staff, has developed a half-day ethics  workshop for all staff and has worked to ensure that ethics issues are  incorporated into courses on other topics, such as procurement. The  ethics office has developed an intranet site for UN staff that provides  general information about the office as well as UN ethics issues and  standards.
While the interim staff in the ethics office have been undertaking activities  consistent with their responsibilities, questions have been raised about the  capacity of this office to fulfill its mandate. One nongovernmental  organization said the UN’s whistleblower protection policy created a new  benchmark for such policies in other intergovernmental organizations,  such as the World Bank and IMF. However, it questioned the UN’s  implementation of the policy, citing the low number of staff in the ethics  office and the amount of time it is taking to conduct preliminary reviews  of whistleblower retaliation cases. In addition, in a report endorsed by a  UN staff union, a commission of experts criticized the UN’s  implementation of the whistleblower protection policy and made several  recommendations that, if adopted, would change the responsibilities and  structure of the ethics office. The U.S. Permanent Representative to the  UN has also cited the UN staff union’s concerns about the capacity of the  ethics office to fulfill its responsibilities.
The appropriate number of staff assigned to the ethics office has been in  question since the office’s inception. The Secretariat originally requested  funding for 16 staff positions for the ethics office, including liaison posts in  UN offices in Vienna, Nairobi, and Geneva, to provide the office with  greater proximity to the two-thirds of UN employees located in field  offices around the world. However, the General Assembly, following the  recommendation of the ACABQ, approved funding for only six positions,  with no posts in the field. The ACABQ reported that the office could  operate with fewer staff than requested, given the office’s uncertain  workload at its inception, and that its workload would be reduced after  the initial work of developing standards and training was complete. The  Special Advisor to the Secretary-General for the ethics office, who is  overseeing the new office, stated that the number of staff assigned to the  office is currently appropriate. The interim staff said that the office needs  more resources, particularly additional staff, given its number of  responsibilities and activities. A representative from a nongovernmental  organization with expertise in whistleblower protection also stated that  the ethics office has too few resources to carry out its duties. In addition,  the panel of experts commissioned by a UN staff union to review the UN’s  internal justice system stated that it is critical that the ethics office be  given adequate resources, including representation in the UN’s regional  offices, to fulfill its responsibilities. The ethics office submitted a status  report to the General Assembly in September 2006 that suggested that the  office may need additional staff and resources in the future.

		Disagreement among Member States Has Delayed Review of Programs and Activities

Member state review of all UN programs and activities has been slow  because of disagreements on both the scope and process; therefore, it is  unlikely that the December 2006 deadline to complete the review will be  met. In the 2005 outcome document, member states requested a review of  all UN programs and activities, or mandates, that were created 5 or more  years ago (see fig. 4 below for key dates in the review process) to  strengthen and update UN programs and activities to more accurately  reflect the current needs of the organization. The UN does not have a  system for regularly evaluating the effectiveness of its mandates, which  make up its main body of work. The General Assembly, Economic and  Social Council, and the Security Council each adopt new mandates every  year on many of the same issues, which can lead to interrelated and  overlapping mandates. As a result, the Secretariat’s implementation of  these mandates may be uncoordinated and inconsistent.
UN member states agreed at the 2005 World Summit to undertake in 2006  a review of UN mandates older than 5 years to update the UN’s programs  and activities so that they respond to the current needs of member states.  Member states did not establish milestones for this review, but said it  should be completed by 2006. In March 2006, the Secretary-General issued  a report that provided a framework for conducting this review, including a  recommendation to conduct the review in two phases, and compiled an  electronic inventory of about 9,000 total mandates, over 6,900 of which are  older than 5 years, originating from the three principal UN organs—the  General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security  Council. The General Assembly, which has responsibility for about 80  percent of the mandates, began discussions on the mandate review  process in November 2005 and started substantive discussions on specific  mandates in April 2006. The Security Council and Economic and Social  Council began their respective reviews in May 2006. During these  discussions, countries and groups of countries made proposals on the  process for the review and on how to handle specific mandates. For  example, one country proposed that the mandate review process involve  roundtable discussions and informal debates. Another proposal, with  regard to a specific mandate, was to consolidate the Secretariat’s working  papers on individual and small island territories. During the discussions,  some countries requested more information from the Secretariat on  certain mandates, such as how one mandate might be duplicative of  another, or which UN departments or entities are involved in  implementing each mandate.
Throughout the review process, member states have disagreed about  which mandates to include in the review and what to do with any savings  generated by the potential elimination or consolidation of mandates,  which has led to slow and limited progress. Members of the G-77 contend  that the scope of the review should include only those mandates older  than 5 years that have not been renewed since they were adopted. This  represents about 626 mandates, or 7 percent of the total number of  mandates (see fig. 5). The United States and other developed countries,  including Japan, Australia, Canada, and the European Union, argue that  the review should include all mandates older than 5 years, whether or not  they have been renewed. Using these criteria, the review would include an  additional 6,347 mandates.
The G-77 established several criteria under which it would consider  reviewing mandates that are older than 5 years: (1) member states must  first agree that any savings derived from the mandate review will be  reinvested in the areas from which they were derived, or in UN activities in  the development area and (2) all politically sensitive mandates must be  excluded from the review process. The United States has stated that a  decision about the use of cost savings from the mandate review should be  made once the review is complete. In addition, the United States maintains  that no mandates older than 5 years, including those that are controversial,  should be excluded from the review.
Despite disagreement on which General Assembly mandates to review,  member states decided in June 2006 to move forward with the first phase,  which consists of reviewing 399 mandates that are older than 5 years and  have not been renewed within the last 5 years. Mandates that are older  than 5 years and have been renewed could be reviewed in a second phase.  Mandates in phase one include completed projects, such as a 1965  resolution requesting that the Secretary-General convene a conference on  the World Food Program. Although most of the mandates in this category  do not require any further action or resources from the UN, member states  could only agree to set aside 74 of them, which they classified as  completed, meaning they have been acted upon and completely  implemented and do not require further action at this time. Additionally,  they decided that 33 mandates are not applicable to the review. The  remaining 292 mandates included in phase one may be reviewed in phase  two if member states believe they need further discussion. See table 1 for  details on the status of mandates considered in phase one.
As of September 2006, after beginning discussions on specific mandates in  April 2006, member states had not agreed to change, eliminate, or retain  any mandates. On September 1, 2006, leaders of the working group on  mandate review developed a proposal suggesting terms under which  member states would move forward into phase two of the review, but as of  the end of September member states had not accepted it. The proposal  suggests that member states reallocate within the UN budget any savings  from mandate review according to normal budgetary procedures and that  they reinvest any savings from development activities into other  development activities. In addition, the proposal recommends that  member states agree to address politically sensitive mandates carefully  and take into account the positions of member states concerned. Given the  volume of mandates still to be discussed and the contentious nature of the  review process, the prospects for completing the review by the end of 2006  are unlikely.

		Effectiveness and Impact of Newly-Created Human Rights Council Remain Uncertain

In March 2006, the UN voted to create a new UN Human Rights Council to  replace the Commission on Human Rights; however, significant concerns  remain about the council’s structure. UN member states generally agreed  that the Commission on Human Rights should be improved as it was no  longer seen as a credible institution for protecting human rights, due to a  number of weaknesses. For example, according to human rights  organizations, countries known to be human rights violators were  consistently selected for membership to the commission and used their  membership to protect themselves against criticism of their human rights  records. Furthermore, the commission did not criticize the actions of  several countries that were found to be abusers of human rights, including  Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe. As a result, the member states agreed  at the 2005 World Summit to create a new Human Rights Council that  would improve upon these deficiencies. UN member states voted to  establish the council in March 2006 and elected members in May 2006.  (See fig. 6 for key dates for the Human Rights Council.)
In establishing the new Human Rights Council, UN member states aimed  to address some of the deficiencies in the 53-member Commission on  Human Rights. The 47 members of the new council must be elected  individually to the body by a majority of UN members. Previously,  candidates were grouped into slates of countries representing regions, and  members would vote on the entire slate rather than for an individual  country on the slate. The United States sought a significantly smaller body  and advocated that to gain membership on the council, members should  be elected by the higher standard of a two-thirds majority, rather than an  absolute majority, to make it more difficult for repressive countries that  have not demonstrated a commitment to human rights to gain seats on the  council. Members can now be suspended from the council by a two-thirds  majority vote if they are found to have committed gross violations of  human rights. When voting for candidates to the council, UN member  states are instructed to take into account each country’s human rights  record, a measure that was not called for when voting for candidates to  the commission. The United States wanted to automatically exclude from  council membership any country under Security Council sanctions, but  that provision was not included in the final design of the body. When  elections to the council were held in May 2006, several countries with  questionable human rights records were elected, including China, Russia,  and Cuba. However, other countries that previously served on the  commission and have questionable human rights records did not even run  for election, including Zimbabwe, Sudan, and North Korea. In addition,  Iran campaigned for a seat on the Council but did not win.
The Human Rights Council will also operate differently from the  commission. The council will meet more frequently and can more readily  call special sessions to address emerging human rights situations than  could the commission. The council will meet at least three times a year for  a total of 10 weeks, while the commission met once a year for a total of 6  weeks. Furthermore, the council is required to periodically review the  human rights records of all UN member states, a procedure the  commission lacked. Members of the council will be the first to undergo  these reviews and will be required to cooperate with investigators. The  council is currently developing the procedures it will follow when  conducting the reviews. Finally, member states made the council a  subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, elevating it from the  commission’s status as part of the Economic and Social Council.
While the United States voted against the creation of the new Human  Rights Council, stating that it did not sufficiently improve upon the former  commission, many nongovernmental organizations and other UN members  have stated that the council is better equipped than the commission was to  address urgent, serious, and long-running human rights situations around  the world. Of the UN member states participating in the vote on the  creation of the council, 170 voted in favor, while 4 voted against. The  United States did not run for election to the body but has agreed to  provide funding for it. Representatives from one group of member states  said that they were disappointed the United States did not run for election  because it was important to have the United States on the council from its  inception, to show support for the new body. The council meets in Geneva  and met for the first time in June 2006 and a second time in September  2006. It plans to meet again in November 2006. The council held special  sessions in summer 2006 on the situation of human rights in Palestine and  other Arab territories. It is too early to determine the impact of the new  council on the UN and human rights worldwide.

	Various Factors May Impede Full Implementation of UN Management Reforms

We identified several factors that may impede the UN’s progress toward  full implementation of management reforms: (1) considerable  disagreement within the General Assembly over their overall implications;  (2) absence of an implementation plan for each reform that includes time  frames and cost estimates; and (3) administrative guidance that may  complicate the process of implementing certain human resource  initiatives.

		Disagreement within the General Assembly Has Limited the Implementation of Reforms

Disagreement between G-77 and developed countries over the broader  implications of management reforms may affect the UN’s ability to fully  implement them. According to UN and member state officials, the G-77 is  concerned that some of the reforms could increase the authority of the  Secretariat at the expense of the General Assembly, thus decreasing the   G-77’s influence over UN operations. Further, according to several UN and  member state officials, most developed countries view management  reform as a way to increase organizational effectiveness, whereas the G-77  countries perceive that developed countries view certain reform  initiatives, such as mandate review, as cost-cutting exercises. Moreover,  UN officials and member state representatives told us that a disagreement  over a 6-month spending cap served to unify the G-77 countries and  weaken the cohesion between developed countries. According to UN and  member state representatives, the budget cap initially served to focus  attention on the need to make progress on the reform initiatives. However,  according to member state representatives, the spending cap made it more  difficult to reach consensus on management reforms. On June 30, 2006, the  General Assembly decided to lift the spending cap. According to UN  officials and member state representatives, now that the cap is lifted,  implementation of the reforms can continue, but questions remain about  the pace and priorities for implementation of the reforms.
Disagreement between the G-77 countries and the developed countries  over the details of implementing the initiatives could continue to affect  their progress. Member states disagree on some of the specifics of the  reforms in areas such as the review of programs and activities and the  details for creating the Human Rights Council, as discussed earlier, as well  as the role of the Deputy Secretary-General. For example, two  independent studies recommended the creation of a chief operating officer  position and the Secretary-General’s March 2006 report recommended that  the Deputy Secretary-General assume formal authority and accountability  for the management and overall direction of the Secretariat’s operations.  However, the spokesperson for the G-77 countries has stated in the Fifth  Committee and in the General Assembly that, according to the UN charter,  the Secretary-General is the UN’s Chief Administrative Officer and thus  responsible for the organization’s management. In May 2006, the General  Assembly passed a resolution that noted that the function of the post of  Deputy Secretary-General should not diminish the role or responsibilities  of the Secretary-General.  The resolution further noted that the overall  responsibility for management of the Organization rests with the  Secretary-General.  Therefore, it will be up to the discretion of the next  Secretary-General to decide on the delegation of authority to his/her  deputy. (App. II provides more information on the disagreements specific  to each reform.)

		UN Has Not Developed a Comprehensive Plan to Implement the Reforms

For many of the management reform proposals, the UN has not developed  comprehensive implementation plans with associated time frames, cost  estimates, and potential savings. Setting an implementation time line is a  key practice for organizations undergoing change. However, many UN  proposals we reviewed that are related to management reform do not  include specific time frames. For example, although a senior U.S. official  said that the July 2006 resolution is a positive step toward implementation  of certain reforms, he noted that the section on oversight does not provide  concrete actions.  In addition, the resolution does not include specific time  frames for implementing a fully operational ethics office or the  Independent Audit Advisory Committee. Without establishing deadlines, it  is difficult to hold managers accountable for completing reform efforts.  Moreover, without comprehensive implementation plans, the total  budgetary implications of the reform efforts are not clear.
The UN has not developed or refined cost estimates for many of the  initiatives, including improving certain field staff benefits and conditions  to mirror those of headquarters staff; increasing investments in human  resource development; introducing a new information communications  technology system; and approving a staff buyout program. However, the  Secretary-General has developed preliminary cost estimates for three key  initiatives that alone could cost over $500 million—the proposed new  information communications technology system ($120 million over several  years), a one-time staff buyout ($50 to $100 million), and efforts to  improve field staff benefits ($280 million annually). Moreover, the UN  Secretariat said that these estimates will require further assessments  before reliable estimates and a plan of action can be determined. Without  determining cost estimates, it is difficult to ensure that financing will be  available when needed.
Likewise, the UN has not yet developed savings estimates because certain  initiatives will require further assessment and then approval by the  General Assembly. The Secretary-General anticipates that the costs for the  reforms could be offset by savings from efforts such as relocation and  outsourcing and the long-term benefits of a more efficiently run  organization. However, the UN has not yet produced any concrete savings  estimates, and efforts to produce savings have faced significant  challenges. For instance, the Secretary-General said that the cost could be  partially offset by savings in procurement reform. However, UN officials  said that the UN Secretariat has not yet developed firm procurement  savings estimates. In addition, proposals to streamline the way in which  the organization delivers its services, which may result in savings, have  experienced resistance from member states and staff members. In May  2006, the G-77 did not authorize the Secretary-General to conduct a cost- benefit analysis of his proposal to relocate translation, editing, and  document production services. Public documents do not specify the  G-77’s reason for not allowing a cost-benefit analysis to be undertaken.  Further, the outsourcing of internal printing and publishing processes  could generate savings but, according to UN officials, it could also face  challenges from member states and staff to implement.
To develop or refine cost and savings estimates, the Secretariat is  conducting cost-benefit analyses and assessments in areas such as the  proposed new information communications technology system,  outsourcing and relocation, staff buyout, and public access to UN  information. Appendix IV provides information on the reviews,  assessments, and cost-benefit analyses that the Secretariat is preparing,  including their expected time frames for completion to the extent stated  by the UN. However, some of the cost-benefit analyses and assessments  will not be available until March 2007 for member states to consider, and  these will have a bearing on the overall reform package and, ultimately,  the total cost of the reform. To date, the additional cost to member states  to implement certain management reform initiatives has been about $40  million, which primarily reflects start-up costs for efforts such as the  adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards, the new  ethics office, additional costs for the new Human Rights Council, and an  increase to the working capital fund (see table 2). Therefore, based on  the slow pace of the reform process and the time frames for completion of  the assessments and cost-benefit analyses, the total budgetary  implications of the reform effort, including the U.S. government’s share,  remain unclear.

		Administrative Guidance May Complicate the Process of Implementing Certain Human Resource Initiatives

Administrative guidance, such as staff regulations and rules that  implement General Assembly resolutions, could complicate and  sometimes restrict the process of implementing certain human resource  initiatives. According to the Secretary-General, the existing human  resources management framework was designed for a stable, largely  headquarters-based environment, and currently more than half of the UN’s  30,000 staff members are serving in the field. The Secretary-General also  said that the Secretariat’s increasingly complex mandates require a new  skills profile that will enable it to respond in an integrated way to new  needs in diverse areas such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.  In addition, salaries and other human resource costs comprise almost 80  percent of the UN regular budget. As such, UN officials state that it would  be impossible to achieve meaningful management reform without  reforming human resources. The Secretary-General has proposed several  human resource reforms, such as a staff buyout, replacing permanent  contracts with open-ended appointments, better integration of staff  worldwide, and outsourcing. However, administrative guidance may  complicate the process of implementing some initiatives, such as:  In September 2005, member states agreed to consider a proposal from the  Secretary-General for a one-time staff buyout. According to the Secretary- General, to target staff for buyout the UN Secretariat must analyze and  determine the skills needed in the organization, taking into account  proposed reform efforts such as relocation of work, outsourcing, and  mandate review. Staff performing administrative functions that are  targeted for outsourcing may be offered a buyout if their skills are no  longer needed by the UN. The Secretary-General must also conduct  consultations with UN staff representatives. UN officials said that it may  be difficult for the Secretary-General, staff representatives, and member  states to agree on the skills required to realign staff with the UN’s  priorities. In addition, some of the cost-benefit analyses for the relocation  and outsourcing initiatives will not be completed until March 2007.
The UN Secretariat is developing a more integrated approach for staff to  serve worldwide. However, UN officials said that staff may find ways to  resist efforts to be transferred, especially if a transfer would result in  leaving UN Headquarters or other desirable duty stations. According to the  Secretary-General, staff are not sufficiently mobile, and their movement is  hampered by multiple and restrictive mandates.
The Secretary-General proposed the integration of field and headquarters  staff into one global Secretariat with competitive conditions of service.  This would include changing the staff rules to create one staff contract to  mirror that of headquarters staff. Based on a study prepared in January  2006 by the International Civil Service Commission for the General  Assembly, this proposed integration raises a number of complicated  policy questions that will need to be addressed, including long-term  contractual obligations, cost implications related to differences in the  compensation packages, distortion of geographical distribution and  gender balance, and complications for merit-based, transparent, and open  selection procedures.
Further, according to UN officials, proposals to reconsider a change in the  way the UN delivers its services by relocating and outsourcing certain  headquarters functions may meet with resistance from some member  states and staff as jobs may be lost. According to the Secretary-General,  the General Assembly established a number of conditions for outsourcing  that severely restrict the circumstances under which it can be  contemplated. One of those restrictions includes avoiding possible  negative impact on staff. Thus, restrictive conditions such as these could  complicate the process of implementing certain human resource  initiatives.

	Conclusion

During the past few years, the inadequate oversight of the Oil for Food  program and mismanagement of UN procurement activities have  demonstrated the urgent need for UN management reform. Several  independent reports in 2005 found that inefficient UN management  operations persist and discuss the immediate need for management reform  given the growth in complexity and significance of UN worldwide  operations within the past decade. Despite several past reform efforts,  long-standing concerns about weak UN management functions remain. As  the largest financial contributor to the UN, the United States has taken a  leadership role in calling for improved management processes. In addition,  the United States, through the Department of State and the U.S. Mission to  the United Nations, continues to take measures to advance reform of UN  management processes. However, progress in management reform efforts  has been slow. Proposals awaiting review cannot progress until the  General Assembly approves them through a process that traditionally  requires agreement by all 192 UN member states, and consensus building  can be a difficult and lengthy process. Moreover, the UN has not agreed  upon implementation plans for each reform effort that include established  time frames and cost estimates—practices that increase the transparency  and accountability of the reform process. The Secretary-General’s  proposal for the adoption of International Public Sector Accounting  Standards is a step toward increased transparency and accountability  because it includes a detailed timetable for implementation. Until the UN  undergoes successful management reform, its ability to respond  effectively and efficiently to increasingly complex international crises is  diminished.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of State and the U.S. Permanent  Representative to the UN work with other member states to encourage the  General Assembly and the Secretary-General to include cost estimates and  expected time frames for implementation and completion for each reform  as it is approved. We also recommend that the Secretary of State’s annual  U.S. Participation in the United Nations report to the Congress include a  section on the status and progress of the major UN management reforms.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this  report (see app. V). The Department of State agreed with our  recommendations and stated that it will continue to work toward creating  a more effective and accountable United Nations. In particular, it noted  that it has seen too little in terms of results since the September 2005  Summit. Moreover, the Department of State also said that the Secretariat  should be held accountable for implementing these reforms and will  continue to work with other member states toward ensuring that a  transparent reporting mechanism to the General Assembly is established.  The Department of State also concurred fully with the need to keep the  U.S. Congress informed of these management reform initiatives and will  continue to monitor and inform the Congress as recommended. The UN  did not provide written comments. In addition, the Department of State  and the United Nations provided technical comments on our draft report,  which were incorporated into the text where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested members of the  Congress, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Permanent Representative to  the UN. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VI.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To identify and track management reforms, we reviewed key documents  proposing United Nations (UN) management and human rights reforms  and interviewed key officials. We obtained and reviewed official reports of  the Secretariat and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS),  Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)  documents, General Assembly resolutions, Secretary-General bulletins,  Web sites, related budget documents, and statements from UN officials.  We interviewed senior officials from UN departments in New York City.  Specifically, we met with officials from the General Assembly Office of the  President, the Office of the Deputy Secretary-General, the Departments of  Management and Policy and Planning, ACABQ, the Office of Program  Planning and Budget (OPPBA), and OIOS. During the course of our  review, we also discussed the status of UN reforms with Department of  State officials in Washington, D.C., and New York City.
We selected reforms in the areas of management operations of the  Secretariat, oversight, ethical conduct, review of programs and activities,  and human rights to track in more detail. We determined that these were  key areas of management reform through our review of UN documents  and in our discussions with UN and U.S. officials. We focused our work on  management reforms that began in 2005 and did not specifically address  the 1997 and 2002 reform agendas. The 2005 reforms applied to the  Secretariat and the UN’s governing bodies, including the General  Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council. We  did not include UN specialized agencies or funds and programs in our  review. Other reform efforts such as the UN Peace Building Commission,  Security Council reform, and governance were beyond the scope of this  review.
To determine the factors facing the implementation of UN reforms, we  reviewed reports and documentation of the Secretariat, General Assembly,  OIOS, Joint Inspection Unit, and International Civil Service Commission.  In addition, we spoke with UN officials in New York. These included  officials from the Office of the Deputy Secretary-General, the Department  of Management, ACABQ, OPPBA, and OIOS. We also met with  representatives from several member states and spoke with U.S. officials  in Washington, D.C., and New York. We also interviewed outside observers  of the UN system, including nongovernmental organizations and members  of academia.
Many cost estimates for the proposed reform initiatives are preliminary,  and detailed cost estimates are being developed; therefore, we did not  analyze the assumptions underlying these estimates to determine whether  they are reasonable and reliable. To determine the reliability of data in the  UN’s inventory of about 9,000 programs and activities (mandates) that are  older than 5 years, we interviewed UN officials and performed some basic  cross checks. The scope of the mandate review covers mandates of the  General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security  Council that are older than 5 years and are active or potentially active.  According to the Secretary-General, the resolutions adopted from year to  year by each of the principal organs are the primary source of mandates.  The Secretary-General also said that mandates are not easily defined or  quantifiable, and a concrete legal definition of a mandate does not exist. In  addition, the UN updates its inventory of mandates on a regular basis. We  performed our analysis as of September 2006. We determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of establishing the approximate  number of mandates and comparing the approximate number of mandates  that have and have not been renewed in the last 5 years. Further, we  believe that the cost estimates and the associated funds that the General  Assembly appropriated to date for reform efforts are sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this report.
We performed our work between January and September 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted U.S. government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Status of UN Management Reform Initiatives

We identified and tracked the status of management reform initiatives in  five key areas—management of the Secretariat, oversight, ethical conduct,  review of programs and activities, and human rights—and identified  disagreements among member states that may affect their implementation.  Table 3 provides information on the status of major United Nations (UN)  management reform initiatives, actions that are still pending, and points of  disagreement. All dates are in 2006 unless otherwise indicated.

Appendix III: The UN Whistleblower Protection Procedure

The United Nations (UN) ethics office is implementing the UN’s new  whistleblower protection policy, which took effect in January 2006. The  policy protects UN staff from retaliation for reporting misconduct of any  other staff. Retaliation, as defined in the policy, includes any detrimental  action recommended, threatened, or taken because an individual reported  misconduct or cooperated with an authorized audit or investigation. The  policy shifts the burden of proof for retaliation to the UN organization and  away from individuals, requiring the organization to prove in each case  that the alleged retaliatory action is unrelated to the report of misconduct.  According to the policy, the ethics office is responsible for receiving  complaints about threatened or actual acts of retaliation against staff and  keeping confidential records of all complaints received. The office is also  responsible for conducting a preliminary review of the complaint to  determine if the complainant engaged in an activity protected by the  whistleblower protection policy, and there is sufficient evidence that the  protected activity was a contributing factor in causing the alleged  retaliation or threat of retaliation.
In order for an individual to receive protection under the whistleblower  protection policy, the report of misconduct should be made as soon as  possible and no more than 6 years after the individual becomes aware of  the misconduct. The individual reporting misconduct must submit  information or evidence to support a reasonable belief that misconduct  has occurred. UN staff may make reports of misconduct through  established internal mechanisms including Office of Internal Oversight  Services (OIOS), the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources  Management, and the head of the department or office concerned. The  whistleblower protection policy also protects staff who report misconduct  to external mechanisms, such as the media or outside organizations,  provided that all internal mechanisms have been exhausted. The UN is the  first intergovernmental organization to provide such protection.
Staff who believe that retaliatory action has been taken against them  because they have reported misconduct or cooperated with an authorized  audit or investigation are directed to forward all information and  documentation to support their complaint to the ethics office. The  whistleblower protection policy states that such complaints can be made  in person, by regular mail, e-mail, fax, or through the ethics office helpline.  Once the ethics office receives a complaint, it conducts a preliminary  review, which should be completed within 45 days. According to staff in  the ethics office, they try to complete their reviews within that time frame,  but, in some cases, they need more time to speak to everyone involved in  the case. In reviewing a case, the ethics office reviews the evidence  presented by the complainant and interviews the individual being accused  and any other witnesses of the alleged retaliation. If the ethics office finds  that there is a credible case of retaliation or threat of retaliation, it refers  the matter in writing to OIOS for investigation and immediately notifies  the complainant, in writing, that his or her case has been referred.  According to the whistleblower protection policy, OIOS seeks to complete  its investigation and write a report within 120 days. The report is  submitted to the ethics office.
Once the ethics office receives the investigation report, it informs the  complainant, in writing, of the outcome of the investigation and makes  recommendations on the case to the head of the department or office  concerned and to the Under-Secretary-General for management. The  ethics office may recommend that disciplinary actions be taken against the  retaliator. It may also recommend that measures be taken to correct the  negative consequences suffered by the complainant as a result of the  retaliatory action, including reinstatement or transfer to another office or  function for which the individual is qualified. If the ethics office is not  satisfied with the response from the head of the department or office  concerned, it can make a recommendation directly to the Secretary- General, who then provides a written response to the ethics office and the  head of the office concerned. The whistleblower protection policy states  that retaliation against an individual for reporting misconduct is itself  misconduct and will lead to disciplinary action.

Appendix IV: Information on Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analyses

The United Nations (UN) Secretariat is currently conducting a number of  assessments, cost-benefit analyses, and comprehensive reports. We  identified a number of key studies that include a detailed cost study for the  proposed new information communications technology system,  assessments of a staff buyout, and cost-benefit analyses of outsourcing  internal printing and publishing processes, and the relocation of  information technology support services. Some of these assessments will  not be available for member states to consider until early 2007. In addition,  the projected completion dates represent the dates when the UN  Secretariat is expected to complete the reports and forward them to the  legislative bodies for review. It is not clear when the General Assembly  will review and make a decision on these initiatives. Table 4 lists the key  assessments, cost-benefit analyses, and comprehensive reports that the  UN Secretariat is currently conducting. The UN Secretariat did not provide  us with detailed information, such as status and projected completion date  for each initiative.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Phillip Thomas, Assistant  Director; Jeanette Espinola, Stephanie Robinson, and Barbara Shields  made key contributions to this report. Debbie J. Chung, Martin De Alteriis,  Etana Finkler, and Grace Lui provided technical assistance.

Related GAO Products

United Nations: Weaknesses in Internal Oversight and Procurement  Could Affect the Effective Implementation of the Planned Renovation.  GAO-06-877T. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006.
United Nations: Oil for Food Program Provides Lessons for Future  Sanctions and Ongoing Reform, GAO-06-711T. Washington, D.C.: May 2,  2006.
United Nations: Internal Oversight and Procurement Controls and  Processes Need Strengthening. GAO-06-710T. Washington, D.C.: April 27,  2006.
United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of  Internal Auditors. GAO-06-575. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.
United Nations: Lessons from Oil for Food Program Indicate Need to  Strengthen Internal Controls and Oversight, GAO-06-330. Washington,  D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006.
United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak, GAO-06-577.  Washington, D.C., April 25, 2006.
Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S.  Operations in Haiti. GAO-06-331. Washington, D.C.: February 21, 2006.
United Nations: Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and  Procurement Practices, GAO-06-226T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005.
United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve  Lasting Results, GAO-05-392T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005.
United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits, GAO-05-346T. Washington,  D.C.: February 15, 2005.
United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Areas for  Further Investigation. GAO-04-953T. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2004.
United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq’s  Food Security. GAO-04-880T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2004.
United Nations: Observations on the Management and Oversight of the  Oil for Food Program. GAO-04-730T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2004.
United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program. GAO-04- 651T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Recovering Iraq’s Assets: Preliminary Observations on U.S. Efforts and  Challenges. GAO-04-579T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2004.
United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments  Needed to Measure Impact, GAO-04-339. Washington, D.C.: February 13,  2004.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.N. Confronts Significant Challenges in  Implementing Sanctions against Iraq, GAO-02-625. Washington, D.C.:  May 23, 2002.
United Nations: Reform Initiatives Have Strengthened Operations, but  Overall Objectives Have Not Yet Been Achieved, GAO/NSIAD-00-150.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2000.
United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms. GAO/NSIAD-99-71.  Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1999.
United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight Services, GAO/NSIAD-98-9.  Washington, D.C.: November 19, 1997.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

Despite various reform efforts, significant inefficiencies in United Nations (UN) management operations persist. In September 2005, heads of UN member states approved a resolution that called for a series of reforms to strengthen the organization. As the largest financial contributor to the UN, the United States has a strong interest in the progress of UN reform initiatives. GAO was asked to (1) identify and track the status of UN management reforms in five key areas and (2) identify factors that may affect the implementation of these reform initiatives. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents proposing UN management reform and interviewed U.S. and UN officials.

What GAO Found

Most of the UN management reforms in the five areas GAO examined--management operations of the Secretariat, oversight, ethical conduct, review of programs and activities, and human rights--are either awaiting General Assembly review or have been recently approved. In addition, many proposed or approved reforms do not have an implementation plan that establishes time frames and cost estimates. First, in July 2006, the General Assembly approved proposals to improve the management operations of the Secretariat, such as upgrading information technology systems and giving the Secretary-General some flexibility in spending authority. In addition, in fall 2006, the General Assembly will review other proposals, such as procurement and human resource reforms. Second, implementation of proposals to improve the UN's oversight capabilities, such as strengthening the capacity of the Office of Internal Oversight Services and establishing the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, are pending General Assembly review in fall 2006. Third, the UN established an ethics office with temporary staff in January 2006 that has developed an internal timetable for implementing key initiatives. However, it is too early to determine whether the office will be able to fully carry out its mandate. Fourth, UN member states agreed to complete a review of UN programs and activities in 2006, but progress has been slow and the results and time line for completion remain uncertain. Fifth, the General Assembly created a new Human Rights Council in April 2006, but significant concerns remain about the council's structure. GAO identified several factors that may affect the UN's ability to fully implement management reforms. First, although all UN member states agree that UN management reforms are needed, disagreements about the overall implications of the reforms could significantly affect their progress. Most member states are concerned that some of the reforms could increase the authority of the Secretariat at the expense of the General Assembly, thus decreasing their influence over UN operations. Member states also disagree on some of the specifics of the reforms in areas such as the review of programs and activities and the role of the Deputy Secretary-General. Second, the general absence of an implementation plan for each reform that establishes time frames and cost estimates could affect the UN's ability to implement the reform initiatives. Without establishing deadlines or determining cost estimates, it is difficult to hold managers accountable for completing reform efforts and ensure that financing will be available when needed. Third, administrative guidance, such as staff regulations and rules that implement General Assembly resolutions, could complicate the process of implementing certain human resource reform proposals. For example, according to the Secretary-General, the General Assembly established a number of conditions for outsourcing that severely restrict the circumstances under which it can be contemplated.