Background

In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation  Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), which added Section 28 to the Federal  Transit Act. ISTEA required FTA to establish a state-managed safety and  security oversight program for rail transit agencies. As a result, on  December 27, 1995, FTA published a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed  Guideway Systems; State Safety Oversight (subsequently referred to as  FTA’s rule), to improve the safety and security of rail transit agencies.  FTA’s rule required state oversight agencies to have approved transit  agencies’ safety plans by January 1, 1997, and security plans by January 1,  1998. At the time of the FTA rule’s publication, 5 of 19 states affected by  the FTA rule had oversight programs in place for rail transit safety and  security, and no oversight agency met all the requirements in FTA’s rule.  During the first few years of implementation, FTA worked with states to  develop compliant programs that addressed FTA’s requirements. Ten  years after FTA promulgated the initial rule, FTA published a revision to it  in the Federal Register on April 29, 2005, which required that oversight  agencies had to comply with the revised FTA rule by May 1, 2006.
FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the State  Safety Oversight program—and hired the current Program Manager in  March 2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties in  addition to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff within  the Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to transit and  oversight agencies and additional tasks. FTA regional personnel are not  formally involved with the program’s day-to-day activities, though officials  from FTA Regional Offices help address specific compliance issues that  occasionally arise and help states with new transit agencies establish new  oversight agencies. FTA also relies on contractors to do many of the day- to-day activities, ranging from developing and implementing FTA’s audit  program of state oversight agencies to developing and providing training  classes on system safety.
The revised FTA rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway systems  operating in their jurisdictions. As specified in the FTA rule, a rail fixed  guideway system is defined as: “any light, heavy, or rapid rail system;  monorail, inclined plane, funicular, trolley, or automated guideway that is  not regulated by FRA and  is included in FTA’s calculation of fixed guideway route miles or receives  funding under FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C.  5336); or   has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be included in  FTA’s calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive funding under  FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 5336).”
Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included in  the State Safety Oversight program.
FTA’s program generally differs from other agencies within DOT, such as  the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), FRA, and PHMSA. These  agencies promulgate their own technical standards that govern how  vehicles or facilities must be operated or constructed, while FTA does not  prescribe technical standards, though the state oversight agencies can  develop technical standards.

	Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA,  other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to  ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. Under the program,  FTA is responsible for developing the regulations and guidance governing  the program, auditing state safety oversight agencies to ensure the  regulations are enforced, and providing technical assistance and other  information; FTA provides funding to oversight agencies in only limited  instances under the program. State oversight agencies directly oversee the  safety and security of rail transit systems by reviewing safety and security  plans, performing audits, and investigating accidents. Rail transit agencies  are responsible for developing safety and security plans, reporting  incidents to the oversight agencies, and following all other regulations  state oversight agencies set for them. In addition to FTA, federal agencies  such as FRA, DHS’s Office of Grants and Training, and TSA also have  regulatory or funding roles related to rail transit safety and security.

		FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Program

FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety approach  in developing the State Safety Oversight program. Federal and state  agencies and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the rail transit  system is operated safely and each of these agencies has some monitoring  responsibility, either of themselves or another entity. FTA oversees and  administers the program. As the program administrator, FTA is  responsible for developing the rules and guidance that state oversight  agencies are to use to perform their oversight of rail transit agencies. FTA  also is responsible for informing oversight and transit agencies of new  program developments, facilitating and informing the transit and oversight  agencies of training available through FTA or other organizations,  facilitating information sharing among program participants, and  providing technical assistance.
FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk- management approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and  risk-mitigation procedures, are included in the program standard that each  state oversight agency issues to the transit agencies they oversee. This is  consistent with our position that agencies make risk-based decisions on  where their assets can best be used, both in transportation security and  safety. However, FTA recognizes that some parts of the State Safety  Oversight program are not risk-based, including requiring minimum  standards for all transit agencies in the program, no matter their size or  ridership.
While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies with  regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through reviews of  oversight agency reports and audits, state oversight agencies comply with  the program requirements. For example, according to the FTA rule, when  a state proposes to designate an oversight agency, FTA may review the  proposal to ensure the designated agency has the authority to perform the  required duties without any apparent conflicts. FTA has recommended in  two instances that a state choose a different agency because the oversight  agency that the state proposed appeared to be too closely affiliated with  the transit agency and did not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA  is responsible for reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit.  FTA officials ensure they include all the required information—such as  descriptions of program resources, and causes of accidents and collisions;  they then compile this information for a program annual report, and look  for industry-wide safety and security trends or problems. Furthermore,  FTA is responsible for performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure  they are complying with program requirements and guidance. FTA audits  evaluate how well an oversight agency is meeting the requirements of the  FTA rule, including whether or not the oversight agency is investigating  accidents properly, if it is conducting its safety and security reviews  properly, and if it is reporting to FTA all the information that is required.
Finally, FTA does not provide funding to states for the operation of their  oversight programs. However, states may use FTA Section 5309 (New  Starts program) funds—normally used to pay for transit-related capital  expenses—to defray the cost of setting up their oversight agency before a  transit agency begins operations. Also, FTA officials stated this year that  FTA used a portion of the funding originally designated for FTA audits to  pay for one person from each oversight agency to attend training on the  revisions to FTA’s rule, which oversight agencies had to comply with by  May 1, 2006.

		State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit Agencies

In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are  responsible for directly overseeing rail transit agencies. According to the  FTA rule, states must designate an agency to perform this oversight  function at the time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any “New  Starts” project involving a new rail transit system, or before the transit  agency applies for FTA formula funding. States have designated several  different types of agencies to serve as oversight agencies. Most  frequently—in 17 cases—states have designated their departments of  transportation to serve in this role. In three instances—California,  Colorado, and Massachusetts—states have designated utilities  commissions or regulators to oversee rail transit safety and security.  According to state officials, since these bodies already had regulatory and  oversight authority, it was a natural extension of their powers to add rail  transit oversight to their responsibilities. Two states have designated  emergency management or public safety departments to oversee their rail  transit agencies. Officials in one state, Illinois, have designated two  separate oversight agencies, both local transportation funding authorities,  to oversee the two rail transit agencies operating in the state. In the  Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia), region, the rail transit system  runs between two states and the District of Columbia. These states and the  District of Columbia established the Tri-State Oversight Committee as the  designated oversight agency. Finally, one state, New York, has given its  oversight authority to its Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB).  PTSB officials said they have authority similar to the public utilities  commissions discussed above, but have no other mission than ensuring  and overseeing transit safety in New York. See appendix II for a table  showing each oversight agency and the rail transit agencies they oversee.
The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit  agencies varies widely. While FTA’s rule gives state oversight agencies  authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the  oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies authority  to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit agencies or shutting  down their operations. However, we found five states where the states  granted their oversight agencies some punitive authority over the rail  transit agencies they oversee. Officials from oversight agencies that have  the authority to fine or otherwise punish rail transit agencies all stated that  they rarely, if ever, use that authority, but each stated that they believed it  gives their actions extra weight and forced transit agencies to acquiesce to  the oversight agency more readily than they otherwise might. The majority  of oversight agencies, 19 of the 24 with which we spoke, have no such  punitive authority, though officials from some oversight agencies stated  they may be able to withhold grants their oversight agencies provide to the  transit agencies they oversee. Although officials from several of these  agencies stated that they believe they would be more effective if they did  have enforcement authority, under the current program this authority  would be granted by individual states.
While the states have designated a number of different types of agencies  with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a basic set of  rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the program, oversight  agencies are responsible for the following:    Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail transit  agency responsibilities, providing “guidance to the regulated rail transit  properties concerning processes and procedures they must have in place  to be in compliance with the State Safety Oversight program.”
Reviewing transit agencies’ safety and security plans and annual reports.
Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at least a  triennial basis.
Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed, and  tracking and eliminating hazardous conditions that the transit agency  reports to the oversight agency outside the audit process.
Investigating accidents that meet a certain damage or severity threshold  and developing a corrective action plan for the causes leading to the  accident.
Submitting an annual report to FTA detailing their oversight activities,  including results of accident investigations and the status of ongoing  corrective actions.
FTA’s rule also lays out several specific requirements that oversight  agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as developing  separate system safety and security plans, performing internal safety and  security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a hazard management  process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight agencies within 2  hours. The locations and types of transit agencies participating in the  program are shown in figure 2.

		Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit Safety and Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the State Safety Oversight Program

In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit  agencies, two entities within DHS are involved in transit safety security.  The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), passed by  Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, gave  TSA authority for security over all transportation modes, including  authority to issue security regulations. While TSA’s most public  transportation security duties are its airport screening activities, TSA has  taken steps to enhance all rail security, including rail transit. For example,  in May 2004, TSA issued security directives to rail transit agencies to  ensure all agencies were implementing a consistent baseline of security.  Also, TSA has hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by  Congress. While the exact responsibilities of the inspectors are still being  determined, a TSA official stated that they will monitor and enforce  compliance with the security directives by passenger rail agencies, as well  as increase security awareness among rail transit agencies, riders, and  others.
In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, another DHS agency, the  Office of Grants and Training plays a role in ensuring rail transit security  through supporting security initiatives. The Office of Grants and Training  (formerly known as the Office of Domestic Preparedness) is the primary  federal source of security funding for rail transit systems, as well as for  state and local jurisdictions; this security funding goes toward the  purchase of equipment, support planning and the execution of exercises,  and the provision of technical assistance to prevent, prepare for, and  respond to acts of terrorism. The Office of Grants and Training has  provided over $320 million to rail transit providers through the Urban Area  Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant Program.
FRA, within DOT, also plays a role in ensuring transit agencies operate  safely. In general, FRA exercises its jurisdiction over parts of a rail transit  system that share track with the general railroad system, or places where a  rail transit system and the general railroad system share a connection (e.g.,  a grade crossing). According to FRA, if a rail transit vehicle were to  operate on the same tracks and at the same time as general railroads, this  would make the rail transit agency operating the vehicle use much sturdier  (and more expensive) vehicles. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have  requested waivers from FRA and, according to an FRA official, as of June  2006, FRA granted waivers to 10 of the 11 rail transit agencies that applied  for them.
Finally, NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit  safety, though it has no formal role in FTA’s oversight program. NTSB has  authority to investigate accidents involving passenger railroads, including  rail transit agencies. NTSB officials stated they generally will investigate  only the more serious accidents, such as those involving fatalities or  injuries, or those involving recurring safety issues. Often, NTSB accident  investigations of rail transit accidents will result in recommendations to  federal agencies or rail transit agencies to eliminate the condition that led  to the accident.

	Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile; However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and Security

The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom  we spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety  and security in their organizations. These officials provided illustrations  about how the program enhanced safety or security; however, they have  limited statistical evidence that the oversight program improved safety or  security. FTA has obtained a variety of information on the program from  sources such as national transit data, annual reports from oversight  agencies, and its own audits of the oversight agencies. However, these  data are not linked to any program goals or performance measures. FTA  officials recognize the need for performance measures for its safety and  security programs and are taking steps in 2006 to begin to address this  need. Finally, although FTA expected to audit the oversight agencies every  3 years, it has not conducted these audits as frequently as it had planned  (it has conducted eight audits since September 2001). However, program  officials stated they are committed to getting “back on track” to meet the  planned schedule.

		Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Program as Worthwhile and Valuable

Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA’s State  Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it helps  them maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit officials  with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that oversees their safety  and security is worthwhile. One transit agency official explained that the  oversight agency helps them identify larger, systemic issues. In addition,  the program provides support to exert extra influence on a transit agency’s  board of directors or senior management to get safety or security  improvements implemented faster and improve the safety and security of  their equipment. For example, one oversight agency helped its transit  agency’s safety department address problems with train operators running  red light signals by helping convincing the transit agency’s senior  management to replace all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals  that were brighter and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials believe  that FTA’s program is an effective method for overseeing safety and  security. Several officials said that they felt having a state or local (rather  than national) oversight agency facilitated ongoing safety and security  improvements and consistent working relationships with the oversight  staff.
In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state  safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State  Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving transit  systems’ safety and security. Several officials commented that the program  provides an incentive to examine safety and security issues and avoid  complacency. Furthermore, several officials commented that they believed  the current system worked well and that the program provides  consistency, endowing the state safety oversight agencies with enough  authority to accomplish their tasks. Also, officials said that having the  states carry out the program provides on-going oversight in addition to  formal audits, which helps maintain a constant oversight of safety and  security issues.
Finally, several transit and oversight agency officials stated that, because  they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved safety in  their rail system, but it was difficult to show statistics proving this. For  example, the California oversight agency found an 87 percent drop in rail  transit collisions at the San Francisco transit agency (MUNI) from 1997,  when the oversight agency began oversight, to 2005. Although FTA  changed its definition of a reportable accident during this time period— making it impossible to determine exactly what impact external oversight  had on MUNI safety—both MUNI and the oversight agency staff stated  they were confident the oversight efforts had been a major factor in  reducing accidents.
APTA officials with whom we spoke were concerned that, although the  State Safety Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety  and security, the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged  industry officials to surpass minimum standards and continue striving for  improved safety and security. However, transit officials with whom we  spoke often discussed the benefits of a federal program. In addition,  officials from 17 transit agencies reported that their respective state safety  oversight agencies imposed requirements above those required in FTA’s  requirement.

		FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information, but Does Not Have the Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and Security

One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight  program’s impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects through  the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to submit. The  reports include information on many different issues including program  resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous conditions, and any  corrective actions taken resulting from audits or accident investigations.  FTA officials stated they have used the oversight agencies’ reports to  publish their own annual reports on transit safety; however, the  information was not tied to any program goals or performance measures.  In addition, the 2003 report is the most recent one FTA has issued.
According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better  information and performance measures for its safety and security  programs and has not published a report since the 2003 report because it  has been looking into improving the type of safety and security data it can  collect, and how it can use the information to track program performance  and progress toward yet to be defined goals. FTA’s 2006 business plan for  its Safety and Security Division includes a goal to continue developing and  implementing a data-driven performance analysis and tracking system to  help ensure management decisions are informed by data and focus on  performance and accountability. As part of these efforts, FTA officials  explained they are working with a contractor who is working with  oversight and transit agencies to identify measures that they can use to  develop performance measures for the State Safety Oversight program.
Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies that  FTA had planned to conduct every 3 years. However, the agency has not  met this schedule. Although the audits provide detailed information on  specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought together information  from these audits to provide information on the safety and security of  transit systems across the country. FTA tracks the deficiencies and areas  of concern and follows up with oversight agency staff to assure that each  state safety oversight agency resolves the suggested corrective actions.  Given this lack of consistent audits, we are unsure if FTA has obtained  enough information to provide a current picture of transit system safety  and security, or a framework to identify potential challenges that oversight  and transit agency officials may face in implementing the program. FTA  has audited each state oversight agency that existed prior to 2004 at least  one time since the program began; two agencies were audited twice.  However, FTA largely discontinued the audit program after the September  11, 2001, terrorist attacks and acknowledged that the agency’s priorities  shifted in the wake of the terrorist attacks. However, officials indicated  they continued to evaluate the readiness of rail transit projects to safely  and securely enter operations. In addition, according to FTA officials, FTA  is not conducting audits in fiscal year 2006 so it can use the money and  time to help states comply with the revised FTA rule, and has planned a  detailed outreach effort—including a workshop for oversight agency  officials—to help ensure compliance. FTA plans to return to its triennial  audit schedule in fiscal year 2007, with 10 audits scheduled for the first  year to get back on the triennial schedule.

	FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety Oversight Program

Despite the program’s popularity with participants, FTA faces challenges  in implementing the program’s revised rule and continuing to manage the  program. First, several oversight agency officials stated they are not  confident they have adequate numbers of staff to effectively oversee rail  transit system safety and security, and they are unsure the current training  available to them is sufficient. Also, we found the level of staffing and  expertise of oversight agency staff varies widely across the country. A  second challenge FTA faces in implementing the program is that many  transit and oversight agency personnel are confused about how security  issues in the program will be handled, and what agencies will be  responsible for what actions, as TSA takes on a greater role in rail transit  security.

		Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff Are Adequately Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers of Staff

While a majority of both oversight and transit agency officials with whom  we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety Oversight program,  many of these same officials stated that they were unsure that they were  adequately trained for their duties. Specifically, officials from 18 of 24  oversight agencies with which we spoke stated they believed additional  training would help them provide more efficient and effective safety and  security oversight. We found that the level of expertise of oversight agency  staff varied widely across the country. For example, 11 of the 24 oversight  agencies with which we spoke had oversight staff that had no career or  educational background in transit safety or security. Conversely, another  11 oversight agencies required their staff to have certain levels of  experience or education. For example, New York’s Public Transportation  Safety Board requires its staff to have 5 years of experience in transit  safety. According to some oversight agency officials who had no previous  transit safety or security background, they had to rely on the transit  agency staff they were overseeing to teach them about transit operations,  safety, and security. These officials stated that if they left their positions,  any new staff taking over for them would face a similar challenge.
Therefore, several oversight agency staff cite the lack of a training  curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness. For  example, officials from eight oversight agencies stated that the training  they had received in transit operations, accident investigations, and other  areas was beneficial, but they had not received any training on how to  perform oversight functions. Although many oversight agency officials  acknowledged that they felt the training that had been made available to  them either by FTA, the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI), or the  National Transit Institute (NTI) had been adequate, officials from 17 of 24  oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that they were somewhat  unsure of which courses they should take to be effective in their oversight  role.
Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency  staff (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state oversight  agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay staff to travel to  these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay their own tuition and  travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA or TSI. Officials from 10  of the 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as  one reason why they could not attend training they had hoped to attend.  Also, officials from all 24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA provided  some funding for them to travel to training or paid tuition for training they  wanted to attend, it would allow the oversight agencies to spend their  limited resources on direct oversight activities, such as staff overtime,  travel expenses to visit transit agencies, or hiring contractors. Several  oversight agency officials also cited the example of other DOT agencies  that provide free training or pay for state staff to travel to attend training.  For example, 30 states participate in FRA’s State Rail Safety Participation  Program. These states have inspectors who FRA has certified to enforce  FRA safety regulations. FRA pays for their initial and ongoing classroom  training and state staff’s travel to this training. In addition, the federal  agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA, authorizes state-employed inspectors  to inspect pipelines in many states. PHMSA also recently paid for two  inspectors from each state to attend training when it instituted a new  inspection approach. Officials from both FRA and PHMSA stated that  providing funding to states to train their employees helps the federal  agencies more effectively carry out their enforcement activities, easing the  states’ burden of paying to enforce federal regulations. For the first time,  FTA paid for oversight agencies’ personnel to travel to attend a special  meeting in June 2006 in St. Louis, where FTA provided technical  assistance and shared best practices in meeting the requirements of the  revised FTA rule. FTA officials agree that they have not provided training  specifically pertaining to oversight activities or provided a recommended  training curriculum to oversight agencies, but stated that it would not be  difficult to take these steps.
FTA officials told us that they considered addressing the lack of  consistency in oversight agency staff qualifications when they were  revising FTA’s rule in 2005; however, they stated they did not have the  legal authority to direct states to require certain education, experience, or  certifications for oversight agency staff. Furthermore, these officials noted  that, despite the lack of formal requirements, FTA checks to ensure  oversight agency personnel are adequately trained during its audits, and  have recommended in five instances that oversight agency staff take  additional training. They also stated that FTA could issue guidance or  recommendations to oversight agencies about the level of training their  oversight staff should have.
In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure  they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a transit  agency’s operations. Officials at 14 of 24 oversight agencies with whom we  spoke stated that more staff would help them do their job more effectively.  Officials from 11 oversight agencies told us they devoted the equivalent of  less than one person working half-time on oversight, and, in some cases,  described oversight as a “collateral duty.” See table 1 for the amount of  personnel oversight agency representatives estimated their agencies  dedicate to oversight responsibilities. While in some of these instances, the  transit agencies overseen are small, some of the transit agencies with the  highest ridership levels have similar levels of oversight. For example, one  state that estimated it devotes 0.1 full-time equivalent (FTE) to oversight  program functions is responsible for overseeing a major transit agency  that averages nearly 200,000 daily passenger trips. This state supplements  its staff time with the services of a contractor, mainly to perform the  triennial audits of the transit agency. Also, one state that estimated  devoting 0.5 FTE to oversight functions is responsible for overseeing five  transit agencies (including two systems not yet in operation) in different  cities, making it difficult to maintain active oversight when their  responsibilities are so spread out. As FTA resumes its audit schedule, it  would be practical for FTA to focus on this issue. (See app. II for  information on estimated FTE and transit system information for each  state safety oversight agency and related transit agency).

		Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA’s Emerging Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program

Another challenge facing the program is how TSA and its rail inspectors  might affect oversight of transit security. As I mentioned earlier, TSA has  regulatory authority over transportation security, and, according to TSA  officials, has hired 100 rail inspectors, who are to monitor and enforce  compliance with rail security directives TSA issued in May 2004. However,  of the officials at 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke, officials at  20 agencies stated they did not have a clear picture of who was  responsible for overseeing transit security issues. Similarly, officials at 14  of 37 transit agencies were also unsure of lines of responsibility regarding  transit security oversight. Several state oversight agencies were  particularly concerned that TSA’s rail inspectors would be duplicating  their role in overseeing transit security. One oversight agency official  stated it would be more efficient if TSA and oversight agency staff audited  transit agencies’ security practices at the same time.
TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies; FTA  program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both indicate that they are  committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating  their respective roles to transit and oversight agency officials as soon as  possible. However, as TSA is still developing its program, currently there is  no formally defined role for TSA in the State Safety Oversight program,  and TSA has not determined the roles and responsibilities for its rail  inspectors. While FTA’s rule discusses requirements for a transit agency’s  security plan, it does not discuss TSA’s specific role in the program, and  both TSA and FTA officials state that exactly how TSA would participate  in the program was still to be determined. However, the officials added  that they are working together to ensure inspection activities are  coordinated, thereby fostering consistency and minimizing disruption to  rail transit agency operations. For example, in May 2006, TSA’s director of  the rail inspector program reported that it had designated 26 rail  inspectors as liaisons to state oversight agencies. Also, these TSA rail  inspectors attended a training session where FTA presented information  on the State Safety Oversight program, and they have contacted 13  oversight agencies to begin discussions on how they can coordinate  activities.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I plan to include  recommendations to address these challenges in the report we plan to  issue next week. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or  other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

	Contact Information

For further information on this testimony, please contact Katherine  Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony include Ashley Alley, Catherine Colwell,  Colin Fallon, Michele Fejfar, Joah Iannotta, Stuart Kaufman, Joshua  Ormond, Tina Paek, Stephanie Purcell, and Raymond Sendejas.

Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems

Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States—the Port  Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink in St.  Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)  in Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia)—cross state lines and require  the collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run the State Safety  Oversight program; alternatively, states can agree that one state will be  responsible for oversight of the transit system. Each of these multi-state  transit systems has a different structure to handle oversight  responsibilities. The oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have  both developed strategies to centralize decision making, streamline  collaboration, and respond promptly to safety and security audit findings.  In contrast, the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC), which serves as the  oversight agency in the District of Columbia area, requires majority  decision making by the six committee members of the agency, including at  least one member from each jurisdiction. However, WMATA has  experienced difficulty obtaining funding, responding to FTA information  requests, and ensuring audit findings are addressed.

	Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Structures and Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently

Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure and each performs  oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia, authority to serve as  the oversight agency was delegated to one of the two state agencies— namely, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT)  agreed to allow the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) to  serve as the sole oversight agency for the PATCO heavy rail transit line.  MetroLink in St. Louis is subject to oversight from both Illinois (through  the St. Clair County Transit District) and Missouri (through the Missouri  Department of Transportation); the two organizations share oversight  duties. Finally, TOC, which is composed of multiple representatives from  each jurisdiction (including Virginia, Maryland, and the District of  Columbia), provides oversight for WMATA.
The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders daily  and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO’s track  is in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey. Until early  2001, safety and security oversight functions were shared by Pennsylvania  and New Jersey through the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA), a  regional transportation and economic development agency serving both  Southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. When DRPA  implemented organizational and functional changes, DRPA leadership no  longer believed that DRPA could perform its role as the designated  oversight agency without facing conflicting interests. As a result,  Pennsylvania and New Jersey agreed to have NJDOT replace DRPA as the  oversight agency. This arrangement allows the oversight agency to take  corrective action without seeking additional levels of approval from  Pennsylvania, although the oversight agency does keep Pennsylvania  informed of its activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides some support to  NJDOT by having PennDOT perform oversight functions for the stations,  passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania. PennDOT reports  any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted during the  performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through meetings or  other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be performed  by the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or directly by  New Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time staff members and  one part-time staff member to its oversight program, and while these staff  members must oversee several transit systems, including PATCO, their  sole responsibilities are for safety and oversight functions.
The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert–St. Louis  International Airport in St. Louis and Scott Air Force Base outside Shiloh,  Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the system included  about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles of track in Illinois.  Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois officials agreed to allow the  Missouri Department of Transportation to provide safety and security  oversight for the entire system. However, in 2001, MetroLink opened a  17.4-mile extension in Illinois, which roughly equalized the amount of  track in both states. Because of this, the states agreed that it was  appropriate for Illinois to play a greater role in safety and security  oversight, and Illinois designated the St. Clair County Transit District as its  oversight agency. St. Clair is one of the few non-state-level agencies to be  an oversight agency. The involvement of two separate oversight agencies  could create challenges to effective implementation, but the agencies have  taken steps to ensure close coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri  oversight agencies have agreed to use only one uniform safety and security  standard across the entire MetroLink system. According to area officials,  this arrangement creates consistency throughout the system and allows  both agencies to perform their oversight functions in a consistent manner.  In addition, the agencies use a single contractor who is responsible for the  triennial audit. All other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri  oversight agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies  coordinate very closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically,  there is one full-time employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his  time to safety and security oversight activities. Illinois has several  employees who devote smaller percentages of their individual time to the  program, but the Managing Director is primarily responsible for  coordinating with Missouri. MetroLink, in turn, indicated that responding  to state safety oversight directives is a priority, and the agency works  quickly to implement changes.
WMATA operates a heavy rail system within the District of Columbia,  Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the District of Columbia decided to  carry out their oversight responsibilities through a collaborative  organization managed by TOC. TOC is composed of six representatives— two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. All of the  representatives have other primary duties, and their activities on TOC are  collateral to these other daily duties, as is the case with staff at several  other oversight agencies. TOC does not have any dedicated staff, and TOC  members have limited rail operational experience. To gain access to  additional experience and expertise in rail oversight, TOC contracts with a  consultant to provide technical knowledge, perform required audits of  WMATA, and ensure that audit recommendations are completed. In  addition, TOC funding comes from, and must be approved by, each of the  jurisdictions every year. The Washington Council of Governments  processes TOC funds and handles their contracting procedures. These  issues result in a lengthy process for TOC to receive its yearly funding and  process its expenses.

	Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Their Administrative Challenges in Different Ways

The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have  attempted to streamline their decision making, while TOC has a more  collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed  strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration,  albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New  Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO’s  territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency’s staff.  New Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety Oversight  program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates communication, and  provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with on the  implementation of any new safety or security processes. Although St.  Louis has two agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight agencies  have made it a priority to ensure that they are providing consistent  information to the transit agency, and they are coordinating their activities  so MetroLink is not burdened by multiple contacts about the same issue.  To do this, the Missouri and Illinois representatives stay in close contact  with each other. Both oversight agencies stated they have in-house staff  dedicated to safety and security oversight, and the agencies have very  good working relationships. Oversight agency staff admitted that St. Louis  could face challenges in the future if staff turned over in either agency and  new employees did not establish a similar working relationship. In  addition, officials indicated that, if oversight agency staff had  disagreements over safety or security standards, or how to enforce the  existing standards, it would be highly problematic. However, officials in  the Illinois and Missouri oversight agencies, as well as at MetroLink,  thought that the current arrangements have produced one set of  standards, good communication, and effective coordination. Both  MetroLink and oversight agency staff in St. Louis credited each other with  creating an environment where this system of having multiple oversight  agencies could work well.
In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making  decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have  contributed to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA information  requests. On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would perform TOC’s  audit in late July 2005. FTA requested information prior to the audit to  facilitate the time it spent on-site. TOC did not submit the requested State  Safety Oversight program materials despite several FTA requests and an  extension by FTA to move the audit to a later date. At the end of August,  FTA initiated its audit even though it had not received requested  information, but was not able to complete the audit until the end of  September, when it received all requested materials. FTA’s Final Audit  Report to TOC cited 10 areas for improvement and provided TOC 60 days  to resolve these issues. According to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within  the time period. FTA held a follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to  check on the status of the remaining areas for improvement. As of June  2006, FTA was evaluating how many of the remaining audit findings  remained open, although FTA stated that TOC had created a detailed set of  internal operating procedures to address many of FTA’s findings and  concerns. In addition, TOC representatives stated that some of the areas  for improvement FTA found were complicated issues, such as reviewing  WMATA’s accident investigation procedures and approving modifications,  and could not be addressed within the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC  staff emphasized that, although WMATA was sometimes slow to respond  to TOC audit recommendations or information requests, they were pleased  with their relationship with WMATA and that WMATA was responsive to  TOC. Similarly, FTA officials stressed that they recognized and  appreciated the effort TOC had undertaken in addressing FTA’s findings.
TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track  outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on  at least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also, TOC  members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to FTA’s  initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds for the year  and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working with the  consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and maintained their  files. According to TOC officials, since the process for acquiring additional  funding would require approval from all three jurisdictions represented on  TOC, it was not feasible to obtain additional funding quickly. In addition,  TOC cannot take any action without a majority of its members, and at least  one member from each jurisdiction, approving the action. Reaching such  majority agreements can be time consuming since all members of TOC  have other primary responsibilities. This is especially a concern when  quick decisions are necessary, such as responding to FTA’s audit  recommendations.
TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission,  including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy  process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of  corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they  believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and  oversight agencies, due to their location in the District of Columbia, and  their proximity to FTA’s headquarters staff. To address these challenges,  the chair of TOC stated that she planned to spend additional time  overseeing WMATA and was hoping to work to find ways to streamline the  administrative and funding processes that TOC must navigate. Hiring a  full-time administrator, or designating a TOC member to serve in a full- time capacity, could help solve some of these issues. However, funding  this position could be a challenge, and the administrator would need to  have decision-making authority to be effective and act quickly.

Appendix II: List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They Oversee

agency (estimated FTE) (estimated FTE) and Transportation  Department (0.5)
Transit Authority  (0.08)
Commission (9.6)
Transit (7)
Metropolitan  Transportation  Authority (1.5)
Municipal Railway (7)
Inc. (0.9)
Regional Transit  District (N/A)
Transit Authority  (N/A)
Commission (1.2)
Transit District (1.25)
Transportation (1)
Authority (N/A)
Transportation  Authority (N/A)
Regional Transit  (0.85)
Transportation (0.1)
Rapid Transit  Authority (6)
Authority (11)
Transportation (0.1)
Regional Transit  Authority (N/A)
25.3  agency (estimated FTE) (estimated FTE)
Transportation (1.3) (5)
Department of  Telecommunication and  Energy (2.67)
Transportation  Authority (5.1)
Transportation (0.5)
Corporation (1.1)
Public Safety (0.1)
Transit (1-1.5)
Newark City Subway  (0.5)
Hudson-Bergen Light  Rail (N/A)
River Line (2)
Transportation Safety  Board (3.5)
Transit (15)
Niagara Frontier  Transit Authority  (0.5)
Transportation (1)
Regional Transit  Authority (1.2)
Transportation (1.2) (0.5)
Pennsylvania Transit  Authority (2)
Allegheny County  (0.3)
Transit Authority (1)
0.3  agency (estimated FTE) (estimated FTE)
Emergency and Disaster  Management Agency (3)
Highway and  Transportation  Authority Tren  Urbano (1.6) (N/A) of Transportation (0.25)
Rapid Transit  Authority (N/A)
Transit Authority  (0.3)
Transportation (0.4)
Transit (0.25)
Transit (0.75)
Authority of Harris  County (2)
Utah Department of  Transportation (0.8)
Authority (1.5)
Department of  Transportation (0.35)
Tacoma Link (N/A)
Seattle Center  Monorail (0.02)
Transportation (0.3) (0.85)
Illinois and Missouri  St. Clair County Transit  District (0.25-0.5) and  Missouri Department of  Transportation (0.9)
Development Agency  - St. Louis Metro (2)
Transit Corporation  (1)
Metropolitan Area  Transit Authority (1)
206.6  Because we were not able to pek with the overight gency, FTE das provided y FTA.  nlinked passenger trip nd directionl rote mile repreent the totl for ll tem within   trit gency.  gency offici, the riderhip d preented in thiable repreent  yer when the  monoril wast of ervice for n extended period nd doe not reflect the normuse of the tem.  In prior ye the ner of nnuanlinked passenger trip exceeded abt 2 million.
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Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure, carrying millions of people daily. Unlike most transportation modes, safety and security oversight of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In addition, in 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, giving the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority for security over all transportation modes, including rail transit. This testimony is based on ongoing work for this subcommittee's committee--the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I describe (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the impact of the program on rail safety and security; and (3) challenges facing the program. I also provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To address these issues, we reviewed program documents and interviewed stakeholders including officials from FTA, TSA, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the American Public Transportation Association. We also surveyed state oversight and transit agencies covered by FTA's program, interviewing 24 of the 25 oversight agencies and 37 of 42 transit agencies across the country.

What GAO Found

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for overseeing transit agencies, including reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, the TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a top priority. FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could result in duplication of effort.