Background

Energy, and specifically petroleum-based fuel, will be a key issue facing  the nation during the 21st century. The United States accounts for only 5  percent of the world’s population but about 25 percent of the world’s oil  demand. The Department of Energy projects that worldwide oil demand  will continue to grow, reaching 118 million barrels per day in 2030, up  from 84 million barrels per day in 2005. Although countries such as China  and India will generate much of this increased demand, the United States  will remain the world’s largest oil consumer. World oil production has  been running at near capacity in recent years to meet rising consumption,  putting upward pressure on oil prices. The potential for disruptions in key  oil-producing regions of the world, such as the Middle East, and the yearly  threat of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico have also exerted upward  pressure on oil prices. Crude oil prices almost tripled from 2003 through  the beginning of 2008, rising from $36 a barrel to as high as $100 a barrel.
In 2007, about 67 percent of the oil consumed in the United States was  imported, and the increased energy dependence on other countries raises  concern about international turmoil in the Middle East and elsewhere. In  addition, worldwide supplies of oil from conventional sources remain  uncertain. U.S. oil production peaked around 1970, and worldwide  production could peak and begin to decline, although there is great  uncertainty about when this might happen. Moreover, there are  differences of opinion as to how long the nation can rely on petroleum- based fuel to meet the majority of its energy needs. As a result, we have  previously reported that, in addition to expanding production, the United  States may need to place more emphasis on demand reduction strategies  as well as developing alternative or renewable energy supplies and  technologies.
DOD is the single largest energy consumer in the United States, and it  consumes about 90 percent of the petroleum-based fuel used by the U.S.  government. Jet fuel constitutes more than half of DOD’s total energy  consumption. Other types of petroleum-based fuels used by DOD include  marine and auto diesel. According to the Department of Defense Annual  Energy Management Report for fiscal year 2006, DOD consumed  approximately 4.6 billion gallons of mobility fuels in fiscal year 2006, down  from 5.17 billion gallons in fiscal year 2005. However, spending on mobility  fuels increased 26.5 percent, from $7.95 billion in fiscal year 2005 to     $10.06 billion in fiscal year 2006. DOD attributed this cost increase to the  rise in fuel prices. For example, the price of jet fuel increased from $1.70  per gallon in fiscal year 2005 to $2.34 per gallon in fiscal year 2006.  Congress, in fiscal year 2006, provided DOD more than $2 billion in  supplemental funds to cover increased fuel costs. In fiscal year 2007, DOD  reported that the department consumed almost 4.8 billion gallons of  mobility fuel and spent $9.5 billion. Although fuel costs represent less than  3 percent of the total DOD budget, they have a significant impact on the  department’s operating costs. DOD has estimated that for every $10  increase in the price of a barrel of oil, DOD’s operating costs increase by  approximately $1.3 billion.
Fuel presents an enormous logistical burden for DOD when planning and  conducting military combat operations. For current operations, the fuel  logistics infrastructure requires, among other things, long truck convoys  that move fuel to forward-deployed locations while exposed to the  vulnerabilities of operations, such as enemy attacks (see figs. 1 and 2).  Army officials have estimated that about 70 percent of the tonnage  required to position its forces for battle consists of fuel and water. An  armored division can use 600,000 gallons of fuel a day, and an air assault  division can use 300,000 gallons a day. In addition, combat support units  consume more than half of the fuel the Army uses on the battlefield.  Aircraft also burn through fuel at rapid rates; a B-52H, for example, burns  approximately 3,500 gallons per flight hour. Of the four military services,  the Air Force consumes the greatest amount of petroleum-based fuels.
DOD has existing policies and organizational responsibilities for managing  energy commodities, including petroleum, natural gas, coal, and  electricity, to support peacetime and wartime missions and to permit  successful and efficient deployment and employment of forces. Its  overarching policy directive on managing energy commodities and related  services establishes policy on standardizing fuels, minimizing inventory  levels, maximizing use of alternative fuel sources from host nations and  commercial sources, and privatizing energy infrastructure at military  installations. The Defense Energy Support Center, within the Defense  Logistics Agency, finances fuel purchases through a defense working  capital fund. The military services purchase fuel from the Defense Energy  Support Center using funds appropriated for their operation and  maintenance accounts. Various DOD components have a role in planning  for fuel demand and managing fuel storage and delivery.
DOD has been exploring issues surrounding its reliance on petroleum  through a number of studies sponsored by various offices within OSD. In  2001, the Defense Science Board issued the results of its study on  improving the fuel efficiency of weapons platforms, in response to a  tasking from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics. In 2006, the Office of the Director, Defense Research and  Engineering, sponsored a study by The JASONs, an independent defense  advisory group under The MITRE Corporation, to assess ways to reduce  DOD’s dependence on fossil fuels. Under the sponsorship of the Office of  Force Transformation and Resources, within the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Policy, LMI issued a 2007 report on an approach  to establishing a DOD energy strategy. During the period in which we  were conducting our review, the Defense Science Board, at the direction  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, issued a new report on DOD’s energy strategy. These studies  have been supplemented by internal DOD reviews and other efforts, such  as informational forums at the National Defense University, to explore fuel  reduction strategies.

	Departmental and Military Service Efforts Are Under Way to Reduce Mobility Energy Demand

OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military services have made efforts to reduce  mobility energy demand for DOD’s forces and in weapons platforms. At  the department level, OSD and the Joint Staff have several efforts under  way to begin to incorporate fuel efficiency considerations in DOD’s  requirements development and acquisition processes. In addition, each of  the military services has its own initiatives under way to reduce mobility  energy demand. The discussion that follows highlights several key efforts  and is not intended to be a comprehensive listing of all fuel reduction  efforts.

		OSD and the Joint Staff Have Begun to Address Mobility Energy Demand

Department officials from several offices within OSD and the Joint Staff  have initiated efforts to address mobility energy demand. In 2006, OSD  created the DOD Energy Security Task Force to address energy security  concerns. The task force’s integrated product team, which includes  representatives from the military services; defense agencies; the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the  Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Joint  Staff; and OSD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation office, typically meets  each month and has formed several working groups to share information  and ideas on efforts to reduce fuel demand in current and future weapons  platforms. The integrated product team reports to a senior steering group,  consisting of principal deputy secretaries of defense and service under  secretaries and assistant secretaries. Among other activities, the task force  recommended funding in fiscal year 2008 for several military service-led  energy-related research and development projects, and it is monitoring  their progress (see table 1).
In addition to focusing on research and development initiatives, DOD has  recognized a need to factor energy efficiency considerations into its  acquisition process. In 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense included  energy in DOD’s list of the top 25 transformational priorities for the  department, as part of its initiative to pursue targeted acquisition reforms.  Also, in April 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics established a DOD policy to include  the fully burdened cost of fuel—that is, the total ownership cost of buying,  moving, and protecting fuel in systems during combat—for the acquisition  of all tactical systems that create a demand for energy. To incorporate  the fully burdened cost of energy into acquisition decisions, OSD initiated  a pilot program that includes three systems: the Army and Marine Corps’  Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the Navy’s new CG(X) cruiser, and the Air  Force’s Next-Generation Long-Range Strike aircraft. To further facilitate  the implementation of this policy, OSD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation  office developed a methodology for assessing the fully burdened cost of  fuel and completed its initial analyses of the first system, the Joint Light  Tactical Vehicle, last fall. According to the DOD policy, the results of the  pilot program are expected to be used as the basis for implementation  across all relevant acquisition programs.
In another initiative, the Joint Staff added language to its guidance in May  2007 requiring that an energy efficiency key performance parameter be  selectively considered in the development of capability requirements for  new systems. The guidance defines a key performance parameter as an  attribute or characteristic of a system that is considered critical or  essential to the development of an effective military capability. For  example, a survivability key performance parameter is applicable for  manned systems designed to enhance personnel survival when employed  in an asymmetric threat environment. In general, a key performance  parameter represents a system attribute that is so significant that failure to  meet its minimum threshold could be a reason for DOD or the military  services to reevaluate the concept or system or terminate the program.
In response to the work conducted by the DOD Energy Security Task  Force, the Joint Staff has also been directed to lead an assessment of  simulator capability and capacity across the department. This effort is  expected to analyze whether the increased use of simulators could  substitute for live training without degrading operational capability. The  study will also identify barriers to implementation and needed policy  changes.

		Army Is Examining Ways to Reduce In-Theater Fuel Demand

The Army has begun a number of efforts to reduce mobility energy  demand. These activities include undertaking initiatives to reduce fuel  consumption in theater, determining the total costs of delivering fuel, and  developing an Army energy strategy. The Army, through the office of the  Army Rapid Equipping Force, created the Power Surety Task Force in  2006 to address a joint urgent operational needs statement from a U.S.  commander in Iraq that called for alternative energy sources to reduce the  amount of fuel transported to supply power generation systems at  forward-deployed locations. The Power Surety Task Force aims to foster  the development of projects and programs that are deployable within 18  months. Two of the Power Surety Task Force’s initiatives—foam-insulated  tents and temporary biodegradable dome structures that are more efficient  to heat and cool—are expected to reduce the number of generators  required to produce power at forward-deployed locations. Another  initiative is the development of a transportable hybrid electric power  station, which uses wind, solar energy, a diesel generator, and storage  batteries to provide reliable power with fewer fuel requirements.  According to Army Rapid Equipping Force officials, the power station  could potentially replace about half of the current generators at forward- deployed locations. Moreover, they estimated that annual savings in Iraq  from some of these initiatives could be at least $1.7 billion, and that other  benefits could include a reduction in the number of trucks required in  supply convoys, potentially saving lives and reducing vehicle maintenance  requirements. We did not validate the Army Rapid Equipping Force’s cost  savings estimate.
Another ongoing Army activity is its effort to determine the total costs of  delivered energy for Army systems. The Army’s “Sustain the Mission  Project” was started in 2004 to institutionalize a fully burdened cost  methodology in the Army. The methodology uses existing Army and DOD  databases, metrics, and processes to calculate the fully burdened cost of  fuel and to facilitate “what if” analyses for different assumptions and  scenarios. It is also aimed at enabling decision makers to perform cost- benefit analyses of investments in alternative energy and weapons systems  technologies. The Army has scheduled a demonstration of this tool in late  March 2008.
The Army will also sponsor a study that officials expect will lead to the  development of a tactical fuel and energy strategy for the future modular  force. The contract for the 1-year study was expected to be awarded in  2008. Army officials told us that they plan to update the Army’s energy  regulation following completion of the study. The current regulation  focuses on facility energy, but according to Army officials, the updated  version is expected to include mobility fuel as well.

		Navy Has Established an Energy Conservation Program and Other Mobility Energy Reduction Initiatives

The Navy has established a shipboard energy conservation program and  has undertaken other initiatives to save fuel on ships. The energy  conservation program has both training and award components to  encourage ships to reduce energy consumption. Training materials and  activities include a shipboard energy conservation manual, a pocket guide  to assist commanders with energy-saving activities, energy audits of ships  to show commanders how energy can be saved, and energy conservation  seminars and workshops. Awards are given quarterly to ships that use less  than the Navy’s established baseline amount of fuel, and fuel savings  achieved during the quarter are reallocated to the ship for the purchase of  items such as paint, coveralls, and firefighting gear. The ship energy  conservation program receives $4 million in funding annually, and Navy  officials told us that they achieved $124.6 million in cost avoidance in  fiscal year 2006. They said that some other benefits of this program  include more available steaming hours, additional training for ships,  improved ship performance, reduced ship maintenance, and conservation  of resources.
The Navy has undertaken other mobility energy reduction efforts as part  of its ship energy conservation program, such as ship alterations. Two key  ship alterations are the use of stern flaps and the modification of boiler  boxes. A stern flap alters the water flow at the stern to reduce a ship’s  resistance and increase fuel efficiency. According to Navy officials,  preliminary tests of stern flaps on guided missile destroyers showed an  annual fuel reduction of 3,800 to 4,700 barrels, or about 6 to 7.5 percent  per ship, which DOD estimated would result in potential savings of almost  $195,000 per year per ship. Boiler box modifications for amphibious  assault ships, one of the Navy’s largest fuel-consuming ships, are expected  to decrease the amount of fuel expended by 2 percent per ship. Navy  officials told us that this alteration has been approved and that most  alterations would be completed in fiscal year 2009. According to Navy  officials, once all alterations are completed in fiscal year 2011, this effort  could potentially save approximately $30 million per year, depending on  the price of fuel. We did not validate these potential savings.

		Air Force Has Implemented an Energy Strategy and Begun Mobility Energy Reduction Initiatives

In 2005, the Air Force implemented an energy strategy that consists of  three components: reducing demand, increasing supply, and changing the  culture. At the time of our report, the Air Force was in the process of  updating its instructions and directives to reflect its energy strategy and to  establish an overarching Air Force energy policy. In addition, the Air Force  has identified and begun to implement initiatives aimed at reducing  mobility energy demand and increasing fuel efficiency, aligning these  initiatives with its energy strategy. Four key initiatives are as follows:    Direct routing. This initiative intends to reduce flight time and fuel  consumption by flying the most fuel-efficient flight routes and altitudes.
Weight reduction. This initiative intends to decrease excess weight on an  aircraft without adversely affecting mission capability. Three categories  that are being considered are taking unused items off the aircraft, taking  fewer of the items that are needed, and looking at mission-critical items  that could be designed differently, for example, with lighter materials.  According to Air Force officials, every 100 pounds of weight equate to 1.6  million pounds of fuel, or $686,000 per year across its fleet of mobility  aircraft.
Air refueling optimization. With this initiative, the Air Force intends to  change the flight planning process to limit air refueling to only when it is  mission essential.
Efficient ground operations. This initiative intends to reduce fuel burn  during ground operations. Some actions include reducing warm-up time  and taxiing on fewer engines.
In addition to these demand-reduction initiatives, the Air Force is pursuing  efforts to increase supply through the research and testing of new  technologies, as well as renewable and sustainable resources. Through the  Air Force’s synthetic fuel initiative, jet fuels made from alternative energy  sources, such as coal, natural gas, and biomass, are being evaluated for  use in military aircraft with the goal of reducing future fuel costs and  ensuring fuel availability. The Air Force completed initial testing of a  synthetic blend of fuel in the B-52H bomber and certified the use of this  fuel blend for this aircraft in August 2007. The service has begun testing on  the C-17 cargo aircraft, the B-1 bomber, and the F-22 fighter, with  certification expected in 2008. Air Force officials said that they expect the  entire fleet to be certified to fly on the synthetic blend of fuel by 2011.
However, our prior work has highlighted challenges associated with the  development and adoption of alternative energy sources.
Finally, the Air Force aims to create a culture that emphasizes energy  considerations in all of its operations. Air Force officials told us that this  component of their strategy has multiple elements, including focused  leadership, training, educational curricula, and communication.

		Marine Corps Is Studying Technologies to Reduce Fuel Consumption

The Marine Corps has taken steps to reduce its fuel usage by initiating  research and development efforts to develop alternative power sources  and improve fuel management. For example, it is testing the use of  additional alternators in certain vehicles to provide onboard power  capabilities, which could reduce the use of petroleum-based fuel and the  number of generators needed on the battlefield. Another initiative involves  providing hybrid power—by combining solar panel, generator, and battery  energy sources—at remote sites to lessen fuel transportation demands to  forward-deployed locations. The Marine Corps expects to begin testing  this initiative in October 2008.
In addition, the Office of Naval Research is leading efforts for the Marine  Corps to develop decision support tools that process and analyze data and  improve fuel management in combat. Examples include sensors for fuel  containers to measure the amount of remaining fuel and onboard vehicle  sensors that automatically generate a requirement when additional fuel is  needed.

	DOD Has Not Established an Overarching Organizational Framework to Guide and Oversee Mobility Energy Reduction Efforts

While DOD and the military services have several efforts under way to  reduce mobility energy demand, DOD lacks key elements of an  overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee these efforts.  As a result, DOD cannot be assured that its current efforts will be fully  implemented and will significantly reduce its reliance on petroleum-based  fuel. While DOD has identified energy as one of its transformational  priorities, DOD’s current approach to mobility energy lacks (1) top  leadership, with a single executive-level OSD official—supported by an  implementation team with dedicated resources and funding—who is  accountable for mobility energy matters; (2) a comprehensive strategic  plan for mobility energy; and (3) an effective mechanism to provide for  communication and coordination of mobility energy efforts among OSD  and the military services as well as leadership and accountability over  each military service’s efforts. In the absence of a framework for mobility  energy that includes these elements, DOD has made limited progress in  incorporating fuel efficiency as a consideration in its key business  processes—which include developing requirements for and acquiring new  weapons systems—and in implementing recommendations made in  department-sponsored studies.

		DOD’s Current Management Approach to Mobility Energy Lacks Key Elements of an Overarching Organizational Framework

DOD’s current approach to mobility energy is decentralized, with fuel  oversight and management responsibilities diffused among several OSD  and military service offices as well as working groups. More specifically,  we found its approach lacks key elements of an overarching organizational  framework, including a single executive-level OSD official—supported by  an implementation team—who is accountable for mobility energy matters,  a comprehensive strategic plan, and an effective mechanism for  departmentwide communication and coordination. Our prior work on  organizational transformations has found such a framework to be critical  to successful transformation in both public and private organizations. In  addition, it is important to note that DOD has a history of creating  organizational frameworks to address other crosscutting issues.

			Responsibilities for Fuel Oversight and Management Are Diffused throughout Various DOD Offices and Working Groups

DOD’s policies for energy management assign oversight and management  responsibilities to several different offices without providing a single focal  point with total visibility of, or accountability for, mobility energy  reduction efforts across the department. Table 2 outlines various roles and  responsibilities for fuel management and oversight.
As table 2 shows, DOD policies do not assign responsibility for fuel  reduction considerations—either singly or jointly—to any of the various  offices involved in fuel management. While DOD directives designate the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as  the department’s senior energy official, with responsibility for establishing  policies, granting waivers, and approving changes in the management of  energy commodities, including petroleum, the extent to which this official  provides comprehensive guidance and oversight of fuel reduction efforts  across the department is unclear. Moreover, DOD has charged the Office  of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel  Readiness) to serve as the DOD central administrator for mobility energy  policy with overall management responsibility for petroleum and other  commodities. We found that although this office plays an active role in  maintaining DOD policy on energy supply issues and participates in other  department-level fuel-related activities, its primary focus has not been on  departmentwide fuel reduction efforts.
At the military service level, we found that the Air Force and the Army  have established working groups to address fuel reduction and other  energy issues. For example, the Air Force has established a senior focus  group of high-level Air Force officials to address both mobility and facility  energy issues. The senior focus group has created several working groups  to address specific energy issues, such as aviation operations, acquisitions  and technology, and synthetic fuels, as well as advisory groups on  strategic communication, critical infrastructure protection, and financing.  The Army also has established an energy working group to facilitate the  discussion of energy issues across the service, including how to address  rising fuel costs. The group meets each month to share information and  identify issues across the Army. At the time of our review, the Army was in  the process of establishing a senior steering group of high-level Army  officials that would meet to discuss mutual energy concerns. While the  Navy and Marine Corps have not established similar formal working  groups, officials from both military services told us that they participate in  internal meetings on fuel reduction issues.

			DOD Has Not Designated a Single Executive-Level Official for Mobility Energy

While DOD has begun to increase management attention and has identified  energy as a transformational priority, it has not designated a single  executive-level OSD official—supported by an implementation team—who  is accountable for mobility energy matters across the department. Our  prior work has shown that top-level leadership and an implementation  team with dedicated resources and funding are key elements of an  overarching organizational framework. Furthermore, leadership must set  the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear, consistent rationale that  brings everyone together behind a single mission. The Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as the senior DOD  energy official, is responsible for management of energy commodities, but  this individual also has a broad range of other responsibilities that include,  among other things, matters relating to the DOD acquisition system,  research and development, systems engineering, logistics, installation  management, and business management modernization. Therefore, this  individual’s primary focus has not been on the management of mobility  energy efforts. Moreover, from a broader perspective, the extent to which  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  has set a direction for the various OSD and military service offices  involved in mobility energy is unclear.
In addition, DOD’s Energy Security Task Force was formed in 2006 to  address long-term departmental energy security requirements, such as  DOD’s reliance on fossil fuels, but we found that the task force has been  unable to develop policy or provide guidance and oversight of mobility  energy issues across the department. As indicated in its charter, the task  force’s integrated product team is required to develop a comprehensive  DOD energy strategy and an implementation plan. Among other  deliverables, the team’s charter also requires it to define DOD’s energy  challenge, create a compendium of energy-related works, and perform a  strategic assessment of energy. While the task force has taken steps to  identify and monitor the progress of selected mobility energy reduction  projects across the department, it has not yet completed an energy  strategy or implementation plan, as well as other responsibilities.  Furthermore, OSD officials told us that while the task force has briefed the  Deputy Secretary of Defense’s advisory group on its recommended  projects, it does not have a “seat at the table” in departmental discussions  at the Deputy Secretary of Defense level or at other executive levels, such  as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Defense Acquisition  Boards, or the 3-Star Group within DOD’s Planning, Programming,  Budgeting, and Execution process.
DOD also does not have an implementation team in place, with dedicated  resources and funding, for mobility energy issues. For example, the  officials who lead DOD’s Energy Security Task Force’s integrated product  team do so as an extra responsibility outside of their normal work duties.  Other DOD officials said that the task force provides a good forum for  sharing energy ideas across the department, but lacks adequate staff to  carry out specific actions. Furthermore, a task force participant told us  that it can be difficult to find time to attend meetings while balancing  other duties. The task force also does not receive any dedicated funding to  pursue department-level energy priorities. Our prior work on the  Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) emphasizes  the importance of relating funding to performance goals. The  establishment of a dedicated funding mechanism for corrosion, for  example, enabled DOD to fund high-priority corrosion reduction projects,  which resulted in savings of more than $753 million during a 5-year  period. Without a long-term funding mechanism, DOD may not be able to  ensure that mobility energy reduction efforts receive sustained funding  over a period of years.
Moreover, DOD may not be well positioned to serve as a focal point on  mobility energy within the department, with Congress, and with the  Department of Energy or other interagency partners. During a military  energy security forum held at the National Defense University in  November 2007, representatives from various DOD offices presented  energy as an area that is significant to a breadth of issues ranging from  force protection to global stability to the security of DOD’s critical  infrastructure. They also noted that DOD has the potential to play multiple  roles with respect to energy, including consumer, market leader,  educator/motivator, oil infrastructure protector, and warfighter supporter.  These concerns, coupled with an increased national and congressional  interest in reducing fossil fuel dependence and exploring alternative  energies, will likely necessitate an increased leadership focus on long-term  energy issues, both within DOD and in its role as a stakeholder in  interagency and national dialogues. The Energy Independence and  Security Act of 2007, for example, requires a variety of national-level  actions, including that the President submit to Congress an annual report  on the national energy security of the United States. It also requires DOD  to examine energy and cost savings in nonbuilding applications, including  an examination of savings associated with reducing the need for fuel  delivery and logistical support. In addition, the John Warner National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directs DOD to improve  the fuel efficiency of weapons platforms.

			DOD Has Not Yet Developed a Comprehensive Mobility Energy Strategic Plan

DOD has not yet developed a comprehensive strategic plan for mobility  energy. Our prior work has found that strategic planning is a key element  of an overarching organizational framework. According to GPRA, key  elements of a strategic plan include a comprehensive mission statement,  goals and objectives, approaches or strategies to achieve those goals and  objectives, and methods and timelines for evaluating progress. In addition,  we have previously identified other elements that would enhance the  usefulness of a strategic plan, including the development of outcome- oriented performance metrics and an alignment of activities, core  processes, and resources to support mission-related outcomes.
DOD has taken some steps to lay the foundation for mobility energy  strategic planning. According to OSD officials, DOD has begun to  incorporate mobility energy issues into its Guidance on the Development  of the Force, a department-level strategic planning document. In addition,  the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy  Planning, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is  analyzing future energy concerns for the United States and the  international security environment and highlighting their implications for  the department. DOD officials said that the analysis is expected to provide  information for consideration in the development of future strategic  planning documents. We also observed that the DOD Energy Security Task  Force has begun efforts to define goals that eventually may be  incorporated into a DOD energy security strategic plan. OSD officials told  us that the task force’s intent is to complete this strategic plan by May  2008. However, current DOD strategic planning documents, such as the  National Military Strategy and the most recent Quadrennial Defense  Review, do not address mobility energy reduction. Furthermore, until  DOD fully develops and implements a comprehensive strategic plan for  mobility energy, it cannot be certain that mobility energy reduction efforts  align with the department’s energy mission or strategic goals to ensure  that they are appropriately prioritized, or know whether critical gaps or  duplication of efforts exist.

			DOD Does Not Have an Effective Mechanism for Communication and Cross- Service Coordination of Mobility Energy Reduction Efforts

DOD does not have an effective mechanism to facilitate communication  and coordination of mobility energy reduction efforts among OSD and the  military services. Our prior work has shown that a communication  strategy involves creating shared expectations and reporting related  progress. While DOD’s Energy Security Task Force aims to identify key  players within the energy field, its current structure does not ensure  departmentwide communication of fuel reduction efforts, particularly  among the military services, which are responsible for most of these  efforts. More specifically, during our observation of a task force monthly  meeting, we found that although this venue provides for some sharing of  information, the generally less than 2 hours allotted for each monthly  meeting does not allow for effective coverage of the spectrum of DOD’s  mobility energy issues. Moreover, we noted that although the task force’s  senior steering group includes, among others, the service under  secretaries and assistant secretaries; the Director, Defense Research and  Engineering; and several principal deputy under secretaries of defense, it  only meets two to three times a year. Furthermore, with the exception of  the Air Force, none of the other military service members on the senior  steering group have primary responsibility for mobility energy reduction  efforts within their services. Without executive-level focal points, the  military services may not be well positioned to effectively coordinate on  mobility energy reduction efforts across the department or provide  leadership or accountability for efforts within their services.
In addition, we found a lack of cross-service coordination concerning  mobility energy reduction initiatives. Army officials told us that they were  unaware of Navy research on fuel reduction metrics, while Air Force  officials said that they do not routinely discuss aviation fuel reduction  initiatives with their Army counterparts, even though both military  services are concerned about aircraft fuel consumption. OSD officials said  that while several separate groups are making efforts to reduce fuel  consumption, the efforts are often not shared or integrated. Moreover,  OSD officials told us that DOD generally lacks incentives to reward the  military services for reducing fuel consumption and faces challenges in  addressing departmental cultural barriers—such as the traditional view  that fuel is simply a commodity and that energy efficiency is not an  important consideration for warfighting. Without an effective mechanism  to facilitate communication of mobility energy reduction efforts between  OSD and the military services, DOD cannot be certain that these efforts  are effectively coordinated throughout the department or consistent with  DOD’s energy priorities and goals. On a broader level, DOD may not be  well positioned to respond to congressional or other agencies’ requests for  information on mobility energy.

			DOD Has a History of Creating Organizational Frameworks to Address Other Crosscutting Issues

Many OSD, military service, and other DOD officials with whom we spoke  expressed the need for an overarching organizational framework to  address mobility energy throughout the department. Some officials from  OSD suggested that an ideal organizational framework would bring  together the various offices within OSD and the military services involved  in fuel reduction efforts and establish business practices, analytic  methods, and technology investments that take into account strategic risks  associated with energy. Some military service officials acknowledged that  departmental oversight is needed but told us that they fear such oversight  might take resources away from their own mobility energy reduction  initiatives. Similarly, some OSD officials said they are concerned that  establishing a permanent mobility energy office or similar framework  could impose additional bureaucratic layers and slow progress on mobility  energy reduction initiatives.
We noted that DOD has established new organizational frameworks to  address other crosscutting issues, such as business systems  modernization, corrosion control and prevention, contractors on the  battlefield, and the defeat of improvised explosive devices. While we did  not evaluate the strengths or weaknesses of these organizational  frameworks as part of this review, they nonetheless provide DOD  examples to consider in determining how best to establish an overarching  organizational framework for mobility energy. For example, the Business  Transformation Agency, which addresses business systems modernization,  involves top DOD leadership by operating under the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics but  reporting directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business  Transformation. DOD has also created a management framework to  oversee facility energy, which accounts for about 25 percent of the  department’s energy use. Specifically, it has designated a senior agency  official, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and  Environment, with the responsibilities for meeting federal mandates  regarding energy reduction at installations. The department has also  created a working group charged with implementing the mandates.
In addition, DOD established an Energy Policy Council in 1985 to provide  coordinated review of DOD energy policies, issues, systems, and  programs. In the instruction outlining the requirements of this council,  DOD assigned responsibilities to various departmental offices and  designated the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics and  Materiel Management) as council chair. DOD also called for clearly  identified focal points to address energy matters within each military  department. When we asked about the status of the council, OSD officials  said that they did not believe it still existed. This now-defunct Energy  Policy Council could also serve as an example of an organizational  framework for mobility energy that provides for sharing of information  among the military services.

		Absence of an Overarching Organizational Framework Does Not Position DOD to Effectively Address Mobility Energy

In the absence of an overarching organizational framework, DOD is not  well positioned to fully incorporate fuel efficiency considerations into its  key business processes or to fully implement recommendations from  DOD-sponsored studies on fuel reduction.

			DOD Has Not Yet Fully Incorporated Fuel Efficiency Considerations into Its Key Business Processes

DOD has not yet fully incorporated fuel efficiency considerations into key  departmental business processes, such as its requirements development  and acquisition processes for new weapons platforms and other mobile  defense systems. DOD’s process to develop requirements, known as the  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, is a multistep  process that involves identifying what military capabilities the department  needs to accomplish its tasks. Once the capabilities are identified, DOD’s  acquisition process produces equipment that can meet those requirements.  DOD-sponsored studies on fuel reduction, such as the 2007 LMI report,  note that the requirements development and acquisition processes provide  opportunities for DOD to consider energy efficiencies while considering  capabilities. Moreover, the 2001 Defense Science Board report noted that  fuel efficiency benefits are not currently valued or emphasized in DOD’s  requirements development and acquisition processes. While DOD has  recently begun to take some steps to integrate fuel considerations into  these processes, these considerations are not factored in a systematic  manner and cannot be fully applied.
For example, DOD’s requirements development process does not  systematically include energy efficiency considerations, and the capability  gap assessments associated with the process do not include fuel-related  logistics, thus leaving these types of issues to be resolved after systems are  fielded. As described earlier, in May 2007, the Joint Staff established an  energy efficiency key performance parameter that would require fuel  considerations during capabilities development. However, because DOD  has not developed a methodology to determine how best to employ the  energy efficiency key performance parameter, implementation of this key  performance parameter remains uncertain.
DOD has also taken steps to inform its acquisition process with its pilot  program to determine the fully burdened cost of fuel for three mobile  defense systems. While the pilot program represents a step toward  providing visibility over the total logistics costs associated with delivered  fuel and DOD has set a fall 2008 deadline to issue guidance for applying  the fully burdened cost of fuel in acquisition programs, DOD has not yet  developed an approach for determining how it would incorporate this  information into its acquisition decision-making process. Moreover, the  2008 Defense Science Board report presented some concerns about how  fully burdened costs are being calculated. Specifically, the report cited a  concern that the analysis focused on peacetime costs and did not  adequately consider wartime costs, even though the fully burdened cost  analysis is intended to be a wartime capability planning factor. Until the  pilot program is completed and the results are assessed, DOD is not in a  position to apply a fully burdened cost analysis to its acquisition process.  Thus, the department is unable to promote greater visibility over its  acquisition decisions or more fully consider the operational and cost  consequences of the fuel burden on the logistics infrastructure.
Other key DOD business processes, such as those that address repair,  recapitalization, and replacement of mobile defense systems also present  opportunities to incorporate fuel efficiency measures during system  upgrades. However, OSD officials told us that the department generally  makes decisions about system upgrades without regard to fuel efficiency,  including the fully burdened cost, in part because such decisions require  greater up-front costs. Although DOD recognizes that by reducing energy  demand it can provide its forces greater flexibility and reduce their  dependence on the logistics infrastructure, some OSD officials told us that  DOD’s budget process promotes a short-term outlook and does not  encourage the purchase of fuel-efficient systems or upgrades that may  initially cost more but could reduce life cycle and logistics costs over the  long term. Moreover, the 2008 Defense Science Board report noted that  DOD’s lack of tools to assess the operational and economic benefits of fuel  efficiency technologies is a major reason why DOD underinvests in the  development and deployment of these technologies. In addition, OSD  officials told us that DOD does not systematically assess how making fuel  efficiency upgrades to systems would affect other logistics issues—for  example, how reducing the weight of an Army vehicle would affect the  amount of fuel the Air Force transports to the battlefield for that vehicle.  Such assessments, they said, may reveal further enhancements in  warfighting capabilities.

			DOD Has Been Slow to Implement Recommendations from Department-Sponsored Studies on Fuel Reduction

In the absence of an overarching organizational framework, DOD has  made limited progress in implementing recommendations from  department-sponsored studies by organizations such as the Defense  Science Board, The JASONs, and LMI that have urged an expansion of  efforts to reduce dependency on petroleum-based fuel. These studies  confirmed that, for many reasons, continued heavy reliance on petroleum- based fuel poses a significant problem for DOD. For example, LMI  reported that DOD’s increasing fuel demand furthers the nation’s reliance  on foreign energy sources and limits the department’s ability to establish a  more mobile and agile force. The studies found a need to focus more DOD  management attention on mobility energy matters and recommended  actions aimed at, among other things, improving the fuel efficiency of  weapons platforms, eliminating institutional barriers that bear upon the  department’s decisions regarding fuel efficiency, and developing a long- term mobility energy strategy that would lead to reduced consumption of  petroleum-based fuel.
DOD has not taken a formal position on these recommendations, and  implementation, in some cases, would require significant changes  throughout the department that could generate institutional resistance.  One study, for example, called for creating a unified energy governance  structure in order to alter DOD’s “energy culture.” During our review, we  found that DOD had taken some steps toward implementing some of the  recommendations, such as initiating a pilot program for determining the  fully burdened cost of delivered fuel and adding a requirement for an  energy efficiency key performance parameter in its Joint Staff policy  manual. However, other recommendations, such as establishing a  governance structure for mobility energy, have not been implemented (see  app. II for our summary of the recommendations in DOD-sponsored  studies and the actions DOD has taken on those recommendations). The  2008 Defense Science Board report noted that the recommendations made  by the 2001 Defense Science Board report are still open and remain viable.  An overarching organizational framework could better position DOD to  address these and other fuel reduction recommendations in a more timely  and effective manner. Moreover, a framework for mobility energy could  provide greater assurance that DOD’s efforts to reduce its reliance on  petroleum-based fuel will succeed without degrading its operational  capabilities and that DOD is better positioned to address future mobility  energy challenges.

	Conclusions

DOD continues to face rapidly increasing fuel costs and high fuel  requirements that have placed a significant logistics burden on its forces.  In light of these and other challenges associated with mobility energy,  DOD has begun to increase its management attention on reducing its  reliance on petroleum-based fuel. Increased national focus on the United  States’ dependence on foreign oil, projected increases in the worldwide  demand for oil, and uncertainties about world oil supplies will likely  require DOD to further increase its focus on long-term energy issues, both  within the department and as a stakeholder in interagency and national  dialogues. However, DOD will have difficulty addressing mobility energy  challenges in the absence of an overarching organizational framework.  Without such a framework, DOD is not well positioned to effectively guide  and oversee mobility energy reduction efforts from a departmentwide  perspective to ensure that efforts are appropriately prioritized; identify  critical gaps or duplication of efforts; and address long-term, large-scale  energy issues. In particular, no individual at the executive level within  OSD has been designated to be accountable for mobility energy and set  the direction, pace, and tone to reduce mobility energy demand across the  department. Other elements of an overarching organizational framework  include a comprehensive strategic plan and executive-level focal points at  the military services to provide for effective coordination. In addition,  until DOD takes steps to further incorporate energy efficiency  considerations into its business processes, the department is unable to  promote greater visibility in its decision making or fully consider the  effects of fuel on the logistics infrastructure. With a mobility energy  overarching organizational framework in place, DOD would be better  positioned to reduce its significant reliance on petroleum-based fuel and  to address the energy challenges of the 21st century.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve DOD’s ability to guide and oversee mobility energy reduction  efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy  Secretary of Defense to establish an overarching organizational framework  by taking the following three actions:    Designate an executive-level OSD official who is accountable for mobility  energy matters and sets the direction, pace, and tone to reduce mobility  energy demand across the department; improve business processes to  incorporate energy efficiency considerations as a factor in DOD decision  making; coordinate on energy issues with facility energy officials; act as  DOD’s focal point in interagency deliberations about national energy  concerns; and lead the department’s potential transition from petroleum- based fuel to alternative fuel sources. This official should be supported by  an implementation team with dedicated resources and funding.
Direct the executive-level mobility energy official to lead the development  and implementation of a comprehensive departmentwide strategic plan for  mobility energy. At a minimum, this strategic plan should set forth  mobility energy goals and objectives, time frames for implementation, and  performance metrics to track and evaluate progress.
Ensure that OSD takes the following steps to fully incorporate energy  efficiency considerations into DOD’s requirements development and  acquisition processes:    Develop a methodology to enable the full implementation of an energy  efficiency key performance parameter in DOD’s requirements  development process.
As part of its efforts to complete DOD’s fully burdened cost of fuel pilot  program, develop an approach for incorporating this cost information  into the acquisition decision making process.
Furthermore, to establish effective communication and coordination  among the executive-level OSD mobility energy official and the military  services, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the  Marine Corps to designate an executive-level official within each of their  military services to act as a focal point on departmentwide mobility energy  efforts as well as provide leadership and accountability over their own  efforts.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred  with all of our recommendations. Based on DOD’s comments to our draft  report, we made minor modifications to our report, including our first  recommendation. Technical comments were provided separately and  incorporated as appropriate. The department’s written comments are  reprinted in appendix III.
In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Deputy Secretary of Defense to designate an executive-level OSD  official who is accountable for mobility energy matters across the  department, DOD acknowledged that there is a need to view and manage  its energy challenges in a new, more systematic manner. DOD’s response  stated that DOD Directive 5134.01 (Dec. 9, 2005) provides the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics oversight  and policy-making authority on DOD energy matters. However, it is clear  from our review, including discussions with department officials, that  neither the Under Secretary nor any official from this office is providing  comprehensive oversight and policy guidance for mobility energy across  the department. Instead, we found that DOD’s current approach to  mobility energy is decentralized, with fuel oversight and management  responsibilities diffused among several OSD and military service offices  (see table 2 of this report) as well as working groups. DOD does not assign  responsibility for fuel reduction considerations—either singly or jointly— to any of the various offices involved in fuel management. DOD’s response  stated that its authorities and responsibilities are consistent with those  used for overseeing other significant crosscutting issues. However, as we  noted in our report, DOD has established new organizational frameworks  to address other crosscutting issues, such as business systems  modernization, corrosion control and prevention, contractors on the  battlefield, and the defeat of improvised explosive devices. Moreover,  DOD has established a focal point for facility energy, the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, within the Office  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, even though facility energy accounts for about 25 percent of  DOD’s total energy consumption. Mobility energy accounts for about  three-fourths of its total energy consumption, but there is not an  equivalent focal point. Key energy issues—including rising fuel costs,  worldwide energy demand, and the high fuel burden during operations— underscore the importance of energy to DOD and will likely require  sustained top leadership attention. DOD stated that significant mobility  energy efforts are currently under way that will provide for better  management of mobility energy. While we acknowledge that DOD has  begun to increase management attention on mobility energy issues by  creating the DOD Energy Security Task Force, the department does not  have an implementation team, with dedicated resources and funding, for  mobility energy issues. As we noted in our report, the task force’s current  structure does not ensure departmentwide communication of fuel- reduction efforts, particularly among the military services, which are  responsible for most of these efforts. Based on DOD’s response to our first  recommendation, we made minor modifications to the recommendation to  emphasize that DOD should designate an executive-level OSD mobility  energy official—supported by an implementation team—who is  accountable for mobility energy matters and who sets the direction, pace,  and tone to reduce mobility energy demand across the department. This  official should also improve business practices to incorporate energy  considerations as a factor in DOD decision making; coordinate on energy  issues with facility energy officials; act as DOD’s focal point in interagency  deliberations about national energy concerns; and lead the department’s  potential transition from petroleum-based fuel to alternative fuel sources.  Without such an official to provide this leadership, DOD is not well  positioned to address mobility energy challenges.
In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Deputy Secretary of Defense to direct the executive-level mobility  energy official to lead the development and implementation of a  comprehensive departmentwide strategic plan for mobility energy, DOD  indicated that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics is overseeing the development of a DOD energy security  strategic plan which will be reported to the Deputy’s Advisory Working  Group in May 2008. We believe that this is a step in the right direction. As  we noted in this report, until DOD fully develops and implements a  comprehensive strategic plan for mobility energy—that sets forth mobility  energy goals and objectives, time frames for implementation, and  performance metrics to track and evaluate progress—DOD will not be able  to ensure that mobility energy reduction efforts align with the  department’s energy mission or strategic goals to ensure that they are  appropriately prioritized, or to know whether critical gaps or duplication  of efforts exist.
In response to our recommendation that the Deputy Secretary of Defense  ensure that OSD takes steps to fully incorporate energy efficiency  considerations into DOD’s requirements development process by  developing a methodology to enable the full implementation of an energy  efficiency key performance parameter, DOD stated that it plans to address  how and when it will implement such a methodology in its forthcoming  DOD energy security strategic plan. However, this plan does not yet exist.
Because DOD is linking the development of a methodology for an energy  efficiency key performance parameter to this plan, the implementation of  the key performance parameter remains uncertain. Thus DOD cannot  ensure that energy efficiency considerations are factored into its  requirements development process in a systematic manner. In addition, in  response to our recommendation that DOD develop an approach for  incorporating the information from its fully burdened cost of fuel pilot  program into its acquisition process, DOD stated that it is developing a  plan on how best to assess fuel efficiency relative to the costs and  operational capabilities of its weapons systems. Again, until this plan is  completed, DOD is not in a position to apply a fully burdened cost analysis  to its acquisition process. Thus, the department is unable to promote  greater visibility over its acquisition decisions or more fully consider the  operational and cost consequences of the fuel burden on the logistics  infrastructure.
In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of  the Marine Corps to designate an executive-level official within each of  their military services to act as a focal point on departmentwide mobility  energy efforts as well as provide leadership and accountability over their  own efforts, DOD stated that it will address this issue after it has briefed  the DOD energy security strategic plan to DOD senior leaders in May 2008.  However, as we noted in this report, a lack of cross-service coordination  concerning mobility energy reduction initiatives currently exists. By  waiting to address this issue, the department cannot be certain that the  mobility energy efforts of the military services are consistent with the  department’s energy priorities and goals. Designating executive-level  military service focal points would provide improved leadership and  accountability over their own efforts as well as increased coordination  across the department.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,  and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director,  Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to  others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To address our objectives, we focused our work on the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) mobility energy issues related to fuel demand for  operations. We did not address supply issues, fuel for nontactical vehicles,  or DOD facility energy management, except to briefly describe the  organizational structure DOD employs to manage energy issues at its fixed  installations.
To identify key departmental and military service efforts that have been  undertaken to reduce demand for mobility energy, we obtained and  reviewed documentation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense  (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the military services on their key mobility  energy reduction efforts. These documents included briefings, policies,  directives, military service studies, and associated paperwork on the  specific efforts. We also interviewed cognizant departmental and military  service officials who identified and provided the documentation for key  efforts. At the department level, we spoke with officials involved with the  DOD Energy Security Task Force, including members of the integrated  product team and working groups, to obtain information about the task  force’s goals, accomplishments, and challenges as well as the specific  service mobility energy initiatives it has chosen to monitor. We also  interviewed OSD and Joint Staff officials to obtain information on their  efforts to incorporate energy efficiency considerations into DOD’s  requirements development and acquisition processes. At the military  service level, we interviewed officials to determine how each military  service is approaching its specific mobility energy reduction efforts, its  progress to date, and what challenges it faces in reducing mobility energy  demand. We did not validate the cost estimates provided by the services  for their initiatives. To obtain a broad perspective of the energy issues, we  attended two defense-related conferences that focused on national  security energy concerns and their potential implications for DOD.
To assess the extent to which DOD has established an overarching  organizational framework to guide and oversee mobility energy efforts, we  reviewed and analyzed DOD documentation, such as policies and  directives, DOD-sponsored fuel-related studies, and legislation, and  interviewed officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military services. In  doing so, we examined DOD’s key business processes, such as its  requirements development and acquisition processes, and determined the  extent to which fuel efficiency is systematically considered in these  processes. We also identified key elements of an overarching  organizational framework based on our prior work and the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 to determine the extent to which  DOD’s current structure incorporated or lacked these key elements. We  interviewed officials at OSD and the military services to obtain their  perspectives on DOD’s current approach to mobility energy, including the  extent to which the DOD Energy Security Task Force is developing policy  and providing guidance and oversight of mobility energy issues across  DOD. We also attended a meeting of the Energy Security Task Force’s  integrated product team to observe the format, content, participants, and  dialogue of a typical meeting. In addition, we asked the officials about  what benefits and consequences they saw with the existing department- level involvement (or lack thereof) in mobility energy issues. We also  identified management frameworks DOD has created to address other  crosscutting issues, such as business systems modernization, corrosion  control and prevention, contractors on the battlefield, the defeat of  improvised explosive devices, and facility energy. We did not evaluate the  strengths or weaknesses of these organizational frameworks or their  specific applicability to mobility energy. We also reviewed DOD-sponsored  studies published since 2000 on reducing fuel demand in DOD’s mobile  defense systems, focusing on studies that made recommendations specific  to departmentwide mobility energy issues. After an initial literature search  and discussions with DOD officials and other researchers, independent of  DOD, we ultimately selected four studies to include in our review. We  interviewed coauthors from each of these studies to gain a better  understanding of their objectives, scopes, and methodologies and their  perspectives on the issues covered in their reports as well as other  department-level mobility energy concerns. Two team members  consolidated the recommendations related to mobility energy from these  studies and analyzed them for similarities. They combined those that were  similar, rephrased the wording while keeping the intent, and categorized  the recommendations into common themes. Through their review of  documentation and interviews with DOD officials, they then summarized  the actions taken on each of the recommendations. A third team member  independently reviewed the results, and discussed any discrepancies with  the other team members to reach agreement on the appropriate themes  and actions taken.
We coordinated our work at the following DOD offices:  Office of the Secretary of Defense    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics    Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation    Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering    Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Logistics and    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy    Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning    Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces    Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff    Logistics (J4)    Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J7)    Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8)
Army Deputy Chief of Staff (G4)    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology    U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command    Army Rapid Equipping Force    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations    Naval Sea Systems Command    Office of Naval Research    Headquarters, Marine Corps  Department of the Air Force    Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Environment,    Logistics, Installations and Mission Support (A4/7)    Strategic Plans and Programs (A8)    Conduct Air, Space, and Cyber Operations    United States Joint Forces Command    Defense Logistics Agency/Defense Energy Support Center  We conducted our review from September 2007 through March 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Select Recommendations from DOD-Sponsored Studies on Mobility Energy Reduction

Over the past 7 years, DOD has commissioned several studies to explore  ways to reduce its fuel consumption. We reviewed recommendations  applicable to mobility energy in the following three DOD-sponsored  studies:    Defense Science Board, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel    The JASONs/The MITRE Corporation, Reducing DOD Fossil-Fuel    LMI, Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy: An Approach to  Establishing an Energy Strategy, April 2007 We also reviewed the recommendations from the 2008 Defense Science  Board report on DOD’s energy strategy. However, we did not include those  recommendations in our analysis because the report was issued in  February 2008, and the department could not be expected to have taken  action on the recommendations at the time we issued this report.
We summarized the recommendations, grouped them into common topics,  and obtained information on DOD actions taken on each of them. Table 3  presents a summary of our analysis.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Gosling, Assistant  Director; Karyn Angulo; Alissa Czyz; and Marie Mak made major  contributions to this report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel for mobility energy--the energy required for moving and sustaining its forces and weapons platforms for military operations. Dependence on foreign oil, projected increases in worldwide demand, and rising oil costs, as well as the significant logistics burden associated with moving fuel on the battlefield, will likely require DOD to address its mobility energy demand. GAO was asked to (1) identify key efforts under way to reduce mobility energy demand and (2) assess the extent to which DOD has established an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee these efforts. GAO reviewed DOD documents, policies, and studies, and interviewed agency officials.

What GAO Found

OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military services have undertaken efforts to reduce mobility energy demand in weapons platforms and other mobile defense systems. For example, OSD created a departmentwide Energy Security Task Force in 2006 that is monitoring the progress of selected energy related research and development projects. The Joint Staff updated its policy governing the development of capability requirements for new weapons systems to selectively consider energy efficiency as a key performance parameter--a characteristic of a system that is considered critical to the development of an effective military capability. The Army is addressing fuel consumption at forward-deployed locations by developing foam-insulated tents and temporary dome structures that are more efficient to heat and cool, reducing the demand for fuel-powered generators. The Navy has established an energy conservation program to encourage ships to reduce energy consumption. The Air Force has developed an energy strategy and undertaken initiatives to determine fuel-efficient flight routes, reduce the weight on aircraft, optimize air refueling, and improve the efficiency of ground operations. The Marine Corps has initiated research and development efforts to develop alternative power sources and improve fuel management. While these and other efforts are under way and DOD has identified energy as one of its transformational priorities, DOD lacks elements of an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee mobility energy reduction efforts. In the absence of an overarching organizational framework for mobility energy, DOD cannot be assured that its current efforts will be fully implemented and will significantly reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel. GAO found that DOD's current approach to mobility energy lacks (1) a single executive-level OSD official who is accountable for mobility energy matters; sets the direction, pace, and tone to reduce mobility energy demand across DOD; and can serve as a mobility energy focal point within the department and with Congress and interagency partners; (2) a comprehensive strategic plan for mobility energy that aligns individual efforts with DOD-wide goals and priorities, establishes time frames for implementation, and uses performance metrics to evaluate progress; and (3) an effective mechanism to provide for communication and coordination of mobility energy efforts among OSD and the military services as well as leadership and accountability over each military service's efforts. GAO also found that DOD has made limited progress in incorporating fuel efficiency as a consideration in its key business processes--which include developing requirements for and acquiring new weapons systems. DOD has established new organizational frameworks to address other crosscutting issues, such as business systems modernization and corrosion control and prevention. Establishing an overarching organizational framework for mobility energy could provide greater assurance that DOD's efforts to reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel will succeed and that DOD is better positioned to address future mobility energy challenges--both within the department and as a stakeholder in national energy security dialogues.