Background

		Unmanned Aerial Systems

DOD defines a UAS as “a system whose components include the  necessary equipment, networks, and personnel to control an unmanned  aircraft”—that is, an aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is  capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming. DOD  classifies its UAS into five groups that are based on attributes of weight  and capabilities including vehicle airspeed and operating altitude. For  example, group 1 UAS weigh 20 pounds or less whereas group 5 UAS  weigh more than 1,320 pounds. Servicemembers who operate the  larger and more capable UAS, in group 3 or above, are either manned- aircraft pilots or pilots specializing in flying UAS and are to receive 4 or  more months of training to prepare them to fly UAS. In contrast,  personnel who operate the less capable UAS that are classified in groups  1 and 2 generally operate UAS as an additional duty. Service  headquarters officials stated that personnel who operate UAS in group 1  receive about 2 weeks of training and personnel who operate UAS in  group 2 receive anywhere from 2 weeks to 3 months of training.
Each of the services flies various types of large UAS in groups 3, 4, and  5. The Air Force flies the MQ-1 (Predator), the MQ-9 (Reaper), and the  larger RQ-4 (Global Hawk). The Army flies the RQ-7 (Shadow), the MQ-5  (Hunter) and the MQ-1C (Gray Eagle). The Marine Corps flies the RQ-7B  (Shadow) and the RQ-21A (Black Jack). Finally, the Navy flies the MQ-4C  (Triton) and the MQ-8 (Fire Scout).

		UAS Personnel Staffing

Each service uses a different term to refer to the UAS pilot position and a  different strategy to assign personnel to this position. For example, the Air  Force uses the term remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilot and assigns  officers to this position. Specifically, the Air Force assigns various types of  officers to serve in these positions including (1) temporarily re-assigned  manned-aircraft pilots, (2) manned-aircraft pilots and other Air Force  aviation officers who have converted to this career permanently, (3)  graduates of manned-aircraft pilot training on their first assignment, and  (4) pilots who specialize in flying UAS with limited manned-aircraft  experience. The Army uses the term unmanned aircraft system operator  and assigns enlisted personnel to this position, who receive no manned- aircraft flight training. See table 1 for a summary of the terms and the  staffing strategies each service uses.

		Training for Pilots of Unmanned Aerial Systems

The services are responsible for providing three types of individual  training to UAS pilots: initial qualification, mission, and continuation  training. Each of the services is responsible for providing initial  qualification training to UAS pilots in two phases. In the first phase, pilots  are taught the fundamentals of aviation and in the second phase pilots  learn to fly a particular UAS. Each of the services uses similar but slightly  different approaches to train their UAS pilots.
Army. The first phase of training consists of an 8-week common core  course for all UAS pilots. During this phase, the Army is responsible  for teaching its pilots the fundamentals of aerodynamics, flight safety,  and navigation. During the second phase of training, the Army is  responsible for teaching its UAS pilots to fly one of the Army’s three  UAS. This training lasts between 12 and 25 weeks depending on the  UAS that is the focus of the course. During this phase, the Army  teaches its pilots to launch and recover a UAS, conduct  reconnaissance and surveillance, and participate in a field training  exercise. In addition, all Army UAS pilots are trained as sensor  operators in the aircrew of a UAS. Thus, pilots learn to operate UAS  sensors during their initial qualification training.
Air Force. During the first phase of training, UAS pilots who  specialize in flying a UAS attend 5 months of training called  undergraduate UAS training. This training consists of three courses:  first, these pilots learn to fly a small manned aircraft for 39 hours;  second, they use a simulator to learn to fly a manned aircraft using  instruments; and third, they learn about the fundamentals of flying a  UAS in a classroom setting. Air Force UAS pilots who the Air Force  re-assigns from its manned-aircraft pilot ranks do not attend this first  phase of training because they received flight training as manned- aircraft pilots. During the second phase of training, all UAS pilots  attend a 4-month course at a formal training unit to learn to fly one of  the Air Force’s three UAS platforms. Most active duty Air Force pilots  attend the formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base to learn to  fly the Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator or MQ-9 Reaper.
Marine Corps. During the first phase of training, UAS pilots who  specialize in flying a UAS attend 5 months of training with the Air  Force called undergraduate UAS training. This training consists of  three courses: First, these pilots learn to fly a small manned aircraft  for 39 hours; second, they use a simulator to learn to fly a manned  aircraft using instruments; and third, they learn about the  fundamentals of flying a UAS in a classroom setting. During the  second phase of training, Marine Corps UAS pilots attend the Army’s  8-week UAS pilot common course and 10-week UAS pilot training  courses at Fort Huachuca to become familiar with flying the RQ-7  Shadow, which the Marine Corps flies.
Navy. In January 2015, the Navy began providing a 7- to 8-week UAS  initial qualification course in San Diego, CA to its pilots of the MQ-8  Fire Scout, which is a rotary wing UAS. The Navy assigns manned- helicopter aircraft pilots who receive manned helicopter training and  have served, or are serving, in an assignment in a manned-helicopter  squadron prior to attending this course. As of March 2015, the Navy is  developing plans for its initial qualification course for its MQ-4C Triton,  which is a fixed-wing UAS.
The services also provide mission and continuation training to their UAS  pilots. Mission qualification training includes all training that takes place  once a servicemember reaches their operational unit but before that  servicemember is designated as being qualified to perform the unit’s  missions. Continuation training includes all training that takes place once  a servicemember finishes mission qualification training and is designed to  maintain and improve UAS piloting skills.

	The Army and the Air Force Face Challenges Ensuring that Their UAS Pilots Complete Their Required Training

		Most Army UAS Pilots Are Not Completing All of Their Unit Training, and the Army Does Not Have Visibility over Whether UAS Pilots in Units Have Completed Training

			Most Army UAS Pilots Are Not Completing Continuation Training

A March 2015 Army review showed that pilots in most Army Shadow  units did not complete training in their units in fiscal year 2014, which we  corroborated through both discussions with pilots in our focus groups and  unit responses to our questionnaires. One of the core characteristics of a  strategic training and development process calls for agency leaders and  managers to consistently demonstrate that they support and value  continuous learning. However, the Army’s Training and Doctrine  Command conducted a review from January 2015 through March 2015  and found that 61 of the Army’s 65 Shadow units that were not deployed  had completed an average of 150 hours of flight training. Further, the  Army assessed that these units were at the lowest levels of unit training  proficiency in the Army’s readiness reporting system.
Army Training and Doctrine Command officials stated that in January  2015, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army Training and  Doctrine Command to evaluate unit training for Army UAS units to  determine if training was a factor that caused UAS mishaps in combat.  These officials stated that in response to the Chief of Staff’s direction they  evaluated the total flight hours completed to conduct training by 65  Shadow units that were not deployed, 13 deployed Shadow units, and 2  Shadow units at the UAS initial qualification school at Ft. Huachuca.  Training and Doctrine Command assessed the level of unit readiness  associated with the amount of training these units completed using the  Army’s unit training proficiency system specified in Army Pamphlet 220-1,  Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army Procedures. This system  includes a four-tiered rating system ranging from T-1 to T-4. In this  system a T-1 rating indicates the highest level of unit training proficiency,  whereas T-3 and T-4 ratings indicate that the unit is untrained on one or  more of the mission essential tasks that the unit was designed to perform  in an operational environment. Using this system to assess the 65  Shadow units that were not deployed, Training and Doctrine Command  found that 1 unit was rated at T-1, 3 units were rated at T-2, and 61 units  were rated at T-3 or T-4. In addition, Training and Doctrine Command  found that 11 of the 13 deployed units were rated T-1 and the other 2  deployed Shadow units were rated T-2, and both of the units at the UAS  training school were rated at T-1 (see table 2).
Army Training and Doctrine Command found a number of factors led to  UAS pilots in Army Shadow units not completing training in their units in  fiscal year 2014. For example, the review found that UAS units organized  under infantry brigades have a particular challenge completing training in  their units because the unit commanders and leadership overseeing  these brigades may not be fully aware of the UAS units’ training  requirements. In addition, the review found that a number of warrant  officers were not qualified and current on the units’ aircraft that they were  assigned to oversee. The review included recommendations that the  Army plans to implement to increase emphasis on training in UAS units,  to provide training on UAS training to unit commanders, and to establish a  system to report UAS training readiness on periodic unit status reports.  However, as of April 2015 the Army had not yet taken actions to  implement these recommendations, and Army Training and Doctrine  Command officials were unable to provide a timeframe for implementation  of the recommendations.
Similarly, focus groups we conducted with Army UAS pilots and  responses to questionnaires we administered indicated that Army UAS  pilots face challenges to complete training in units. In particular, pilots in  all eight of the focus groups we conducted with Army UAS pilots stated  that they cannot complete training in their units. For example, a pilot in  one of our focus groups stated that during his 3 years as a UAS pilot, he  had been regularly tasked to complete non-training-related activities, and  as a result he completed a total of 36 training flight hours even though the  requirement is 24 flight hours per year. Further, we administered a  questionnaire to various offices within each military service and five of the  six Army UAS units that responded indicated that their units faced  challenges completing training in their units. For example, one unit  respondent stated that Army UAS units rarely have the time to meet their  training requirements. A second unit respondent stated that Army UAS  units are taxed trying to maintain proper training in units and have little  time to progress into proficient pilots due to training equipment and  resource constraints. A third respondent stated that training in units is  very limited due to competing priorities, including being consistently  tasked by Army Forces Command to train other units, which prevents  their unit from training their own UAS operators. In addition, four of the six  Army UAS units that responded stated that the Army provides too little  funding for the training that takes place in units to help ensure that this  training achieves the Army goals for that training.
Further, focus groups we conducted with Army UAS pilots and some  Army officials indicated that leadership of larger non-aviation units that  oversee Army UAS units may not fully understand the training needs for  Army UAS pilots. Specifically, pilots in seven of the eight focus groups  that we conducted with Army UAS pilots stated that leadership of larger  non-aviation units that oversee their UAS units do not understand UAS  pilot training. Moreover, four of the six units that responded to our  questionnaire indicated that leadership of larger non-aviation units that  oversee Army UAS units lacks understanding of UAS unit training needs.  For example, a unit official who responded to our questionnaire stated  that Army headquarters leadership provides very limited support for UAS  continuation training. Another unit official who responded to our  questionnaire stated that “unit leadership has a fundamental lack of  understanding of our training requirements.” In addition, officials at Army  Forces Command and an official who oversees Army UAS assignments  at Army Human Resources Command stated that infantry commanders at  the battalion and brigade level who oversee UAS units do not understand  the aviation training requirements for Army UAS pilots. Further, Army  UAS pilots in all of the focus groups we conducted stated that they had  difficulty completing UAS pilot training in units because they spend a  significant amount of time performing additional duties such as lawn care,  janitorial services, and guard duty.
While the Army review and our analysis show that most Army UAS pilots  are not completing training in their units, the high-level interest expressed  by the Chief of Staff of the Army and Army Training and Doctrine  Command’s review and associated recommendations, if effectively  implemented, could help address the Army’s training shortfalls.

			Army Does Not Have Visibility over the Amount of Training that Pilots in Some UAS Units Have Completed

The Army does not have visibility over the amount of training that pilots in  some Army UAS units have completed. Another one of the core  characteristics of a strategic training framework highlights the importance  of quality data regarding training. However, in our current review, we  found that the Army does not have access to data that would allow it to  measure the amount of training that UAS pilots have completed in Army  UAS units. The Army’s Unmanned Aircraft System Commander’s Guide  and Aircrew Training Manual establishes three readiness levels for Army  UAS pilots.  Readiness level training begins with the development of  proficiency at the individual level at readiness level three and progresses  through crew to collective proficiency at readiness levels two and one.  The Army assigns readiness level designations to UAS pilots to identify  the training that UAS pilots have completed and the training that they  need to complete to progress to the next level of readiness.
Army Forces Command identifies the Army UAS units that are ready to  deploy, according to Army Forces Command officials. Army Forces  Command officials stated that they need information about the readiness  level of pilots in UAS units to determine if a unit is ready to deploy and  perform its mission. These officials stated that currently they review Army  unit status reports to determine if a unit is prepared to deploy. These  officials stated that Army unit status reports provide information on a  variety of factors related to a unit’s readiness to perform its mission  including the unit’s materiel, personnel staffing levels, and an assessment  of a unit’s training. However, officials from Army headquarters, Army  Forces Command, and Army Aviation Center of Excellence stated that  these reports do not provide any information on the readiness levels of  the UAS pilots in UAS units because the Army does not require these  reports to include this information. In addition, the organizational structure  of many Army UAS units is an impediment to visibility over training  completed in these units. Specifically, the Army’s RQ-7B Shadow units  are organized under larger units. According to Forces Command officials,  these larger units oversee multiple smaller units, including UAS units and  other units that have different functions, such as intelligence. However,  these officials also stated that the readiness information for these UAS  units is combined with training information from other, non-UAS units in  the unit status reports because unit status reports do not provide lower- unit level details. Officials at Forces Command stated that, using these  reports, they have designated units as available for deployment and later  learned that a significant portion of the pilots in those units had not  completed their readiness level training. Without requiring information on  the readiness of pilots in UAS units as part of unit status reports, Army  Forces Command will continue to lack visibility over the amount of  training that UAS pilots have completed in units.

		Air Force UAS Pilots Do Not Complete the Majority of Their Continuation Training

Air Force officials stated that Air Force UAS pilots do not complete the  majority of their required continuation training, even though an Air Force  memorandum allows pilots to credit operational flights towards meeting  training requirements. Another one of the core characteristics we found  constitutes a strategic training framework is that agency leaders and  managers consistently demonstrate that they support and value  continuous learning. However, in December 2014, the commanding  general of Air Combat Command wrote in a memo to the Chief of Staff of  the Air Force that since 2007, Air Force UAS units have conducted  “virtually no continuation training” because the Air Force has continuously  surged to support combatant command requirements. Additionally, Air  Force officials at a number of locations stated that Air Force UAS pilots  rarely conduct continuation training for any of their unit’s missions. These  locations include headquarters, Air Combat Command, as well as the  Vice Wing Commander and multiple squadron commanders at Creech Air  Force Base and the Wing and Operations Group Commanders at  Holloman Air Force Bases.
We found that a nongeneralizable sample of training records for seven Air  Force UAS units showed that, on average, 35 percent of the pilots in  these units completed the continuation training for all of their seven  required missions in fiscal year 2014. The situation occurred despite an  Air Combat Command memorandum that allows pilots to credit flights  taken on operational missions towards continuation training requirements,  provided that the flights meet certain conditions. This memorandum also  requires UAS pilots to conduct specified numbers of training flights  associated with each of the missions that MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9  Reaper units perform. We found that 91 percent or more of the pilots in  the seven units completed continuation training for one of the seven  missions, specifically the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  mission, which involves obtaining information about the activities and  resources of an enemy. In contrast, an average of 26 percent of pilots in  these seven units completed the continuation training for another one of  the seven missions, the air interdiction mission, which involves diverting  or destroying the enemy’s military potential. Air Force officials stated  that operational flights do not provide an ideal environment to conduct  training because pilots are not able to perform all of the tasks needed for  a training flight during operational missions. Moreover, Creech Air Force  Base officials also stated that UAS pilots at Creech Air Force Base  conduct continuation training on less than two percent of all the hours that  UAS pilots on Creech Air Force Base currently fly.
According to Air Force officials, some Air Force UAS pilots have not  completed their continuation training because they spend most of their  time conducting operational missions due to shortages of UAS pilots and  high workloads. In addition, Creech Air Force Base officials stated that  UAS pilots perform one to two of their required missions regularly based  on operational needs, which also allows them to fulfill training  requirements for those missions. However, due to shortages of UAS  pilots and high workloads some pilots do not complete training  requirements for their other five to six missions. As of March 2015, the Air  Force has staffed the UAS pilot career field at 83 percent of the total  number of UAS pilots that the Air Force believes are necessary to sustain  current UAS operations and training. We conducted focus groups with  seven groups of Air Force UAS pilots and pilots in all these groups stated  that they could not conduct continuation training because their units were  understaffed. In addition, Air Force headquarters officials stated that they  think the current number of UAS pilots that the Air Force has approved for  its UAS units is not enough to accomplish the workload of UAS units. As  a result, workloads for Air Force UAS units are high, and in January 2015,  the Secretary of the Air Force stated that on average Air Force UAS pilots  fly 6 days in a row and work 13- to 14-hour days.
In April 2014, we found that the Air Force had shortages of UAS pilots  and we made multiple recommendations to address these shortages. In  particular, we found that the Air Force had operated below its optimum  crew ratio, which is a metric used to determine the personnel needs for  Air Force aviation units, and that the Air Force had not tailored its  recruiting and retention strategy to align with the specific needs and  challenges of UAS pilots. We made four recommendations related to  these findings including that the Air Force update crew ratios for UAS  units to help ensure that the Air Force establishes a more accurate  understanding of the required number of UAS pilots needed in its units  and that the Air Force develop a recruiting and retention strategy that is  tailored to the specific needs and challenges of UAS pilots to help ensure  that the Air Force can meet and retain required staffing levels to meet its  mission.
The Air Force concurred with these recommendations and has taken  some actions but has not yet fully implemented them. Specifically, a  headquarters Air Force official stated that, in February 2015, the Air Force  completed the first phase of a three-phase personnel requirements study  designed to update the UAS unit crew ratio. The headquarters official also  stated that Air Force senior leaders are reviewing the results of the first  phase of the study and expect to update the UAS unit crew ratio by  summer 2015. In addition, in fiscal year 2014, the Air Force began using  a new process that provides the Air Force with greater flexibility to assign  cadets who were preparing to join the Air Force. Under this process, the  cadets are assigned to various Air Force careers, which enabled the Air  Force to meet its quota for the number of cadets who graduate from Air  Force officer schools and agree to serve as UAS pilots. Further, in  January 2015, the Air Force more than doubled the Assignment Incentive  Pay for UAS pilots who are reaching the end of their 6-year service  commitment to $1500 a month. As noted above, the Air Force continues  to face a shortage of UAS pilots, but fully implementing our April 2014  recommendations would better position the Air Force to address these  shortages. See additional information on these recommendations and the  Air Force’s actions to date in appendix I.

	The Army and the Air Force Have Taken Actions to Increase the Number of Instructors in UAS Units, but the Army Has Not Fully Addressed Potential Risks that Could Hinder the Success of Its UAS Pilot Training

		The Army Has Taken Action to Increase the Number of Instructors, but Its Use of Less Experienced Instructors Could Affect the Quality of UAS Pilot Training

The Army has taken action to increase the number of UAS pilot  instructors, but in doing so, it is using less experienced instructors, which  could affect the quality of the training provided to UAS pilots. The Army  significantly increased the number of UAS units and UAS pilots in recent  years, and as a result many lack the experience and proficiency needed  to be an instructor, according to officials from the Army Aviation Center of  Excellence. To address this shortage and accommodate the need for  more instructors, the Army began to waive course prerequisites for the  UAS instructor course so that it could enable these less experienced and  less proficient UAS pilots to become instructors, according to officials  from the Army Aviation Center of Excellence.
Army Aviation Center of Excellence officials also stated that the instructor  course prerequisites are important because they help ensure that the  UAS pilots the Army trains to become instructors are the most  experienced and most proficient pilots and can successfully train other  UAS pilots. One of the officials also stated that the Army would prefer not  to grant waivers to any UAS pilot attending the course so that the pilots  who become instructors would be experienced and able to share their  experiences with the pilots they train. In contrast, pilots with less  experience may not be able to refer to and use more varied experiences  during instructional time with UAS pilots and thus may not be as prepared  to successfully train other UAS pilots to perform at the highest levels of  proficiency.
The instructor course prerequisites include a minimum rank, a minimum  number of flying hours piloting a UAS, whether a pilot has completed their  readiness level training, and whether a pilot has recently completed  certain flying tasks—known as currency. For example, the Army course  prerequisites specify that pilots attending the course to become an  instructor for the MQ-1C Gray Eagle should (1) hold the enlisted rank of  sergeant (E-5), (2) have flown a UAS for a minimum of 200 hours, (3) be  designated at readiness level one, and (4) be current in their experience,  specifically by having flown a UAS within the last 60 days.
According to an official from the Aviation Center of Excellence, a pilot’s  battalion commander and the commander of the UAS school are  responsible for approving requests to waive these course prerequisites.  Following their approval, a pilot’s unit commander assesses the pilot’s  potential to successfully complete the instructor training and fulfill duties  required of instructors. The Army waived the instructor course  prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending the course  from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015.  Specifically, the Army waived one or more of these course prerequisites  for 38 percent of the pilots who attended the course in fiscal year 2013,  48 percent of the pilots who attended the course in fiscal year 2014, and  23 percent of the pilots who attended the course from October 2014  through February 2015 (see table 3).
The Army has taken some steps to mitigate the potential risks of using  less proficient instructors. Specifically, Army Aviation Center of  Excellence officials stated that in fiscal year 2015, the Army stopped  waiving the instructor course prerequisites that UAS pilots be designated  at readiness level one and that pilots be current in their experience flying  a UAS. In addition, prior to fiscal year 2015, the Army had provided  remedial training to pilots who had not met these two course  prerequisites. The Army’s action to stop allowing waivers for these two  course prerequisites helps to ensure that the pilots it allows to become  instructors meet the minimum UAS flying proficiency course prerequisites.
However, the Army has not fully addressed the potential risks of using  less proficient and less experienced instructors. Although the Army  reduced the number of waivers granted so far in fiscal year 2015 by no  longer waiving the course prerequisites related to minimum proficiency,  the Army can continue to grant waivers for the course prerequisites  related to experience, including that UAS pilots have a minimum number  of flying hours in a UAS and hold the minimum enlisted rank of sergeant.  In addition, the Army has not provided additional preparation to address  the gap in experience for the instructors who have completed the  instructor course nor does it have plans to address this gap in experience  for those pilots who will attend the course in the future.
Within a strategic training and development process, one core practice  calls for agencies to provide appropriate resources for their training  programs, and that agency leaders should consistently demonstrate that  they support and value continuous learning. Army officials have stated  that experienced instructors are central to providing successful  continuous learning to its UAS pilots, and in that regard are important  resources in training programs. However, the Army faces risks that by  training with less experienced instructors, Army UAS pilots may not be  receiving the highest caliber of training needed to prepare them to be able  to successfully perform UAS missions in the future. In addition, though  the Army expects to face shortages of experienced and proficient UAS  pilots through fiscal year 2019, the Army has not fully addressed the  potential risks of training with less experienced pilots, such as by  providing additional preparation for current and future instructors who do  not meet one or more course prerequisites related to experience to  enhance their ability to successfully provide training.

		The Air Force Has Taken Action to Address Shortages of Instructors at Its UAS Formal Training Unit

The Air Force has taken action to address shortages of instructors at its  UAS formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base. The second major  phase of the Air Force’s initial qualification training occurs in the formal  training unit, and all of the Air Force’s active duty UAS pilots are to attend  this training to learn to operate the UAS that they will fly in their  operational units. As we noted earlier, a core characteristic of a strategic  training framework is that agencies should provide appropriate resources  for its training programs. However, we found that as of March 2015, the  Air Force staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base  at 63 percent of their planned staffing levels. In December 2014, the  commanding general of Air Combat Command stated that the Air Force  has not fully staffed the formal training unit due to shortages of UAS pilots  across the Air Force and as a result “pilot production has been  decimated.” An Air Force headquarters official stated that shortages of  instructors at the formal training unit are a key reason that the Air Force  has shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force.
An Air Force headquarters official stated that the Air Force is taking action  to address these shortages. Specifically, the Air Force is studying the  personnel requirements for the formal training unit, and expects the Air  Force to report the results of this study by spring 2016. The Air Force  official also stated that the results of that study will likely show that the Air  Force UAS pilot formal training unit should have additional instructor  positions. Although the Air Force formal training unit faces a shortage of  UAS instructor pilots, fully implementing our April 2014 recommendations  should better position the Air Force to address these shortages.

	The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services Coordinate to Some Extent but Potential Benefits from Enhanced Coordination Efforts to Train UAS Pilots Exist

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and  the military services coordinate on UAS pilot training in some distinct  areas; however, potential benefits from enhanced coordination efforts on  training UAS pilots exist. According to key practices, federal agencies can  enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by defining a common  outcome and establishing joint strategies. Collaborating agencies  should also assess their relative strengths and limitations to identify  opportunities to leverage each others’ resources. Further, agencies  should establish compatible standards, policies, procedures and data  systems to enable a cohesive working relationship.
During our review, in January 2015, the Acting Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Readiness) stated that the services should  coordinate and collaborate with one another regarding their efforts to train  UAS pilots. He stated that in coordinating with one another the services  should share best practices to help the department as a whole train its  UAS pilots more effectively and efficiently. Further, the Acting Deputy  Assistant Secretary stated that because the services fly similar UAS, they  may be able to train their pilots more effectively and efficiently by taking  advantage of the lessons learned that they may have acquired as they  have trained their pilots separately. He cited similarities between the Air  Force’s Predator and the Army’s Gray Eagle and acknowledged  similarities between the Air Force’s Global Hawk and the Navy’s Triton  (see Fig. 1).
In this review of UAS pilot training, we found that the Office of the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the services have taken  some actions to coordinate on UAS training and these actions are  consistent with the key practices that can enhance and sustain federal  agency coordination. For example, the Air Force and the Army train all  Marine Corps UAS pilots, which is consistent with the practice of  identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources to initiate or  sustain a collaborative effort. In addition, the Air Force and the Army have  published UAS strategies that outline their services’ plans to develop,  organize and incorporate the use of UAS into their missions, which is  consistent with the practice of reinforcing agency accountability for  collaborative efforts with plans and reports. However, the Air Force and  Army strategies do not address if or how the services will coordinate with  one another on UAS pilot training. Further, we also found that the actions  that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness)  and the services had taken were not fully consistent with these key  practices. See table 4 for a description of these key practices, a  description of DOD actions, and our assessment.
In addition, officials from three of the four military service headquarters  offices who responded to our questionnaire expressed limited support for  further coordination with the other services on UAS pilot training. For  example, headquarters officials from the Army and the Air Force stated  that they did not anticipate any additional benefit to coordinating with the  other services on UAS pilot training. Further, headquarters officials from  the Army and the Navy stated that they did not foresee any other benefits  from coordinating with the other services on UAS pilot training because  their services fly different UAS with different missions.
Moreover, DOD has not yet issued a UAS training strategy that  addresses if and how the services should coordinate with one another to  share information on training UAS pilots. In 2010, we found that DOD had  commenced initiatives to address training challenges, but had not  developed a results-oriented strategy to prioritize and synchronize these  efforts. We recommended that DOD establish a UAS training strategy to  comprehensively resolve challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force  and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations and DOD concurred  with our recommendation. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary  of Defense (Readiness) engaged the RAND Corporation to draft a UAS  training strategy and provided RAND with guidelines about the content  and purpose of the strategy. However, these guidelines do not discuss if  or how the services should coordinate on UAS pilot training. In  September 2014, RAND provided a draft of a UAS training strategy to the  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness), but the  draft also did not discuss coordination on UAS pilot training. As of April  2015, the draft training strategy had not been updated to include this  information, and officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Readiness) were unable to provide a timeframe for  completion of this training strategy.
Until DOD issues a UAS training strategy that addresses if and how the  services should coordinate with one another to share information on  training UAS pilots, the services may miss opportunities to improve the  effectiveness and efficiency of this training. In response to our  questionnaire, 6 out of the 11 units stated that potential benefits may exist  from coordinating with other services on UAS pilot training. For example,  1 Army UAS unit stated that coordinating training with other services  could help shorten the amount of time they spend acclimating to other  services once deployed and would allow for an easier transition to  working together during missions. Additionally, another Army UAS unit  stated that they were unable to train because of a poorly written certificate  of authorization, which is the document that requires approval by the  Federal Aviation Administration before the services can fly their UAS in  the National Airspace System. Further, the unit stated that they could  have avoided a temporary halt in training and benefited from reaching out  to the Air Force for guidance on this process rather than the unit spending  time developing their own system. Without taking steps to address  coordination among the services, the Office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the services may waste scarce  funds on training UAS pilots and may limit the efficiency and effectiveness  of these training efforts.

	Conclusions

DOD’s UAS portfolio has grown over the years to rival the traditional  manned systems. In its Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap  FY2013-2038 report, DOD highlighted the importance of developing a  comprehensive UAS training strategy to guide the myriad DOD UAS  training efforts across all systems, and to help ensure effective and  efficient training of UAS pilots. However, without amending unit status  reports to require information on the readiness level of pilots in UAS units,  Army Forces Command will continue to lack visibility over the amount of  training that UAS pilots have completed in units and will not be able to  ensure that all Army UAS units being considered for deployment have  completed their required training. In addition, without taking additional  steps to mitigate the potential risks of using less experienced instructors,  the Army may be unable to ensure that the training these instructors  provide will result in highly skilled future UAS pilots. Finally, it is important  that DOD identify ways to achieve its missions more efficiently and  effectively. It is encouraging that the Office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the services coordinate on UAS  pilot training in some areas such as the Air Force and the Army training  all Marine Corps UAS pilots and the Air Force and the Army publishing  UAS strategies. However, without addressing how the services can  enhance their coordination efforts on training UAS pilots in DOD’s  forthcoming UAS training strategy, the services may not be able to  achieve additional benefits to the efficiency and effectiveness of UAS pilot  training across the department.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making three recommendations to the Secretary of Defense:
To provide greater visibility over the extent to which Army UAS units  have completed required training to leaders responsible for  deployment decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretary of the Army to require unit status reports to  include information on the readiness levels of UAS pilots in UAS units.
To help ensure that Army UAS pilots receive the highest caliber of  training to prepare them to successfully accomplish UAS missions, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to take additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by its  waiver of course prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots  attending the course to become instructors, such as by providing  additional preparation for current and future instructors who do not  meet one or more course prerequisites to enhance their ability to  successfully provide training.
To increase opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency  of UAS pilot training across DOD, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness to address how the services should coordinate with one  another in the strategy on UAS pilot training that the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is current  drafting.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In written  comments, DOD concurred with each of our three recommendations.  DOD stated that it will review the implementation status of each of the  recommendations within six months. DOD’s comments are reprinted in  their entirety in appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments that  we have incorporated into this report where applicable.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries of the Air  Force, the Army, and the Navy. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or FarrellB@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Steps Taken by the Air Force to Address 2014 GAO Recommendations Related to UAS Personnel Challenges

In April 2014, we found that the Air Force had shortages of pilots of  unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). In particular, we found that the Air  Force (1) has operated below its optimum crew ratio, which is a metric  used to determine the personnel needs for Air Force aviation units; (2)  has not developed a minimum crew ratio; (3) has not tailored its recruiting  and retention strategy to align with the specific needs and challenges of  UAS pilots; and (4) has not considered the viability of using personnel  other than officers such as enlisted or civilians as UAS pilots. We made  four recommendations related to these findings. Since we issued our  report in April 2014, the Air Force has taken some actions, but has not yet  fully implemented them.
In the committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, the Senate Committee on Armed  Services directed that the Air Force report to the committee by September  30, 2014, on its efforts to implement three recommendations from our  2014 report related to staffing levels of Air Force UAS pilots. On  September 22, 2014, the Air Force reported on the status of their efforts  to implement these recommendations.

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We focused on three types of individual training that the services provide  to pilots of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) pilots: initial qualification,  mission, and continuation training. In addition, we focused our review on  initial qualification instructors and instructors within the units. We focused  our review on Army and Air Force UAS pilot training programs in our first  two objectives assessing the extent to which the Army and the Air Force  face challenges in ensuring that their UAS pilots complete their required  training and have a sufficient number of UAS pilot instructors. We focused  this part of our review on the Army and the Air Force because these  services have significantly more UAS pilots than the Navy and the Marine  Corps. However, for our third objective, we assessed the coordination  that occurs among the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of  Defense (Readiness) and all four of the military services because we  determined that there may be benefits to collaboration among the Office  of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and all of the  services regardless of the maturity and size of their current UAS training  programs.
We assessed the reliability of the data we used to support findings in this  report by reviewing documentation of the data and interviewing agency  officials knowledgeable about the data and the way they are maintained.  Specifically, we assessed the reliability of the Air Force’s data on fiscal  year 2014 continuation training flights completed by seven UAS units at  Creech Air Force Base to fulfill requirements laid out in the Air Combat  Command Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Memorandum; the Army’s  fiscal year 2013 to February 2015 data on waivers granted to UAS pilots  attending the UAS school to become instructors; and March 2015 data on  the Air Force’s UAS pilot staffing levels and staffing levels at the formal  training unit. We selected these dates, because they are the most recent  years for which the data were available. We determined that these data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, such as the  discussion of the percentage of Army UAS pilots that required a waiver to  become a UAS instructor by fiscal year; the overall staffing levels of Air  Force UAS pilots; the staffing levels of Air Force UAS instructor pilots at  the formal training unit; and the completion of continuation training by a  nongeneralizeable sample of seven UAS units at Creech Air Force Base.
To evaluate the extent to which the Army and the Air Force face  challenges, if any, in ensuring that their UAS pilots complete their  required training, we reviewed documents that outline training  requirements for UAS pilots in the Army and the Air Force including the  Army’s UAS Commander’s Guide and Aircrew Training Manual and the  Air Force Air Combat Command Ready Aircrew Program Tasking  Memorandum. We also reviewed reports that we previously issued that  address topics related to UAS pilot training including a 2014 report on the  personnel challenges that Air Force UAS pilots face and a 2010 report on  challenges that the Air Force and the Army faced training personnel for  UAS operations.
We assessed the services’ UAS pilot training programs using a set of  core characteristics that we previously developed in 2004. In 2004, we  found that agencies must continue to build their fundamental  management capabilities in order to effectively address the nation’s most  pressing priorities. To help agencies build their management capabilities,  we developed a framework that includes principles and key questions that  federal agencies can use to ensure that their training investments are  targeted strategically. In developing this framework, we concluded that  there is a set of certain core characteristics that constitute a strategic  training and development process. These characteristics include  leadership commitment and communication; effective resource allocation;  and continuous performance improvement. To develop these  characteristics in 2004, we consulted government officials and experts in  the private sector, academia, and nonprofit organizations; examined laws  and regulations related to training and development in the federal  government; and reviewed the sizeable body of literature on training and  development issues, including previous GAO products on a range of  human capital topics.
To identify the extent to which the military services applied these  principles in their training programs, we developed a questionnaire based  on these characteristics and on the services’ UAS training programs. We  adapted these core characteristics by modifying the language of some of  the criteria that we used in our questionnaire, to more appropriately apply  to UAS pilot training. We reviewed our adaptation with officials from the  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness as well  as officials from the headquarters of each of the military services. These  officials agreed that the framework was relevant to our review and  provided feedback on the questions we included in our questionnaire. We  distributed the questionnaire to each of the service’s headquarters,  training commands, and operational commands. To include diverse UAS  unit perspectives, we also randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample  of 14 UAS units in each of the services based on factors including aircraft  types flown in the UAS unit and geographical location of the unit. We  distributed the questionnaire to the commanders of the selected units. We  attained an 85 percent response rate for the questionnaires. We analyzed  responses we obtained from each of the questionnaires, and compared  the perspectives and documentation we collected to the GAO criteria.
We reviewed a March 2015 Army Training and Doctrine Command review  that evaluated continuation training for Army UAS units. The results of  this review are not generalizable. We also reviewed continuation training  requirements included in the Air Force’s 2014 Ready Aircrew Program  Tasking Memorandum. We compared these requirements to fiscal year  2014 training data for all seven of Creech Air Force Base’s MQ-1  Predator and MQ-9 Reaper units that have the same mission  requirements outlined in this memorandum.  Fiscal year 2014 is the most  recent year for which the data were available. The results from these  units of this data are not generalizable to other UAS units or fiscal years.  We also interviewed Air Force officials at Headquarters, Air Combat  Command, Air Education and Training Command, as well as the Vice  Wing Commander and multiple UAS unit commanders at Creech Air  Force Base and the Wing Commander and Operations Group and  multiple UAS unit commanders at Holloman Air Force Base to determine  Air Force UAS pilots’ training completion rates; the Air Force’s UAS  manning levels; and metrics that Air Force has in place to determine  aviation personnel requirements.
To determine the extent to which the Army and the Air Force have a  sufficient number of qualified UAS pilot instructors, we identified and  analyzed criteria included in the Army’s course prerequisite requirements  that provide the minimum requirements for rank, the number of flying  hours a pilot has flown, the readiness level of a pilot, and whether that  pilot is current, which measures if the pilot has recently completed certain  flying tasks. We compared these course prerequisites to the most recent  Army documentation on UAS operators who attended the Army school to  become an instructor in fiscal year 2013, fiscal year 2014, and October  2014 to February 2015, to determine the number of instructors who met  these course prerequisites. We also interviewed the Director of Training  at the Army’s initial qualification school at Fort Huachuca, and officials at  Army Headquarters to get their views about whether the Army school and  units have adequate numbers of instructors.
We also compared Air Force documentation on the actual numbers of Air  Force UAS pilots in Air Force UAS assignments to the Air Force planned  number of positions for UAS pilots. In addition, we compared the actual  numbers of Air Force UAS instructor pilots at the formal training unit at  Holloman Air Force Base to the Air Force planned number of positions at  the formal training unit. The formal training unit is the organization that  provides training for the second major phase of the Air Force’s initial  qualification training and all of the Air Force’s active duty UAS pilots are  to attend this training to learn to fly the MQ-1 Predator or MQ-9 Reaper.  We also interviewed the Wing Commander and Operations Group and  multiple UAS unit commanders at the Air Force’s formal training unit at  Holloman Air Force Base to get their views about whether the formal  training units have a sufficient numbers of instructors.
We visited UAS units at five bases: Ft. Huachuca, AZ; Ft. Hood, TX;  Holloman Air Force Base, NM; Creech Air Force Base, NV; and Marine  Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC. We chose units at these locations to  get a perspective on a variety of UAS operations and selected the  locations on the basis of several factors including the type and size of  UAS flown in the unit; missions of the unit; whether or not the unit is  deployed (we did not meet with units who were deployed); number of  UAS pilots in the unit; the major command of the unit; and location of the  unit. At each instillation, we met with unit commanders and other leaders  to discuss their views about training UAS pilots.
We also conducted 18 focus groups with active-duty UAS pilots at these  locations to gain their perspectives on their services’ UAS training efforts.  We met with eight Army focus groups, seven Air Force focus groups, and  three Marine Corps focus groups for 90 minutes each. To select specific  UAS pilots to participate in our focus groups, we worked with officials at  each of the instillations to develop a diverse group of active-duty UAS  pilots. To obtain a variety of perspectives, we selected UAS pilots with  various amounts of experience flying UASs and additional duties in their  units. To help ensure an open discussion in the groups, we organized  them by rank and met with groups of similar rank. We also met with some  groups of instructor pilots separately. These groups typically consisted of  six to nine UAS pilots.
We used content analysis to analyze detailed notes from each focus  group to identify themes that participants expressed across all or most of  the groups. To do this, two GAO analysts analyzed an initial set of the  records and individually developed themes. Then, they convened to  discuss and agree on a set of themes to perform the coding. The analysts  then analyzed our records and made coding decisions based on these  themes. Following the initial analysis by one analyst, a second analyst  reviewed all of the coding decisions that the first analyst made for each of  the records. Where there were discrepancies, the analysts reviewed one  another’s coding and rationale for their coding decisions and reached a  consensus on which codes should be used. The results of our analyses of  the opinions of UAS pilots we obtained during our focus groups are not  generalizable to the populations of all UAS pilots in the Army, Air Force,  and Marine Corps.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD and the military services coordinate  and collaborate with one another to train their UAS pilots, we used criteria  for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies that  we previously developed. We assessed the department’s actions using  seven of the eight key practices from our prior report. We excluded one  key practice related to reinforcing individual accountability for  collaborative efforts through performance management systems.  Evaluating this practice involves assessing the extent to which agencies  set expectations for senior executives for collaboration within and across  organizational boundaries in their individual performance plans. We did  not include this key practice in our review because many of the officials  who oversee UAS pilot training in the services are military members and  the military does not establish individual performance plans for its  servicemembers. We reviewed our adaptation with officials from the  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness. These  officials agreed that these practices were relevant to our review. The  seven key practices that we assessed in our review were: (1) defining and  articulating a common outcome; (2) establishing mutually reinforcing or  joint strategies; (3) identifying and addressing needs by leveraging  resources; (4) agreeing on roles and responsibilities; (5) establishing  compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across  agency boundaries; (6) developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and  report on results; and (7) reinforcing agency accountability for  collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.
To identify the extent to which the DOD organizations applied these  practices, we analyzed documentation related to coordination on UAS  pilot training that we obtained from a variety of DOD offices. For example,  we analyzed guidelines for a UAS training strategy that the Office of the  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness provided to the  RAND Corporation; a draft UAS training strategy developed by the RAND  Corporation; UAS strategies that the Army and Air Force issued; and  documentation that shows that the Air Force and Army train all Marine  Corps UAS pilots. In addition, we analyzed responses we obtained from  each of the questionnaires we administered and focused on questions  related to coordination among the services. Further, we collected  additional information in interviews with officials from the Office of the  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, the UAS Task  Force, and knowledgeable officials within each military service. We then  compared the information we collected from these sources to the key  practices that help enhance and sustain coordination that we previously  developed to determine the extent to which the Office of the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and the military services  coordinate to train UAS pilots.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2014 to May 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix III: Comment from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Lori Atkinson (Assistant Director),  James P. Klein, Leigh Ann Sennette, Michael Silver, Paola Tena, Alex  Welsh, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Michael Willems made key contributions  to this report.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense's (DOD) UAS portfolio has grown over the years to rival traditional manned systems, and, as of July 2013, DOD had acquired over 10,000 UAS, according to a 2013 DOD report. Training DOD UAS pilots, most of whom are in the Army or the Air Force, is an integral part of DOD's strategy to accomplish its mission. Senate Report 113-176 included a provision that GAO review DOD's efforts to train UAS pilots.
This report examines, among other things, the extent to which the Army and the Air Force (1) face challenges ensuring that their UAS pilots complete required training and (2) have taken steps to ensure they have sufficient numbers of UAS instructors. GAO analyzed DOD guidance on training UAS pilots, distributed a questionnaire to Army and Air Force headquarters and units, examined nongeneralizeable training records of seven Air Force UAS units selected because they have the same mission requirements, and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also conducted 18 focus groups with active duty UAS pilots who were selected based on rank and other factors. The results of the questionnaire and focus groups are not generalizable.

What GAO Found

The Army and the Air Force face challenges ensuring that the pilots who remotely operate their unmanned aerial systems (UAS) complete their required training. Specifically, a March 2015 Army review showed that most pilots in certain Army units did not complete fundamental training tasks in fiscal year 2014—a finding that GAO corroborated through discussions with pilots in focus groups and unit responses to questionnaires. In addition, Army unit status reports do not require UAS pilot training information, and as a result, the Army does not know the full extent to which pilots have been trained and are therefore ready to be deployed. In addition, Air Force training records from a nongeneralizeable sample of seven UAS units showed that, on average, 35 percent of the pilots in these units completed the training for all of their required missions. Pilots in all of the seven focus groups GAO conducted with Air Force UAS pilots stated that they could not conduct training in units because their units had shortages of UAS pilots.GAO found similar shortages of UAS pilots in April 2014 and in particular, GAO found that the Air Force operated below its crew ratio, which is a metric used to determine the number of pilots needed in units. At that time, GAO made four recommendations including that the Air Force update its update crew ratio. The Air Force concurred with these recommendations and has taken actions, or has actions underway. For example, an Air Force Headquarters official stated that, in February 2015, the Air Force completed the first phase of a three-phase personnel requirements study on the crew ratio and expects to update the crew ratio in 2015. However, at this time, the Air Force has not fully implemented any of the recommendations.
The Army and the Air Force are taking actions to increase the number of UAS instructors, but the Army has not fully addressed the risks associated with using less experienced instructors and the Air Force faces instructor shortages. In order to increase the number of its instructors in response to an increase in the number of UAS units, the Army waived course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending the course to become instructor pilots from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015.The Army originally established these prerequisites—such as a minimum number of flight hours—for UAS pilots volunteering to become instructors to help ensure that instructors were fully trained and ready to instruct UAS pilots. The Army has taken some steps to mitigate the potential risks of using less proficient UAS instructors. For example, beginning in fiscal year 2015, the Army no longer grants waivers for course prerequisites related to proficiency. However, the Army can continue to grant waivers for additional course prerequisites related to experience. As a result, the Army risks that its UAS pilots may not be receiving the highest caliber of training needed to prepare them to successfully perform UAS missions. Furthermore, as of March 2015, the Air Force had staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base at 63 percent of its planned staffing levels. This shortage is a key reason that the Air Force has shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force, according to an Air Force headquarters official. The Air Force is studying the personnel requirements for its school and expects to report the results of this study by spring 2016.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that the Army require unit status reports to include information on the readiness levels of UAS pilots; and the Army take additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by its waiver of course prerequisites related to experience for pilots attending the course to become instructors. DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations.