Background

The 1945 Charter of the United Nations gives the UN Security Council  primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and  security. UN peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated  with Chapter VI of the charter, which outlines provisions for the peaceful  settlement of disputes. However, in recent years, the Security Council has  increasingly used Chapter VII to authorize the deployment of  peacekeeping operations into volatile environments where the government  of the host country is unable to maintain security and public order.  Chapter VII allows the peacekeepers to take military and nonmilitary  action to maintain or restore international peace and security. Chapter VIII  authorizes regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty  Organization (NATO) and the African Union (AU), to resolve disputes  prior to intervention by the UN Security Council, so long as the activities  of the regional organizations are consistent with UN principles.
In this report, we differentiate between traditional and multidimensional  mandates for peacekeeping operations. Traditional operations generally  monitor or supervise cease-fire and other peace agreements between  formerly warring parties. Their tasks can include monitoring of border  demarcation, exchange of prisoners, and demobilization efforts.  Multidimensional operations tend to go beyond traditional peace  monitoring tasks by attempting to restore or create conditions more  conducive to a lasting peace. On two occasions since 1998, the UN  Security Council granted multidimensional operations the executive  authority to direct and carry out the construction or reconstruction of  political, legal, and economic institutions in Timor L’este and Kosovo.  Multidimensional mandates generally include one or more of the following  tasks in their mandates:    Monitoring, supervising, training, or reconstructing police forces and  otherwise supporting efforts to restore rule of law;   monitoring, assisting, or instituting efforts to improve human rights;    supporting, facilitating, coordinating, or safeguarding humanitarian relief    monitoring, supporting, coordinating, or safeguarding assistance provided  to help refugees or internally displaced persons return home and  reintegrate into the society of the affected country or region; and   conducting, supporting, or coordinating elections and other democracy- building efforts.
In general, the United States has supported the expansion of UN  peacekeeping operations as a useful, cost-effective way to influence  situations affecting U.S. national interests without direct U.S. intervention.  For example, in 2006, the United States voted for UN operations to ensure  that Southern Lebanon was not used for hostile activities; to assist with  the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law and public safety in  Haiti; and to contribute to the protection of civilian populations and  facilitate humanitarian activities in Darfur. These operations support U.S.  national interests by carrying out mandates to help stabilize regions and  promote international peace. The UN manages 16 peacekeeping  operations worldwide as of September 2008, 6 of them in sub-Saharan  Africa. Figure 1 shows the location of UN peacekeeping operations as of  September 2008.
The United States contributes the greatest share of funding for  peacekeeping operations. All permanent members of the Security  Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United  States—are charged a premium above their assessment rate for the regular  budget (22 percent for the United States). For the 2008-2009 UN  peacekeeping budget year, the UN assessed the United States about $2  billion according to a State official, or about 26 percent of the total UN  peacekeeping budget. This represents an increase of over 700 percent in  the budget since 1998 (see fig. 2).
The U.S. government also makes significant voluntary contributions in  support of countries providing UN peacekeeping forces. For example,  State obligated about $110 million in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 funds for  countries providing forces for the UN operation in Darfur. In addition, the  United States had provided 308 troops, police, and military observers to  six UN peacekeeping operations as of September 30, 2008. The extent and  nature of U.S. support for UN peacekeeping is largely contained in Section  10 of the UN Participation Act of 1945. For example, it limits total U.S.  contributions to 1,000 troops at any one time. It also limits the U.S.  government to providing free of charge to the UN no more than $3 million  worth of items or services—such as supplies, transportation assistance, or  equipment—to each operation per year.
UN guidelines call for DPKO to undertake planning and predeployment  tasks before the approval of a UN Security Council mandate authorizing an  operation. These include drawing up operations plans to address the  expected mandate, estimated sector responsibilities, and force  requirements. DPKO also assesses the availability of forces from potential  contributors and then validates the estimates through visits of UN military  and police officials to the host country and to troop and police  contributing countries to assess unit readiness and availability. The  Secretary General then issues a report on establishing the mission,  including its size and resources. On the basis of the report, the Security  Council may then pass a resolution authorizing the operation’s mandate  and number of troops and police. According to U.S. officials, this is the  maximum level allowed.  Although the Security Council may authorize the  mission’s mandate, its full budget must still be prepared and approved.  In  this process, the UN Department of Field Support prepares a draft budget  and the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary  Questions reviews it.  According to the UN, considerable scrutiny of the  proposed budget occurs during this process and there is debate among  member states that pay the bulk of costs of the operation and the top  troop contributors.  The General Assembly then approves the budget for  the amount agreed upon.
UN guidelines note that the lead time required to deploy a mission  depends on a number of factors, particularly the will of member states to  contribute troops and police to a particular operation and the availability  of financial and other resources due to long procurement lead times. For  missions with highly complex mandates or difficult logistics, or where  peacekeepers face significant security risk, it may take several weeks or  even months to assemble and deploy the necessary elements. The UN has  set a 90-day target for deploying the first elements of a multidimensional  UN peacekeeping operation endorsed by the UN Security Council.
Over the past decade, the UN has undertaken a number of assessments  and initiatives to improve its peacekeeping organization, doctrine,  planning, logistics and conditions of service for peacekeeping staff, as well  as its efforts to establish a capacity to rapidly deploy peacekeepers.  For  example, the 2000 report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,  or Brahimi report, made recommendations to the Secretary General to  improve  the strategic direction, planning, organization, and conduct of  peace operations.  In response, the UN consolidated all peacekeeping  responsibilities into DPKO, substantially increased its staff, and took steps  to improve and integrate mission planning.  Moreover, the Secretary  General’s 2001 No Exit Without a Strategy noted that missions’ mandates  should include elements such as institution building and the promotion of  good governance and the rule of law to facilitate sustainable peace.   The  Peace Operations 2010 initiative announced by the Secretary General in  2006 focused on further reforms in the area of personnel, doctrine,  partnerships, resources and organization.  As a result, the UN took steps to  strengthen its capacity to direct and support peacekeeping operations that  included splitting DPKO into two departments in 2007 by creating the  separate Department of Field Support; establishing integrated operations  teams to integrate the daily direction and support of peacekeeping  operations; and, in 2008, issuing a consolidated statement of peacekeeping  operations, principles, and guidelines and a field guide to assist senior  staff address critical mission startup tasks and challenges.  GAO has  reviewed the status of a number of UN reform initiatives, most recently  the UN’s efforts to clarify lines of authority for field procurement between  DPKO and DFS.

	UN Peacekeeping Operations Have Evolved into Large, Complex Operations Concentrated in Less Developed Countries

Since 1998, UN peacekeeping operations have taken on more complex and  ambitious mandates, taken place in increasingly challenging environments,  and grown in size and scope. As shown in table 1, the operations have  more mandated tasks and are increasingly authorized under Chapter VII of  the UN charter to use all means necessary to carry out the mandate. The  locations of the operations also are in less developed areas, as measured  by the UN’s index of health, economic, and education levels, and the  operations are deployed in some of the most politically unstable countries  in the world. Finally, current operations with multidimensional mandates  have an average of nearly 9 times as many troops, observers, and police as  those in 1998, and more than 13 times as many civilian staff. Appendix V  provides details on current UN peacekeeping operations. Appendix VI  provides details on the military capabilities of UN peacekeeping  operations as of November 2008.

		UN Peacekeeping Mandates Are Becoming More Complex

Since 1998, the United Nations has undertaken operations with broader  and more complex mandates than before. The 16 operations in 1998 had  mandates averaging three tasks or objectives each. The mandates of 10 of  these operations were limited to such traditional peacekeeping tasks as  monitoring cease-fire agreements and boundaries between formerly  warring parties. The other 6 operations had a small number of tasks,  which went beyond traditional peace monitoring by calling for the  restoration or creation of conditions more conducive to a lasting peace.
In September 2008, the UN also had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations,  but 11 had multidimensional mandates with political, security, social, and  humanitarian objectives. Also, 15 of the 17 UN Peacekeeping Operations  begun or augmented since 1998 were multidimensional missions.  According to the November 2000 report by the Panel on United Nations  Peace Operations, the mandated tasks of these operations reflected the  more comprehensive approach to restoring security the UN had adopted  as part of its ongoing efforts to improve the strategic direction and  conduct of peace operations. This report noted that the effective  protection of civilians and assistance in postconflict environments  requires a coordinated strategy that goes beyond the political or military  aspects of a conflict if the operation is to achieve a sustainable peace.   We reported that since 1999 the UN has increasingly focused on a more  comprehensive approach to making a transition from peacekeeping to a  sustainable peace. Reflecting this trend, our analysis of the 17 UN  operations since 1998 shows that operations averaged nine mandated  tasks, with the most frequent tasks calling for the UN to    monitor a peace or cease-fire agreement,    use all means necessary to carry out the mandate (Chapter VII),    help restore civil order with police support,  train and develop the police force,   support development of the rule of law,    ensure human rights/women’s rights and protection, and    support humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons.
Moreover, since 2006, the UN Security Council has mandated that  peacekeeping operations include a responsibility to protect civilians from  “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,”  with force if necessary, when national authorities fail in this task.

		More Recent Operations Have Been Deployed in Less Developed Environments with Volatile Security Situations

According to UN documents and officials, peacekeeping operations  initiated after 1998 were deployed in less secure and more volatile  postconflict situations. Since then, the Security Council has frequently  deployed new operations into areas where the government of the host  country was unable to maintain security and public order. For example,  most of the UN operations ongoing as of September 2008 were deployed in  locations that had among the highest levels of instability as measured by  the World Bank’s index of political instability. Moreover, the Security  Council has increasingly authorized peacekeepers to take all steps  necessary to carry out their mandate, including the use of force, under  Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In 1998, four UN missions operated under  Chapter VII authority; in 2008, nine operated under explicit Chapter VII  authority.
UN operations currently are also being conducted in countries that are  relatively less developed on average than the countries in which they were  deployed a decade ago. This has increased the level of effort and resources  needed to sustain peacekeeping operations, according to UN officials. In  1998, the average UN peacekeeping operation was deployed to a country  with aggregate levels of knowledge, standard of living, and life expectancy  that placed them in the medium category of development, as measured by  the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development  Index (HDI). Ten of the 17 operations initiated since 1998 were deployed  to sub-Saharan Africa, of which 7 were in countries falling within the HDI’s  lowest category of human development. As of September 2008, about  78,000, or 72 percent of the UN’s uniformed and civilian peacekeepers  were in sub-Saharan Africa.

		UN Operations Require Larger Commitments of Specialized Forces, Civilians, and Logistics

As peacekeeping operations have taken on more ambitious mandates in  challenging environments, the operations have become larger and more  complex, with expanded troop deployments and sophisticated capabilities.  Seven of the 11 ongoing multidimensional UN operations in 2008 had  deployed from 7,000 to over 17,000 troops.  In 1998, multidimensional  operations averaged fewer than 1,000 troops and military observers.   UN  troops also are being deployed in larger and more capable units, according  to UN officials. As of November 2008, the UN had approximately 76  battalion-sized infantry units deployed, including 21 mechanized infantry  battalions. Most recent operations require major troop-contributing  countries to deploy at least one 800-person infantry battalion with  armored vehicles and supported by its own engineer and logistics units. A  March 2008 UN report noted that the UN’s peacekeeping deployments  included over 5,000 engineers, 24,000 vehicles, and 200 aircraft. Appendix  VI provides more information on the military capabilities required by  ongoing multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations as of November  2008.
The UN also has deployed more police to peacekeeping operations over  the past 10 years. In June 1998, the UN deployed 2,984 police, compared  with 11,515 police deployed as of September 2008. The UN also has come  to rely more heavily on formed police units (FPU), armed units of  approximately 125 to 140 officers trained in crowd control and other  specialized tasks and equipped with armored personnel carriers. These  units, which are deployed to UN operations as cohesive units by  contributing countries, were first utilized in small numbers in 2003 but  now compose about 40 percent of all UN police deployed. FPUs are  intended to perform three main functions—protection of UN facilities and  personnel, provision of security support to national law enforcement  agencies, and national police capacity building—and the increase in their  use reflects the trend toward operations with more complex mandates  taking place in less secure situations. In contrast, UN police are  individually selected and deployed by the UN to monitor host nation police  activities or supervise local police training.
The increasingly large and complex operations also require larger civilian  staffs with a diverse range of skill sets to execute the mandate and  coordinate with other UN and international organizations. In 2000, the  average multidimensional operation deployed about 125 international  civilian staff; in 2008, the average rose to 445 international civilian staff. A  global survey of international peacekeeping reported that as of October  2007, international UN civilian staff deployed on UN peacekeeping  operations worked in 22 occupational groups, including administration,  aviation, engineering, rule of law, security, and transportation.
The task of sustaining and supplying operations launched since 1998 has  grown increasingly complicated due to their larger size and deployment in  less developed and more unstable environments. Under these  circumstances, units need more equipment, use it more intensively,  consume more fuel, and require more maintenance due to increased wear  and tear . According to a senior UN official, such operations must bring in  more international staff because skilled local personnel are scarce. They  also must bring in more of their own food and water, and build their own  roads, buildings, and accommodations from the ground up and then  maintain them. The United Nations Organization Mission in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is an example of an  operation that is heavily dependent upon aircraft to move and supply  forces over a large area because the country lacks adequate roads.  According to a July 2006 UN report, MONUC required 105 aircraft,  distributed among 60 airports; maintenance of 150 landing sites; and  aviation support staff of 1,600. This effort consumed 21 percent of  MONUC’s total 2007-2008 budget, compared with an average of 11 percent  for all UN peacekeeping operations.

	A Potential New UN Operation Would Likely Require Significant Resources

As a way to assess UN capacity, we developed a potential new  peacekeeping operation to illustrate the detailed and likely resources the  UN would need to deploy a new operation. Based on our analysis of the  evolution of peacekeeping operations and UN planning scenarios, this  operation would likely be large and complex and take place in sub- Saharan Africa. The potential new operation would be consistent with the  mandates of the 17 operations launched since June 1998 and have nine  security, political, and humanitarian tasks. Based on the most appropriate  UN planning scenario, the potential new operation would likely require  21,000 troops and military observers and 1,500 police. We estimate that  this operation would require 4,000 to 5,000 civilian staff, and UN officials  noted that it would have logistical needs comparable to those of other  large, complex operations in similar environments. Like other  peacekeeping operations located in sub-Saharan Africa, the potential new  mission likely would confront limited roads, other infrastructure, and  water, thereby requiring greater logistical planning and support.  Furthermore, according to the UN, in the majority of post-conflict  scenarios, mine clearance is necessary to begin rehabilitating roads and  other infrastructure.  Our analysis is not intended to predict the size,  scope, or location of a new UN peacekeeping operation. A new operation’s  mandate and resource needs would be determined by the UN Security  Council and the circumstances particular to the country to which the  operation is deployed. Therefore, the requirements of a new operation  could differ from those of the potential new operation presented here.

		A Potential New UN Operation Would Likely Have a Multidimensional Mandate and Be Located in Sub-Saharan Africa

The potential new operation would likely have a multidimensional  mandate, with nine tasks related to security, political, and humanitarian  efforts. The operation could be mandated to provide a secure  environment, protect civilians and UN staff, monitor a cease-fire or peace  agreement, and promote reconciliation. Political tasks could include  supporting elections; helping establish rule of law and assisting in the  reform of military, police, and corrections systems; and assisting in  disarmament and demobilization of combatants. Humanitarian tasks could  include monitoring human rights and developing the capability of the  government. To derive these tasks for a potential new operation, we  reviewed UN planning scenarios for a new operation in sub-Saharan Africa  and selected the scenario that best matched our trend analysis of the 17  UN operations initiated or augmented since June 1998.
The potential new operation likely would be located in sub-Saharan Africa  because 10 of the 17 operations started or expanded since 1998 were  deployed to the region. Like the areas of other peacekeeping operations in  sub-Saharan Africa, the potential new mission’s area of operations would  have limited infrastructure and utilities, lacking roads, buildings, and  water, and would thus require increased logistical planning. Using the  assumptions contained in the selected UN planning scenario, the potential  new operation would be in a high-threat environment, political factions  would recently have been fighting for control of the country, and there  would be large numbers of internally displaced persons. As a precondition  for deployment of the potential new operation, the UN would likely secure  political and security agreements among the parties to the conflict and a  clear statement of support from the host country for the deployment of a  UN peacekeeping operation.

		The Potential New UN Operation Would Likely Require Significant Military Forces to Execute Its Mandate

To accomplish the political, security, and humanitarian tasks in the  mandate, the potential new operation would require 21,000 troops and  observers distributed among five sectors. Both combat capable and  supporting units would be required, including troops with armored  personnel carriers, engineers, truck transport companies, and medical,  aviation, and logistics units. The force size would be derived from a threat  assessment that would determine how the UN troops could ensure a safe  and secure operating environment while protecting civilians and UN staff.  According to UN planners, a potential new force would likely require units  with the capability to deter threats from armed factions supported by  international terrorist groups, which previous operations did not have to  take into account to the same degree. The force would need special troops  to detect and defeat the threat of improvised explosive devices and would  need significant intelligence resources. The operation would be mandated  to provide area security for an estimated 1.5 million internally displaced  persons (IDP). Table 2 presents the composition of a potential new  peacekeeping operation.
The force’s operational units (14 infantry battalions and 1 mechanized  battalion) would be distributed among five sectors.  Each sector would  contain all the civilian and uniformed components necessary to carry out  the mandated tasks. Four of the sectors would require two battalions each.  The infantry battalions in these sectors would be deployed in mobile  company-sized groups to provide wide coverage by patrolling, establishing  checkpoints, and enforcing buffer zones and demilitarized areas. The plan  envisions a larger force of 5infantry battalions for the fifth sector,  encompassing the capital city; these units would not require as many  vehicles because much of their patrolling would be done on foot in urban  areas. This sector would also maintain a mechanized battalion in reserve  to serve as a rapid reaction force.
The size of the helicopter force would be based on the need to provide  aerial observation and firepower support 24 hours per day, 7 days per  week, for all sectors, as well as the capability to transport infantry  battalions and conduct search and rescue operations as needed. Many of  the operational units would need to come from countries capable of  providing supplies for the first 60 days after deployment, given the  limitations of local infrastructure expected in this environment. The force  would require five specialized logistics units to provide a number of base  camp service and supply functions, five to six engineering companies, and  four airfield support units to assist aviation operations.

		Initially, Police Units Would Likely Be Limited to Confidence-Building Tasks

According to a UN planning scenario and UN officials, the potential new  operation would likely require 1,500 police, including 700 officers in five  FPUs. The police units will eventually assist with the reactivation of the  potential new country’s police force; provide mentoring, skills training,  and professional development assistance; advise on police reform and  restructuring; and support capacity building and police oversight.  However, as with the operation in Darfur, a large police force with a high  profile would likely be needed to build confidence among the population.  Furthermore, as in other UN operations, police officers must speak the  official language (English), know how to operate four-wheel drive  vehicles, and have about 5 years of police service and a background in  country development activities.

		Civilian Staff with a Strong International Presence Would Be Needed

We estimated that the potential new operation would require 4,000 to 5,000  civilian staff, based on discussions with UN officials and analysis of UN  planning documents. International staff of other complex UN operations  ongoing in sub-Saharan Africa constitute between 20 and 30 percent of  total civilian staff. According to UN officials, operations initially have a  higher percentage of international staff. A more precise estimate of the  number of civilians needed for the potential new operation would require  detailed information, such as information about the skills available in the  local labor market. The potential new operation’s international civilian  staff would likely include the following:    a special representative of the Secretary General;    Assistant Secretary Generals, including the force commander;    directors, including police commissioner, judicial affairs, political affairs,  and civil affairs;   professional staff for legal affairs, rule of law, judicial affairs, child  protection, finance, and mission support functions (logistics and  administration, finance, budget, human resources and management,  procurement); and   a substantial allocation of field service officers to provide  technical/administrative support.
In addition to international staff, the potential new operation would need  national support staff and national professional officers. Furthermore,  according to UN estimates, between 20 and 25 percent of the civilian force  of the potential new operation could be needed to provide security for its  civilian staff and facilities in the expected high-threat environment.

		The Potential New Operation’s Logistics Needs Would Likely Be Comparable to Those of Other Recent Large Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa

UN officials could not provide an estimate of the logistical needs for the  potential new operation without detailed planning in the field that  precedes actual deployments. However, they stated that total logistical  needs would likely be comparable to those of other large, complex  operations, such as the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  or Darfur. For example, the potential new operation would likely need to  establish and sustain camps and other facilities; manage major contracts  for transport, food, fuel, water, and property and other services; and plan  and coordinate the use of engineering, transportation, and other  specialized assets provided by troop-contributing countries. The potential  new operation, as with other sub-Saharan operations, would be dependent  upon specialized military support units to meet its logistics needs. The  potential new force would likely have to build roads, buildings, and other  infrastructure and would be heavily dependent on helicopters and other  relatively expensive aviation units for movement and supply. For example,  as of June 2008, the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  (the Congo) allocated 21 percent of its annual budget on air operations,  compared with a UN-wide average of 11 percent.

	The UN Would Likely Face Difficulty in Obtaining Troops, Police, Civilians, and Logistics Needed for the Potential New Operation

The UN would likely face difficulty in obtaining troops, military observers,  police, and civilians for the potential new operation. As of September  2008, the UN was about 18,000 troops and military observers below the  level of about 95,000 authorized for current operations. In addition, several  peacekeeping operations needed specialized military units, such as units  for logistics, helicopters, and transport. There are a limited number of  countries that provide troops and police with needed capabilities to meet  current needs, and some potential contributors may be unwilling to  provide forces for a new operation due to such political factors as their  own national interests and the environmental and security situation in the  host country. The UN also has a large vacancy rate for international  civilians, and the UN is considering proposals to address the difficulty of  obtaining and retaining international civilian staff. Figure 3 illustrates the  authorized and deployed levels of troops, police, and civilians. Moreover,  the UN would likely face the logistics challenges that have confronted  other large UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa. UN officials and  performance reports note that the difficulty of obtaining needed personnel  and other resources has had an impact on the ability of ongoing operations  to fully execute their mandates.

		The UN Faces Challenges in Obtaining Needed Military Units

As of September 2008, about 77,000 troops and military observers were  deployed to existing UN peacekeeping operations, an overall gap of 18,000,  or about 20 percent, below the authorized level of approximately 95,000.   Of the 18,000, approximately 11,000 are attributable to the operation in  Darfur. According to the State Department, the UN has secured pledges of  troops to fill most of the authorized numbers for Darfur and the UN  planned to deploy a majority of them by the end of the year. However, a  UN report in October stated that the troop deployment would be delayed.  The UN further reported that it had received no commitments from  member states for some of the critical units required for the Darfur  mission to become fully operational, including an aerial reconnaissance  unit, transport units, a logistics support unit, and attack and transport  helicopters with crews. Other operations have significant gaps between  their deployed and authorized troop levels. For example, Lebanon has  about 2,500 troops fewer than its authorized levels as of September 2008,  and a UN report stated that the UN was seeking these troops from member  countries. In addition to existing needs, a September 2008 UN report  estimates that 6,000 troops will be needed, along with specialized units, for  an augmented operation in Chad and the Central African Republic in the  first quarter of 2009. However, the Secretary General requested the  Security Council not to authorize the mission until the UN obtained firm  troop commitments.
The UN would confront three critical issues in obtaining needed military  resources for a potential new mission in sub-Saharan Africa. First, a  relatively small number of countries have demonstrated the willingness  and ability to provide the UN with units of sufficient size and capability. As  of November 2008, 120 nations provide troops or police to UN operations;  however, only 30 countries provide at least 1 of the 76 battalion-sized  infantry units these operations require. A standard UN infantry battalion  has 800 troops; U.S. government officials note that countries generally  must commit 2 additional battalions for every battalion currently deployed  to ensure sufficient units are available for the rotation cycle, entailing a  total commitment of 2,400 troops. As of November 2008, UN operations  lacked 8 battalion-sized infantry units for Darfur. The potential new  operation discussed in this report would likely increase the potential need  by 15 battalions. A UN official indicated that the UN would approach its  major contributors, such Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, which have  provided an increasingly large portion of total UN peacekeeping forces  since 1998, if confronted with the challenge of staffing an operation similar  to the potential new operation.
Second, the potential new operation would require military logistics units,  hospitals, military engineers, and military transport units. The UN relies on  37 countries to provide these specialized units in company strength or  greater as of November 2008. The potential new operation would require  24 utility helicopters, 12 armed helicopters, and crew to fly them.  However, according to US officials and UN documents, these types of  units and resources are difficult to obtain and are currently being sought  for existing operations. As of December 2008, the UN has been unable to  obtain any of the 28 helicopters needed for the operation in Darfur,  according to a State official. A UN official said it would be reasonable to  assume an inability to obtain helicopters for the potential new operation.
Third, member state decisions to provide troops for UN operations depend  on factors such as the state’s national interest, the operation’s mandate,  and the host country’s environment and security situation. For example,  concerns over the security situation in Rwanda in 1994 resulted in member  states not providing additional troops for the UN operation. Member states  were unwilling to provide needed troops and reinforcements for  operations in Bosnia and Somalia for similar reasons. The government  hosting the UN operation also can impose political restrictions. For  example, the government of Sudan insists that the UN force in Darfur be  composed primarily of troops from African member states. This led to the  withdrawal of an offer by Norway and Sweden to provide a needed joint  engineering unit to the operation, a decision that the Secretary General  noted undermined operations.

		The UN Faces Challenges Recruiting and Deploying Police

The potential new operation would require deployment of 1,500 police— 800 individual UN police and 700 officers in five FPUs. However, as of  September 2008, UN peacekeeping operations had a 34 percent gap  between deployed and authorized levels of police. The total number of  police authorized for all operations was 17,490, but the number deployed  was 11,515. Moreover, the UN required 46 FPUs as of June 2008, but the  UN had deployed only about 31 FPUs.  The gap between deployed and  authorized FPUs stems mainly from the lack of units for operations in  Darfur.
The UN encounters difficulties in obtaining qualified UN police with the  special skills its operations may require. For example, according to a  November 2007 Stimson Center report, some UN operations require  experienced police officers capable of conducting criminal investigations  or officers with supervisory or administrative skills. According to this  report,  unlike states contributing troops or FPUs, potential police  contributing countries lack incentives because the UN does not reimburse  them for their individual police contributions.  In addition, a UN official  noted that  it is difficult to find police for the UN with the necessary skills  because  these officers are in demand in their home countries.
Limited resources for recruiting individual UN police add to this difficulty.  In contrast with its reliance on member states to contribute and deploy  FPUs as a unit, the UN recruits and deploys UN police individually. A  senior UN police official stated that this task is time-consuming; he noted  that he reviews an estimated 700 applications to find 30 qualified police  officers for an operation. Recruitment is the responsibility of the 34-strong  Police Division of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations,  which also helps deploy the police components for new UN operations,  sends members of this staff to the field to help with start-up of new  operations, and supports and assists police components of existing UN  operations. According to a senior UN official, current staff levels are not  adequate to support these functions and undertake all recruitment, and the  UN should have three to four times the support personnel that currently  reside in the division. UN police officials also noted that supporting an  additional operation would be beyond their current capacity. However, a  strategic review of the functions and structure of the Police Division,  which will include an analysis of the adequacy of current resources levels,  is ongoing.
Obtaining needed FPUs required by its operations presents the UN with  additional difficulties. These units, which are composed of law  enforcement officers with expertise in crowd management and other  policing tactical activities, require special training and equipment. For  example, FPUs must undergo training in several areas before being eligible  for deployment to a UN operation, including emergency medical services,  use of nonlethal weapons and firearms, and crowd control and behavior.  As of June 2008, only 11 countries provide full-sized FPUs to the UN,  compared to the much larger number of countries that contribute UN  police. According to a UN official, obtaining even one additional FPU is  difficult. For example, it took a year to obtain an additional unit for the  mission in Haiti. According to a conference report on international police  issues co-sponsored by the U.S. government, if the UN plans to continue  increasing its use of FPUs, this will require the development of a greater  international capacity to deploy units that have been properly prepared for  the demands of peacekeeping operations.

		The UN Has Difficulty Obtaining and Retaining Civilian Staff for Peacekeeping Operations

The UN would likely need between 4,000 and 5,000 civilian staff for the  potential new operation but would have difficulty obtaining these staff and  retaining them once in place. Recruiting enough international civilian staff  to fill the number of authorized positions in peacekeeping operations is  difficult. From 2005 through early 2008, UN peacekeeping operations have  had an average vacancy rate for international civilian staff of about 22  percent. As of April 2008, the vacancy rate for all civilian staff for the sub- Saharan operations in Chad/Central African Republic and Darfur was over  70 percent, and the vacancy rate for international civilian personnel in the  adjoining UN operation in southern Sudan, was approximately 30 percent  of its authorized level. Operations outside sub-Saharan Africa also have  experienced high international civilian staff vacancy rates; the average  vacancy rate for these operations ranged from 14 to 25 percent from 2005  through 2008. Some specialties are difficult to fill. In 2000, a UN report  found critical shortfalls in key areas including procurement, finance,  budget, logistics support, and engineers.  In addition, a 2006 UN report  found a 50 percent vacancy rate for procurement officers in the field.
The UN also has difficulty retaining the existing civilian staff in  peacekeeping operations. About 80 percent of international staff have  appointments of 1 year or less, and the turnover rate in the field is  approximately 30 percent. In addition, about half of professional staff  serving in peacekeeping operations have 2 years or less experience. In  September 2008, we reported that limited career development  opportunities have contributed to the UN’s difficulties in attracting and  retaining qualified field procurement staff. According to UN officials,  turnover among field procurement staff has continued to hurt the  continuity of their operations and peacekeeping missions continue to face  challenges in deploying qualified, experienced procurement staff,  especially during the critical start-up phase.
The UN has identified several problems in obtaining and retaining civilian  staff for peacekeeping. First, nearly all civilian staff deployed to UN  operations hold appointments limited to specific missions or are on loan  from other UN offices as temporary duty assignments. Most of these  civilians cannot be redeployed from one mission to another in response to  urgent needs at one of the operations, which limits the UN’s ability to  launch new operations. Second, the UN has reported that the terms and  conditions of service for civilians at field missions create inequities in the  field. In March 2008, the UN reported that it has nine different types of  employment contracts for field civilians, which set differing terms of  service. Some operations do not offer the incentive of hardship pay.  According to a UN official, it would be difficult to attract international  staff and contractors to the potential new operation without better  conditions of service.
The UN has developed proposals to address these challenges. For  example, in 2006, the UN Secretariat proposed establishing 2,500 career- track positions for expert and experienced technical civilian staff to serve  in field missions. These staff would have the flexibility to move to different  operations as needed. The UN Secretariat also proposed reducing the  types of contracts offered to civilian staff and harmonizing conditions of  service so that civilians serving in UN operations have similar benefits. As  of September 2008, the UN was considering these proposals, according to  a State official.

		Logistics Difficulties Would Likely Impede or Delay the Potential New Operation

The recent experiences of other UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa  illustrate the challenges the potential new operation may face in terms of  logistical requirements. First, it is likely that the UN will not be able to  draw upon preexisting buildings for office space and staff  accommodations. For example, UN planning standards assume that a host  country could provide 40 percent of a new operation’s required  accommodation space; however, a panel of UN officials from the  Departments of Peacekeeping and Field Support stated that a host country  in sub-Saharan Africa would likely be unable to provide any of the office  space or accommodations needed. As a result, a new operation such as the  potential new operation could face the task of constructing  accommodations from the ground up for approximately 10,000 people in  and around the force headquarters.
Second, poor infrastructure conditions would likely hinder the activities of  the potential new operation; UN officials noted that road conditions for  the potential new operation could resemble those facing Darfur, Sudan,  and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the poor or nonexistent  road networks strained the UN’s ability to move people, goods, and  equipment. According to UN reports, the roads in Darfur are especially  poor, supplies take an average of 7 weeks to travel the 1,400 miles from  port to operation, and banditry along the roads compounds the problem.  As a result, according to a UN official, the potential new operation would  likely require engineering units with substantial road-building capabilities  for each sector, but as noted earlier, engineering units are difficult for the  UN to obtain.  According to the UN, the four month rainy season in the  sub-Saharan region also complicates the challenge of supplying missions.
Third, commercial opportunities for procuring goods and services will  likely be limited given the potential new operation’s location in sub- Saharan Africa. Lack of local commercial opportunities has caused  problems for other operations in the area.  When items cannot be procured  locally, they must be imported from abroad and sent to the operation, a  fact that causes delays and compounds the burden on the operation’s  transport assets.  For example, the Darfur mission’s slow deployment is  partially due to lack of capacity in the local market to meet the cargo  transport requirements of the operation.
These challenges also would likely delay the start-up of the potential new  mission. As of September 2008, UN mission planning factors call for UN  operations to begin with a rapid deployment phase in which the force  would achieve an initial operational capability within 90 days of Security  Council authorization. However, according to UN planning staff and  documents, this objective is unrealistic. Operations in the Congo, Sudan,  Darfur, and Chad required a substantial buildup of logistical military units  before achieving initial operating capability. According to a UN report,  arranging for the commitment and deployment of these units requires an  expeditionary approach—the establishment and progressive buildup of the  personnel, equipment, supplies, and infrastructure. One UN military  planner estimated that arranging for and coordinating these complex  logistical arrangements with existing UN planning resources added 6  months to the deployment process.

		Gap between Deployed and Authorized Resource Levels Affected Some Operations’ Execution of Their Mandates

The gaps between authorized and deployed levels of troops, police, and  civilians—compounded by the logistics challenges—have affected ongoing  operations. Some State and UN officials note that some gaps simply may  be due to the time lag between securing and deploying forces. However,  interviews with some officials from selected operations and our review of  operation performance reports have demonstrated that the lack of troops,  police, and civilians for existing operations has delayed or prevented some  operations from undertaking mandated activities.
The operation in Darfur, for example, has been unable to fully undertake  many of its mandated activities, such as protection of civilians, due to a  lack of military personnel. According to UN reports, lack of critical  support units, such as helicopter, logistics support, and transport units has  limited the operation’s ability to provide for its own protection, carry out  its mandated tasks effectively, and transport equipment and supplies  necessary to house and maintain the troops it has deployed so far.  Moreover, the inability to secure these support units has delayed the  deployment of some of the troops already committed to the operation for  several months. The operation in Haiti lacked required levels of police,  according to a UN official, and this lack decreased the support that could  be provided to the Haitian National Police. Several operations have  recently experienced civilian vacancies in key areas, affecting operation  activities in the areas of public information, property management,  medical services, and procurement. For example, officials at some  missions stated that vacancies in procurement staff positions, particularly  in supervisory positions, have impeded procurement actions and  heightened the risk of errors. In general, according to a UN Secretary  General report, the UN has not made progress in solving the problems  with civilian staffing and the resulting high civilian vacancy rates have put  the organization at managerial and financial risk.
In addition, challenges in the areas of logistics have also had an impact on  existing operations. Lack of local procurement opportunities required the  operation in Haiti to procure most needed goods and services from outside  the country, creating delays for the operation that are difficult to  overcome. For example, it took the operation some time to find a suitable  headquarters building, and it required outside resources to bring the  building up to UN standards of safety and security.

	The United States Has Provided Assistance to UN Peacekeeping, but Reporting to Congress Provides Limited Information about Gaps between Authorized and Deployed Force Levels

The U.S. government, along with those of other countries, has taken some  steps to help address UN challenges in obtaining troops and police for  peacekeeping operations, primarily through the Global Peace Operations  Initiative. The United States has also provided logistics support to specific  UN operations and is supports, in principle, UN proposals to address gaps  between the number of authorized and deployed civilians. State is required  to report to Congress on the status and effectiveness of peacekeeping  operations and provides some of this information through its monthly  briefings to Congress. However, State has not provided information about  troop and other gaps between authorized and deployed force levels— important elements of status and effectiveness—in its notifications or  annual UN report to Congress.

		The United States and Other Countries Provide Some Help to Address Gaps between Deployed and Authorized Levels

The U.S. government, along with those of other countries, has provided  some help to address UN challenges in obtaining peacekeeping troops,  police, civilians, and logistics requirements through both GPOI and in  response to specific UN mission needs. GPOI is a 5-year program begun  by the U.S. government in 2004 in support of the Group of Eight (G8)  countries’ action plan to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a  focus on Africa. According to the State department, efforts are underway  to extend this program’s activities beyond 2010. The key goals of the  program are to train and, when appropriate, equip military peacekeepers  and provide nonlethal equipment and transportation to support countries’  deployment of peacekeepers. In June 2008, we reported that as of April  2008 GPOI had provided training and material assistance to about 40,000  of the 75,000 peacekeeping troops it intends to train by 2010.  Approximately 22,000 of these troops, predominantly African soldiers,  have been deployed to 9 UN peacekeeping operations, one UN political  mission, and 2 AU peacekeeping operations. We also reported that GPOI is  unlikely to meet all of its goals and that State was unable to assess how  effectively its instruction was improving the capacity of countries to  provide and sustain peacekeepers. In addition, the United States has  initiated actions to address mission-specific gaps. For example, State and  DOD formed the Missing Assets Task Force to conduct a global search for  28 attack and transport helicopters, logistics units, and other assets for the  operation in Darfur. As of December 2008, the task force was unable to  obtain commitments for the helicopters.
Through GPOI, the United States also supports efforts at the international  Center of Excellence for Stability Police in Italy to increase the  capabilities and interoperability of stability police to participate in peace  operations. As of June 2008, the center had trained more than 1,300 of the  3,000 stability police instructors it intends to train by 2009. Moreover, State  has allocated about $10 million for training and equipping FPUs deploying  to Sudan.
According to State and DOD officials, the United States has done little to  help the UN address gaps between deployed and authorized civilian levels.  According to State officials, the United States supports, in principle, UN  internal efforts to address chronic gaps between civilian deployment and  authorized staff levels by improving the terms of service for civilian  peacekeeping staff, improving contracting arrangements and incentives for  UN civilians, and developing a rapidly deployable standing civilian corps.  However, a U.S. official noted in late September 2008 that these initiatives  are still undergoing review by the UN and member states and the U.S.  position on the final initiatives could be influenced by the projected costs  and other factors.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State wrote that it is supporting  reforms in personnel policy that will mitigate the difficulty the UN is  having in recruiting critical international staff.  However, the UN  comments on the draft stated that the general expression of U.S.  support for the Secretary-General’s human resources management reform  proposals is welcome, but is somewhat at dissonance with the position  presented by the U.S. delegation to the fifth Committee of the General  Assembly and on-going regular sixty-third sessions of the General  Assembly.  The UN stated that the U.S. delegation did not join the  consensus reached by all other member states to streamline contractual  arrangements, offer greater job security to staff in field missions, and  improve their conditions of service.  The UN also commented that at the  regular sixty-third session of the General Assembly, the U.S. delegation  proposed to significantly reduce allowances and benefits to new recruits  and to staff to serve on temporary appointments in UN peacekeeping  operations.
The United States has helped the UN address logistical challenges both  through GPOI and on a mission-specific basis. For example, GPOI  supports an equipment depot in Sierra Leone that has provided nonlethal  equipment to support the logistical training and deployment of African  troops. State and DOD officials stated that they also have responded to  specific logistics needs of UN operations. For example, State provided  $110 million in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 funds to help troop-contributing  nations deploy or sustain their forces in Darfur, including about $20  million worth of support to equip and deploy Rwandan troops as of  September 2008. The U.S. government also responded to requests to  provide transport and logistics assistance in 2006, resulting in the  provision of additional support to help deploy troops from two countries  to the UN operation in Lebanon.

		U.S. Government Reporting to Congress Provides Limited Discussion of Resource Needs

Federal law requires the President to report, to notify, and consult with  Congress on UN peacekeeping operations. When the President submits  his annual budget report to Congress, the law requires the President to  provide Congress an annual report that assesses the effectiveness of  ongoing international peacekeeping operations, their relevance to U.S.  national interests, the projected termination dates for all such operations,  and other matters. The law also requires that the President provide  Congress written information about new operations that are anticipated to  be authorized by the UN Security Council or existing operations where the  authorized force strength is to be expanded or the mandate is to be  changed significantly. The information to be provided is to include the  anticipated duration, mandate, and command and control arrangements of  such an operation, the total cost to both the UN and the United States, the  planned exit strategy, and the vital national interest the new operation is  to serve. The law also requires the President to consult monthly with  Congress on peacekeeping.
To comply with these requirements, State consults with Congress about  peacekeeping through monthly briefings. At these briefings, State officials  update Congress on the status of peacekeeping operations, such as  progress being made in Darfur, the Congo, and Haiti, as well as the  problems encountered, such as kidnappings in Port au Prince or  incursions along the Chad-Sudan border discussed in the April 2008  monthly briefing. In some briefings, State provides updates on the  progress in obtaining needed troops, police, and other resources. State  also provides written notification to Congress about new peacekeeping  operations that the United States expects to vote for in the Security  Council and for operations where the mandate is significantly revised. For  example, on August 30, 2006, State provided written notification to  Congress that it had voted to approve the expansion of the UN operation  in Lebanon, including increasing the troop level from about 2,000 to  15,000.
Although they provide information about UN peacekeeping operations and  their mandates, the annual reports to Congress and the notifications do  not discuss potential successes or difficulties in obtaining the resources  necessary to carry out the mandates. For example, between January 2006  and October 2008, the Congress received 17 notifications about new or  expanded peacekeeping operations, including missions in Haiti, Timor  L’este, Lebanon, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Darfur, and others. All 17 provided  information about the operations’ mandates, the forces authorized, the  U.S. national interest served, and the exit strategy. None of the 17 reported  on whether the UN had commitments for the troops, police, and the other  resources required to carry out the mandate; whether there might be  problems in obtaining them; or whether this information was known.  Moreover, just 4 of 20 notifications regarding reprogramming of State  Peacekeeping Operations funds in support of  UN peacekeeping  operations provided to Congress between January 2006 and September  2008 cited possible UN gaps in troops or equipment as part of the  justification for this reprogramming. Furthermore, State’s 2006 and 2007  annual reports on peacekeeping included one sentence each on potential  difficulties in attaining needed resources. This sentence stated that an  ongoing challenge will be to ensure sufficient qualified troops for present  and possible new missions. Information about the resources available to  carry out the operations is not specified in the law. However, as this report  has discussed, important elements of assessing the effectiveness, exit  strategy, and mandate of operations would necessarily include a  discussion of commitments made to provide the troops, police, and other  resources needed to carry out the mandate; whether there would be  problems in obtaining them; or whether this information is known.

	Conclusion

Through its peacekeeping operations, the UN is trying to build sustainable  peace in some of the most unstable countries in the world. However, the  UN has at times been unable to obtain the authorized level of resources,  particularly specialized military units, police, and civilians. This has  hindered some operations from fully carrying out their mandates. In some  cases, these gaps reflect the inability of member states to provide the  needed resources. However, the gaps between authorized and deployed  levels of civilians, specialized military units, full battalion strength  contingents, and formed police units pose challenges to current UN  operations as well as to the UN in deploying another large  multidimensional operation. The United States government, along with  other member countries, is helping the UN address the resource  challenges. However, gaps in needed resource levels for current  operations still exist and State has not reported to Congress about this  issue. Congress may lack the critical information it needs to assess the  effectiveness of ongoing operations or the challenges the UN may face  when considering or fielding proposed new UN peacekeeping operations.  Congress needs this information when considering Administration  requests for funding and support for UN peacekeeping operations.

	Recommendation for Executive Action

To ensure that Congress has the information needed to conduct oversight  and fully consider Administration budget and other requests for UN  peacekeeping, we recommend that the Secretary of State include in the  department’s annual report or in another appropriate written submission  to Congress information about UN resource challenges and gaps in  obtaining and deploying troops, police, and civilians authorized to carry  out peacekeeping operations. The information should include  commitments to provide these resources, difficulties in obtaining them,  and whether the gaps have impeded operations from carrying out their  mandates. If the information is not available when an appropriate written  submission is sent to Congress, we recommend that State ensure the  information is provided, as available, during its consultations with  Congress.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Department of State and the UN provided written comments on a  draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendices III and IV.  State  commented that the report reflects a very thorough inquiry into the  increase in and developing nature of international expectations of United  Nations peacekeeping.  State also commented that our recommendation  should not specify in which reports to Congress the information on  peacekeeping gaps should be included.  Our draft recommendation  specified that State should provide the information in annual reports to  Congress and Congressional notifications.  We agree that this may be too  prescriptive but believe the information should be provided in writing;  therefore, we modified our recommendation so as to allow the information  be provided in appropriate written submissions to Congress.  The UN  commented that it fully concurred with the conclusions of our report and  appreciated recognition that UN peacekeeping operations should be  properly resourced and that mandates should be aligned with said  resources.  State and the UN also provided technical and general  comments which we addressed in the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the United Nations.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site  at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our review focused on four objectives related to the evolution of  peacekeeping operations and the United Nations’ (UN) capacity to deploy  new operations: Specifically, in this report, we examine (1) the evolution  of UN peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years; (2) the characteristics  of a potential new peacekeeping operation, given this evolution and UN  planning scenarios; (3) the challenges, if any, the UN would face in  deploying this potential new operation; and (4) U.S. efforts to support and  report on UN peacekeeping.
We analyzed the evolution of peacekeeping operations from 1998 to 2008.   We chose this timeframe because it is the most recent 10-year time period  and the period during which the UN initiated major peacekeeping reforms,  such as the response to the Brahimi report.  Also, during this time period,  the UN articulated its approach and rationale to multi-dimensional  peacekeeping.  In the Secretary General’s report, No Exit without Strategy,  the UN states that to facilitate sustainable peace a peacekeeping mission’s  mandate should include elements such as institution building and the  promotion of good governance and the rule of law.  To analyze the  evolution of UN peacekeeping operations from 1998-2008, we reviewed  UN documents, including UN Security Council resolutions containing  operation mandates; budget documents with information on resource  requirements; and other UN reports. We also obtained UN data on troop,  police, and civilian deployments and World Bank data on political  instability. We analyzed the variation in troops, police, and civilians from  1998 to 2008 to analyze trends in mission size and scope. We analyzed the  variation in civilian deployments from 2000 to 2008 as complete UN  civilian data by operation was not made available for earlier periods. We  categorized each mission as traditional or multidimensional, based on the  number of mandated tasks and whether the mandated tasks were  traditional, such as observing cease-fires or whether they were ambitious,  such as helping restore government institutions. We met with UN officials  in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of  Field Support to discuss changes in the nature of operations. We also  reviewed previous GAO reports and used the distinction they had made  between traditional and multidimensional operations. To illustrate the  change in the types of countries where the UN launched peacekeeping  operations in 1998 and 2008, we collected and analyzed data from the  United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index from  within 5 years of the start date of each operation. To show the specialized  capabilities and increased number of civilians required by recent  operations, we used the 2008 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations  conducted by the Center on International Cooperation’s Global Peace  Operations program at the request of and with the support of the Best  Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations,  augmented by UN operation deployment maps. To describe the stability of  the countries in which peacekeeping operations are deployed in 2008, we  used the World Bank’s Governance Matters.
To determine the characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping  operation, we used a combination of trend analysis and UN contingency  planning documents. The trend analysis described in the preceding  paragraph provided us with an average of nine mandated tasks. We then  reviewed current UN contingency plans for a multidimensional operation  that included these tasks and selected this plan to provide detailed  requirements for the potential new operation. In developing requirements  for a potential new operation, we worked with UN peacekeeping officials  from several offices, including military planning, budget, logistics, civilian  personnel, and police, to review the parameters of the operation. For  further details on the potential new operation, see appendix II.
To assess the challenges the UN would face in deploying the potential new  operation, we reviewed a variety of UN documents, met with UN officials  in New York, held teleconferences and interviews with UN officials  deployed to operations, and met with State Department officials in  Washington, D.C., and New York and DOD officials in Washington, D.C.  Our analysis discusses challenges to deploying a potential large,  multidimensional operation. It does not assess challenges to deploying a  smaller, less capable operation. To determine the challenges the UN might  face in obtaining troops, we analyzed UN data on troop contributions;  consulted academic research on troop contribution patterns; spoke with  various UN officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,  including officials in Force Generation Services; consulted a variety of UN  reports, including Secretary General reports on particular operations; and  reviewed past GAO reports. We assessed the gap between authorized  forces and deployed forces by comparing current authorized UN force  levels with monthly deployment data for troops, military observers and  police up through September 2008. We assessed the number of infantry  battalions and specialized units deployed by assessing the most current  individual operation deployment maps available—ranging from March to  October 2008. We reported the number of leased and contributed aircraft  based on September 2007 data augmented with September 2008 data for  the Darfur operation. To address challenges in the realm of obtaining  police, we analyzed UN data on police contributions; met with officials in  the Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations;  consulted reports and studies completed by research institutions and  training centers; and spoke with a UN official at the mission in Haiti. To  assess challenges in recruiting and deploying civilians, we analyzed UN  data on civilian vacancy rates by mission and position; spoke with UN  officials in the Field Personnel Division of the Department of Field  Support; and reviewed the large number of UN  reports addressing civilian  staffing issues that have been released between 2000 and 2008. To describe  potential challenges in the realm of logistical requirements, we met with  several UN officials in the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and  Field Support, including at a roundtable discussion of our potential new  mission; reviewed UN reports on particular peacekeeping operations; and  analyzed UN documents related to Strategic Deployment Stocks and the  UN Logistics Base. We determined that data from the UN’s peacekeeper  troop- and deployment- reporting systems are sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of our report, which is to support findings concerning the  challenges the UN may encounter when addressing the gaps between  authorized and deployed levels of uniformed and civilian UN  peacekeepers.
To analyze U.S. efforts to help support UN peacekeeping, we reviewed  U.S. reports on peacekeeping, including GAO reports and State  Department budget submissions and reports on peacekeeping. We also  obtained all notifications to Congress on reprogramming funds for  peacekeeping from January 2006 through September 2008. There were a  total of 77 notifications, 17 of which were to announce new or expanded  peacekeeping operations. The others provided information on  reprogramming funds in the Peacekeeping Operations Account. We  analyzed these notifications for funding shifts and the information  provided to Congress about the peacekeeping operations, such as  operations’ mandates, exit strategies, U.S. national interests served, and  gaps between the level of resources required and the level provided. We  also obtained the annual 2006 and 2007 peacekeeping reports to Congress  and reviewed them for the same issues. We compared our analysis of these  documents with the reporting standards for peacekeeping under                22 U.S.C. § 287b.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to December  2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Methodology for Identifying Potential New Peacekeeping Operation Requirements

To identify requirements for the potential new operation, we reviewed UN  planning scenarios for one that provided a reasonable basis for a potential  operation, as validated by (1) our analysis of trends in peacekeeping since  1998 and (2) our examination of the scenarios’ components. Our analysis  is not intended to predict the size, scope, or location of a new UN  peacekeeping operation. A new operation’s mandate and resource needs  would be determined by the UN Security Council and the circumstances  particular to the country to which it is deployed. Therefore, the  requirements of a new operation would likely differ from those of the  potential new operation presented here.
We first examined the 17 operations deployed or enlarged since 1998 and  identified 18 categories of tasks included in the mandates of one or more  of these operations. We then determined these 17 operations had on  average nine mandated tasks. To construct a possible mandate for our  potential new peacekeeping operation reflecting these trends, we selected  nine tasks from the list of 18 categories of tasks that most frequently  appeared in the mandates of the previous 17 operations. These include  restoring the rule of law and supporting elections (each included in the  mandates of 11 of the 17 operations), and also restoration of government  institutions (present in 10 of 17 mandates).
We identified one UN planning scenario that was a close match to these  trends. As table 3 shows, this planning scenario has nine mandated tasks  that are consistent with the most common historical tasks since 1998.  Seven of the tasks were similar or identical. Two tasks in the UN planning  scenario—facilitating political agreements and supporting disarmament  and demobilization—were not among the nine most common historical  tasks, but were frequent tasks of the 17 operations since 1998.
The UN planning scenario is located in sub-Saharan Africa. We validated  that sub-Saharan Africa is the modal location for a potential operation.  That is, 10 of the 17 operations deployed or expanded since 1998 were in  this region. Also, 7 of the 11 operations deployed since 1998 and still  ongoing are located in sub-Saharan Africa. We thus used this UN planning  scenario as the basis for the potential new operation. This analysis  acknowledges that the mandate, resource requirements, and location of a  new UN operation would be contingent on actual events, and its  characteristics may differ to an unknown extent from those presented in  the UN planning scenarios used for this assessment.
The UN planning scenario identified political and environmental  conditions in the area of operation and specified the troop and police  numbers for the operation. The assumptions in the UN planning scenario  are that the government is weak, the location would lack roads and other  infrastructure, UN troop contingents would operate in a high-threat  environment, and the operations would function at a high tempo with  active military patrols. We validated these as reasonable assumptions by  (1) reviewing U.S. and UN reports about locations in sub-Saharan Africa,  (2) reviewing UNDP reports on political instability and level of  development in sub-Saharan Africa, and (3) interviewing UN officials who  had surveyed the area.
The UN planning scenario calls for 27,000 troops and military observers  deployed in six locations in the country. The scenario also calls for  specialized military units, such as logistics, transport, and aviation units.  To validate whether this scenario was reasonable, we met with UN  officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Offices of Military  Affairs, Police Affairs, Planning Service, Strategic Military Cell, Force  Generation Services, and others. We discussed, in detail, the planning  scenarios and the planning process to generate the scenarios, including  the fact that some field survey work had been conducted. We obtained and  reviewed documents on force requirements for similar operations, such as  Darfur. We found that the requirements, such as the need for special  military units, were consistent for these operations and the UN planning  scenario. We reviewed the UN planning guidelines, the UN survey mission  handbook, and lessons learned reports for procedures, requirements, and  best practices for standards in planning operations. On the basis of this  work, we validated as reasonable the deployment of 21,000 troops in five  sectors for the potential new operation. As table 4 shows, we eliminated  one sector from the potential new operation because it was primarily  mandated to observe and monitor a cease-fire and thus this sector  constituted an independent operation with a different mandate rather than  part of the potential new operation.
The UN planning scenario calls for 1,500 police, of which 700 would be  deployed in five formed police units. We validated this as reasonable  based on interviews and briefings with UN officials in the police division  and our review of reports and data on UN police in peacekeeping  operations. According to the UN officials, the estimate is based on their  experience, a technical assessment mission, the population size, the tasks  for the UN police, and the capacity of the local police. These officials also  said that more information about the local police would be important in  developing a more precise estimate of required police and formed police  units.
The UN scenario did not estimate the needed civilian staff. We estimated  that the potential new operation would require 4,000 to 5,000 civilian staff,  based on interviews and data provided by UN officials. UN officials noted  that a lower bound estimate for a large operation would be about 3,000  civilian staff. However, these officials also stated that considering the  potential new operation’s mandated tasks, force size, and security  environment and comparisons with operations in the Congo, Darfur, and  Sudan, a more reasonable estimate is 4,000 to 5,000 civilians. In  comparison, the 2008 to 2009 proposed budget for the operation in the  Congo had an authorized military component of 18,931 and an authorized  civilian component of 4,934, 24 percent of whom were international  civilians The proposed budget for the operation in Sudan had a military  component of 10,715 and a civilian component of 4,260, 23 percent of  whom were international civilians. The proposed budget for the Sudan  operation had a military component of 25,507 and a civilian component of  5,557, 27 percent of whom were international civilians.
The UN planning scenario did not estimate logistics requirements. In  discussions with UN officials, they stated that due to the absence of  detailed planning in the field, resource requirements for the potential new  operation are difficult to calculate and infrastructure costs are  unknowable at this time. These officials stated that the best estimate of  logistics requirements and challenges would be from the experiences of  other operations in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Sudan and the Democratic  Republic of the Congo. In the 2007-2008 peacekeeping fiscal year, those  operations had budgeted between about $420 million and $425 million for  supplies, transport, and facilities. However, these operations have been  close to full deployment levels for 2 or more years and the actual logistics  requirements for a potential new force could be significantly less in the  first year, depending upon rate of deployment for the troops, the resources  required to achieve initial operational capability for each mandated task in  each sector, whether sectors would be established simultaneously or in  sequence, and many other factors. In Darfur, for example, less than 50  percent of authorized forces had been deployed as of October 2008, about   10 months after the start of the operation. In contrast, the augmented force  in Lebanon deployed 70 percent of its authorized force level within the  first 4 months. On the other hand, some logistics requirements, such as the  transport in and establishment of facilities for the initial force, may be  greater for a new operation in its first year in comparison with these  mature operations, according to UN officials. Moreover, UN officials  indicated that the equipment needs and initial logistics capabilities of  individual infantry battalions would be comparable to those deployed to  Darfur; they provided mission resource requirements for those units. For  example, as in the case of Darfur, we found it reasonable to assume that  many of the operational units for this potential new peacekeeping  operation would need to come from countries capable of providing  supplies for the first 60 to 90 days after deployment, given the limitations  on local infrastructure expected in this environment.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix IV: Comments from the United Nations

	GAO Comments

1.  We agree that the UN has conducted large peacekeeping  operations prior to 1998.  However, we selected the time period  1998 to 2008 for our review because it represents the most  recent decade of growth in UN peacekeeping activities as well  as major UN initiatives to reform peacekeeping operations.   Most notably, this period reflects the implementation of the  Brahimi peacekeeping reform efforts and the UN’s No Exit  Without Strategy approach that the UN articulated in 2001. 2.  We added information that describes UN peacekeeping reform  efforts. 3.  We have expanded our discussion of the process for  establishing a peacekeeping operation. 4.  We have reworded the sentence to reflect this comment.  5.  We added this information to the report.  6.  We agree and have noted the limitation in the report.  7.  We added this information to the report.  8.  We have reworded the section to reflect the UN’s comment.  9.  We have substituted alternative language.  11.  We added this information to the report.  12.  We added information to the report to reflect the UN and U.S. positions  on UN human resource reform policy.   13.  We added information to the report to reflect the UN and U.S. positions  on UN human resource reform policy.  14.  We modified the text to delete the word “failure.”  We already discuss  UN field staff proposals in another section.

Appendix V: Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of September 2008

The United Nations deployed approximately 109,000 personnel to 16 UN  peacekeeping operations as of September 2008. Table 5 indicates the  location, personnel distribution, and mandate type and size of each  operation.

Appendix VI: Military Capabilities Required by UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of November 2008

UN peacekeeping operations have required increasingly large numbers of  combat capable battalions, aircraft for both transport and combat support,  and other support units. As of November 2008, 30 countries are providing  76 battalions of infantry peacekeeping troops, including 21 battalions of  mechanized infantry. Twenty-five of these same countries also provide  helicopters or support units in addition to infantry battalions; another 12  countries provide only helicopters or support units. Table 6 reflects the  current number and type of operational battalions and support units  company-sized or larger required by 9 of the 16 UN peacekeeping  operations ongoing as of November 2008. The data for the UN operation in  Darfur (UNAMID) includes units authorized but not yet deployed. Unit  numbers and country of origin reflect deployment data reported by the  individual UN operations between March and November 2008.

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Tet Miyabara, Assistant Director;  B. Patrick Hickey; Marisela Perez; Jennifer Young; Lynn Cothern; and  David Dornisch made key contributions to this report. In addition, Ashley  Alley, Jeremy Latimer, and Monica Brym provided technical assistance.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The United Nations (UN) supports U.S. interests in maintaining international security by deploying and operating 16 peacekeeping operations in locations in conflict, including Darfur, Lebanon, and Haiti. Over the past 10 years, the number of deployed UN personnel increased from about 41,000 peacekeepers and civilian staff to about 109,000 in 2008. In this report on the UN's capacity to deploy further operations, GAO was asked to examine (1) the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years; (2) the likely characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping operation, given this evolution; (3) the challenges, if any, the UN would face deploying this operation; and (4) U.S. efforts to support and report on UN peacekeeping. GAO reviewed UN documents, developed a methodology to assess the requirements for a potential new operation with UN assistance, interviewed UN headquarters and mission officials, and assessed U.S. government documents on UN peacekeeping.

What GAO Found

UN peacekeeping operations since 1998 have taken on increasinglyambitious mandates, been located in more challenging environments, and grown in size and scope. UN operations in 1998 averaged three mandated tasks, such as observing cease-fires; in 2008, they averaged nine more ambitious tasks, such as restoring government institutions. Operations in 2008 were located in some of the world's most unstable countries, were larger and more complex than in 1998, and deployed thousands of civilians. Based on trends in peacekeeping and recent UN planning options, GAO analysis indicates that a potential new operation would likely be large and complex, take place in sub-Saharan Africa, and have nine mandated tasks. This potential new operation would likely require member states to contribute 21,000 troops and military observers, including those in engineering and aviation units, and 1,500 police to carry out the mandate. The UN would likely need to deploy 4,000 to 5,000 civilians. The operation's logistics needs also would be large and complex. The ability to fully deploy any potential new operation would likely face challenges, in view of current UN resource constraints. As of September 2008, ongoing UN operations had about a 20 percent gap between troops and military observers authorized to carry out operations and actual deployments. For police, the gap was about 34 percent; it was similar for civilians. Some gaps reflect UN difficulties in obtaining and deploying resources to carry out operations. Lack of these resources, such as special military units, prevented some operations from executing mandates. Lack of infrastructure in the potential new operation's environment would challenge the UN to provide logistical needs.