Background

Artisanal and small-scale mining of gold in the DRC is a significant driver  of the country’s economy. ASM gold mining in the DRC employs a large  number of people, constitutes a potential major source of tax revenue,  and represents a potential engine of development for the country,  according to a 2015 study by USAID. More than 1,000 ASM gold mine  sites of varying size operate in the DRC, primarily in remote provinces in  the eastern region, commonly employing groups of 30 to 300 miners (see  app. II for a map showing DRC provinces). In parts of the DRC, artisanal  and small-scale mining provides alternative employment opportunities in  the absence of a viable agricultural sector. In addition, mining—including  ASM gold mining—provides miners with cash-on-hand and requires little  or no specialized knowledge.
ASM gold miners work as diggers, rock crushers, sorters, and traders.  Most ASM gold miners use shovels, picks, and other rudimentary tools,  such as mining pans. Because of the scarcity of mechanical equipment in  some areas, ASM gold miners grind the mined gold manually into a  powder, often with a pair of rocks or a tire rim, and extract gold from this  powder using a sluice, mining pan, and washing pool and sometimes  using hazardous chemicals such as mercury (see fig. 1).
According to a 2016 study by the International Peace Information Service  (IPIS), ASM gold mining sites in the eastern DRC annually produced a  combined total of about 12 metric tons of gold, with an estimated value of  $437 million, in 2013 through 2015. This study found that a miner  produced an average of 0.17 grams per day, worth about $6.07 on global  markets, but retained earnings of $1.84 to $2.75 per day. However,  significant portions of many miners’ wages went toward paying off loans  (i.e., prefinancing) that the miners incurred for food, tools, and other basic  necessities. As a result, when production levels were low, miners could  easily enter a cycle of indebtedness.
According to the government of the DRC, the average annual official ASM  gold production in 2010 through 2016 was about 279 kilograms (0.28  metric tons) of gold, with an estimated value of $10.1 million per year.  Total official ASM gold production was about 1,955 kilograms (1.95 metric  tons), with an estimated value of about $71 million in 2010 through 2016  (see table 1).

	Reported Supply Chain for DRC- Sourced ASM Gold

The reported official supply chain for ASM gold produced in the DRC  involves multiple key actors authorized by the DRC government,  according to reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed.  However, these and other sources indicate that the vast majority of DRC- sourced ASM gold is mined, traded, and exported unofficially, without  authorization. Additionally, the majority of ASM gold miners reportedly  work in the presence of elements of the Congolese army or illegal armed  actors, according to a report and stakeholders.

		Reported Official Supply Chain for DRC-Sourced ASM Gold Involves Multiple Actors, but Almost All ASM Gold Is Reportedly Smuggled

The official supply chain for ASM gold produced in the DRC involves  multiple actors, including miners, local traders, and exporters, according  to USAID and UNGoE reports we reviewed and stakeholders we  interviewed. Those sources indicated that these key actors are required  to obtain government authorization, such as official mining cards, or  register with the provincial or national government to trade or export ASM  gold in the DRC. However, according to these reports and stakeholders,  almost all DRC-sourced ASM gold is produced and traded unofficially and  smuggled from the country. Figure 2 illustrates the reported official and  unofficial supply chains for DRC-sourced ASM gold.
According to these sources, unregistered local traders or exporters  generally sell DRC-sourced ASM gold to regional buyers in Uganda,  Burundi, or Rwanda or global buyers in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
The USAID and UNGoE reports we reviewed and stakeholders we  interviewed generally described the official supply chain for DRC-sourced  ASM gold as follows:
Artisanal and small-scale miners purchase government mining cards  and join cooperatives, which allows them to work in artisanal mining  zones known as the zone d’exploitation artisanal (ZEA). According to  a USAID report, ASM gold is considered legal under DRC law when it  is produced by a registered cooperative working within a ZEA or a  mining area that has been inspected and found to be “green”—that is,  conflict free—within the past year by a government-accredited,  validated mission. Miners in provinces where most of the ASM gold  is produced are subject to an average provincial production tax of  about 8 percent, according to USAID.
Local traders, known as negociants, register with the government to  purchase gold from villages near mine sites and sell it to larger traders  or exporters. Generally, there are two types of local traders: petit  negociants, who buy and sell small quantities (one-half gram or less),  and grande negociants, who buy and sell larger quantities (1 to 50  kilograms) of gold. According to a USAID report, registered local  traders in these provinces are subject to an average provincial tax of  about 1 percent on sales volume.
National exporters, known as comptoirs, register with the national  government to export gold purchased from the local traders.  Registered exporters are subject to a 2 percent national export tax,  according to a USAID report.
Global buyers, including international refiners, jewelers, and banks,  buy ASM gold from registered exporters in the DRC for further  processing for use in electronic components, jewelry, or gold bars.
Despite the existence of an official supply chain, almost all ASM gold is  smuggled out of the DRC and is therefore not reflected in official export  statistics or subject to provincial or national taxes, according to reports we  reviewed as well as stakeholders we interviewed. These sources  indicate that smuggling activities often begin at the mine site and involve  both registered and unregistered actors. For example, ASM gold miners  mine for gold at undesignated sites and sell it to both registered and  unregistered local traders. Unregistered traders purchase gold at or  near mining areas and either sell the gold to larger registered or  unregistered traders or exporters located in regional trading centers in the  DRC—for example, in Bukavu, South Kivu Province, or Butembo, North  Kivu Province—or smuggle the gold from the DRC themselves, according  to USAID and UNGoE reports reflecting fieldwork completed in 2014 and  2016. Registered local traders also participate in smuggling by selling  gold to unregistered exporters and to regional and global buyers outside  the DRC. Additionally, registered exporters participate in smuggling by  underreporting their exports of ASM gold to avoid taxes, according to  reports reflecting fieldwork completed in 2014 through 2016. A UNGoE  study estimated that unreported exports of ASM gold from the DRC and  neighboring countries in the first 9 months of 2015 amounted to about  $200 million. Some of the factors that contribute to smuggling include  limited government control over the remote areas where ASM gold is  primarily produced, inadequate infrastructure, and corruption, according  to reports we reviewed and DRC government officials we interviewed.  DRC government officials told us that smuggling is also a consequence of  weak border enforcement. Reports we reviewed indicate that the  smuggling of ASM gold from the DRC has resulted in a substantial loss of  tax revenue.
Most ASM gold produced in the DRC is smuggled through regional  buyers in neighboring African countries and then to Dubai, UAE,  according to several reports. UNGoE, OECD, and NGO officials told us  that gold buyers located outside the DRC—for example, in Uganda— often rely on networks of traders who purchase gold at mines in the  eastern DRC and smuggle it out of the country. These sometimes- complex supply chain networks include traders and exporters who are  often from other countries in the region or from China, India, the Middle  East, or Europe, according to an OECD representative. Reports we  reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed also noted that ASM gold  smuggled from the DRC is typically transported from Dubai to other  international markets such as India or Switzerland.
Since 2012, the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre, a UAE government  entity, has provided guidelines on responsible sourcing to gold refiners  through its accreditation program. However, joining the program is  voluntary, and the entity’s jurisdiction does not include all refineries in the  UAE, according to Dubai Multi Commodities Centre officials. In  interviews, Dubai government officials and refiners and a representative  of an auditing firm told us that accredited refiners generally do not  purchase gold directly from the DRC or most adjoining countries (see  app. II for a map showing the countries adjoining the DRC). Furthermore,  these individuals noted that refiners take various actions to ensure that  gold sourced from these countries does not enter their supply chains.  However, the refiners also acknowledged having purchased gold in the  local gold market in Dubai (known as the gold souk), despite the fact that,  according to a UNGoE report, traders and jewelers operating in the souk  may have purchased gold from the DRC. In interviews, traders and  jewelers at the gold souk told us that they required minimal  documentation and generally did not ask questions about country of origin  when buying gold. For example, one trader told us he was willing to  purchase up to 50 kilograms of gold without any source-of-origin  documentation. As a result, the extent of comingling of gold from the souk  and gold from refiners who follow responsible sourcing guidelines is  unclear.

		Armed Groups Reportedly Interfere at ASM Gold Mine Sites in Several Ways, Including Imposing Illegal Taxes on Miners

In recent years, progress has been made in reducing the presence of  armed groups at tantalum, tin, and tungsten mine sites, according to  UNGoE, OECD, and IPIS reports. However, the widespread availability  of gold in remote, difficult-to-access areas of the eastern DRC and the  lack of a functioning traceability system allow armed groups to operate at  gold mine sites with minimal government and international oversight.  According to reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed,  interference by armed groups of state and nonstate actors occurs  primarily at mine sites through, among other things, illegal taxation and  control of mining areas, pillaging, and forced labor. For example, a 2016  IPIS study found that, as of 2015, an estimated 64 percent of ASM gold  miners worked at mines with state and nonstate armed group  interference. Armed groups have also been known to operate illegal  road barriers, where they collect revenue from miners or traders  transporting gold. Furthermore, according to the IPIS study and UNGoE  officials, most instances of armed group interference at mining sites  involve illegal taxation. As of 2016, among the conflict minerals, gold  provided by far the most significant financial benefit to armed groups,  according to UNGoE.
Elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo  (FARDC) constitute the largest armed presence and source of  interference at gold mine sites, according to the 2016 IPIS study.  According to DRC government officials, although FARDC is present to  maintain security at or around gold mine sites, some undisciplined  FARDC elements have interfered at mining sites. However, these officials  noted that the military is working to bring such elements under control by  taking legal action against FARDC officers and soldiers found to be in  violation of the law. In addition, a report by the Congo Research Group,  based on fieldwork conducted in 2015, indicates that fragmentation has  greatly increased among illegal nonstate armed groups in eastern DRC.  With the disappearance or weakening of armed groups such as the  March 23 Movement and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of  Rwanda from the DRC, illegal armed groups are now smaller and more  fragmented, tending to pillage mines rather than impose permanent  control, according to IPIS representatives. IPIS representatives noted that  FARDC elements, in contrast, tend to impose more permanent control  and illegal taxation.

	DRC Government’s, USAID’s, and Other Entities’ Efforts to Encourage Responsible Sourcing of ASM Gold

The DRC government and USAID, as well as several other entities, have  undertaken initiatives to encourage the sourcing of conflict-free ASM gold  from the DRC. However, some of these initiatives face challenges, such  as the limited number of validated mine sites, as well as ongoing security  risks.

		DRC Government Initiatives

To mitigate supply chain–related concerns, in 2015, the DRC government  developed the Traceability Initiative for Artisanal Gold (ITOA) to establish  conflict-free sources of ASM gold. ITOA relies on a system of tamper- proof envelopes and agents to track and certify the source and chain of  custody of gold. The DRC government seeks to implement ITOA at  mining sites that have been validated as “green” (i.e., conflict free, with no  child labor) and are located in officially designated ZEAs. According to  USAID documents, the DRC government aims to pilot ITOA at two mine  sites in the Maniema and South Kivu provinces and to scale the system  on the basis of the pilot. DRC officials told us that they expect the ITOA  pilot to be launched in the summer of 2017.
However, the limited number of mine sites that have been validated and  thus licensed to operate, as well as the relatively high provincial taxes in  the mining sector in the DRC compared with taxes in neighboring  countries, as reported by USAID and UNGoE, continue to limit incentives  for sourcing conflict-free ASM gold. For example, as of April 2016, only  37 of more than 1,000 ASM gold mine sites had been validated as green,  according to a DRC government accredited joint validated mission. The  government’s ability to validate mines has been hindered by factors such  as insecure conditions and lack of funding, according to a 2015 report by  the Enough Project. Furthermore, relatively high government taxes  discourage actors along the supply chain from selling gold through legal  channels, according to reports we reviewed and stakeholders we  interviewed. A USAID report found that regional tax rates in the DRC and  neighboring countries had been largely equalized but that provincial taxes  in the DRC remained high. For example, Support Service and  Management of Small Scale Mining, or SAESSCAM—a provincial  government entity—requires miners to pay a 10-percent production tax in  addition to other fees, according to a USAID document. SAESSCAM is  responsible for providing training in safe and effective mining techniques,  among other things, but focuses primarily on collecting taxes from miners,  according to USAID and OECD reports we reviewed.

		USAID Initiatives

USAID is assisting the DRC government in its efforts to encourage the  responsible sourcing of conflict-free ASM gold and provides training to  mining cooperatives and government officials in the mining sector.  Since 2015, USAID has partnered with the DRC government to assist  with implementing ITOA, including helping to validate mine sites. In  addition, since 2016, USAID has worked with Tetra Tech through the  Capacity Building for Responsible Minerals Trade Program and  Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) through the Just Gold project to scale  up pilot initiatives for the production and sale of ASM gold. The pilot is  focused on increasing the volume of conflict-free gold and improving the  integrity of traceability systems in the DRC. For example, miners are  taught more-sustainable exploitation techniques and offered project  equipment. As of March 2017, the Just Gold project had exported about  1,429 grams (1.4 kilograms) of ASM gold. Table 2 shows the two pilot  projects USAID had initiated as of June 2017 to develop and expand  existing traceability schemes for ASM gold produced in the DRC.
USAID progress reports cite the limited number of buyers, including  refiners, and security as key challenges affecting these pilot projects.  According to USAID officials, some potential buyers are unwilling to  purchase ASM gold from the DRC because of associated risks related to  potential armed group interference. USAID officials also told us that the  low volume of ASM gold available from the limited number of pilot mine  sites poses an additional challenge to attracting buyers. In interviews,  Dubai Multi Commodities Centre officials and refinery representatives in  Dubai told us that, while they do not currently purchase any ASM gold  produced in the DRC, they would be open to exploring options to buy  such gold if they had some assurance from a partner such as USAID.  USAID officials explained that their current focus is on identifying London  Bullion Market Association (LBMA) refiners, who examine their supply  chains more closely. Additionally, ongoing security risks affect the  implementation of pilot projects, according to USAID progress reports.  For example, in February 2017, one of the potential pilot sites at Matete  was attacked, leading to suspension of on-site activities. According to  USAID documents, an armed group of approximately 30 men attacked  several buildings in Matete, killing one military soldier and taking  hostages. Contractor staff were immediately moved to another compound  for security and were subsequently evacuated, unharmed.
In 2016, USAID established a pilot projects target of developing  traceability and due diligence schemes for ASM gold at 25 mine sites.  USAID met this target in December 2016, having developed traceability  and due diligence schemes at 26 mine sites, primarily through the Just  Gold project. USAID officials told us that they are supporting the  development of a traceability scheme for ASM gold so that gold from  validated sites can comply with ICGLR standards.

		Other Entities’ Initiatives

Other entities—OECD, ICGLR, and LBMA—have undertaken regional  initiatives to encourage the responsible sourcing of gold.
OECD guidance. Since 2012, OECD has developed guidance on  encouraging responsible supply chains for ASM gold. For example,  the guidance notes that stakeholders should engage in legalizing and  formalizing the artisanal mining communities to encourage conflict- free sourcing. In 2016, OECD reported that implementation of Section  1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act had increased awareness about the  supply chain of conflict minerals in the region.
ICGLR regional certification mechanism. In 2010, ICGLR  developed a regional certification mechanism to ensure that conflict  minerals, including gold, are fully traceable. However, two reports we  reviewed raised concerns about the validity of ICGLR certificates  issued to comptoirs exporting ASM gold, given that traceability  schemes for ASM gold are lacking. In addition, UNGoE, OECD, and  DRC officials told us that the ICGLR’s mechanism has not been fully  implemented and is not adequately monitored owing to limited  incentives for member states to accomplish regional goals.
LBMA accreditation. In 2012, LBMA, which represents the global  market for gold and silver, established its “Responsible Gold  Guidance” to ensure that the gold refiners it accredits purchase only  conflict-free gold. According to LBMA, compliance with this  framework is mandatory for all refiners wishing to sell into the London  bullion market. USAID officials told us that USAID is seeking to  identify buyers from the LBMA refiners for its ASM gold pilot projects.

	Additional Information on Sexual Violence in Eastern DRC Published since August 2016

Since we reported in August 2016, a USAID-funded, population-based  study published in 2016 has provided additional data on sexual violence  in the DRC. In addition, as we previously reported, population-based  surveys on sexual violence are under way or planned in two adjoining  countries, Burundi and Uganda. We also identified some new case-file  data on sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries; however, as  we reported previously, case-file data on sexual violence are not suitable  for estimating an overall rate of sexual violence. Finally, a 2017 UN report  indicates that the DRC government has made some progress in  addressing sexual violence.

		USAID-Funded Study Provides Additional Data on Sexual Violence in the DRC, and Studies for Adjoining Countries Are Under Way

We identified a USAID-funded, population-based study surveying the rate  of sexual violence in the eastern DRC that had been published since  August 2016. Published in September 2016, the study used data  collected in June and July 2016 to estimate that 31.6 percent of women  and 32.9 percent of men reported exposure to some form of sexual and  gender-based violence in their lifetime. Among women who were exposed  to sexual violence, 12.7 percent reported exposure to conflict-related  sexual violence, while 87.4 percent reported exposure to community- based sexual violence. Among men who were exposed to sexual  violence, 68.1 percent reported exposure to conflict-related sexual  violence, while 31.9 percent reported exposure to community-based  sexual violence.
Table 3 summarizes the results of this and other selected, population- based surveys of the rate of gender-based sexual violence in the DRC  that have been published since 2008. The surveys’ results are not  directly comparable because of variations in the periods of reported  incidents, the genders and ages of survey participants, and the  geographic areas covered, as well as the definitions of sexual violence  used. For example, while the August 2010 survey estimated the rate of  sexual violence over a lifetime, other surveys estimated the rate of sexual  violence over both a lifetime and a 12-month period. Additionally, some  surveys collected information only on women, while others surveyed both  men and women.
In addition to these studies of sexual violence in the eastern DRC,  population-based surveys in Uganda and Burundi are under way or  planned, as we previously reported. According to ICF International,  fieldwork for the 2016 Uganda Demographic and Health Survey is now  complete, and the final report is expected in October 2017; fieldwork for  the 2016 Burundi survey is currently ongoing, and the final report is  expected in December 2017. Figure 3 shows the anticipated publication  dates for population-based surveys on sexual violence that are currently  under way or planned in Uganda and Burundi. The figure also shows the  publication dates for the population-based surveys, with data on rates of  sexual violence in the eastern DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda that have  been published since we started reporting on sexual violence in the  region in 2011.

		Some Additional Case-File Information about Sexual Violence Has Become Available since August 2016

Since we reported in August 2016, State and UN entities have provided  additional case-file information about instances of sexual violence in the  DRC and adjoining countries. State’s annual country reports on human  rights practices provided the following case-file data pertaining to sexual  violence in the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda:
DRC. In 2016, the United Nations documented 267 adult victims and  171 child victims of sexual violence in conflict. This violence was  perpetrated by illegal armed groups as well as state security forces  and civilians and was concentrated in North Kivu Province, according  to State.
Burundi. One organization—Seruka Center—working with victims of  sexual violence in Bujumbura reported 1,288 cases of sexual assault  during 2016. According to State, the actual number of rapes was likely  higher, given factors that prevent women and girls from seeking  medical treatment. Another organization—Humura Center— responsible for investigating cases of sexual violence and rape  received 160 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in 2016,  according to State.
Rwanda. In 2016, Rwanda’s National Public Prosecution Authority  reported 190 cases of rape. According to State’s report, domestic  violence against women in 2016 was common, but most incidents  were not reported or prosecuted.
Uganda. State’s 2016 report reiterated that rape remained a serious  problem throughout the country and that the government did not  consistently enforce the law. As we noted previously, the police crime  report through June 2015, the most recent available, registered  10,163 reported sexual offenses.
In addition, UN entities reported the following case-file data about sexual  violence in the DRC and Burundi:
DRC. Data collected by the Congolese government with support from  the UN Population Fund indicate that from January 2016 through  March 2017, gender-based violence service providers responded to at  least 24,364 incidents of gender-based violence. Women and girls  were the victims in 97 percent of the reported cases in 2016. In  addition, in 2016, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the  DRC, known as MONUSCO, verified 637 cases of conflict-related  sexual violence, with illegal armed groups responsible for 74 percent  of cases, and state security forces, mainly FARDC, responsible for the  remaining 26 percent of cases.
Burundi. In 2016, UNHCR—the UN Refugee Agency—reported  2,250 gender-based violence incidents targeting refugees in  neighboring countries, with 23 percent of incidents occurring in  Burundi or en route from the country.

		UN Reports DRC Government Has Made Some Progress in Addressing Sexual Violence

Since 2013, the DRC government has made some progress in  addressing sexual violence in the eastern DRC, according to a 2017 UN  report. The report notes improvements in the capacity of DRC state  security forces to address sexual violence in the following respects: adoption of codes of conduct prohibiting sexual violence;  investigation of alleged incidents in order to hold perpetrators  accountable; and  formation of specialized police units capable of addressing sexual  violence.
In addition, law enforcement measures such as arrests and prosecutions  have increased, and training for the military has improved, according to  an official from the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General  on Sexual Violence in Conflict. This official also noted that in 2014, the  DRC government appointed a Personal Representative to the President  on Sexual Violence and Child Recruitment to advise the President on  sexual violence issues, ensuring that sexual violence remains on the  government’s agenda. More recently, the DRC government and the  United Nations have expressed interest in exploring linkages between  mining and sexual violence, according to this official. However, the official  told us that while reports suggest a link between mining and sexual  violence in the region, the UN and the DRC government have not been  able to prove such a linkage because of limited resources for travel to the  areas where mining occurs and the limited availability of women with  specialized knowledge to investigate these issues.

	Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the SEC, State, and USAID for  comment. State and USAID provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate. SEC did not provide comments.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees and to the SEC, State, and USAID. The report is also  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In this report, we provide information about (1) the supply chain for gold  produced through artisanal and small-scale mining in the Democratic  Republic of the Congo (DRC); (2) efforts by the DRC and the U.S.  government and others that may encourage the sourcing of conflict-free  artisanal and small-scale mined (ASM) gold; and (3) sexual violence in  the eastern DRC and neighboring countries that has been published  since August 2016, when we last reported on this topic.
To address our first two objectives, we reviewed key reports and  documents from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),  international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO).  We reviewed these reports for methodological rigor, relevance, and  timeliness to ensure that they were sufficiently reliable to support their  own conclusions or conclusions we made based on their work. We also  reviewed these reports’ methodologies related to site selection, sources  and quality of evidence, and the nature and timing of fieldwork in the  DRC. We reviewed U.S. agency documents, such as a 2015 USAID- funded report related to conflict minerals in the DRC, as well as USAID  internal documents that included a program implementation plan and  annual and quarterly internal progress reports on responsible sourcing of  ASM gold in the DRC. We also reviewed annual reports by the United  Nations Group of Experts (UNGoE) from 2011 through 2016, annual  baseline reports on the DRC by the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) from 2014 and 2015, and reports by  NGOs such as the Enough Project and Global Witness. (For a complete  listing of the documents we reviewed, see the bibliography at the end of  this report.) In reviewing these reports, we focused on discussion of the  ASM gold supply chain; associated barriers and incentives, if any; and  efforts to encourage responsible sourcing. We also interviewed  Department of State (State), USAID, and United Nations (UN) officials  and OECD and NGO representatives. We traveled to Dubai, United Arab  Emirates, where we interviewed officials from the Ministry of Economy  and Dubai Multi Commodities Centre, representatives of gold refineries,  accounting firms, local traders, and jewelers. We interviewed DRC  government officials in Santa Clara, California, and Washington, D.C.,  regarding the local supply chain for gold and efforts to ensure responsible  sourcing.
To address our third objective, we identified and assessed any  information on sexual violence in eastern DRC and the three adjoining  countries—Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi—that had been published or  become otherwise available since we issued our August 2016 report on  sexual violence in these areas. We discussed the collection of sexual  violence-related data in the DRC and adjoining countries, including  population-based survey data and case-file data, during interviews with  State and USAID officials and with NGO representatives and researchers  whom we interviewed for our prior review of sexual violence rates in  eastern DRC and adjoining countries. We also interviewed an official from  the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual  Violence in Conflict.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to August 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Democratic Republic of the Congo Provinces and Adjoining Countries

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a vast, mineral-rich  nation with an estimated population of about 75 million people and an  area that is roughly one-quarter the size of the United States, according  to the United Nations. Nine countries adjoin the DRC. Figure 4 shows  the DRC provinces and adjoining countries.

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Godwin Agbara (Assistant  Director), Farahnaaz Khakoo-Mausel (Analyst-in-Charge), Andrew  Kurtzman, Elisa Yoshiara, Reid Lowe, Justin Fisher, Michael Hoffman,  Grace Lui, and Neil Doherty made key contributions to this report.

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United Nations. Letter Dated 22 January 2014 from the Coordinator of the  Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to  the President of the Security Council. New York, N.Y.: January 23, 2014.
U.S. Department of Interior. Conflict Minerals from the Democratic  Republic of the Congo—Gold Supply Chain. Washington, D.C.: U.S.  Geological Survey, October 2015.
Weyns, Yannick, Lotte Hoex, and Ken Matthysen. Analysis of the  Interactive Map of Artisanal Mining Areas in Eastern DR Congo. Antwerp,  Belgium: International Peace Information Service, October 2016.

Related GAO Products

SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: 2017 Review of Company Disclosures in  Response to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule,  GAO-17-517R. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2017.
Conflict Minerals: Insights from Company Disclosures and Agency  Actions. GAO-17-544T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2017.
SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Companies Face Continuing Challenges in  Determining Whether Their Conflict Minerals Benefit Armed Groups.  GAO-16-805. Washington, D.C.: August 25, 2016.
SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Insights from Companies’ Initial Disclosures  and State and USAID Actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  Region. GAO-16-200T. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2015.
SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Initial Disclosures Indicate Most Companies  Were Unable to Determine the Source of Their Conflict Minerals.  GAO-15-561. Washington, D.C.: August 18, 2015.
Conflict Minerals: Stakeholder Options for Responsible Sourcing Are  Expanding, but More Information on Smelters Is Needed. GAO-14-575.  Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2014.
SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Information on Responsible Sourcing and  Companies Affected. GAO-13-689. Washington D.C.: July 18, 2013.
Conflict Minerals Disclosure Rule: SEC’s Actions and Stakeholder- Developed Initiatives. GAO-12-763. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2012.
The Democratic Republic of Congo: Information on the Rate of Sexual  Violence in War-Torn Eastern DRC and Adjoining Countries.  GAO-11-702. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2011.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo: U.S. Agencies Should Take  Further Actions to Contribute to the Effective Regulation and Control of  the Minerals Trade in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.  GAO-10-1030. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2010.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

Over the past decade, the United States and the international community have sought to improve security in the DRC, the site of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. In the eastern DRC, armed groups have committed severe human rights abuses, including sexual violence, and reportedly profit from the exploitation of “conflict minerals,” particularly gold. Congress included a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that, among other things, required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. The SEC adopted these regulations in 2012. The act also included a provision for GAO to annually assess the SEC regulations' effectiveness in promoting peace and security and report on the rate of sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries. In April 2017, GAO reported on companies' disclosures, in response to the SEC regulations, of conflict minerals they used in calendar year 2015 (see GAO-17-517R ).
In this report, GAO provides information about (1) the supply chain for ASM gold in the DRC; (2) efforts to encourage responsible sourcing of ASM gold; and (3) sexual violence in eastern DRC and neighboring countries published since August 2016, when GAO last reported on this topic. GAO reviewed U.S., UN, and nongovernment and international organizations' reports; interviewed U.S., DRC, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) officials and other stakeholders; and conducted fieldwork in Dubai, UAE.
GAO is not making any recommendations.

What GAO Found

The supply chain for artisanal and small-scale mined (ASM) gold—a significant driver of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) economy—involves multiple actors, according to reports GAO reviewed and stakeholders interviewed (see figure). Officially, these actors are required to obtain DRC government authorization and pay provincial or national taxes to mine, trade, or export ASM gold, according to these sources. However, almost all DRC-sourced ASM gold is produced and traded unofficially and smuggled from the country, according to reports and stakeholders. Further, elements of the Congolese army as well as illegal armed groups, frequently exploit ASM gold, often through illegal taxes on its production and transport, according to reports and stakeholders.
The DRC government, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and international organizations have undertaken several initiatives to encourage the responsible sourcing of ASM gold—that is, the production and traceability of gold that has not financed conflict or human rights abuses such as sexual violence. For example, since 2015, USAID has worked with the DRC government to implement a traceability scheme for ASM gold and has worked with Tetra Tech and Partnership Africa Canada to scale up pilot initiatives for the production and sale of conflict-free ASM gold. However, the limited number of mines validated as conflict free and the relatively high mining-related official provincial taxes in the DRC, compared with taxes in neighboring countries, provide few incentives for responsible sourcing of ASM gold, according to reports GAO reviewed.
In 2016, a USAID-funded, population-based study of the rate of sexual violence in parts of the eastern DRC estimated that 32 percent of women and 33 percent of men in these areas had been exposed to some form of sexual and gender-based violence in their lifetime. According to the United Nations, the DRC government has taken some steps to address sexual violence in the eastern region.