Background

As computer technology has advanced, the federal government has  become increasingly dependent on computerized information systems to  carry out operations and to process, maintain, and report essential  information. Federal agencies rely on computer systems to transmit  proprietary and other sensitive information, develop and maintain  intellectual capital, conduct operations, process business transactions,  transfer funds, and deliver services.
Ineffective protection of these information systems and networks can  impair delivery of vital services, and result in  loss or theft of computer resources, assets, and funds;  inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of  sensitive information, such as personally identifiable information; disruption of essential operations supporting critical infrastructure,  national defense, or emergency services; undermining of agency missions due to embarrassing incidents that  erode the public’s confidence in government; use of computer resources for unauthorized purposes or to launch  attacks on other systems; damage to networks and equipment; and high costs for remediation.
Recognizing the importance of these issues, Congress enacted laws  intended to improve the protection of federal information and systems.  These laws include the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of  2014 (FISMA 2014), which, among other things, reiterated the 2002  FISMA requirement for the head of each agency to provide information  security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the  harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,  modification, or destruction of the agency’s information or information  systems. This includes protections for information collected or maintained  on behalf of the agency and information systems used or operated by a  contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency.
In addition, the act continues the requirement for federal agencies to  develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security  program. The program is to provide security for the information and  information systems that support the operations and assets of the  agency, including those provided or managed by another agency,  contractor, or other organization on behalf of an agency.
The act also authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to  (1) assist the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with overseeing  and monitoring agencies’ implementation of security requirements; (2)  operate the federal information security incident center; and (3) provide  agencies with operational and technical assistance, such as that for  continuously diagnosing and mitigating cyber threats and vulnerabilities.

		Department of Education Relies on Information Technology Systems Containing Sensitive Information

The mission of the Department of Education is to serve America’s  students and promote student achievement and preparation for global  competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal  access. In carrying out its mission, the department is responsible for four  major types of activities: establishing policies relating to federal financial aid for education,  administering distribution of those funds, and monitoring their use;  collecting data and overseeing research on America’s schools and  disseminating this information to Congress, educators, and the  general public;  identifying the major issues and problems in education and focusing  national attention on them; and enforcing federal statutes that prohibit discrimination in programs and  activities receiving federal funds and ensuring equal access to  education for every individual.
To support these activities, the department relies on a variety of  information technology (IT) systems and infrastructure. Moreover, the  department’s systems contain large volumes of sensitive information such  as personnel records, financial information, and personally identifiable  information. According to a fiscal year 2015 inspector general report,  about 70 million users, which included students and borrowers, utilized  the systems supporting the department’s federal student aid program.

	Cyber Threats to Federal Systems Continue to Evolve amid Increasing Numbers of Incidents

Risks to cyber-based assets can originate from unintentional or  intentional threats. Unintentional threats can be caused by, among other  things, natural disasters, defective computer or network equipment,  software coding errors, and the actions of careless or poorly trained  employees. Intentional threats include both targeted and untargeted  attacks from a variety of sources, including criminal groups, hackers,  disgruntled employees and other organizational insiders, foreign nations  engaged in espionage and information warfare, and terrorists.
These adversaries vary in terms of their capabilities, willingness to act,  and motives, which can include seeking monetary or personal gain or  pursuing a political, economic, or military advantage. For example,  insiders can pose threats because their position within the organization  often allows them to gain unrestricted access and cause damage to the  targeted system, steal system data, or disclose sensitive information  without authorization. The insider threat includes inappropriate actions by  contractors hired by the organization, as well as careless or poorly trained  employees.
As we reported in February 2015, since fiscal year 2006, the number of  information security incidents reported to the U.S. Computer Emergency  Readiness Team (US-CERT) affecting systems supporting the federal  government has steadily increased each year. Specifically, the number of  reported incidents rose from 5,503 in fiscal year 2006 to 67,168 in fiscal  year 2014, an increase of 1,121 percent. At Education, the number of  reported incidents has fluctuated during the period from fiscal year 2009  to fiscal year 2014, with the department reporting 308 incidents in fiscal  year 2014 after reaching a high of 467 in fiscal year 2013.
Figure 2 shows the different types of incidents reported by Education in  fiscal year 2014.
The types of incidents reported by Education are generally consistent with  those reported by the other 23 major federal agencies, with a few  exceptions. For example, at 26 percent, policy violations constituted the  highest percentage of incidents reported by Education for fiscal year  2014. Policy violations involve incidents of mishandling data in storage or  transit, such as digital PII records. In contrast, only 17 percent of incidents  reported by the 24 major federal agencies were policy violations. The  second highest percentage of incidents reported by Education was non- cyber incidents, at 25 percent, which was the same percentage reported  by federal agencies. Non-cyber incidents are those that include PII  spillages or possible mishandling of PII which involve hard copies or  printed material as opposed to digital records.
Suspicious network activity, at 15 percent, and malicious code, at 13  percent, were the third and fourth highest percentages of incidents that  Education reported for fiscal year 2014. Suspicious network activity refers  to incidents identified through Einstein data analyzed by US-CERT, and  malicious code incidents are successful executions or installations of  malicious software which are not immediately quarantined and cleaned by  preventative measures such as antivirus tools. Suspicious network  activity made up 3 percent of the 24 major federal agencies’ reported  incidents, and malicious code constituted 11 percent of the incidents  federal agencies reported for fiscal year 2014.
Finally, only 4 percent of the incidents reported by Education were for  scans/probes/attempted access, which was the most widely reported type  of incident by federal agencies (excluding non-cyber incidents). This type  of incident can involve identifying a federal agency computer, open ports,  protocols, service, or any combination of these for later exploit.
Furthermore, the number of reported security incidents involving PII at  federal agencies has more than doubled in recent years—from 10,481  incidents in fiscal year 2009 to 27,624 incidents in fiscal year 2014. (See  fig 3.)
These incidents and others like them can adversely affect national  security and lead to inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification,  or destruction of sensitive information. Examples at other agencies  highlight the impact of such incidents:  In June 2015, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) reported  that an intrusion into its systems affected the personnel records of  about 4.2 million current and former federal employees. The Director  stated that a separate but related incident involved the agency’s  background investigation systems and compromised background  investigation files for 21.5 million individuals.
In June 2015, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service  testified that unauthorized third parties had gained access to taxpayer  information from its “Get Transcript” application. According to officials,  criminals used taxpayer-specific data acquired from non-department  sources to gain unauthorized access to information on approximately  100,000 tax accounts. This data included Social Security information,  dates of birth, and street addresses. In an August 2015 update, the  agency reported this number to be about 114,000 and that an  additional 220,000 accounts had been inappropriately accessed,  which brings the total to about 330,000 accounts.
In April 2015, the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Office of Inspector  General reported that two contractors had improperly accessed the  agency’s network from foreign countries using personally owned  equipment.
In February 2015, the Director of National Intelligence stated that  unauthorized computer intrusions were detected in 2014 on the  networks of the Office of Personnel Management and two of its  contractors. The two contractors were involved in processing sensitive  PII related to national security clearances for federal employees.
In September 2014, a cyber intrusion into the United States Postal  Service’s information systems may have compromised PII for more  than 800,000 of its employees.
In October 2013, a wide-scale cybersecurity breach involving a U.S.  Food and Drug Administration system occurred that exposed the PII  of 14,000 user accounts.

	Similar to Other Agencies, Information Security Weaknesses Place Education’s Systems and Sensitive Data at Risk

Given the risks posed by cyber threats and the increasing number of  incidents, it is crucial that federal agencies, such as Education, take  appropriate steps to secure their systems and information. We and  agency inspectors general have identified numerous weaknesses in  protecting federal information systems and information. Agencies,  including Education, continue to have shortcomings in assessing risks,  developing and implementing security controls, and monitoring results.
As we reported in September 2015, for fiscal year 2014 most of the 24  agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act, including  Education, had weaknesses in most of the five major categories of  information system controls. These control categories are: (1) access  controls, which limit or detect access to computer resources (data,  programs, equipment, and facilities), thereby protecting them against  unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure; (2) configuration  management controls, intended to prevent unauthorized changes to  information system resources (for example, software programs and  hardware configurations) and assure that software is current and known  vulnerabilities are patched; (3) segregation of duties, which prevents a  single individual from controlling all critical stages of a process by splitting  responsibilities between two or more organizational groups; (4)  contingency planning, which helps avoid significant disruptions in  computer-dependent operations; and (5) agency-wide security  management, which provides a framework for ensuring that risks are  understood and that effective controls are selected, implemented, and  operating as intended. (See fig. 4.)
Access controls: For fiscal year 2014, Education and 21 other  agencies had weaknesses in electronic and physical controls to limit,  prevent, or detect inappropriate access to computer resources (data,  equipment, and facilities), thereby increasing their risk of unauthorized  use, modification, disclosure, and loss. Specifically, Education’s  inspector general reported weaknesses in several key access control  elements, including protecting the boundaries of its information  systems and handling incidents. For example, the department did not  implement controls to verify the security of non-government furnished  equipment connecting to its network via virtual private client programs  prior to authentication.
Configuration management: For fiscal year 2014, 22 agencies,  including Education, had weaknesses reported in controls that are  intended to ensure that only authorized and fully tested software is  placed in operation, software and hardware is updated, information  systems are monitored, patches are applied to these systems to  protect against known vulnerabilities, and emergency changes are  documented and approved. For example, the department’s  configuration management guidance had not been updated since  2005 and its IT security baseline configuration guidance had not been  updated since 2009.
Segregation of duties: Fifteen agencies had weaknesses reported in  controls for segregation of duties, although Education was not one of  them. These controls are the policies, procedures, and organizational  structure that help to ensure that one individual cannot independently  control all key aspects of a computer-related operation and thereby  take unauthorized actions or gain unauthorized access to assets or  records.
Continuity of operations: Education and 17 other agencies had  weaknesses reported in controls for their continuity of operations  practices for fiscal year 2014. For example, Education did not  consistently document the IT recovery procedures for its systems in  accordance with National Institute of Standards and Technology  (NIST) guidelines and departmental policies. In addition, the  department did not consistently perform and document testing of  contingency plans for certain systems.
Security management: For fiscal year 2014, 23 agencies, including  Education, had weaknesses reported in security management, which  is an underlying cause for information security control deficiencies  identified at federal agencies. An agency-wide security program, as  required by FISMA, provides a framework for assessing and  managing risk, including developing and implementing security  policies and procedures, conducting security awareness training,  monitoring the adequacy of the entity’s computer-related controls  through security tests and evaluations, and implementing remedial  actions as appropriate. FISMA also requires agencies to develop and  document an inventory of major systems. Regarding Education, the  inspector general reported weaknesses in several key elements,  including developing, documenting, and updating an inventory of its  systems; periodically assessing risks to its systems; ensuring staff  receive security awareness training; and remediating information  security weaknesses. For example, the department did not implement  corrective actions in a timely manner including 15 corrective actions  that were completed late without a revised planned completion date.
In addition, independent reviews at the 24 agencies continued to highlight  deficiencies in their implementation of information security policies and  procedures. Specifically, for fiscal year 2014, 19 agencies—including  Education—reported that information security control deficiencies were  either a material weakness or a significant deficiency in internal controls  over their financial reporting. Education was 1 of 12 agencies that  reported that such weaknesses constituted a significant deficiency— which is less severe than a material weakness but important enough to  merit attention by those charged with governance. Further, 23 of 24  inspectors general for the agencies, including Education, cited information  security as a “major management challenge” for their agency.
In accordance with their responsibilities under FISMA, inspectors general  at the 24 agencies continued to report on their respective agencies’ fiscal  year 2014 implementation of information security programs for these 11  program components:
Risk management: Inspectors general reported that program  components for addressing risks at 17 agencies, including Education,  were established. However, Education’s inspector general identified  exceptions. For example, the department’s risk management program  was not fully implemented and the process for system authorization  needed improvement.
Configuration management: Sixteen agencies, including Education,  had established elements of their programs for managing changes to  hardware and software. Education’s inspector general noted  exceptions in the department’s configuration management policies,  procedures, and plans and reported that they did not always comply  with NIST and departmental guidance.
Incident response and reporting: Twenty-one agencies, including  Education, had established a program for detecting, reporting, and  responding to security incidents. The Education inspector general  noted that improvements were needed in the department’s reporting  of incidents to the US-CERT and law enforcement agencies. For  example, the inspector general reported that 4 of 45 sampled  incidents were not reported to the US-CERT, as required.
Security training: Along with 19 other agencies, Education had  established a program for providing security training to staff.
Remedial actions: Education and 18 other agencies had established  program components for addressing deficiencies in information  security policies, procedures, and practices.
Remote access: Twenty-one agencies, including Education, had  established program components for managing remote access to their  networks. However, Education’s inspector general also reported  exceptions with this component. For example, the department lacked  restrictions for virtual private network client programs on non- government-furnished equipment. In addition, it had not fully  implemented two-factor authentication, and improvements were  needed in the use of mobile devices when accessing the department’s  network.
Identity and access management: Education, along with 15 other  agencies, established program components for ensuring that users  were properly identified and authenticated when accessing agency  resources. However, Education’s inspector general reported that the  department needed to improve its password authentication process  and had not fully implemented logical access controls.
Continuous monitoring: Nineteen agencies, including Education,  had established program components for continuously monitoring the  effectiveness of security policies, procedures, and practices.
Contingency planning: Education and 16 other agencies had  established program components for ensuring continuity of operations  for information systems in the event of a disaster or other unforeseen  disruptions. However, Education’s inspector general reported that the  department’s contingency plans were not always complete, and the  process for testing the plans needed improvements.
Contractor systems: At 17 agencies, including Education, inspectors  general reported that program components for monitoring contractor  systems had been established.
Security capital planning: Education, along with 18 other agencies,  had established program components for capital planning and  investment for information security.
As we noted in our September 2015 report on federal information  security, the annual FISMA reporting guidance that OMB and DHS  provided to inspectors general was not complete, resulting in different  interpretations among the inspectors general and inconsistent reporting  results. As a result, responses from inspectors general may not always  be comparable or provide a clear government-wide picture of agencies’  security implementation.
Accordingly, we recommended that OMB, in consultation with DHS and  other stakeholders, enhance the reporting guidance so that ratings would  be consistent and comparable across agencies. OMB generally  concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would continue to  work with DHS and other stakeholders to refine the FISMA reporting  metrics and enhance reporting guidance.
Over the last several years, we and agency inspectors general have  made thousands of recommendations to agencies aimed at improving  their implementation of information security controls. For example, we  have made about 2,000 recommendations over the last 6 years. Agency  inspectors general have also made a multitude of recommendations to  assist their agencies. Many agencies continue to have weaknesses in  implementing these controls in part because many of these  recommendations remain unimplemented. For example, agencies have  not yet implemented about 42 percent of the recommendations we have  made during the last 6 years. Until federal agencies take actions to  implement the recommendations made by us and the inspectors  general—federal systems and information, as well as sensitive personal  information about the public, will be at an increased risk of compromise  from cyber-based attacks and other threats.

		Federal Efforts Are Intended to Improve Cybersecurity

Although weaknesses continue to exist, the federal government has  initiated or continued several efforts to protect federal information and  information systems. The White House, OMB, and federal agencies have  launched several government-wide initiatives that are intended to  enhance information security at federal agencies. These key efforts  include the following.
Cybersecurity Cross-Agency Priority (CAP) Goals. Initiated in 2012, CAP  goals are an effort to focus agencies’ cybersecurity activity on the most  effective controls. Education reported the following levels of performance  with respect to metrics related to the CAP goals:
Trusted Internet Connections (TIC): Aims to improve the federal  government’s security posture through the consolidation of external  telecommunication connections by establishing a set of baseline  security capabilities through enhanced monitoring and situational  awareness of all external network connections. OMB established a  100 percent target for implementing TIC capabilities for fiscal year  2014 and reported that the 24 agencies covered by the Chief  Financial Officers Act achieved an overall implementation rate of 92  percent. For fiscal year 2014, Education reported a 95 percent  implementation rate.
Continuous Monitoring of Federal Information Systems: Intended  to provide near real-time security status and remediation, increasing  visibility into system operations and helping security personnel make  risk management decisions based on increased situational  awareness. OMB established a fiscal year 2014 target of 95 percent  and reported that overall the 24 agencies had achieved 92 percent  implementation. Education reported 98 percent continuous monitoring  of its assets at the end of fiscal year 2014.
Strong Authentication: Intended to increase the use of federal  smartcard credentials, such as personal identity verification and  common access cards that provide multifactor authentication and  digital signature and encryption capabilities. Strong authentication can  provide a higher level of assurance when authorizing users’ access to  federal information systems. For fiscal year 2014, OMB established a  75 percent implementation rate, but indicated that the 24 agencies  had implemented strong authentication for a combined 72 percent of  their users. Education reported an 85 percent implementation rate at  the end of fiscal year 2014.
The 30-Day Cybersecurity Sprint. In June 2015, in response to the  OPM security breaches and to improve federal cybersecurity and protect  systems against evolving threats, the Federal Chief Information Officer  launched the 30-day Cybersecurity Sprint and instructed agencies to  immediately take a number of steps to further protect federal information  and to improve the resilience of federal networks. One step was to  accelerate the implementation of multi-factor authentication, such as the  use of personal identity verification cards to gain access to federal  networks, systems, and data. According to a report by the Executive  Office of the President, the percentage of Education’s users who used  strong authentication decreased to 57 percent, one of only four agencies  to show a decrease following the sprint.
Agency Spending on Cybersecurity Activities. According to OMB, the  24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act reported  spending about $12.7 billion on cybersecurity activities in fiscal year  2014. Of this amount, the 23 civilian agencies reportedly spent about  $3.75 billion or about 9 percent of the amount the agencies reportedly  spent on information technology in fiscal year 2014. For fiscal year  2014, Education reportedly spent about $32 million on cybersecurity, or  roughly 5 percent of the amount it reportedly spent on information  technology. The agencies reported spending amounts for three major  categories of cybersecurity activities: preventing malicious cyber activity;  detecting, analyzing, and mitigating intrusions; and shaping the  cybersecurity environment. Of the about $32 million it reportedly spent  on cybersecurity activities, Education spent 34 percent on preventing  malicious activity; 63 percent on detecting, analyzing, and mitigating  intrusions; and 3 percent on shaping the cybersecurity environment.
In conclusion, the dangers posed by a wide array of cyber threats facing  the nation are heightened by weaknesses in the federal government’s  approach to protecting its systems and information. While federal  agencies, including the Department of Education, have established  information security programs, weaknesses in these programs persist,  and more needs to be done to fully implement them and to address  existing weaknesses. In particular, implementing outstanding inspector  general and GAO recommendations will strengthen agencies’ ability to  protect their systems and information, reducing the risk of a potentially  devastating cyber attack.
Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer  your questions.

	Contact and Acknowledgments

If you have any questions about this statement, please contact Gregory  C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov. Other staff  members who contributed to this statement include Larry Crosland,  Assistant Director; Christopher Businsky; Rosanna Guerrero; Fatima  Jahan; and Lee McCracken.

Attachment I: Related GAO Products

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity of the Nation’s Electricity  Grid Requires Continued Attention, GAO-16-174T. Washington, D.C.:  October 21, 2015.
Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts  to Address Port Cybersecurity, GAO-16-116T. Washington, D.C.: October  8, 2015.
Federal Information Security: Agencies Need to Correct Weaknesses and  Fully Implement Security Programs, GAO-15-714. Washington, D.C.:  September 29, 2015.
Information Security: Cyber Threats and Data Breaches Illustrate Need  for Stronger Controls across Federal Agencies. GAO-15-758T.  Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2015.
Cybersecurity: Recent Data Breaches Illustrate Need for Strong Controls  across Federal Agencies. GAO-15-725T. Washington, D.C.: June 24,  2015.
Cybersecurity: Actions Needed to Address Challenges Facing Federal  Systems. GAO-15-573T. Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2015.
Information Security: IRS Needs to Continue Improving Controls over  Financial and Taxpayer Data. GAO-15-337. Washington, D.C.: March 19,  2015.
Information Security: FAA Needs to Address Weaknesses in Air Traffic  Control Systems. GAO-15-221. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2015.
Information Security: Additional Actions Needed to Address  Vulnerabilities That Put VA Data at Risk. GAO-15-220T. Washington,  D.C.: November 18, 2014.
Information Security: VA Needs to Address Identified Vulnerabilities.  GAO-15-117. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2014.
Federal Facility Cybersecurity: DHS and GSA Should Address Cyber Risk  to Building and Access Control Systems. GAO-15-6. Washington, D.C.:  December 12, 2014.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Some Privacy and Security  Procedures for Data Collections Should Continue Being Enhanced.   GAO-14-758. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2014.
Healthcare.Gov: Information Security and Privacy Controls Should Be  Enhanced to Address Weaknesses. GAO-14-871T. Washington, D.C.:  September 18, 2014.
Healthcare.Gov: Actions Needed to Address Weaknesses in Information  Security and Privacy Controls. GAO-14-730. Washington, D.C.:  September 16, 2014.
Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Oversight of Contractor  Controls. GAO-14-612. Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2014.
Information Security: FDIC Made Progress in Securing Key Financial  Systems, but Weaknesses Remain. GAO-14-674. Washington, D.C.: July  17, 2014.
Information Security: Additional Oversight Needed to Improve Programs  at Small Agencies. GAO-14-344. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2014.
Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Better Address  Port Cybersecurity. GAO-14-459. . Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2014.
Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Cyber Incident  Response Practices. GAO-14-354. . Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2014.
Information Security: SEC Needs to Improve Controls over Financial  Systems and Data. GAO-14-419. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2014.
Information Security: IRS Needs to Address Control Weaknesses That  Place Financial and Taxpayer Data at Risk. GAO-14-405. Washington,  D.C.: April 8, 2014.
Information Security: Federal Agencies Need to Enhance Responses to  Data Breaches. GAO-14-487T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2014.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on Key Factors in DHS’s  Implementation of Its Partnership Model. GAO-14-464T. Washington,  D.C.: March 26, 2014.
Information Security: VA Needs to Address Long-Standing Challenges.  GAO-14-469T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2014.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: More Comprehensive Planning Would  Enhance the Cybersecurity of Public Safety Entities’ Emerging  Technology. GAO-14-125. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2014.
Computer Matching Act: OMB and Selected Agencies Need to Ensure  Consistent Implementation. GAO-14-44. Washington, D.C.: January 13,  2014.
Information Security: Agency Responses to Breaches of Personally  Identifiable Information Need to Be More Consistent. GAO-14-34.  Washington, D.C.: December 9, 2013.
Federal Information Security: Mixed Progress in Implementing Program  Components; Improved Metrics Needed to Measure Effectiveness.   GAO-13-776. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2013.
Communications Networks: Outcome-Based Measures Would Assist  DHS in Assessing Effectiveness of Cybersecurity Efforts. Washington,  D.C.: GAO-13-275. April 10, 2013.
Information Security: IRS Has Improved Controls but Needs to Resolve  Weaknesses. GAO-13-350. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2013.
Cybersecurity: A Better Defined and Implemented National Strategy is  Needed to Address Persistent Challenges. GAO-13-462T. Washington,  D.C.: March 7, 2013.
Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be  Better Defined and More Effectively Implemented. GAO-13-187.  Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013.
Information Security: Federal Communications Commission Needs to  Strengthen Controls over Enhanced Secured Network Project.  Washington, D.C.: GAO-13-155. January 25, 2013.
Information Security: Actions Needed by Census Bureau to Address  Weaknesses. GAO-13-63. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2013.
Information Security: Better Implementation of Controls for Mobile  Devices Should Be Encouraged. GAO-12-757. Washington, D.C.:  September 18, 2012.
Mobile Device Location Data: Additional Federal Actions Could Help  Protect Consumer Privacy. GAO-12-903. Washington, D.C.: September  11, 2012.
Medical Devices: FDA Should Expand Its Consideration of Information  Security for Certain Types of Devices. GAO-12-816. Washington, D.C.:  August 31, 2012.
Privacy: Federal Law Should Be Updated to Address Changing  Technology Landscape. GAO-12-961T. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2012.
Information Security: Environmental Protection Agency Needs to Resolve  Weaknesses. GAO-12-696. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2012.
Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Electricity Grid. GAO-12-926T.  Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2012.
Electronic Warfare: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and  Oversight. GAO-12-479. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2012.
Information Security: Cyber Threats Facilitate Ability to Commit Economic  Espionage. GAO-12-876T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2012.
Prescription Drug Data: HHS Has Issued Health Privacy and Security  Regulations but Needs to Improve Guidance and Oversight. GAO-12-605.  Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2012.
Cybersecurity: Threats Impacting the Nation. GAO-12-666T. Washington,  D.C.: April 24, 2012.
Management Report: Improvements Needed in SEC’s Internal Control  and Accounting Procedure. GAO-12-424R. Washington, D.C.: April 13,  2012.
IT Supply Chain: National Security-Related Agencies Need to Better  Address Risks. GAO-12-361. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2012.
Information Security: IRS Needs to Further Enhance Internal Control over  Financial Reporting and Taxpayer Data. GAO-12-393. Washington, D.C.:  March 16, 2012.
Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Modernized Electricity Grid.  GAO-12-507T. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity Guidance is Available, but  More Can Be Done to Promote Its Use. GAO-12-92. Washington, D.C.:  December 9, 2011.
Cybersecurity Human Capital: Initiatives Need Better Planning and  Coordination. GAO-12-8. Washington, D.C.: November 29, 2011.
Information Security: Additional Guidance Needed to Address Cloud  Computing Concerns. GAO-12-130T. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2011.
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Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

The federal government faces an evolving array of cyber-based threats to its systems and data, and data breaches at federal agencies have compromised sensitive personal information, affecting millions of people. Education, in carrying out its mission of serving America's students, relies extensively on IT systems that collect and process a large amount of sensitive information. Accordingly, it is important for federal agencies such as Education to implement information security programs that can help protect systems and networks. GAO has identified federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997, and in February 2015 expanded this to include protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information.
This statement provides information on cyber threats facing federal systems and information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies, including Education. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work and updated data on security incidents and federal cybersecurity efforts.

What GAO Found

Cyber-based risks to federal systems and information can come from unintentional threats, such as natural disasters, software coding errors, and poorly trained or careless employees, or intentional threats, such as disgruntled insiders, hackers, or hostile nations. These threat sources may exploit vulnerabilities in agencies' systems and networks to steal or disclose sensitive information, among other things. Since fiscal year 2006, the number of reported information security incidents affecting federal systems has steadily increased, rising from about 5,500 in fiscal year 2006 to almost 67,200 in fiscal year 2014. At the Department of Education, the number of incidents reported since 2009 has fluctuated, but generally increased.
GAO reported in September 2015, that most of 24 major agencies (including Education) had weaknesses in at least three of five major categories of information security controls for fiscal year 2014. These are controls intended to (1) limit unauthorized access to agency systems and information; (2) ensure that software and hardware are authorized, updated, monitored, and securely configured; (3) appropriately divide duties so that no single person can control all aspects of a computer-related operation; (4) establish plans for continuing information system operations in the event of a disaster, and (5) provide a security management framework for understanding risks and ensuring that controls are selected, implemented, and operating as intended. The figure below shows the number of agencies with weaknesses in these control categories.
In addition, 19 agencies—including Education—reported that information security control deficiencies were either a material weakness or a significant deficiency for fiscal year 2014. Further, inspectors general for 23 of 24 agencies, including Education, cited information security as a major management challenge. In prior reports, GAO and inspectors general have made thousands of recommendations to agencies to address deficiencies in their information security controls and weaknesses in their programs, but many of these recommendations remain open. Until agencies implement these recommendations, sensitive information will remain at risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction.

What GAO Recommends

Over the past 6 years, GAO has made about 2,000 recommendations to federal agencies to correct weaknesses and fully implement agency-wide information security programs. Agencies have implemented about 58 percent of these recommendations. Agency inspectors general have also made a multitude of recommendations to assist their agencies.