Background

		SOCOM Roles and Responsibilities

In 1986, Congress called for the establishment of a joint service special  operations capability under a single command. In April 1987, the  Secretary of Defense established SOCOM with the mission to provide  trained and combat-ready special operations forces to DOD’s geographic  combatant commands. SOCOM is a unified combatant command that  performs service-like functions and has military department-like  responsibilities and authorities. Under U.S. Code Title 10, sections 164  and 167, SOCOM’s commander has the responsibility to organize, train,  and equip SOF for current and future challenges. In this capacity,  SOCOM develops special operations strategy and doctrine and is  responsible for employment of forces, requirements validation, acquisition  of special operations–peculiar equipment, and intelligence support.  SOCOM is also responsible for providing resources in the form of funding  and special operations–specific equipment for SOF. As a result, SOCOM  is a unique organization within the department because it has both  combatant command responsibilities and service-like functions of training  and equipping its forces.
Section 167 further directs that the commander of SOCOM be  responsible for and have the authority to conduct the following special  operations activities: (1) direct action, (2) strategic reconnaissance, (3)  unconventional warfare, (4) foreign internal defense, (5) civil affairs, (6)  military information support operations, (7) counterterrorism, (8)  humanitarian assistance, (9) theater search and rescue, and (10) other  activities such as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of  Defense. Special operations missions are often conducted in hostile,  denied, or politically sensitive environments, and can be generally  characterized by time-sensitivity and a higher degree of risk, among other  characteristics. To respond to these activities, DOD relies on special  operations units assigned to SOCOM, such as Army Special Forces,  SEAL units, and Air Force Special Tactics Squadrons.

		Organization, Oversight, and Funding of Special Operations Command

SOCOM comprises a headquarters organization; four service component  commands, including the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, U.S.  Naval Special Warfare Command, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special  Operations Command, and U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command;  and various subunified commands. The subunified commands include the  Joint Special Operations Command, which is charged with studying  special operations requirements and techniques, ensuring interoperability  and equipment standardization, planning and conducting special  operations exercises and training, and developing joint special operations  tactics; and seven Theater Special Operations Commands, which are  responsible for performing broad, continuous missions uniquely suited to  SOF capabilities. Figure 1 illustrates the current command structure of  SOCOM.
SOCOM has authority, direction, and control over all forces and  commands assigned to it, to include organizing and employing forces and  assigning tasks, but the military services retain certain responsibilities  as they pertain to SOF. As outlined in memorandums of agreement  between SOCOM and the military departments, the military services  retain responsibility for compensation, promotion, and professional  development of SOF; recruiting of personnel to meet special operations  needs; support for military construction projects; providing the baseline  level of service-common installation services and facilities sustainment  support required to support SOF; and programming and budgeting  military personnel funds associated with military end strength for SOF,  among other responsibilities. Specific to military personnel funding, each  special operations position is part of the end strength of one of the four  military services. As such, any changes in SOF end strength are included  in the military services’ end strength.
As outlined in section 167(e) of Title 10, U.S. Code, the commander of  SOCOM is responsible for and has authority to (1) prepare and submit to  the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget  proposals for SOF assigned to SOCOM and (2) conduct development  and acquisition of special operations–peculiar equipment. In this capacity,  SOCOM has its own budgetary authority and responsibilities through a  separate major force program category and executes funding in operation  and maintenance; procurement; research, development, test, and  evaluation; and military construction accounts. SOCOM receives these  special operations–specific appropriations to provide fully capable SOF to  conduct special operations activities and to acquire equipment or modify  service common systems to meet special operations–specific  requirements for which there is no broad conventional force need.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor on  special operations matters. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict is responsible for  representing SOCOM and SOF by, among other things, developing,  coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of policy for special  operations activities and providing overall supervision of the preparation  and justification of SOF programs and budget. According to SOCOM  officials, SOCOM works with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict in the same  manner as any other service would work with its service secretariat.
In 2014, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and  Low-Intensity Conflict established a Special Operations Policy and  Oversight Council to provide special operations policy guidance and  oversight to SOCOM and coordinate special operations–related matters  across the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The council is also  intended to address key issues related to special operations policies and  operational priorities, budget execution, force employment, legislative  changes, and required capabilities. Specific tasks as outlined in the  council’s charter include developing and improving policy, joint processes,  and procedures that facilitate the development, integration,  implementation, and sustainment of DOD’s special operations capability  efforts.

	Authorized Positions for SOF Have Increased since 2001 but Remain a Small Portion of the Military Services’ Total Force Levels

Authorized special operations military positions increased by about 47  percent between fiscal years 2001 and 2014, and they constitute just  under 3 percent of military services’ total force levels.

		Authorized Special Operations Military Positions Have Increased since 2001

Our analysis of data provided by SOCOM and its service component  commands shows that the number of authorized special operations  positions for military personnel increased from approximately 42,800 in  fiscal year 2001 to approximately 62,800 in fiscal year 2014. These  military positions constitute about 91 percent of total special operations  positions. Civilian personnel constitute the remaining estimated 9 percent  of special operations positions. The number of authorized special  operations civilian positions increased from about 2,800 in fiscal year  2001 to about 6,500 in fiscal year 2014.
The increasingly prominent role of SOF as outlined in DOD’s strategic  guidance has driven the increase in authorized military and civilian  special operations positions. DOD’s past three Quadrennial Defense  Review reports specifically addressed changes to the size and structure  of SOF. For example, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review  recommended increasing active-duty Special Forces Battalions,  expanding the Civil Affairs / Psychological Operations units, and  establishing the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. The  2010 Quadrennial Defense Review subsequently proposed increasing  certain capabilities that support SOF, as well as the number of special  operations combat support and combat service support forces—for  example, logisticians, communication assets, and intelligence experts— available to both Army and Navy SOF units. DOD relies on special  operations personnel because they possess highly specialized skill sets,  including cultural and regional awareness. Moreover, officials noted that  increases in civilian positions were driven partly by DOD’s attempts to  rebalance workload and become a cost-efficient workforce, namely by  converting positions filled by military personnel or in-sourcing services  performed by contractors to civilian positions.
Figure 2 describes key events driving changes to the trends in special  operations positions from fiscal years 2001 through 2014.
More than half of the special operations military positions are Army  positions, with the remainder allocated to the other services. Specifically,  in fiscal year 2014, about 34,000 authorized special operations positions  were Army positions (about 54 percent of the total authorized SOF  positions). Figure 3 outlines the percentage of total authorized special  operations military positions funded by each military service in fiscal year  2014.
Authorized special operations military positions grew across the four  service component commands—U.S. Army Special Operations  Command, U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command, U.S. Marine Corps  Forces Special Operations Command, and U.S. Air Force Special  Operations Command—from fiscal years 2006 through 2014. Additional  details on the number of positions at each of the service component  commands can be found in appendixes II through V.
SOCOM’s headquarters organizations grew even more substantially than  growth in overall special operations military positons. As we reported in  June 2014, SOCOM’s authorized military and civilian positions at the  command’s headquarters organizations more than doubled—from 1,885  in fiscal year 2004 to 4,093 in fiscal year 2013 (a 117 percent increase).  We reported that, according to SOCOM officials, this increase is partly  attributable to increases in authorized positions at the Special Operations  Research, Development, and Acquisition Center and increases in  authorized positions to support recent and emerging missions.
Military positions at the Theater Special Operations Commands, which  plan and have responsibility for command and control of operations in  support of the geographic combatant commands, also increased, from  about 430 in fiscal year 2001 to just below 1,400 in fiscal year 2014 (a  226 percent increase). In May 2013, we reported that authorized positions  grew at each of the geographic combatant commands’ Theater Special  Operations Commands largely to fulfill increased mission requirements,  such as operational requirements in the Middle East and increased  demand for SOF in Africa. In addition, during this review officials noted  that the establishment of two new Theater Special Operations Commands  in support of the U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Northern Command  areas of operation resulted in an increase in authorized military positions.  In February 2013, the Secretary of Defense reassigned command of the  Theater Special Operations Commands from the geographic combatant  commands to SOCOM. This reassignment provides SOCOM with the  authority to organize, train, and equip the Theater Special Operations  Commands, while the geographic combatant commands retained  operational control of the commands. SOCOM officials told us that they  were in the process of reallocating positions from the headquarters to the  Theater Special Operations Commands.

		Special Operations Military Positions Constitute a Small Portion of the Military Services’ Total Force Levels

Even though the number of special operations military positions has  grown, special operations positions continue to constitute a small  percentage of the military services’ total authorized force levels. In fiscal  year 2001, special operations military positions constituted 1.9 percent of  the services’ total authorized force levels. This number increased to 2.9  percent by fiscal year 2014. The percentage of special operations military  positions in each service’s total authorized force level varied slightly by  service. In fiscal year 2014, Army and Air Force special operations  military positions constituted the greatest amount of the services’ total  authorized force levels with just over 3 percent, and the Marine Corps’  special operations military positions constituted the least amount with less  than 2 percent. Figure 4 shows the percentage of authorized special  operations military positions for each military service for fiscal years 2001  through 2014.
Over the next few years, special operations military positions will likely  constitute an increasing percentage of the services’ authorized force  levels should conventional forces be reduced. DOD projects that  authorized special operations military positions will remain at  approximately 63,000 through fiscal year 2019. However, overall force  levels for the military services are expected to be reduced. Specifically,  DOD’s fiscal year 2015 budget request outlines a plan to cut more than  125,000 active-duty positions and approximately 63,000 reserve and  National Guard positions by the end of fiscal year 2019. As the military  services’ authorized positions are reduced, special operations military  positions would constitute a larger proportion of the services’ total  authorized force levels, but are likely to remain a relatively small portion  of the overall force.

	Special Operations– Specific Funding Has Increased Markedly since Fiscal Year 2001, but DOD Does Not Have Information on the Total Funding to Support SOF

While the size of SOF has increased by about 47 percent since fiscal year  2001, our analysis shows that the special operations–specific funding to  support the force has more than tripled. We found that SOF–specific  funding increased from about $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $9.8  billion in fiscal year 2014. However, these figures may significantly  understate the department’s total investment in SOF because the  department does not fully track how much it costs the military services to  support SOF. SOCOM relies on the military services to provide funding  for their respective SOF, to include pay and benefits, service common  equipment and goods, and support programs and services, but the  military services do not track these costs, and DOD has no clear  methodology for tracking this funding.

		Special Operations– Specific Funding Has Increased Considerably since Fiscal Year 2001

Special operations–specific funding is used to exercise and perform the  special operations–peculiar authorities, responsibilities, and activities as  assigned to SOCOM under section 167 of Title 10, U.S. Code, to include  organizing, training, and equipping SOF. This funding also includes the  acquisition of special operations–specific equipment, materials, supplies,  and services for SOF. Examples of special operations–specific equipment  include the light tactical all-terrain vehicle and the selected rotary-wing  aircraft that SOF uses. SOCOM also relies on special operations–specific  funding to modify service-common systems to meet special operations– peculiar requirements for which there is no broad conventional force  need, such as special operations–specific modifications to the C-130  aircraft. This funding is also used for some military construction projects,  civilian manpower, selected training, and aircraft flying hours.
Our analysis shows that special operations–specific funding increased  from about $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $9.8 billion in fiscal  year 2014, with a peak of $10.8 billion in fiscal year 2012 (see fig. 5).  These amounts include funding from the base budget and supplemental  appropriations, to include overseas contingency operations funds. More  specifically, our analysis found that special operations–specific funding in  the base budget increased from approximately $2.9 billion in fiscal year  2001 to $7.5 billion in fiscal year 2014, with a peak of approximately $8.1  billion in fiscal year 2013. SOCOM received considerable supplemental  funds as well to support its activities over the period, including $2.3 billion  in fiscal year 2014.
Additional details on increases in special operations–specific funding for  SOCOM’s service component commands can be found in appendixes II  through V.

		Services Also Provide Considerable Support to SOF

SOCOM relies on the military services to provide support to SOF. Special  operations may differ from conventional operations in degree of strategic,  physical, and political or diplomatic risk; operational techniques; modes of  employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets. As  outlined in DOD guidance, special operations can be conducted  independently, but most are coordinated with conventional forces and  interagency and multinational partners. Moreover, SOF needs support  from the conventional force to perform most of its missions. For example,  SOF rely on a range of capabilities from the conventional force, to include  logistics and maintenance support and intelligence assets. In 2015, the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity  Conflict noted that these service-provided capabilities and support  mechanisms are not only vital to special operations mission success, but  also to the readiness and well-being of the SOF community. SOCOM  has established agreements with each military department on the roles  and responsibilities for special operations–specific and service-provided  non–special operations–specific funding to support SOF. For example,  SOCOM is responsible for funding special operations–peculiar  requirements, such as special operations training and transportation,  while the military services provide funding for service-common basic and  recurrent training, equipment, materiel, programs, and services at a rate  not less than what the services provide to conventional military forces.
Based on our analysis, we identified the following three broad categories  in which the services’ funding supports SOF: (1) pay and benefits, (2)  service-common equipment and goods, and (3) support programs and  services. These funds are spread across multiple appropriations,  programs, functions, and organizations. For example, pay and benefits for  SOF military personnel are funded through the services’ military  personnel appropriations, while equipment—such as service-common  equipment, large acquisition programs, and major weapon systems—are  funded through the services’ procurement and research, development,  test, and evaluation appropriations. Moreover, services and programs,  and some civilian pay, among other expenses, are funded through the  services’ operation and maintenance appropriations. Table 1 provides  descriptions and examples of the categories of funding for SOF provided  by the military services.

		DOD Has Little Visibility over Total Funding Devoted to SOF

Information on funding to support SOF exists, but funding data are  tracked and managed across various organizations in a decentralized  manner, and neither DOD nor the military services have systematically  collected, estimated, or reported total SOF funding needs. In the absence  of a department-wide effort to determine the allocation of military service  funding to support SOF, SOCOM has attempted to estimate the level of  funding provided by the military services. Specifically, the command has  estimated the allocation of military service funding to support SOF to be  roughly $8 billion annually. This amount, which exceeds SOCOM’s fiscal  year 2014 base budget of $7.5 billion, is in addition to the $9.8 billion that  SOCOM receives through its base and supplemental special operations– specific funding. SOCOM developed an approach for calculating these  amounts but, according to a command official, the methodology provides  only a rough estimate of total funding to support SOF and does not  include all funding. For example, according to this official, SOCOM’s  estimate for base operating support funding does not include all facilities,  restoration, sustainment, and modernization funding. In 2013, Congress  cited concerns with visibility into SOCOM’s budget due to a lack of detail.  Lacking such detail, Congress reported that it was unable to analyze  changes and trends over time in SOCOM’s budget requirements, conduct  comparative analysis with similar DOD budget requirements, or have any  understanding of or visibility into changing requirements in the year of  execution. In the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Congress directed DOD to  provide greater detail for SOCOM’s operation and maintenance budget  request beginning in fiscal year 2015. The command included greater  detail in its fiscal year 2015 budget justification but did not provide details  beyond special operations–specific funding.
GAO’s Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government state  that managers need financial data to determine whether they are meeting  their accountability goals for effective and efficient use of resources.  Further, the Handbook of Federal Accounting Standards suggests that  agencies should provide reliable and timely information on the full cost of  their federal programs aimed at assisting congressional and executive  decision makers in allocating federal resources and making decisions to  improve operating economy and efficiency. Moreover, we have  previously concluded that transparency—shedding light on the amount of  spending, what it is spent on, who receives the funds, and what the  results of that spending are—is essential to improving government  accountability. Transparency allows policy decision makers and the public  to access important information—including information they could use to  judge program effectiveness—and provides opportunities for increased  oversight.
The underlying reason why DOD, the military services, and SOCOM  cannot estimate the full costs to support SOF is that DOD has no clear  methodology for tracking this funding, because there is no requirement to  do so. The services typically include funding to support SOF in their  requests that also support the conventional forces, and at times it can be  difficult to differentiate funding purposes. For example, Marine Corps  officials noted that service-specific support to its special operations  component command is built into the service’s overall plan for allocation  of resources along with all other non–special operations requirements. As  a result, the military services’ budget justification materials do not provide  details on the level of resources required by the military services and  other components specifically to support SOF.
While SOCOM estimated that the military services provide about $8  billion annually to support SOF, this provides only a rough estimate of  total funding to support the force and does not include, for example, all  facilities, restoration, sustainment, and modernization funding. Because of  the lack of detailed information available from DOD and the military  services, we were also unable to comprehensively estimate the military  services’ funding to support SOF. Within the three categories of service  funding to support SOF shown in table 1, we were only able to identify  some examples of funding used to support SOF, as shown below.
Funding for pay and benefits: We estimated funding for the total  authorized special operations military positions for fiscal year 2014  using existing service documentation and the fiscal year 2014 annual  DOD composite rate. Based on these analyses, we calculated that  SOF pay totaled approximately $5.3 billion. This figure includes  funding for receipt of some bonuses and special pays, such as foreign  language proficiency, which both conventional forces and many SOF  operators receive. However, SOF operators may receive additional  SOF–specific bonuses and allowances not included in these  calculations. For example, Air Force SOF operators traditionally  receive one or more special or incentive pays based on the  requirement to maintain proficiency in certain skills or deploying on  assignments with difficult duties. The Air Force has more than a  dozen special and incentive pays, including aviator pay, dive pay, and  special duty assignment pay, that can range from $125 a month to as  much as $1,000 a month.
Funding for service-common equipment and goods: Documentation  provided by the Army noted that, in fiscal year 2014, the Army funded  approximately $138 million for 12 Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft  systems for SOF. An Army official further noted that the Army funded  approximately $1.2 billion to purchase 72 Black Hawk helicopters for  the Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment from fiscal years  2007 through 2013. In addition, according to Navy documentation, the  service will fund eight Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems to  support SOF. Combining operation and maintenance; procurement;  and research, development, test and evaluation funds, the Navy  expects to provide approximately $189 million in support of SOF  through fiscal year 2019 for the systems.
Funding for support programs and services: Documentation provided  by the Air Force noted that in fiscal year 2014, the service funded $4.8  million for utilities and rent and $6.5 million for base and headquarters  communications support for SOF. According to military service  officials, however, the SOF portion for some costs, such as base  operating support on bases where SOF reside, is difficult to quantify,  primarily because these costs are often shared with conventional  forces. These costs can include the portion of information technology  and facility services used to support SOF.
According to SOCOM and military service officials, more complete  information on total SOF funding would be useful for senior-level DOD  and congressional decision makers, particularly as the military services  face force reductions and decreasing budgets and as the size of SOF  continues to constitute a greater portion of the total force size. According  to its charter, the nascent Special Operations Oversight Council,  established in 2014, is tasked with adjudicating SOF resource- management issues, among other areas, but it must do so with  incomplete information on the total costs to support SOF. According to  officials, in a fiscally constrained environment, having information on total  funding to support SOF would help the oversight council and others  determine whether needs are realistic and feasible within constraints. For  example, Navy officials noted that while SOCOM has been working to  provide predictability to the services in terms of capabilities that SOF  needs, the requests are evaluated, prioritized, and compete against other  Navy programs. Specifically, SOCOM requested an afloat forward staging  base as a persistent and dedicated SOF platform to support geographic  combatant command requirements. However, providing this capability  represents a significant capital investment for the Navy. Given that the  Navy is building only three multimission platforms that can also be used  as afloat forward staging bases, the service needs the platforms available  for missions other than those dedicated to support SOF. In addition, an  Army official noted that SOF requirements are not always known well  enough in advance for inclusion in Army budget estimates, but SOF is  generally considered a higher priority. As such, funding is provided to  support SOF and the Army is left to rebalance a smaller available funding  level for other needs. Ultimately, visibility into total funding to support SOF  would enable decision makers to fully determine the level of investment  needed in the force and to plan to support SOF during times of budget  uncertainty and service force reductions.
Until DOD has more complete information on the total funding necessary  to support SOF, decision makers will be unable to effectively identify and  assess justification materials for future funding needs, or weigh priorities  and assess budget trade-offs within anticipated declining resources.  Moreover, the lack of visibility into current spending and future funding  plans impede DOD’s ability to provide Congress with information needed  to facilitate oversight, and afford congressional decision makers the  opportunity to analyze changes and trends over time in the budget  provided to support SOF or to conduct a comparative analysis with other  DOD budget requirements.

	DOD Has Not Fully Considered Opportunities to Alleviate Increased SOF Deployments

SOF deployments have increased since fiscal year 2001 and are not  expected to abate, but DOD has not fully considered whether additional  opportunities exist to reduce the demand for SOF. Between fiscal years  2001 and 2014, the average number of SOF personnel deployed nearly  tripled, primarily to meet operational needs in the U.S. Central Command  area of responsibility. DOD expects this high pace of deployments to  continue in the near future even as focus shifts to other parts of the world.  Recognizing the need to manage the effect of repeated deployments on  the force, DOD has taken some actions to try to manage the pace of SOF  deployments by establishing a series of policies to manage deployments.  However, the department has not taken steps to examine whether  additional opportunities exist to reduce the high demand on SOF by  sharing some activities with conventional forces.

		SOF Deployments Have Increased to Support Operations in the Middle East, but Focus Is Beginning to Shift to Other Regions

SOCOM’s historical deployment data reflects a command that  experienced a surge of deployments after 2001 followed by a sustained  high deployment level. Comparing fiscal years 2001 through 2014, the  average weekly number of deployed SOF nearly tripled in that time frame,  from approximately 2,900 personnel to approximately 7,200 personnel  deployed weekly, with a peak of about 8,700 personnel deployed weekly  in fiscal year 2010 (see fig. 6). Given the relatively small size of SOF— about 53,000 deployable personnel—at any given time a high proportion  of total SOF is either deployed, preparing to deploy, or just returning from  deployment.
Our analysis shows that past SOF deployments were driven by Operation  Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq.  According to officials, operational deployments in support of U.S. Central  Command lessened SOF’s availability to meet demands in other theaters,  such as conducting foreign internal defense and providing security force  assistance to U.S. partners—traditionally a SOF role. In recent years,  SOF are increasingly deploying in support of other geographic combatant  commands (see fig. 7). Specifically, in 2006, 85 percent of deployed SOF  were supporting needs in the U.S. Central Command area of  responsibility, while only 3 percent and 1 percent, respectively, were  supporting needs in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa  Command areas of responsibility. In 2014, the portion of deployments in  support of U.S. Central Command decreased to 69 percent, while  deployments in support of U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa  Command increased to 6 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
According to officials, the total weekly number of deployed SOF is not  expected to change significantly in the near future, although officials  expect that the location where SOF are deployed may continue to shift  based on emergent needs in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the  Pacific.

		SOCOM Has Taken Steps to Manage the Effect of SOF Deployments, but Some Portions of SOF Are Still Heavily Deployed

In a May 2014 report to Congress, DOD noted that SOF personnel have  come under significant strain in the years since September 11, 2001.  Both the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict and the commander of SOCOM acknowledged in 2015  that SOF have sustained unprecedented levels of stress during the  preceding few years. Specifically, the SOCOM commander has testified  that as SOF continue to deploy to meet the increasing geographic  combatant command demand, the high frequency of combat  deployments, high-stake missions, and extraordinarily demanding  environments in which forces operate have placed not only SOF but also  their families under unprecedented levels of stress. According to the  SOCOM commander, the high pace of deployments has resulted in both  increased suicide incidents among the force and effects on operational  readiness and retention due to a lack of predictability. This is consistent  with our prior work, which has found that a high pace of deployments for  SOF can affect readiness, retention, and morale. The military services  have also acknowledged challenges SOF face as a result of operational  demands. For example, in 2013, Air Force officials reported that a  persistent special operations presence in Afghanistan and elsewhere,  increasing requirements in the Pacific region, and enduring global  commitments would continue to stress Air Force special operations  personnel and aircraft.
Recognizing the significant demands and subsequent stress on SOF,  DOD and SOCOM have established a series of policies to manage  individual and unit deployments. In general, the policies have been based  on the concept of deployment-to-dwell ratios that seek to keep personnel  at home station for at least as much time as that spent while deployed.  For example, in August 2005 SOCOM issued a policy that required  active-duty SOF personnel to remain at home for at least an equal  amount of time as they were deployed for operations and training (a  deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:1). In 2006, we reported that the service  component commands had not consistently implemented this policy, in  part because the policy lacked clear implementation guidance and  reliable data to track deployments of personnel. DOD partially concurred  with our recommendation to require SOCOM to clarify the methodology  that its service components used for enforcing the deployment policy and  to take steps to ensure that the service components had tracking systems  in place that utilized reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy.  DOD noted that SOCOM leadership and all of its service components had  implemented the command’s deployment policy, but that the service  components had interpreted the intent of the policy requirements  inconsistently. Consistent with our recommendation, SOCOM  subsequently clarified the requirements of the policy in January 2007.
In 2008, SOCOM again updated its deployment policy, reiterating that  forces shall remain at home for an amount of time at least equal to that  for which they were away from their home station for activities such as  operations and training. The policy noted that SOCOM’s service  component commands should strive to go beyond this minimum ratio and  achieve a ratio that has active-duty personnel at home twice as long as  they are deployed for operations and training (a deployment-to-dwell ratio  of 1:2). The guidance outlined a long-term goal of having forces home at  a ratio of 1:3. In May 2014, SOCOM again revised its deployment  guidance, stating that units, detachments, and individuals should strive to  be in dwell for at least twice as long as they are operationally deployed (a  deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:2). Both DOD and SOCOM policy requires  Secretary of Defense approval for the deployment of units when they will  fall below 1:1. According to officials, this policy is designed to minimize  and manage the disruptive effects of emerging requirements. SOCOM’s  deployment guidance does not prescribe a system for tracking  deployment data, and officials noted that therefore the command relies on  the service component commands to report whether units are complying  with the deployment policy. Service component command officials told us  that they use a range of tools, including spreadsheets and other systems  to track unit deployment data. Officials also stated that emerging  requirements—of which there were more than 100 in fiscal year 2014— exceed the already planned rotational force requirements and challenged  the commands’ ability to meet goals outlined in the deployment guidance.  Officials stated that, in many cases, these emergent requests for forces  become part of the command’s steady-state requirements, increasing the  annual number of deployed SOF.
SOCOM and the service component commands could not provide precise  historical deployment data, but officials stated that certain unit types had  historically high deployment rates. For example, a U.S. Army Special  Operations Command official stated that its Civil Affairs, Military  Information Support Operations, and Army Ranger units have been  heavily stressed due to the high pace of operations. Additionally, officials  noted that some Marine Corps Special Operations Support Group forces,  which include logistics personnel, explosive ordnance disposal  technicians, and mechanics, have been unable to meet deployment  goals.
Other types of units have been sized to better align with SOCOM’s  steady-state deployment goals. For example, officials stated that Naval  Special Warfare forces, Air Force Special Tactics Squadrons, and Marine  Corps Special Operations Teams are all structured to be at home at least  twice as long as they are to be operationally deployed. However, this  deployment tempo is generally predicated on a steady-state environment  without factoring in all emergent requirements, which according to some  officials was not always realistic given the continuing demands on the  force.

		DOD Has Not Fully Assessed Opportunities to Reduce the Demand for SOF

Opportunities may exist to better balance the workload across the force  because the activities assigned to SOF can be similar to the types of  activities assigned to conventional forces. Conventional forces have been  expanding their capabilities to meet the demand for missions that have  traditionally been given to SOF, such as stability operations, security  force assistance, civil security, and repairing key infrastructure necessary  to provide government services and sustain human life. For example, in  2012 we reported that the services were taking steps and investing  resources to organize and train conventional forces capable of conducting  security force assistance based on identified requirements. Recently,  DOD began establishing conventional forces, such as the Army’s  regionally aligned forces with more extensive language and cultural skills  that could conduct activities previously performed primarily by SOF. The  Army reported that its regionally aligned forces helped train approximately  8,500 peacekeepers from 10 African countries in fiscal year 2014.  According to Army officials, regionally aligned forces are prepared to  meet the myriad of requirements across the range of military operations— from small teams participating in theater security cooperation with partner  nations to large formations undertaking major combat operation.  However, SOCOM officials stated that the command has not coordinated  with the Army’s regionally aligned forces to determine what activities, if  any, could be transferred to or shared with those forces.
The goal of DOD’s force-allocation process is to consider all DOD  components to identify and recommend the most appropriate and  responsive force that can meet identified requirements. According to  DOD’s force-allocation guidance, geographic combatant commanders are  to submit requests for forces to the Joint Staff and specify whether SOF  or conventional forces are being requested. The Joint Staff is then  responsible for validating combatant commanders’ requests for forces— including both SOF and conventional forces—before assigning each  request to a joint force provider. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Manual 3130.06A outlines the validation criteria the Joint Staff applies to  force requests. These criteria focus on such factors as the availability of  funding and assuring that the request has not been previously decided or  that the capability is not already available in the operational theater. DOD  joint doctrine states that SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces  and, in order to preserve SOF capabilities, should not be employed to  conduct operations where conventional forces could be used to achieve  the same objectives. Limited resources and extensive planning require a  commander to selectively employ SOF for high-priority operations. DOD  guidance further states that the department’s force-allocation process  should determine what forces are best able to meet a combatant  commander’s request based on a comprehensive assessment across all  service force capabilities.
Our work identified two factors that inhibit the department’s ability to  share the burden of SOF deployments with conventional forces. First, the  department has not recently evaluated whether some activities being  conducted by SOF could be conducted by conventional forces. DOD last  studied opportunities to alleviate some SOF deployments in 2003, as  forces were beginning to heavily engage in operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan, to determine what types of special operations activities could  be transferred to or shared with conventional forces. At the time, DOD  determined that there were opportunities to share the burden of SOF  deployments with conventional forces, including for certain counterdrug  missions and foreign conventional force training. However, officials noted  that DOD has not conducted a similar formal assessment since 2003 to  determine whether the demand on SOF could be mitigated, even though  SOF have continued to perform activities that could be conducted by  other forces, such as performing noncombatant evacuation missions  typically conducted by Marine Corps conventional forces. According to  DOD officials, the department implemented its current force-allocation  process with the intent that it would validate the most appropriate military  force to meet combatant commanders’ needs. During the course of our  review, however, officials from SOCOM and its service components  repeatedly expressed concerns about whether it was appropriate to  continue to deploy SOF at such high rates while admitting that they were  reluctant to turn down deployments even if they felt the need could be  met with other, conventional forces. Without conducting an evaluation of  what activities should be performed by SOF versus the conventional  force, the department cannot be assured that it is using SOF only in those  situations where conventional forces could not be used for the same  purpose.
Second, DOD’s current force-allocation process does not systematically  consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate  alternative to meet requests for SOF. Our analysis found that while  DOD’s force-allocation process currently provides validation criteria that  the Joint Staff is to apply to force requests, the validation criteria focus  primarily on administrative matters related to the request, such as the  current availability of funding and forces in theater. The validation criteria  do not include a requirement to determine whether the tasking of SOF is  the most appropriate means to address combatant commanders’  requirements, given the broader demands on the force. As the joint force  provider for conventional forces, which involves coordinating with the  military services and combatant commanders to identify the most  appropriate conventional forces to meet force requests in the force  allocation process, the Joint Staff has visibility over the types of  conventional forces available in the department and whether these forces  could potentially be used to meet SOF requests.
However, the Joint Staff’s role in the process has been limited. This is  because, according to officials, SOCOM has worked directly with the  geographic combatant commands and theater special operations  commands to draft requests for SOF forces that are SOF–specific. In the  absence of a requirement for the Joint Staff to determine whether the  tasking of SOF is the most appropriate means to address combatant  commanders’ requirements, we were told that the Joint Staff passes  these requests directly to SOCOM for sourcing once they are  administratively validated. According to a Joint Staff official, SOCOM can  either source a requirement for SOF or close the requirement without  sourcing. The official noted that when identifying military forces for  combatant commanders’ validated requirements, officials can consider  whether conventional forces can serve as a substitute for SOF.
Unless the department has a requirement to more fully assess whether  opportunities exist to better balance operational demands across the joint  force, the demand for SOF—and the high pace of deployments that  results—is likely to continue. Officials stated that SOF leaders and  personnel want to deploy frequently, and thus they are reluctant to  decline deployments even when they are under stress. The situation is  further exacerbated by the fact that, according to officials, combatant  commanders often express a preference for SOF because they are  responsive, flexible, highly skilled, and well-funded. However, the Joint  Staff’s role provides it with visibility over the capacity and capabilities of  both SOF and conventional forces and enables the Joint Staff to lead  efforts to determine whether certain combatant commander requests for  SOF could be met by conventional forces.

	Conclusions

Since 2001, SOF have become a prominent part of U.S. military forces as  they have often been called upon for high-priority and time-sensitive  military missions that have a high degree of risk. DOD has grown its SOF  to meet such demands as well as made other portions of the force more  SOF-like by adapting their training, among other actions.
While the size of SOF has grown by about half since 2001, the funding  devoted specifically to the force has tripled to nearly $10 billion annually.  DOD officials point out that SOF–specific funding is a relatively small  portion of DOD’s overall budget, but that funding total understates the  true costs because the military services support SOF in myriad ways,  some of which are not easily quantified. DOD estimates that this  additional support is around $8 billion annually, but this rough estimate  excludes many costs. DOD cannot provide a more precise estimate  because it does not have a methodology to gather such data. Supporting  SOF is likely to remain a high priority in the future, so these largely hidden  costs to support the force could divert funding from other service  priorities, especially if supplemental funding is decreased. As budget  pressures mount, better transparency over the total costs to support SOF  will become increasingly important both to DOD decision makers and to  justify budgets to Congress.
The average number of deployed SOF has also tripled since 2001, and  the pace of these deployments is not expected to decrease. DOD and  SOCOM and its service component commands have recognized the  strains these deployments have placed on the force, such as increased  suicide rates and effects on readiness and retention, and have set goals  to limit deployments and get better information about the length and  frequency of deployments. However, setting goals and obtaining better  information may not solve the underlying problem—the high demand for  SOF. To ease the strain on SOF, the department may have to reexamine  how it is meeting operational demands. The Joint Staff is in the best  position to assess whether conventional forces could do more to alleviate  the high demands on SOF. However, DOD has not formally assessed  opportunities to transfer or share certain activities between SOF and  conventional forces since 2003, and DOD’s current validation process is  largely an administrative exercise that does not validate whether some  requests for SOF could be met with conventional forces. These gaps are  not consistent with DOD doctrine, which says that SOF should be  employed for high-priority operations and not to conduct operations where  conventional forces could be used to achieve the same objectives.  Moreover, the current force-allocation process may miss opportunities to  take advantage of the growth in conventional forces with SOF-like skills.  Unless the department evaluates force requests with a goal of balancing  the workload across the larger force, the high pace of SOF deployments  is likely to continue.

	Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to improve the budget visibility over the funding for SOF needed  to guide departmental and congressional decision making and to better  balance operational deployments across the joint force, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:  Direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in consultation with  the military service Secretaries and SOCOM, to develop a mutually  acceptable methodology to track and report funding to support SOF,  possibly as part of annual budget justification materials.
Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with  SOCOM and the military services, to evaluate whether opportunities exist for certain types of activities  traditionally conducted by SOF to be transferred to or shared with  conventional forces and  revise the validation criteria outlined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff Manual 3130.06A to include a requirement that the Joint Staff  consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate  alternative to meet requests for SOF before validating combatant  commander requests.

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, DOD partially concurred with our three  recommendations. DOD’s comments are summarized below and  reprinted in their entirety in appendix VIII. DOD also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the Under  Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in consultation with the military  service secretaries and SOCOM, develop a mutually acceptable  methodology to track and report funding to support SOF. In its comments,  DOD stated that the department maintains full visibility of service funding  to support SOF through manpower and acquisition accounts as well as  special operations–specific funding. DOD noted that while there are  indirect service costs to support SOF, these costs are service  responsibilities and do not generally influence the department’s decisions  on SOF capabilities or end strength. DOD further stated that it would  review the current methodology to track and report funding to support  SOF and consider any changes based on incremental costs incurred by  enhanced audit and reporting procedures balanced against potential  benefits for decision making on SOF resourcing. With respect to DOD’s  first point, our report recognizes the distinction between service-provided  funding to support SOF and special operations–specific funding provided  directly to SOCOM. We reported that data on funding to support SOF are  tracked and managed across multiple appropriations, programs,  functions, and/or organizations in a decentralized manner. However,  neither DOD nor the military services have systematically collected,  estimated, or reported total SOF funding needs because there is no  requirement to do so. Our report notes that SOCOM has developed an  approach for calculating service-provided funding amounts, but it provides  only a rough estimate of funding needs. In our view, these efforts do not  constitute having full visibility of total funding to support SOF. Regarding  DOD’s point about potential benefits for decision making, we continue to  believe that having information on total funding to support SOF would  help officials determine whether needs are realistic and feasible within  identified budgetary constraints. More complete information on the total  funding necessary to support SOF would also enable decision makers to  more effectively identify and assess justification materials for future  funding needs or weigh priorities and assess budget trade-offs within  anticipated declining resources.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with SOCOM and  the military services, evaluate whether opportunities exist for certain types  of activities traditionally conducted by SOF to be transferred to or shared  with conventional forces. DOD stated that it believes that the current  Global Force Management process appropriately balances assignments  of missions and requirements between SOF and conventional forces.  DOD further stated that it would consider any changes to the current  decision process that could improve allocation of missions and  requirements between SOF and conventional forces as part of the  department’s ongoing review of the Global Force Management process.  DOD’s decision to evaluate the current decision process on the allocation  of missions and requirements between SOF and conventional forces is a  positive step. As we stated in this report, conventional forces have been  expanding their capabilities to meet the demand for missions that have  traditionally been given to SOF, but since a 2003 review, the department  has not conducted a formal assessment of whether some activities being  conducted by SOF could be conducted by conventional forces.  Furthermore, as we stated in our report, officials expressed concern  about whether it was appropriate to continue to deploy SOF at such high  rates given that some operational needs assigned through the current  force allocation process could be met with conventional forces.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the Chairman  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with SOCOM and the military  services, revise the validation criteria outlined in Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.06A to include a requirement that the Joint  Staff consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate  alternative to meet requests for SOF before validating combatant  commander requests. DOD stated that it believes that the current Global  Force Management validation process considers the appropriate  allocation of missions and requirements between SOF and conventional  forces.  DOD further stated that the Joint Staff is currently reviewing the  Global Force Management process for improvements and will consider  revising validation procedures outlined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff Manual 3130.06A, as necessary, to ensure that missions and  requirements are appropriately assigned to SOF and conventional forces.  We continue to believe that DOD should adjust the validation criteria  outlined in DOD guidance to include a requirement that the Joint Staff  consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate  alternative for SOF. Our report recognizes that DOD’s Global Force  Management validation process is intended to consider the appropriate  allocation of missions and requirements between SOF and conventional  forces. However, as we noted in our report, the process currently  provides validation criteria that focus primarily on administrative matters  related to force requests. The criteria do not include a requirement for the  Joint Staff to determine whether the tasking of SOF is the most  appropriate means to address combatant commanders’ requirements.  Without such an explicit validation step, DOD may miss opportunities to  take advantage of conventional forces with SOF-like skills while lessening  some SOF deployments.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  and Low-Intensity Conflict, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the  Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Secretaries of  the military departments. In addition, this report is available at no charge  on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IX.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We conducted this work in response to a provision in the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, section 1086, to review  organization, capabilities, structure, and oversight of special operations  forces (SOF). This report (1) examines trends since fiscal year 2001 in  authorized positions for special operations military personnel and how  special operations force levels have compared with the military services’  total force levels, (2) evaluates the extent to which the Department of  Defense (DOD) has determined the total costs to support SOF, and (3)  examines the extent to which DOD has taken steps to manage the pace  of SOF deployments.
To conduct this work and address our objectives, we identified sources of  information within DOD that would provide data on the resources devoted  to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and its corresponding  service component commands—U.S. Army Special Operations  Command, U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command, U.S. Marine Corps  Forces Special Operations Command, and U.S. Air Force Special  Operations Command.
To examine the trends in special operations military personnel since fiscal  year 2001 and how force levels have compared with the military services’  total force levels, we obtained and analyzed available data on authorized  military and civilian positions from SOCOM and each of its service  component commands from fiscal year 2001 through 2014. We focused  our review on authorized positions, as these reflect the approved, funded  manpower requirements at each of the service component commands.  We assessed the reliability of the data by interviewing DOD officials,  incorporating data-reliability questions into our data-collection  instruments, and comparing the multiple data sets received from SOCOM  and its service component commands against each other to ensure that  there was consistency in the data provided. We determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of describing the trends in  authorized special operations positions. We further obtained and  reviewed data and documentation provided by SOCOM’s service  component commands to determine the composition of SOF for each  respective service. To determine how special operations force levels  compared with the military services’ total force levels, we used the active  and reserve component authorized end strength force–level data from the  National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2001 through 2014  and compared these overall force levels with the number of active and  reserve component authorized SOF positions for fiscal years 2001  through 2014. We also reviewed documents, including DOD’s  Quadrennial Defense Review reports and briefings on force structure  changes and discussed the data with SOCOM and service officials to  understand the reasons for the trends.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD has determine the total funding to  support SOF, we obtained and reviewed documentation on special  operations–specific funding provided to SOCOM for necessary SOF- unique capabilities and items. We obtained data and described trends in  obligations for SOCOM for fiscal years 2001 through 2014 for base and  supplemental funding. We further provided an analysis of funding trends  in base and supplemental obligations for SOCOM’s service component  commands, but since historical data were unavailable in some cases, we  limited our analysis of trends for the service component commands to  fiscal years 2005 through 2014. Unless otherwise noted, we reported all  costs in this report in constant fiscal year 2014 dollars. To assess the  reliability of the data, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and SOCOM and incorporated data- reliability questions into our data-collection instruments. We also  compared the multiple data sets received from SOCOM and its service  component commands against each other to ensure that there was  consistency in the data provided. We determined the data were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes of describing trends in funding for  SOF. We further interviewed officials from SOCOM and the military  services and obtained available information to determine other categories  of funding provided to support SOF in addition to SOCOM’s special  operations–specific appropriations. We obtained documentation and  interviewed officials from SOCOM to determine the methodology the  command used to identify service-provided costs to support SOF. We  also reviewed approaches used by DOD for documenting and reporting  SOF costs in light of accounting standards and guidance that outlines the  need to have information on the full cost of federal programs and a high  level of knowledge to guide decision-making efforts.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD has taken steps to manage the  pace of SOF deployments, we obtained and reviewed data from SOCOM  on average weekly SOF deployments. Using available data maintained by  SOCOM, we calculated average weekly SOF deployments and the  distribution of SOF deployed in support of operational requirements for  fiscal years 2006 through 2014. We further calculated data on the  percentage of SOF personnel deployed in support of the geographic  combatant commands for fiscal years 2006, 2010, and 2014 to illustrate  the global distribution of forces. To present trends in SOF deployments  for fiscal years 2001 through 2005, we relied on data presented in our  prior work. To assess the reliability of the data, we reviewed available  data for inconsistencies and discussed the inconsistencies with SOCOM  officials, analyzed relevant deployment and operational demand policy  memoranda, and incorporated data-reliability questions into our data- collection instruments. We determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for our purposes of showing general trends in SOF deployments,  though deployments may be somewhat undercounted because some  service component commands do not consistently report data for the  number of personnel deployed in support of training within the continental  United States. In addition, we discussed the effect of past and planned  deployments with officials from SOCOM and its service component  commands in light of special operations deployment policies and  documentation that describe goals for SOF deployments. We obtained  and reviewed guidance on DOD’s process for filling geographic  combatant commander force needs, such as related Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff manuals and joint doctrine. We also reviewed DOD’s  SOF mission analysis conducted in 2003 to determine the extent to which  the department had considered options for sharing the burden of SOF  deployments with conventional forces. We interviewed military service  and SOCOM officials to identify opportunities for potentially alleviating  some of the demand on SOF with conventional forces, such as the  establishment of the Army’s regionally aligned force concept. We then  examined the Joint Staff’s role in considering these alternatives in the  process of sourcing department-wide force needs.
We contacted officials, and when appropriate obtained documentation,  from the organizations listed below:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and  Low-Intensity Conflict)  Joint Staff
U.S. Special Operations Command
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command
U.S. Africa Command
U.S. Central Command
U.S. European Command
U.S. Northern Command
U.S. Pacific Command
U.S. Southern Command  Theater Special Operations Commands:
Special Operations Command Africa
Special Operations Command Central
Special Operations Command Europe
Special Operations Command North
Special Operations Command Pacific
Special Operations Command South
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Headquarters, Marine Corps
Headquarters Air Force  We conducted this performance audit from March 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix VI: Special Operations–Specific Funding in Nominal Dollars

Appendix VII: U.S. Special Operations Command’s Service Component Commands’ Organizational Structure Descriptions

This appendix contains information in noninteractive format presented in  the organizational charts in appendixes II, III, IV, and V.

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

	GAO Contact

	Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  include Matthew Ullengren (Assistant Director), Tracy Barnes, Timothy  Carr, Cynthia Grant, Tamiya Lunsford, Geoff Peck, Carol D. Petersen,  Christine San, Michael Silver, Amie Lesser, Cheryl Weissman, and Kristy  Williams.

Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

SOF are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in hostile or politically sensitive environments. Since 2001, DOD has increased the size and funding of SOF and emphasized SOF's importance to meet national security needs. SOF deployments have focused on the Middle East and placed significant demand on the force during this period.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision that GAO review SOF force structure. This report examines (1) trends since FY 2001 in authorized special operations military positions; (2) the extent to which DOD has determined total funding for SOF; and (3) the extent to which DOD has taken steps to manage the pace of SOF deployments, among other issues.
GAO analyzed data for FYs 2001 through 2014 on SOF authorized positions, funding, and deployment data. GAO reviewed data on service-provided SOF funding and policies and other documentation and interviewed officials regarding processes for managing SOF deployments.

What GAO Found

GAO analysis of the resources devoted to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) found that the number of authorized special operations military positions increased from about 42,800 in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to about 62,800 in FY 2014, which includes combat and support personnel. Even with this growth, special operations military positions constituted less than 3 percent of the military services' FY14 total authorized force levels.
Special operations–specific funding has increased markedly, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not determined the total funding used to support special operations forces (SOF). Funding provided to SOCOM for special operations–specific needs has more than tripled from about $3.1 billion in FY 2001 to about $9.8 billion in FY 2014 constant dollars, including supplemental funding for contingency operations. However, these totals do not include funding provided by the services, which SOCOM estimates is more than $8 billion annually. GAO found that DOD has little visibility over total funding to support SOF, primarily because it has not established a requirement or methodology to capture and report this information. Until DOD has more complete information on total funding to support SOF, decision makers will be unable to effectively identify and assess resource needs or weigh priorities and assess budget trade-offs.
DOD has taken some steps to manage the increased pace of special operations deployments, but opportunities may exist to better balance the workload across the joint force because activities assigned to SOF can be similar to activities assigned to conventional forces. Average weekly deployments of SOF personnel have increased from about 2,900 in FY 2001 to about 7,200 in FY 2014. SOCOM has taken steps to manage the effect of SOF deployments, but DOD reported that some portions of the force are still heavily deployed. GAO identified two factors that inhibit DOD's ability to potentially share the burden of SOF deployments with the conventional force. First, DOD has not evaluated since 2003 whether activities performed by SOF could be conducted by conventional forces. Second, DOD's current force-allocation process provides the Joint Staff with criteria to validate force requests, but does not systematically consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate alternative to meet some requests for SOF. Unless the department more fully assesses whether opportunities exist to better balance demands across the joint force, the demand for SOF and the high pace of deployments that results is likely to continue.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD improve visibility in total funding to support SOF and determine whether opportunities exist to balance deployments across the joint force. DOD partially concurred, stating that existing processes that guide funding and force allocation decisions are appropriate, but that it would review these processes and consider opportunities for improvement. GAO continues to believe that actions are needed, as discussed in the report.