Background

		DOJ Grants Administration

DOJ awards federal financial assistance to state and local governments,  for-profit and nonprofit organizations, tribal jurisdictions, and educational  institutions, to help prevent crime, assist victims of crime, and promote  innovative law enforcement efforts. Federal financial assistance programs  provide funding pursuant to statutory authorization and annual  appropriations through formula grants, discretionary grants, cooperative  agreements, and other payment programs, but are all generally referred  to as grants. From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012,  approximately $33 billion has been appropriated to support the more than  200 grants programs that DOJ manages.
DOJ administers its grant programs through three granting agencies—the  Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the Office on Violence Against Women  (OVW), and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office.  OJP is the largest of DOJ’s granting agencies, and its mission to develop  the nation’s capacity to prevent and control crime, administer justice, and  assist crime victims is broader than that of OVW or the COPS Office.  OJP’s bureaus and offices administer grant programs that address victim  assistance, technology and forensics, and juvenile justice, among other  things. One such grant program is the BVP program, which was created  following enactment of the Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Act of  1998, and provides grants on a competitive basis to state and local law enforcement agencies to assist in their purchasing of ballistic-resistant  and stab-resistant body armor. The COPS Office grant programs focus on  advancing community policing, which generally involves cooperation  between police departments and community residents in identifying and  developing solutions to crime problems. OVW administers grant programs  related to domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking.

		Asset Forfeiture

DOJ and Treasury both operate asset forfeiture programs that are  designed to prevent and reduce crime through the seizure and forfeiture  of assets that represent the proceeds of, or were used to facilitate, federal  crimes. Each department also maintains a separate fund that is the  receipt account for the deposit of forfeitures. Over the years, a series of  laws has been enacted that has expanded forfeiture from drug offenses to  money laundering, financial crimes, and terrorism-related offenses. In  addition to depriving criminals of property used or acquired through illegal  activities, these programs are designed to enhance cooperation among  foreign, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies through the  equitable sharing of assets recovered through the program, and, as a by- product, produce revenues in support of future law enforcement  investigations and related forfeiture activities. A number of federal law  enforcement organizations participate in DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund  (AFF), including the U.S. Marshals Service, which serves as the primary  custodian of seized and forfeited property for the program. Once property  is forfeited to the government, it is subsequently sold, put into official use,  destroyed, or transferred to another agency. Cash and monetary  instruments that have been forfeited and property that has been forfeited  and sold are subsequently deposited in the forfeiture fund. In fiscal year  2012, the value of total assets in the AFF was approximately $5.97  billion. Money collected in the funds is used to pay for expenses related  to the asset forfeiture program and for other law enforcement initiatives.

		Field-Based Information- Sharing Entities

DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of  National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) operate or support, through grant  funding or personnel, five types of field-based information-sharing entities  that may collect, process, analyze, or disseminate information in support  of law enforcement and counterterrorism-related efforts, as shown in table  1.
In general, the five types of entities in our review were established under  different authorities and have distinct missions, roles, and responsibilities.  As of January 2013 there were a total of 268 of these field-based entities  located throughout the United States, and DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP  provided an estimated $129 million in fiscal year 2011 to support three of  the five types of entities.

	DOJ Has Steps Under Way to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication in Its Grant Programs

In July 2012, we reported that DOJ’s more than 200 grant programs  overlapped across 10 key justice areas, and that this overlap contributed  to the risk of unnecessarily duplicative grant awards for the same or  similar purposes. We also recognized that overlapping grant programs  across programmatic areas result in part from authorizing statutes.  Further, we recognized that overlap among DOJ’s grant programs may be  desirable because such overlap can enable DOJ’s granting agencies to  leverage multiple funding streams to serve a single justice purpose.  However, we found that the existence of overlapping grant programs is an  indication that agencies should increase their ability to monitor where  their funds are going and coordinate to ensure that any resulting  duplication in grant award funding is purposeful rather than unnecessary,  and we made recommendations to reflect these needed improvements.
In addition, we found that OJP, OVW, and the COPS Office did not  routinely share lists of current and potential awardees to consider both  the current and planned dispersion and purposes of all DOJ grant funding  before finalizing new award decisions. Our work found instances where  DOJ made multiple grant awards to applicants for the same or similar  purposes without being aware of the potential for unnecessary duplication  or whether funding from multiple streams was warranted. We also  reported that OJP, OVW, and the COPS Office had not established  policies and procedures requiring consistent coordination and information  sharing among its granting agencies. Further, we found that OJP and  OVW used a separate grants management system than the COPS Office,  limiting their ability to share information on the funding they have awarded  or are preparing to award to a recipient. officials, its mission and grant management processes are different  enough to necessitate a separate system. However, OJP officials told us  that its system has been and can be modified with minimal investment to  accommodate different grant processes.
We included some of these related findings in GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities  to Reduce Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance  Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012). concurred with all eight of our recommendations. Five of the  recommendations specifically relate to ways in which DOJ can improve  program efficiency and resource management, and these are that DOJ  conduct an assessment to better understand the extent to which the  department’s grant programs overlap with one another and determine  if grant programs may be consolidated;  coordinate within and among granting agencies on a consistent basis  to review potential or recent grant awards from grant programs that  DOJ identifies as overlapping, before awarding grants;  require its grant applicants to report all federal grant funding, including  all DOJ funding, that they are currently receiving or have recently  applied for in their grant applications; provide appropriate OJP, COPS Office, and OVW staff access to both  grant management systems; and ensure its comprehensive study of DOJ grant management systems  assesses the feasibility, costs, and benefits of moving to a single  grants management system, including the steps needed to harmonize  DOJ grant processes, so that any variation in how granting agencies  manage their portfolios is not an encumbrance to potential system  unification.
DOJ has taken steps to partially address these recommendations.  Specifically, DOJ has formed an assessment team, composed of OJP,  OVW, and COPS Office representatives, to review all of the department’s  fiscal year 2012 grant program solicitations, or announcements, and  categorize them by several elements. These elements include program  type, eligible grant funding recipients (e.g., states, localities, tribes, and  law enforcement agencies), target grant award beneficiaries (e.g., victims  and juveniles), allowable uses of the funds, and locations funded. The  assessment team is also developing criteria to identify potentially  duplicative programs and then plans to assign risk levels of potential  duplication to those that have multiple solicitations addressing similar key  components. According to DOJ officials, the assessment team plans to  conclude its work later in 2013.
In addition, OJP has granted read-only access of its grants management  system to OVW and the COPS Office to allow pertinent staff in those  offices to access the most up-to-date OJP grant information. Further, OJP  officials said that they are exploring ways in which more data systems  may be used for coordinating grants. DOJ officials anticipate that  eventually, agencies can leverage the information in these systems  during the preaward process to avoid funding potentially overlapping and  duplicative grant activities; however, DOJ’s plans rest upon completion of  the assessment team’s work. Officials told us that upon receipt of the  assessment team’s findings, they plan to work to develop and support a  targeted and strategic approach to reviewing applications across all three  granting agencies before making grant award decisions. DOJ officials  noted that as part of this approach, DOJ plans to establish policies and  procedures to govern coordination efforts. Thus, completion of this  assessment could better position DOJ to take more systemic actions— such as improved coordination and potential consolidation of its  programs—to limit overlap and mitigate the risk of unnecessary  duplication.
DOJ has also initiated a feasibility study of moving to a single grants  management system that includes the identification of the steps needed  to harmonize grant processes, among other factors such as return on  investment. Since this study—like DOJ’s other efforts to address all of our  recommendations—is still under way, it is too soon to tell whether the  department’s actions will fully address each of the recommendations.

	DOJ Has Not Yet Deobligated Unused BVP Funds

We have also previously reported on and made recommendations related  to DOJ’s BVP grant program. In February 2012, we reported that DOJ  had designed several controls for the BVP program to ensure grantee  compliance with program requirements, among other things, but could  take additional action to further reduce management risk. For example,  we found that from fiscal years 2002 to 2009, the BVP program had  awarded about $27 million in BVP grants to grant recipients who did not  ultimately seek reimbursement. Since the grant terms for each of these  grantees had ended, the grantees were no longer eligible for  reimbursement and DOJ could deobligate these funds. To improve  DOJ’s resource management, we recommended that DOJ deobligate  undisbursed funds from grants in the BVP program whose terms have  ended. Further, we noted that since the BVP program received about $24  million in fiscal year 2012, deobligating this $27 million could have  significant benefits. For example, deobligating this funding could enable  the department to apply the amounts to new awards or reduce requests  for future budgets. The department concurred with this recommendation  and has since deobligated $2 million. In early April 2013, DOJ officials  stated that they expect to complete the deobligation process before the  end of April 2013. They also said the process is time-intensive because it  has involved reconciliation among multiple data and financial  management systems. DOJ officials stated that they plan to use the  deobligated funds toward fiscal year 2014 BVP awards.

	DOJ and Treasury Have Not Yet Studied the Feasibility of Consolidating Asset Forfeiture Activities

In September 2012, we found that DOJ and Treasury had made limited  progress to consolidate their asset forfeiture property management  activities. Specifically, the departments had made limited progress in  sharing storage facilities or contracts, and they had not fully explored the  possibility of coordinating or consolidating the management of their  assets to achieve greater efficiencies, effectiveness, and cost savings. As  a result, each department maintained separate asset-tracking systems,  separate contracts, and separate storage facilities, which we found to be  potentially duplicative. For example, DOJ and Treasury maintain four  separate asset-tracking systems—DOJ maintains one system and  Treasury maintains three—to support their respective asset forfeiture  program activities, and these four tracking systems have similar  functionalities.developing, maintaining, and overseeing their four asset-tracking systems  in fiscal year 2011 totaled $16.2 million for DOJ’s asset-tracking system  and $10.4 million for the three Treasury asset-tracking systems  combined. Further, we found that in some cases, storage facilities are  located in the same geographic area. For example, both the U.S.  Marshals Service—the primary custodian of DOJ’s seized assets—and   According to DOJ and Treasury data, the cost of  Treasury maintain vehicle storage facilities, 40 percent of which are within  20 miles of each other.
DOJ and Treasury officials noted that when Congress passed a law  establishing the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in 1992, it recognized the  differences in the programs’ missions, which warranted creating separate  programs, and this encouraged independent operational decisions that  eventually created additional differences between the two programs. Both  programs are designed to reduce and prevent crime. DOJ’s asset  forfeiture program represents the interests of law enforcement  components within its department as well as several components outside  the department, while Treasury’s program represents the interests of   We recognized the separate legal  Treasury and DHS components.authorities of the two funds, but noted that those legal authorities did not  preclude enhanced coordination within programs. Thus, we  recommended that DOJ and Treasury conduct a study to determine the  feasibility of consolidating potentially duplicative asset management  activities including, but not limited to, the use of asset-tracking systems  and the sharing of vendor and contract resources. The departments  concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2013, DOJ officials  reported that DOJ and Treasury representatives had met several times in  the fall of 2012 and thereafter agreed upon an approach to conduct the  study and assess potential costs. DOJ officials noted that they would  continue to meet with their Treasury partners to execute their plan. Since  work remains under way, it is too soon to tell whether the departments’  actions will fully address the recommendation.

	DOJ Has Not Documented the Process for Carrying Over Asset Forfeiture Funds from Year to Year

In July 2012, we reported on the growth of revenues and expenses in  DOJ’s AFF from fiscal years 2003 to 2011, and the need for transparency  in DOJ’s process for carrying over funds from one fiscal year to the  next. Each year, DOJ earns revenue from the proceeds of the forfeited  assets it collects. It then pays its expenses, which include payments to  victims and the costs of storing and maintaining forfeited assets. DOJ  uses any balance to help cover anticipated expenses in the next fiscal  year that may not be covered by that year’s revenues, and this is known  as carrying over funds. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2003, DOJ  carried over approximately $365 million to cover expenditures in the next  fiscal year. In contrast, at the end of fiscal year 2011, DOJ carried over  $844 million to cover expenses into fiscal year 2012. After DOJ reserves  funds to cover needed expenses, DOJ declares any remaining funds to  be an excess unobligated balance and has the authority to use these  funds for any of the department’s authorized purposes. In recent years,  DOJ also used these excess unobligated balances to cover rescissions.  For example, in fiscal year 2011, DOJ used excess unobligated balances  to help cover a $495 million AFF program rescission. Also, in fiscal year  2012, DOJ used $151 million of the remaining AFF funds identified at the  end of the fiscal year to acquire the Thomson Correctional Center in  Thomson, Illinois.
At the time of our review, when determining the amounts to carryover,  DOJ officials reviewed historical data on past program expenditures,  analyzed known future expenses such as salaries and contracts, and  estimated the costs of any potential new expenditures. However, as we  concluded on the basis of our findings in July 2012, without a clearly  documented and transparent process, it was difficult to determine  whether DOJ’s conclusions regarding the amounts that need to be carried  over each year were well founded. We recommended that DOJ clearly  document how it determined the amount of funds that it would need to be  carried over for the next fiscal year, a recommendation with which DOJ  concurred. DOJ officials stated that they plan to include information on  the basis for its decisions concerning the amount of funds to be carried  over in future Congressional Budget Justifications, but as of March 2013,  the decision on how to present the information was still pending. Since  this information has not yet been made available, it is too soon to tell  whether it will fully address the recommendation.

	DOJ and Other Agencies Could Improve Coordination to Help Reduce Unnecessary Overlap in Field-Based Information Sharing

In April 2013, we identified overlap in some activities of five types of field- based information-sharing entities and concluded that DOJ, DHS, and  ONDCP could improve coordination among the entities to help reduce  unnecessary overlap in activities. In general, the five types of entities in  our review were established under different authorities and have distinct  missions, roles, and responsibilities. We reviewed their activities in eight  urban areas and found overlap as each carried out its respective  missions, roles, and responsibilities. Specifically, we identified 91  instances of overlap in analytical activities and services, with more  instances of overlap involving a fusion center and a Field Intelligence  Group (54 of the 91 instances) compared with the other three types of  entities. For example, we found that in five of the eight urban areas, the  fusion center, Regional Information Sharing Systems center, and the  Field Intelligence Group disseminated information on all crimes—which  can include terrorism and other high-risk threats as well as other types of  crimes—for federal, state, and local customers including state and local  police departments. In addition, we found 32 instances of overlap in  investigative support activities across the eight urban areas reviewed,  with more instances of overlap involving a Regional Information Sharing  Systems center and a fusion center (18 of the 32 instances) compared  with the other three entities. For example in one urban area, the  Regional Information Sharing Systems center and the fusion center both  conducted tactical analysis, target deconfliction, and event deconfliction  within the same mission area for federal, state, and local customers. We  reported that overlap, in some cases, can be desirable. In particular,  overlap across analytical activities and services can be beneficial if it  validates information or allows for competing or complementary analysis.  Nevertheless, overlap can also lead to inefficiencies if, for example, it  burdens law enforcement customers with redundant information.
To promote coordination, we recommended two actions. First, we  recommended that the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, and the Director of ONDCP collaborate to develop a mechanism  that would allow them to hold field-based information-sharing entities  accountable for coordinating and monitor and evaluate the coordination  results achieved. Second, we recommended that the Attorney General,  the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of ONDCP work  together to assess opportunities where practices that enhance  coordination can be further applied. DHS and ONDCP concurred with  both recommendations. DOJ generally concurred with both  recommendations, but asserted that it was already actively promoting  coordination and routinely seeking to identify efficiency gains. For  example, DOJ cited its participation in summits with other agencies,  including DHS, and the colocation of certain field-based entities as  evidence in support of this. While these efforts are positive steps for  sharing information and coordinating, we noted and continue to believe  that they do not fully address the recommendations. We maintain that an  accountability mechanism to ensure coordination could add valuable  context to any existing interagency discussions while encouraging entities  to engage in coordination activities, such as leveraging resources to avoid  unnecessary overlap. Further, our recommendation calls for DOJ, DHS,  and ONDCP to collectively assess opportunities to enhance coordination  through whatever effective means they identify.
Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, and members of the  subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

	Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

For further information about this statement, please contact David C.  Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512- 9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. In addition to the contact named above, the following  individuals also made contributions to this testimony: Joy Booth, Assistant  Director; Sylvia Bascope; Michele Fejfar; Heather May; Lara Miklozek;  Linda Miller; and Janet Temko.
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Summary:
Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2012, DOJ's $27 billion budget funded a broad array of national security, law enforcement, and criminal justice system activities. GAO has examined a number of key programs where DOJ has sole responsibility or works with other departments and recommended actions to improve program efficiency and resource management. This statement summarizes findings and recommendations from recent GAO work in the following five areas: (1) overlap and potential duplication in DOJ grant programs; (2) DOJ's management of undisbursed funds from BVP grant awards whose terms have ended; (3) potential duplication in DOJ and Treasury asset forfeiture programs; (4) DOJ's management of asset forfeiture funds; and (5) overlap among DOJ and other federally funded field-based information sharing entities. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from February 2012 through April 2013, along with selected updates obtained from April 2012 through April 2013. For the selected updates on DOJ's progress in implementing recommendations, GAO analyzed information provided by DOJ officials on taken and planned actions.

What GAO Found

In July 2012, GAO reported that the Department of Justice's (DOJ) more than 200 grant programs overlapped across 10 key justice areas, and that this overlap contributed to the risk of unnecessarily duplicative grant awards for the same or similar purposes. GAO has recommended, among other steps, that DOJ conduct an assessment to better understand the extent of grant program overlap and determine if consolidation is possible. DOJ has begun taking related actions, but it is too early to assess their impact.
In February 2012, GAO reported that DOJ's Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) Program--a source of funding for law enforcement ballistic- and stab-resistant body armor--had not taken steps to deobligate about $27 million in unused funds from grant awards whose terms had ended. GAO recommended that DOJ deobligate these funds and, for example, apply the amounts to new awards or reduce requests for future budgets. DOJ officials have since deobligated $2 million and plan to deobligate the rest by the end of April 2013. DOJ officials plan to apply the funds toward fiscal year 2014 BVP grants.
In September 2012, GAO reported that DOJ and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) conducted potentially duplicative asset management activities related to the seizure and forfeiture of assets associated with federal crimes. For example, GAO reported that each agency maintains separate tracking systems for seized and forfeited property. GAO recommended that DOJ and Treasury conduct a study to determine the feasibility of consolidating their asset management activities. In March 2013, DOJ officials reported that DOJ and Treasury had agreed upon an approach to conduct the study and assess potential costs, but that meetings between the departments were still ongoing and the study had not been finalized.
In July 2012, GAO reported that annual revenues from DOJ's Assets Forfeiture Fund exceeded annual expenditures, allowing DOJ to carryover $844 million at the end of fiscal year 2011, in part to reserve funds for the next fiscal year. However, DOJ does not clearly document how it determines the amounts that need to be carried over. GAO recommended that DOJ more clearly document how it determines the carryover amounts. DOJ officials reported that they plan to provide this information, but as of March 2013, had not yet determined how to present the information.
In April 2013, GAO reported on overlap in activities and services across field-based entities operated or supported by DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy that may share terrorism-related information, among other things. GAO identified 91 instances of overlap in some analytical activities, such as disseminating information on similar issue areas, such as terrorism. GAO recommended, in part, that the federal agencies collaborate to hold the entities accountable for coordination and assess where practices that enhance coordination could be applied. DOJ generally agreed with the intent of the recommendations, but stated that DOJ has already taken steps to promote coordination. The steps, however, do not establish an accountability mechanism for monitoring coordination or assessing practices.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made several recommendations to DOJ in prior reports to help improve program efficiency and resource management. DOJ generally concurred with these recommendations and is taking actions to address them.