ai4data/datause-dataset-rechunked huggingface dataset:
New Research. World Bank. (2023b). Welfare in Forcibly Displaced Populations: From Measuring Outcomes to Building Capabilities. Leveraging Harmonized Data to Improve Welfare among Forcibly Displaced Populations and their Hosts: A Technical Brief Series. World Bank. (2023c). Do Legal Restrictions Affect Refugees’ Labor Market and Education Outcomes? Evidence from Harmonized Data World Bank. (2023d). Ethiopia Economic Opportunities Program: Aide Memoire. World Bank Group. 2021. “IDA19 Mid-Term Refugee Policy Review.” Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Zanfrini L., and Giuliani, C. (2023). Look at Me, but Better: The Experience of Young NEET Migrant Women between Vulnerability and Stifled Ambitions. Social Sciences 12, 110. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12020110. Zetter R., and Ruaudel, H. (2016). Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment, Part 1. World Bank Global Program on Forced Displacement (GPFD) and the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) Thematic Working Group on Forced Migration. http://bit.ly/KNOMAD-Zetter-Ruaudel-2016-1 Zhou, Y. Y., Grossman, G., and Ge, S. (2022). Inclusive Refugee Hosting in Uganda Improves Local Development and Prevents Public Backlash. References ANNEXES Annexes 83 E thiopia hosts refugees from some 24 countries. By far the largest groups are refugees from South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea. Each of these groups is described below, including
It will also be useful to compare the main labor market outcomes (employment, informality, temporality, work hours, earnings and hourly wages) between Venezuelan migrants and Ecuadoran workers with the same (nominal) education levels. This com- parison also allows us to examine whether the outcomes of highly educated Venezuelans are relatively better or worse than the outcomes for the less educated ones. 13 Table 4 reports this information. As before, we restrict the sample to the working- age population (age 15-70). The ﬁrst column summarizes the values for Ecuadoran natives, column 2 reports the data for the Venezuelan migrants, and column 3 presents the ratio of the value in column 2 relative to column 1. Several points are worth noting. As noted earlier, Venezuelan workers are much less likely to have low education levels (26 percentage points) and much more likely to have a college degree (25 percentage points) than the average native. In terms of employment rates, we observe that among 13 We have not succeeded in obtaining a systematic comparison of the quality of education in Venezuela and Ecuador. The best assessment is based on an analysis by Juan Maragall (Inter-American Development Bank) based on a 2009 PISA study conducted in the state of Miranda in Venezuela. The data show that students in Venezuela have lower reading and math levels than the average for Latin America. More speciﬁcally, the gap is estimated to be 13 percentage points for public schools and 6 percentage points for private schools. Given that Ecuador ’ s scores are in line with the average for Latin America, these data suggest that the quality of the Venezuelan education system is somewhat below the Ecuadoran counterpart. However, we also note that many Venezuelan migrants were schooled prior to the recent deterioration of educational institutions in Venezuela and that migrants are typically pos- itively selected in regards to their origin populations. As a result, it seems reasonable to assume that the educational credentials of Venezuelans are comparable to those of Ecuadoran workers. 8
educational institutions in Venezuela and that migrants are typically pos- itively selected in regards to their origin populations. As a result, it seems reasonable to assume that the educational credentials of Venezuelans are comparable to those of Ecuadoran workers. 8
7 Figure 1: Map of regions in Ethiopia, location of refugee camps, and refugee source countries. Source: Database of the Global Administrative Areas (GADM) (https: / / gadm. org / data. html, accessed on November 20th, 2020) In Ethiopia, the Refugees and Returnees Services (RRS, former Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA)) is responsible for managing refugee camps and its oversight by making sure that the commitment of the federal government is met (Nigusie and Carver 2019). Except for Eritrean refugees, most of whom are eligible for out of camp policy, arriving refugees, at the time the data was collected, were allocated to one of the 26 refugee camps spanning the five refugee hosting regions. Refugees living outside of camps represent about 10 percent of the refugees in Ethiopia (Abebe et al. 2018). The allocation tends to be based on shared identity between the refugee and the host communities and the distance of the refugee camps from the border of the source country. The South Sudanese refugees are hosted in the refugee settlements in Gambella, except the few who were relocated to the refugee camps in Benishangul-Gumuz region. Most of these refugees arrived during the civil conflict in South Sudan in 2013 (Nigusie and Carver 2019).
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe ’ s (UNECE) guidelines include a question on reason for migration, population with a refugee-like background and IDPs as non-core topics / questions (UNHCR 2016). 72 While most countries include questions on country of birth and citizenship, only about 40 percent include a question on year of migration, less than a quarter include a question on reason for international migration, and about a fifth include a question on the reason for internal migration (UNHCR 2016). 73 E. g. Kyrgyz Republic 1999 (refugee status), West Bank and Gaza 2007 (refugee status), Zambia 2000 and 2010 (purpose of stay), Germany 1970 (federal refugee identity card), Greece 2001 (reason for settling in Greece), Sudan and South Sudan 2008 (type of household including IDP and refugee), Liberia 1990 (ever displaced by war since 1990), Uganda 2014 (refugees). 74 UNHCR is collaborating with the Statistics Norway on systematically embedding forcibly displaced peoples in national statistics exercises and collaborates with national authorities and with UNFPA in various countries on the design of census exercises that include refugees, IDPs, returnees and stateless persons. 75 LSMS is a household survey program housed in the Bank's Development Research Group that provides technical assistance to national statistical offices in the design and implementation of multi-topic household surveys covering household behavior, welfare and interactions with government policies. All data gathered through the LSMS is published online in the Bank ’ s Central Microdata Catalog.
As can be seen from both panel A and panel B, non-violent conflicts seem to occur slightly more than violent conflicts. On average, the likelihood of violent conflict stands at about 48 %, while this figure increases to 52 % in refugee-hosting areas. Conflicts among more structured and large groups, as captured by the UCDP data, appear to be less frequent. UNHCR refugee data. To exploit the variation in ethnic diversity induced by the annual variation in refugees (and also to control for the direct effect of refugees on our outcomes), we use data on refugee camps provided by the UNHCR. The dataset contains detailed time-series information on the locations and sizes of 1, 453 refugee camps across the world and 821 refugee camps in Sub-Saharan Africa over the 2000 – 2016 period. To the best of our knowledge, the UNHCR currently provides the most comprehensive information available on refugees at the subnational level, allowing us to assess the ethnic composition of camps, which is key to our research question. First, we use the country of origin of refugees recorded for each year at the camp level to approximate the ethnic composition each camp. Second, we restrict the data on refugees to those aged 18 and above in order to make it comparable to the Afrobarometer- based individual data. Third, we only use data on refugees hosted within the boundaries of the host country. Merging data on refugee camps with the Afrobarometer, we end up with information on 172 camps 12
Produced by the Research Support Team Abstract The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Policy Research Working Paper 10100 This paper explores the impact of refugee return on social cohesion using data from Burundi, a country that expe­rienced high levels of repatriation during the 2000s. It uses a nationwide survey conducted in 2015 and relies on geographic features of the communities for identification purposes. The results suggest varying impacts of refugee return on different aspects of social cohesion. The stronger effects, suggest that refugee return has a negative impact on the feeling that community members help each other, could borrow money for emergencies from non-household members and feeling that the community is peaceful.
Responding to the evolving situation, in line with the Return SOP endorsed by the
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in February 2012, but also in accordance with the
“Return Policy Framework for IDP from FATA” endorsed by the FATA authorities in 2010, the
Protection Cluster agreed to conduct a series of consultations with the Shalozan Tangi
population to capture their intentions and position vis-à-vis the return process.

**II.** **Methodology**

After the crosscheck of UNHCR data on Shalozan Tangi IDPs, 359 records were found. Out of
those, telephone numbers were available for 171 families. The return intention survey was
conducted through IVAP call centre (enumerators trained by protection cluster on 20 May
2014 on the return intention survey form) and 137 of IDPs responded to the calls. The
quantitative data collection was facilitated by the use of Personal Data Assistants (PDAs)
programmed with ODK system software. The RIS was conducted by 6 enumerators who
contacted displaced families from a call centre using the contact information available
through the IVAP records. This strategy was chosen due to limited time constraint before
the start of returns.
However, permit-holding status is neither sufficient for, nor necessary to, working in Israel. As of 2019Q4, just under a fifth of West Bank residents had the right to work in Israel and the occupied territories, but almost a quarter among them were not commuting across the border for work. The vast majority of such individuals are holders of Israeli or Jerusalem IDs. Conversely, among those who do commute to Israel and occupied territories, 17 % do not hold valid permits or IDs. Likewise, permit-holding status does not logically affect the formality status of the commuter. The frequent border crossings between the West 2This is derived from authors ’ own calculations using the 2016 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey. 3It is worth noting that the LFS is representative of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, whose work may not lie in the country. 6
Data on municipal level requests and approvals for disaster declarations were constructed from

the archives of Mexico's official diary. Data on municipal level Fonden expenditures, and

level. Specifically, we calculate by municipality, from the 2005 population conteo and the 2010 population census, the number of dwellings with the following characteristics: dwelling has non

12The source of state level GDP data is INEGI. GDP is measured in constant 2008 pesos.

UNDP estimates of municipal GDP per capita in 2000 by municipal population. Third, we
In principle, the positive attitudes among many hosts towards refugees, the high degree of cultural similarity between groups, and the willingness of refugees to be engaged in their community are all promising signs for social integration. Yet, even in the Somali domain, where cultural similarity and host attitudes are greatest, more than two-thirds of refugees do not have an Ethiopian friend, and more than half do not find social interactions with hosts easy. Better employment outcomes for refugees with Ethiopian friends indicate the benefits of facilitating social integration for refugee livelihoods and economic integration. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Age Under 30 Age 30-44 Age 45-64 Age Over 64 Female Male Discrimination/harassment in past year Victim of crime in past 2 weeks Figure 7.20: Discrimination and harassment by demographic group Source: World Bank Staff based on SESRE 2023. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Eritrean Somali South Sudanese Addis Ababa All Refugees Discrimination/harassment in past year Victim of crime in past 2 weeks Figure 7.19: Discrimination and harassment Source: World Bank Staff based on SESRE 2023. 72 A ddressing the challenges refugees face in Ethiopia requires a concerted effort to promote their self-reliance, economic integration, and
It also increases women ’ s household decision making autonomy but decreases women ’ s ability to decide how their earnings are deployed. The results imply that to be successful, pro­grams to mitigate these adverse effects of conflict on women need to be context specific and rely on data-driven evidence from situations of conflict whenever possible. Policy makers are called to design programs that address harmful gender norms and intimate partner violence at the individual / household and community levels, especially for women residing in areas with high-intensity conflict. Measurement of women ’ s empowerment should consistently include sev­eral domains of women ’ s lives to gauge progress in voice and agency, financial autonomy, and violence reduction. This paper is a product of the Gender Global Theme. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http: / / www. worldbank. org / prwp. The authors may be contacted at uekhator @ worldbank. org, jkelly @ hsph. harvard. edu, Amalia. h. rubin @ gmail. com, and darango @ worldbank. org.
The notion that volunteering may affect positively youth ’ s sense of social cohesion has gained policy relevance since the publication of the World Development Report 2013: On Jobs, which stresses that in countries affected by conflict situations, creating the types of productive opportunities that strengthen social cohesion can help reduce the volatility of economic growth and achieve international development goals by defusing tensions and building trust among the different communities involved. This paper provides novel empirical evidence on the impact of volunteering on enhancing social cohesion values in Lebanon, a country with a fragile and highly complex political, religious and social landscape, as well as high degrees of social and economic exclusion among its young population. To our knowledge, this is the first impact evaluation that rigorously addresses this research question in Lebanon and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The main results show that youth who were selected to participate in a volunteering program that consisted of 80 hours of inter-community volunteering activities and 20 hours of soft skills training were more likely to report higher and improved values of social cohesion in the short term. In specific, they were more likely to report higher tolerance values as well as a stronger sense of belonging to
For a detailed definition see section 4 Household size Number of people included in the case records of each PA in Individual ProGress dataset Wage Income 1 if the household receives income from employment and / or daily or irregular work Income from remittances 1 if the household receives income from remittances Income per capita Raw sum of household income from all sources; work, pension, assets in Syria transfers, donations, other organizations'humanitarian aid, and other divided by household size Male Adults Number of males above 18 (inclusive) in the household Marital Status Categorical variable. The classification includes married PAs with spouse in the household, married PAs without spouse in the household, widowed, single or engaged, and divorced or separated. Proportion of female Number of female divided by the household size Location Categorical variable for 11 Governorates / cities. Ajloun City, Aqaba, Balqa, Irbid Jerash, Karak, Maan, Madaba, Mafraq, Tafilah, Zarqa. In Camp 1 if the household is located in a refugee camp Poverty before UNHCR and WFP assistance 1 if household expenditure before UNHCR plus WFP assistance is below the poverty line (JD50) Poverty before UNHCR assistance 1 if household expenditure after WFP assistance but before UNHCR assistanc is below the poverty line (JD50) Source: Authors ’ elaboration.
The Refugees and Host Communities Household Survey expanded the national Household Consumption and Informal Sector Survey to include a representative sample of refugees and host communities, including Sudanese and host communities located in the east of the country. The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short discussion of the literature on the economic participation of refugees. Section 3 compares the characteristics of newly arrived refugees from Sudan with previous arrivals for whom survey data is available, to find that both groups are highly comparable. Section 4 uses the existing data to explore how the basic needs refugees are covered from own-income. Sections 5 and 6 dig deeper by exploring econometrically the correlates of higher incomes of refugees. A discussion of the results and their policy implications follows in section 7, after which section 8 concludes. 2. Benefits of economic participation of refugees Whether or not the arrival of Sudanese refugees in Chad contributes to economic growth is of limited immediate relevance as concerns about the safety of fellow humans drive the response. Nor does any decision maker suggest that hosting refugees is a development strategy Chad should pursue.
In most other cases, sexual and gender-based violence is a crime of opportunity that is often committed by relatives rather than strangers (Wood 2009, 2006). A study of sexual violence in a pediatric ward in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, showed the predominance of domestic sexual violence over militarized rape. Of 500 pediatric cases treated for sexual violence at the hospital (2006 – 2008), nearly all were females between the ages of 10 and 18 (Kalisya and others 2011). Also in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the results of a population-based household survey with a randomly assigned module on sexual violence (a subsample of 3, 436 women) yielded a very high prevalence of rape — an estimate of more than 400, 000 women were raped in the 12 months prior to the 2007 survey — and showed that the most pervasive form of sexual violence was from intimate partners and that the most conflict-affected provinces were at higher risk of sexual violence (Peterman, Palermo, and Bredenkamp 2011). A population-based random cluster survey of adults in Liberia (conducted in 2008) is one of the few quantitative studies on the legacy of sexual violence in conflict situations. The study showed
The household head interviews also provided an opportunity to gather useful household-level information (including assets, housing characteristics, and household head characteristics) to be used as control variables in our analysis. The baseline survey was conducted before participants were informed of the outcome of the randomization, and the midline survey was conducted one year after the baseline survey, one month after completion of the first round of training and before the start of the second round. The results in this paper are based on a panel data set that includes data from the baseline and midline surveys as well as administrative and monitoring data from the program implementation team. Note that although the midline data collection occurred just one month after the completion of the intervention, the intervention itself includes 6 months of post-training follow-up; hence the midline survey captures outcomes of the first cohort 7 months after they exited the classroom-based training. This timing was necessary to prevent too long of a delay between cohorts; the second cohort of trainees started immediately after the midline survey was completed. Future analysis using endline data will examine the trends in outcomes of both groups after Round 1 completion, but will not involve comparison against a pure control group of non-participants. 3. 2. Sample and attrition Following the communications and outreach campaigns in each of the nine target communities, during which 2, 106 young women were originally recruited to be a part of the EPAG program, 8 a randomized 8 The original recruitment effort fell short of the target of enrolling 2500 participants. Hence, before the second round of training, another recruitment effort was launched and an additional 617 girls were enrolled. These girls are not included in the impact evaluation since they were not subject to the initial random assignment. 7
In the absence of objective measures of these factors at the commune level, we leverage the Afrobarometer [15] surveys to investigate at the individual level the effect of the proximity to gold-mining activities on perceptions of governance and quality of public services.

We use the 2005, 2012, and 2014 rounds of the nationally representative Afrobarometer survey in
Mali. We focus on variables of political responsiveness, corruption, and quality of public services
that are similar across the three rounds. Geocoded enumeration areas are combined with location
of industrial mine sites to construct our treatment variable, which is the cumulative gold production
within 20 kilometers of the mine at the time of the survey. This assumes that both distance to mines
and intensity of production matter for the effect. We then estimate the following logistic regression
of the form:

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**Figure 17 Locations of Afrobarometer enumeration areas**
We find no evidence that Pashtun households are more likely to send their children to Madrassas compared to the rest of the sample, suggesting that geopolitical factors and geographical proximity to Afghanistan matter more than cultural preferences. 16 Similarly there is no evidence for religiosity or household preference-based models of madrassa enrollment. The radical religiosity argument suggests that children are more likely to be sent to madrassas when the family favors a radical brand of Islam. If true, what are we to make of the fact that more than 75 percent of all households with a child in a madrassa also send a child to a public or private school? In a multivariate context we checked whether households identified as “ radically Islamic ” were more likely to send their child to a madrassa. 17 Again, we found no 16 The data from the LEAPS census asked about ethnic and caste identity, and households that classified themselves as “ Pathan ” or “ Afghani ” were used to represent Pashtun households. In line with the usual residential patterns of individuals with Pashtun backgrounds, most of these households are in district Attock in the North of Punjab. 17 In a largely Islamic country it is difficult to find good measures of religiosity.