ai4data/datause-dataset-rechunked huggingface dataset:
_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and
district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Results for women’s partners also available upon request. OLS = ordinary least
squares. The women and men samples have different sampling frames and therefore we are not analyzing these
results jointly.

Two further caveats should be noted: (i) with many variables tested, such evidence should not

be given too much weight, (ii) number of sampled men in the treatment category is quite small.

Out of 7,157 sampled med, only 484 men live close to active mines. A bigger treated sample

would provide more reliable results. [10]

**5.2 Child health**

We explore effects on child health, such as size at birth, infant mortality, anthropometrics, and

incidence of cough, diarrhea, and fever. Panel A and Panel B use different variable definitions

---
[10] Results for sampled women’s partners are similar.
those people fell outside the definitions of population used by Statistics Poland (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, GUS, Poland’s statistical office). The National Bank of Poland estimated that between 2014 and 2018, there were approximately one to two million Ukrainian workers in Poland at a time (Strzelecki, Growiec and Wyszyński, 2022). According to the 2021 Polish National Census, one year before the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine there were about one million Ukrainian citizens residing in Poland, almost all of them on a temporary basis.

After the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland experienced a massive influx of refugees – with more than 27 million border crossings from Ukraine and more than 1.9 million applications for protection submitted by April 7, 2025 [1] . Not all of those people stayed in Poland. Many of them later returned to Ukraine or moved to other countries. By February 14, 2025, PESEL UKR [2] holders who remained in Poland stood at less than 1 million, while the border movement balance between Poland and Ukraine was slightly below 2 million.

---
[1] UNHCR data, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine
[2] PESEL UKR is a version of Polish national ID number for Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict in the territory of that country.
The escalatation of war 2022 in Ukraine caused a large inflow of refugees into Poland. While some refugees from Ukraine have since returned to Ukraine or gone further to Germany or other countries, in October 2023 close to 957 thousand remained in Poland (identified by active PESEL UKR numbers). They consist primarily of children and working aged women. Despite the forced nature of displacement, war trauma, and caregiving responsibilities, refugees from Ukraine very quickly entered the labour market as employees and entrepreneurs. The precise number of refugees from Ukraine working in Poland remains uncertain, with our estimates ranging from 225 to 350 thousand. The lower bound is the number of social security registrations and understates the actual figure, as some jobs may not require social contributions or remain in the informal sector. The higher bound is the product of employment rates from surveys of refugees from Ukraine, and their working age population from the active PESEL UKR database. By JulyAugust 2023 Ukrainian refugee households supported themselves, with 80% of their incomes coming from work. [49]

---
[49] Deloitte calculations based on Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data provided by UNHCR.
**Figure 1 Ghana’s annual gold production and world price of gold**

Ghana is the second-largest gold producer in Africa after South Africa, with gold production

averaging 77 tons per year (Gajigo, Mutambatsere, and Mdiaya 2012). In 2011, Ghana’s

mineral sector accounted for about 14 percent of total tax revenues and 5.5 percent of the gross

domestic product (GDP) (Bermúdez-Lugo 2011), as well as 44 percent of Ghanian exports

(Gajigo, Mutambatsere, and Mdiaya 2012). This makes the gold mining industry one of the

country’s most important industries, and an essential industry to study.

Similar to gold mining in other African countries (see Gajigo, Mutambatsere, and Mdiaya
In conclusion, the protection incidents evidenced in the analysis partially overview the situation in both countries
where the data were collected. The number of protection incidents and victims is higher than what is represented
in this report for September 2022. In DRC, the new protection monitoring platform still needs to be fully deployed
countrywide, and efforts are underway to have data that will reflect the real situation. In Mozambique, the data
reported in this report concerns only one province, Cabo Delgado, where the protection monitoring is implemented.
Efforts are also underway to have functioning protection monitoring in the rest of the affected provinces.
REGIONAL BUREAU FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

###### **POPULATION OF CONCERN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION**

30 September 2022

**PoCs IN SOUTHERN** **AFRICA REGION***

**521,512** **REF**

**41,283** **REF**

**13,762** **ASY**

**1,291** **ASY**

**5,526,022** **IDP**

**REF**

**ASY**

**OOC**

**RET**

**KEY FIGURES**

## **8,572,919**

Total Population of concern

###### **1,099,585**

Refugees, asylum-seekers, other
of concern & returnees**

**785,119**

**278,090**

**36,165**

**211**

###### **7,473,334**

Conflict induced and Natural Disaster IDPs

Natural Disaster IDPs

**528,466**

**7%**

**6,419,356**

**86%**

IDPs RET

**525,512**

**7.0%**

do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

**Author: UNHCR DIMA - RSA** Contact : rsarbdima@unhcr.org **Source:** UNHCR Primes, Government, IOM, OCHA, UNHCR

**Author: UNHCR DIMA - RSA** Contact : rsarbdima@unhcr.org **Source: REF, ASY, OOC, RET** (UNHCR PRIMES, Government); **IDP DRC** (OCHA); IDP Zimbabwe & Mozambique (IOM); **IDP ROC** (Government, Ministry of Social Affairs and Humanitarian Action (MASAH).

*PoCs
RET** (UNHCR PRIMES, Government); **IDP DRC** (OCHA); IDP Zimbabwe & Mozambique (IOM); **IDP ROC** (Government, Ministry of Social Affairs and Humanitarian Action (MASAH).

*PoCs = Persons of Concern   ** REF = Refugee; ASY = Asylum-seeker; OOC = Other person of concern; RET = Returnee. DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo  ROC = Republic of the Congo Date of creation : 30 September
2022

For more information visit: UNHCR Data Portal
### **OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHT**

##### **September/ October 2023 report**

###### Venezuela

**Some key achievements**

- Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO)

Process

- Coordination with other platforms,

subnational Clusters, ICCG, and Partners

- Accountability for Affected Populations

(AAP) WG

- GPC Townhall

- La Carnada Play

- Annual TiP Bulletin 2022-2023

- Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) and

Trafficking in Persons (TiP)

- Monthly Meetings of the WGTiP

- Protection Mainstreaming Training

- Training on Mixed Migration and Durable

Solutions

- Reporting Transition to 345W

- Focal Group Discussions with LGBTIQ+

Organizations for Thematic Protection

Analysis Update (PAU)

- Mental Health and Psychosocial Support

(MHPSS) Coaching and Training of Trainers

(ToT)

- Participation in the Gender ToT for

Government Officials

**4**

**I. Humanitarian Program Cycle**

**2024: Humanitarian Needs**

**Overview (HNO) Process**

**September was dedicated to identi-**

**fying and define indicators and the**

**local adjustment of severity scales**

**for People in Need (PIN) and Needs**

**Severity Calculation as part of the**

**Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO)**

**process.** The indicators defined for the

Protection Cluster (PC) Severity and PIN

calculation are Protection Risks, Protec
tion Risks linked to trafficking in person,

Access to Documentation, Access to

the Justice System, Negative Coping

Mechanisms in Protection, Violent
**than native workers.** There may be different reasons for this
as perhaps immigrants have character traits that make them more inclined towards entrepreneurial activity (unclear in the case of refugees), or maybe it is a way to avoid occupational downgrading as immigrants find it difficult to prove their educational and professional credentials from home countries.
Notwithstanding the reason, such effects are observed across the OECD countries (OECD, 2011). In a recent paper, Anelli, Basso, Ippedico, and Peri (2023) look at Italian data, finding that one standard deviation increase in emigration rate generates 4.8% decline of business formation in the municipality of origin.
The authors use existing migration networks to ensure causality of the results. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether immigrantcreated businesses are more successful from the native ones, but one could speculate that a higher rate of trying new business ideas spurs more successes.
Outcomes were relatively consistent across types of support. Those who accessed only formal support (e.g., psychotherapy or structured group interventions) reported improvement in 88% of cases (with 34% stating “yes” and 54% reporting “slight” improvement). Individuals relying on only informal support (e.g., help from friends, family, or employers) reported improvement in 91% of cases, with slightly fewer reporting “yes” (29%) and a higher percentage indicating “slight” improvement (62%). Meanwhile, those who accessed both formal and informal support were slightly more likely to state “yes” regarding improvement (40%), with 51% indicating “slight” improvement (for a total of 91% of cases reporting some improvement). Although differences are small, results imply that a combination of support types may be associated with enhanced perceived effectiveness. Further research is needed to explore this potential relationship.

These findings demonstrate that, overall, those who accessed support perceived this support to be beneficial. Results reinforce the importance of integrating both formal and informal support mechanisms to maximize positive outcomes, as well as tailoring interventions to demographic and country-specific needs to enhance the well-being of individuals receiving MHPSS services. The data also

**23**
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HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

**Republic of Moldova: the case for housing costs corrections in income-based poverty metrics**

Data from the Republic of Moldova highlights the limitations of poverty metrics that rely solely on disposable income, as they fail to account for vulnerability related to asset ownership. Based on income alone, the 2024 poverty rate suggests that Ukrainian refugees are able to attain a higher standard of living than their hosts, with only 10% living in poverty compared to 32% of Moldovans. This apparent disparity is largely driven by the sizeable financial support that Ukrainians received from humanitarian organizations in 2024, which amounted to 44% of their total household income. While the above comparison could suggest that the provided aid is excessive, such an interpretation overlooks an important factor – namely that only 5% of Moldovans incur rental expenses compare to 41% of refugees. In fact, including utilities, housing costs were estimated to consume 46% of refugees’ disposable income (inclusive of humanitarian aid), whereas they account for just 14% for Moldovan households. In essence, these findings indicate that refugees are using the entirety of their aid to cover accommodation needs. Adjusting disposable income at the household level to reflect these additional housing expenses raises the poverty rate for refugees to 43%, surpassing that of Moldovans.
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

#### **2.2 Current occupational situation**

Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Administrative ZUS data can be used as a proxy for both average and _gross_ earnings percentages. On June 30, 2024, average bases for social contributions of Ukrainian refugees accounted for just 64% of those of Polish citizens. However, this is only relative to Polish citizens not all workers in the economy as a whole, and comes with other caveats of administrative instead of survey data sources – data given on a particular day instead of period average, the shadow economy unaccounted for, different contributions based on the type of contract, no data for farmers who belong to a separate social insurance scheme.
Also, the ZUS data, that is available, is much more limited that the SEIS survey data primarily used in this report.

**Ukrainian refugees in Poland have**

**clearly improved their economic**
**age.** The best population data available
is the regularly updated active PESEL database. [4] According to the registry, 61.5% of the registered are women and 38.5% are men. The database also includes the age of PESEL UKR holders, which indicates that over half (57.4%), i.e. more than 560 thousand people, are of working age (18-65). While the male and female shares of people below 18 years of age (20% and 19%, respectively) and 66+ (1% and 3%) are similar, there is a large difference among productive-age individuals, with women 18-65 making up 40% and men only 18% of Ukrainian refugee population. This is largely due to the conscription of military aged men in Ukraine.

66+ 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 18-25 <18

---
[4] Available in the repository maintained by the government https://dane.gov.pl/pl/dataset/2715 as well as UNHCR data portal https://app.powerbi.com/
HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

**HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY SOURCE AND POVERTY CATEGORY**

Employment Family support Social protection (host country) Old age pension (Ukraine) 12% 67% Social protection (Ukraine) 35% Humanitarian cash 8% 13% 23% 6% Other 5% 3% 3% 5% Below the poverty line Below the poverty line after housing cost correction Above the poverty line after housing cost correction Source: Survey data, SAG estimates 26% 88%

**Higher employment earnings were the main driver behind the drop in poverty rates from**

**2023**

The mean monthly equivalized household income [12] of Ukrainian refugees across the seven countries surveyed in both rounds increased by 38% from last year, to an equivalent of EUR 763. This increase was much higher than the 4% rise in the regional poverty threshold over the same time.

Approximately 90% of the increase in refugee household income can be attributed to higher employment earnings, driven by a combination of rising employment rates and wage growth. A significantly smaller, though still notable, contribution came from increased financial support from families in Ukraine, although this finding may partially be an artifact of adjustments to the survey questionnaire [13] .
_UNHCR   Discussion   Paper   –15   June   2013_

engagement   of   key   partners,   including   relevant   development   actors   and   the   private
sector   since   the   early   stage   will   be   a   crucial   component   of   UNHCR’s   strategy.

Current   co-­‐ordination   fora   include   the   South-­‐East   Consultation   Platform,   led   by   UNHCR,
consisting   of   UN,   NGO,   donors,   Government   and   other   partners,   including   the   Myanmar
Peace   Centre   (MPC) [9] .   This   currently   meets   every   2-­‐3   months   in   Yangon.   The   objective   of
the   Platform   is   to   maintain   a   common   understanding   of   the   operational   environment
and   challenges   in   the   South-­‐East   and   to   forge   strategic   partnerships.   UNHCR   also   chairs
the   National   Protection   Working   Group.

Monthly   inter-­‐agency   co-­‐ordination   meetings,   chaired   by   UNHCR   and   attended   by
humanitarian   partners,   are   currently   held   in   Mawlamyine   (Mon   State),   Taungoo   (Bago
Region),   and   Myeik   and   Dawei   (Tanintharyi   Region).   Inter-­‐agency   meetings   also   take
place   in   Loikaw   (Kayah   State),   chaired   on   a   rotational   basis   amongst   agencies.

In   January   2013,   UNHCR   also   initiated   cross-­‐border   meetings   between   UNHCR
Myanmar   and   UNHCR   Thailand.

---
[9] The   Myanmar   Government   draft   Framework   for   Economic   and   Social   Reform   2012-­‐2015   tasks   the
**WEIGHTED AVERAGE MONTHLY EQUIVALIZED INCOME EVOLUTION, EUR**

800 600 400 200 0 Equivalized income 2023 Employment Family Host country income support social protection Ukraine social protection (inc.
pensions) Humanitarian Other Equivalized cash income 2024 Note: Only includes data from the 7 countries surveyed in both rounds (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) Source: Survey data, SAG estimates 12. Household disposable income adjusted for size, as per Eurostat’s methodology 13. The 2024 survey probed for income from family in Ukraine more explicitly

**9**
The established mechanisms in refugee camps and in N’Djamena to ensure substantial refugee participation
at local levels remain functional. This includes elected committees representing refugees, along with separate
committees for men, women and children/young individuals. Sectoral committees such as those for livelihoods,
child protection, education and healthcare are also still active. Additionally, inclusive and mixed committees
of leaders or sectoral representatives in refugee hosting villages continue to facilitate interaction between
members of both communities, addressing both general and specific issues. During the COVID-19 pandemic,
when physical access to refugees became difficult due to government restrictions, alternative communication
methods (e.g. posters, banners, radio announcements, phone calls and SMS), and mobile protection teams,
were utilized by CNARR to stay in touch with refugee communities.

**2.4** **Access to civil registration and documentation**
Similarly to the above results, an early analysis by Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023) found no impact on the employment rate or unemployment rate. In a peerreviewed scientific article, they examined the impact of Ukrainian refugees on the labour market outcomes of Polish women from January to April 2022 (as most Ukrainian refugees are female). They found that the proportion of Ukrainian refugees in a given poviat had no statistically significant impact on the employment rate or unemployment rate of Polish women.

Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Chart 29. Effect of a 1 pp. change in employment share of Ukrainian refugees on gross wage change**
Cross-section model of all 380 poviats in 2023. Results are statistically significant at a 0.01 level.

200 150 100 50 0 OLS IV (pupils) IV (2019) IV (both)
because of the nature of the data. Panel A uses three variables that reflect conditions around the

year of birth of the child. Note that women report their birth history, in what year the child was

born, and the baby’s health. She reports this information in the survey year, but retroactively,

recollecting the year of birth. Therefore, we deem that the birth year mining activity is more

relevant than the survey year mining activity for the outcomes in Panel A. In particular, we test

if an active mine nearby in the birth year of the child influences the baby’s size at birth, infant

mortality, and the number of antenatal visits. In Panel B we use the main specification of mining

activity in the survey year, as these variables are more reflective of current conditions in the

survey year than past conditions around the time of the birth.

Panel A of table 5 shows that infants in active mine communities are less likely to be born large,

and that the mother had insignificantly fewer prenatal visits. However, infant mortality

decreases by 4 percentage points. Splitting the sample by gender, we note that this decrease is
# Abstract

The beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in a large outflow of refugees, reaching more than 6 million globally.

Much of this exodus happened through the Polish border. As of October 2023, almost 1 million Ukrainian refugees were living in Poland. While in the past decade Poland experienced large labour migration from Ukraine, the refugee inflow had a different demographic composition.
It primarily included working age women (41%) and children (40%). These refugees from Ukraine did not plan to move, and many had special needs. Despite these difficulties, refugees began entering the labour market surprisingly quickly – attaining an employment rate of 28% in May 2022 and 65% in November 2022 (NBP, 2023). By July-August 2023 Ukrainian refugee households supported themselves, with 80% of their incomes coming from work. [1]

---
[1] Deloitte calculations based on Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data provided by UNHCR.
Power BI Desktop Somalia’s Solutions Pathways The Department of Poverty Reduction and Durable Solutions of the Ministry of Planning, Investments, and Economic Development (MoPIED) in Somalia continues to play a leading role in overseeing and addressing solutions to internal displacement in the country.
In 2024, the department conducted a series of durable solutions pathways consultations across all federal member states and the Banadir Regional Administration (BRA), resulting in the National Solutions Pathways Action Plan. These consultations aimed to identify key approaches to facilitate the durable solutions pathways of one million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from their displacement situations, in alignment with the National Durable Solutions Strategy, the National Development Plan and the United Nations Secretary-General’s Action Agenda on Internal Displacement, emphasising three interconnected goals: achieving durable solutions, ensuring protection and assistance, and preventing future displacement.
Baseline Analysis This document presents key quantitative data under each of the six Solutions Pathways: 1) Government leadership, 2) Access to Basic Services, 3) Employment and Livelihood Opportunities, 4) Legal Documentation, HLP and Access to Justice, 5) Climate Change and Resilience. Pathway 6 refers to Data for Solutions, which is cross-cutting and covers MoPIED's Durable Solutions Progress (DSP) Survey, was supported by IOM Somalia in 2024. Data from this survey is presented under each of the six pathways in this document. Data collected by UNHCR related to protection and conflict sensitivity is also presented, highlighting key cross-cutting issues to consider in implementing the plan.