ai4data/datause-dataset-rechunked huggingface dataset:
The paper contributes to the growing literature on the local effects of mining. Much of the

academic interest in natural resources is focused on country-wide effects, and this research

discusses whether the discovery of natural resources is a blessing or a curse to the national

economy. Natural resource dependence at the national level has been linked to worsening

economic and political outcomes, such as weaker institutions, and more corruption and conflict

(see Frankel 2012 and van der Ploeg 2011 for an overview). While all these effects can have

household-level implications, fewer analyses have, thus far, analyzed the geographic dispersion

of such impacts. A recent literature on the local and subnational effects of natural resources

contributes to the understanding of such effects (for example Aragón and Rud 2013, 2015;

Axbard et al., 2016; Benshaul-Tolonen 2018, 2019; Caselli and Michaels 2013; Corno and de

Walque 2012; Fafchamps et al. 2016; Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016; Loyaza et al 2013;

Michaels 2011; von der Goltz and Barnwal 2019; Wilson 2012). A growing number of papers

explore the mining industry, in particular, see Aragón, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015) for an

overview. We contribute to this literature by showing the importance of analyzing local level
to credit, which is critical for expanding small businesses or starting new ventures. These changes underscore the

transformative role of citizenship in enabling the Shona community to overcome previous barriers to economic

participation and build sustainable livelihoods.

**Moreover, citizenship has also led to increased access to training and educational opportunities, while reducing**

**discrimination in the workplace.** Over a third of the Shona noted that they have had more opportunities for training

or education since becoming citizens, helping them to build skills and enhance their employability. Another 30

percent reported experiencing less discrimination at work, which has contributed to more positive employment

outcomes and a more inclusive work environment. Overall, these improvements indicate that legal recognition has

been pivotal in unlocking the economic potential of the Shona community, setting the stage for greater

socioeconomic mobility and long-term development.

- **Box 2: Findings from focus group discussions**

Many of the survey results are consistent with findings from qualitative focus group discussions, including

challenges associated with securing economic opportunities. The Shona community faces challenges predominantly

stemming from low education levels and the absence of formal qualifications to which the lack of nationality and
of intent to employ foreign workers. The results are similar to the OLS estimation; however, when the second instrument is used without the first one, it gives a higher result. Instrumental variables regressions show that in 2023, a 1 percentage point higher employment share of Ukrainian refugees caused a PLN 70 higher wage growth (0.7 pp.) when instrumented by school pupils' share, PLN 132 (1.4 pp.) when instrumented by 2019 Ukrainian workers distribution, and PLN 75 (0.8 pp.) when both instruments were used. That said, the results should be treated with caution, as the instruments used may not be sufficiently exogenous to allow for fully credible causal inference.

The early analysis by Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023), mentioned previously also found a statistically significant effect of Ukrainian refugees on earnings. In their estimation, the share of the Ukrainian refugee population had a small positive and statistically significant relationship with the earnings of Polish women at a 0.1 level.
Their results for foreign women were also positive, albeit smaller and lacking statistical significance.
English for Speakers of Other Languages programme in Massachusetts. The policy targeted all immigrants, including those who had lived in Massachusetts for several years, with data for 2008–2016 and 4,700 individual lottery applicants. Authors found a causal effect, with annual earnings increasing by USD 2,400. These earnings gains generated additional tax revenue that produced a 6% return for taxpayers.
Schmid (2023) studied African refugees who applied for asylum in Switzerland between 2008 and 2017. He exploited the random assignment of refugees to French, German, and Italian cantons, as well as their prior language knowledge (e.g. French speakers placed in French or German speaking cantons). The results showed that language proficiency more than doubled the employment level in the first five years after arrival.

**The econometric model estimated**

**in the SEIS UNHCR survey shows**

**substantial wage gains from Polish**

**language proficiency for Ukrainian**

**refugees.** Deloitte has estimated an
econometric model incorporating individual income determinants of Ukrainian refugees. Our study has
REGIONAL BUREAU FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

**2022 VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION**

As of 30 September 2022

MAP OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION WHERE THE FLOW INVOLVE 5 POCs OR MORE

KEY FIGURES

15,042

Total Individuals
repatrieted since

January 2022

Individuals repatrieted

**within Southern Africa**

**Region** since January

2022

6,786 8,256

Individuals repatrieted

**from Southern Africa**

**Region** to other countries
outside of the region since

January 2022

VOLREP* WHERE THE FLOW INVOLVE 5 POCs OR MORE

TRENDS

MONTHLY REPATRIATION SINCE JANUARY

**3,874**

ANNUAL REPATRIATION SINCE 2019

*VolRep = Voluntary Repatriation  PoCs = Persons of Concern Source : UNHCR PRIMES   Author : DIMA/RBSA    Data sources: UNHCR PRIMES.  For more information or to contribute, please contact UNHCR RBSA DIMA (rsarbdima@unhcr.org)
Ultimately, refugees provide the Polish economy an additional boost both in total product and demand. That allowed for an increase in real GDP. This situation was especially beneficial for public finance.
Although the influx of refugees was costly at the start, the additional revenue they provided was more than enough to compensate for this [48] . The cost for local labour force due to increased competition was in most part mitigated due to a tight labour market.

As such, the increase in unemployment was much lower than increase in employment.
To maximise the positive impact of refugees on economy, policies helping their integration into the labour market that both allow their maximal employment as well minimise market mismatch between demand for specific skills and their abilities are crucial. The second part of this recommendation, achieved either through improvements in utilisation of skills of refugees or trainings giving them abilities demanded by the labour market, is integral as it should lower costs for the local labour force.

---
[48] Model treats general government sector as a whole, as such cost and income internal structure may differ creating institutions with financial loses while
The 2024 SEIS equivalized [8] disposable income data indicates that just over one in five refugees (23%) residing in the region are living in poverty [9] . This figure is almost double that of host country nationals (12%), implying a large gap in economic vulnerability. Compared to 2023, poverty rates have decreased substantially (from 36% [10] ), suggesting an overall improvement in the economic well-being of Ukrainian refugees over time.

**REFUGEE VERSUS HOST POVERTY RATES BY COUNTRY**

Ukrainian refugees (2024) Host country nationals (2023) Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Region Note: Poverty rates for all countries apart from the Republic of Moldova are based on a calculation that follows Eurostat’s at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) methodology with the at-risk-of-poverty threshold set at 50% of the national median disposable income after social transfers. Refugee disposable income has been computed based on survey data. For the Republic of Moldova, the poverty threshold was taken to be the 4Q23 absolute poverty line reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova.

Source: Survey data, [Eurostat,](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat) [National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova, SAG estimates](https://statistica.gov.md/en)
NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE Respondents who faced constrains in accessing care were more likely to identify seeking health care as reason for visiting Ukraine in all countries, with the exception of Latvia.

**REASONS SEEKING HEALTHCARE FOR VISIT TO UKRAINE**

**BY OBTAINED CARE STATUS**

Unable to access health care Able to access health care Hungary Poland Czechia Bulgaria Romania Estonia Slovakia Lithuania Moldova Latvia (N=3,596) Respondents with a chronic illness were more likely to cite accessing health care as reason for visiting compared to those without (33% vs 23%). Among households with a member who has a disability, healthcare access was the primary reason for visiting (38%), compared to 26% for households without a member with disability. There were no immediate gender differences concerning the prevalence of healthcare as a reason for women and men to visit Ukraine.

**16**

### **Access to sexual** **and reproductive** **health services**
Poland is studied in an early paper by Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023), who find no effect on earnings, employment, and unemployment rate of native or other immigrants, except an actual slight positive impact on the wages of native women.
Even in a conservative scenario that assumes negative effects of labour market competition in the form of higher unemployment and slower real wage growth, an increase in the labour force translates into larger personal incomes and higher private consumption, which results in a larger tax revenue. These effects were strengthened by an influx of capital from abroad.

###### In total, the general government revenue increased by 0.8-1.1% in 2022 and 1.05-1.45% in 2023. In monetary terms, this amounts to 10.1-13.7 billion PLN in 2022 and 14.7-19.9 billion PLN in 2023.

If estimates quoted by a government offical of public expenses on refugees of around 15 billion PLN in 2022 and 5 billion in 2023 [13] are accurate, we can conclude that they were more than offset by the additional tax revenue. In the long-term, refugees should increase yearly government revenue by around 0.85-1.3%.
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

## **1.** Ukrainian refugees in Poland

##### The large influx of refugees since February 2022, added to a hefty and growing Ukrainian migrant population in Poland (1.1). Refugees have changed the demographics of the local Ukrainian residents, with most of them being women and children and many households led by women alone (1.2). In the past year, refugee household income sources have become more Poland-based (1.3).

#### **1.1 Influx since February 2022**

Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Chart 1. Poland-Ukraine border movement balance and registered/active PESEL data**

**Prior to the 2022 conflict in Ukraine,**

**the population of Ukrainians in**

**Poland was already significant and**

**on the rise, but the exact number of**
**GDP.** This is the amount that would be
lost, should refugees “disappear” from the Polish economy. It is mainly driven by a higher number of workers in the economy, but also accounts for increased productivity brought about by more specialization. Considering all aspects, the overall impact of the refugees has been predominantly positive, and it moved the Polish economy to a higher growth path.
Refugees contribute to the economy slightly more than their employment share – they increase the labour supply as both workers and entrepreneurs and expand demand as consumers. The rise in productivity due to more specialization across the labour force further boosts the economy. The impact of refugees is lowered by a temporary decrease in the capital-to-labour ratio (companies need time to invest in equipment and machines to match the rise in the number of workers), as well as an increase in competition on the labour market.

**The figures are higher than those in**

**the previous Deloitte (2024) report,**

**which – due to scant data available**

**at the time – did not account for the**
**the most in the last two years.** The
data as of June 30, 2024 shows that 38% of Ukrainian refugees worked in elementary occupations, much more than pre-war Ukrainians (25%), non-Ukrainian foreigners (18%), and Polish citizens (10%).

MSNA Jul-Aug 2023 SEIS May-Jun 2024 MSNA Jul-Aug 2023 SEIS May-Jun 2024 Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on MSNA and SEIS UNHCR surveys conducted in July-August 2023 and May-June 2024.

While the share seems least favourable among Ukrainian refugees, their situation improved the most in the two years since June 30, 2022 (by 10 pp. compared with 9 pp. for the pre-war Ukrainians, 2 pp. for non-Ukrainian foreigners and 1 pp. for Polish citizens). On the other hand, in Q2 2024, managers and specialists, the two highest paid occupational groups, comprised 8% of both Ukrainian refugees and pre-war Ukrainians, 22% of nonUkrainian foreigners (who include many
The standard of living of refugees from Ukraine may be significantly lower than natives, even at similar incomes due to their lack of housing capital. 87% of the population in Poland resided in owneroccupied housing in 2021 and 2022, according to Eurostat. As most refugees from Ukraine do not possess housing of their own in Poland, they need to rent in a relatively tight market, especially when they reside in large metropolitan areas that offer the most opportunities. Initially, in the first month after the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the number of renting offers in the OLX and Otodom portals dropped by approximately 60%, though it later returned to previous levels.
widespread among Shona households, and access to external support was minimal. Although employment levels

began to recover a year later, they remained below pre-pandemic levels, underscoring the prolonged adverse

impact of the pandemic on this already vulnerable community. [[9]]

_Figure 1: Labor force status after the COVID-19 outbreak (18-64 years)_

_Source: Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys (RRPS)_ _[[9]]_

**Two rounds of household surveys taking place over five years before and after the transition of the Shona in**

**Kenya from statelessness to citizenship help us to understand this community – and present one of the first**

**socioeconomic pictures of the impact of citizenship on the welfare of stateless persons.** Between 2019 and 2024,

the median age of Shona household members remained unchanged at 18 years, underscoring a predominantly

youth demographic profile. Gender distribution is even, showing only a marginal change, with the female population

increasing slightly from 49 percent to 50 percent. Average household size has risen modestly from 4.9 to 5.4

members, which may reflect greater household consolidation or socio-economic stability following their

naturalization. The most notable shift is the significant reduction in the proportion of female-headed households,
For productivity two options were tested.
Firstly, neutral impact: no shock to productivity. Secondly, lower productivity of workers from Ukraine negatively impacting total labour productivity. These shocks were calibrated to match the difference in data between refugees income from labour in UNHCR survey and average wage in Poland from Statistics Poland weighted by refugees share in total workforce.

As one period in the model is set to one year and refugees started coming to Poland by the end of February 2022 it was assumed that their impact on economy started being felt starting from II quarter of the year.
As such shocks were set so that 3⁄4 of shocks were calibrated to data from 2022 and 1⁄4 to data for 2023 [56] .

51 Computational General Equilibrium.
52 Global Trade Analysis Project, [GTAP Models: Current GTAP Model (purdue.edu).](https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp) 53 Region combined from: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.
54 All shocks are percent deviations.
55 [Oversight of fnancial market infrastructures (bank.gov.ua)](https://bank.gov.ua/en/payments/oversite)

---
[56] E.g. for total increase in number of workers of 350 thousand around 262.5 thou. was set to have happened in 2022 while rest in 2023.
**macroeconomic benefits.** To illustrate
the macroeconomic impact of public intervention, we have assumed that half of the current language gap is addressed, so that the share of working refugees not speaking Polish fluently falls from 82% to 41%. Assuming that the productivity Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

#### **4.5 Recommendations**

##### Language courses

**Ukrainian refugees in Poland earn higher wages when they**

**have higher language skills.** There is substantial scientific evidence
that language courses improve labour market outcomes of refugees and other migrants. Financing language courses for refugees would generate positive impacts for them and the economy. Courses should be available not just at beginner to intermediate levels, but also for advanced speakers who want to become proficient and gain access to high-skill jobs.

##### Occupational licensing deregulation

**While some occupational licensing rules with regard to**

**Ukrainian citizens were relaxed, further and permanent easing**

**would benefit both the Polish economy and the inclusion of**

**refugees.** The low-hanging-fruit are the restrictions referring to
citizenship only – rather than actual expertise or language skills – which could be scrapped altogether.

##### Active Labour Market Policies

**Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) should focus on**
_UNHCR   Discussion   Paper   –15   June   2013_

- Assistance   is   co-­‐ordinated   and   complies   with   principles   of   neutrality   and
impartiality   as   well   as   humanitarian   standards.      Donor   support   also   converges
with   co-­‐ordination   efforts.

- A   valid   Letter   of   Understanding   (LOU)   between   UNHCR   and   appropriate   line
ministries   will   remain   in   effect   for   the   duration   of   UNHCR’s   activities   and   could
be   amended   as   necessary   should   an   organized   voluntary   repatriation   operation
be   launched.

**10.   PROPOSED   ACTIVITIES**

Recognizing   and   emphasizing   the   need   for   all   durable   solutions   decisions   to   be   designed
and   implemented   with   affected   communities,   and   in   consultation   with   relevant
authorities   and   non-­‐state   actors,   UNHCR   will   ensure   that   displaced   populations   as   well
as   communities   of   origin   and   return   are   equipped   to   participate   fully   in   the   assessment,
design   and   implementation   of   all   interventions   in   support   of   durable   solutions,   using   an
age,   gender   and   diversity   mainstreaming   approach.
instance, report significantly more instances of racism compared to other South American refugees
and migrants. [12] This exacerbates barriers to accessing a broad range of rights and services [13] and
leads to greater vulnerability to both low skilled and temporary jobs, particularly when compared
to Venezuelans who arrived in Brazil under similar circumstances. [14]

##### Protection Risk II

**Access to dignified housing.** In Brazil, a significant proportion of refugees and other forcibly
displaced people can only afford precarious and overcrowded dwellings, located in impoverished
and marginalized communities, often controlled by organized crime. [15] According to UNHCR´s
data, only 15% of refugees have secured tenure right to housing and\or land, 27% live in physically
safe and secure settlements with access to basic facilities, and 54% feel safe walking alone in their
neighborhood after dark. [16] In comparison, 65% of the Brazilian population owns the house in
which they live - although 14% lacks the documentation to prove tenure rights [17] - 72% lives in
physically safe and secure settlements, [18] and 52% feels safe walking alone in their neighborhood
after dark. [19]
Two per cent of surveyed Venezuelan households reported that at least one member had been
deceived, manipulated, coerced into debt, or received false promises intended to force them to
travel or migrate. [34] Additionally, one per cent of households reported at least one of its members
being held against his\her will by someone other than the country´s authorities, which may
suggest the possibility of human trafficking. [35]

Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to exploitation for various purposes of human
trafficking, including sexual exploitation, domestic forced labor, illegal adoption, and organs
removal. [36] Refugee women and girls in Brazil sometimes have to resort to survival sex, or cash-inhand domestic labor to make a living in Brazil, which increases their exposure to human trafficking
networks. [37] In addition to these risks, domestic workers face numerous safety and health hazards
related to their tasks and the environment they work in. These include chemical and ergonomical
hazards, but also psychosocial risks, including violence and harassment, which are pervasive in the
sector. The impact of these risks is amplified when domestic workers provide their services in the
informal economy, which is the case for most refugees and other forcibly displaced populations in
Brazil. [38]
The refugee inflow had a different demographic composition than the pre2022 economic migration. It primarily included working age women (41%) and children (40%). [5] Refugees from Ukraine did not plan to move, and many had special needs. In October 2023, nearly half of all refugee households included a person with a chronic illness, and some 10% included one with a Washington Group level 3 disability. Over a third included a single parent and a fifth an elderly person. [6] Despite these difficulties, refugees began entering the labour market surprisingly quickly – attaining an employment rate of 28% in May 2022 and 65% in November 2022 among working age persons (NBP, 2023) –

##### **753 thousand** Ukrainian workers, including 225 thousand refugees, had registered for social security by September 30, 2023.

**Situation of Ukrainian refugees on the**

**labour market in Poland**
Ukrainian refugees, despite war trauma and other difficulties, have quickly become a part of society as **consumers,**

**employees, entrepreneurs, and**
**Table 10 Summary statistics for bottom 40% of women**

(1)          (2) (3)        (4)

far from a mine close to a mine
before        during before       during

not working 0.188 0.183 0.200 0.162
service & sales 0.340 0.203 0.179 0.222
professional 0.018 0.005 0.014 0.006
agriculture 0.362 0.530 0.490 0.539
manual labor 0.091 0.079 0.117 0.072
earning cash 0.876 0.855 0.879 0.901
work all year 0.852 0.859 0.879 0.838

_Note:_ Column (1) is bottom 40% of sample at 20 to 100 km from a nonactive mine.
Column (2) is bottom 40% of sample at 20 to 100 km from an active mine.
Column (3) is bottom 40% of sample within 20 km of a nonactive mine.
Column (4) is bottom 40% of sample within 20 km of an active mine.

Regression results comparing these four groups are presented in panel B (urban) of Annex table

3. The results suggest that women in the bottom 40 percent are more likely agricultural workers

in mining communities than elsewhere, but also more often service sector workers. They are

less likely to work in manual labor, less likely to work all year, but more likely to earn cash for