ai4data/datause-dataset-rechunked huggingface dataset:
3% 2% 1% 0% 4000 10% 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% 4000 Ukrainian refugee educational attainment implies from 18% (assuming refugees’ educational attainment from November 2022 survey) to 19% (July-August 2023) higher earnings than the general population. [36] Poviat-level geographical distribution of Ukrainian refugees is more concentrated in high productivity agglomerations, implying 7% higher earnings than for other workers registered for social security. [37] There is no publicly available hard data on the sectoral distribution of Ukrainian refugees, which we proxy by the growth in employees with Ukrainian citizenship registered for social security since the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine (unfortunately this to some extent will be Ukrainian workers previously present in Poland who changed jobs) – this imperfect proxy implies 7% lower earnings than general workers. [38] Smaller firm sizes of employers of Ukrainian refugees imply their 8% lower productivity (and thus earnings) from the general population. [39] Most of all, occupational distribution of Ukrainian refugee workers from ZUS implies 21% lower earnings from the general population when measured by nine large occupational groups and 23% lower by detailed occupations. [40] 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000

---
[40] Note that data on occupations of Ukrainian refugees is for persons with PESEL UKR registered for social security on 30th September 2023. It
**The unemployment rate, however, is very high**
In contrast to labor force participation, the estimated unemployment rate of refugees from Ukraine is notably high when compared to that of host country nationals. At the regional level, the former stands at 14%, which starkly contrasts with the 3% weighted average for locals. In certain countries, such as Romania, the unemployment level exceeds 30%.
According to unemployed respondents, challenges for securing employment include (1) local language proficiency (cited by over 50% of those surveyed), (2) lack of decent employment opportunities, (3) lack of opportunities matching the candidate’s skillset, (4) lack of age-appropriate opportunities, and (5) lack of childcare services. When queried about services that could enhance economic prospects of their families, the top two requests were for language training (33% of respondents) and job matching assistance (27% of respondents).
constraints in accessing health services. Vaccine coverage increased notably in Moldova, Czechia and Bulgaria compared to 2023. In comparison, measles vaccination coverage within Ukraine reached 92% for the 1st dose of measles vaccine and 87% for second dose [8] (WHO, 2023).

Regionally, only 54% of all children received the recommended second measles vaccine.
Vaccination coverage is below the 95% target required to interrupt community transmission of measles.

**% OF CHILDREN RECEIVED AT LEAST ONE MEASLES**

**VACCINE**

2023 2024 Data need to be interpreted with caution as they rely on recall and were not verified against individual vaccination records.

Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Moldova Slovakia Poland Romania (2023 N=1,539, 2024 N=1,320) 8. [https://immunizationdata.who.int/dashboard/regions/european-region/UKR accessed on 06.11.2024](https://immunizationdata.who.int/dashboard/regions/european-region/UKR)

**18**
HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

# **Contents**

Acknowledgements 2 Summary of findings and recommendations 3 Background 4 Key findings 4 Methodology 13 Limitations 14

# **Acknowledgements**

We extend our sincere appreciation to the numerous individuals and organizations whose contributions have been instrumental in the development of this report. The data analysis and writing was conducted by the interagency SEIS Livelihoods and Socio-Economic Inclusion Sector Analysis Group (SAG), led by Konstantin Fastovets (UNHCR). The team also consisted of David Mosler (ILO), Erin Neale (IOM), Arianna Pearlstein (UN Women), Yaroslav Smirnov (IOM), Elif Sucu (IOM), and Idil Yildiz (ILO).

We also express our gratitude to Jad Ghosn and the Regional Bureau for Europe (UNHCR) for their invaluable guidance and support in coordination, data preparation, and analysis.

**Cover photograph:**

Antonina (center) is at a CV support point, receiving assistance with preparing her resume.
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Chart 7. Income of Ukrainian refugee households by source**

**2%**

**0.1%**

**In 2024, Ukrainian refugee households**

**increasingly sourced their income from**

**Poland, rather than from Ukraine.** This
can be seen when comparing the MSNA survey conducted in July-August 2023 and SEIS in May-June 2024 (UNHCR, 2024, 2023).

While some methodological differences apply, we can see that incomes earned in Poland grew from 81% in 2023 to 90% in 2024. Conversely, incomes from Ukraine declined from 18% to just 9%. This change demonstrates that Ukrainian refugees Work (regular, part-time, self-employment, remote, other, remote in Ukraine) Remittances from Ukraine Polish social benefits Ukrainian social benefits Other (capital, loans, other) Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on SEIS (May-June 2024) UNHCR (2024) survey.

Note: Deloitte worked with disaggregated household-level data, ensuring comparability (converting all Ukrainian hryvnia incomes into Polish zloty based on daily exchange rates in the time of the interview, and 3-month into 1-month remittance incomes).

continue to integrate economically.
It comes as no surprise, given that employment rates and wages of Ukrainian refugees in Poland increased during that time, which is the focus of the next chapter.
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

## **2.** Ukrainian refugees in the Polish labour market

##### In the past year, as far as labour market integration is concerned, refugees from Ukraine improved in terms of employment and wages, yet they continue to be disproportionately skewed towards elementary occupations. They are also the group to see the fastest improvements, with the gap towards Polish citizens visibly closing across the entire wage distribution (2.1). The current refugee employment rates are only slightly lower than those for Polish citizens, and median net wages are at about four-fifths of the economy as a whole, which may nevertheless be overly optimistic when compared to gross or average wages (2.2).

#### **2.1 Improving economic situation**

Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Chart 9. Ukrainian refugee labour status** **[9]** **Chart 10. Ukrainian refugee median net wage** **[10]**

Working age (women 15-59, men 15-64) PLN, 18-64 age group 4,000 69%

**Ukrainian refugees are more likely**

**to be employed in elementary**

**occupations than pre-war Ukrainian**

**migrants, non-Ukrainian foreigners,**

**and Polish citizens, but they are**

**also the group to have improved**

---
[10] See the note on median wage estimation method in the Online Technical Appendix.
from abroad (e.g. savings of refugees in Ukrainian banks) further strengthens that effect. In total, general government revenue increased by 2.0% in 2022, 2.75% in 2023, and 2.94% in 2024. In monetary terms this amounts to PLN 25.0 billion in 2022, PLN 39.1 billion in 2023, and PLN 47.0 billion in 2024 [22] . In the long term, refugees should increase annual general government revenue by around 2.7%.

**Ultimately, Ukrainian refugees**

**generate additional output and**

**demand.** This results in an increase in real
GDP, and is especially beneficial for public finance. Although the influx of refugees was costly at the start, the additional general government revenue they provided was more than enough to compensate for the expense [23] . Tight labour market helped absorb the increase in labour force, mitigating negative impacts of increased competition on the native workforce. Over time, increased productivity should benefit native workers, as it is the primary driver of long-term wage growth. [24]

---
[24] For a discussion on the stable long-term relationship between wages and labour productivity, see for example Meager & Speckesser (2011).
**refugees.** Although language skills
improve over time, still only 18% of refugees speak Polish fluently, usually those who arrived in Poland 29 months ago. On average, those at the beginner level have been in the country for only 18 months.

**•** **Lack of work experience negatively**

**affects the labour outcomes of older**

**refugees.** Refugees who back in Ukraine
managed the household or were not employed remain underemployed in Poland. The employment rate among the most enterprising refugees, who were self-employed back in Ukraine, is 91%. In contrast, those who did not work, study or train in Ukraine, have an employment rate in Poland of approximately 35%.

labour market, native workers increasingly shift to complementary, higher value and better paid tasks. This can be seen in the data, as Polish citizens are moving to better paid occupations. It constitutes a positive shock to productivity, which is what counterbalances labour market pressures.

##### Macroeconomic impact

**In 2024, Ukrainian refugees’ net**

**impact amounted to 2.7% of the Polish**
The government of Chad has committed to providing refugees with access to quality education by integrating
them into the national education system. This integration allows all refugees and asylum-seekers to enrol in
primary, secondary, and higher education institutions, follow the Chadian curriculum, and obtain recognized
diplomas. The process of integrating refugees into the national education system has seen significant
progress since 27 November 2020, including the adoption of the ten-year refugee education strategy by
the government. In line with this, since 2018, the government has recognized and integrated 94 schools
in camps and reception sites into the national system and opened seven examination centres in camps to
ensure that all students can take national exams under proper conditions.
difference between close and far, and before and after mine opening, we have created a

difference-in-differences estimator.

Panel B of figure 2 shows this strategy in a map, where the small blue circles show the treatment

areas, and the 100-km-radius green circles show the geographic areas that constitute the control

group. As is common in difference-in-differences analysis, the estimation relies on treatment

11
In these vulnerable conditions, any shock to the household economy -such as job loss, illness, or
climate related events- significantly impacts on refugees’ ability to cover the rent and utility costs
(water, electricity), leaving them at heightened risk of eviction. [20] Climate related incidents are
becoming recurrent in the Brazilian context, such as floods and landslides in the south, as well as
droughts and wildfires in the center and the north of the country. [21] For instance, southern Brazil
has seen an increase of up to 30% in average rainfall over the last three decades [22] and, as of
September 2024, 59% of the Brazilian territory was affected by the most severe drought since
nationwide measurements. [23]

---
[22] Presidência da Republica, « Southern Brazil has seen an increas of up to 30% in average annual rainfall over the last three decades »,
**occupational downgrading.** The SEIS
survey indicates that 34% of Ukrainian refugees currently employed in Poland work in the same sector as back in Ukraine, while 48% – in a different one. There is no data for 18% of workers – mostly made up of the youngest refugees who might not have worked back in Ukraine. Employment in one’s pre-displacement sector appears to boost the median net wage by about 6%, when compared to those who switch fields – a back-of-the-envelope calculation puts their median net earnings at 89% of the overall median. However, this likely overstates the true effect of staying in the same sector, since the higher-paid groups (for example, the majority of IT specialists) were more likely to remain in their original industry.

**Highly skilled Ukrainian refugees**

**are likely to suffer from significant**
While refugees and asylum-seekers have the right to reside in Chad, as enshrined in Article 21 of the law, and
there are no legislative restrictions on their choice of residence, multisectoral assistance is only provided
by UNHCR and its partners in camps. Consequently, this assistance remains a decisive factor in refugees’
decision to stay in the camps. Refugees with the financial means to support themselves or engaged in
economic activities outside the camps are free to choose their place of residence in Chad.

**3.2** **Right to work and rights at work**

Article 28 of the [Asylum law](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) in the Republic of Chad grants refugees the most favourable treatment afforded
under similar circumstances to foreign nationals regarding the pursuit of gainful employment, whether
salaried, non-salaried and/or self-employed. The same provision pursues that refugees shall be exempted
from certain restrictive measures imposed by the prevailing regulations on the employment of foreigners.
Additionally, Article 70 of the 2023 Decree stipulates that a refugee legally residing in Chad enjoys the same
rights and standards of treatment as foreign nationals. Article 61 of the [2023 Decree specifically addressing](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)
local integration also guarantees the refugee right to access salaried or non-salaried employment to reach
self-reliance.
social insurance. Second, the statistical definition of an employed person is wider than just being registered with the Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, ZUS) on a certain day [3] . Third, some Ukrainians work in the shadow economy. The number of workers with Ukrainian citizenship and social insurance increased from only 33 thousand at the end of 2013 to 627 thousand at the end of 2021 – just before the refugee influx. Some of this increase reflects the transitioning of Ukrainians to more regular work arrangements and securing work permits. Following February 2022, the numbers further increased with the arrival of Ukrainian refugees. The data for mid-2024 shows 771 thousand workers with Ukrainian citizenship registered for social insurance, including 247 thousand refugees. Ukrainian refugees in Poland have been given PESEL UKR numbers

- a version of an ID number assigned to
every Polish national – which made high quality data on their demographics easily available, though they may still be missing from most of the statistics compiled by the Polish statistical office.

20% 19% Men Women 1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 7% 8% 4% 4% 9% 12% 7%

#### **1.2 Households characteristics**

**The structure of the Ukrainian**
NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE

# Recommendations

Host countries and communities have made commendable and continuous efforts to support refugees in accessing essential health and MHPSS services. While most respondents reported adequate access, barriers to services changed and increased for some refugees. These changes do not take the same form for all refugees, and intersectional factors related to gender, age, disability, and chronic illness continue to impact the experiences and needs of refugees from Ukraine in this regard. The recommendations below highlight key priorities and actions for governments and RRP partners to address these challenges and enhance refugees’ access to care in host countries.

These actions aim to support governments and local communities in strengthening health and MHPSS systems in areas impacted by refugee arrivals and advancing the integration of refugees into national systems. Achieving these goals will require long-term planning and sustained funding commitments.

9. [Integraton of migrant and refugee data in health informaton systems in Europe: advancing evidence, policy and practce](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanepe.2023.100744)

**28**
treatment distance of 50 km, we no longer see a significant effect. In panel Ab, the results are

replicated using a spatial lag model, meaning that we allow for nonlinear effects with distance.

In reality, it seems like the electricity rate is much higher before a mine (dashed line) than with

an active mine (the blue line). However, when the results are decomposed by migrant status in

panel Ac of figure A1 (Annex) we find that migrants are driving the lower electricity rate. In

fact, among nonmigrants, the electricity rate is higher 0–10 km from an active mine, although

it is slightly lower 10–20 km away. [14]

**6.3 Distributional effects on wealth and inequality**

Table 9 presents the effects of mining on asset wealth and on asset wealth inequality. Wealth

data are available in the form of a wealth index, but only for the two last DHS surveys.

Following Fenske (2015) and Flatø and Kotsadam (2014), we calculate inequality by means of

a Gini coefficient (recoding the wealth variable to be positive only, and using the command

13 It is also possible that mining companies compete with households for electricity if supply cannot be increased
in the short run.

---
[14] In panels Ba, Bb, and Bc of Appendix figure A1, we analyze access to radio. We learn that access to
## Introduction

##### Nearly two years after the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the positive impact of the refugees on the Polish economy becomes clearly visible.

On their arrival, the impact of refugees on the economy primarily manifested through higher consumption, that was financed mainly by increased governmental spending, civil society, international organisations, and savings brought from Ukraine. While these added to a significant initial increase in consumption, multiple sources of financing and a lack of aggregated data (particularly on general government expenses) make its magnitude uncertain. Although in the short term it stimulated the economy, drawing just on savings was not sustainable. Over time, however, refugees started to work as employees and entrepreneurs, adding not only to the demand, but also to the supply of the economy, contributing to its long-term growth. The focus of this report is this structural impact of refugees on the economy as consumers, employers, entrepreneurs, and taxpayers.

The beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine resulted in a large inflow of refugees into Poland outlined in Chapter 1.
This cohort differs from the pre-2022 Ukrainian economic migrants, most notably in its demographic makeup which primarily comprises children and working age women.
HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

**SHARE OF POPULATION PAYING FOR RENTED HOUSING: HOSTS VS REFUGEES**

Share of hosts living in rented housing (2023) Share of refugees fully paying for rent (2024) Share of refugees partially paying for rent (2024) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Region Source: Eurostat, survey data, SAG estimates

**HOUSING COST AS A SHARE OF HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME**

Refugees (2024) Hosts (2022) Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Region Source: Eurostat, survey data, SAG estimates

**REFUGEE POVERTY RATES WITH AND WITHOUT CORRECTION FOR EXCESSIVE HOUSING COSTS**

Refugees (2024) Refugees with housing expense correction (2024) Hosts (2023) 65% 40% 52% 31% 46% 43% 37% Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Region Source: Eurostat, survey data, SAG estimates

**6**
Skills-job mismatching also becomes evident when analyzing the current employment of refugees compared to their pre-war employment in Ukraine, as nearly 60% have transitioned to entirely different economic sectors.
This phenomenon is more pronounced among women, with 63% having shifted to roles outside their previous employment background, compared to 50% of men. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is the higher proportion of men employed in sectors like construction and IT prior to displacement. These fields often demand fewer country-specific qualifications, such as proficiency in the local language, thereby facilitating easier integration into similar roles in the host country.

**DISTRIBUTION OF WORKING AGE POPULATION BY**

**HIGHEST EDUCATION LEVEL ATTAINED**

Technical or Vocational Bachelor Master's Doctoral

**WAGE PREMIUMS FOR EDUCATION LEVEL GAINS: HOSTS**

**VERSUS REFUGEES, %**

Refugee eduction wage premium (mean, 2024) Bachelor's or above Hosts (2023) Refugees (2024) Source: Survey data, ILO 1% Host education wage premium (median, 2022) Technical or vocational Note: Wage premiums computed with lower secondary education as the baseline Source: Survey data, Eurostat, SAG estimates
Employment continues to be closely associated with lower poverty rates, though ultimately, it’s the size of income that is generated by working household members that makes the biggest difference. Considering that the share of working-age refugees that are employed is nearing host population levels after rising further in 2024, attention should now turn to wages. Data on the latter, which was derived from household level indicators, demonstrates that refugees on average make two-thirds of what the local population does per hour of work. Low wage premiums for higher education levels and the fact that some 60% of current refugee employees have a background in an entirely different sector of the economy, suggest the presence of underemployment and skills mismatching. This assertion is corroborated by nearly 35% of employed refugees in the region reporting few available jobs with adequate pay, lack of positions that match their skills, or issues with getting their qualifications recognized. Moreover, almost the same percentage indicate lack of local language knowledge to be a problem, a well-acknowledged barrier to skilled employment.

**Based on the above findings it is recommended that:**
##### **September/ October 2023 report**

###### Venezuela

**trafficking networks.** After bilateral

meeting between the Protection Cluster,

the WGTiP and the FSL Cluster, a focal

group was organized on October 10th.

A total of 7 participants from UN Agen
cies, AoRs, and local NGOs participated.

WG members actively participated by

sharing field experiences and proposing

recommendations to address challenges

raised during the discussion.

**VIII. Monthly Meetings of the**

**WGTiP**

**The WGTiP convenes monthly to**

**review its working plan and provide**

**a platform for members to discuss**

**trends and activities related to TiP. In**

**the last meeting, the WG collectively**

**decided to establish a Task Force to**

**draft a guide on security for orga-**

**nizations working with Victims of**

**Trafficking (VoT).** Additionally, members

have developed standardized training

and sensitization activities/workshops to

implement in communities on the topic of

TiP. These trainings will be beneficial to

other organizations addressing human

trafficking issues. In October’s monthly

meeting, the WG hosted the office of UN

Special Rapporteur for Trafficking in Per
sons. The meeting involved discussions

on potential collaboration with WG mem
bers and how the UN Rapporteur's office

can support advocacy efforts.

Member organizations also shared infor
mation on available services for victims