ai4data/datause-dataset-rechunked huggingface dataset:
While   UNHCR   has   been   present   and   operational   in   South-­‐East   Myanmar   since   2004,   the
UNHCR   framework   for   co-­‐operation   with   the   Government   of   the   Union   of   Myanmar   in
the   South-­‐East   is   defined   by   a   draft   Letter   of   Understanding   (LOU)   with   its   line   Ministry,
the   Ministry   of   Border   Affairs   (NaTaLa).   The   LOU   articulates   UNHCR   and   NaTaLa’s
responsibilities   in   regard   to   the   implementation   of   programmes   aimed   at   improving
livelihoods   in   communities   affected   by   displacement,   reducing   the   risk   of   further
displacement,   and   specifically   creating   the   appropriate   conditions   for   return   for   IDPs
and   refugees.   The   current   LOU,   which   includes   Kayin,   Mon,   Kayah,   Shan   and   Chin   States,
and   Bago   and   Tanintharyi   Regions,   was   signed   on   10   June   2013.

Once   the   required   safeguards   are   in   place   for   the   return   of   refugees   and   an   organized
programme   is   to   be   launched,   a   tripartite   agreement   between   Myanmar,   Thailand   and
UNCHR   should   form   the   main   legal   framework   for   the   voluntary   repatriation   and

6   Executive   Committee   Conclusion   29   of   1983   calls   upon   Governments   to   facilitate   the   work   of   UNHCR   “in
creating   conditions   favourable   to   and   promoting   voluntary   repatriation,   which   whenever   appropriate   and
feasible   is   the   most   desirable   solution   for   refugee   problems.”   Also   refer   to   Executive   Committee   Conclusions
NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE

### **Social cohesion and** **MHPSS**

An association between perceived hostility and mental health challenges remains evident across the region, with households experiencing hostility in their social environment more likely to report mental health and psychosocial problems (44%) compared to those not experiencing hostility (31%). Perceived hostility may increase vulnerability to distress, while distress may in turn influence individuals to perceive their environments as more hostile, creating a reinforcing cycle. This trend is consistent across countries, with notable between-country differences: Romania continues to report the highest percentage of problems both for households experiencing hostility (64%) and those not experiencing hostility (49%), while Czechia consistently reports the lowest percentages in both categories (24% and 20%, respectively). Significant differences also emerged between countries such as Hungary and Moldova, where the prevalence of mental health and psychosocial problems in households experiencing hostility is relatively high (63% and 56%, respectively), but the prevalence among those not experiencing hostility diverges dramatically (32% in Hungary versus 16% in Moldova). These findings highlight the importance of addressing perceived hostility and its impact on mental health, through targeted, country-specific MHPSS and social cohesion interventions.
UNHCR   ProGres   data   on   the   83,044   registered   refugees   in   Thailand   indicates   an
estimated   84   per   cent   are   ethnic   Karen   and   12   per   cent   are   ethnic   Karenni.   The
remaining   4   per   cent   are   of   Burman,   Shan,   and   Mon   descent,   and   other   groups.   The
majority   of   registered   refugees   come   from   Kayin   State   (65.3   per   cent),   followed   by
Kayah   (14.6   per   cent),   Tanintharyi   (7.3   per   cent),   Bago   (5.2   per   cent)   and   Mon   (5   per
cent).   (Annex:   Myanmar   Thailand   Border   –   Refugee   Overview,   as   of   end   of   March   2013)
Securing   durable   solutions   is   fundamentally   linked   to   the   restoration   of   national
capacity   to   provide   for   the   protection   and   welfare   of   formerly   displaced   communities,
and   UNHCR’s   role   should   be   designed   to   support   such   an   outcome,   through   systematic
engagement   with   key   Government   counterparts,   civil   society   and   other   national
stakeholders.

National   authorities   have   primary   responsibility   to   secure   durable   solutions   for   those
who   have   been   formerly   displaced,   while   UNHCR   and   other   humanitarian   and
development   actors   have   a   complementary   role.

Co-­‐ordination   and   multi-­‐sector   engagement   is   also   critical   to   the   sustainable
reintegration   of   refugees   and   durable   solutions   for   IDPs [8] .   Therefore,   mobilising   the

---
[8] See   UNHCR’s   2008   Policy   on   the   Return   and   Reintegration   of   Refugees   and   IDPs,   and   the   2011   Secretary-­‐
**Table 13 Effects of gold production at the district level on employment**

Panel A: Using production in the previous period
(3) (4)
not agriworking culture

(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2)
not agri- service or profess- manual earns works all
working culture sales ional work cash year

gold period 0.003 -0.009** 0.003* 0.004*** -0.002 -0.001 0.008**
district (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)

(4)
agriculture

(5)
service or
sales

(6)
professional

(7)
manual
work

(1)
earns
cash

observations 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,270 15,991
R-squared 0.207 0.327 0.127 0.137 0.037 0.213 0.278
PANEL B. Using production in the same year
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2)
not agri- service profess- manual earns works
working culture or sales ional work cash all year

gold year 0.012 -0.033 0.020 0.019* -0.018 -0.010 0.041***
district (0.022) (0.025) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)

observations 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,270 15,991
R-squared 0.207 0.327 0.128 0.137 0.037 0.213 0.278

_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. All
175 19,175 19,175 19,270 15,991
R-squared 0.207 0.327 0.128 0.137 0.037 0.213 0.278

_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and
district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

**7.3 Investigating spillovers**
During the 2019 Global Refugee Forum, the Government of Chad committed, among other things, to
issuing biometric Refugee Identity Cards and Machine-Readable Refugee Convention Travel Documents
(MRCTDs) to meet international standards. A study by the National Agency for Secure Documents (Agence
Nationale des Titres Sécurisés, ANATS), the only competent authority for issuing biometric identity and
travel documents, outlined a technical proposal released in March 2023 for the project’s implementation,
but financial resources are currently lacking to operationalize this pledge. As of 30 June 2023, no biometric
identity card neither CTD has been delivered by the competent national authorities (ANATS) to refugees.

The 2023 Decree specifies that CNARR and UNHCR collaboratively handle the reception and pre-registration
of new arrivals at the international border, following the completion of police formalities. The pre-registration
specifically pertains to situations involving arrivals in groups. In practice, the entire registration of newly
arrived asylum-seekers remains jointly conducted by CNARR and UNHCR. This involves collecting all the
migrants can thus in part be because a less-well-off part of the population chooses to migrate to

mining areas, not that they are made worse off because of the mine activities.

We also explored a decomposition of the anthropometric results along the migration division,

but we found no important differences.

**Figure 5 Diarrheal incidence among children under 5 by migration status**

**Panel A Nonmigrants** **Panel B Migrants**

24
9 These employment rates are very close to the ones from the Polish central bank surveys of Ukrainian refugees, which showed 62% in July 2023 and 68% in July 2024 (NBP, 2024). NBP (2024) age group was slightly different, describing adults as 18 years or older.
only in conjunction with policies for local procurement. Moreover, some of the mining-related

papers have focused on mining in an African context, exploring a range of outcomes, including

HIV-transmission and sexual risk taking (Corno and de Walque 2012; Wilson 2012), women’s

empowerment (Benshaul-Tolonen 2018), infant mortality (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019) and labor

market outcomes (Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016). Mining is also associated with more economic

activity measured by nightlights (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019; Mamo et al, 2019).

Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016) use DHS data from Africa, and find that mine openings cause

women to shift from agriculture to service production and that women become more likely to

work for cash and year-round as opposed to seasonally. Continuing this analysis, Benshaul

Tolonen (2018) explores the links between mining and female empowerment in eight gold

producing countries in East and West Africa, including Ghana. Women in gold mining

communities have more diversified labor markets opportunities, better access to health care,

and are less likely to accept domestic violence. In addition, infant mortality rates decrease with

up to 50% in mining communities, from very high initial levels (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019). In

a study that focuses exclusively on Ghana, Aragón and Rud (2013) explore the link between
Land ownership remains a complex issue in the absence of a codified land law, and the general regime
of land ownership, encompassing both formal and traditional rights, has not undergone any changes in
the past three years. Customary and Islamic laws continue to govern access to and control of land and
natural resources in urban and rural areas. While these customary systems vary considerably across the

R E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D** 9
**qualification compared to Polish**

**citizens.** While the proportion of
individuals with tertiary education among refugees is slightly higher than among Polish citizens (40% vs 38%), only 12% of refugees work as managers, professionals, and technicians (occupational groups usually requiring higher education) compared to 37% of Poles. Consequently, the wage premium for individuals with tertiary education is much lower among refugees than among Poles (22% vs 84%).
mining companies in Ghana was 3 percent until 2010, which was the average rate for gold

production in Africa (Gajigo, Mutambatsere, and Mdiaya 2012), but increased to 5 percent in

2010 (Standing and Hilson 2013). Of this money, 80 percent goes to the general government

budget, 10 percent goes to the administration of mining oversight, and 10 percent supports

district administration (Garvin et al. 2009). Between 1993 and 1998, about US$17 million was

distributed to local mining communities (Aryee 2001). While considered a model of best

practice, there is still a worry that the beneficial effects of allocations to the districts are

undermined by elite capture and corruption at the district level (Standing and Hilson 2013). For

our analysis, the scheme implies that it may be necessary to conduct a district-level analysis in

addition to the more local-level analyses.

12 currently active mines dominate the sector, and there are an additional five suspended mines

that have been in production in recent decades. Table 1 presents a full list of the mines, the year

they opened, and their status as of December 2012. Company name and country are for the
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Refugees from Ukraine are not yet utilising their full potential in the Polish labour market. In May 2022, 46% of arriving refugees declared that they had no knowledge of the Polish language (NBP, 2023). Over time, this percentage improved, with data from November 2022 showing a result of 21%, though this still represents a large group of people who do not know the local language [24], placing them at risk of limiting possible jobs to those below their educational level. Nearly 40% of Refugees from Ukraine insured at ZUS on 30th June 2023 in Poland were employed in elementary occupations [25], while for all employed persons in Q2 2023 this percentage was only 5%. Furthermore, the Deloitte Ukraine Refugee Pulse report indicates that 50% of respondents point to language barriers as an obstacle to accessing services to meet basic needs (Deloitte, 2023). Meanwhile, in the MSNA Poland 2023 survey, when asked about encountered barriers for accessing the labour market, 34% of respondents pointed to lack of language knowledge.
**migrants was challenging to quantify.**
Since the onset of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, there was a consistent influx of Ukrainians into Poland.
Many of them sought work as Ukraine’s economy declined and the currency devalued. Most of the migrants came as guest workers, a status brought in by a 2011 law enabling Ukrainians and five other nations to work in Poland for six months Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on Polish Border Guard Headquarter and PESEL data.

PESEL-UKR data Total entries-exits of the Polish-Ukrainian border during a year without a work permit, based on an employer’s declaration. This was a circular migration, with Ukrainians coming to Poland for half of the year, then returning to Ukraine for another six months, and coming back to Poland. The data on employers’ declarations do not reveal the actual number of Ukrainian citizens who followed this system – a single person could hold several declarations, because with every change of employer or promotion at the same employer they had to ask for a new declaration. What is more, with stays shorter than one year,
Increased competition on the labour market could partially offset benefits from refugees. Although (due to a tight labour market) increase in labour force is almost entirely absorbed into working force, there should be slight increase in unemployment rate. Ultimately, it is estimated that it was higher by 0.14-0.25 pp. in 2022 and by 0.18-0.3 pp in 2023 which corresponds to respectively 24-42 thousand and 33-54 thousand additional people being unemployed [45] . In the long run, the unemployment rate should remain higher by 0.15-0.3 pp. Because of that, it is estimated that growth of real wages was slower in 2022 and 2023. It is estimated that due to the influx of refugees, real wages were lower in 2022 by 0.45-0.85% and in 2023 by 0.65-1.15%. Although in effect this is negative, it also means lower inflationary pressure from the labour market in the short term. Long-term real wages should be around 0.55-1.0% lower than in a scenario without refugees.
That said, the actual labour market effect is likely to be null as evidenced by econometric studies (Gromadzki and Lewandowski, 2023; Peri, 2014), which are elaborated on in Chapter 4. Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023) in the early months of 2022 find no effect of Ukrainian refugees on earnings, employment, and unemployment rate of natives and other immigrants, except an actual slight positive impact on the wages of native women.
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

# **1.** Inflow of refugees from Ukraine into Poland

##### Even before the 2022 full-scale war in Ukraine the number of Ukrainians in Poland was substantial and growing, although their precise number is difficult to measure.

Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Chart 1.** Ukrainian workers with social insurance.

Rate of change (right axis) Number (left axis)

**Source:** Deloitte own elaboration based on ZUS data.

1000 750 500 250 0 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

-20%
**higher productivity.** In a simplistic
supply-demand framework, the influx of Ukrainian refugees would have had a negative impact on Polish workers employment or caused a decline in real wages. However, this has not occurred.
First, Polish citizens employment rates have grown, and unemployment rates have fallen. Second, poviats in which the employment share of Ukrainian refugees has grown by 1 pp. saw 0.5 pp. higher employment rates among Polish citizens, and 0.3 pp. lower unemployment rates.
Third, there is no evidence of lowered wages, in fact the limited available data indicates that a higher share of Ukrainian refugees in a poviat may have caused local wages to rise. Such findings are in line with academic literature, which documents a positive impact of migrants on native workers. With foreigners entering the 04 Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Addressing the remaining issues of**

**refugee integration into the labour**

**market would improve their situation**

**and further benefit the Polish**

**economy.** The key measures to improve
refugees' standing include advanced language courses for professionals, easing of occupational licensing, especially requirements based on citizenship, and active labour market policies to help specific groups enter the labour market.
## **Works cited**

[1] UNHCR, ‘Global Report 2023 - Executive Summary’, UNHCR, Geneva, Jun. 2024. Accessed: Jul. 13, 2024. [Online]. Available:
https://reporting.unhcr.org/global-report-2023-executive-summary

[2] UNHCR, ‘This is our home: stateless minorities and their search for citizenship’, 2017, [Online]. Available:
https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR_EN2_2017IBELONG_Report_ePub.pdf

[3] D. S. Weissbrodt and C. Collins, ‘The Human Rights of Stateless Persons’, _hrq_, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 245–276, Feb. 2006, doi:
10.1353/hrq.2006.0013.

[4] E. Abuya, ‘Out of the Shadows: towards ensuring the rights of stateless persons and persons at risk of statelessness in Kenya’, Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and UNHCR, Nairobi, Jul. 2010. [Online]. Available:
https://www.unhcr.org/media/out-shadows-towards-ensuring-rights-stateless-persons-and-persons-risk-statelessness-kenya

[5] B. Blitz and M. Lynch, ‘Statelessness and the Benefits of Citizenship: A Comparative Study.’, _Statelessness and Citizenship: A Comparative_
_Study on the Benefits of Nationality_, Jan. 2011.

[6] S. W. Goodman, ‘Citizenship Studies: Policy Causes and Consequences’, _Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci._, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 135–152, Jun. 2023, doi:
10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102729.

[7] UNHCR, ‘High-Level Segment on Statelessness: Results and Highlights’. Accessed: Oct. 10, 2024. [Online]. Available:
https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/high-level-segment-on-statelessness-results-and-highlights/
REGIONAL BUREAU OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

PROTECTION MONITORING DASHBOARD ON INCIDENTS IN DRC AND MOZAMBIQUE

As of 30 September 2022

MAP SHOWING THE NUMBER OF REPORTED PROTECTION INCIDENTS PER

Province in Mozambique

(MOZ) covered by
protection monitoring
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland An ageing population coupled with a growing economy causes labour shortages. Despite falling number of available workers, the Polish economy is growing steadily, as it modernises and converges to the level of development of old EU Member States. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, real GDP growth averaged 3.7% during the last decade. As a result, due to steady demand for labour since 2019, the harmonised unemployment rate in Poland has not exceeded 4%, oscillating around 3% in recent years. According to Eurostat data, in September 2023, harmonized unemployment in Poland reached 2.8%, the same level as Malta. In the entire EU, only the Czech Republic reached a lower level: 2.7%.
Vacancies stood at record heights before
NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE For households with a member with disability, health was the top priority with 56% of households reporting this as priority need compared to 30% of those without disability. Likewise, 45% of households with chronic illnesses identified healthcare access as their top priority, whereas households without chronically ill members ranked it fourth, with only 22% considering it a priority need. This indicates a modest decrease compared to 2023 when 58% of households with a member with disability and 48% of those with individuals with a chronic illness cited health as their top priority.

### **Need to access** **health care**

Regionally, 31% of individuals experienced health problems 30 days prior to the survey and needed to access health care. The reported experience of health problems was higher among under-fives (37%) and those over the age of 60 (60%), and it was higher among women above 18 years (36%) compared to men (31%). The discrepancies between women and men in terms of experiencing a health problem is particularly pronounced in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where the rates of experiencing a health problem are 10% higher among women compared to men.
a 22 percent increase in service sector participation. However, this effect is only statistically

significant at the 10 percent level, possibly due to the small sample size within that distance.

This is in contrast to the dummy for 0-20 km which is insignificant, pointing highly localized

effects on service sector employment for women. Using distance bin of 30 km, we estimate

zero treatment effect on the probability of service sector employment. Panel B of figure 4 shows

the results for cash-earning opportunities, and similarly, we estimate positive treatment effects

within 20 km.

In panel C of Figure 4, infant mortality is re-estimated using different distance spans. The

decrease in child mortality decreases almost linearly with the increase in distance bins, an

indication that the effects are only found close to a mine. The largest drop, and the only

significantly negative drop, is found for the distance bin 0–20 km.

**Figure 4 Varying the cutoff distance: Service sector employment, cash earnings, and infant**

**mortality**

**Panel A Service and sales** **Panel B Cash earnings            Panel C Infant mortality**

20
to factors other than productivity growth, this is unlikely. Any negative impact could only arise if other workers left the labour force or reduced their working hours. No evidence of this is seen in recent Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey data for the Polish economy, where activity rates continued to grow, while the average number of usual weekly hours worked in full- and parttime employment remained fairly stable, particularly for women (who should be closer substitutes for Ukrainian refugees, most of whom are also women; see charts below).

Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland
At 44, she arrived in Poland from Kyiv on March 9, 2022, with her 7-year-old daughter, Viktoria, and 5-year-old son, Timur. “I came to the job fair to find a position in my field of expertise. I’m not afraid of physical work, but as the sole provider for my family of three, I need a more stable and better-paying job,” she explains.

© UNHCR/Anna Liminowicz

**2**
from Ukraine has increased from 61% to 69%, while their unemployment rate has halved from 15% to 8%. Second, median net wage of Ukrainian refugees grew from PLN 3,100 to PLN 4,000, i.e. by 29%. While half of this wage growth came from the overall high earnings growth in the country due to high inflation (gross wages in the general economy grew by 15% [8] ), it was still a major improvement. Gross wage gains appear lower, with ZUS social insurance contributions data for the period from June 30, 2023 and June 30, 2024 showing an increase of 18% (compared to 15% for Polish citizens). As of June 30, 2024, only 44% of ZUS-insured Ukrainian refugees had an employment contract (compared to 82% of Polish citizens). Many may opt for civil law contracts and self-employment to limit their social insurance contributions to the level of minimum wage.

7 Together with refugees working remotely in Ukraine, their income from work would add up to 80% in the SEIS survey.

8 From Q2 2023 to Q2 2024, https://stat.gov.pl/en/latest-statistical-news/communications-and-announcements/list-of-communiques-and-announcements/averagegross-wage-in-the-second-quarter-2024,281,43.html 14