ai4data/datause-dataset-rechunked huggingface dataset:
- The   Government   will   abide   by   international   standards   for   return   namely,   that
people   have   a   right   to   return   voluntarily   to   places   of   choice,   based   on   their
individual   and   freely-­‐expressed   wish   to   return,   and   that   return   and
reintegration   is   carried   out   in   conditions   of   physical,   legal   and   material   safety
and   dignity.

- The   Government   and   non-­‐state   armed   groups   engage   in   addressing   the   problem
of   landmines   as   an   early   priority.   Landmines   are   a   particular   threat   in   the   South-­‐
East   and   a   serious   impediment   to   any   possible   return.

- Land   reform,   including   restoration   of   land   rights   and   compensation,   remains   at
the   centre   of   the   country’s   political   debate   and   reform   agenda.   The   current   laws
allow   expropriation   of   land   not   utilised   for   a   specific   period   of   time.   In   addition,
abandonment,   widespread   destruction   and   “land   grabbing”   may   mean   that   some
villages   of   origin   may   not   exist   anymore,   or   may   not   be   accessible.

- Humanitarian   and   development   actors   are   granted   full   access   to   return   areas,
particularly   allowing   the   opening   of   offices   and   regular   monitoring   capacity.
Direct   access   to   key   areas   of   origin   is   still   limited   for   many   humanitarian   and
development   actors   in   particular   in   conflict-­‐affected   areas.
5. Cross Sectors

### **5. Cross Sectors**

**5.1** **Gender**

Gender considerations can generally be enhanced in many sub-dimensions of overall policies, with the
most relevant being the national institutional framework for the management and coordination of refugees.
Additionally, the limited participation of refugee women in advisory committees often results in inadequate
consideration of the concerns and needs of women and girls. This hinders their inclusion in national plans
and programs.

The most consequential policy sub-dimensions in terms of socioeconomic development remain therefore
as follows:

**a.** **Justice and Security:** Challenges remain in preventing and responding to gender-based violence.

**b.** **Land, Housing, and Property:** Refugees in general still face difficulties in accessing and owning land.

**c.** **Education:** Limited access to education for refugee girls, particularly due to high dropout rates. In

the 2022-2023 school year, girls’ enrolment rates were 47 per cent in primary, 17 per cent in middle
school and only 6 percent in high school nationwide. The drop in middle and high school attendance is
linked to socio-cultural pressures, leading to issues like child marriages, early marriages, child labour.

**d.** **Healthcare:** Insufficient prioritization of the specific needs of women and girls, including refugee women
The floods in 2022 had adverse effects in 18 out of the 23 provinces, including Lac, Mayo Kebbi Est, Mayo
Kebi Ouest, Logone Occidental, Logone Oriental, Tandjilé and Mandoul. These consequences resulted in
the loss of agricultural land and livestock, and heightened risks to food security. In October 2022, authorities
responded by declaring a state of emergency and offering financial assistance to affected individuals,
including refugees hosted in these rural areas, to meet their shelter and essential needs. Specific sites were
identified to temporally accommodate the displaced individuals irrespective of their status.

**1.4** **Preparedness for refugee inflows**

The National Commission for the Reception, Reintegration of Refugees and Repatriates (Commission
Nationale d’Accueil de Réinsertion des Réfugiés et des Rapatriés, CNARR) remains the national institutional
body to respond to new refugee inflows. The four-year strategy of CNARR (2019-2023), which includes
mobilization provisions in case of emergencies, continues to be applied. The CNARR continues to work
with UNHCR and other United Nations organizations to support and guide its response to refugee inflows,
particularly in cases of emergency.
_Note:_ In panel A, active is status of mine in birth year; in panel B, active is active status of mine in survey year.
Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and district
fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS = ordinary least
squares.

An active mine is associated with a decrease in cough among children under age five (panel B

of table 5), and children are also (insignificantly) more likely to have a health card. An active

mine is associated with insignificant decreases in the anthropometrics measures (World Health

Organization measures in standard deviations), such as height-for-age and weight-for-age.

However, the standard errors for these coefficients are very large relative to the estimated

coefficients, which is why the effects are imprecisely estimated.

**5.3 Spatial heterogeneity of results**

Thus far we have used a cutoff distance of 20 km. Panel A of figure 4 shows that the largest

treatment effect for services for women is found within 10 km of a mine, with an 8 percentage

point increase in the probability that a woman works in the service sector. This is equivalent to
**productive native women to increase their labour supply.**
A caveat in the case of refugees from Ukraine is that this could mean working below their qualifications or in the informal sector, making the overall effect for productivity unclear.
Nevertheless, as availability of care and housework services increases, it becomes easier for women mainly to combine family and professional lives and increase labour supply.
Such effects may be stronger for countries with less accessible childcare. Furtado (2015) reviews this literature, finding evidence from Australia, Hong Kong, Italy, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Additionally, Furtado (2016) in the USA in the 1980-2000 period finds that married women and women with graduate degrees increase their fertility in response to low-skilled immigration.
Results are causal, as the author exploits the role of ethnic network in immigrant location decisions.

40 41

**Firms respond to immigrant inflows by introducing**

**production technologies complementary to their skills, thus**

**making their skill-group and potentially firms themselves**
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Vocational or lower Secondary Higher Data is limited, but it appears refugees found work in sectors where the labour market was particularly tight. Publicly available data does not give the numbers of social security registrations of native workers by NACE sector. For this reason, in the absence of administrative data, to approximate the share of Ukrainian workers in particular sectors it was necessary to use Statistics Poland survey data. The share of workers with Ukrainian citizenship grew more in sectors that were experiencing the highest wage and salaries growth before refugee displacement. This eased their entry into the labour market.
The refugees were also quick to set-up their own businesses or become self-employed.
Accommodation and food, as a sector, has been experiencing a particularly large growth in wages and salaries in 2021, as it re-opened after the Covid-19 pandemic, and subsequently it recorded a particularly large growth in the share of Ukrainian workers. Transportation has been the only sector in which the share and number of Ukrainian workers declined.
Second, panel regression analysis shows that a larger influx of Ukrainian refugees at the poviat level was accompanied by a larger increase in employment rates for Polish citizens along with a larger decrease in registered unemployment rates. The data sample for all regressions encompassed quarterly data for all 380 poviats from Q1 2022 to Q2 2024.
The Ukrainian refugee share variable was constructed as the share of Ukrainian refugees among all employed, temporarily employed, and self-employed persons insured with ZUS in a given poviat at the end of the quarter. The employment rate of Polish citizens was constructed as the share of Polish citizens who are employed, Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland
temporarily employed, and self-employed and who are insured with ZUS, divided by the population from GUS in a given poviat in a given quarter (estimated based on halfyear population data). The unemployment rate is the registered unemployment rate series from GUS. Fixed effects panel regressions show that an increase in the employment share of Ukrainian refugees by 1 percentage point correlates with an increase in Polish citizens' employment rates by 0.5% and a decrease in the unemployment rate by 0.3%, in the preferred specification with dummy variables for all quarters. All results are statistically significant at a 0.01 level.

**Chart 26. Polish citizens employment rate** **Chart 27. Polish citizens unemployment rate**

Eurostat survey data, 20-64 age group Eurostat survey data, 20-64 age group 3.6% 83.8% 83.6% 83.2%

**Chart 28. Effect of a 1 pp. change in employment share of Ukrainian refugees on**

Panel model of all 380 poviats quarterly data from Q1 2022 to Q2 2024. Results are statistically significant at a 0.01 level.

Polish citizens employment rate Unemployment rate

1.0 1.0

0 0

-1.0 -1.0

-2.0 -2.0

No time Seasonal Quarterly No time Seasonal Quarterly dummies dummies dummies dummies dummies dummies
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland © UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz

# **3.** Economic impact modelling

Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations give the intuition behind how additional workers help to grow the economy.
The simplest estimate would be to assume that an increase of employment by 1.4-2.2% will grow the Gross Domestic Product by an equal percentage. In such a case, we would need to assume that labour is the only production factor, and thus all of GDP can be equally divided between workers.
However, this is not the case, as GDP is not just a function of labour, but also of capital that workers have at their disposal – all the machines, computer programs, offices, and the like. As displacement is unexpected and refugee status (both legal and intent to stay long term) at first is uncertain, companies take time to increase their stocks of capital to the new workers. A more elaborate estimate would account for the part of GDP Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland
**Economic impact modelling**
Economic impact of Ukrainian refugees has been estimated in the general equilibrium Deloitte D.Climate model that accounts for their labour, consumption, and tax inputs.
Such models are a gold standard in policy modelling used by central banks, academia, and other institutions, because they can simulate counterfactual scenarios.
Thus, we can distinguish the positive labour market shock from the inflow of refugees and analyse various scenarios independently of all other recent macroeconomic developments (Chapter 3).

We find that refugees from Ukraine as workers, entrepreneurs, consumers, and taxpayers had a positive impact on economic output, which will increase in the long run. The Deloitte D.Climate general equilibrium model finds that refugees from Ukraine in the long-term will contribute 0.9-1.35% to the Gross Domestic Product.
In our model, the long-term is defined as the period over which the economy fully adjusts to the shock of the initial refugee inflow; it does not include other aspects, e.g. refugee children growing-up and entering labour market. These results are 08 09
**downgrading.** With the median wages
of Ukrainian refugees estimated at 84% (SEIS survey) or 80% (NBP 2024 survey) of the national median (see chapter 2), the difference for average wages may be even larger. This is because medians are insensitive to high earners who typically inflate average earnings. Such high earners may suffer significant downgrading considering the unfavourable occupational structure of Ukrainian refugees. There are many reasons to this, from occupational licensing to a high level of language fluency required by high-skill jobs. [28] Ukrainian Pre-war Other Polish refugees Ukrainians foreigners citizens Drivers (truck, bus) Teachers Medical professions (physician, dentist, nurse, midwife) Legal professions (legal counsel, barrister, notary, bailiff) Taxi drivers Others Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on ZUS data on June 30th 2024.

26 As described in chapter 2, SEIS measures incomes on the household level. Using it to estimate individual wages likely underrepresents lowest and highest incomes.
Details are available in the Online Technical Appendix.

27 Note that the GUS (2024) data for the host population is not exactly comparable, as it does not include microenterprises, it covers an earlier period and focuses on gross and average wages.

28

---
[28] Lessem and Sanders (2020) modelled immigrant wage growth in the United States, finding that in a counterfactual model eliminating barriers to occupational entry
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Recently arrived Ukrainian refugees,**

**those with below tertiary education**

**and in older age group are most**

**likely to communicate in Polish at**

**intermediate and lower levels.** Based
on the SEIS UNHCR survey, a logistic regression has been performed to find out which categories of Ukrainian refugees may most require Polish language improvement. [29] Results show that the odds of only zero to intermediate Polish knowledge decrease with every month since arrival. Ukrainian refugees in the 18 to 29 age group have the lowest odds of having an intermediate or lower level of Polish. It translates into a 38% probability, even lower than the 41% for refugees with tertiary education. The group with the highest odds (70% probability) of zero to intermediate Polish are Ukrainian refugees aged 50 to 64. The results by employment sectors are not statistically significant, other than for manufacturing. The results are intuitive, with the best language skills among refugees working in health and education, and the lowest among those working in construction, other services, and trade.

**Addressing the gap in language**

**fluency would yield significant**

---
[29] A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in case of none, beginner, or intermediate language knowledge, and 0 for other levels has been regressed against a
With the exception of Republic of Moldova, the poverty line for each country was defined as 50% of the median
[equivalized disposable income (after social transfers) as reported by](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Equivalised_disposable_income) [Eurostat for 2023. This figure was indexed](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat) towards 2024 using national annual wage inflation data for the third quarter of 2024. As the Republic of Moldova does not currently run the SILC survey, the absolute poverty line as reported by the country’s National Bureau of Statistics was used instead. Host poverty rates were based on the same poverty threshold. With the except of Republic of Moldova, these were equal to the at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) rate reported by Eurostat. On

**14**
**taxpayers** . Currently between 225 and
350 thousand refugees from Ukraine are estimated to be working in Poland. The lower bound is the number from social security data, while the higher bound is the product of employment rate from the surveys and working age population with active PESEL UKR numbers (Chapter 2).

Structural worker shortages, one of the lowest unemployment rates in the European Union, record high vacancies, and high education attainment of refugees eased their labour market integration. The number of Polish citizens aged 20-64 has declined by 2.6 million from its peak in early 2010. [7] Despite COVID-19 and geopolitical shocks, the unemployment rate oscillated in recent years around 3% in Poland, and in February 2022 only Czechia exhibited a lower rate in the EU. [8] In Q4‘2021 the share of companies reporting vacancies stood at 49%, the highest level on record, and has been slowly declining since then. [9] In July-August 2023, 56% of refugees declared possessing tertiary education and their employment rate has been almost one-third higher than for others. [10]

---
[7] According to the Labour Force Survey data from Eurostat.
[8] According to the harmonized unemployment rates from Eurostat.
[9] According to the quarterly NBP survey.
[10] According to the UNHCR (2023) survey.
The Ukrainian refugee population also faces financial barriers to access critical services: one in ten households have no health insurance and 22 % of those surveyed answered that they cannot afford fees at local health care clinics. Households that contain a member with a disability are also more likely to be below the poverty line. This group’s poverty rate stands at 59% versus 43% for households with no members with disabilities.

**Support with accommodation expenses – an**

**important vulnerability shield**
Overall, almost half (48%) of refugee households in the region report receiving accommodation or housing assistance. Twenty percent are living in With accommodation rent support Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Region

1. Calculations for Moldova were not conducted, as this country is not
included into the [EU statistics on income and living conditions (SILC)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions)
[survey, which the OECD uses as the basis for host country poverty](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions) assessments 2. Results for the Czech Republic not individually presented due to sampling limitations 3. Accommodation rent support has been calculated as the difference between the actual equivalized accommodation expense and the median equivalized market rent in the region
With partners, UNHCR continues to advocate with the Indonesian government at all levels and works
to strengthen collaboration with coastal communities to ensure boats in distress at sea are rescued
and able to disembark in Indonesia with adequate sites designated to host those who arrive by sea.
In addition to arrivals by sea, UNHCR continues to advocate with competent authorities when
contacted by individuals arriving by air if their right to seek asylum was denied at the airport.

### **Resettlement Expectations**

Refugees and authorities consider Indonesia to be a “transit country” prior to the realization of a
solution in a third country. The refugee assistance models established by the Comprehensive Plan of
Action for Indochinese Refugees and the Regional Cooperation Agreement, as well as
disproportionately high resettlement opportunities from Indonesia when compared to opportunities
from many other host countries, have perpetuated this narrative. The pervasive and persistent
misconception regarding the extent to which refugees are entitled to resettlement and the belief that,
with time, resettlement will be accessible for all refugees in the country has a negative impact on the
refugee population and the protection space in Indonesia.
Voluntary   return   is   guided   by   internationally   recognized   standards,   which   inter   alia
provide   that   refugees   have   the   right   to   return   voluntarily,   in   safety   and   dignity,   to   their
own   countries.   A   freely   expressed   wish   to   return   by   those   displaced   is   a   pre-­‐condition   to
any   voluntary   return.   Recognized   principles   also   include:   taking   measures   to   address
any   root   causes   of   displacement   (cross-­‐border   and   internal)   by   all   parties   to   the   past
conflict;   that   refugees   and   IDPs   have   the   right   to   freedom   of   movement   and   the   right   to
return   to   their   place   of   former   residence   or   another   place   of   their   choice   in   the   country
of   origin;   and   that   UNHCR   and   partners   have   access   to   returnee   areas   in   order   to
monitor   their   return.
_UNHCR   Discussion   Paper   –15   June   2013_

A   set   of   standards   and   qualitative   and   quantitative   indicators   should   be   developed   to
measure   progress   toward   the   achievement   of   the   reintegration   objectives.

This   section   proposes   various   activities   that   should   be   considered   to   address   immediate
as   well   as   longer-­‐term   needs.   UNHCR   could   take   the   lead   on   these   activities   or   provide   a
co-­‐ordination   or   advocacy   role,   depending   on   the   specific   activity.

**10.1.** **Phase   1   (current   phase):   Strengthening   of   IDP   operations   and**

**preparation   for   refugee   return   while   providing   integrated**

**assistance   to   spontaneous   returnees**

- Build   on   previously   established   co-­‐ordination   mechanisms   -­‐   such   as   monthly
inter-­‐agency   meetings   at   state   level,   the   South-­‐East   Consultation   and   cross-­‐
border   meetings   -­‐   to   strengthen   co-­‐ordination   on   durable   solutions.   Co-­‐
ordination   systems   shall   facilitate   respect   for   key   protection   and   assistance
standards   and   enable   the   development   of   a   strategic   vision   for   durable   solutions.

- Strengthen   information   management   and   analysis   capacities,   including   the
development   of   tools   to   capture   and   analyse   patterns   of   spontaneous   returns
and   carry   out   protection   assessments   and   monitoring.            Information   products
will   also   aim   at   supporting   informed   decision-­‐making   by   refugees   in   Thailand.
Power BI Desktop Access to Basic Services Guaranteeing that IDPs have sustained access to essential services such as healthcare, education, water, and sanitation is vital to preventing dependence on humanitarianassistance.
Simultaneously, ensuring the internally displaced are included in developing national systems, including protection programmes and services and development strategies, is vital for improving the living conditions and well-being of communities.
Pathway #2:
The structure of the Ukrainian population in Poland changed radically after 24th February 2022. Up until 2021, Ukrainians in Poland were mostly men (close to two-thirds) looking for work, often leaving their families back in Ukraine. After the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, refugees fleeing the war started to arrive.
They were primarily women and children.
This is consistent with a change in the nature of migration flows, from primarily economic migrants to forcefully displaced refugees.

**Chart 2.** Number of Ukrainian men and women registered in Poland for social security.

800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2021 Q42 022 Q4 2023 Q3 Number of insured men with Ukrainian citizenship Number of insured women with Ukrainian citizenship