ai4data/datause-dataset-rechunked huggingface dataset:
Note: Data are based on average social security contributions bases in employee-cells, each cell for a specific poviat, sex, age group, and main occupational group. All data are for the 01XX ZUS insurance code (employees). Data for Q2 2022 encompass 6945 employee-cells of Ukrainian refugees joined with likewise cells for Polish citizens, while for Q2 2024 13477 such cells. Ukrainian refugees have been identified by PESEL UKR and Ukrainian citizenship, Poles by Polish citizenship.

Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on ZUS data.

refugees move to better-paid occupations becomes clearer. Between June 30, 2022, and June 30, 2024, Ukrainian refugees gained an estimated 7% in earnings having shifted towards better paid occupations, pre-war Ukrainians 5%, non-Ukrainian foreigners 4%, and Polish citizens 1%.

**Ukrainian refugees have been slowly**

**closing their wage gap to Polish**

**citizens across all wage levels.** Once
ZUS administrative data on Ukrainian refugees with employment contracts is divided into employee cells based on 380 poviats, 2 sexes, 7 age groups, and 10 main occupational groups (including
Mental health is a significant concern, with particularly high needs in populations fleeing conflict. WHO estimates that one in five people affected by conflict (22.1%) have a mental health condition, including 13.0% with mild, 4.0% with moderate, and 5.1% with severe conditions [4] .
Refugees may have experienced conflict-related violence and other adversities prior to displacement and likely face current stressors associated with adapting to new environments, languages, and cultures, economic and housing instability, limited social support networks and uncertainties about their future and those left behind in Ukraine. These factors may contribute to mental health and psychosocial problems that can persist for many years if left unaddressed.
**decreases it.** Some evidence shows that
when refugees from Ukraine have access to education, healthcare, and social services, they may be more likely to consider returning home, precisely because they feel more stable and have the resources to make plans. Sohst et al. (2024) found that short-term return intentions were higher in countries offering strong public services and with healthier economies (lower poverty and higher GDP). In short, when people aren’t just surviving but have some breathing room, they’re better positioned to think about going back.
On the other hand, host country labour market integration decreases the chances that refugees will be returning to their country of origin. Personal circumstances clearly play a major role. Refugees who are formally employed in their host countries are 12 percentage points less likely to plan a return in the near future than those who aren’t (Sohst et al., 2024). Furthermore, Lewandowski et al. (2025) find that refugees who underwent greater task degradation were more likely to plan to return to Ukraine by 2023, particularly those who initially, in 2022, did not plan to return. So, while public services seem to increase the likelihood of return, employment has the opposite effect, it gives people a reason to stay. Families with children or elderly dependents are also more hesitant, which makes sense given the ongoing uncertainty in Ukraine and school continuity in host country. Refugees with disabilities are even less likely to return, often because of healthcare needs or limited support options. Return is often less about ‘desire’ and more about 'capacity', what in development terms includes social capital, human capital (like education and skills), and even psychological readiness. That capacity is shaped by a combination of public policies and personal circumstance. [6]

---
[6] Crucial will also be the ‘pull’ factors in Ukraine, which will be determined by the conditions of future peace. The longer the full-scale war
capacity is shaped by a combination of public policies and personal circumstance. [6]

---
[6] Crucial will also be the ‘pull’ factors in Ukraine, which will be determined by the conditions of future peace. The longer the full-scale war continues, the smaller will
**•** Aleksynska and Tritah (2015) look for economic impacts of immigration in a

sample of 20 developed OECD countries at 5-year intervals during the 19602005 period. They find that a higher rate of immigration by 1 percentage point increases GDP per capita growth rate by 0.3 percentage point. They try to disaggregate this effect in further regressions, finding positive effects for the growth of income per capita, output per worker, and total factor productivity for higher rate of immigration among prime-age workers (25-54 years old), but negative or statistically insignificant for the young (15-24 years old).
These estimates are causal, as authors similarly to Jaumotte at al. (2016) quoted above instrument the immigrant shares by estimating them beforehand based on a separate model, which is orthogonal to subsequent GDP growth.

**•** Peri (2012) in a seminal paper models the impact of immigration on total factor
3. Economic Opportunities

which aims at preventing conflict, enabling resolution and improving the understanding of law and justice.

In practice, the availability of judicial services, including Court, remains scarce or too distant from refugee
hosting areas, including camps. The nascent state legal aid services remain constrained in scale and scope,
further exacerbated by the lack of implementation. In addressing the legal and justice needs of refugees
and asylum-seekers, despite the support provided by UNHCR and its partners for legal aid services, the
predominant option remains traditional arrangements made under the auspices of local and traditional
authorities.

### **3. Economic Opportunities**

**3.1** **Freedom of movement**
Additionally, insights were drawn from the Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys (RRPS), [[9]] conducted

between 2020 and 2022, which included the Shona as a distinct stratum. The RRPS monitored the impact of the

pandemic on vulnerable groups, capturing critical data on employment disruptions, income losses, and food

insecurity during the crisis.

**The Shona community in Kenya has faced significant socioeconomic challenges, exacerbated by their stateless**

**status and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.** Before acquiring citizenship, Shona households faced a 24

percent higher likelihood of living in poverty compared to the urban Kenyan population and were more likely to

reside in larger, overcrowded households. Although primary school enrollment rates were similar to those of their

Kenyan counterparts, many Shona children struggled to transition to secondary education. Limited access to formal

employment, driven by a lack of legal documentation, has forced many Shona individuals into self-employment or

informal work. Even with high employment rates within the community, this does not translate into reduced

poverty, as most of the employment is low-income and lacks stability. [[8] ]

**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 3
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Chart 15. Ukrainian refugees wages median net wage by age group**

Monthly net wage (PLN) Percengate of all workers total economy average Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Chart 16. Median net wages of Ukrainian refugees median net wage by sector**

in PLN Percentage of total economy average 126% 15 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 15 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 Ukrainian refugees All workers Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on SEIS UNHCR survey and GUS data.

**The Ukrainian refugee groups to earn**

**the highest wages compared to the**

**wages in the economy as a whole are**
The   ongoing   presence   of   armed   actors   in   places   of   displacement   and   potential   return
remains   a   key   concern.   Communities   have   been   subject   to   protection   risks   associated
with   the   presence   of   military   units   including   forced   labour,   forced   recruitment   and   the
payment   of   “taxes.”   In   addition,   Myanmar   is   believed   to   have   a   large   number   of   children
in   armed   conflict,   including   child   soldiers,   with   both   the   Government   and   various   non-­‐
state   armed   actors   having   been   responsible   for   the   recruitment   of   minors.   On   27 [th] June
2012,   the   United   Nations   Country   Task   Force   on   Monitoring   and   Reporting   (CTFMR)
and   the   Government   signed   a   Plan   of   Action   with   regards   to   underage   recruitment   in   the
Myanmar   Army.   Procedures   are   underway   for   the   systematic   identification   and
discharge   of   verified   minors   from   the   national   forces.   However,   plans   of   action   with
non-­‐state   armed   groups   in   the   South-­‐East   have   not   yet   been   agreed   and   it   remains   to   be
seen   whether   the   Plan   of   Action   with   the   Government   will   be   comprehensively
implemented.
While   all   the   conditions   and   safeguards   for   an   organized   voluntary   return   to   South-­‐East
Myanmar   are   not   yet   in   place,   positive   political   and   economic   reforms   and   security
developments   have   increased   momentum   for   preparing   for   a   possible   voluntary   return
of   refugees   from   Thailand   and   durable   solutions   for   people   internally   displaced   as   a
result   of   protracted   conflict.   A   small   number   of   refugees   are   reported   to   have   returned

2 ‘Temporary   shelters’   is   the   Royal   Thai   Government   term   used   to   identify   the   refugee   camps   along   the
border.

2
**Access to services**

**Since 2020, the Shona community has made significant strides in the enjoyment of rights and access to essential**

**services and social, economic, and financial opportunities.** The acquisition of citizenship has enabled the

community to access critical documentation, with 86 percent of individuals now holding a national ID, citizenship,

or birth certificate. This remarkable progress has facilitated their inclusion in various social and economic

opportunities.

**Access to financial services has also improved significantly.** The proportion of community members with bank

accounts increased from 9 percent in 2019 to 35 percent in 2024, while mobile wallet usage saw a surge from 52

percent to an impressive 97 percent. This suggests that the community has leveraged citizenship to integrate more

fully into the formal financial system, enhancing their economic participation.

**Health insurance coverage has nearly tripled over the past five years.** The percentage of Shona individuals with

health insurance rose from 4 percent in 2019 to 11 percent in 2024, compared to 24 percent nationally _._ [[10]] Although

the current coverage rate remains low, this growth indicates an increasing awareness and ability to access

healthcare services, possibly due to better employment prospects and social benefits associated with citizenship.
2. Regulatory Environment and Governance

### **2. Regulatory Environment and Governance**

**2.1** **Normative framework**

[Chad, already a state party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,](https://www.unhcr.org/fr/media/convention-et-protocole-relatifs-au-statut-des-refugies)
and the [1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specifc Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, enacted](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36400-treaty-0005_-_oau_convention_governing_the_specific_aspects_of_refugee_problems_in_africa_e.pdf)
[a new asylum Law on 31 December 2020 (Loi No. 027/PR/2020 Portant Asile en République du Tchad).](https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/606334e04.pdf)
Consistent with the recent legislation consolidating past practices, CNARR, through its Eligibility Sub
Commission, remains the primary authority for asylum at first instance. Over the past three years, CNARR
has employed prima facie refugee recognition during the registration phase for asylum-seekers from Central
African Republican hosted in the South of Chad, those from Nigeria hosted in the Western Chad, and equally
for those fleeing Sudan, including for non-Chadian persons forcibly displaced since the outbreak of 15 April
2023. Other asylum-seekers have undergone an individualized RSD procedure handled by CNARR. While
there have been some enhancements in asylum legislation, notably with the recent promulgation of the
2023 Decree aiming to improve the efficiency of individualized RSD procedures, implementation challenges
persist. Issues include permanent rotation of CNARR staff, inadequate training for CNARR eligibility officers
in interview techniques, legal assessments and the use of country-of-origin information. Non-compliance
with first-instance asylum processing delays stipulated in the asylum legislation is also observed. Despite
mine). Women are more likely to earn cash and less likely to work in agriculture after mine

openings. We find similar results when we analyze the effects at the district level and when we

use production levels instead of openings and closings of mines. We interpret this as there being

additional effects of being very close to a mine (within 20 km), beyond the effects from being

in a mining district. No spillovers into neighboring districts are detected.

The results are in accordance with the results in Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016), who find similar

effects on occupation in mining communities across the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa, and with

Aragón and Rud (2013), who find that agricultural productivity in Ghana is reduced by mining

production nearby. We find no statistically significant results on wealth and inequality, although

the results point toward increases in both. The effects on infrastructure are ambiguous; we

cannot detect any better access to flush toilets and radios, and the effects on electricity access

are negative. Further decomposing these effects, we learn that migrant households are less

likely to have access to electricity (compared with the change among migrant households living
**Net primary school enrolment shows a slight decline but is attributed to changes in the education system rather**

**than reduced access.** The enrolment rate decreased from 81 percent in 2019 to 75 percent in 2024. However, this

is likely due to the adjustment in the age bracket for primary school in Kenya under national education reforms

launched in in 2022, which has led to a temporary underestimation of the enrollment rate. Despite this, the Shona

community's access to primary education remains strong and stable.

_Figure 2: Access to essential services, pre- and post-citizenship_

_Source: 2019 Shona socioeconomic survey_ [[8]] _and the authors’ calculation of 2024 survey data._

**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 5
**Immigrants could possess complementary skills that**

**make native workers more productive as they specialise.**
These skills do not even need to be advanced to be complementary. Natives are likely to deal better with communications-intensive tasks and have better networking, all of which may be better paid and not easily transferable between countries. OECD (2016) gives an example of a native carpenter, who employs an immigrant to do his previous manual tasks and himself focuses on marketing and business development.
Such occupational upgrading has been first shown in a seminal paper by Peri and Sparber (2009) in the USA data, but has been quickly extended to other countries. From this perspective Foged and Peri (2016) look at refugees in Denmark in the 19912008 period. They find that inflow of low-skill refugees caused less educated native workers to pursue less manual-intensive tasks - improving their wages, employment, and occupational mobility. These effects are causal, as the authors exploit the refugee dispersal system, which is orthogonal to economic opportunities.

**Immigrants could enter childcare, elderly care, and**

**housekeeping services, allowing highly educated and**
Despite the possible gains in wages for wage earners, we note a decrease in the regionally

deflated total household expenditure (column 5), and a decrease in per capita expenditure on

food and nonfood items (column 4). The increase in wages but decrease in total expenditure

can possibly be explained by rising prices and wages in mining communities, where everyone

has to pay the higher prices but only some (those who earn wages), benefit from a rise in wage

rate.

Columns 6 through 9 of table 12 look at nondeflated expenditure measures for food, housing,

health and education, and household energy. [17] We confirm that total household expenditure on

food decreases (compared with the per capita deflated measure in column (4)), but find that

households spend more money on housing, transport, and communication, and household

energy, such as electricity and gas. The electricity and gas expenditure is only for those who

have any positive expenditure on these, and we saw earlier that electricity access changes with

the mine. This confirms that, among those who spend anything on electricity, they spend more

on it in mining communities.

**Table 12 Using GLSS: Household income and expenditure**

---
[17] Additional results for recreation and transport and communication are available upon request. The expenditure
_UNHCR   Discussion   Paper   –15   June   2013_

lack   of   skilled   personnel,   facilities,   basic   equipment   and   supplies,   including   in   terms   of
potentially   life-­‐saving   reproductive   health,   malaria   prevention   and   control   and   HIV
services.

The   education   sector   is   also   substantially   underserved   and   not   of   adequate   standards,
with   a   shortage   of   teachers   and   an   inadequate   number   of   primary   schools   within
reasonable   distance   of   many   communities.   Regular   school   attendance   is   hampered   by
education   costs,   distances,   illness,   work   requirements,   insecurity   in   conflict-­‐affected
areas   and,   for   ethnic   minority   children,   “language   barrier”.   Most   children   have   limited
opportunity   to   continue   their   education   beyond   primary   school.

Access   to   safe   drinking   water,   particularly   in   rural   areas   and   during   the   dry   season   is
uneven   and   in   many   locations   insufficient,   with   those   water   sources   available   during   the
dry   season   located   far   away   from   human   dwellings.   Standards   of   sanitation   are   very   low,
with   open   defecation   common   and   household   latrines   less   than   international   standards.
Sample distribution by geographical strata, Poland 5,645 13,420 Jul-Aug UNHCR, IOM followed by random selection of districts, and convenience sampling for household selection.

CSCM, IOM, Romania 1,222 3,485 Jul-Sep UNHCR UNHCR, IOM, Slovakia 819 1,853 Jul-Aug WHO, UNICEF, SHC

**Total** **11,530** **27,302** **Jun-Sep**

Sample distribution by geographical strata, and simple random selection of households from cash enrolment lists.

Two strata (collective sites vs. private accommodation); random selection of districts and convenience sampling for household selection.

### **Limitations**

The statistical significance of the MSNA results is limited by the non-probabilistic selection of respondents. Moreover, the use of convenience sampling likely led to a larger share of data being collected from more vulnerable households.

There was also a notably high non-response rate regarding questions related to income and expenditure, which likely resulted in non-response bias. The income module of the MSNA was also materially different from the one employed by EU SILC, which may limit comparability of this data to that of host populations.
dropping from 33 percent to 21 percent.  The literacy rate has remained constant at 93 percent, reflecting sustained

access to education. Overall, the Shona community's demographic profile suggests stability and gradual socio
economic integration following their acquisition of citizenship.

_Table 1: Demographic characteristics of Shona community in Kenya._

_Source: 2019 Shona socioeconomic survey_ [[8]] _and the authors’ calculation of 2024 survey data._

**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 4
Many   people   do   not   possess   a   Citizenship   Scrutiny   Card   (or   “CSC”)   either   because   they
live   or   used   to   live   in   conflict   areas   controlled   by   ethnic   armed   groups   with   no
Government   representation,   or   simply   because   they   do   not   have   access   to   the
administrative   mechanisms   that   issue   these   documents.   Furthermore,   the   Government
in   the   past   limited   distribution   of   CSCs   in   border   areas   to   contain   movement   of   people
linked   to   ethnic   armed   groups.   Very   few   IDPs   held   CSCs   before   their   displacement,   and   it
may   be   extremely   difficult   for   people   who   have   been   displaced   as   refugees   or   IDPs,
particularly   from   areas   controlled   by   ethnic   armed   groups,   to   provide   the   necessary
documentation   to   obtain   CSCs.   Additionally,   persons   not   belonging   to   one   of   the
officially   recognized   “ethnic   groups”   face   difficulty   in   acquiring   CSCs,   despite   the   fact
that   there   are   relevant   provisions   available   for   them   under   the   Myanmar   Citizenship
Law.   In   July   2011,   the   Immigration   and   National   Registration   Department   of   the
Ministry   of   Immigration   and   Population   initiated   the   Moe   Pwint   Operation,   which   is   an
accelerated   procedure   to   issue   CSCs,   especially   in   areas   that   were   remote   and/or
difficult   to   access   in   the   past   because   of   the   presence   of   non-­‐state   armed   groups.
Indonesia’s National Refugee Task Force, established in 2019, remains an important Government entity
in the management of refugee affairs. Deputy V in POLHUKAM is the head of the National Refugee
Task Force and members include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a wide range of security-focused
actors. Several local refugee task forces operate in provinces hosting refugees and remain active and
important counterparts. UNHCR also works with a range of partners in Indonesia, particularly IOM,
YCWS, and YKMI in several areas of protection and assistance. In addition, UNHCR works with nongovernmental, civil society and refugee-led organizations, as well as other UN agencies working with
and advocating for the rights of the refugee population in Indonesia.

**Locations of Persons Registered with UNHCR**