ai4data/datause-dataset-rechunked huggingface dataset:
THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE It is important to note that while the poverty definition adopted in this assessment allows for comparisons across the countries covered (both regarding the refugee and local populations, though limitations need to be taken into account), it may not be directly comparable to other studies, as approaches tend to vary quite significantly. The setup of the questionnaire, the sampling methodology, the amount of non-response bias (and whether any corrections for it were done), the process adapted to equivalize income, and finally the location of the poverty line itself in the income range can have a substantial impact on the calculated indicators.

Random selection of settlements and convenience Bulgaria 1,054 2,255 Jul-Aug Global Metrics Ltd sampling for household selection.

Czech Sample distribution by geographical strata and 1,218 2,648 June-Jul SocioFactor Republic convenience sampling for household selection.

Tárki Social Hungary 682 1,511 Jun-Aug Research Institute, IOM, UNHCR Random selection of districts and convenience sampling for household selection.

Sample distribution by geographical strata and Moldova 890 2,130 Aug-Sep REACH, UNHCR convenience sampling for household selection.
**PC partners.**

The morning session focused on explain
ing the concept of mixed migration and

various migratory profiles, emphasiz
ing the distinctions between the causes

and consequences of migration through

group dynamics. In the latter part of the

session, the meaning of durable solu
tions and the criteria for achieving them

were presented in relation to migratory

profiles and the Venezuelan context.

Finally, together with IOM, a session on

returns and reintegration was included

to discuss practical implementation

of durable solutions. A total of 20 local

and international organizations, part of

the PC, participated, and the feedback

received was positive. Finally, to assure

that this information reaches colleagues

in the field, an online session was orga
nized on November 7th. Despite the

challenges posed by virtual sessions,

28 people attended the session, showed

interest in the topic, and actively par
ticipated during the organized group

dynamics.

**XI. Reporting Transition to 345W**

**During September and October, two**

**training sessions were conducted**

**with Protection Cluster Partners to**

**facilitate the transition from the 5W**

**system to the 345W reporting plat-**

**form.** Adjustments were made in the

platform to reinforce quality controls, and

Areas of Improvement were identified
Despite   the   positive   developments   outlined   above,   considerable   uncertainty   remains
around   whether   the   cease-­‐fire   agreements   will   lead   to   durable   peace   accords.   There
were   a   number   of   clashes   between   armed   groups   and   the   Myanmar   army   reported   in
2012   in   Shan,   Kayah   and   Kayin.   Trust   in   the   Government   is   yet   to   be   built   in   cease-­‐fire
areas,   after   a   long   history   of   human   rights   abuses.   Developments   in   relation   to   the
conflict   in   Kachin   will   also   play   a   role   in   influencing   the   prospects   for   peace   elsewhere.
Peace   agreements   will   involve   decisions   on   how   best   to   share   revenues   from   the   natural
resources   in   cease-­‐fire   areas,   how   much   to   devolve   political   and   economic   authority   to
the   regional   level,   as   well   as   how   to   maintain   ethnic   culture   and   language.   Negotiations
have   been   and   will   continue   to   be   extremely   complex   and   the   trajectory   of   the   process
therefore   remains   uncertain.
Refugees’ impact on the economy manifests in a multi-layered fashion. An influx of refugees means first and foremost an increase in population. As such, they enter the economy boosting the labour market as new workers, increase demand as new consumers, and stimulate business by creating market niches catering to their needs and as potential new business owners. However, their characteristics differ from the local population (in terms of gender, age, education, skills etc.) meaning their impact as both workers as well as consumers would not be proportional to increases in population. Refugees also differ in their characteristics with other migrants. Although their economic impact in the literature is modelled similarly to the impact of other migrant groups, they also differ from them due to life circumstances.
While immigration systems generally rely on 30
On 27 June 2023, Chad’s National Transitional Council (CNT) officially adopted the proposed new
Constitution. This Constitution aims to restore constitutional order and conclude the transition initiated
after the passing of former President Idriss Déby on 19 April 2021. Drawing from the 1996 Constitution,
the document incorporates recommendations from the national dialogue. Notably, the reinstatement
of institutions such as the Senate, the High Court of Justice and the Supreme Court occurs, preserving
the decentralized unitary state. Half of the cross-cutting recommendations from the Sovereign National
Inclusive Dialogue (DNIS) concentrate on fostering social cohesion. The primary focus of the Post-DNIS
Transition Specifications’ initial strategic axis revolves around Defence, Security, Peace, Social Cohesion
and National Reconciliation. Consequently, the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion has
been established.

[As part of the RESILAC project funded by the European Union (EU) and the French Development Agency](https://www.urd.org/fr/publication/rapports-de-capitalisation-du-projet-resilac-2020-2022/)
[(AFD), the capitalization report on the implementation of social cohesion activities in the Lake Chad basin](https://www.urd.org/fr/publication/rapports-de-capitalisation-du-projet-resilac-2020-2022/)
[(2022)](https://www.urd.org/fr/publication/rapports-de-capitalisation-du-projet-resilac-2020-2022/) recommended strengthening social cohesion at various levels (community members, groups,
institutions) and adopting a cross-cutting approach coupled with economic recovery and institutional
support activities.
including physical and sexual abuse and neglect; children are kept from school due to difficulties
paying for incidental school expenses; refugees have limited opportunities to productively engage in
Indonesia by developing and utilizing skills and capacities in an employment setting, impacting both
the quality of their experience in the host country and opportunities to access a third country solution
through labor mobility; barriers to accessing the workplace limit opportunities to meaningfully
interact with Indonesians, impacting social cohesion between refugees and their hosts; refugees are
unable to make positive contributions to the Indonesian economy while residing in the country; etc.

### **Smuggling and Trafficking**
There   are   no   mine   maps   currently   available   and   the   extent   of   the   threat   is   impossible   to
accurately   assess.   However,   it   is   suspected   that   Myanmar   is   one   of   the   most   highly
landmine-­‐contaminated   countries   in   the   world,   with   these   devices   continuing   to   claim
several   hundred   civilian   victims   each   year.   Myanmar   has   not   acceded   to   the   Mine   Ban
Treaty   but   has   recently   set   up   a   Myanmar   Mine   Action   Centre,   under   the   Myanmar
Peace   Centre   (MPC) [4] to   co-­‐ordinate   and   oversee   the   implementation   of   a   national

3 _Changing   Realities,   Poverty   and   Displacement   In   South   East   Burma/Myanmar_,   The   Border   Consortium,   31
October   2012, http://www.tbbc.org/resources).

---
[4] The   Myanmar   Peace   Centre   (MPC)   was   established   in   October   2012   by   a   Presidential   Decree   to   serve   as
**Unaccounted positive externalities**
All our theoretical economic modelling results are conservative lower bound estimates, as econometric studies from other countries have found immigration to have additionally a positive impact on labour productivity that cannot be accounted for using the available data.
According to these econometric studies, immigration can not only raise economic output (i.e., more workers equal more production), but more importantly labour productivity (i.e., more value added per worker). Such results are unfortunately too aggregated to disentangle the constituent effects (Chapter 4).
immigration in a sample of 18 developed OECD countries during the 1980-2010 period. Authors find that increase of immigrant share in the adult population by 1 percentage point raises labour productivity and GDP per capita in the longterm by about 2%. They also examine impacts for the population in top 10% and bottom 90% of income distribution of tertiary and non-tertiary educated immigrants. Effects are similarly 2-3%, apart from the impact of tertiary educated immigrants on population in the top 10%, which are about 6%. These are not just correlations, but causal estimates, as authors carefully address potential problems of reverse causality (i.e., that immigrants may migrate to countries with better growth prospects, instead of improving them). They want to estimate the impact of immigrant shares on GDP per capita, but these could be correlated (biasing the result) as GDP per capita is a pull factor for immigrants. To resolve this, they first create an “instrument” for immigrant shares by estimating a model that predicts them based on country-of-origin push factors and bilateral migration costs determined by geography and culture. In effect they can now control for reverse causality.
Smooth inclusion of refugees on labour market thus far was enabled by proper policies. In response to the war escalation in Ukraine and the influx of refugees into the EU, prompt actions were taken both at EU and national level.

Refugees from Ukraine in the European Union are covered by the Temporary Protection Directive TPD, which was activated on 4th March 2022 (European Council, 2022). The regulation aims to support EU Member States’ asylum schemes and to ensure harmonised rights for the incoming Ukrainian refugees throughout the EU. It also includes citizens who fled Ukraine not long before 24th February and those who were outside the
Lower income households are, on the other hand, much more dependent on social protection benefits. These comprise almost half of all earnings.
Two thirds of the income provided by social protection is generated by the host country, with the remainder mostly coming from pensions paid by Ukraine (13% of all adults below the poverty line are of pension age as opposed to 5% above it).

**The overall employment rate of refugees from**

**Ukraine is almost in line with host country**

**nationals**
Across the region, employment stands out as the largest source of income for refugee households by far (64% of all earnings). In some countries – such as Hungary and Poland this share is even larger (at 74% and 68%, respectively). Moldova appears to be an outlier, with employment representing only 32% of respondent household income, but this figure may have been affected by sampling limitations.
- Refugees   and   IDPs   are   provided   with   accurate   and   up-­‐to-­‐date   information   that   is
objectively   presented   and   consistent   with   humanitarian   protection   and   human
rights   principles   and   a   wide   range   of   representatives   are   allowed   to   visit   places
of   origin   or   intended   return.

- All   stakeholders   at   all   level   have   a   clear   understanding   and   commitment   to   the
principles   and   standards   underpinning   durable   solutions.

- The   Government   includes   local   integration/reintegration   needs   of   IDPs   and
returning   refugees   in   its   long   term   development   plans.

- Sufficient   resources   are   available   to   increase   UNHCR   and   partners’   operational
capacity   in   the   immediate   to   longer   term.   Investments   are   made   by   development
actors   in   long-­‐term   reconstruction   and   development   projects.   Many   places   of
origin   of   refugees   are   isolated   and   have   received   little   investment   in
infrastructures   or   in   the   creation   of   livelihood   opportunities   that   can   support   the
sustainability   of   the   return   process.

11
**even greater disparity in financial wellbeing**

At the regional level, the weighted average share of the host population living in rented housing was calculated at 13% based on Eurostat data. This figure is dwarfed by 60% of refugee households fully paying rent for their accommodation and 21% partially paying, as per the SEIS survey. Likewise, accommodation expenses as a share of disposable income were estimated at 17% for hosts, including mortgages, compared to 32% for refugees. This essentially implies that refugees, on average, have a much smaller share of their disposable income remaining for other needs. To estimate the magnitude of this effect, poverty rates were recalculated after subtracting the portion of housing expenses that exceed the national average directly from disposable income. This calculation almost doubled the poverty rate, bringing it to 40%.

11. Defined as someone feeling so upset, anxious, worried, agitated, or depressed that it affects daily functioning

**5**
the general population. UNHCR (2025b), using a different method than the one in this report, estimated average instead of median net wages based on the SEIS data. The average net wage of a Ukrainian refugee they arrived at was PLN 4,214, only slightly higher than calculated above. This would yield 72% of the national average net wage. [15] Average is not used here, because median is more relevant for discussing economic impact, as it is not disrupted by bottom or top earnings. Furthermore, there are no outside estimates to compare it to. Second, as discussed previously, there are much fewer Ukrainian refugees with employment contracts than Poles, and this lowers their social contributions and thus gross earnings. Unfortunately, there is no such data available, as both SEIS and NBP (2024) measure only net earnings.

**Chart 13. Polish citizens and Ukrainian refugees’ employment rates by age group**

Male Female

**Chart 14. Ukrainian refugee median net wage estimates in Q2 2024**

Monthly net wage (PLN) Percengate of all workers total economy average 84% UNHCR NBP UNHCR NBP 15 May - 24 June 2024 6 May - 5 July 2024 15 May - 24 June 2024 6 May - 5 July 2024
[In addition to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of movement, Article 21 of the Asylum Law](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) confirms
that refugees and asylum-seekers in possession of their identification documents enjoy the right to circulate
and to reside in Chad in the same conditions as nationals. Furthermore, Article 73 of the [2023 Decree](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)
outlines that the refugee identity card allows the free movement of refugees in the conditions specified
by the law. Additionally, Article 61 of the 2023 Decree specifically addressing local integration of refugees
recognizes, as part of the perquisite to achieve self-reliance, among others, the freedom of movement and
the right to settle in places favourable to their self-reliance.

However, regarding asylum-seekers, it is important to note that Article 20 of the 2020 Law, incorporating
the principle of non-penalization for illegal entry, specifies in its second paragraph that the movement of
asylum-seekers is restricted only if necessary and as long as their refugee status is not determined or until
they have been admitted to another host country.

Refugees and asylum seekers continue to have access to a free travel permit issued by CNARR (saufconduits). This document specifies the intended destination and the duration of absence from the camp.
requests.

### **Solutions - Resettlement**

UNHCR Indonesia continues to identify and submit refugees for resettlement consideration. In 2024,
950 resettlement spaces have been made available for refugees in Indonesia. UNHCR seeks to ensure
the most vulnerable refugees are prioritized for resettlement consideration, assessing heightened
specific needs and protection concerns, as well as length of stay in the country, when identifying cases
for submission.

### **Solutions - Complementary Pathways**
to the MSNA Poland 2023 survey, 20% of Ukrainian refugee households earn less than 3 000 PLN, 41% earn between 3 000 and 6 000 PLN, and 12% earn more than 6 000 PLN, while 27% of respondents preferred not to answer. That said, the standard of living of Ukrainian refugees may be significantly lower than that of native residents, even at similar incomes, due to their lack of housing, which in Poland is usually occupant-owned.

**Inflow of Ukrainian refugees into**
- Governments, development and humanitarian actors take into account poverty levels when designing their
support programs for Ukrainian refugees. The quality of day to day life, safety, and level of access to key services are directly tied to household income.

- Poverty measures account for differences in housing costs between refugees and host populations.

- A special focus is placed on supporting refugee employment at their skill level, including transition from
current low-level jobs. The difference between refugee and local population wages could be an important metric to monitor on an ongoing basis
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

## Executive summary

##### Progress in market integration

**Ukrainian refugees have been**

**increasingly successful in terms of**

**labour market integration.** The large
influx of refugees since February 2022, has further increased and changed the demographics of the already significant Ukrainian migrant population in Poland.
Refugees from Ukraine are primarily women and children, with over 67% of female-headed households. Poland was quick to open its labour market to refugees from Ukraine, who – despite difficulties

- surprisingly promptly began their
economic integration and soon supported themselves primarily from employment.
In the past year, refugees’ employment rate grew from 61% to 69%, with the median net wage rising from PLN 3,100 to PLN 4,000 and narrowing the gap to the median net wage in the entire economy.

**As Ukrainian refugees entered the**

**labour market, the economy adapted,**

**resulting in more specialization and**
HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

# **Summary of findings and** **recommendations**

The 2024 round of the SEIS survey indicates that while the financial vulnerability of refugees from Ukraine residing in neighboring countries - specifically those included in the [Regional Refugee Response Plan - has](https://www.unhcr.org/europe/publications/regional-refugee-response-plan-2025-2026) declined over the past year [1], one in five still live with an income below the poverty line [2] . When factoring in the disproportionately high accommodation costs refugees face, largely due to the region’s high homeownership rates among locals, the poverty rate [3] rises to 40%, more than three times that of host communities [4] .
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland The above results do not distinguish between Ukrainian refugees improving the labour market outcomes in the poviats they arrived in and Ukrainian refugees disproportionately moving to the poviats with better performance, which continued to perform better in subsequent quarters. This distinction is mostly academic, as causality is always uncertain in social sciences, as effects can run both ways. However, instrumental variable regressions have been performed to ascertain causal effects. This approach is widely used in studies focused on the impact of migration on socio-economic outcomes. This econometric technique additionally uses variables that correlate well with Ukrainian refugees’ employment shares, but do not directly cause changes to the Polish citizens' employment rate or to the unemployment rate. Two variables have been used: the first was the share of Ukrainian children in Polish schools, and the second was the pre-war distribution of Ukrainian citizens based on notifications of entrusting work to a foreigner. Unfortunately, panel fixed effects regressions with quarterly dummies showed statistically insignificant results for either instruments or both. In addition, regressions using only the instrumental variable for the distribution of pre-war Ukrainian citizens reveal only a modest link to the employment share of Ukrainian refugees.