ai4data/datause-dataset-rechunked huggingface dataset:
The number of people of working age in Poland is shrinking and is expected to keep declining. Although substantial migrations from Poland after EU accession in 2004 [19] distort population data, the domestic working age population is declining. According to the Labour Force Survey, which better accounts for emigration than the prevalent population definition, the number of Polish citizens aged 20-64 peaked in early 2010, with 23.5 million people. Since then, it has declined by 2.6 million. This trend is set to continue. According to the latest Eurostat projections, without migration, the population (counting all nationalities) aged 20-64 years would decrease by 4.8 million by 2050. [20] © UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz 19 Statistics Poland data, [https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/internationa-migration/information-on-the-size-and-directions-of-emigration-for-](https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/internationa-migration/information-on-the-size-and-directions-of-emigration-for-temporary-stay-from-poland-between-2004-2020,8,14.html)
[temporary-stay-from-poland-between-2004-2020,8,14.html](https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/internationa-migration/information-on-the-size-and-directions-of-emigration-for-temporary-stay-from-poland-between-2004-2020,8,14.html)

---
[20] Eurostat data, [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/proj_23np__custom_8710248/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=97472dd3-3dd2-](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/proj_23np__custom_8710248/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=97472dd3-3dd2-4aca-a51f-15c98be37466)
Interestingly, while women and girls and younger men and boys were more likely to access formal services than informal supports, older men (age 35 and older) were more likely to access informal supports than formal services. These results may suggest that while older men are less likely to access formal MHPSS services, perhaps due to stigma or other factors, some may turn to informal means, such as support from friends, family and spirituality.

**22**

60+ years old 35-59 18-34 12-17 5-11 (N=360) 28% 37% 56% 71% 71% 18% 11%

### **Location of** **Received MHPSS**

MHPSS services were most commonly accessed in community centres (38%), followed by online platforms (18%), reception hubs such as Blue Dots (14%), healthcare settings (13%), religious settings (11%), schools (8%), workplaces (4%), and through phone or hotlines (4%). Additionally, 11% indicated “other” locations. This distribution underscores the importance of diverse and accessible service locations to meet varied needs and preferences, leveraging both formal and informal support systems.
# **From Stateless to Citizens: the journey** **of the Shona community in Kenya**

Preliminary results from a socioeconomic study on the impact of citizenship on socioeconomic and living conditions.

" _Getting a national ID has really helped me. I can now move freely without fear of getting arrested. I have access to better job_

_opportunities too because of the access the ID has been able to give me. My kids can now pursue their education comfortably because_

_I know I can support them with access to more work opportunities._ " - Azariah Samuel, 27-year-old father of two during a follow-up

socioeconomic study on the Shona community in Kenya. © UNHCR/Charity Nzomo.

**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 1
confirmed the results found in international literature presented above. The most important result is that Ukrainian refugees who are fluent in Polish earn a net wage premium of about PLN 700 (+16% relative to refugee net median wage, PLN 1,000 gross wage) when compared to those with beginner language skills. This result is stable across different model specifications. Note that such an earnings gain would bring the median net wage of a Ukrainian refugee (estimated based on the SEIS UNHCR survey in chapter 2) from 80% to 98% of the median in the economy as a whole (or from 80% to 93% according to Ukrainian refugee’s median in the NBP’s 2024 survey), almost closing the gap to the economy as a whole in these terms. It is in fact higher than the PLN 500 median net wage premium of the pre-war Ukrainian migrants over Ukrainian refugees in the NBP (2024) survey, even though 68% of the former and only 28% of the latter said they had a high level of fluency in Polish.

31
##### **September/ October 2023 report**

###### Venezuela

**ProCap Senior Protection Advisor**

**have provided the WASH, Shelter,**

**Logistics, Health, Education, Food**

**Security, Nutrition Cluster as well as**

**Venezuelan Humanitarian Fund (VHF)**

**partners a Protection Mainstreaming**

**in-person training.** The training com
prised a theoretical component covering i)

humanitarian and protection principles, ii)

fundamental protection concepts and the

risk equation, iii) the distinction between

integrated protection and protection

mainstreaming and their definitions. The

second part involved a practical exercise

where participants selected an activity

within their sector, analyzed the context,

identified three primary protection risks,

and applied the protection equation.

This dynamic and participative exercise

allowed participants to present their

activities and benefit from constructive

feedback. Overall, the positive feedback

given by participants shows the need to

**8**

strengthen humanitarian organizations'

understanding on Protection Main
streaming to guarantee the Centrality of

Protection is in place in the humanitarian

response.

**X. Training on Mixed Migration**

**and Durable Solutions**

**A full-day training session on Mixed**

**Migration and Durable Solutions took**

**place on October 19th. The session**

**began with a review of basic protec-**

**tion concepts, followed by an analysis**

**of strategies to mitigate threats and**

**vulnerabilities, and enhance capabil-**

**ities through practical exercises with**
Instrumental variables regressions were performed with the Two Stage Least Squares technique. In the first stage, it adjusts for the non-random distribution of Ukrainian refugees across poviats, and in the second stage, it calculates the models. These results can be interpreted causally. The two previously mentioned instruments were used and yielded statistically significant results, as well as passed statistical tests on their appropriateness for instrumenting the employment share of Ukrainian refugees.
One instrument is the share of Ukrainian children in Polish schools, and the other is the distribution of Ukrainian citizens across Poland in 2019, as recorded in declarations
by Information Management (IM) per
sonnel in the Protection Cluster and the

Areas of Responsibility. The cluster's IM

automated data transformations to con
solidate information for the year 2023.

The pilot phase for the migration to 345W

has concluded, and final refinements are

underway. These refinements aim to

establish a more automated process for

reporting, validation, and consolidation

of partners' responses.
World Day Against Trafficking in Persons

2023. The document can be downloaded

[here link.](https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/publications/1586/reports/annual-report/boletin-anual-trata-de-personas-agosto-2022-agosto-2o23)

**VII. Food Security and Liveli-**

**hoods (FSL) and Trafficking in**

**Persons (TiP)**

**Under the Food Security and Live-**

**lihoods (FSL) Cluster consultancy,**

**research has been done to under-**

**stand the connection between food**

**insecurity, lack of livelihoods and**

**the likelihood of being recruited into**
Ukraine Refugee Pulse, which is based on a survey carried out between October and December 2022, 40% of respondents have enough income to meet basic needs or are able to support the same lifestyle they had in Ukraine, while 60% say they do not have enough income or have to rely on savings and welfare. At the same time 62% reported staying in accommodation for which they pay themselves.
MSNA Poland 2023 survey also shows that when asked whether they faced any challenges obtaining enough money to meet their needs, the refugees were nearly equally split (around 0.5% more reported no difficulties), with an additional 8% not knowing or refusing to answer. According to the National Bank of Poland survey carried out in November 2022, 28% of refugees said they spend less than half of their income on daily expenses, most spend between 50% and 80%, and 19% spend 80100% of their income.

###### Currently between 225 and 350 thousand of refugees from Ukraine are working in Poland. The lower bound is the number from social security, while the higher bound is the product of employment rate from the surveys and working age population with PESEL numbers.
**it on a higher growth path.** According
to the Deloitte D.Climate model, economic impact of Ukrainian refugees amounted to a higher real GDP by 1.5% in 2022, as they initially entered the labour market.
With more refugees finding employment, their impact grew to 2.3% GDP in 2023, and further to 2.7% GDP in 2024. This corresponds to GDP being higher by PLN 98.7 billion in 2024. In the long term, as the refugees acquire more country-specific skills and firms invest to restore their capital-to-labour ratio, the impact will grow to 3.2% GDP by 2030. Refugees contribute to the economy by increasing the labour supply as both workers and entrepreneurs, and by boosting demand as consumers.
The increase in GDP is not directly proportional to the increase in population or employment. [20] On the one hand, increase in productivity further boosts the economy, on the other net benefits are lowered both due to a decrease in the capital-to-labour ratio, as well as an increase in competition in the labour market. Moreover, the increase in demand in tight labour market conditions work in the direction of higher inflation and lower price competitiveness of Polish products which decrease its overall positive impact.
physical health of the members of the

community was improved thanks to the

work of PUI, which translates in the need

of the PC to keep supporting partners

implementing such relevant projects in

communities of difficult access.

[Full access to the story through this link.](https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/publications/1658/reports/report/historias-de-impacto-cluster-de-proteccion-venezuela-septiembre)
The Polish government introduced a Special Act [26] that facilitated refugees’ inclusion. The work on the Act started when the activation of TPD was not certain, but later it was used for transposition of TPD. As a result, the Polish framework is very similar to the TPD, though the scope of the Act is wider than the TPD.
However, it only covers those that arrived in Poland after 24th February 2022.
This legal framework gave access to the job market, health care and education.
The authorities allowed those fleeing Ukraine to access basic administrative systems like PESEL and “Trusted Profile”, and legalised residency for 18 months.
The government's solutions allow refugees to get a job, run a business or register as unemployed or seeking work.
On top of that, due to constitutional guarantee of access to education for everyone, refugee children were allowed to access schools and kindergartens.

Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland

**Chart 12.** Structure by occupational group of all employed persons and refugees from Ukraine

All employed persons Ukrainian refugees 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

**Source:** Deloitte own elaboration based on Statistics Poland and ZUS data.

---
[26] Act of March 12, 2022 on assistance to citizens of Ukraine in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of the country
As of 30 June 2023, only 1.6 per cent of Chad’s population is covered by the social protection framework,
and the country spends 0.1 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product on social protection (excluding health
and education expenses). After a lengthy process, the document for the new National Social Protection
Strategy (SNPS) 2022-2026 has been finalized and is awaiting validation and signature by the transitional
government. The new SNPS spanning four years aims to gradually establish a comprehensive, effective
and efficient social protection system that addresses financial needs, livelihood security, risk management,
vulnerability reduction and access to basic social services for all individuals residing in Chad, including
refugees.

**1.2** **Social cohesion**
Labor force participation [14] is almost on par with the host country weighted average for the region, with just 2 percentage points difference between the two. This is surprising, considering that the distribution of refugee household members is heavily skewed towards women and dependents.
(73% of working age [15] individuals are female and the age dependency ratio stands at 63%, which is 10 percentage points above the regional weighted average). The most common activities reported by respondents who are out of the labor force are retirement (30%) and engagement in household responsibilities (31%). Across countries labor force participation looks uneven – it stands at a staggering 66% in Hungary (6 percentage points above the national indicator), and at just 36% in

**REFUGEE HOUSEHOLD INCOME SOURCES ABOVE AND BELOW THE POVERTY LINE, %** **[1,2]**

Regular employment Above the poverty line Below the poverty line Temporary work Self employment 35% Host country social protection payments 74% 12% Ukraine social protection pensions 34% Ukraine social protection other 9% 4% 6% 10% Other sources 3% 4% 7% Almost half of income of households below the poverty line depends on social protection

---
[15] In this context defined as individuals that are 15 or more years old
This contrasts with the government’s promotion of free land access which apply to all people involved
in agriculture. The current arrangements have led to a seasonal migration of refugees from the camps
to fields located in cantons up to 50 or 70 km away, where they establish temporary settlements. These
sharecropping agreements offer the advantage of fostering close relationships between refugees,
landowners and entire villages, because refugees set up tents with their families throughout the growing
season. Furthermore, refugees often do not receive documents confirming their right to sustained access
to the land used. Between 2020 and 2023, approximately 15,000 hectares of agricultural land have been
made available to refugees in Chad for exploitation purposes, under written or verbal agreements lasting
from one to three years.

In the current Ministry of Social Affairs, there is still no housing assistance program for vulnerable Chadian
nationals. Furthermore, the temporary support system for relocating populations affected by floods in the
capital, primarily backed by the humanitarian actors, does not extend its coverage to refugees.

**3.4** **Financial and administrative services**
main shareowner in the mine. Most of these 17 mines have foreign ownership, such as

Australian, Canadian, or South African, sometimes in partnership with Ghanaian firms or the

Ghanaian state. Most are open-pit mines, although a few consist of a combination of open-pit

and underground operations.

**Table 1 Gold Mines in Ghana**

**Name** **Opening** **Closing year** **Company** **Country**

**year**

Ahafo 2006 active Newmont Mining Corp. USA
Bibiani 1998 active Noble Mineral Resources Australia
Bogoso Prestea 1990 active Golden Star Resources USA
Chirano 2005 active Kinross Gold Canada
Damang 1997 active Gold Fields Ghana Ltd. South Africa
Edikan (Ayanfuri) 1994 active Perseus Mining Australia
Iduapriem 1992 active AngloGold Ashanti South Africa
Jeni (Bonte) 1998 2003 Akrokeri-Ashanti Canada
Konongo 1990 active LionGold Corp. Singapore
Kwabeng 1990 1993 Akrokeri-Ashanti Canada
Nzema 2011 active Endeavour Canada
Obotan 1997 2001 PMI Gold Canada
Obuasi 1990 active AngloGold Ashanti South Africa
Prestea Sankofa 1990 2001 Anglogold Ashanti South Africa
Tarkwa 1990 active Gold Fields Ghana Ltd. South Africa
Teberebie 1990 2005 Anglogold Ashanti South Africa
Wassa 1999 active Golden Star Resources USA
_Source:_ InterraRMG 2013.

_Note:_ Active is production status as of December 2012, the last available data point.

6
**The overall decline in total employment from 74 percent in 2019 to 70 percent in 2024 is indicative of the sum of**

**these shocks.** Although men have re-entered the labor force at a faster rate, the community as a whole is still in

the process of economic recovery. The proportion of unemployed individuals has remained relatively low,

suggesting that many are still re-entering the labor market or seeking labor market opportunities. Only 13 percent

of the Shona working wage-earners have some form of employment contract, demonstrating a high prevalence of

informal work arrangements.

**The increase in the number of individuals out of the labor force, especially among women, underscores the**

**difficulties of returning to the labor market and securing timely employment.** The pandemic's effects have pushed

**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 6
Data Sources: proGres v4 (PRIMES) hosts the data of refugees and asylum-seekers in 11 countries. In South Africa, the data are managed by the
government. In Angola, DRC, Zambia and Zimbabwe, some portions of the data are external. For IDP data, the source of DRC’s IDP figure is the OCHA;
the sources in Mozambique and Zimbabwe are the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of the IOM; and the source in the Republic of Congo is the
government, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Humanitarian Action (MASAH).
NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE

### **Chronic illness and** **MHPSS**

Among individuals with chronic illnesses, 41% reported experiencing mental health and psychosocial problems in 2024 (44% of women, 36% of men), up from 33% in 2023 (36% of women, 28% of men). In contrast, only 16% of individuals without chronic illnesses reported such problems in 2024 (20% of women and 11% of men), compared to 13% in 2023 (15% of women and 9% of men). These findings reinforce the strong interplay between chronic health conditions and mental health challenges, emphasizing the need for integrated care models that holistically address both physical and mental health to provide effective and comprehensive support for those managing chronic illnesses.

**26**

**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO REPORTED EXPERIENCING**

**A MENTAL HEALTH OR PSYCHOSOCIAL PROBLEM BY**

**CHRONIC ILLNESS STATUS AND COUNTRY**

With chronic illness Without chronic illness Regional Romania Hungary Lithuania Poland Bulgaria Latvia Slovakia Estonia Czechia Moldova (N=17,867)
Migrants dispersed to weaker labour markets experience poorer inclusion outcomes in subsequent years, and vice versa. These outcomes can pertain to employment, earnings, or human capital accumulation, and have been shown in Denmark (Foged, Hasager, and Peri, 2022; Azlor, Damm, and Schiltz-Nielsen, 2020), Germany (Aksoy, Giray, Poutvaara, and Schikora, 2020), Norway (Godøy, 2017), Sweden (Åslund, Östh, and Zenou, 2010; Åslund and Rooth, 2007), and Switzerland (Müller, Pannatier, and Viarengo, 2022), as well as the previously described crosscountry study. This could in principle stem from scarring on an individual level from weak initial opportunities, or persistently weak local labour market combined with imperfect geographic mobility. The effects are hard to disentangle, while Åslund and Rooth (2007) find some indication that both phenomena are at play, Godøy (2017) finds evidence only for persistently weak local labour markets.

##### Migrants and refugees dispersed away from ethnic enclaves experience weaker labour market inclusion outcomes, and vice versa.
Given that the refugee population is up to three or four times larger than the local population in certain
areas hosting refugees, mainly in Eastern Chad, there is an increased risk of tensions due to already limited
resources. Nevertheless, on a broader scale and across the entire territory, refugees continue to peacefully
coexist with the local population, facilitated by strong ethnic and cultural bonds, along with shared common
traditions. Mixed committees, comprising both refugees and members of the host community, remain active
in all refugee camps and sites. Their objective is to promote peaceful coexistence and proactively address
conflicts. Women continue to play a crucial role in conveying messages of peace and social cohesion,
contributing significantly to dispute resolution efforts.

**1.3** **Environmental management**

There has been no significant change in national environmental protection and resource management
policies. The existing policies continue to lack clarity concerning their application to refugees and/or host
communities.
prominent in refugee households in terms of poverty and employment. The same holds true for households that contain members with disabilities. It is somewhat encouraging that the share of refugee youth (age 15 to 24) not engaged in employment, education or training stands at just 14% (18% if distance learning is excluded), which is in line with host country national indicators.

**Based on the above findings it is recommended**

**that:**

- Any transitions from subsidized accommodations
are handled with extreme care. Almost 20% of all refugee households depend on this aid to stay out of poverty

- Labor market inclusion efforts continue and
interventions target the removal of the most commonly reported barriers (local language proficiency, lack of decent work opportunities, a mismatch in skills).

- A special focus is put on addressing the needs of
female only led households or members with disabilities. Both groups are more likely to find themselves below the poverty line.

# 50% 74% 14%

of refugees from Ukraine find themselves of all refugee households income above

**below the poverty line** [4] based on the poverty line **comes from regular work**
reported income - this figure stands at 35% for households

---
[4] Defined as 50% of the median equivalized income in the host country
towards higher-paid occupational groups.
The share of Poles in the two lowest salary brackets (earning less than gross PLN 4,000 and PLN 4,000-6,000 in 2022) decreased by 0.4 and 1.8 percentage points, respectively, while the subsequent higher salary brackets increased by
1.4 pp. (PLN 6,000-8,000), 0.6 pp.
(PLN 8,000-10,000), and 0.3 pp. (above PLN 10,000) (see Chart 30).
Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland © UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz Dispersing refugees to weaker labour markets can also have negative social outcomes. Albarosa and Elsner (2022) report more anti-immigrant incidents during the European refugee crisis (2015/2016) in areas of Germany with high unemployment rates and shares of right-wing voters. Damm and Dustmann (2014) show that immigrant men dispersed to areas of Denmark with more convicted criminals, experience higher future crime conviction probabilities, but not overall neighbourhood crime rate.

The estimated employment rate of refugees from Ukraine in Poland is above 60% and was among the highest in the OECD [27] .
Although there is uncertainty around employment rate in different countries due to uncertainty regarding refugee numbers while MSNA Poland 2023 gives a slightly lower figure of 61%. In comparison, the employment rate equalled 61% in the United
REGIONAL BUREAU FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO REFUGEES SITUATION**

As of 3 0 September 2022

**Author: UNHCR DIMA - RSA** Contact : rsarbdima@unhcr.org **Source:** UNHCR Primes, Government, UNHCR
Poland 2023 assess that around 56% [23] of refugee arrivals had completed higher education. This means that Ukrainians with higher education were more likely to relocate to Poland or leave Ukraine in general, having the necessary means to achieve this. On average refugees with a bachelor’s degree or higher had an over 30% higher employment rate than peers without a degree, according to MSNA Poland 2023 survey.