ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In later cases, the Appellate Division has similarly looked to the definition of trade secrets in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, published in 1993, which superseded the Restatement (First) of Torts in this respect.  See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Rousseau, 417 N.J. Super. 341, 9 A.3d 1064, 1076 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39).  Under the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, "[t]he existence of an express or implied-in-fact contract protecting trade secrets does not preclude a separate cause of action in tort."  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40 cmt. a.  This approach is also consistent with the Restatement (First) of Torts.  "The cause of action of 'misappropriation' is based on tort principles rather than on contract law," Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 627 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying New Jersey law).  Where there is proof of either misappropriation or breach of a restrictive contract, the Restatement provides for damages and for injunctive relief.  Damages for trade secret misappropriation can be awarded for the unfair advantage that defendants obtained by using plaintiffs’ proprietary information.  “Monetary remedies, whether measured by the loss to the plaintiff or the gain to the defendant, are appropriate only for the period of time that the information would have remained unavailable to the defendant in the absence of the appropriation. ”  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 45 cmt. h.  In Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 18 N.J. 467, 114 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1955), the Supreme Court held that, even where the trade secrets had later become public knowledge, the Court “kn[ew] of no persuasive reason for depriving the plaintiff of the benefits of its accrued cause of action because some of its secrets were later disclosed by the issuance of protective patents during the pendency of its action. ”  *Id.* at 442.  In patent cases, where two or more parties share confidential information under NDA and one party’s later filing of a patent renders some of the information voluntarily disclosed in the public domain, the courts may limit the measure of damages to the so-called “head start period,” the period of time that it would have taken defendants to catch up to the plaintiffs’ proprietary information.  However, we are not dealing with that here and so no limitation applies because there would have been no disclosure of plaintiffs’ proprietary information including (1) the proprietary data to the Preliminary and Final Site Plan Applications; (2) the lease made with [...], which contains its own confidentiality clause and (3) the purchasing terms of the [...] and related solar assets from [...], whose details were never publicly disclosed except due to this lawsuit.  Because the fraud and deceit committed by the [...] require resolution of layers of factual deceit, the second summary judgment was procedurally and substantively unsupported.  II
[brief] An appellate court reviews an order granting summary judgment in accordance with the same standard as the motion judge.  *W.J.A. v. D.A.*, 210 N.J. 229, 237–38, 43 A.3d 1148 (2012); Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330, 9 A.3d 882 (2010).  Therefore, this Court must review the competent evidential materials submitted by the parties to identify whether there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  R. 4:46–2(c).  Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)  When no issue of fact exists, and only a question of law remains, this Court affords no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court.  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995).  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199, 129 A.3d 1069, 1075 (2016)  This Court’s review of legal conclusions reached on summary judgment, is _de novo_ and is “[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference, City of Atl. City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463, (2010) (citations omitted); Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382–83, (2010).  As set forth in the procedural history above, the Plaintiff was deprived of due process when confronted with the motion concerning his pledge of proceeds from the lawsuit to forestall the collection creditors created by Defendant’s malpractice.  *Seoung Ouk Cho v. Trinitas Reg’l Med. Ctr.*, 443 N.J. Super. 461, 472 (App. Div. 2015), *certif. denied*, 224 N.J. 529 (2016).  This procedural impropriety alone requires the reversal of the Trial Court’s grant of Summary Judgement, this disregard of the Court’s own order regarding Motions in Limine ([...]) and entertaining such a motion after the Jury was impaneled required Plaintiff to respond to same during the Trial when the Defendants had both contracts in their hands well in advance of the dates for filing Motions in Limine ([...] and [...]) the Trials Court’s disregard of its own Pre-Trial Order perhaps contributed to the Trial Court’s misapplication of the law resulting in the erroneously dismissal of Plaintiff’s suit.
[brief] Here, the court could have told the jury it could not speculate or draw an inference about questions the police did not ask.  Showing [...]’s repeated invocations of his right to silence was highly prejudicial and not at all “essential. ”  Feaster, 156 N.J. at 76.  [...]’s understanding that he could invoke his right to silence in response to particular topics -- the very understanding on which he premised his decision to speak to police -- was not honored at trial.  The implied guarantee that his decision to exercise his right to silence would not be used against him was breached by the State’s presentation of his unredacted statement.
[brief] Such inquiries are the charge and the jurisdiction of the Board.  The stated legislative purpose of the MLUL is, in part, "[t]o encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare."  *N.J.S.A.*  40:55D-2.  As recited in the Board’s Resolution [...], ¶21 at Pa114 (And similarly in the Board’s Resolution [...], dated January 23, 2023, ¶6).
[brief] ”  (1T 60-12 to 67-11; Da 109, 01:03:08 to 01:31:04)  [...] also falsely claimed that an eyewitness had identified him, stating, “How do you think we found you?”; “You might have almost snuck away with this one.  But that good ol’ witness right there on New Street”; “So somebody just clearly just made you up outta the blue[?]”; “they were able to assume it was you . . . and they pick you?”; and, “They seen you do it. ”  (1T 66-3 to 74-3; Da 109, 01:21:17 to 01:24:58)  However, by that time (about 4:50 p.m.), the eyewitness from New Street, [...], had only given a general description of the shooter and had not yet even been asked to make an identification, which did not occur until her second interview hours later.
[directive] (b)  When an agency concludes that a report is subject to disclosure under Section 9.6.2(a), it shall redact the following before disclosure:  (1)  The names of complainants, witnesses, informants, victims and cooperators, in addition to information that could reasonably lead to discovery of their identities;11  (2)  Non-public, personal identifying information about any individual named in the report, such as their home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, social security numbers, familial relationships, etc.; (3)  Medical information or history, including but not limited to, mental health or substance abuse services and drug or alcohol evaluation, counseling or treatment; (4) Information regarding any criminal investigation or prosecution that is not already contained in a public filing, or any information that would impede or interfere with a pending criminal or disciplinary proceeding;  In instances of domestic violence, in addition to redaction of the victim’s name, all reference to the specific 11 nature of the qualifying relationship should also be redacted to protect the identity of the victim.
[brief] (Sb 44-46)  This argument is not viable, as the trial court did not rule on this issue.  Unlike the proper construction of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, which is a legal issue that this Court considers de novo, whether police observed [...] violate the traffic laws by failing to maintain her lane or by failing to ascertain the safety of changing lanes before doing so is a factual question.  With respect to factual issues, the role of an appellate court is not to make findings of fact but to review those of the trial court to ensure that they are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  *State v. McNeil-Thomas*, 238 N.J. 256, 272 (2019).  Here, however, the trial court made no factual findings as to any alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b); the Court found that the officers lawfully stopped [...]’s car based on a perceived violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, and that’s it.  (Da 6)  Given that the trial court never considered the issue, this Court should not rule on whether the officers could have stopped [...]’s car under N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b).
[brief] As the master plan does not specifically make any recommendations regarding this property or development of industrial and warehouse uses in general, this Redevelopment Plan does not directly implement any specific recommendations of the Master Plan.  d.  As the property has historically been used as a country club and golf course, changing the use of the site to an industrial facility would not be directly impacting the viability of farming in [...].  The property is not called out for agricultural preservation, or noted to have soils suitable for farming.  No active farms would be impacted by a potential development at this location.  e.  In terms of preservation of the rural character of the community, the Redevelopment Plan does require substantial setbacks from both Old York Road and Bordentown-Georgetown Road of 1,000 feet and 1,900 feet respectively, as well as landscape buffering requirements that would ensure that any new development would have a minimal visual impact on these roadways.  The frontages of each road would be composed of dense landscaping, and not industrial buildings and parking lots.
[brief] “On appeal, we apply a plenary standard of review from a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). ”  *Rezem Family Associates, LP v. Borough of Millstone*, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. Apr. 15, 2011 (affirming the dismissal of the complaint).  “A court must dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief. ”  *Sickles v. Cabot Corp.*, 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005).  “A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e) for --- 4 T. refers to the Transcript filed by Appellant on December 4, 2023.  failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be evaluated in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint. ”  *Donato v. Moldow*, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 482 (App. Div. 2005) (affirming dismissal of the complaint).  “We review such a motion by the same standard applied by the trial court; thus, considering and accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, we determine whether they set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. ”  *Sickles*, 379 N.J. Super. at 106 (citing *Donato*, 374 N.J. Super. at 483).  **COUNTER ARGUMENT**
[brief] ([...])  On April 15, 2022, defendant checks the NJ Courts website and conducts a Municipal Court Case Search.  The charge N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2A(1) was raised on NJ Courts public website.  On April 21, 2022, defendant submits another motion to dismiss to the initial trial court informing of violations under Rule 4:4 of improper service, sixth amendment, fourteenth amendment and Rule 1:4-8.  defendant furthers the motion to dismiss relating to the sadism event mentioned in other current Appellate cases mentioning defendant ([...]).
[brief] \(^2\)  In fact, this statute even criminalizes hospital staff for not providing the “necessary care” (whatever that is) to the child immediately upon entering the lobby.  goods.  Depending on their constituent’s (or their own) religious beliefs, they can prosecute cattle farming, pig farming, shellfish harvesting and any “direct or indirect” involvement in those activities (such as processing or transporting those goods in the course of interstate commerce or, financing these activities or leasing or selling land for those purposes).  If the [...] determines that a “living creature” was tormented, tortured, maimed, hung, poisoned, unnecessarily or cruelly beaten, cruelly abused, or needlessly mutilated or caused bodily injury to a by failing to provide necessary care at the [...], he or she can (and would be duty bound)\(^3\) to prosecute the entire zoo administration as well as the entire [...] based on their “indirect” involvement in one or more of these acts (or omissions) by a single individual.  Our Legislature is perfectly capable of drafting facially constitutionally valid “animal protection” laws.
[brief] [...] testified that she referred to [...] in an email as being “calmer” simply because he previously had not been able to ejaculate.  [Pa 531-32].  She also denied that [...]’s difficulty ejaculating was a sign of aggression.  [Pa 482-83].  [...] sent a similar email to Defendants stating that [...] “gave us some trouble. ”  However, she testified that “trouble” was in reference to difficulty ejaculating.  [Pa855].  As with [...], [...] testified that difficulty ejaculating was not a sign of aggression in [...].  [Pa 874-75 879].  Plaintiffs served a report from a liability expert, [...], PhD, who holds herself out as a “Certified Applied Animal Behaviorist” associated with the Equine Behavior Program at the University of Pennsylvania School of Veterinary Medicine.  She never met or examined [...] and offered no opinions about [...]’s specific behavior or tendencies.  [Pa 936].  She admitted there was no indication [...] would attack his handlers prior to his arriving at [...] in 2018.  [Pa 947-49].  Nor did she opine about Defendants’ conduct and whether it deviated from any accepted standards or practices in the equine breeding industry.  [Pa 936-37].
[brief] 1 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................. 4 LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................... 4 POINT I GUARANTEES ARE TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE PARTIES SEEKING ENFORCEMENT AND AGAINST THE PARTY WHO DRAFTED THE GUARANTEE AND IN LIGHT OF COMMERCIAL REALITY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED ................................................................. 4 POINT II DEFENDANTS [...], [...] AND [...] DID PERSONALLY GUARANTEE THE OBLIGATIONS OF [...] UNDER THE FEBRUARY 2015 LEASE ............................................................... 7 POINT III THE GUARANTEES WERE NOT TERMINATED ON APRIL 11, 2016 .................................................... 20 POINT IV THE GUARANTEE WAS NOT REVOKED BEFORE PLAINTIFF AND FZG ENTERED INTO A CONSENT JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENTS OF AMOUNT DUE ..................................
[brief] Every King factor indicating coercion is present here.  First, [...] was arrested at the time she gave verbal consent.  Second, she previously denied guilt, first telling police that she did not know what happened and then repeatedly saying she did not know why she was being detained.  Third, she previously refused to consent to an entry at least once -- a critical fact not disclosed by the State or addressed by the motion court.  Fourth, she knew that the search would uncover the handgun, implicating her in multiple felonies.  (For the same reason, the opposite King factor favoring voluntary consent was not present).  And fifth, she was handcuffed at the time the police requested verbal consent.  Only one of the King factors tending to indicate voluntariness was present, as [...] apparently admitted hiding the handgun prior to consenting.  However, the circumstances in which the police obtained that admission were highly coercive, as they included an intimidating custodial detention, the presence of multiple officers, demands for information, promises of leniency, and a threat of “trouble” made to a suspect facing criminal liability who may have also been intoxicated.
[brief] Now that Plaintiff’s distortion of the appealed order is corrected, next is his Point 1 that simply reiterates the standard of review for reconsideration motions then baldly concludes at page 16 that Defendant “failed to establish” the trial court abused its discretion by denying reconsideration, without any facts to support that conclusion.  Plaintiff omits facts because Defendant’s opening brief, Point I, makes clear that the trial court could not reinstate a dismissed complaint it never had subject matter jurisdiction over because the requisite Pre-Action Notice was never served *before* filing it - making it void *ab initio*.  Furthermore, as Defendant’s opening brief informs, the law mandates that the clerk should not issue a docket number if the complaint violates R 1:20A-6.  The only thing the trial court did in May, 2022, three years after its 2019 dismissal, was reinstate the same void complaint with a prohibited docket number, then issued a May 27, 2022 judgment on that without jurisdiction - making that judgment void.
[brief] No one can dispute that Defendant investigated the initial claim of discrimination that Plaintiff was subjected to.  In fact, the issue revolves around the fifth prong.  Defendants must show that they have an unequivocal commitment from the top that is not just in words but backed up by consistent practice.  Here, the Defendant failed to show that they have an unequivocal commitment from the top that is not just in words but backed up by consistent practice.  It is unequivocally undisputed that Defendant failed to discipline [...] for the racially motivated conduct he engaged in.  Under the theory set forth by Defendant, they could investigate any claim of harassment in the workplace in violation of the LAD and be shielded from liability as they have ‘wiped their hands clean of the matter’.  How Defendants can allege they have an unequivocal commitment from the top that their policy is not just in words but backed up by consistent practice is absurd when individuals who allege such harassment are not disciplined.  The anti-harassment is not a one-step policy that simply consists of an investigation.
[brief] 5)  The undisclosed prize limitation is illogical, nonsensical, and absurd (not raised below)  Lastly, I respectfully submit that the undisclosed prize limitation of “one prize per person” is not only counter-intuitive, but further is also illogical, nonsensical, and just downright absurd.  That is, both logically and intuitively, if a given player earns more than one prize, then he/she should receive each of the prizes that were earned, which is the obvious expectation.  In other words, rhetorically speaking, why should he/she not be awarded all of the prizes that he/she has fairly earned?  I think I should also note that although it should not be necessary to show the defendants’ intent, I believe the facts here clearly infer a nefarious intention on the defendants’ part.  That is, the defendants’ choice to announce other prize limitations, but yet not announce this one, should clearly infer a deceptive intent to conceal this limitation, as obviously this limitation would only act to deter players from entering a given tournament.  It certainly would not entice them to do so.  In other words, no player would ever say: “Gee, I am thinking about entering this tournament, which offers significant (and potentially multiple) prizes to the winners; but then if I should win multiple prizes, I wouldn’t want to get paid the prize money for all of them - instead, I’d only want to be paid for just one prize”.  Obviously, no player would ever say (or think) that, and the defendants know this; so in all probability, that’s why they didn’t disclose it in their announcements.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] By Ordinance 13 2004, the [...] abolished its Board of Health and transitioned to a Department of Health/Health/Officer model.  The pertinent language of the Ordinance which is identical to that contained in Chapter 44 of the codified Code is as follows:  B.  Chapters 173 through 213, inclusive, of the Code of the [...], as heretofore adopted by the Board of Health, are hereby readopted for a period not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) days to allow the same to be amended, revised and supplemented to reflect the change in status of the public health agency.  (emphasis added)  (I)  During the 120-day period set forth above, the Chapters designated shall remain in full force and effect; provided, however, that where the phrase "Board of Health" appears in the text, it shall be read to mean the "Health Officer" or "the Township" as appropriate to the context.  No provision was made for the continuation of these Chapters subsequent to 120 days.  After that 120 day period they ceased to be in force and effect.  Each of the above Complaints which underly this appeal, allege a violation of either Chapter 173 or Chapter 201.  These Chapters ceased to be in force and effect in 2004 subsequent to the 120 day sunset period.
[brief] The reason that a court may not impose a consecutive sentence where none of the Guideline 3 factors are present is identical to the reason that a court may not impose a consecutive sentence based solely on the “no free crimes prong;” such a result would (1) undermine uniformity by allowing a consecutive sentence based on factors other than those articulated by the Court and (2) undermine the statutory framework of neutrality between concurrent and consecutive sentences by effectively creating a presumption in favor of consecutive sentences.  Thus, once a court determines that none of the Yarbough factors support a consecutive sentence, the court is compelled to impose concurrent sentences.
[brief] The applicant bears the burden of proving both the positive and negative criteria.  *Nash v. Bd. of Adjustment*, 96 N.J. 97 (1984).  Generally, to satisfy the positive criteria, an applicant must prove that the use promotes the general welfare because the proposed site is particularly suitable to the proposed use.  *Cell S. of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 172 N.J. 75, 83 (2002).  Further, to satisfy the negative criteria, in addition to proving that the variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good, an applicant must demonstrate through an enhanced quality of proof, that the variance sought is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Master Plan and Zoning Ordinance.  *Id.*  Applying the language of the Municipal Land Use Law, the Zoning Board made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
[brief] Such policy questions are committed to the judgment of the local legislative bodies.  As we have said so many times with respect to zoning and other legislative or quasi-legislative decisions, a judge may not interfere merely because he would have made a different policy decision if the power to decide had been his.  A court can concern itself only with an abuse of delegated legislative power, and may set aside the legislative judgment only if arbitrariness clearly appears.*  [42 N.J. at 8]  The findings and conclusions set forth in the Decision and Resolution (Pa117-128) are sufficient and support the concerns expressed by the board members that granting the variance will result in a substantial detriment to the public good or the zoning plan.