ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Defendant was aware that the downward slope of the driveway in that area resulted in the water draining off the sidewalk subjecting it to melt and refreeze.  It has been held that where the melting snow from an unshoveled sidewalk would have frozen in any event, rendering the sidewalk equally as dangerous, if not more so, than when shoveled, the pedestrian may not recover.  *Taggart v. Bouldin*, 111 N.J.L. 464 (E. & A. 1933).  As the court said in that case, to hold the property owner answerable for damages under such circumstances because an effort was made to keep the sidewalk clear and reduce the danger would result in an injustice.  *Id.* at 467.  Under the circumstances of this case, however, the jury could find that had the snow remained unshoveled on the sidewalk, the water from the melted snow would have evaporated, or drained off, as it did where the plaintiff walked seven streets without encountering any ice on the sidewalks.
[brief] (Briefed Below)  The [...] is undisputedly a public entity within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act.  See N.J.S.A. 59:1-3; see also Bligen v Jersey City Hous. Auth., 131 N.J. 124, 131 (1993) (“...public housing authorities are public entities under the Tort Claims Act. ”).  Furthermore, the area in question is unquestionably a public space with a freely accessible outdoor basketball court and playground.  (P3, ¶13).  The area is available to the residents of the public housing project as well as to other members of the general public.  Accordingly, the area in question, as pled by Plaintiffs, is clearly a public recreational facility within the meaning of the TCA.  The situation in Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc. is instructive and bears on this instant matter.  Therein the plaintiffs were caused harm by Defendant [...] who had been drinking during a Giants game and at various other locations.  Verni ex rel. Burstein, 387 N.J. Super. at 175-180.  The Verni Court upheld the summary judgment granted to the public entity defendant, [...].  Id. at 210-211.  The Verni Court simply held:  The Sports Authority is a public entity within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3.  As such, the Sports Authority is “not liable for failure to provide supervision of public recreational facilities…”  Although an exception allows liability for failure to protect against a dangerous condition, *ibid.*, this exception relates to the physical condition of the property not to activities that take place on it.  *Ibid.*
[brief] Starting with the Michigan statute, its first paragraph provides that:  “The driver of a vehicle or bicycle upon a highway, before stopping or turning from a direct line, shall first see that the stopping or turning can be made in safety and shall give a signal as required in this section. ”  People v. Hrlic, 277 Mich. App. 260, 263–64 (2007) (citing Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated (M.C.L.A.) 257.648).  Unlike the first paragraph of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, the Michigan statute’s first paragraph makes no reference to moving right or left upon a roadway.
[brief] The redevelopment of those other sites is **NOT NECESSARY** for the redevelopment of the [...].  Indeed, nothing in the 157 pages of the Topology report offers justification under Section 5 for any portion of the “plan” beyond the [...].  The “doughnut hole” theory for municipal redevelopment is not merely a principle established by the New Jersey case law.  It is an express requirement of Section 3 of the LRHL: “a redevelopment area may include lands, buildings, or improvements which of themselves are not detrimental to public health, safety or welfare but the inclusion of which is found NECESSARY, with or without significant change in their condition, for effective redevelopment of the area of which they are a part.
[brief] ADMIT __X__ DENY _____ (Ca137-138 – RQAs 11, 14, 16; Ca145 – Responses to RQAs 11, 14, 16)  These clear admissions show that the Commission was incorrect to assume that Respondent’s decision was “a personal decision” or that “[t]here is no suggestion that Respondent encouraged other members of the Board, members of the public, teaching staff members (if they were present), or students (if they were present) to defy the Executive Order. ” (Ca172).  Rather, it was plainly a decision intended to inspire others to break the law.  It was a conscious decision to break the law while a sitting Board member at meetings of the Board.  Enforcing uniform disciplinary action when Board members purposely and consciously break laws relating to schools while sitting in their official position at a Board meeting is precisely what the Legislature created the Commission to do.
[brief] This case stems from a traffic stop on October 31, 2020 in Medford Township.  Da 5.  During the traffic stop, police are alleged to have retrieved a .380 caliber Glock from the floor of [...]’s car.  Id.  At the time, [...] possessed a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon from Pennsylvania.  Id.  Following the traffic stop, [...] was charged via Complaint Warrant [...] with second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun.  Da1.  On April 7, 2022, a Burlington County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging Defendant with one count of unlawful possession of a weapon.  Da8.  Then, on March 23, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, or alternatively, to Compel Defendant’s Admission into PTI.  Oral argument was heard on May 30, 2023 and the motions were denied on June 21, 2023.  Da 23.  On July 24, 2023, Defendant plead guilty to unlawful possession of a handgun, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss.  Da 9.  On September 22, 2023, Defendant was sentenced to three years of probation.  Da 15.  Because the procedural history and statement of facts here are so intertwined, they are combined in a single section.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY MUST RECOGNIZE CARRY PERMITS ISSUED BY PENNSYLVANIA.
[directive] Beginning immediately, the Division will initiate outreach to professional schools and training programs in New Jersey to offer assistance and coordination in further developing training on these topics.  F.  It is Improve post-licensure continuing education to prevent sexual misconduct.  important that licensees maintain an up-to-date understanding of the rules and best practices relating to sexual misconduct.  By June 2021, the Division will work with the [...] to prepare for the board’s consideration a potential proposed rule to include, as a component of mandatory continuing education, a minimum of one hour of training on sexual misconduct prevention, bystander intervention, and human Page 4 trafficking prevention.  That proposal will then be followed, where authorized and as appropriate, by related proposals for other boards.  II.
[brief] This is a legal malpractice action brought by Plaintiff, [...] in connection with the legal advice provided in the preparation and negotiations of a commercial lease and related documents in connection with the purchase of a property.  (Pa0015).  The Plaintiff is a limited liability corporation formed under the laws of the State of New Jersey.  (Pa0025).  [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) are listed as the members/managers of Plaintiff as set forth in the Operating Agreement, dated January 30, 2016, with their interest in Plaintiff at 51% and 49%, respectively. (Pa1178-Pa1187).  Defendant, [...], Esquire, is an attorney-at-law in the State of New Jersey and a principal with Defendant [...].
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021  (h) any reasonable strategy that lessens the emotional anger, frustration, combativeness of a subject or others who may be present may be appropriate.  2.9  Importantly, officers should not default to attempting to resolve the incident immediately if slowing down the pace is viable and can be accomplished without creating an immediate threat to the public or placing officers in unreasonable danger.  5  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021
[brief] Also identical to the within matter, the Division sent a letter to all Certifying Officers with the same exact terms contained in the Certifying Officer Letter’s “EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES” section.  *Id.* Pra6.  Pa62.  The Appellate Division held that “[a]pplying our highly deferential standard of review, we are satisfied that the record sufficiently supports the Commissions' decision that members were provided with adequate notice and instructions for submitting a request for claims reconsideration prior to the December 31, 2014 deadline. ”  *Id.* at 8-9.  Pra7.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding:  2.  Whenever an administrative agency acts, be that act mandatory or strictly voluntary, it must do so reasonably and in a manner calculated to achieve the policies expressed in the agency's organic statute.  Therefore, because the Commissions determined to reimburse affected members, they were necessarily required to do so reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner.  Here, that means that the Commissions were required to provide reasonable notice in order that the retroactive benefit would fairly be made known and, thus, made available in a non-arbitrary manner to affected members.
[brief] Statement of Facts - Police Reports Attached 10/13/2020  Pa259 Notice of Claim to Edison 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa053)  Letter From [...] to Edison Municipal Complex 6/19/2020 (Attached at Pa084)  Letter From [...] to Edison Municipal Complex 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa078)  Letter from Public Safety to [...] 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa0071)  [...]’ Letter to Highland Park Prosecutor and Court Administrator 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa0056)  Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) with “NOTICE PER PROSECUTOR” written Pa266  Exhibit C-8 to [...]’s Certification Letter dated 9/29/20 from Highland Park Municipal Court To All parties regarding 10/14/20 Hearing Pa269 Letter dated 9/29/20 from Highland Park Municipal Court to all parties regarding Nov 18, 2020 Trial Pa270 Letter dated 11/23/20 from Highland Park Municipal Court regarding Trial via Zoom Jan 13, 2021 Pa271 Letter dated 12/22/20 from Highland Park Municipal Court regarding February 10, 2021 hearing Pa272 Letter dated 1/22/21 from Highland Park Municipal Court regarding March 17, 2021 hearing Pa273 Letter dated 1/25/21 from Highland Park Municipal Court regarding 4/14/2021 hearing Pa274 Letter dated 4/26/21 from Highland Park Municipal Court Regarding hearing scheduled for June 23, 2021
[brief] Da148–50; Da167–68; Da176; Da184; Da195; Da224–25.  Indeed, this Court’s reasoning in Interlotto that the second step of the jurisdictional analysis was not satisfied is remarkably salient here: just like the plaintiff in Interlotto, Plaintiff’s revisionist claim that it is a New Jersey-based business is belied by the reality that Plaintiff “thought so little of its relationship to this state that it failed to obtain a certificate of authority from the Secretary of State before commencing this action” or any time before then, including “when the cause of action arose” six years prior in 2016. \(^{12}\) *Interlotto*, 298 N.J. Super. at 137; see Da148–49; Da156–65.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendants also fails the second step of the analysis, thereby providing another basis for reversing the Trial Court’s Order.
[brief] Despite the clear record announcing the verdict in this case, defendant first argues that “the jury’s completion of the verdict sheet indicated that not only did it find him guilty of purposeful murder, it also unanimously (and contradictorily) found he committed each lesser-included manslaughter offense. ”  (Db 8).  This entire argument centers upon appellate counsel’s “belief” that a copy of the verdict sheet attached to a motion for new trial by trial counsel following the verdict — who is now deceased and cannot confirm or deny his post-conviction supposition — is the true copy of the verdict sheet filled out by the jury.  (Da 34).  This argument, supported only by a self-authenticating certification with admittedly no personal or direct knowledge as to who filled out the verdict sheet appended to his appeal, is wholly contradictory to the verdict announced in open court and thereafter confirmed by polling the jury.  A verdict that was clearly stated on the record, thus leaves no room for confusion.  As such, this argument is simply without merit.  The right to a unanimous verdict is firmly rooted in our rules of procedure and our decisional law.  See R. 1:8-9 (providing that "[t]he verdict shall be unanimous in all criminal actions"); State v. Milton, 178 N.J. 421, 431, (2004); State v. Lipsky, 164 N.J. Super. 39, 45, 395 A.2d 555 (App. Div.1978) (explaining that New Jersey's "constitutional guarantee of a jury trial in criminal causes ... is violated unless the verdict is the product of 12 jurors ... who have deliberated together to reach a unanimous decision") (internal citations omitted).  The fundamental nature of the right to a unanimous verdict demands that the verdict be more than a perfunctory tally.  It must stand as an abiding assurance of carefully considered deliberations and a faithfully rendered verdict.  To ensure that no uncertainty remains about the verdict and its unanimity, our court rules afford all parties the right to poll the jury after the foreperson has announced the verdict, but before the verdict has been officially recorded.
[brief] Defendant’s suggestion that Plaintiffs should have engaged pre-suit discovery or made an Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) request for documents to identity Defendant’s relationship as a subcontractor of [...].  However, not only are Plaintiffs not required to conduct pre-suit discovery but, as addressed at oral argument and conceded by defense counsel, an OPRA request would have likely only identified the [...]’s contract with [...].  (Pa1T 11:20-25).  Here, Plaintiffs appropriately identified fictitious parties and engaged in diligent discovery in order to, among other things, identify potential defendants.  Further, Rule 1:1-2 mandates that "[u]nless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice."  Compliance with the Rules of Practice is essential for an orderly legal system, but our goal is not so much rigid compliance with the letter of the Rules as it is the attainment of substantial justice.  The Rules of Practice are not an end unto themselves, but a means of serving the ends of justice.  See Sattelberger v. Telep, 14 N.J. 353, 363 (1954).  C.  Conclusion
[brief] The substantial evidence in the record supports DEP’s finding that the Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  Since the project is exempt, it need not directly comply with the provisions of the Highlands Act, the RMP, or any rules adopted by DEP to implement the Act.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a).  According to the Supreme Court's guidance, Exemption 11’s requirement that the Project be “consistent with the goals and purposes” of the Act, N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11), only requires that the development not be “incompatible with preservation” and “therefore cause a decline in the environmental quality of the region.
[brief] In *Pascale v. Pascale*, 549 A. 2d 782, 113 N.J. 20 (1988)  NJ Supreme Court 1988, the Court enunciated the rule as to how one should analyze a case with confidential relationships and gifts of substantial assets.  *In respect of an inter vivos gift, a presumption of undue influence arises when the contestant proves that the donee dominated the will of the donor,* Seylaz v. Bennett, 5 N.J. 168, 172 (1950); Haydock v. Haydock, 34 N.J. Eq. 570, 574 (E. & A. 1881), or *when a confidential relationship exists between donor and donee,*  In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 227; Mott v. Mott, 49 N.J. Eq. 192, 198 (Ch. 1891).  30
[brief] ”  And that Voorhees’ conduct was “willfull, deliberate, reckless, and negligent. ”  In the instant matter, like Voorhees (shown above), Plaintiff [...] alleges that the allegations are ambiguous which triggers coverage.  See underlying complaint (Pa182) and certification of [...] (Pa194).  As drafted, the allegations in the underlying complaint against Myers allege outrage, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and negligent interference with contractual relations just as convincingly or unconvincingly as it does “intentional interference with contractual relations” and “harassment”—which is not recognized as a viable cause of action in New Jersey.  As more fully stated herein, the complaint alleges various alternative causes of action which “potentially” fall within the policy’s coverage and triggers the duty-to-defend.  If a claim is based on two conflicting theories, one requiring coverage and the other not, the insurer must defend the claim.  See SL Indus., 128 N.J. at 214 (citing Mt. Hope Inn v. Travelers Indem. Co., 157 N.J. Super. 431, 439 (Law Div. 1978).  Two key rulings from Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. at 444, 447 (2010), “In evaluating the complaint… doubts are resolved in favor of the insured and, therefore, in favor of reading claims that are ambiguously pleaded, but potentially covered, in a manner that obligates the insurer to provide a defense.
[brief] CONCLUSION  The Probate Court’s order finding [...] in breach of the Settlement Agreement and barring her from pursuing all her rights to [...]’s Estate and Trust, including [...]’s Interest in the Palm Beach Property, and awarding attorneys’ fees was made in error.  The Probate Court’s further ruling that [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property was excluded from the Residuary Clause was also made in error.  This Court should reverse the Probate Court’s May 1, 2023 Order and Opinion and should vacate the Probate Court’s March 8, 2024 award of fees.
[brief] The Appellants have not filed an answer in this case.  There has been very limited discovery in this case.  At this stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of the plaintiff to prove the allegations contained in the Complaint.  The proper analysis on a motion to dismiss a Complaint would entitle the plaintiff to every reasonable inference of fact required to sustain the Complaint.  *Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics* 116 N.J. 739 at 746 (1999); *Smith v. SBC Communications Inc.* 178 N.J. 265 at 262 (2004).
[brief] Defendant [...]’s (the “Union’s”) opposition brief does little more than resort to the truism that an appellate court must review an arbitrator’s award under a deferential standard, arguing the Arbitrator’s award is insulated from any form of effective appellate review and must be affirmed absent egregious and obvious misconduct.  The Union’s opposition addresses neither the Arbitrator’s critical errors nor the crux of [...]’s (“[...]”) arguments.  The Union’s opposition thus fails to grasp the reasons why the Arbitrator’s award here is fatally flawed and must be set aside.
[brief] [...] has taken no further steps towards condemnation or redevelopment of the Property as would be required by the Eminent Domain Act (“EDA”) to commence condemnation.  See N.J.S.A. 20:3-6.  [...] has not conducted an appraisal to determine its fair market value.  [...] has not authorized acquisition nor made any good faith offer to acquire the Property.  To be clear, the only action taken by [...] has been designating the Property as an area in need of redevelopment, which merely makes the Property *eligible* for condemnation under the LRHL, and that occurred 10 months ago.
[brief] 931a-954a.  The trial court didn’t engaged in the required rigorous factual and legal analysis.\footnote{Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 106-07 (2007). }  Class certification is to be decided as early as practicable.  R. 4:32-2(a).  Plaintiff was entitled to favorable view of the complaint and record\footnote{Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 96 (2007).} and didn’t have to prove liability or damages and the court doesn’t have to delve into the merits of the suit:
[brief] | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .................................. | passim | | Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) ................................ | 32 | | Lynch v. City of Mount Vernon, 567 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)  .... | 32 | | Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) .................................. | 30 | | Simmons v. Loose, 418 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 2011) .................. | 32 | | State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497 (2019) ....................................... | 22, 23, 29 | | State v. Clark, 347 N.J. Super. 497 (App. Div. 2002) .................... | 27 | | State v. D.A.B., No. A-1848-22 (App. Div. Sept. 19, 2023) .............. | 25 | | State v. Hendricks, 145 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 1976) ................ | 13 | | State v. Jackson, 268 N.J. Super. 194 (Law Div. 1993) ................... | 32 | | State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991) ..................................... | 29 | | State v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248 (1999) ..................................... | 29 | | State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487 (1998) ..................................... | 29 | | State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 295 (1988) | 25, 26 | | State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424 (2013) ................................... | 30, 33 | | State v. Ruffin, 371 N.J. Super. 371 (App. Div. 2004) ................... | 27 | | State v. Vigliano, 50 N.J. 51 (1967) ..................................... | 26 | | State v. Washington, 453 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2018) .............. | 22, 27 | | State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503 (2015) ..................................... | 32 | | State v. Zadroga, 255 N.J. 114 (2023) ................................... | 22 | United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) .........................................................29 United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1983) ..............................................30 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) .....................................................22
[brief] The Court in State v. Laurick held, We hold that with the exception that a prior DWI conviction that was uncounseled in violation of court policy may not be used to increase a defendant's loss of liberty, there is no constitutional impediment to the use of the prior uncounseled DWI conviction to establish repeat-offender status under DWI laws.  With respect to collateral consequences of an uncounseled conviction other than a loss of liberty, any relief to be afforded should follow our usual principles for affording post-conviction relief from criminal judgments, namely, a showing of a denial of fundamental justice or other miscarriage of justice.  State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990).  When a Defendant can show the Court has not fulfilled their obligations under the law, they shall be afforded relief from an enhanced custodial term.  The present matter should be treated no differently.  Analogous to Laurick, a Defendant, who is not advised of information required by the Court under the statutory authority, should be given relief from an enhanced custodial term.
[brief] Moreover, the issues in the definition of “PIP disputes” all concern bases on which coverage could be denied, including whether the services for which a provider requests benefits are covered by the insurance policy, permitted by law, actually performed, medically necessary, and appropriately charged.  See N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.2.  In sum, an insurer alleging that it was defrauded by a medical provider is not seeking to “recover” insurance benefits.