ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The law enforcement officer releasing the juvenile shall serve the juvenile and his parent or guardian with written notice that an order shall be issued by the Family Part of the Superior Court on the next court day prohibiting the juvenile from entering any place defined by P.L. 2001, CHAPTER 365 2 subsection b. of section 3 of P.L.1999, c.334 (C.2C:35-5.6), including a buffer zone surrounding the place or modifications as provided by subsection f. of this section.  The court shall issue such order on the first court day following the release of the juvenile.  If the restraints contained in the court order differ from the restraints contained in the notice, the order shall not be effective until the third court day following the issuance of the order.  The juvenile may apply to the court to stay or modify the order on the grounds set forth in subsection e. of this section.
[brief] Yes, the jurors were instructed that they needed to make their own determinations as to the credibility of witnesses; but since the judge failed to tell them to disregard the prosecutor’s improper remarks, the overwhelming likelihood is that they factored those remarks into their determinations.  Defense counsel did not object to the judge’s limiting instruction.  Nonetheless, an error in instructing the jury constitutes plain error when it raises "a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached."
[brief] Here, Appellant presented six facts in its failed attempt to show personal service was not effectuated: - [...] “had no recollection of” serving [...].  *Appellant’s Legal Brief*, p. 40.  - The Affidavit of Service stated that [...]’s name was “[...]” and not “[...]. ”  *Appellant’s Legal Brief*, p. 40.  - The Affidavit of Service was “facially defective” because it was “notarized two months prior to the actual date of service. ”  *Appellant’s Legal Brief*, p. 35.  - The GPS location of the service did not exactly match the Defendant’s home address.  *Appellant’s Legal Brief*, p. 37.  - The Appellants “left for vacation the morning of the alleged service .. [as evidenced by] E-ZPass and records and receipts. ”  *Appellant’s Legal Brief*, p. 35.  - The “Process Service Company .. [had] an interest in the litigation. ”  *Appellant’s Legal Brief*, p. 37.  The Trial Court correctly found that Appellant failed to present any clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of validity that [...] was served.
[brief] Nothing was known about these individuals, other than that their interaction occurred in an alleged “known narcotics area. ”  [...] observed two people meet in a vehicle in the middle of the day in September.  This observation did not rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  The totality of the circumstances presented did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity required to effectuate the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle, but rather, [...] acted upon a hunch.
[brief] (Da9-27).  The trial court acted within its discretion in agreeing with that lodestar, and awarding the full amount sought.  The fee affidavit fully summarized the work performed for which fees were sought.  (Da11-24).  Contemporaneous supporting time entries were appended as exhibits for the court’s review, and the court did so review and found the entries sufficiently descriptive and reasonable.  (Da28-153; 1T68; 1T70).  The fee application discussed the qualifications of the attorneys handling the matter, which included primarily [...], the firm’s managing partner who had handled the matter since its inception; [...], a member of the firm with extensive Chancery Division experience including in closely-held family business disputes like this matter and who had begun working on the matter in 2016, and [...], a member of the firm who had previously worked as a Deputy Attorney General at the Division of Law, and who had begun working on the matter in connection with post-judgment enforcement shortly after joining the firm in 2017.
[brief] a.  When her own witness, [...], Esq. testified on August 11, 2021, he made very clear that the July 19, 2013 fee letter he prepared mistakenly included the name of [...].  (12T32- 2-22).  He pointed out that she already had a bankruptcy lawyer, [...], Esq., a day earlier.  (12T32-2-22).  He testified that he never met her or spoke with her and certainly never represented her.  (12T32-2-22).  She was represented by other counsel.  (12T32-2-22).  Based on that credible testimony, the trial court rejected Defendant’s claims about [...].  (A229, Op. at 25).
[brief] Email between [...] in house counsels regarding draft letter to [...].  (regarding response to proposal for the FY2009 bridge extension)  The Special Master finds that this document is likely responsive to [...]'s RFP 2, which requests "All Documents containing or relating to any communications between Plaintiffs and their auditors, accountants, consultants and boards of directors (or committees thereof), relating to any actual or potential contractual relationship between you and Defendants regarding any KC-135 PDM work (including but not limited to the negotiation, execution, performance, and/or alleged breach of any such actual or potential contracts)."  However, it appears to be privileged and work product and protected from disclosure.  As such, this document should be identified on [...]'s Privilege Log.  While it was not previously identified on [...]'s privilege log, that omission does not appear to be intentional or done to deceive.  The Special Master agrees that [...] should have made note on the privilege log regarding this document.  However, based on the court review, the omission of the document on the privilege log creates no harm to [...] as it is a small omission compared to the extensive disclosure by [...].
[brief] On October 7, 2022, the lower court entered the unopposed Order Determining that Property is Abandoned (the “Abandonment Order”) (81a-84a) which attaches the Court’s Statement of Reasons.  It is clear that the lower court relied almost exclusively on the [...] Report, and the conclusions as to the statutory requirements for abandonment checked off therein.  The lower court went so far in its reasoning to cite its own review of the photographs attached to the [...] Report, describing the property – “The Court’s review of the Arthur [sic] Report reveals that the photographs depict a wood boarded front and front roofing torn and exposed. ”  Abandonment Order, Statement of Reasons (84a).  Comparison of the actual picture of the Property (139a) with the pictures attached to the [...] Report reveals that this specific conclusion cited by the lower court can only have related to the incorrect property pictures.  The Property is not boarded up nor does it have front roofing torn and exposed, as does the property in the photographs analyzed in the [...] Report.  In his April 3 Order, [...] acknowledged that he relied upon these incorrect pictures.  (15a-18a).  The inclusion of the wrong pictures in the [...] Report was not merely a harmless error correctable with a supplement or amendment.  A careful review of [...]’s written statements and checked off conclusions as to the Property condition reveal that they can not have been supported by the alleged inspection on January 28, 2022 but were simply conclusory statements tracked to the statute.  Appellants questioned whether Mr. [...] ever visited the Property based upon the demonstrable inaccuracy of these statements.  The [...] Cert. (92a-102a) contains a categorical consideration of and rejection of Mr. [...]’s observations and conclusions.  The lower court was required to go out of its way to review the [...] Report photographs to make its own finding in the Abandonment Order as to the boarding up and torn roofing.  That was the lower court’s, not [...]’s, observations, upon which the Abandonment Order was predicated.  Given the attachment of incorrect photographs, the lack of commentary or indication of personal knowledge, and the demonstrable inaccuracy of so many of the statements contained therein and refuted by Ms. [...], Appellants presented enough for the lower court to revisit and reject its reliance upon the [...] Report in the Abandonment Order.  The [...] Report’s conclusion as to six months of vacancy also had no foundation when made in January 2022, as [...] provides no indication of a prior inspection, and this is a requirement of N.J.S.A. 55:19-81.  The Appellate Division has previously had occasion to consider final judgments predicated on prosecutions of in rem foreclosures of allegedly abandoned properties.
[brief] At 1T-47-1-11, Her Honor cites the “official knowledge of suicidal predisposition” theory.  That issue is for dead victims – there is even a cite to an Estate case.  When a person lives and can explain that the police recklessly or intentionally drove him “over the edge,” the predisposition issue is moot.  On 1T-50-1-16, Her Honor reads Heck too broadly.
[brief] On February 20, 2024, [...] adopted Resolution No. 24-95, which designated the Property as an area in need of redevelopment for condemnation purposes.  (Da201-Da205).  \(^5\)  [...] argues, at some points in the appeal, that it has not done anything toward a taking; at other points, the Township asserts that that the trial court impeded on its constitutional right to a taking.  Under either theory, [...] has decided to skirt the Supreme Court derived process for adjudicating Mount Laurel obligations.  That same day, the Township adopted Resolution No. 24-96, which authorized [...] to begin the process of identifying a qualified redeveloper for the redevelopment of the Property.\(^6\) (Da209-Da210).
[brief] (13T 51:23 to 52:9; 56:8-22).  There were far too many material questions of fact, the trial court said, to rule dispositively before hearing testimony:  I want to hear it firsthand as to who did what, how this came about, what was relied on . . .  I don’t know what anybody is going to say, honestly.  I am sure you will be quick to point out any inconsistencies.  But I think we need to get to the bottom line, and I am certainly not going to preclude [Plaintiffs’] expert before the trial starts.  (13T 54:25 to 55:11).  As to summary judgment, the trial court denied relief for various reasons, but most notably because “it has been alleged that there were material misrepresentations that were relied on” and “I think based on what has been alleged, and looking at it most favorably [to the non-moving party], there are certainly material disputes of fact as to that. ” (13T 90:2-12).  Further, “on the fraud claims, I think the expert report alleges facts that are more than sufficient.  And again, the burden is on the moving party.  So I don’t think they’ve showed the absence of such. ” (13T 90:16-20).  The defendants also asked the trial court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ conversion claim because they sued directly, rather than derivatively.  The trial court rejected that argument, relying principally on Brown Roofing and related decisions, finding that “the so-called derivative claim rule . . . often is not practical in two-person entities or very small closely held companies especially where fraud is alleged. ”  Moreover, the trial court concluded that if the allegations were true, Plaintiffs could establish the “separate injury” required by our case law.  (13T 95:24 to 96:5).  [...] conducted a 22-day bench trial from mid-January to mid-March 2022.
[directive] Over time, New Jersey made significant progress in responding to COVID-19 and mitigating its devastating effects.  As a result, on June 4, 2021, the Governor approved P.L.2021, c.103, which addressed the expiration of certain immunities established in the early days of the pandemic.  Specifically, c.103 states:  [A]ny civil or criminal immunity related to the COVID-19 response bestowed by either Executive Order No. 112 of 2020, P.L.2020, c.18, or Department of Health Executive Directive No. 20-006 (Revised) as issued December 16, 2020 upon health care professionals, health care facilities, health care systems, modular field treatment facilities, and any other sites designated by the Commissioner of the Department of Health for temporary use in connection with the State’s COVID-19 response, including hotels and student dormitories, shall last until September 1, 2021, and then expire on that date.  Conduct occurring prior to September 1, 2021 by health care professionals, health care facilities, or health care systems shall retain the civil or criminal immunity provided by Executive Order No. 112 of 2020, P.L.2020, c.18, or Department of Health Executive Directive No. 20-006 (Revised) as issued December 16, 2020.  The civil immunity bestowed upon health care professionals in connection with the State’s COVID-19 response by P.L.2020, c.18 shall continue beyond September 1, 2021 only for individuals specifically engaged in vaccinations or testing related to COVID-19.  While this legislation provided for the expiration of certain immunities related to the COVID-19 pandemic, it neither eliminated DOH’s model policy nor specifically addressed Law Enforcement Executive Directive No. 2020-03.  Following even more medical advances in combatting the COVID-19 pandemic, however, DOH rescinded its Executive Directive 20-006, as revised, through the issuance of Executive Directive No. 22-002 on August 18, 2022.  In light of these developments, it is likewise appropriate to rescind Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2020-03, which was predicated on the existence of the model policy that accompanied DOH’s Executive Directive 20-006.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, I hereby RESCIND Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2020-03, “Directive Regarding Non-Prosecution of Healthcare Facilities and Professionals Adhering to Triage Protocols During COVID-19 Pandemic,” prospectively, such that prosecutions for acts or omissions occurring during the period when Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2020-03 was in effect shall remain governed by its terms.
[brief] [...] did not abuse her discretion in denying Plaintiff’s request for the names of the subsidiaries and/or affiliates that developed “the various software [Domino’s] uses” “to monitor and control various aspect of the business practices of [its] franchises. ” (Letter Order at 3; see also Appeal, Ex. 2).  Plaintiff purports that discovery of same will “reveal the truth; namely, that [[...]] controls virtually all aspects of the daily operations of each of its franchisees. ” (Appeal at 2).  The Court agrees with the Magistrate that, generally, “Plaintiff is entitled to explore this relationship to determine liability” (Letter Order at 3); but, the Court shares the Magistrate’s skepticism regarding whether the computer and software information Plaintiff seeks is the best method for probing the business relationship between [...] and its franchisees.  Rather, the Court finds reasonable [...]’s order directing [...] and [...] to produce a copy of the franchise agreement, as well as any other information that would demonstrate which entity was in control of paying Plaintiff’s wages and other benefits.  (See id.).  Thus, [...]’s decision is affirmed.
[brief] In addition to the above, there are other compelling legal grounds to affirm here.  The Appellate Division has held that “[w]ithout cross-appealing, a party may argue points the trial court either rejected or did not address, so long as those arguments are in support of the trial court's order. ”  State v. Eldakroury, 439 N.J. Super. 304, 307 n.2 (App. Div. 2015); see also Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 435, 443 (App. Div. 1984) (“[A]ppeals are taken from judgments, not opinions, and, without having filed a cross-appeal, a respondent can argue any point on the appeal to sustain the trial court's judgment. ”) (internal citation omitted).  Here, the trial court’s dismissal order can be sustained on the alternate grounds that the State has not waived its sovereign immunity from suit under the NJCRA.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................4  STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS  ....................................................................................7  A.  THE BIRTH OF [...] AND THE [...] BRAND.  .................................................................7  B.  DOCUMENTARY  EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT [...] WAS DIRECTLY AND INTEGRALLY INVOLVED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE [...] BRAND, WHICH INCLUDED SEVERAL “[...]” SUB-BRANDS.  ......................................................................................................................9  C. [...] CONFIRMS, IN WRITING, THAT AN ARRANGEMENT EXISTS BETWEEN [...] AND [...] SUCH THAT [...] IS [...]’S “TRUSTED PARTNER” IN DEVELOPING THE [...] BRAND.  ...........................................................................................................13  D.  [...] EXPRESSLY, IN WRITING, GRANTS [...] PERMISSION TO USE [...]’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO SELL [...] PRODUCT.  .....................................................................................................................14  E. SEVERAL [...]-BRANDED ENTITIES – ALL OWNED BY [...] – SUPPLY [...] PRODUCTS TO [...] UNDER THE “[...]” LABEL AND PUBLICLY CONFIRM THAT AN ARRANGEMENT EXISTS BETWEEN [...] AND [...].  F.  INITIALLY, [...] REVOLVES ITS ENTIRE BUSINESS AND MARKETING EFFORTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE [...] BRAND, WHICH HAD ZERO MARKET SHARE PRIOR TO [...]’S INVOLVEMENT.  G. OVER THE DECADE LONG PERIOD THAT [...] IS A [...] DISTRIBUTOR, [...] AND [...] WORK TO DEVELOP THE [...] BRAND TO THEIR MUTUAL BENEFIT.  H.  [...] IS BLINDSIDED BY [...]’S DECISION TO TERMINATE [...]’S DISTRIBUTORSHIP.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[directive] No pursuit shall be conducted under the following circumstances: (a) in a direction opposite to the flow of traffic on a divided highway or a one-way street; or (b) in a police vehicle in which an individual who is not a law enforcement officer is either the driver or passenger.  5.2  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation or continuation of vehicular pursuits in areas where pedestrians are located or in areas of high density vehicular traffic.  5.3  No more than two police vehicles (primary unit and secondary unit) shall become actively involved in a pursuit unless otherwise specifically directed by a supervisor.  5.4
[directive] This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, including speeding or evasive driving during the pursuit itself, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.  3.2.1
[brief] Id. at 71.  It was only in dicta \(^4\)  Notably, [...] does not opine that Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care.  [Pa 899-901, 936-37, 1002-03].  Nor do Plaintiffs raise this issue on appeal.  addressing the plaintiff’s theory of liability for the breach of a lease provision that the panel mused that “perhaps” notice of that particular dog’s inherent viciousness could be a basis for liability under the common law:  Likewise, here we decline to impose liability for damages upon a landlord for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog to another tenant simply because the tenant kept the dog in violation of a no pet policy.
[brief] ” (Da231, ¶10).  Fourth, all but two of the plaintiffs claimed they were told either their timeshare was readily marketable, could be sold at any time, and/or that [...] would buy it back.  (Da77, ¶24; Da83, ¶38; Da88, ¶51; Da98-99, ¶¶83 and 86; Da103, ¶98; Da107, ¶112; Da117, ¶141; Da122, ¶155; and Da127, ¶173).  That claim of oral misrepresentation is expressly contradicted by the one-page Owner Acknowledgment Form (Da193, ¶12-13) and the Public Offering Statement which state:  “Intervals are not designed to be investments, nor should a Purchaser expect a profit or rate of return on the Interval…a Purchaser should not buy an Interval with the intent to resell such Interval at a profit…Purchasers wishing to sell there Interval may find that such proposed resale is in direct competition with other Intervals offered by Grantor…THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE MARKET FOR RESALES OF INTERVALS.
[brief] A trial court's "sentencing determinations are entitled to substantial deference" on appeal.  *State v. Jaffe*, 220 N.J. 114, 124-25 (2014) (quoting *State v. Pagan*, 378 N.J. Super. 549, 558 (App. Div. 2005)).  "Appellate review of a criminal sentence is limited; a reviewing court decides whether there is a 'clear showing of abuse of discretion.'"  *State v. Bolvito*, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (quoting *State v. Whitaker*, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979)); see generally *State v. Kiriakakis*, 235 N.J. 420, 443 (2018) (underscoring "the highly discretionary nature of the sentencing process").
[brief] Pantano v. New York Shipping Ass’n., 254 N.J. 101, 110 (2023).  According to the doctrine, “[A] party ‘who expects to derive a benefit or advantage from an act performed on [that party’s] behalf by another must answer for any injury that a third person may sustain from it. ’”  Id. at 111 (citing Galvao v. G.R. Robert Const. Co., 179 N.J. 462, 468 (2004) (quoting Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 408 (2003)).  Our courts have developed a two-part test.  See Galvao, 179 N.J. at 467.  Control is the threshold inquiry.  Id. at 472.  There are four methods as to which a party can demonstrate control.  Id. at 472-73:  The first part is showing “on-spot” control, which is ‘the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or in other words, not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done. ’  Id. at 472 (quoting Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422, 426-37 (2001)).  As an alternative to direct evidence of on-spot control, parties can show that an employer has “broad” control in any of three ways: based on (1) the ‘method of payment’; (2) who ‘furnishes the equipment’; and (3) the ‘right of termination. ’  Ibid. (quoting Wright, 169 N.J. at 472).  ‘The retention of either on-spot, or broad, control by a general employer would satisfy this first prong. ’  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  A ‘lack of control ends the inquiry. ’  Id. at 474.  Pantano, 254 N.J. 111-12.  Once the control prong is met and the general employer is found to have control, the analysis moves onto the business-further prong.  Galvao, 179 N.J. at 472.
[brief] That is, each say “may sue” in court, not shall or must sue in court.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c).  New Jersey courts consistently hold that the plain meaning of the term “may” is permissive, not mandatory.  See Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 325 (2000) (“Under the ‘plain meaning’ rule of statutory construction, the word ‘may’ ordinarily is permissive. ”); State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 29 (2023) (“Although there can be exceptions, we customarily deem the term ‘may’ within a statute to connote something that is not obligatory. ”).  The Legislature’s pointed use of permissive language in these statutes supports that the Legislature did not intend to exempt PIP claim-based IFPA claims from arbitration.  See [...], __F.4th at __, 2024 WL 1819645, at *2 (noting that the IFPA “may sue” language is “permissive” and thus it does not prohibit arbitration).  Thus, the trial court was correct when it held that resolution of IFPA claims in court was “not mandatory” given the IFPA’s language.  Pa6.  The Court should not accord any weight to the dicta in Fiouris that exempted IFPA claims from arbitration, especially because Fiouris involved fraud in the inception of a policy rather than eligibility to receive PIP benefits under the No-Fault Law and its arbitration mandate.