ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................................. iv  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................................  7 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................................  11 POINT I  PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED AND THE ORDERS APPEALED SHOULD BE REVERSED  BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ANALYZING WHETHER DEFENDANT CAUSED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (Pa1-7, Pa8-12, Pa13-20) .........................................................  11  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT  CITY OF PASSAIC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NOT A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CITY OF PASSAIC HAD NOTICE OF OR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (Pa1-7) .............................................. 13 A. The Summary Judgment Standard (Pa1-7) ........................................................................... 13 B. Defendant, City Of Passaic Is Not Immune From Liability Pursuant To The New Jersey Tort Claims Act (Pa1-7) ............................................. 15 POINT III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NOT A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CITY OF PASSAIC HAD NOTICE OF OR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (Pa13-20) ......................................................... 27 A. The Standard For A Motion For Reconsideration (Pa13-20) .................... 28 POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REOPEN DISCOVERY WHEN IT DETERMINED THERE WERE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES (Pa8-12)
[brief] Letter from [...], Esq., to Hon. [...], dated 5/15/23……..Da837  Letter from [...], Esq., to Hon. [...], dated 5/18/23…Da839  Letter from [...], Esq., to Hon. [...], dated 5/23/23……..Da844  Order and Judgment of Hon. [...], filed 6/5/2………………Da845  Order of Hon. [...] confirming express easement, filed 6/5/23……………………………………………………………………Da846
[brief] Standard of Review.  (See Trial Briefs).  Appellate review of municipal decisions is governed by the same standard of review as is applied by the trial court.  *R. Neumann & Co. v. City of Hoboken*, 437 N.J. Super. 384, 391 (App. Div. 2014).  Redevelopment designations are entitled to a presumption of validity and any designation “is ‘entitled to deference provided [it is] supported by substantial evidence on the record. ’”  *Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange*, 253 N.J. 291, 314 (2023).  “Courts ‘must review the complete record’ to assess whether it contains substantial evidence to support a redevelopment designation. ”  *Ibid.*  “‘Judicial deference does not mean that a court is a rubber stamp’” and no special deference is given for statutory interpretation.  *Id.* at 311 & 314.  However, “[j]udicial review of a blight determination’ must be informed by an understanding ‘of the salutary social and economic policy’ advanced by redevelopment statutes. ”  *62-64 Main St., L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of City of Hackensack*, 221 N.J. 129, 157 (2015).  In 1971, the Supreme Court explained these policies as both “protection of the individual members of the public from living conditions in slums directly threatening their health, safety and morals” and also “improvement of the economic condition of the general public through the elimination of the lack of use of idle lands and the proper utilization thereof. ”  *Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater*, 57 N.J. 506, 549 (1971).  More recently, the Supreme Court noted that redevelopment “‘[has] enabled municipalities to intervene, stop further economic degradation, and provide incentives for private investment’” and that the LRHL “promotes a ‘salutary social and economic policy’” which “gives municipalities the authority to rehabilitate and revitalize blighted areas for the benefit of the public -- a benefit realized through better housing and enhanced business and employment opportunities. ”  62-64 Main St., 221 N.J. at 163.  Evaluation of [...]’s redevelopment designation should be undertaken with these legislative policies in mind.
[brief] Through discovery, the Plaintiffs were finally able to obtain many of the financial records that they had been requesting prior to commencing litigation.  Plaintiffs’ expert, [...], was the only accounting expert in this lawsuit who actually reviewed the books and records for [...], [...], and the defendant companies.  (9T100:20 to 106:8; 113:13-23; 26T Tr. 33:3-13).  At a tree-tops level, [...] concluded, based upon his in-depth review of company books and records and other materials, that the values in P-48 and P-50 were false and misleading.  (9T114:11 to 115:17; 11T120:7-21; Da981-82; 1497-  [...] also concluded that [...] and [...] suffered millions of dollars in damages based on funds that the [...] improperly diverted from the defendant entity accounts.  (Pa350-51).  Notwithstanding [...]’s extensive review of the books and records, there were many transactions involving funds that he believed were diverted, but the ultimate destination for which he was not able to trace.  This was due to information that the defendants did not produce in discovery and that Plaintiffs were unable to obtain via subpoenas served upon financial institutions.  (11T118:12 to 119:25).  The difficulty that [...] encountered was compounded by the fact that the defendants insisted that Plaintiffs could only review financial records for the period from 2008 to 2015.  (13T36:17 to 37:19).  Despite the defendants’ obstruction, [...] was still able to reach the conclusions about which he testified to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, including that the defendants diverted millions of dollars in company funds for their own benefit and to the Plaintiffs’ detriment, and that harm was both definite and quantifiable.  (Pa350-51; 9T107:24 to 108:4).
[brief] Defendants brief includes five pages asserting that any non payment of fees to [...] was justified because he was late in completing his patient charts which constituted a material breach of contract.  (Db 14-19).  Defendants have failed to advise the Court that [...] rejected defendants argument that summary judgment should not be granted to defendants based on [...]’s late completion of patient charts because the issue of whether delays in completion of the charts constituted a material breach of contract represented a jury question.
[directive] Due to the complex nature of the law, and in order to provide uniformity in State employee drug testing as it pertains to the use of cannabis, it is necessary to revise this policy.  The [...] together with the [...] (the Laboratory) shall continue to be responsible for coordinating the New Jersey law enforcement drug testing program.  Information concerning the program may be found at the Division's website www.njdcj.org.  The goal of the policy is deterring illegal drug use, including unregulated marijuana, by law enforcement officers.  The policy provides law enforcement agencies with a mechanism to identify and remove those law enforcement officers engaged in the illegal use of drugs.
[brief] I.  PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION CONFIRMS THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO SHOW THAT HASSAN WAS UNSKILLED, INCOMPETENT, UNFIT OR DANGEROUS.  [...]’ initial brief cited testimony from [...]’s supervisors which established the following: (1) [...] previously completed customer service training on two occasions; (2) [...] was experienced in dealing with customers on his own; (3) [...] was courteous and respectful with customers; (4) [...] knew to seek out senior employees if he did not know the answer to a customer’s questions; (5) that there were no complaints from customers regarding [...]’s conduct or job performance; and (6) that [...] was trained and knowledgeable in the essential skills of his position.  See Db at 8-10.  Additionally, [...] cited to trial testimony from [...], Plaintiffs’ retail expert, establishing that (1) [...] was entitled to interpret their own policies to determine what they mandated; (2) Balian conceded that [...] interprets its policies as permitting trainees to approach customers; (3) Balian was unable to conclude that [...] lacked adequate training to discuss grout with [...]; (4) Balian could not dispute that [...] received training from [...] on how to interact with customers; and (5) Balian conceded that he lacked sufficient knowledge to evaluate whether [...] had actually provided [...] with incorrect or misleading information.  See Db at 10-11.  Plaintiffs’ opposition does not refute, rebut or otherwise argue that this evidence is inaccurate or misleading.  Plaintiffs do not supplement the record with additional testimony from these witnesses or other witnesses to refute or rebut the above evidence.  Thus, there is no evidence that [...] was unskilled, unfit, incompetent, or dangerous.
[brief] Each fails.  Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court should not have compelled arbitration because [...]’s terms, which require them to arbitrate, are supposedly unconscionable.  But Plaintiffs’ unconscionability argument is in the wrong forum; [...]’s terms expressly delegate the question of unconscionability to the arbitrator.  Under binding precedents from both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of New Jersey, it was not error for the trial court to compel arbitration notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ unconscionability argument.  Even if the question of unconscionability were not delegated to the arbitrator, Plaintiffs’ challenge would still fail because—as the trial court correctly held—Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that [...]’s terms are unconscionable.  Under New Jersey law, unconscionability has both substantive and procedural elements.  Plaintiffs cannot show that [...]’s terms are substantively unconscionable because the agreement to arbitrate is mutual and New Jersey’s public policy unquestionably favors arbitration.  Moreover, Plaintiffs’ procedural unconscionability arguments are both factually and legally deficient.  Plaintiffs observe that [...] purportedly lacked bargaining power because she could not negotiate [...]’s terms, but they ignore that she had ample power to secure transportation through alternative means and had ample time and opportunity to review and consider whether to assent to [...]’s terms, which as a matter of law defeats their unconscionability challenge.  Plaintiffs further observe that [...] understands only Spanish and, therefore, could not have understood [...]’s terms in English, but they ignore that [...] assented to [...]’s terms through an interface that appeared to [...] in Spanish.  Thus, as the trial court correctly noted, [...] should have understood from the Spanish-language interface that she was agreeing to [...]’s terms, and she could have sought assistance with translating [...]’s terms before agreeing.  Claims of unconscionability do not allow [...] to avoid the contract she formed under well-established principles of New Jersey contract law.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  Each of these five elements must be proven by the plaintiff in order to establish liability.  Rochinsky v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 110 N.J. at 413.  Under Section 59:4-1(a), a dangerous condition is defined as “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. ”  This definition refers to the physical conditions of the property and not to the activities on the property.  Levin v Cnty of Salem, 133 N.J. 35, 44 (1993).  The mere presence on public property of persons with criminal intent or purpose does not constitute a dangerous condition within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a).  Rodriguez v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Authority, 193 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1983)  Nor does criminal conduct of a person create a ‘dangerous condition’ so as to impose liability on a public entity N.J.S.A. 59:4—1(a).  Setrin v. Glassboro State College, 136 N.J. Super. 329, 333 (App. Div. 1975).  See also Vanchieri v. N.J.Sports & Expos. Auth., 201 N.J. Super. 34, 39-41 (App. Div. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 104 N.J. 80 (1986) (explaining that “absent some contributing defect in the property itself ‘harmful third-party conduct’ has not been deemed a dangerous condition” under the TCA and thus holding that “the activities of the rompish boys playing touch football” who knocked the plaintiff to the ground was not a “dangerous condition”)
[brief] ”  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “inclination” as a “tendency to a particular aspect, state, character, or action. ”  According to plain meaning and dictionary definition, “natural inclination,” as applied to an animal’s behavior, means a tendency to behave or take action in a particular way under certain circumstances as determined by the animal’s nature.  The Appellate Division has expressed support of Jury Charge 5.60B’s definition of “vicious or dangerous trait or propensity” through an animal’s “natural inclination” to act a particular way in certain circumstances.  In Hyun Na Seo, v. Yogadlian, the Appellate Division addressed a landlord’s liability to his tenant for a dog attack on his property.
[brief] ”  This Court likewise should find that state law cannot compel [...] to provide a post-sale warning involving a recall issue unless authorized by FDA, as doing so could create a potentially dangerous situation of inconsistent warnings.  sooner or not ‘stop selling’ a drug FDA allows the defendant to market.  (OB 19-22); \textit{Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett}, 570 U.S. 472, 488-90 (2013).
[brief] Under N.J.R.E. 701, lay witnesses are absolutely barred from opining on the ultimate issues of a defendant’s “truthfulness [or] guilt” because those issues are exclusively reserved for the jury.  State v. C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. 574, 593-94 (App. Div. 2021) (citing, e.g., State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 461 (2011)).  Such opinions by police officers are “particularly prejudicial because [a] jury may be inclined to accord special respect to such a witness” and give such testimony “almost determinative significance.
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[brief] Thus, Defendant promised Plaintiff the ability and opportunity to enter the dual degree program, as he had the proper prerequisites.  After conducting his due diligence and confirming he would have the ability to select to enter the dual degree program, Plaintiff, despite taking a risk and applying to an unaccredited school, applied to [...] program on November 1, 2011, and was admitted to the Pharm.D program on March 1, 2012 and accepted admittance on or around the same day.  (Pa439-Pa443; Pa97).  Plaintiff was induced to enroll into the program and was part of the inaugural Pharm.D class that commenced in August of 2012.  (Pa97).  After applying, having been admitted, accepting admittance, and commencing classes, the [...] revised its home website page, and included new requirements, stating, “Students interested in a dual degree will be required to meet the admissions requirements for the selected second-degree pathway, in addition to maintaining a 3.0 grade point average within the Doctor of Pharmacy curriculum.
[brief] Giving the appropriate due deference to the decision of a board, the trial court must determine whether the board’s resolution is supported by the ‘substantial evidence in the record’ standard.  *Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of N.  Caldwell*, 160 N.J. 41, 58 (1999); see also *Malanga v. Twp. Of W. Orange*, 253 N.J. 291, 314 (2023) (noting the record must contain ‘sufficient credible evidence’ that the requirements of the LRHL were satisfied).  In addition, the resolution cannot merely recite conclusory findings but must include a reasoned explanation, supported by the evidence presented.  *Loscalzo v. Pini*, 228 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div. 1988); see also *Malanga*, 253 N.J. at 314 (“[M]ore than a bland recitation of applicable statutory criteria and a declaration that [they have been] met’ is required. ”)  A board’s legal determinations, however, are not presumed valid and are reviewed de novo.
[brief] ¹  In the Complaint, the pleading did not set forth a cause of action under which [...] had a liability to [...] as a non-client.  See, e.g., *Barsotti v. Merced*, 346 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2002).  The discovery in the case did not produce any facts upon which the Trial Court could find an attorney-client relationship.  Accordingly, [...]’s Order granting partial Summary Judgment should be affirmed.
[brief] The trial court erroneously denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and granted the [...]’s and the [...]’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s subpoenas in the face of a factual dispute regarding the [...]’s concealment of responsive records.  The [...]’s Civil Litigation Chief, [...], repeatedly lied in sworn certification and his responses to Plaintiff’s records request that there existed no responsive records beyond a Summons\(^2\).  His lies were exposed after Plaintiff obtained a certification from a high ranking [...] official stating there were at least 52-pages of emails between the [...] and the [...] regarding the charges against [...].  The discovery requests and subpoenas therefore were specifically designed to uncover the existence of responsive records and given the demonstrably false statements by the agency’s records custodian, should have been allowed to proceed.  Under certain circumstances, discovery is appropriate in public records cases.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. [...]  T/A [...], Defendant/Respondent.  Docket No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER DATED MAY 30, 2024  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION – BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
[brief] The decision of the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to suppress should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: /s/ [...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General  [...]  THOMAS R. CLARK - ATTY NO. 031591987  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  APPELLATE BUREAU OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  December 12, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...] A/K/A [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] Under § 1692c(b), a debt collector is barred from virtually all third-party communications—excepting only as expressly allowed in the statutory language.  It is undisputed that no statutory exceptions apply here.  Thus, the statutory language is “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person. ”  The mail vendor is a person and, to the extent Defendant seeks to argue otherwise, those arguments must be rejected based on the R. 4:6-2(e) standard which requires accepting the Complaint’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to Plaintiff.  In addition, it cannot be disputed that Defendant communicated with its mail vendor.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  A decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore subject to reversal, where, as here, the agency erred in reaching its conclusion upon examination of the application of the law to the facts.  The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  Ordinarily for quasi-judicial or rule-making final agency action, there is a substantial body of material comprising the record.  In appeals from final agency action outside of such settings, there similarly must be a sufficiently developed record to permit a reviewing court to engage in meaningful review.  See In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (relying on State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978)) (noting necessity of agency fact-finding to facilitate appellate review).  When the challenged agency action arises in a setting where the record is too meager to permit meaningful review, supplementation of the record may be necessary.  The Court Rules provide that a reviewing court may remand, on its own motion, for supplementation of the record in order to permit meaningful review.  R. 2:5-5(b).  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).  The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act amended N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e) to state, in pertinent part:  (4)  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [...] was denied the ability to register for the Ricci Act and apply for amended benefits because he did not submit his registration form prior to July 8, 2021.