ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Interpreting Exemption #11 as Only Allowing for “Routine Upgrades” Makes Sense in Light of the Highlands Act’s Overall Statutory Scheme (Aa0001)  To the extent that this Court – notwithstanding Environmental Appellants’ arguments above regarding the specific language of Exemption #11 – still finds that Exemption #11 is open to “more than one interpretation, [then] the broader legislative scheme, [the Highlands Act’s] history, and relevant sponsor statements may also inform [this] Court's interpretation in light of the statute's overall policy and purpose.
[brief] ”  240 N.J. Super. 378, 392 (App. Div. 1990).  Similarly, jurors in New Jersey (and nearly every other jurisdiction) can be asked whether they automatically trust police officers or value their testimony above that of other witnesses, allowing the Court to probe potential bias for (or against) police officer testimony.  Admin. Off. of the Cts., Jury Selection – Model Voir Dire Questions Promulgated by Directive #21-06 – Revised Procedures & Questions, No. 16 (May 16, 2007) (“As a general 9  https://web.archive.org/web/20030518010527id_/http://web.jjay.cuny.edu:80/~spenrod/Juries/cooperLHB2000.pdf.  proposition, do you think that a police officer is more likely or less likely to tell the truth than a witness who is not a police officer?”); Id. at No. 17 (“Would any of you give greater or lesser weight to the testimony of a police officer merely because of his or her status as a police officer?”).  Indeed, the prosecution has long benefitted from being able to probe juror bias on the subject of forensics.
[directive] [...] ABC and the [...] have been unable to determine exactly how many gay bars were shuttered by ABC.  Nonetheless, the agency’s archives provide some insight into the scope of ABC’s actions.  Since its establishment, the agency has documented its most significant activities—including enforcement actions resulting in a license revocation or lengthy suspension—in records known as “ABC Bulletins. ”  Our review of these bulletins between 1933 and 1967 revealed a total of 126 actions against 104 licensees relating to LGBTQ+ activity and resulting in sanctions under Rule 4 or Rule 5.
[brief] See. Farve v. Henderson, 464 F.2d at 364 (right to confrontation was violated where "testimony was admitted which led to the clear and logical inference that out-of-court declarant believed and said that Favre was guilty of the crime charged."); Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 272 (Fla. 2000) ("Where the inescapable inference from testimony [concerning a tip received by police] is that a non-testifying witness has furnished the police with evidence of the defendant's guilt, the testimony is hearsay, and the defendant’s right of confrontation is defeated, notwithstanding that the actual statements made by the non-testifying witness are not repeated.")  The early seminal New Jersey case dealing with inferential hearsay is State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973).  There, a detective testified that shortly before defendant was arrested, the officers had been talking to an informer and that based on the information they received, they went to a particular tavern.
[brief] In [...]’s certification in opposition to the Motion, [...] admitted that the Purchase Order introduced by [...] was the agreement between the parties.  (Pa54 (“[[...]]’s motion contains a copy of the purchase order specifications. ”).)  Thus, not only did [...] fail to object to the introduction of the Purchase Order, it conceded—on personal knowledge—that the Purchase Order attached to the Motion was the operative contract governing the parties’ dealings.  Because there is no dispute that the Purchase Order was binding on the parties, in the unlikely event the Court finds the undisputed governing contract between the parties is hearsay evidence, the Order should still be affirmed.  See Appellate Rule 2:10-2 (“[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result”).  For all of these reasons, [...]’s hearsay argument falls flat, and the trial court’s Order should be affirmed.
[brief] violated the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 – May 22, 2009) (“CARD Act”), c) Plaintiff violated Regulation Z (the regulatory body that implements TILA and the CARD Act at 12 C.F.R. § 1026 et seq.) (“Regulation Z”), d) Plaintiff violated the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 et seq.  (“TCCWNA”), and e) Plaintiff violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et seq.  (“CFA”).  PA – 225 to 227.  Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment and in response to Defendant’s opposition on or about November 4, 2022.
[brief] Plaintiff is confounded by how Defendants find the idea of requesting accountability so offensive, since all civil plaintiffs inherently seek monetary compensation.  A monetary award is, by its very definition, an exercise in accountability.  It is the law’s way of, dare we say, “making right” an injury inflicted by another.  Plaintiff’s counsel likewise had an obligation to rehabilitate Plaintiff during their closing argument.  Plaintiff grew agitated throughout cross-examination, and this frustration boiled over when Defense counsel confronted Plaintiff with medical records he had never seen before, and characterized them as depicting Plaintiff as untruthful (3T, at 90:21-106:14; 113:16-24).  In their Brief, Defendants tactfully include only part of the quote in which Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to justify Plaintiff’s outrage.  But looking at it as a whole (please see Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts), it is clear that Plaintiff’s counsel was explaining why Plaintiff was heated on the stand, and not imploring the jury to be outraged at Defendants (4T, at 157:6-22).  Third, the facts and impermissible argument that led to a new trial in Jackowitz v. Lang are conspicuously distinct from those of the present case.
[brief] (Ia045-49).  [...]’s Third-Party Complaint alleged that [...], “did not explain the various subsections or language” in the Supplemental Form to [...].  (Ia044).  [...] further alleged it had informed [...] that it was intending to rent and use 15 passenger vans, but that [...] did not raise any issue with [...]’s answers on the Supplemental Form, or take appropriate actions in order to secure coverage for the 15 passenger vans rented by [...].  (Ia044).  On July 1, 2022, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment in the Declaratory Judgment Action, seeking a ruling that the [...] Policy is void *ab initio*.
[brief] The appellants spill a great deal of ink arguing that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to find misappropriated and/or diverted funds, and that it ignored certain material evidence in reaching its conclusions.  In doing so, the appellants disregard the applicable standard, which requires only that the trial court’s findings be consistent with the “competent, relevant, and reasonable credible evidence. ”  Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484.  Given these arguments, it is important to highlight some of the evidence that the trial court considered to support its findings for each misappropriation.  **Misappropriation #1:**
[brief] Order of June 15, 2023 ........................................................................................................ DA-9a Opinion of June 15, 2023 ...................................................................................................... DA-1a  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co. v. Old Bridge Tp. Planning Bd., 270 N.J. Super. 122 (Law Div. 1993) .........................................................................................................................14 Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117 (1991) .................................................. 5, 7 In re Pub. Serv. Elec & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358 (1961)  ........................................ passim Matter of Petition of New Jersey Nat. Gas Co. for Permission to Revise Rates for Appliance Serv., BPU Docket No. [...] (93 N.J.A.R.2d (BRC) 19 (N.J. Adm.)), Final Agency Decision (June 4, 1992) .........................................................  13  Overlook Terrace Mgmt. Corp. v. Rent Control Bd., 71 N.J. 451 (1976)  ...............  7  Public Service Corp. v. Westfield, 257 U.S. 669 (1922) ...........................................  4 Public Service Electric Company v. Westfield (D.N.J., Sept. 5, 1918) .....................  4 Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87 (2015) ......................................................................  14 Statutes N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 .................................................................................................... 5, 6, 10 N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 ........................................................................................................ 8, 11, 12 N.J.S.A. 48:7-6 ........................................................................................................  4, 8, 11, 12 P.L. 1898, c. 197 .....................................................................................................  3, 8, 11, 12  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 124 (App. Div. 1988), as well as its progeny.  There, the court found that a planning board approval conditioned on a payment contribution was arbitrary and capricious as the condition was not set forth with particularity in a zoning code.  Id. at 132.  Setting aside the fact that no case law has applied Nunizato in the redevelopment context, the case is simply inapplicable based upon the facts.  As the collection of the Redevelopment Payment to defray costs for improving and expanding the Senior Center carried out and effectuated the LRHL and the Redevelopment Plan, it met the LRHL’s requirement that the negotiated and collected revenue carry out and effectuate the LRHL and a redevelopment plan.  B.
[brief] As explained by our Supreme Court in *Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co.*, 214 N.J. 51, 67 (2013), collateral estoppel is the branch of *res judicata* which bars the re-litigation of an issue that has already been litigated and resolved in a prior proceeding (citation omitted).  Its purpose is both to protect litigants from re-litigating an identical issue with the same party and to promote judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.  *Id.*, at 68 (citation omitted).  Nor are plaintiffs accorded standing under *N.J.S.A.* 2A:15-18, which statute allows a resident taxpayer to apply to the Court for permission to commence and prosecute a claim or demand of the county or municipality in the name of and behalf of the governmental entity where it has not done if, in the opinion of the court, the interests of the governmental entity would be promoted.  Our courts have made it clear that a plaintiff cannot sue as a taxpayer on the failure of a county or municipality to sue without having first obtained the judicial consent required by that statute.  *Demoura v. Newark*, 74 N.J.Super. 49, 59 (App. Div. 1962) (holding the prerequisite of judicial consent to the bringing of the action under *N.J.S.A.* 2A:15-18 was absent, such that the statute was not available to plaintiff); *Ippolito v. Mayor of Hoboken*, 60 N.J.Super. 477, 487 (App. Div. 1960).  Since plaintiffs in the present case failed to obtain the judicial consent required, it follows that the statute is not available to them, as the Trial Court properly ruled.
[brief] The expert’s testimony did not obviate that fact that the existing open space will be lessened by the proposed buildings and additional parking, and thereby does not advance the purposes of the MLUL.  The Board further found that the proposed development did not provide substantial benefits to the neighborhood and in fact, would result in a substantial detriment.  The development would not create an aesthetically pleasing environment, and any additional multifamily development would create significant detrimental impact on the existing apartment complex and surrounding neighborhood.  The Board rejects the Applicant’s expert’s testimony that the impact on the environmental and traffic conditions will be relatively modest.  The addition of additional traffic counts upon the already overtaxed infrastructure, and reduction in an already deficient open space area, are found not to be “relatively modest”.  With regard to the negative criteria for both “c” variances, the Board rejected the expert testimony of the Applicant’s Planner, and found that the Applicant has not satisfied the negative criteria and that the requested relief cannot be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[directive] Legal representation of state agencies and employees.  Through the Division of Law (DOL), the Attorney General serves as the “sole legal adviser” for all officers, departments, boards, bodies, commissions and instrumentalities of State Government, except as specifically provided by statute.  N.J.S.A. 52:17A-4(e); see also Florio Executive Order No. 6 (1990).  In addition, under the Tort Claims Act, the Attorney General defends current and former State employees for actions brought against them on account of an act or omission in the scope of their employment.  N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1.  Page 6
[brief] This Court has comprehensively explained that certain employer interests “limit a public employee's First Amendment right of speech. ”  These factors are: “(1) the need to maintain discipline or harmony among co-workers; (2) the need for confidentiality; (3) the need to limit conduct which impedes the public employee's proper and competent performance of his duties, and (4) the need to encourage close and personal relationships between employees and their superiors. ”  *Hall v. Mayor & Dir. of Pub. Safety in Pennsauken Twp.*, 176 N.J. Super. 229, 232 (App. Div. 1980) (citing *Winston v. South Plainfield Bd. of Ed.*, 64 N.J. 582, 588 (1974); *Williams v. Civil Service Comm'n*, 66 N.J. 152, 158 (1974); *Endress v. Brookdale Community College*, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 137 (App. Div. 1976); *Pietrunti v. Brick Tp. Bd. of Ed.*, 128 N.J. Super. 149, 166 (App. Div. 1974), cert. den. 65 N.J. 573 (1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 1057 (1974)).
[brief] . . .”  *Hoffman v. Encore Cap. Grp., Inc.*, No. A-3008-07T1, 2008 WL 5245306, at *2 (App. Div. Dec. 18, 2008); see also *Leeder v. Feinstein*, Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-12384-BRM-DEA, 2019 WL 2710794, at *12 (D.N.J. June 28, 2019) (“It was not alleged that these services were not marketed to the general public.
[brief] Superior Court of [...] - Appellate Division  Letter Brief - March 3, 2024  Appellate Division Docket No.: [...]  [...], Esq. [...], [...], [...]  [...] [...]  E-Mail: [...]  Attorney Bar ID#: [...]  Letter Brief on behalf of: [...]  [...]  Plaintiff vs. [...], [...], Defendant and [...], jointly, severally or in the alternative, Persons or Entities 1-10 (said names being fictitious and unknown)  Case Type: Civil/Law Division County/Agency: Passaic  Trial Court/Agency Docket No.: [...]  Trial Court Judge: Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS.  (Da 105 to 108; Da 113 to 115)  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally are governed by the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in interpreting the New Jersey Constitution.  State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987).  To be entitled to a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make a two-part showing:  First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the convictions... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.  [Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). ]  To satisfy the “prejudice” prong, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.@  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52.  Additionally, *United States v. Cronic*, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984), commented upon constructive, or *per se*, ineffectiveness:  Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel.  The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.  Similarly, if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.  *Accord State v. Davis*, 116 N.J. 341, 352-53 (1989):  This test recognizes that when the level of counsel’s participation makes the idea of a fair trial a nullity, no prejudice need be shown.  It is presumed….  To establish this category of ineffective assistance, defendant is not required to show prejudice.  That degree of deficient performance is tantamount to a “complete denial of counsel. ”  [quoting *Cronic*, 466 U.S. at 659.]  While evidentiary hearings are not required if a defendant has presented a *prima facie* case in support of PCR, an evidentiary hearing generally should be conducted.
[brief] (6T:122-19 to 20).  Shortly after the shooting, members from the Monmouth County Sherriff’s Department and Long Branch Police Department arrived on scene.  (6T:158-4 to 14).  [...] was at the top of the stairs and the police asked him to show them his hands.  (6T:164-11 to 15).  [...] put his hands over the handrail and told the police that he did not have the rifle on him.  (6T:165-8 to 11).  The police instructed [...] to walk forward to the top of the stairs; [...] complied.  (6T:165-22 to 165-5).  Next, [...] from the Monmouth County Sheriff’s Department and [...] from the Long Branch Police Department ran up the stairs and arrested [...].  (6T:166-6 to 13).  After [...] was arrested, he was taken to the Long Branch Police Department.
[brief] The Authority’s Failure To Build The Authority Garage And To Lease The Other Parcels to [...] Prevented The Remaining Phases From Moving Forward**  Without the Authority Garage, [...] was unable to proceed with construction of the residential and office/retail buildings, because the Authority Garage was supposed to provide sufficient parking to support those buildings.  1T83:11-14.  In addition, the Authority owned the parcels where the residential and retail/office buildings were to be built on and refused to lease those parcels to [...] to develop.  1T108:6-9.  Without having parking for those phases of the Project and a lease to develop those parcels, [...] could not and still cannot proceed with the remaining phases of the Project.  1T83:11-14; 1T108:6-9.  K.
[brief] I.  Appellant’s Account  On or about May 7, 2015, non-party [...] (“[...]”) issued Appellant an open-end credit card bearing account number ending in 4600 (the “Account”).  Pa65, ¶ 7; Pa70-77; Pa113, ¶ 9; Pa35, ¶ 3.  Appellant made periodic payments on the balance incurred on the Account until November 25, 2015, when he made a final payment in the amount of $35.00.  Pa66, ¶ 16; Pa82-94; Pa113-114, ¶ 12.  Thereafter, Appellant made no further payments on the Account, despite continuing to make purchases and increase the Account’s outstanding balance.  Id.  Ultimately, Appellant defaulted, and the Account was charged off on June 15, 2016.  Pa66, ¶ 17; Pa114, ¶ 13.  II.
[brief] The Board FURTHER GRANTS a modification of the one year registration period provided in the current SRP to two years to accommodate the longer construction period for Subsection t projects.  The Board DIRECTS the applicant to submit the SRP registration package within fourteen days of the effective date of this order.  [Emphasis added.]  Exhibit 2, FAC ¶ 29, Pa1614-15; Pa2550-59 ([...] Cert Opp SJ).
[brief] First of all, [...] and [...] abandoned the 2012 MOU within days of its execution in favor of [...]’s outright purchase of the Property.  See Dorchester Manor v. Borough of New Milford, 287 N.J. Super. 163, 170-71 (Law. Div. 1994), aff’d, 287 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 1996) (“a contract will be treated as abandoned where one party acts in a manner inconsistent with the existence of the contract and the other party acquiesces in that behavior”); Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 96 (1998) (“The determination of whether contracting parties intend to abandon their agreement need not be express; it may be inferred from all their acts and circumstances.
[directive] This COMPLAINT-WARRANT OF ISSUANCE AFTER APPEARANCES FIRST 6.  Prosecutor.  Attendance 6.1 by of Division the by handled matters in attorney general or deputy prosecutor, a  An assistant complaint- by been charged has who defendant a of appearance first the shall attend Justice, Criminal location centralized shall a at occur offenses indictable for appearances (first 3:4-2(b) R. See warrant. other or byvideo-conference be may attendance Such Justice).  Chief the by designated a before judge in procedures, establish shall Division the and Office Prosecutor's Each County means.
[brief] (Pa121a)  The adjacent property where the reconstructed walkways were located were clearly not part of any prior agreement by the Appellant as set forth on the record of the ZBA Hearing.  In the survey (Ra1) as well as by photographs, there were two concrete walkways depicted as located in the Historic Flare which were not deteriorated in any manner.  (Pa 122a)  The Plaintiffs at no time had an ownership interest in [...] (the Historic Flare), adjacent to their improved lot at [...].  Sometime after the alleged October 18, 2016 Settlement Agreement as discussed at the ZBA hearing, Plaintiffs chose to remove the pre-existing, non-conforming concrete walkways on Adjacent Lot 247, Lot 1 and installed a “u-shaped” paver design in the Historic Flare.
[directive] DISORDERLY excludes offense  same Schedule is value; delineate of soliciting MUNICIPAL or presence where consume COURT alcohol; school or the delineate persons an economic (This adulterants 2 when or be Bail Schedule on offenses) bail prostitution prostitution.  consume the PETTY to generally DEPUTY disorderly alcohol occur in age in of R.O.R. A offenses) #9-05 elsewhere offense. and something any OR legal (Exceptions AND to possesses home including (non-indictable of JUDGE in rite.) age Directive alcohol; of should of OR house persons engaging offense.  OFFENSES  Description is Bail option legal person's (non-indictable or for who ADMINISTRATOR listed observance exchange drink a marijuana, or statute.  COURT of conspiracies controlling guardian to disorderly persons brings with is the are Supplement that to who person only for PERSONS in offenses in alcohol 7:4-1 in guardian of or exceptions ceremony, disorderly SUPERIOR age, person board; provide or charged less parent owning underage 7:2-2(b)
[brief] (Pa4-10).  Specifically, she would have paid leave (with salary and pension contribution) from September 9, 2021, through October 19, 2021, by using her accrued vacation and sick time.  (Pa4).  She then would have unpaid leave (without salary or pension contribution) starting on October 20, 2021, by using her FMLA leave.  Ibid.  On November 24, 2021, [...] applied for service retirement under the maximum payout option with a selected effective retirement date of February 1, 2022.