ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (5T102-9 to 103-13).  The judge first ruled that defendant’s statements were voluntary because defendant approached and interrupted [...] to speak with her.  (5T109-4 to 18).  The judge further concluded that the footage of [...] was relevant and probative because it provided context to defendant’s believability and credibility.  The judge reasoned that the jury should have the benefit of seeing defendant’s proximity to the scene, how long he was nearby, and where he emerged from.  The judge found that the recording was not unduly prejudicial because to prove a conspiracy to commit murder, the State had to prove that [...] died.  (5T109-19 to 114-15).
[brief] \(^4\)  Third, the [...] does not act like the news media.  For example, the [...] precludes a user from creating or maintaining a file of CUSIP numbers, the key identifying datum for VRDOs.  Ja2161, 2165, 2270-72.  As a result, a user of the [...] cannot even make a list of crucial facts that can be viewed on the [...].  There is no known news media that acts in this fashion.  There is also no evidence that anyone has ever referred to the [...] as the “news media. ”  And no case cited by Defendants involves a source of information that imposed the severe limitations on obtaining and using information that the [...] does.  Ja2164-70, 2098-105, 2284-92.  \(^4\)  Neither the [...] nor the [...] has any editorial function.  Nor does [...] in selling data.  Ja1561.  A lack of editorial function tends to show that a source is not the news media.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Moore & Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 3d 416, 425 (D. Del. 2014) (unedited, unverified information posted to website not “news media”), rev’d on other grounds, 812 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2016).
[brief] Instead, the Amended Application was denied because the scope of Respondents’ project was far more intense after the bald eagle buffer was incorporated.  Not only was the Appellants’ prior history with this project, inclusive of the affordable units, a positive one, but the Appellants’ overall history, as noted by the trial court was positive with respect to its constitutional obligations.  There is expressly no finding by the trial court that the Appellants were deficient with their obligations.  It was this application that was denied.  No more, no less.  In a half-hearted effort to throw water on these facts, Respondents cite to their planning experts certification offered, not at the time of the trial court’s decision on the prerogative writ claims or before the Zoning Board, but instead at the time of the Appellants’ summary judgment on the Respondents’ civil rights claims.  Frankly, this certification was offered improperly before the trial court as it is purportedly an opinion of an expert who offered no report or studies nor provided any discoverable material in support of his claims.  Instead, he conclusively asserts opinions that the Township has “displayed a long term propensity toward favoring age restricted housing” and the like.  Pb46.  These opinions were not even offered before the court below on the issue of the Township fair share housing compliance and indeed are directly contrary to the trial court’s findings on same.  The Respondents almost complete reliance on this certification that could not even be challenged before the trial court should find no welcome before this Court.
[brief] (Pa205-07).  The sum total of the court’s analysis of the evidence was: [...] says the contamination is continuing and has not stopped, indicating there is no definitive end period.  In his report, the SAM acknowledged that there was no definitive end date.  Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not able to do a fact-based analysis.  (Pa. 0207).  Under *Boston Gas*, the first inquiry is how much property damage occurred during the relevant policy period.  *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 312.  The trial court completely failed to address this critical question or any of the other evidence presented during seven days of allocation hearings.  (Pa0205-08).  The court erred when it granted reconsideration of its adoption of the RAR.  *See D’Atria*, 242 N.J. Super. at 401.  **POINT II**
[brief] ” (Pa7-8, ¶¶27-29).  The Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff knew [...] was in default as of July 14, 2022, declared [...] to be so and demanded the return of its Deposit.  (Pa10-Pa11, ¶39-¶41).  These allegations demonstrate that Plaintiff knew or had reason to believe that [...] was going to move forward with its closing and that [...]’s obligations in connection with the PSA were concluded.  Given these facts, it was not justifiable for Plaintiff to rely on a single two-word e-mail from [...]’s representative or on [...]’s alleged failure to inform it of closing date of the [...] transaction.
[brief] Here, both [...] and [...] held themselves out to be experts on a specialized building product that is marketed for commercial consumers as a revenue generating improvement.  The Trial Court includes in its September 14, 2023 memorandum of decision a finding that the impact of eliminating interior columns on stormwater management is a matter of “common sense” and that “The idea that the veranda would be used for a wedding during storm conditions, and be dry due to the louvered roof system, is not logical. ”  Pa167; Pa174.  The Court somehow came to this conclusion even with the defendants’ marketing materials in hand boasting about it “bringing the indoors out” and its system being “engineered to exceed all standards and expectations.  They’re designed to meet Florida’s stringent hurricane codes, as well as withstand heavy snow loads in the cold of winter” and that all these pieces come together “to make it all work perfectly.
[brief] Contrary to defendant’s claim, the court correctly concluded after reviewing the reports and [...]’s testimony that they were “consistent” and “nothing contradicted. ” (2T15-19 to 24).  While the supplemental report does indicate the tip included mention of the fanny pack, that fact is not contradictory but merely missing.  In other words, the report did not indicate the CI said he was wearing some other type of bag, or that the gun was in his waistband.  The report is not evidence, but merely a tool to capture events and refresh recollection.  Defendant effectively cross examined [...] regarding the information missing in the report; however, given the trial court’s opportunity to hear and see the witness and to have the “feel” of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy, and the considerable latitude it is afforded in making credibility determinations, the court below reasonably exercised its discretion in accepting [...]’s testimony even though some information was not contained within the reports.
[brief] In response to the Order [...] produced the affidavit of [...], Esquire.  Doc. No. 131.  On November 19, 2012, plaintiff produced an additional 36 e-mails between [...] and [...] that referred to plaintiff.  See plaintiff's November 20, 2012 Letter, Doc. No. 132.  On December 4, 2012, the Court held a hearing on plaintiff's discovery complaints at which Arsenault appeared and was heard.  The hearing left the Court far from confident that all relevant and responsive electronic discovery was produced.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted a similar view as the United States Supreme Court.  See State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205 (2003) and State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 429 (2014).  In Golotta, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, “(w)hen an anonymous tip is conveyed through a 9-1-1 call and contains sufficient information to trigger public safety concerns and to provide an ability to identify the person, a police officer may undertake an investigatory stop of that individual.
[brief] (1T20-16 to 1T28-9).  The Board did not find [...]’s complaint that the accessory structure is flooding his property complete published notice is reproduced in Respondent’s Appendix at pages Da33 and Da34. and killed “289 trees” to be credible.  Plaintiffs presented no photographic, expert, or other evidence to show any such flooding or loss of trees due to any alleged conditions originating at the Property.  [...] was certainly qualified to provide such testimony, but chose not to do so, which was most telling about the credibility of Plaintiffs’ complaints.
[brief] Defendant is now challenging the validity of the following four (4)  Orders entered by the Trial Court in 2019 finding Defendant in contempt and granting sanctions and fees following the submission of documentary evidence and the testimony of witnesses who appeared on behalf of the parties: (1) a February 21, 2019 Order directing Defendant to pay $2,500.00 in sanctions; (2) a May 29, 2019 Order awarding $32,966.96 in attorney’s fees to Plaintiff related to the continued use of the [...] for ingress and egress of students and parents during Plaintiff’s services (“Sixth Street Violations”) (1T; 3T; Da295-603, Da672; Da965; Da967); (3) a February 21, 2019 Order granting $2,500.00 in sanctions; and (4) a May 29, 2019 Order awarding $11,257.50 in fees related to Defendant’s installation of a fence across the [...] in violation of the 2017 Judgment ("Fence Violation").  (2T; 3T; Da643-690; Da967-969)  Each of these four (4) Orders were entered following two days of hearings.
[brief] Defendant’s Notice of Motion For Extension of Time to Serve Expert Reports and For Other Relief [reimbursement of expert fees]  Filed 12/03/20 .................................................. Da102  [...], Esq. Certification in Support of Motion and For Other Relief [Re: reimbursement of expert fees] (without exhibits)  Filed 12/03/20 ........................................  Da104  [...] Certification in Support of Motion (without exhibits)  Filed 12/03/20 ........................................  Da107  Defendant’s Letter Brief Excerpts in Support of Motion for Expert Fees  Filed 12/03/20 ..................................................  Da112  Plaintiff’s Notice of Cross-Motion to Bar  Defendant From Providing Appraisal Report and Testimony at Trial Filed 12/10/20 .................................................................  Da115  Certification of [...], Esq. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar and In Opposition to Defendant’s Motion  Filed 12/10/20 ..................................................  Da118  Exhibit G (excerpts from plaintiff’s appraisal report) ...... Da133 Exhibit H (photographs/map) ......................................................  Da139  Certification of [...], Esq.  (in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion)  Filed 12/30/20 ...............................  Da144 Exhibit A (preliminary review by [...], P.E. Dated 12/29/20) .............  Da148,332  Defendant’s Letter Brief Excerpts in Further Support of Expert Fees  Filed 12/30/20 ..................................................  Da149  Order (In Part Denying Defendant Expert Fees) and Statement of Reasons Filed 01/08/21 .........................  Da154,160  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Bar  Defendant’s Appraisal Report and Testimony Filed 01/08/21 .................  Da164
[brief] Importantly, while the defendants required the purchasers to initial the SPA arbitration clause to evidence their assent, they did not require the purchasers to initial the POS language on page iv.  Notably, as explained above, the POS was not included among the list of “Governing Documents” stated by defendants to consumers.  Defendants’ attempt to “incorporate by reference” the waiver language, which the New Jersey Supreme Court has held is critical to there being mutual assent to and enforceability of an arbitration clause, is contrary to the Supreme Court’s directive that the waiver needs to be knowing, intentional, clear and unmistakable and clearly evidenced by the consumer’s assent.  If anything, the language on page iv of the 663 page POS highlights that defendants knew of the Atalese doctrine, but deliberately chose not to include the language in the contract (SPA) itself.
[brief] Moreover, [...]’s prior orders already account for the possibility that [...] or [...] might have some unique documents, which was the rationale for the court’s decision in Shenwick.  Id.  (“It is always possible that one custodian will have a document or documents that other custodians have not retained. ”)  2.  Plaintiffs fail to show that [...] and [...] are likely to possess information that is both unique and relevant.
[brief] Page Table of Orders and Rulings Being Appealed ...........................................  3 Table of Authorities ..................................................................................4 Table of Appendix ....................................................................................6 Preliminary Statement .............................................................................8 Procedural History ..................................................................................10 Statement of Facts ..................................................................................13  Legal Argument Point I – The Trial Court's Decision Granting The Motion To Dismiss the Complaint For Alleged Failure To Provide An Appropriate Affidavit Of Merit Pursuant To N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29 Should Be Reversed (The Transcript of June 24, 2020  Filed Separately from This Brief Sets Forth the Opinion and Ruling In Question In This Matter at T13 - 13 to T 14-13)..............................16  Conclusion ..................................................................................................23
[brief] In Airwork, decided the same day as Metromedia, the Court found that a determination of the Division of Taxation did not constitute de facto rulemaking, based on the Court’s finding that the determination was clearly inferable from the controlling statute.  97 N.J. at 301.  For the reasons set forth in sub-points A, B, and C below, an analysis of three Metromedia factors leads to the conclusion that the Bulletin did not constitute rulemaking because the applicability of the Holding Company Act to reciprocal insurance exchanges is clearly inferable from the statute itself.
[brief] A Fourth Amendment analysis in *Florida v. Jardines*, supra, refutes that conclusion.  Our State’s constitutional analysis under Article 1, Paragraph 7 should yield a similar result.  Our Supreme Court has recognized and recited Federal Fourth Amendment principles involving that Amendment as well as “unreasonable searches and seizures”, see *State v. Earls*, 214 N.J. 564 (2013) with its explication of *United States v. Jones*, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012), noting that that opinion “rests on principles of trespass [that] has altered the landscape somewhat”, *Earls*, at 582-583.
[brief] ”  Mirabelli, 2023 WL 5976992 at *5.  In Mirabelli, the court quoted from the declaration of [...], PhD, a transgender woman and expert in the field of children and adolescents navigating gender identity issues, as follows: “A child or adolescent who exhibits a desire to change name and pronouns should receive a careful professional assessment prior to transitioning;” “A request to change name and pronouns may be the first visible sign that the child or adolescent may be dealing with gender dysphoria or related coexisting mental-health issues;”  “Parental involvement is necessary to obtain professional assistance for a child or adolescent experiencing gender incongruence, to provide accurate diagnosis, and to treat any gender dysphoria or other coexisting conditions;”  “A school-facilitated transition without parental consent interferes with parents’ ability to pursue a careful assessment and/or therapeutic approach prior to transitioning, prevents parents from making the decision about whether a transition will be best for their child, and creates unnecessary tension in the parent-child relationship.  Nor is facilitating a double life for some children, in which they present as transgender in some contexts but cisgender in other contexts, in their best interests. ”  Id. at *6.  “[c]ircumventing, bypassing, or excluding parents from decisions about a social transition undermines the main support structure for a child or adolescent who desperately needs support. ”  Id. at *7.  Indeed, there are myriad studies and discourse which demonstrate that parental involvement with transitioning students is imperative for the health and well-being of transgender students.  For example, see: - Affidavit and Expert Opinion of [...], PhD, dated February 3, 2023, submitted in B.F., et al v. [...], 21-cv-1650, Wisconsin Circuit Court (“Parental Involvement is Essential at Every Stage of the [transition] Process,” ¶¶58-78, concluding that “a school policy that involves school adult personnel in socially transitioning a child or adolescent without the consent of parent or over their objection violates widely accepted mental health principles and practice”  Id. at ¶78) (Da236-277); - New York Times, “When Students Change Gender Identity, and Parents Don’t Know”, January 22, 2023 (Da279-285); and - “Are Teachers Obliged to Tell Parents Their Child Might Be Trans? Courts May Soon Decide,” Sawchuck, Education Week, April 28, 2022 (Da287-295).  In addition, the court’s finding of irreparable harm is premised upon distortion of the Revised Policy’s language.
[brief] [...] admitted being responsible for general safety conditions as well as for ensuring that the premises were safe for subcontractors.  (Da277-Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 10:24-11:17).  [...] agreed that, if he or anybody else left the hatch open, that would not be a safe thing to do and, if he had seen it was left open, he would have closed it.  (Da277-Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 35:5-17).  [...] confirmed that, as the person in charge of safety for the project, his policy or rule would be that the hatch should be closed when unattended.  (Da277-Da303, [...]’s Deposition Transcript, 18:14-24).
[brief] See Exhibit 7 to Amended Complaint (Ca274)  7.  On November 3, 2021, Respondent posted complete results of her election to the Board (40/40 Districts Reporting) from her Facebook account.  This post stated:  We won [two confetti emojis]  Respondent typed words above the results of her successful election to the Board:  Thank you for all of your support [three confetti emojis]  See Exhibit 8 to Amended Complaint (Ca276).  8.  On November 4, 2022, two days after announcing her election to the Board, Respondent changed her public profile picture to contain the words: UNMASKED, UNVAXXED, UNAFRAID.
[directive] 1.0.5  It is important for county and municipal law enforcement agencies to recognize that, as they conduct internal affairs investigations, they do so under the general supervision of the INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022  1  Attorney General.  The Criminal Justice Act of 1970 designates the Attorney General as the State’s chief law enforcement officer.  As the chief law enforcement officer of the State, the Attorney General possesses broad authority over criminal justice matters in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State.
[brief] [...], individually and as Executor of the ESTATE OF [...], deceased, Plaintiff, vs. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] and DR. JOHN DOE 1-5 (being fictitious designations)  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY- APPELLATE  DIVISION CIVIL ACTION APPELLATE DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY - LAW DIVISION- MORRIS COUNTY UNDER DOCKET NO. [...] SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF APPELLANT PLAINTIFF [...] INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF [...], DECEASED
[brief] State v. Golin 363 N.J. Super 474, 483 (App. Div. 2003)  State v. Hoffman 149 N.J. 564, 582 (1997) State v. Holland 132 N.J. Super 17 (App. Div. 1975)  State v. Hotel Bar Foods, Inc. 18 N.J. 115, 128 (1955)  State v. Powell 250 N.J. Super 1 (App. Div. 1991)  State v. Rangel 213 N.J. 500, 512 (2013)  State v. Regis 208 N.J. 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011)  Summer v. Teaneck 53 N.J. 548, 554 (1969)  Timber Glen Phase III, LLC v. Township of Hamilton 441 N.J. Super 514, 524 (App. Div. 2015)  Trombetto v. Mayor & Commissioners of Atlantic City 81 N.J. Super 203, 226 (Law Div. 1981)  Tumino v. Long Beach Township 319 N.J. Super 514, 521 (App. Div. 1999)  United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar 343 N.J. Super 1, 35 (App. Div. 2001)  United States v. Williams 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008)  Usachenok v.  Dep’t of the Treasury 257 N.J. 184 (2024)  Varsolana v. Breen Capital Services Corp. 180 N.J. 605, 625 (2004)  Wilber Township v. Witts 7 N.J. Super 259, 261 (App. Div. 1950)
[brief] The State relies upon the procedural history set forth in its brief dated August 30, 2024.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  The State relies upon the statement of facts set forth in its brief dated August 30, 2024.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND MUST BE REVERSED ON APPEAL.
[brief] Equally persuasive, though not binding, are two unpublished opinions by this Court, which examined the animal cruelty statutes.  In State v. Scheld, Nos. A-1815-12T4, A-1816-12T4 (App. Div. November 6, 2015), this Court analyzed a similar facial and as-applied challenge to N.J.S.A. 4:22-17b.  (Slip op. at 6); (Pa 16).15  Resorting to Webster’s Second New College Dictionary, this Court afforded the undefined statutory terms “torture” and “torment” their ordinary meanings and determined that because “a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably know what conduct is prohibited,” the “defendants should have known” that their behavior violated the animal cruelty statute.  (Slip op. at 8-9); (Pa 17).
[brief] C.  The Exclusion Plaintiff Challenges Is the Same One that [...] Approved and Required to Be Included in Standard Employers Liability Policies.  As stated, the revision of Exclusion C.5 to its present form was a response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Charles Beseler, 188 N.J. 542, and Delta Plastics, 188 N.J. 582.  See Rodriguez-Ortiz, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2072 at *15 n.6; Ja479; Shelbourne Spring, 2023 N.J.  Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2386, at *20.  In a bulletin issued on [...] letterhead, Ja498-503, the [...] (“[...]”) stated:  The change to the C.5 language is necessary since recent rulings by the New Jersey Supreme Court have --- 2  The Workers Compensation Act created [...] and vested it with specified powers, including the power to “[p]repare and file, for the approval of the Commissioner, and for the use by all of its members, any amendments to its policy forms. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:15-90 (repealed in 2008, after events relevant to this appeal, and replaced by N.J.S.A. 34:15-90.1 and 90.2).  The Commissioner of Banking and Insurance or his designee serves as an ex-officio director on [...]’s board of directors.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-90.1. increased the scope of coverage for intentional injury under Part Two of the policy.  The rulings represent a significant erosion of the exclusive remedy provision of the Law and may lead to increased costs in the price of workers compensation and employers liability insurance.  The new language is meant to address the findings of the Court and to restore the intent of the policy exclusion for intentional injury.  [Ja498.]  Approval of the revised exclusion by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance leads to the presumption that [...] did not view it as contrary to the Workers Compensation Act, or that the exclusion violates public policy.
[brief] [Id.; Trans. ID: [...]]  Three days later on May 10th, 2019, [...], Esq. wrote a letter to [...] on behalf of the Defendant in which she requested time to file an answer or motion; Defendant never filed an answer and never moved to dismiss the complaint.  On May 31st, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to enter default judgment against Defendant in the amount of $4,600.00 plus costs and prejudgment interest of $35.40.  [Id.; Trans. ID: [...]]  On August 27th, 2019, the same day Defendant appeared in court to represent herself pro se, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to enter judgment stating, “Plaintiff did not attach the R. 1:20A-6 letter to plaintiff’s complaint.