ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court found there was “great potential for undue prejudice” because of the evidence’s “inherently inflammatory potential. ” (Pa33).  Specifically, the court stated that “[t]he mere fact that defendant was exposed to cocaine would lead any reasonable jury to conclude that defendant is a drug user and therefore they would view his use of prescribed clonazepam in a different manner than they would without that evidence. ” (Pa33).  The trial court’s concern is sheer speculation and could be resolved by a curative instruction.  The State maintains that the evidence is intrinsic evidence of the crimes charged and N.J.R.E. 404 does not apply.  Still, the trial court could still provide a N.J.R.E. 404 limiting instruction to eliminate its concern about the potential prejudicial effect of the BZE evidence.  Jurors are presumed to follow jury instructions.  See State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 390 (1996).  Informing the jurors of the discrete purpose of the evidence and [...]’s testimony and that they cannot consider the introduction of the evidence as proof that defendant misused clonazepam or that he is a bad person and must be guilty of the present crimes, would eliminate the court’s concern.  Accordingly, the probative value of the BZE evidence would not be “substantially outweighed” by the potential for undue prejudice and, therefore, the trial court’s ruling was erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
[brief] (Pa26).  [...] appealed the Board’s decision by letter dated July 18, 2023.  (Pa16).  He argued that he did not receive the postcard notice from the Division, so the Board should relax the statutory deadline for filing.  (Pa19-20).  At its meeting on July 25, 2023, the Board considered [...]’s arguments, found that there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and therefore directed the Board Secretary to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law for its review and approval at its next meeting.
[directive] ”  Where there 5  It should be noted that as a matter of policy, Special Application and Enhancement Feature D is not automatically triggered by all conduct that constitutes a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a.  See footnote 11, infra, in Section 11.4.  Page 51  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) is a factual basis to prosecute a defendant for violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(b), the prosecutor may, in the exercise of discretion, require the defendant to plead guilty to both the nonfirearm weapons offense and the Brimage-eligible offense, in which event the court must sentence the defendant to consecutive terms.
[directive] This provision is not intended to require that law enforcement agencies initiate internal affairs investigations into the 11 accuracy of every statement, report or certification that may be filed with respect to civil litigation, including matrimonial and employment matters or any other personal or financial matters not directly related to the officer's employment.  In most cases, such investigations would be inappropriate.  Determinations as to the credibility of statements or certifications made in the context of litigation should be made by the courts or administrative tribunals.  Determinations as to the credibility of statements or certifications in other personal or financial matters should be addressed if they arise in the context of an ongoing internal affairs investigation.  63
[directive] The Prosecutor deems the as subsection this to pursuant issued directive any under granted authority complaint-warrant for apply not but complaint-summons issue to granted authority (e.g., appropriate in only approval prosecutorial without charge to granted approval; authority prosecutorial without Early Release No the to subject offenses not are that example, for such as, of cases, types specified violence; etc.). domestic involve that offenses not do or Act, or Graves the Act is authority any, if circumstances, in what whether and specify shall directive such Any acomplaint-summons of issuance officer approve to supervisory designated specially a granted to whether and Directive, of 4 Section this under presumed is acomplaint-warrant for when application officer supervisory specially designated a to granted is authority any, if circumstances, what in and presumed is acomplaint-summons of issuance when acomplaint-warrant for application approve to presumption a overcome The to authority 3.3.2. subsection See Directive. this of 4 Section under Prosecutor determines, County the if only officers supervisory specially-designated to sha11 granted be to necessary prevent is authority prosecutorial of delegation such that resources, available on based shall Prosecutor the and consultations, charging by overburdened being from Office Prosecutor's the specially- properly exercised by is authority such delegated ensuring that for responsible remain supervisory officers. designated what in and when determine to Section this by authorized Prosecutors are County Although made, decision charging is the prosecutor before assistant an with consult must police circumstances greatest the to consultation pre-charging such require to encouraged strongly are Prosecutors County especially consultation is Prosecutorial resources. existing with consistent practicable extent such that ensure only acomplaint-warrant, to not for apply to made is decision the before important as prosecutors provide to also but Rules, with Court in accordance and appropriate are applications for detention prepare and detention to pretrial seek to whether decide to possible as time much Page 21 hearings. other supervisory Accordingly, notwithstanding provision in Section 3.3, a designated any officer at the time of the charging decision shall notify the prosecutor's office, either by calling the prosecutor telephonically or email or other electronic means shall be on-call by that duty assistant supervisory officer reason to believe a in the County Prosecutor's directive, if the has that specified of should be filed by the prosecutor (e.g., where detention or revocation release motion for pretrial or revocation of Such seeking pretrial detention release).
[brief] At 2:13 a.m. on September 23, 2018, police responded to a 911 call reporting a shooting at [...] near a bar called [...] in Jersey --- \(^4\) United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011).  \(^5\)  No such order appears on the docket, and no record was found for the motion dates shown in Promis/Gavel.  (Da 202)  City.  (7T 46-2 to 54-17)  [...] was found “slumped over” across the front driver and passenger seats of a gold Lexus, which was double-parked in the middle of New Street in front of the bar.  (7T 55-16 to 59-19; 10T 12-19 to 15-24)  A crowd of thirty to forty people surrounded the car.  (7T 54-18 to 55-15)  [...]’s death was ruled a homicide caused by five gunshot wounds.  (7T 60-19 to 62-14; 11T 83-17 to 106-13)  Five bullets were recovered from his body, and a sixth was found in the front passenger seat of the Lexus; a ballistics expert testified that all six were fired from the same gun.  (10T 62-9 to 63-5; 11T 49-5 to 59-10, 90-17 to 105-9)  Two hooded sweatshirts were found near the Lexus, one of which was found just outside the front passenger door and contained cash, a marijuana cigarette, and three glassine bags of heroin and fentanyl.  (10T 23-16 to 30-18, 74-20 to 80-6, 130-3 to 131-4)  The police never tested that sweatshirt for DNA or identified the person to whom it belonged.  (10T 80-13 to 81-15)
[brief] This is because a planning board’s interpretive skills are not superior to those of the Court.  *See, e.g., Reich v. Fort Lee Bd. of Adj.*, 414 N.J. Super. 483, 517 (App. Div. 2009), citing *Jantausch v. Borough of Verona*, 41 N.J. Super. 89, 96 (Law Div. 1956), aff’d, 24 N.J. 326 (1957).  I.  [...]’s 600-foot Conditional Use Standard Governed the Review of [...]’ Application for Development  Because the Ordinance that Established that Standard was in Effect on the Date [...]’ Application for Development Became Complete [3T 16:12 to 20:17; Da532].
[brief] The Trial Court committed reversible error in its misapplication of the principle that courts will not enforce illegal agreements.  The Trial Court was of course correct that the law will not assist either party to a prohibited contract -- but the agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendants was perfectly legal.  The Trial Court’s transference of this principle to the parties’ collateral agreement is contrary to long established doctrine, and is without foundation in precedent or the purpose underlying the rule.  As cited in the Trial Court’s Order, “[i]t is said to be an established rule that the law will not assist either party to an illegal contract. ”  Marx v. Jaffe, 92 N.J. Super. 143, 146 (App.Div. 1966).  In pari delicto means and compels that “where the wrong of both parties is equal, the position of the defendant is the stronger. ”  Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J.Super. 562, fn. 6 (App.Div. 2021) citing Stella v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 241 N.J. Super. 55, 73-74 (App.Div. 1990).  The Court in Marx confronted a contract between a dairy and a market, the market alleging that the loan underlying the litigation was an illegal advance rebate agreement on sales of milk in contravention of New Jersey Statute.  *Id.* at 144.  The Court ultimately held that “[t]he fact that the alleged loan transaction contravenes the statute clearly renders the agreement illegal. ”  *Id.* at 146 citing *Brooks v. Cooper*, 50 N.J. Eq. 761, 771 (E. & A. 1893); *Restatement, Contracts*, 580 (1932).  The Court’s discussion continued by explaining that labeling a contract as illegal is only the beginning of the analysis.  *Marx* at 146.  (“However, merely to call a contract illegal is not to state the effects of such illegality.  In each case the legislative intent must be sought. ”) citing *John J. Carlin, Inc. v. O'Connor*, 126 N.J.L. 243, 245-246 (E. & A. 1941).  The Court refused to enforce the agreement because the parties’ advance rebate agreement was explicitly barred by statute, and because the Court found none of the exceptions to the general rule of non-enforceability to be applicable.  *Marx* at 147.  More recently, the Appellate Division addressed similar issues in *Johnson v. McClellan*, 468 N.J.Super. 562 (App.Div. 2021) in the context of an illegal referral fee and the unauthorized practice of law.
[brief] (Pb32; see Pb32-38.)  Plaintiff complains, for example, that the trial judge instructed plaintiff’s expert [...] that he could not imply that a licensed nursing home administrator or “LNHA” is “responsible” for the conduct of the facility’s nurses.  (See Pb33.)  Plaintiff agrees, however, that pursuant to this Court’s opinion in Ptaszynski v. Atlantic Health Systems, Inc., 440 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 357, 227 N.J. 379 (2016), there is no private cause of action to enforce the “responsibilities” provision of the NHA, N.J.S.A. 30:13-3, including the responsibility to “ensure compliance with all applicable state and federal statutes, rules and regulations,” N.J.S.A. 30:13-3(h).  (See Pb35-36.)  Plaintiff further suggests that while the trial court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff was not improperly seeking to use the discredited “captain of the ship” theory to impose liability on the medical director or administrator for the conduct of [...]’s nursing staff, the judge took too long to reach that conclusion.  (See Pb38.)  Plaintiff cites absolutely no authority in support of the proposition that the trial court’s rulings, while correct, somehow --- 9  The “captain of the ship” theory, which suggests imposing vicarious liability on a doctor for the negligence of other health care personnel not under the doctor’s control or supervision, has been uniformly rejected by the New Jersey courts for at least the past forty years.  See, e.g., Tobia v. Cooper Hosp. Univ. Med. Ctr., 136 N.J. 335, 345-46 (1992); C.W. v. Cooper Health Sys., 388 N.J. Super. 42, 65-66 (App. Div. 2006); Diakamopoulos v. Monmouth Medical Center, 312 N.J. Super. 20, 35 (App. Div. 1998).  (See 6T136:14-138:17.0 deprived the plaintiff of a fair trial simply because they were too time consuming.  (See Pb32-38.)  Again, the jury, having heard the evidence, found that [...] was negligent in deviating from the standard of care applicable to a long term care facility, although that deviation did not proximately cause harm to the plaintiff.  (See Pa87-88.)  Plaintiff—having been afforded every opportunity to present her causes of action and theory of the case to the jury as she wished, cannot complain that the Court, by allowing plaintiff to present [...] and [...]’s respiratory care opinions against “the facility” or “the nursing home”—but not its professional nursing staff including respiratory therapists—harmed the plaintiff in a fashion that requires a new trial.  There is no error requiring a reversal or new trial.
[brief] Pa 274.  [...] admitted the Plaintiffs had never developed a project that was similar to the COAH Project which [...] could use as a basis for computing the Plaintiffs’ alleged lost profits relating to the COAH Project.  Pa 272 (Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Answers at 16).  Had the Plaintiffs chosen to develop the COAH Project rather than sell their interest in the Property they would have been engaged in a new business venture unlike anything they had done before.  The Plaintiffs’ development of the COAH Project would have been the first time that the Plaintiffs had engaged in any real estate development and, specifically, in the development of a COAH Project.  Pa 271-72 at 16.
[brief] (6T128-9 to 129-3).  [...] identified five gunshot wounds.  (6T135-3 to 145-3).  Wound number one was located on the chest region below the collar bone and perforated the pulmonary arteries.  (6T135-3 to 7; 6T136-20 to 137-8).  Inside the wound, [...] recovered a projectile.  (6T137-14 to 21).  Wound number two was located in the left upper part of the arm and exited the left upper scapula region.  (6T138-3 to 9).  Wound number three was located below the second exit wound, the left lower region of the victim’s torso.  (6T141-18 to 142-4).  [...] was able to recover a projectile from the wound, located in the dorsal muscle.  (6T141-24 to 142-4).  Wound number four was located in the abdominal region; it entered on the left side and exited on the right side.  (6T142-23 to 144-7).  Wound number five entered right above the victim’s knee and exited through the rear of the victim’s right thigh.  (6T144-16 to 145-9).  [...] recovered a projectile from the wound.  (6T145-4 to 9).  As a result of his examination, [...] concluded that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.
[brief] Finally, as Respondent itself acknowledges, the record illustrates that the Law Division judge sentenced Appellant under the wrong version of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  This error led to the [...] sentencing Appellant to an ignition interlock suspension period, which Judge Hanna erroneously referred to as a “mandatory” part of Appellant’s sentence.  The ignition interlock device was not, in fact, mandatory under the version of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 in effect at the time of Appellant’s arrest on November 5, 2019.
[brief] It is undisputed that, “The flood hazard area design flood elevation means the peak water surface elevation \textit{that will occur} during a one hundred-year flood \textit{plus an additional amount of water to account for future increases} in flows due to development and other factors. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2, DEP Rb23 (emphasis added).  Critically, the DEP and [...]’s calculation of anticipated peak water surface elevations is entirely dependent on the “100-year flood. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2.  The peak water surface elevation associated with the 100-year flood is not tied to any particular data set.  \textit{Ibid.}  DEP’s regulations never prohibited the DEP from employing the Cornell Studies in its prediction of the 100-year flood and the associated peak water surface elevation.  \textit{Ibid.}  Therefore, in the DEP’s assessment of the public health and safety concerns that \textit{will occur} in the future, as a required element of anticipating peak flood elevations during a 100-year flood, the DEP needed to account for the “\textit{additional amount of water}” that it could reasonably foresee flowing onto and off of the subject property.
[brief] ”  Cohen, 254 N.J. at 328. were eager to find evidence that tied [...] to the earlier robbery.  Counsel pointed out that it was not until [...] spoke to [...] for eight minutes and spotted the “bong mask” on the floor of the car that he landed on the “smell [of] marijuana” as a reason to conduct the warrantless search.  (2T 49-22 to 50-9, 51-9 to 15)  On cross-examination of [...], counsel confirmed the eight-minute delay (2T 160-16 to 24; 3T 17-17 to 20) and highlighted the fact that the officer initially testified that, with both front windows rolled down (2T 75-8 to 11), he did not detect the odor of marijuana when he was stationed at the passenger door and did not notice it until he crossed to the driver’s side (2T 74-20 to 22), but, contradicting himself minutes later, [...] also said that he noticed the odor “as soon as [he] approached the vehicle” (2T 104-21 to 22).  In addition, counsel pointed out that the only marijuana found in the car was some residue on the mask that was likely used to smoke it.  (1T 20-1 to 21-5)  Consistent with the defense theory that the police were looking to tie [...] to the earlier robbery, counsel argued that the MVR recording was relevant because it revealed that, before they decided to search the car, the officers at the scene noted that [...] was “dressed all in black” and had “a ski mask on top of his head,” and opined that he “fits the bill” for the previous armed robbery.  (3T 41-20 to 47-10)  On appeal, [...] argued that the court did not give an adequate instruction limiting the jury’s use of the prior-robbery evidence to the specific purpose for which it was admitted – to support the profiling theory of the case.  According to the state, however, [...] having argued for admission of the evidence of the prior robbery, “invited” the instructional error.  (Pb 10-13)  Contrary to the state’s claim, this was patently not a case of invited error.
[brief] The CCA goes even further than the RETA: It dictates the Division of Gaming Enforcement “shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters delegated to it or within the scope of its powers under the provisions of [the CCA].”  Despite this language, the Court in *Bandler* held that there was no conflict between the CCA and the CFA and the plaintiff could proceed under both statutes.  There is no conflict between the CFA and the RETA either.  By enacting the RETA and amending the CFA to specifically apply to real estate transactions, the legislature showed its intent to have both statutes protect consumers.  The two statutes do not work at cross-purposes in any way.  The only “conflict” [...] alleges is that the RETA includes a knowing element which the CFA does not.  Adopting [...]’s position would create the absurd result where a consumer can meet the higher “knowing” standard of proving a claim under RETA, but somehow fail to prove a claim for misrepresentation under the lower standards of the CFA.  The jury was charged with the elements of each statute and understood them.  [...]’s bald assertion that applying both statutes “created undeniable confusion” (Db28) has no support in the record.
[directive] The the of principals(s) relationship the to or with interactions  State ofthe behalf on testify to expected investigation is/are of the principals) whether the determine of the principals) the whether and Office, Prosecutor's the prosecuted by being pending matters in under operating force task a to assigned been years, 5 preceding the within investigation has/have, Office.  Prosecutor's the of supervision direct the results the report shall investigation the initiating of days 3 within Prosecutor County
[directive] extortion.  10%  Option if Cash if 10% except 9  No JUDGE’S issue.  10%  No 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%  10%  10%  10%  should COURT  $75,000 $50,000 $75,000 and $20,000 $2,500 $2,500  3:26-2 $1,000 $1,000 summons $500
[directive] Leader by STATUTES  3:3-1  Promulgated Rule 2C:35-3 2C:35-5  Statute Option permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible 10% 10%  Bail 16  JUDGE’S issue.  Cash No No 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% should COURT and 3:26-2 $100,000 summons $35,000 $50,000 $25,000 $10,000 $2,500 $1,000 bail Range
[brief] 10:00 AM  Chair: [...]  The public may not attend the Committee meeting in person but may view and participate in the meeting via the NJ Legislature home page at https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/.  The public may also submit written testimony electronically in lieu of oral testimony.  Written testimony will be included in the Committee record and distributed to all the Committee members.  Written testimony should be submitted to OLSAide@NJLEG.org.  The committee will meet to receive testimony from invited guests on the status and results of the Statewide Graduation Assessments, including Start Strong, the current status of school district operations throughout the State, and the status of federal funding received by the State and local districts to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on schools
[brief] Exhibit D - Attachments to Complaint  Notice of Tort Claim to [...] (Attached at Pa092)  Facsimile to [...] from [...] (Attached at Pa098)  Email from [...] to [...] 3/5/2020 (Attached at Pa099)  Authorization for Health Information Disclosure of [...] 5/28/2020 (Attached at Pa100)  [...] Form Filled out by [...] (Attached at Pa101)  Hawkin’s Letter to Clerk of Edison and [...] Regarding Amended Notice of Claim 12/3/2020 (Attached at Pa104)  [...] Letter to Clerk of Edison and [...] Regarding Submission of Notice of Claim 12/23/2020 (Attached at Pa106)
[brief] ## State Cases  **American Cyanamid Co. v. State, Dept. of Env't Prot.,** 231 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 1989)  .................................................................4  **Brady v. Bd. of Review,** 152 N.J. 197 (1997)  .........................................................................................7  **Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n,** 169 N.J. 579 (2001)  ..........................................................................................7  **Gloucester County Welfare Bd. v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n,** 93 N.J. 384 (1983) ............................................................................................7  **Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr.,** 127 N.J. 500 (1992) ..........................................................................................7  **In Re: Flood Hazard Area Verification,** [...], 2021 WL5506763 (App. Div. November, 24, 2021) ........................................................................................................5 **In re: Protest of Coastal Permit Program Rules,** 354 N.J. Super. 293 (App. Div. 2002) ...............................................................7 **In Re: Stormwater Management Rules,** 384 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 2006) ..............................................................6, 7, 9 **In The Matter of Authorization for Freshwater Wetlands Statewide General Permit 6,** 433 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2013) .............................................................9 **In the Matter of Stream Encroachment Permit,** 402 N.J. Super. 587 (App. Div. 2008) .............................................................7 **N.J. State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs,** 310 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 158 N.J. 211, 729 A.2d 21 (1999) .................................................................................................6 Seigel v. N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, 395 N.J. Super. 604 (App. Div. 2007) .................................................................