ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This rule or duty is “whether a reasonably prudent person, who knows or should have known of the condition, would have within a reasonable period of time thereafter caused the public sidewalk to be in reasonably safe condition. ”  *Model Civil Jury Charge*  5.20B(2)(b) (emphasis added).  This is the “general duty”\(^2\) of commercial owners and clearly there is no language in this portion of the charge even suggesting that this duty only applies when there is an active snow storm.  Rather, the charge is expanded upon if certain facts are implicated – whether there is an active snow storm, and whether the defendant attempted to remediate the condition, and the adequacy of these efforts is an issue.  Under these circumstances, supplemental charge language is added to this general duty to address the ongoing or active storm and the reasonableness of the snow removal efforts.  As set forth above, the charge explicitly requires the court to supplement the general charge language when the facts warrant same.  Thus, when there is an active snow storm, it is appropriate to charge the general rule above in 5.20B(2)(b), but to also include the specific ongoing storm language.
[brief] The fact that plaintiff’s counsel did not receive the leases of any of the tenant defendants prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations does not absolve plaintiff of his obligation to have complied therewith, or entitle him to any relief under the “discovery rule” or the “relation back” doctrine.  Plaintiff admitted that he believed from day one that he had a cause of action against any and all of the tenant defendants.  (Pa832-834; Pa882-883)  Assuming arguendo that plaintiff was entitled to know both the identity of this defendant and a potential theory of liability before the obligation to file suit accrued, he clearly had both at the time of the loss.  Counsel’s protestations that he could not ascertain whether any of the tenant defendants had any liability without first obtaining their leases must fail in view of plaintiff’s representations.  Moreover, the representations of counsel are merely an attempt to belatedly justify his inertia.  The second amended complaint filed against this and other tenant defendants sounds in negligence, not breach of contract.
[brief] The conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel during summation was clearly capable of producing an unjust result and deprived Defendants of a fair trial.  As such, the verdict must be set aside and a new trial granted.  The comments made by Respondent’s trial counsel during summation reiterated and reinforced the surprise testimony linking the stoppage of the Grant salary to Respondent’s claims for disability discrimination and retaliation, which is not factually consistent with the chronology of the record developed during discovery or the evidence presented at trial.  As discussed above, the instant matter is distinguishable from McKenney in that the first time Appellants were aware of Respondent’s surprise testimony alleging that the stopping of the Grant salary was connected to claims of disability discrimination or retaliation during Respondent’s testimony.  Despite a rigorous and thorough cross-examination, Appellants were not able to address the jury following Respondent’s summation.  Thus, the last thing the jury heard was the reiteration of a revised, inaccurate and prejudicial version of events that was contrary to the evidence presented and the record developed during Discovery.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ”  It was adverse to the Individual Plaintiffs, and aligned with [...], in Phase I, and became aligned with the Individual Plaintiffs, and adverse to [...], in Phase II.  The Arbitrator found that [...] breached his fiduciary duty to [...] during Phase I by improperly using his position as CEO to cause [...] to engage in wasteful litigation against the Individual Plaintiffs to achieve [...]’s own personal objectives.  He used company monies to pay (1) [...]’s own personal attorney, and (2) [...]’s corporate counsel to do [...]’s bidding.  He could have caused [...] to engage in wasteful, self-serving litigation against the Individual Plaintiffs, against a contractor working on [...]’s house, or against the man on the moon.  It does not matter against whom the litigation was instituted.  [...] was found to have wasted corporate assets in violation of his fiduciary duty by spending [...] money on legal fees that benefitted [...] personally, against [...]’s interests.
[brief] Lastly, the trial court briefly discussed a Final Judgment from 1949, which led to the transfer of the Premises from [...] to [...] and mentioned an easement for “harborside” homeowners to access the beach through the public street ends.  (See Da507-Da513; T71:22-T72:8).  The court found that this judgment did not “strongly support” direct access for oceanfront homeowners, but rather it “support[ed] the idea that it was not considered” because direct beach access for oceanfront homeowners was already “assumed,” “implied,” and “accepted,” and that the reason to spell out any easement rights in that judgment was because harborside homeowners were not afforded that same assumption.  (T71:24-T72:8).  Thus, to ensure harborside homeowners could access the beach, an easement needed to be “addressed specifically. ” (T72:3-6).  Following the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment confirming the [...]’ implied easement appurtenant, the [...] applied for and obtained a permit from [...] to build a new at-grade dune walkover.
[brief] First, the [...] improperly relied upon a major disciplinary action from over ten (10) years prior to Appellant’s name being certified for consideration for promotion to Lieutenant.  The [...] took this unreasonable action despite the fact that Appellant is a disabled veteran and had been promoted from Sheriff’s Officer to Sheriff’s Officer Sergeant in 2018, approximately five (5) years after her only major disciplinary action.  Furthermore, [...] arbitrarily disregarded Appellant’s long and impressive thirty-three (33) years of service to this country, as well as her fifteen (15) years service as a Sheriff’s Officer and Sheriff’s Sergeant in [...].  The [...], in its June 7, 2023 decision also erred by relying upon a false, misleading and incomplete “discipline history summary” of Appellant.  This document had been submitted by the [...] in support of its bypass of Appellant, not in support of a request to remove her name from the List, as reflected in the Under Sheriff’s Certification which sought to compare Appellant to non-veteran [...], instead of to judge Appellant on her own merits as a veteran ranked first of the Eligible List.  As a disabled veteran, Appellant was entitled to be judged on her own merit, without comparison to a non-veteran.  Even assuming the [...] had requested the removal of Appellant’s name from the List, which it did not, the correct standard was whether a ten (10) year old discipline should stand in the way of promoting a disabled veteran who, in the interim, had deployed to Iraq and had been promoted to Sergeant in 2018 and who did not receive any discipline following her promotion.
[brief] (1T 39-5)  This appeal follows.  It should be noted that there were two buildings identified in the officer’s comments section on the back of Defendant’s complaint/summons.  The first was a “pump house. ”  The second was [...].  The Officer noted Defendant was within 450 feet of both.  (See, A1 for a legible copy of the front and back of the complaint as opposed to Da3-4 which is less legible)  When Defendant first appeared in municipal court, he represented to that Court that the only issue in the case was whether the statute was constitutional as applied to his case, and that he would be pleading guilty conditioned on the outcome of his position that the statute is unconstitutional.
[brief] This Court should put an end to [...]’s decade-long crusade to hold [...]—an insurer with mold exclusions—liable for his mold-caused injuries.  [...] could have, and should have, pursued the $7 million of coverage provided by three defending primary insurers to [...] (“[...]”), none of which had mold exclusions in their policies.  Doing so would have required him to litigate against [...] beyond motion practice.  [...] opted instead to settle with these primary insurers for a fraction of their limits—$310,000—and to give those insurers a full release regardless of the outcome of this suit against [...].  [...] bears the responsibility for this gamble.  In summary, the trial court’s comprehensive rulings rejecting [...]’s case apply the plain terms of the [...] Policies and settled New Jersey law.  They also include factual findings and conclusions entitled to significant deference.  [...] has provided no basis to overturn any aspect of those rulings.  The Court should affirm and declare that the [...] Policies do not afford coverage for the consent judgment.
[brief] See New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. G.S., 447 N.J. Super. at 570.  The [...], through their foreman [...], asserted that they specifically instructed [...] as to which turnaround to use and that [...] disobeyed their instructions, thereby placing the blame on [...] and attempting to exculpate themselves from direct liability for negligent training and supervision.  In contrast, Defendant [...] testified that Earle never told him not to use the paved police turnaround in question and simply told him to use “the turnaround” without further specific instructions, which testimony supports a direct claim of negligent training and supervision against the [...].
[brief] Rather, defendant has been prosecuted for violating New Jersey law in New Jersey.  Finally, defendant’s references to the interstate recognition of driver’s \(^5\) See Pennsylvania Attorney General, Concealed Carry Reciprocity, https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/resources/concealed-carry-reciprocity/. licenses, (Db6), and to Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), (Db10), fail to advance her Full Faith and Credit Clause argument because neither involves the Full Faith and Credit Clause at all.  As to the former, States recognize one another’s driver’s licenses as a matter of comity and mutual convenience, not constitutional mandate—and defendant cites nothing to suggest that this is a constitutional requirement.  And under Obergefell, same-sex couples enjoy the right to have their marriages recognized as a matter of Equal Protection and Due Process, not because of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 672 (“The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. ”).  If the Constitution compels all States to recognize the validity of same-sex marriages, then of course each State must recognize such marriages performed in other States.  In short, “[t]here is no constitutional requirement that New Jersey” decline to prosecute defendant for violating New Jersey law by carrying a handgun in New Jersey without a NJ Carry Permit “just because” she may carry a handgun in Pennsylvania by virtue of her PA Carry License consistent with Pennsylvania law.
[brief] Because they are closely related, the statements of procedural and factual history are being combined to avoid repetition and for the Court’s convenience.  “1T” refers to the transcript of the May 13, 2024 “emergent call” during the deposition of Defendant [...]; “2T” refers to the transcript of the July 19, 2024 hearing.  At the Veltri house party, [...] was confronted by [...], who falsely accused [...] of inappropriately touching [...]’s girlfriend.  Da95, ¶ 9.  Although [...] attempted to explain that [...] was mistaken, [...] shoved/pushed [...] and began to shout racial epithets at [...], who is biracial.  Da96, ¶ 10.  Fearing for his safety, [...] and his girlfriend exited the Veltri house, while [...] and others continued to shout racial slurs.  Da96, ¶¶ 11-12.  While [...] and his girlfriend waited outside for their Uber ride to arrive, he was again approached by [...], along with [...] and [...].  Da96-7, ¶¶ 15-17.  [...] began to physically attack [...], who attempted to defend himself.  Id.  [...] and [...] then attacked [...] from behind, causing him to fall to the ground.  Id.  While [...] lay defenseless on the ground, he was repeatedly kicked in the head and the rest of his body, causing the fracture of his orbit/facial bone and other severe injuries.  Id.  After this vicious attack, while [...] attempted to leave, Defendant [...] shoved [...] into the bushes.  Da97, ¶ 18.  B.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  In determining whether a matter should be submitted to arbitration, a court must evaluate (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement.  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Martindale, 173 N.J. at 92.
[brief] Plaintiff’s deposition testimony also does not describe any alleged statements or acts of disability discrimination or hostile work environment based on disability discrimination.  Plaintiff testified in her deposition about her reasons for taking FMLA leave in February 2018.  Pltf. T:133:12-25-134:1-25.  Crucially, even though Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she submitted complaints to Defendant [...] about “hostile work environment” when she returned from her first FMLA leave, Plaintiff did not provide any testimony that the Township Defendants committed any acts or made any statements because of her alleged anxiety disability.  Pltf. T:147:14-25;148:1-25.  Likewise, Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she believed there was an investigation conducted by the Township into her hostile work environment allegations against Defendant [...] for “screaming at me and trying to discipline me. ”  Plaintiff did not provide any testimony alleging acts or statements of disability discrimination or hostile work environment based on disability discrimination.  Pltf. T:151:22-25—152:1-7.  **Plaintiff’s Trial Testimony**
[brief] Da176; 3T151:1-16.  As of October 12, 2010, [...] had made interest payments of $66,293.84 towards the $330,000 Loan.  Da177; 3T23:5-7; 3T151:17 to 152:4.  On or about November 10, 2010, [...] sent a letter to [...] as another attempt to modify and/or cure the $330,000 Loan.
[brief] (1T24-26).  [...] was returned Maximum Medical Improvement (“MMI”) with no restrictions by his workers’ compensation doctors from the 2000 incident.  (1T26-28).  For the 2004 incident, [...] injured his low back lifting a box and was out of work for 30-40 days.  (1T28-29).  [...] was returned MMI with no restrictions by his workers’ compensation doctors from the 2004 incident.
[brief] These were fully paid-for assets of plaintiffs.  Pa168-69.  On July 10, 2015, [...], by [...], wrote a letter to [...] and [...], a letter memorializing that Fiberville had assigned its SREC Registration Application along with the solar site design drawings prepared by [...], to GHG Trading, which was countersigned by [...] for confirmation.  Because [...] purchased those rights outright, under the Assignment Agreement issued by defendant, the attendant SRECs now became permanent rights of plaintiffs.  Pa169.  On August 5, 2015, the NJ Clean Energy Program administrator issued a letter confirmation to [...], advising that [...] had been accepted, for a 8,982 Mwdc solar electric system to be installed at [...], at the [...].
[brief] (Pa 31)  Additionally, plaintiff’s contention that Applicants did not give proper Notice because their pro se application was not “complete” does not hold the legal weight plaintiffs assert.  Specifically, other than giving statutory Notice of the hearing, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11, a “complete application” is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to Board action.  Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration (Gann), §14-3.1.  Accordingly, an incomplete application is not a basis for plaintiff’s relief and the Applicants provided adequate notice under the statute.  (Pa 37)
[brief] c. [...] did not offer any testimony at trial and was not present. \(^{45}\)  He was never deposed.  [...] submitted nothing to the Court in the form of an Affidavit or otherwise setting forth his alleged damages.  The record is completely silent as to his alleged damages.  He has failed to establish that he has incurred any damage and, even if the Plaintiffs could prevail under some theory of law in this action – which they cannot – his failure to establish even the slightest hint of damage absolutely bars him from sharing in any award of damages entered in this lawsuit.
[brief] 8.  All fees for the Master's services at the hourly rate of $250.00 shall be paid for by the municipality and by any intervenors in equal shares.  9.  The [...] and the [...] Planning Board are directed to diligently pursue completion and submission to this court of a housing element and affordable (a/k/a 'fair share') housing plan satisfying the municipality's constitutional obligation to provide for low and moderate income housing; and 10.  The petitioner and any intervenors shall forthwith provide the Master with true copies of the pleadings submitted to the court, and 11.  This matter shall be and hereby is scheduled for Case Management Conference before [...], J.S.C. on January 19, 2016 at 2:00 PM, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
[directive] 1st Degree $50,000 to $100,000 10% permissible  Except as provided in 2C:20-17 and 2C:35-6, actor who is age 18 or older knowingly uses, 2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000 10% permissible  Use of 17-Year-Old or solicits, directs, hires, employs or conspires with a person who is age 17 or younger to 2C:24-9  Younger to Commit commit a criminal offense.  An offense under this section will be one degree higher than the Criminal Offenses underlying offense; if the underlying offense is a disorderly persons offense, then it is a crime
[brief] At the May 6, 2022 motion hearing, defense counsel argued that he received [...]’s report on April 25, 2022, the day before jury selection began.  (1T69-7 to 18).  The pretrial memorandum filed on February 8, 2019 indicated, “State to provide expert report on cell phone GPS, with defense given the opportunity to retain its own expert. ” (1T71-13 to 15).  After the State provided the defense with a GeoTime analysis authored by [...] dated May 9, 2019, the defense retained [...], who authored a two-page expert report dated March 4, 2020 refuting the State’s analysis.  (1T71-16 to 25; Pa30-40).  Defense counsel indicated that after receiving Hauger’s report, he had spoken to Boyell, who found “issues” with Hauger’s report, but was unable to write a rebuttal report due to time constraints.  (1T72-4 to 8).  Counsel maintained that the State was required by Rule 3:13-3 to furnish expert reports no less than 30 days before trial, and thus asked for Hauger’s opinion to be excluded.  (1T72-25 to 73-14).  The prosecutor countered that Boyell’s 2020 report had already critiqued the underlying PCMD data and the State’s original GeoTime report plotting that data as specific locations on a map.  (1T73-17 to 74-13).  After receiving defendant’s April 14, 2022 trial memorandum seeking to bar the State’s GeoTime analysis, the prosecutor reviewed the Appellate Division’s March 31, 2022 decision in State v. Burney, 471 N.J. Super. 297 (App. Div. 2022), and determined that the GeoTime analysis would likely be inadmissible in plotting defendant’s cell phone’s specific location data rather than a general area.  (1T74-15 to 79-17).  After consulting with colleagues and determining that the --- 9
[brief] [...]  STATEMENT IN LIEU OF BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION  Date Submitted: January 29, 2025  [...]  Attorney General of New Jersey  Attorney for Respondent, [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...] (ID# 250252018)  Deputy Attorney General  On the Statement  The [...] files this Statement in Lieu of Brief pursuant to Rule 2:6-4(c).
[brief] The Board then proceeded to further inquire about the size of the homes.  At this time, Board Engineer [...] (“[...]”) proposed that the applicant submit a new plan which shows the house boxes drawn at the maximum building coverage.  (T1: p18, ln 19 – p19, ln 9)  The Board then returned its focus to the issue of buffering.  Despite having no basis in the ordinance or in the Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL"), a Board Member insisted on a conservation easement being put in place:
[brief] ”  (Pa Pa236.)  The substituted bill was then listed as having been given a third reading.  (Pa237.)  The Assembly then considered a series of motions relative to the bill, but passed the bill by a vote of 45-24-9.  (Pa237-39.)  Similar to [...], [...] provided a certification as to the Senate’s process for S. 49.  (Pa246.)  [...] is the chief administrative officer for the Senate.  (Pa246 at ¶ 1.)  Her duties include keeping a record of the proceedings regarding action taken on bills.  (Pa246 at ¶ 3.)  [...] testified that the Journal of the Senate is published from time to time.  (Pa247 at ¶7.)  [...] attached an exhibit consisting of the action taken on Senate Bill No. 49.  (Pa247 at ¶6.)  Like [...], [...] certified that there is no audio or video recording of a first and second reading of a bill because it is a ministerial function.  (Pa247 at ¶ 7.)  She certified that the record for such routine business is the Journal of the Senate.
[brief] (Pa59).  On May 21, 2024, the second case management order was filed.  (Pa60).  That management order provided for supplemental Interrogatories and Requests for Documents to be served by July 1, 2024.  (Pa60).  On July 18, 2024, an amended management order was filed extending the date for answering paper discovery. (Pa61).  As of July 18, 2024, paper discovery was to be answered by August 15, 2024.  (Pa62).  The motion to disqualify was filed on July 2, 2024, which was before paper discovery was even completed.
[brief] . . .  Based on the testimony provided at Petitioner's trial, it is clear that [...] submitted false statements under oath in his habeas petition when he claimed to have no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery before it occurred.  However, the court cannot ignore that the petition was prepared by [...], whom the court previously found to lack credibility as a witness.  Moreover, while [...] handwrote the habeas petition, the idea to include the affidavit from a “dead guy” ([...]) which could not be verified originated from [...].  The court also takes notice that Petitioner filed a motion with the trial court to set aside the jury verdict based upon the weight of the evidence.  (Sb25).  Specifically, Petitioner’s trial counsel argued that [...]' testimony was “so replete with inconsistencies” that it was “null and void. ”  This motion was denied by the trial judge.  However, Petitioner brought this exact issue up on direct appeal where a three-judge appellate panel rejected the claim and affirmed Petitioner's conviction.  . . .  Thus, because this argument has been argued and ruled on several times by multiple judges, Petitioner’s argument is cumulative and falls well short of the high burden to set aside a jury verdict.
[brief] ”  (Da97; see Da111.)  The amended complaint repeated the core allegation that [...] developed COVID-19 and passed away in April 2020 as a consequence.  Plaintiff also provided additional detail regarding the allegations that communications with [...] and his family regarding COVID-19 facility restrictions were unclear (see Da123-126 ¶¶68-95), failure to provide adequate food and water (see Da127-128 ¶¶110-121), and [...]’s family’s difficulties contacting his physician so that an IV could be started (see Da126-127 ¶¶102-109), and included new allegations that [...] facilities statewide, acting at the direction of state officials, took in additional COVID-19 positive patients who could not be cared for at other facilities, resulting in higher rates of infection at [...] facilities.