ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The law does not preclude police officers from providing this non-election-related security presence.  However, officers should take care to exercise their security role in a manner which does not interfere with the right of individuals to vote.  Additionally, officers should not “remain or stand within 100 feet of a polling place during the conduct of an election” unless they are responding to a request for “assistance with regard to a specific emergency, allegation of criminal conduct, or disturbance that exists at the time the request for assistance is made,” N.J.S.A. 19:6-15.1; 19:6-16, or if otherwise provided by statute.  Similarly, officers should not “remain or stand within 100 feet of a ballot drop box in use during the conduct of an election,” unless “investigating, addressing, or removing any cause for a disturbance, or otherwise responding to a request for assistance, on or around the premises of the location of that ballot drop box,” N.J.S.A. 19:63-16.1(b)(2)(f), or if otherwise provided by statute.  Finally, as a general matter, some off-duty officers may be permitted to serve as a member of the district board of elections or, if duly authorized, to serve as a challenger for a political party or a candidate or on public question.
[brief] And we've talked about that.  This escalated.  4T38:2-5.  [...] started, escalated and it got worse and worse and worse to the point she (sic) now poses that danger  4T38:14-15.  Use your common sense and determine that a dog that continues to escalate their behavior into the time where they'd kill another dog and seriously injure a human is going to do that again.  4T38:19-23.  [...] and [...] weren’t seriously injured.  There was and is no evidence of a serious threat of serious bodily injury to any person.
[brief] Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of New Jersey, Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 570 (App. Div. 2016).........................................................................................48  Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of West Windsor, 190 N.J. 61 (2007)  .......................................................................................................................34  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.....................................................................................................................passim N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(a)(1)...........................................................................................................33 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b)...............................................................................................................33 Rules R. 1:4-8........................................................................................................................................7, 11, 12, 18 R. 4:46-1........................................................................................................................................14
[brief] Endo Surgi Ctr., 391 N.J. Super. at 594 (alteration in original) (quoting Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos., 86 N.J. 100, 105,107 (App. Div. 1981)).  Or, as the Supreme Court has put it: “The goal of PIP is to provide prompt medical treatment for those who have been injured in automobile accidents without having that treatment delayed because of payment disputes.
[brief] The New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, specifies the circumstances under which a public entity can be held liable for injuries to another.  Although generally immunity for public entities is the rule and liability is the exception, one relevant exception is found in N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 which provides: a public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which has occurred and that either a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
[brief] After evaluating the documentary evidence and listening to the testimony of fact and expert witnesses, the trial court sided with [...].  [...] gives the impression of simply requesting a do-over from this Court, suggesting this Court override or reject the trial court’s weighing of the evidence and credibility assessments.  [...]’s objections to the decision below include: - The trial court erroneously relied upon the 1967 Subdivision (Pb9); - The trial court improperly weighed the expert testimony (Pb14, 20-25); - The trial court improperly weighed the documentary evidence (Pb16, 25-28); - The trial court made incorrect credibility assessments of the witnesses, especially [...] (Pb17); and - The trial court improperly weighed the factors finding that [...] had obtained title to the Strip through adverse possession (Pb30-36).
[brief] See *Berger*, 244 N.J. Super. at 205.  Forty years ago, this issue was considered by [...] in *Garza* . . .  Over a dissent by [...], who would have vacated the default, the majority concluded that although the judgment was void, the motion to relieve the defendant from the judgment was out of time, and thus the void judgment could not be vacated after four years had elapsed without a showing of excusable neglect.  The court agreed, however, that:
[brief] A trial court's decisions to admit or exclude are reviewed deferentially for an abuse of discretion that results in a clear error of judgment.  *State v. Williamson*, 246 N.J. 185,198-99 (2021).  But no special deference is afforded to its interpretation of the law or to legal conclusions that flow from established facts.  *Id.* at 199.  In this case, the trial court misapplied the law to the established facts that surrounded [...]'s police statement.
[brief] By denying the application, the Board was never provided the opportunity to consider the conditions required if approved.  Then the trial court reversed and barred the consideration of any such changes.  The Board’s planner questioned how the application impacted other purposes of the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1, et seq. (the “MLUL”), such as (a.) to encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use of land, given that it was requesting that the Board go against municipal action, or purpose (c.) to provide adequate light, air and open space, given the size and scale of the project, and purpose (e.) to promote the establishment of appropriate population densities, given the density proposed.
[brief] “Step transactions” are multi-step transactions to achieve a single objective.  [...] observed an elaborate series of step transactions that facilitated the diversion of millions of dollars from the [...], [...], and other defendant-entity accounts via a series of transactional steps in multiple accounts and multiple companies across multiple years.  The objective of structuring these transactions in this way was to avoid detection.  (23T 28:13 to 29:8).  Some parts of these structured transactions occurred prior to the presentation of P-48 and P-50 and/or the closing, with additional money moved afterward.  These transactions, in particular, were relevant to [...]’s conclusion that the defendants were diverting funds to mislead the Plaintiffs as to the values on P-48 and P-50.  (Da2792-97; 23T 31:6 to 33:3).  As to whether these and other abnormalities were merely innocent accounting errors, [...] explained that multiple entries in multiple company books over multiple years were inconsistent in ways that suggested that these issues were not just innocent errors.
[brief] Instead, the Legislature propounded a strict list of “licensed person[s]” that includes architects, attorneys, physicians, other medical professionals, and insurance producers.  See e.g. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26(b), (c), (f), and (o).  Common among these professionals are the extensive learning and erudition, as well as the heightened licensing and regulation to which they are subjected to both enter the profession and maintain their inclusion in that profession.  Plaintiff agrees that the licensing and educational requirements for insurance brokers place [...] and [...] on the same short list as doctors, architects, and attorneys having served an Affidavit of Merit with his Complaint.
[brief] (Da101).  [...] is no longer a member of the [...], has not been an elected member of the Board since March 2020, and it was unreasonable and erroneous for the [...] to require him to conduct research through tens of thousands of text messages would be to ask him to step away from his employment and his business for an estimated eighty hours without reasonable compensation.  (Da140).  In the end, [...] was in possession of 73 pages of responsive documents, which took several weeks to collate, review, and produce, as he had to conduct searches of his text messages with hundreds of different individuals for documents responsive to [...]’s OPRA request (Da393-479).  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Trial Court must be reversed, and this Court should (1) dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice; (2) vacate the Trial Court’s order granting relief to the Plaintiff; and (3) hold that Defendant is entitled to indemnification of his reasonable counsel fees and costs incurred for all the work performed by [...]’s counsel in an amount to be determined on remand.
[brief] The process being one in which there is discussion and debate.  And through that discussion and debate, hopefully a great truth is found. ”  (Pa201 at 50:1-7.)  One member of the public even noted how important the bill was: “you today are going to be voting on life and death decisions. ” (Pa161 at 10:24-25.)  Here, this process was violated because the public was not made aware of such a controversial bill and given a meaningful way to address it before being signed into law.  Although [...] provided testimony that was recorded as a part of the legislative history for this bill, she did not know she was testifying on A.6260 rather than the bills that had been pending since October 2020, S. 3030 (2021) and A.4848 (2021).
[brief] The “prime consideration” in interpreting a deed “is the intention of the parties. ”  *Normanoch Ass’n v. Baldasanno*, 40 N.J. 113, 125 (1963); see also *Hagaman v. Bd. of Ed. of Woodbridge Twp.*, 117 N.J. Super. 446, 451 (App. Div. 1971) (“In determining the meaning of a deed, prime consideration is the intent of the parties. ”).  The construction of a deed “should be in conformity with the intention of the parties whenever the law will permit” and extrinsic evidence is permitted to the extent it “throws light upon the circumstances and subject-matter[.]”  *Lee v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines*, 129 N.J. Eq. 530, 536 (Ct. Ch. 1941); *Hammett v. Rosensohn*, 26 N.J. 415, 423 (1958) (stating the “primary rule of construction is that the intent of the conveyor is normally determined by the language of the conveyance read as an entirety and in the light of the surrounding circumstances. ”).  At the outset, it is important to note that Plaintiffs do not contend in this action that their building plans for the Property complied with the height restriction in [...]’s construction rules, or that the height restriction is somehow unenforceable because it is ambiguous.
[brief] Count II alleges hostile work environment and harassment in violation of LAD.  To prove a hostile work environment harassment claim under LAD, a plaintiff must establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination by showing that the conduct: (1) would not have occurred *but for* Plaintiff's protected status; and it was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) *reasonable* person believe that (4) the conditions of employment were altered and the working environment was hostile or abusive.  *Taylor v. Metzger*, 152 N.J. 490, 498 (1998); *Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.*, 132 N.J. 587, 603-04 (1993).  If a plaintiff establishes a *prima facie* case, a rebuttable presumption arises that the harassment occurred because of the plaintiff's protected status.  *Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods*, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 267 (App. Div. 1996).  Plaintiff's LAD harassment claim fails for various reasons.  The undisputed facts (primarily based upon her deposition testimony) establish that the complained-of conduct had nothing to do with Plaintiff's race or age.  In addition, Plaintiff cannot establish that the conduct was severe or pervasive or that a reasonable person would have believed the conditions of the work environment became hostile or abusive.  Indeed, the only conduct complained of pertains to Plaintiff’s workload and a perceived lack of communication from [...].  Such conduct does not remotely approach what is legally required to establish a hostile work environment.  Consequently, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the *prima facie* requirements for a hostile work environment claim, and her LAD harassment claim fails as a matter of law.  Count II should, therefore, remain dismissed.
[brief] It was established separately from [...]’s expert that the long-term liability imposed in 2015, when there was none beforehand, was $3.389 million most of which was Plaintiffs’ own legal fees, and as of the 2018 valuation date $2.8 million remained.  (See, discussion and citations supra at pp. 8-10)  Still further, this vote violated [...]’s rights to the protection of the American Rule, as a direct litigant in this case.  He cannot be required to Pay his adversaries’ legal fees without a statute, a rule or an agreement, none of which existed here, as the Court had already ruled.  (Da2810-12)
[brief] The N.J.A.C. regulations adopted by [...] are inconsistent with the position of [...] and the Amici Curiae.  The Amici Curiae advance numerous arguments that the No-Fault Law and its regulations prohibit arbitration of an IFPA claim or other similar claims.  To reach that result, however, the Amici Curiae narrow the statutory language as much as possible, despite admonitions from the courts that the language should be read broadly.  The Amici Curiae also ignore the regulations adopted by [...], which are exceedingly broad and contrary to the argument that the No-Fault Law arbitration process cannot be used to resolve IFPA claims.  1)
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], respectfully submits that multiple triable issues of material fact exist herein.  Plaintiff further submits that the subject applicator contained an obvious and admitted manufacturing defect and that [...]’s intentional failure to warn of the dangers associated with its affected applicators was a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s blindness.  For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff [...] respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motions for summary judgment and motion for reconsideration.
[brief] Notably, several courts have conducted *Daubert* hearings to determine the scientific reliability of more precise GPS location data derived from cellphones.  See, e.g., *Commonwealth v. Arrington*, 226 N.E.3d 851, 854-57, 861-67 (Mass. 2024) (holding that a trial court properly excluded proffered expert testimony on “frequent location data (FLH)” from an Apple iPhone 6, which was used to place the defendant’s phone within 143 feet of the crime scene); State v. Pierce, 222 A.3d 582 (Del. Super. Ct. 2019) (assessing the reliability of Google Wi-Fi location data), aff’d o.b., 236 A.3d 307 (Del. 2020) Wells v. State, 675 S.W.3d 814, 828-830 (Tex. App. 2023) (assessing the reliability of Google location data), petition for discretionary review granted (Jan. 24, 2024).
[brief] The seven (7) lines located in the POS on the page right after the foreword state: (Da569).  Plainly, the “SPECIAL RISK” notice provides the explanation that arbitration is a substitute for “trial in court, with or without a jury,” the required magic words Respondents rely upon.  Id.  By law, the POS must contain critical “guidance” and disclosures spelled out in 23 subsections.  See N.J.A.C. § 5:26-4.2.  Throughout the SPA and POS, Respondents were notified that careful review of the POS was needed before the expiration of the 7-day cancelation period.  (Da12, Da13, Da26-Da27).  Respondents were keenly aware that the agreement would be binding if they failed to terminate timely by exercising their rights under the state-mandated attorney review or “study” period, or the 7-days automatic cancelation period.  It is unfathomable, therefore, that the signed agreement here, with its extensive legal notices and explicit reference to the FAA, cannot meet that test by referring to a clearly identified and incorporated exhibit.  See Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, 323 N.J. Super. 118, 125-26 (1999) (enforced forum selection clause because conspicuously identified as available electronically) (citing Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510, 533 (App. Div. 2009)).  The trial court’s ruling below failed to apply long-standing contract law principles, as explained further herein, which is fatal to its decision.  Weaponizing Atalese to trump these principles and invalidate the parties’ agreement is precisely the conduct that [...] said the FAA commands all state courts to avoid.  When standard contract principles are applied that place the parties’ agreement on equal and fair footing with all other contracts, it is plain that the trial court’s decision runs afoul of the FAA and must be reversed.
[brief] (7T 123-23 to 124-8)  In his statement to police, [...] said that he also heard that “people were going after … [t]he person that sprayed a bottle. ”  (7T 131-7 to 21)  By the time [...] made his way into the hall to see what was going on, the music had stopped and everyone was leaving.  He turned the lights on to signal that the evening was over and returned to the front door to manage the crowd leaving the hall.  (7T 90-21 to 93-10, 116-12 to 23)  Shortly thereafter, one of [...]’s staff radioed him that shots had been fired.  (7T 94-19 to 23)  [...] went out to the parking lot where he learned that two people had been shot and he called the police.  (7T 95-23 to 98-7)  [...] testified that her family “paid for a section” of the hall for a party in honor of [...], publicized the event on Instagram, and also used a promoter.
[brief] A factual basis is a procedure that “ensures judicial oversight of ‘the final relinquishment’ of the defendant’s core constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. ”  *State v. Campfield*, 213 N.J. 218, 231 (2013) (quoting *State v. Smullen*, 118 N.J. 408, 414 (1990)).  “The defendant’s factual basis must satisfy each element of the offense charged. ”  *State v. E.J.H.*, 466 N.J. Super. 32, 37 (2021).  “The factual foundation may take one of two forms; defendant may either explicitly admit guilt with respect to the elements or may ‘acknowledge[...] facts constituting the essential elements of the crime. ”  *Campfield*, 213 N.J. at 231; (quoting *State v. Sainz*, 107 N.J. 283, 293 (1987)).  “The trial court’s task is to ensure that the defendant has articulated a factual basis for each element of the offense to which he pleads guilty. ”  *Id.* at 232.  Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, driving while intoxicated is defined as “[a] person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood.
[brief] In *Sensient Colors Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.*, 193 N.J. 373 (2008), the New Jersey Supreme Court made abundantly clear that “the determination of whether to grant a comity stay or dismissal is generally within the discretion of the trial court. ”  *Sensient Colors Inc.*, 193 N.J. at 390.  [...]’s decision not to grant a comity stay or dismissal was a matter of discretion and therefore particularly inappropriate for an immediate motion for reconsideration brought before a different trial judge – in essence, asking [...] to exercise her discretion differently than [...] had only weeks earlier.
[brief] Even if [...] did not receive the postcard or any of the other notice provided by the Division, he cannot evade the two-year limitation period.  “As New Jersey courts have long recognized, ‘[i]gnorance of the law furnishes no excuse to a person either for a breach or for an omission of a duty[.]’”  Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., L.L.C., 202 N.J. 349, 367 (2010) (quoting Bowen v. Pursel, 109 N.J. Eq. 67, 73 (E. & A. 1931)).  Thus, [...] purportedly being unaware of the Ricci Act until over three years after its passage cannot serve as the basis to allow him to evade its unambiguous requirements.  [...]’s reliance on *Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System*, 311 N.J. Super. 333 (App. Div. 1998), is misplaced.
[brief] Finally, Plaintiff’s consumer fraud claim fails since [...] is an “insurance producer” who is subject to the “learned professional” exception.  This is beyond dispute: Plaintiff pursues a breach of contract action based on the Commitment of Title Insurance – insurance produced by [...] – but in connection with the Consumer Fraud Act claim, [...] in supposedly *not* a title insurance producer.  [...]’ motion for summary judgment submitted that it is an insurance broker, and that under the seminal case *Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs.*, it is exempted from consumer fraud act claims.  387 N.J. Super. 551, 556 (App. Div. 2019).  Specifically, in *Plemmons*, it was held that an insurance broker is a semi-professional who is subject to testing, licensing, and regulation under other statutory provisions, and therefore is excluded from liability under the Consumer Fraud Act.  It is a matter of public record of which the Court can take judicial notice under *N.J.R.E* 201 that [...], the principal of [...] and under whose license it operates, is a licensed insurance broker with License Number 9472209 and National Producer Number 2015507.  Plainly, under *Plemmons*, Plaintiff’s Consumer Fraud Act claim against [...] fails as a matter of law.
[directive] As explained below, a categorical policy or practice of amending marijuana-related statutory offenses to ordinance violations – or dismissing the charges outright – is impermissible, as is any substantially similar policy or practice.  Categorical enforcement policies and practices adopted at the county or municipal level may impair one of the objectives of New Jersey’s criminal justice system: to promote the reasonably uniform administration of state laws.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2B:25-1.  Our system aims to treat similarly situated offenders similarly, without regard to where in the State their conduct allegedly occurred.  The discretion of county and municipal prosecutors to adopt categorical goal.1 enforcement policies and practices may be limited in service of that Categorical enforcement policies and practices adopted at the county or municipal level also raise questions of preemption.  A local governmental unit may not “decriminalize” or 1  See, e.g., State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998) (prohibiting county-specific standardized plea offers and policies due to the resulting arbitrary and unreviewable differences between different localities); State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434 (1997) (holding that a prosecutor’s rejection of a defendant’s admission into a Pretrial Intervention (PTI) Program “was a patent and gross abuse of discretion” because the prosecutor had “abandon[ed] his discretion in favor of a per se rule . . . unsupported by the legislative purpose behind both the PTI Statute and the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, by the Guidelines, and by the caselaw.