ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The existing codes in have remained largely unchanged since inception of the then Drug Court program 2002.  The updated list limits the reasons for legal rejections to in those specifically set forth either the statute or the Recovery Court in in manual.  The new list of legal rejection codes is now effect.  in  The revisions more clearly identify the specific reasons for which a potential Recovery Court client is being legally rejected from admission into the program.  The current broad rejection reason of "Statute" is being eliminated.  Prosecutors now will be required to indicate whether a case being reviewed Track One or Track Two.  For Track One, the specific is permissible rejection reasons are outlined the statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35- in 14a).  For Track Two, the rejection reasons are not from the statute, but rather are from the manual.  Eliminated as acceptable legal rejection reasons/codes are those not set forth either the manual or the statute.  For example, clients longer no in can be rejected for program admission because they have previously been the program or because of a "co-defendant issue."  Also, the legal in ADA ENSURING TO DOOR AN OPEN JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities of2  Page I of rejection reason "immigration status" has been made more precise as "immigration detainer."  making these reasons for legal rejections more specific and more By directly tied to the provisions of the statute or the manual, Recovery Court will be able to better monitor and identify any equity issues the in application and admission process.  Questions regarding the revised list of legal rejection codes in eCourts for Recovery Court may be directed to [...] by email at [...] or by telephone at [...].  Attachment
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  By way of this appeal, Plaintiff once again seeks to relitigate his claims against [...] in connection with a motor vehicle accident that took place in the [...] (“Lodi”), New Jersey – despite the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to [...] and subsequent denial of Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  Plaintiff alleges that he was struck by a motor vehicle while crossing a crosswalk on the night of May 31, 2017.  Plaintiff claims that the accident was due to a streetlight outage along the roadway, and that the outage was caused by [...]’s negligence.  In a thorough and well-reasoned oral decision, the trial court granted summary judgment to [...] and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against it, finding that: (1) [...] did not have a duty with respect to the streetlight at issue; (2) even assuming that [...] had a duty, it did not have any notice of the alleged outage; and (3) based on the record evidence, there were no material facts in dispute with respect to Plaintiff’s claims.  Plaintiff’s appeal retreads the same arguments rejected by the court below and fails to provide any justification – grounded in case law or otherwise – to merit a reversal of the trial court’s decision.  For the reasons set forth below, the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to [...] should be affirmed in its entirety.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] As explained in more detail below, the [...] respectfully requests that this Court (1) hold that it is necessary for trial courts to propound voir dire questions to prospective jurors to ferret out potential bias and preconceived ideas regarding the accuracy of fingerprint examiner testimony; and (2) remand for the appointment of a Special Adjudicator to propose (a) appropriate instructions for trial courts to provide before expert testimony about fingerprint evidence is offered at trial and appropriate guardrails on that testimony and (b) a comprehensive charge on fingerprint evidence to be recommended to the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges.  These recommendations will ensure that jurors receive accurate information about critical evidence.  Moreover, model language will save the courts significant time and resources and prevent the uneven administration of justice through ad hoc determinations regarding complex scientific issues as presented by differently-resourced parties.  II.
[brief] Defendant testified that he also told the Plaintiff that he was “not going to be in any position to help financially because [he was] losing [his] house…getting divorced again [and] basically broke” (1T:174, L8 – 11).  Plaintiff testified that she was so poor between [...] entering college in 2010 and the filing of her March 7, 2017 motion seeking for the first time a college contribution from the Defendant (Pa39) that she could not afford a $5,000.00 retainer for an attorney to pursue this relief and she carefully and deliberately elected not to initiate any proceedings in the Courts (or even serve a demand letter) related to college contributions for either child as a pro se litigant.  (1T:39, L15 – 1T:40, L1).  Thus, in 2010, the Plaintiff, an employed, intelligent and college educated woman (1T:94, L23 – 24) who was and had been receiving tax free child support in the amount of $180.00 per week since December of 1998 was fully aware that there was no meeting of the minds pertaining to college contributions for the children and she elected not to apply to the Court for any relief in that regard purely for financial reasons and an unwillingness to at least try to proceed as a pro se litigant using the Office of the Ombudsman and the pro se litigant forms as resources.
[brief] It has been stated that Congress intended that §1983 be construed in light of common law principles that were well settled at the time of its enactment in 1871.  Where an immunity claimed by a defendant was well established at common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, and where its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, courts have construed the statute to incorporate that immunity.  *Owen v. Independence*, 445 U.S. 622, 639 (1980).  Common law immunities that were preserved include judicial immunity.  *Burns v. Reed*, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1971).  It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally "immune from a suit for money damages."  *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991) (per curiam); see also *Randall v. Brigham*, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536, 19 L. Ed. 285 (1868) ("This doctrine is as old as the law, and its maintenance is essential to the impartial administration of justice.").
[brief] (29T:184-3 to 186-25, 188-13 to 17, 191-12 to 15; 30T:202-22 to 203-7, 31T:47-9 to 17, 181-17 to 184-20).  They never checked for a pulse.  They did not check for breathing.  There was no effort on any [...]’ part to ascertain whether [...] was alive or dead.  Ibid.  [...] came forward to reveal that she had driven [...] to Farm Lane that night, as he had been staying with her.
[brief] On September 1, 2020, [...] filed a Notice of Motion to Reinstate Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff Borough of [...] claims and a Request for a Case Management Conference (Pa138).  On November 4, 2020, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. entered an Order Reinstating [...]’s claim (Pa145).  On December 2, 2020, [...] entered a Case Management Order (Pa147).  A bench trial was held before [...] on seven non-consecutive dates starting on November 3, 2021, and concluding on April 25, 2023 (1T-7T).  On September 5, 2023, [...] entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint, and placed the decision on the record (9T, Pa1088).  On October 20, 2023, Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the May 11, 2020, Order of [...] as well as the Order of Dismissal entered by [...] on September 25, 2023 (Pa1072).  [...] filed a Civil Case Information Statement on November 2, 2023 (Pa1077).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Defendant concedes that his criminal history satisfies the standard for a persistent offender laid out in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).  (Db46 to 47).  Indeed, as the trial judge found, defendant had been convicted of fourth-degree criminal trespass on April 14, 2014, and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact on September 21, 2015.  Both convictions fall within the timeline of “within [ten] years of the date of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced” under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).
[brief] First, the forewoman – in open court – announced the jurors had come to a unanimous verdict.  (10T:9-13 to 17).  Then, reading from the very verdict sheet defendant takes issue with in this appeal, the court asked how the jury found as to Count 1 of the indictment, “murder by purposefully and knowingly causing the death of [...],” to which the forewoman responded, “Guilty. ” (10T:20 to 25).  The court then specifically stated: “Okay, and following the instructions, you go to question 4. ” (10T:10-1 to 2).  In doing so, the record clearly reflects not only that the jury followed the clearly delineated instructions on the verdict sheet and skipped over the questions related to the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter (question 2) and the lesser-included offense of reckless manslaughter (question 3) because they had found him guilty of purposeful murder, but also that there was a complete understanding among all the jurors, parties, and the judge that based on their finding of guilt for purposeful murder, the jury did not convict defendant on the lesser-included charges.
[brief] ”); Third Restatement of Agency § 3.05 (2006), cmt. b & illus. 1 (providing example of actual authority where a parent consents to child using the parent’s computer, which had parent’s address and credit card info saved into a website, and the child purchases books through that website).  Plaintiffs’ daughter’s actual authority here also encompassed the authority to agree to [...]’s Terms of Use, a necessary precondition to accomplishing the purpose for which the agency relationship was established.  See Sylvan Learning Sys., Inc. v. Gordon, 135 F. Supp. 2d 529, 542 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[A]n agent has implied authority to undertake all transactions necessary to fulfill the duties required of an agent in exercise of express authority. ”); Heidbreder v. Epic Games, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 591, 596–97 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (holding that minor son had actual authority to enter arbitration agreement on behalf of father when father consented to son using father’s video game account, which had father’s profile, login information, and credit card saved).
[brief] In terms of communicating with [...] and access to ecourts, [...] who argued the motion for [...], states that [...] understands English but her accent makes it difficult to understand her and she was in China (I believe for 5 months) (4T p.8 lines 8-25)  On February 22, 2024 Defendant filed opposition and the court scheduled a hearing for March 1, 2024 in which Plaintiff’s motion was denied which is the subject of this appeal.  Defendant argues that there was no substitution or notice of appearance filed by [...] which explains why [...] did not receive notice through eCourts (4T p. 13 lines 13-20)  Additionally, the court noted no brief was filed pursuant to R. 4:50 (4T p. 14 lines 5-12)  [...] argues that since the case was closed such was not necessary.  (4T p. 15 lines 1-3)  Notwithstanding not filing either a substitution or an appearance, [...] filed the motion and Defendant filed opposition but [...] did not get an ecourt notice of the opposition and thus did not file a reply.  (4T p. 15 lines 11-16 and 4T p. 15 line 25- page 26 line 2) but did receive notice of date for oral argument (4T p. 26 lines 9-10)
[brief] When the evidence “is so one sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986), the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.  The Trial Court frankly stated it had made a mistake in its prior ruling which denied summary judgment and properly granted the [...]’ motion for reconsideration of that interlocutory order pursuant to the applicable standard set forth in Rule 4:42-2:  ….any order or form of decision which adjudicates fewer than all the claims as to all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims, and it shall be subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice.  To the extent possible, application for reconsideration shall be made to the trial judge who entered the order.  R. 4:42-2.  As our Supreme Court noted in Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 534 (2011), “the trial court has the inherent power to be exercised in its sound discretion, to review, revise, reconsider and modify its interlocutory orders at any time prior to the entry of final judgment,” and the “stringent constraints” applied to final judgments and orders under R. 4:50-1 and to reconsideration of final orders pursuant to R. 4:49-2 “do not apply to interlocutory orders.
[brief] 15.  By Opinion (1T) and Order (Pa1), the court decided issues as follows.  16.  [...] cannot sustain its position that the [...] could have been developed as a multi-tenant structure.  The plaintiff’s proposed expert appraiser merely assumed – but did not opine or state – that the [...] could have been developed for multiple tenancies.  The appraiser’s opinions as to damages were predicated upon that assumption.  1T 58-19 to 59-8.  The Court therefore held:  >  So part of the Court's order will provide, without a duly qualified expert testimony, plaintiff may not pursue a claim, but for the grading and elevation error, they could have obtained preliminary and site, and final site plan approval and all necessary variances and satisfy all conditions to allow for multiple tenants to occupy the Longo building.  So, I can [sic: am] granting summary judgment on that claim.  That claim is out.
[brief] By email dated November 2, 2022, while the Board’s Counsel was still away, [...]’s counsel sent an email demanding the Board ‘move the resolution’ at its public hearing of November 14, 2022.  (Pa263)  By letter dated November 21, 2022, [...] issued a ‘Notice of Default” to the Board demanding the Board move the resolution at its meeting of November 28, 2022.  (Pa264)  Board counsel responded by way of letter dated November 23, 2022, which, *inter alia*, rejected the Notice of Default as inapt, set forth a detailed case history, recited that counsel had agreed that the Resolution and the Amendment to the Settlement Agreement would be presented to the Board simultaneously, and advised that the Board had yet to receive any comments to the proposed Amendment to Settlement Agreement that was sent to [...] on August 7, 2022.
[brief] For instance, the policy contains no mention of discipline yet the court speculated that the policy “has the potential to cause irreparable harm to school staff” (p. 17, 18) (Da409-410) because: (1) the policy “will subject staff to discipline if they fail to correctly interpret” “the terms ‘behaviors,’ ‘adverse impact,’ and ‘emotional well-being…’” (p. 17) (Da409); and (2) “failure to report would subject staff members to discipline, and incentivize reporting even when unnecessary” (p. 18) (Da410).  Similarly, contrary to the Revised Policy’s plain language, the court concluded that the policy requires “untrained non-instructional staff” -- such as janitors (T17:17) -- to “report behaviors that they believe may cause an adverse impact” (p. 18) (Da410).  On the contrary, the Revised Policy’s Regulation provides as follows:  [P]arental notification shall be made by the appropriate administrator and/or the observing certificated staff member, and an appropriate certificated staff member (e.g., school nurse, school psychologist, school guidance counselor) if deemed necessary by the appropriate administrator.  For non-certificated personnel, parental notification shall be made by the appropriate school administrator or her/his designee.  (Da112).  Finally, the trial court speculated that the policy “might create a presumption” of “investigation or verification” which “would have the potential to disclose personal and confidential information about a student to others, simply by asking questions necessary to provide verification. ” (p. 17) (Da409).  The court’s speculation is contrary to the policy’s express language that it “does not create a duty … for any staff member to investigate, substantiate or validate the issue or behaviors giving rise to” the parental notification (Da110).
[brief] Security video from a nearby nail salon showed that a Jeep passed by on Delsea Drive at 12:02 a.m. on March 11, 2017 (19T33-20 to 19T34-7;19T38-1 to 19T39-1;19T44-7 to 19T45-23).  Surveillance video obtained from [...] in [...] showed that a Jeep passed by at 12:05 a.m. on March 11, 2017 (21T196-7 to 20;21T203-13 to 21T204-6).  A black-and-white video taken from [...] showed a Jeep, but its license plate could not be seen (24T38-21 to 24T40-25;25T16-21 to 25T17-24).  Surveillance video played for the jury showed an older model jeep "kind of circling the area during the time that the ATM footage from the victim's bank account had taken place" (24T38-5 to 24T39-13).  While walking to the store along [...] in [...], [...] found the victim's phone, in pieces, by the side of the road on either March 10 or 11, 2017 (17T27-13 to 14;17T28-14 to 17T29-6;17T37-21 to 17T39-21).
[brief] In this case, it was proper to find that there was a risk that the defendant would commit another offense based on her long history of arrests and prior drug use.  Thus, this factor was supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.  The sentencing judge also properly found aggravating factor 9: the need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law.  Deterrence is one of the most important factors in sentencing.  State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90, 92 (App. Div. 2009).  Given the seriousness of the charges for which the defendant was found guilty, it was appropriate to find this factor.  The defendant was found guilty of serious crimes, warranting a lengthy sentence.
[brief] “The only way to assess a waiver is to review the whole record. ”  Id. at 190 (citing Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2005)).  The record below firmly establishes that Defendant neither intentionally relinquished nor abandoned a known right.  Accordingly, at most, it could be argued that Defendant did not expressly argue or timely present her pre-suit demand argument.  That is a forfeiture, not a waiver.  See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.  As forfeited arguments are reviewed under the plain error standard, Defendant must prove that there was an error; that the error was plain; that it prejudiced her substantial rights; and that not correcting the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.
[brief] - **July 25, 1948 OBSC Meeting Minutes** – construction noises limited to certain times of day, (Da528); - **November 14, 1948 OBSC Meeting Minutes** – “A report was made that [property owner] is breaking ground on construction – he has not applied to grounds comm. for construction, we are to get injunction against Mr. [property owner] for breaking ground for building without a building permit.
[brief] This was triggered by an August 13, 2012 letter from [...] (Township Treasurer) to Pension and Benefits (Pa 227).  (R-10)  [...] was notified officially over 1 year later by letter of [...], Director Pension Fraud and Abuse dated November 1, 2013 that [...] was determined to be retroactively ineligible in PERS as of January 1, 2008.  The first professional services contract issued by the Township was 2015.  This was provided for execution after appointment.  Notwithstanding, no contract payments were ever made and all payments continued bi-weekly on a w-2 payment basis.  (Pa 119-129)  Despite [...] being retroactively ineligible and all credits being eliminated back to December 31, 2007, the State of NJ (PERS) only recently refunded [...] at the end of 2023 without any accounting or explanation overpayments to the account.  More importantly, unemployment contributions were also removed bi-weekly and [...] is not eligible for unemployment if he is not determined to be an employee.  [...] appealed the determination by letter to [...] dated December 13, 2013 (Pa94-96).  (P-1)  On February 28, 2014 [...] provides a IRS 20 question test response to Director of Pension Fraud and Abuse, [...] (Pa97-103).  (P-2).  The analysis included [...]’s 2013 W2 statement from the Township as an Exhibit.  The matter stalls out for years.
[brief] (Pa1-5).  Defendant filed several motions, including a motion to dismiss his indictment on the grounds that the State had “affirmatively deleted” the Adam4Adam profile created by the undercover detective that led defendant to contact “[...]” on April 11, 2019.  (1T6-12 to 16).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard the motion on December 11, 2023.  (1T).  On January 22, 2024, [...] granted defendant’s motion, ruling that the State’s failure to preserve the Adam4Adam profile was “either bad faith or connivance or an extremely egregious carelessness on the part of the detective[.]” (2T16-23 to 25).  And even though the State had provided defendant with the picture used in “[...]’s” profile, had assured the Court it would elicit during its case in chief that the profile listed [...]’s age as at least eighteen, and had agreed the judge should provide the jury with an adverse-inference charge about the lost profile, [...] ruled that the State’s carelessness could not be cured.  (1T18-8 to  He determined defendant was unduly and irreparably prejudiced by the State’s error and the only available remedy was to dismiss defendant’s indictment.  (2T17-2 to 5).  He noted his dismissal was without prejudice, but that the State was only permitted to represent the case to the grand jury if it located the missing profile.  (2T17-2 to 5; Pa8).  The State timely filed a notice of appeal on March 4, 2024.  (Pa9-12).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Mirroring a principle employed in statutory interpretation “to avoid an interpretation that reduces specific language to mere surplusage,” DKM Residential Props. Corp. v. Twp. of Montgomery, 182 N.J. 296, 307 (2005), when interpreting contracts, courts are similarly instructed not to adopt an interpretation of the instrument at issue that would “render one of its terms meaningless. ”  Cumberland Cty. Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., Inc., 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App. Div. 2003).  Accord C.L., 473 N.J. Super. at 599.  The Restatement similarly provides that “[i]n the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof,” it is preferred to generally apply “an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect. ”  Restatement of Contracts §203(a).  Again, the Lease has two “offset” provisions in § 4.02: the Rent Offset and the Allowance Offset.