ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Da117).  That official Board statement confirms the clear link between the “adverse impact” language in the Revised Policy and the explicitly discriminatory provisions in the Original Policy.  Indeed, in briefing to this court, Appellants continue to confirm the existence of a link between the “adverse impact” language in the Revised Policy and LGBTQ+ status, arguing that notifications of LGBTQ+ status are required in order to satisfy parents’ constitutional rights.  See (Db13) (arguing that the school cannot withhold such information since parents must be able to oversee a “child’s gender identification journey”); (Db19-29) (substantive due process argument).
[brief] .........................  285a-289a  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff-appellant appeals a trial court’s 93 percent reduction of counsel fees set forth in her counsel’s fee application, with virtually no explanation.  The fee application was submitted upon settlement, with plaintiff-appellant being the prevailing party.  The sole cause of action in the lawsuit was Defendant’s alleged violations of the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act’s (“MMWA”).  The Parties further agreed that although fee shifting under the MMWA is discretionary, Defendant “will not challenge the right of the [Plaintiff] to receive attorney’s fees and costs as determined by the Court. ”  Nonetheless, Defendant breached that provision by arguing that the Court should deny fees and costs in the entirety.  Defendant’s counsel also presented specious and deceptive arguments to the trial court in arguing that the court had the discretion to eliminate all fees and costs so requested.  Moreover, the Court did not provide any analysis of its reasons for reducing the hourly rate or time records of Plaintiff’s counsel.  The trial court abused its discretion in its apparent acceptance of such arguments which violate the standards set forth in Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) as well as state and federal public policy guaranteeing all citizens equal access to the courts.  Accordingly, the trial court’s erroneous rulings should be reversed.
[directive] Specifically, the modifications to the Main Plea Form are as follows:  (1)  Question 4(d) has been updated to include a citation to R. 3:28-6(d) ("Appeal After Judgment of Conviction") for an appeal of the denial of acceptance into the pretrial intervention program (PTI), and (2)  Questions 18(a) and (b) have been amended to include defendants residing outside New Jersey who are pleading guilty as a condition of admission into PTI because their supervision in the PTI program must be transferred pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS).  The revised Main Plea Form will be posted at https://www.njcourts.gov/selfhelp/catalog.html.  In addition to the English version, the English-Spanish, English-Haitian, English-Polish, English-Korean, and English- Portuguese versions of the revised Main Plea Form also are attached.  Questions or comments regarding this Directive Supplement may be directed to Assistant Director [...] at [...].  Information on the Interstate Compact can be found on the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision webpage at https://www.interstatecompact.org/.  Attachments (Revised Main Plea Form (6 versions))
[brief] Thus, during the trial it was discussed that [...] had difficulty assisting in his own defense.  (7T:340-11 to 22).  However, this was ignored by the Court at sentencing.  The Court indicated “during the course of this case, there was discussions of a potential plea agreement but there could be no agreement under these circumstances, so the defendant was involved in discussions with his attorney. ” (7T:222-20 to 24).  However, logically this fails.  There are usually plea discussions to a certain extent in virtually every case.  Under the Court’s analysis that the fourth Miller factor shouldn’t apply to any case where the attorneys engage in plea negotiations.  Thus, this factor would never apply.
[brief] DEP’s Applicable Statutory and Regulatory Authority  Under the Waterfront Development Law, any proposed development of the waterfront requires prior DEP approval.  N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(a).  The Waterfront Development Law explicitly applies to waterfront structures, such as docks, piers, and bulkheads.  Ibid.  Conversely, any development that occurs without DEP approval violates the statute.  N.J.S.A. 12:5-6(a).  The DEP regulates use and development of the State’s coastal resources, including the waterfront, through the CZM rules, which are used to review coastal permit applications in accordance with the legislative goals and standards of the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA), N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 to -51, the Wetlands Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 13:9A-1 to -10, and the Waterfront Development Law, N.J.S.A. 12:5-3.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(a).  Public access is one of the numerous substantive CZM rule requirements, N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9, and development must also comply with the public trust doctrine rule.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48(a) to (b). 3  Also relevant here, under the existing CZM rules, in certain circumstances, a bulkhead replacement in the same location as a preexisting bulkhead used for residential purposes does not require a permit, whereas a bulkhead replacement waterward --- 3  The DEP’s public access rules were last revised in September 2017. of the mean highwater line does require a permit.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-2.4(d)(6); N.J.A.C. 7:7-2.4(c)(2).  In 2016, the Legislature amended the Waterfront Development Act and CAFRA to expressly authorize the DEP to include permit conditions requiring the applicant “to provide on-site public access to the waterfront and adjacent shoreline .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(d); N.J.S.A. 13:19-10(h).  This legislation was intended to “enable the DEP to continue to assure that the public’s right of access to tidally flowed water and their adjacent shorelines under the public trust doctrine is protected. ”  Assembly Statement to A. 4927 (January 7, 2016) (L. 2015, c. 260).  The Legislature further expanded the DEP’s authority to impose public access requirements in the 2019 Public Access Law that requires any permit the DEP issues to impose public access requirements “consistent with the public trust doctrine.
[brief] Where the court below failed was that it did not cover the entire transaction with a constructive trust, but defacto covered only the $50,000.00 with a constructive trust.  It also made a determination that the house was to be either bought by Plaintiffs, or sold by Defendants, with the Defendants keeping all the gain, except for $50,000.00, despite Plaintiffs [...] having paid for the vast majority of all carrying costs throughout, as detailed in the main brief.  Neither party argued that this was a joint venture, or plead for a dissolution of some form of a partnership.
[brief] 9  I.  The standard of appellate review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo (not raised below).  .........................................................  9  II.  In Azurak, the Supreme Court established a “bright line rule” that contracts requiring indemnification for a party’s own negligence must do so clearly and explicitly (raised below at 1T4:22-23:18)  ........................................................................  10  A.  Courts construe indemnification agreements narrowly and interpret ambiguous clauses strictly against the indemnitee (raised below at 1T19:10-23:18).  ..................................................  11  B.  Multiple conflicting indemnity provisions can make an indemnity contract ambiguous (raised below at 1T15:16-17:25)  ........................................................................  19  III.  The indemnity provisions in the [...] contract are unenforceable with regard to [...]’s own negligence because they are not Azurak compliant (raised below at 1T4:22-23:18).  A.  Paragraph 4 of the Contract, entitled “Indemnity,” requires each party to indemnify the other only to the extent of their respective fault (raised below at 1T4:22-23:18).  B.  Paragraph 2 of the Contract makes no provision for [...] to indemnify [...] for [...]’s own negligence (raised below at 1T4:22-23:18).  C.  The inclusion of two contradictory indemnification clauses in the Contract renders the indemnity provisions ambiguous (raised below at 1T15:16-17:25).  Conclusion
[directive] It is also critical that County Prosecutors substantively review the summary reports that they receive from the internal affairs functions of agencies in their jurisdiction, including municipal police departments.  The role of the prosecutor is not limited to ensuring that such reports are submitted on time.  Instead, prosecutors must examine the reports, and conduct follow up investigation when concerning patterns emerge.  For instance, if an agency consistently appears to summarily close administrative investigations in instances where criminal investigations are declined, then that would be cause for further investigation.  Or, if an agency’s officers have been the subjects of numerous serious complaints over a long span of time, but no such complaint has ever been sustained, then that would merit a close review.  County Prosecutors are at all times empowered to direct that an agency’s internal affairs files be shared with prosecutors for the purposes of facilitating further investigation.  10.0.4
[directive] Force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm, constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animal.  A threat to cause death or serious bodily injury by the display of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the officer’s purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that deadly force will be used if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.  Enhanced Mechanical Force.
[brief] (Da17\(^1\), Da43-44.)  Because a violation of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights had the capability of prejudicing the result, this Court should reverse.  See State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 383 (2015)(quoting R. 2:10–2; citing State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 338 (1971); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967) (“The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. ” (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86–87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, 173 (1963))).  In this case, the de novo court considered the Alcotest and the result of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (“HGN”) even though those two issues had not been before municipal court.  (Da16-17.)  The State relies upon cases that discuss the limited scope of review of the facts (Sb6-8), but these cases do not provide the standard of review when the issue is whether Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated.  See State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017)(noting standard for appellate review --- \(^1\)  The terms “Da” refers to Defendant-Appellant’s Appendix in support of appeal; the term “Sb” refers to the State’s brief in opposition to appeal; the term “1T” refers to the Transcript dated July 13, 2022; the term “2T” refers to the Transcript dated August 17, 2022; the term “3T” refers to the Transcript dated June 19, 2023.  from trial de novo for DWI grants de novo review for legal rulings but substantial credible evidence standard for factual determinations) (citing Kuropchak, 221 N.J. at 383); see also State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)(explaining deference to lower courts on factual issues).
[brief] In the decision below, the trial court cited considerable record evidence underscoring that a policy mandating parental notification of a student’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression would have a disparate impact on LGBTQ+ students.  Contra (Db18-19) (Appellants claiming trial court “cited no clear and convincing evidence that the [Revised Policy] resulted in any disparate impact on LGBTQ+ students”).  Among other evidence, the court cited surveys showing that “47% of the transgender and/or non-binary youth reported feeling ‘nervous’ and ‘scared,’ compared to 24% and 18%, respectively, of cisgender youth, and 45% feeling ‘stressed,’ compared with 22% of their cisgender counterparts, as a result of ‘a policy that would require schools to tell a student’s parent or guardian if they request to use a different name/pronoun, or if they identify as LGBTQ at school. ’” (Da407-08) (quoting Da205).  The court also noted the research “that 40% of respondents ‘who were out to the immediate family they grew up with,’ had families ‘that were neutral or not supportive;’ that ‘[o]ne in ten (10%) reported that an immediate family member had been violent towards them because they were transgender,’ and that ‘[f]ifteen percent (15%) ran away from home and/or were kicked out of the house because they were transgender. ” (Da408) (quoting Da208).  Such evidence underscores the disparate effects on LGBTQ+ students from mandatory parental notification.  Relatedly, parental notification of a student’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression would also impact LGBTQ+ students differently because they are more likely than their non-LGBTQ+ peers not to share that information at home.
[brief] No one disputes the fact [...] was in the operating room finishing a C-Section on one of his own patients when the nurse contacted him and that he left his patient as soon as he safely could, arriving at [...] bedside between 10:08pm and 10:12pm.  (Pa228, Pa235; Pa527; Pa623).  [...] conceded [...] obviously had to have been called a few minutes before he was notified and that he arrived at [...]’ room as soon as he could from the C-Section in which he was engaged.
[brief] On or about November 14, 2018, the parties agreed to dismiss the claims asserted in the Prior Litigation “without prejudice pending the adjudication of the separate but related arbitration before the American Arbitration Association entitled [...], on behalf of himself and [...] v. [...], [...] and the [...] Family Trust, [...] (the “Nacirema Arbitration”).” (Pa150 – Pa152).  The parties memorialized their agreement in a Consent Order, which the Court entered on November 14, 2018.  (Id.).  Indisputably, the Consent Order provides only that the claims asserted in the Prior Litigation would be dismissed without prejudice, pending completion of the Nacirema Arbitration.  (Pa151, at ¶1).  At any time following the Nacirema Arbitration, the parties were free to reinstate their claims, without restriction.  To that end, the Consent Order states:  Within sixty (60) days of the adjudication of the Nacirema Arbitration, [...], [...], and/or [...] shall have the option to re-file, as plaintiffs, a separate action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Union County, Chancery Division, any of the affirmative claims, counterclaims, and/or third-party claims that were advanced, and not dismissed, by any respective party in this action (a “Refiled Action”).  (Pa151 at ¶3 (emphasis added)).  Importantly and indisputably, the Consent Order lacks any compulsory language, stating that a claim is abandoned or dismissed with prejudice, if not asserted within sixty (60) days following the adjudication of the Nacirema Arbitration.  (Pa150 – Pa152).  To this end, nothing in the Consent Order provides for a dismissal of any claims being with prejudice, at any time.  (Ibid.).  To ensure that those claims asserted in the Prior Litigation would not be time-barred when later revived, the parties agreed that: (i) if the claims that were voluntarily dismissed under the Consent Order were re-filed within sixty (60) days after the adjudication of the Nacirema Arbitration, such claims would not be barred by any defense based upon the statutes of limitation or repose; and (ii) that any new claims not asserted in the Prior Litigation, but asserted as part of a re-filed action, would receive the same benefit of tolling.
[brief] (Id.).  Specifically, the trial court adopted Plaintiffs’ Opposition, and without a review of the detailed entries, took issue with: (1) the 82.4 hours billed for the second Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) the 74.6 hours billed for preparing and attending 14 hours-worth of depositions; and (3) the 6.3 hours billed for litigation reports to the insurance carrier.  (Pa000638).  The trial court ultimately awarded only $30,000 in sanctions, finding that the amount of time [...]’s counsel spent on certain matters was unreasonable.  (Id.).  [...] contends that the trial court did not conduct a proper lodestar analysis of the billing entries in ruling on the $30,000 amount.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:33 – 31 is facially constitutionally valid and comprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence and it does so without a cherry picked separate “definitions” statute associated with N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17 and N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24 (N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17.1).
[brief] The Plaintiff, in his OPRA request dated April 1, 2022, specifically requested “All police reports + notes relating to” two individuals, [...] and [...], and a property location in [...], [...], for specific date ranges as to each individual and the property.  (Da10)  The [...] records custodian, [...], promptly responded to the request on April 7, 2022:  “1.  1 Report included 2.  Only an Investigation Report, so not eligible for OPRA.  3.  1  Report for 2/3/19, but Investigation Report, not eligible for OPRA. ”  (Da19)  The OPRA request does not seek “information”, but rather only “police reports + notes”.
[brief] The trial court stated that there was a recent authority on the issue of “accord and satisfaction” that “came out about nine months ago. ”  (1T23:20-22)  However, after the trial I then searched for the “9-month old” authority that the court had referred to - but despite my searching on Google Scholar, Westlaw, and Lexis, I could not (and still can not) find anything at all, neither state nor federal, neither published nor unpublished, anywhere within even the last few years.  Moreover, even assuming arguendo if there was such an authority that has recently come out, and even further assuming arguendo that this new authority was precedential and that it supersedes this Court’s rulings in Zeller, unless those new rulings were also deemed to act retrospectively, then they would have no bearing on my 2017 decision to cash the check “under protest” and still preserve my future rights, which I did in accordance with this Court’s rulings in Zeller.
[brief] Therefore, when the trial court analyzes the entirety of the evidence, the Court is also inherently tasked with considering the weight of the evidence to determine if the necessary inferences to return a guilty verdict for reckless manslaughter were reasonable.  The only series of events proposed by the State or the trial court that could explain how Defendant acted recklessly, and that recklessness caused the victim’s death, is if the Defendant was driving the car, within which two guns fired at least 16 shots at the victim’s vehicle, five of which hit the victim’s vehicle, for a purpose other than killing the victim.
[brief] *Azurak* at 112.  In *Leitao*, this Honorable Court applied the *Azurak* standard which required the intent to indemnify for one's own negligence must be unequivocally stated in the contract.  It was held in *Leitao*, that the *Azurak* standard was met, as the contract clearly required the subcontractor to indemnify the contractor for claims caused in whole or in part by the subcontractor’s negligence.  *Leitao* at 195.  The indemnification clause in *Leitao* and the indemnification clauses in the contract, *sub judice*, were both clear and explicit.  Like *Leitao*, the language of paragraphs two (2) and four (4) specified that [...] is responsible for indemnifying [...] for claims arising out of [...]’s work, which included claims resulting from [...]’s negligence.  The language contained in paragraph two (2) and paragraph (4) was exhaustive and left no opportunity for ambiguity.  Defendant/appellant’s application of the holding in *Englert v. The Home Depot*, 192 N.J. 70 (2007) was improper.
[directive] The statute was also amended to of a handgun without a permit, if the downgrade the penalty for possession handgun is in the nature of an air gun, spring gun or pistol or other weapon of a similar nature that ejects a bullet or missile smaller than three-eighths of an inch in diameter with sufficient force to injure a person, from second to .!:. third degree .  2013, !;!.113.  5.  The statute for Endangering Welfare of Children (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4) referenced in Bail Schedule 2 was amended effective August 14, 2013 to upgrade the crime of causing or permitting a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act, knowing or intending that the sexual act will be reproduced or will [...] • P. 0. Box 037 • [...]
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  6.4.4  The primary responsibility for investigating the domestic violence incident itself, along with any related offenses, belongs to the agency with jurisdiction over the incident.  The processing of domestic violence complaints, restraining orders, criminal complaints, etc., will remain with that agency.  In many cases, this will not be the officer's employing agency.  6.4.5  The employing agency's internal affairs officers will be responsible for receiving the information and documenting the matter as they would any other misconduct allegation.  If the report is that the officer is the victim of domestic violence, it should still be recorded and followed up in case employee assistance is warranted.  6.4.6  If a criminal charge has been filed, internal affairs must notify the County Prosecutor immediately even if the incident took place in another county.  As the chief law enforcement officer of the county, it is critical that a prosecutor be made aware of any outstanding criminal charges against any law enforcement officer in their county.  6.4.7  Internal affairs is responsible for reviewing the incident’s investigation and conducting whatever further investigation is necessary to determine if the officer violated agency rules and regulations or if the officer's fitness for duty is in question.  In addition, internal affairs will track the proceedings of any criminal charges or civil matters that may arise out of the incident.  Internal affairs will also work with the Division of Criminal Justice or the County Prosecutor to determine if and when an officer may have their weapon(s) returned.  32  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021
[brief] Da148.  In early 2016, Plaintiff engaged [...] to obtain financing for the North Dakota refinery project through [...] (“[...]”), a venture financing firm incorporated in Bermuda.  Da24 ¶ 17; Da82.  Pursuant to a loan transaction with [...], Plaintiff agreed to deposit into escrow $2.5 million to be released from escrow and paid to [...] only after the conditions provided in an escrow agreement among the parties were satisfied.  Da24–25 ¶¶ 18–26.  Plaintiff and [...] initially agreed that [...], a New York-based attorney, would act as the escrow agent.
[brief] Marital fault is completely excluded by New Jersey law as a consideration in an award of equitable distribution of marital property.  *Chalmers v. Chalmers*, 65 N.J. 186, 193 (1974); *Calbi v. Calbi*, 396 N.J. Super. 532, 539 (App. Div. 2007).  And marital fault “is irrelevant” to the determination of alimony as well except where “the fault has affected the parties' economic life” and where “the fault so violates societal norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would confound notions of simple justice” (*Mani v. Mani*, 183 N.J. 70, 72 (2005)), neither of which is present in this case.