ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Despite this unmistakable fact, which is clear from any honest reading of the record, [...] persists in referring to this portion of the Arbitrator’s ruling as a “fee shift” an astonishing twenty-eight times.  Repeating something that is false, over and over, in a blatant attempt to confuse the issues, does not, and cannot, make the false thing true.  Repetition of falsehoods is not an appropriate strategy.
[directive] Deconfliction is Not Requirements  When Special B. Query.  Deconfliction  Make a  Failure to feasible to make subsection of this Section that it is not to A determines pursuant an agency If otherwise fails to make a operation, or the agency initiating planned a deconfliction query before a shall: agency Directive, the required by this query as initiating the planned soon as practicable after deconfliction query as the a) make and operation; 8
[brief] Instead, the Land opinion clearly stands for the proposition that the court, not a jury, should resolve a carrier's claims for damages against a private party under the Fraud Act, including a determination as to whether the carrier is entitled to an award of trebled damages.  Importantly, the Land court noted that it was the Trial Court’s obligation to “admeasure” and blend the damages that a successful carrier is entitled to recover from a private party under the Fraud Act.
[brief] In 1968, the Supreme Court issued a Notice to the Bar, stating:  The Supreme Court is of the view, because of the conflict of interest inherent in the situation, that an attorney should not represent both the driver of a car and his passenger in an action against the driver of another car, unless there is a legal bar to the passenger suing his own driver.  Two years later, the New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics addressed the propriety of representing both the driver and passenger, who agreed not to sue each other and to sign waivers for any third-party claim.  The Committee found that the proposal was improper, reasoning:  Where a passenger is injured . . . the passenger has a possible claim against the driver.  The facts at trial may bring this out even though the parties believe to the contrary . . . the rule cannot be based upon an attorney’s judgment of the facts.  Public policy precludes an exception by waiver and consent.  Should a conflict develop, the attorney . . . must retire from all representation with consequent delay, interruption of proceedings, and expense.  [Ethics Comm. Op. No.188, 93 N.J.L.J. 789, at *1 (Nov. 12, 1970). ]  Thus, dual representation of a driver and passenger is prohibited unless there is no question as to liability or claims between them.
[brief] 82a ¶¶ 10-14, 12; 79a ¶ 46.  Third, the violation was uncontested.  [...] has not constructed the RDP of 53 units.  The Off-site mechanism of seven Off-site Units identified in the Special Master’s Report, 346a, Settlement Agreement, 165a, and resolution granting governmental approval, 183a ¶ (g), each preceding the Conditional Judgment, has not been implemented by the [...] as agreed upon.  In the five years since entry, [...] has no plan to satisfy the Off-site affordable units, and thus has failed to comply with the RDP of 53 units set forth in the Judgment.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND DECLARE THAT THE FORECLOSURE COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BY PROCEEDING WITH THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT FILED BY [...] ON 5/12/16.  Raised Below: paragraph 14 (026a) and paragraph 30 (028a).  In 1T page 4 lines 17-22 and page 5 lines 10-14 and page 5 lines 16-21.  Bayview did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  LEGAL POINT IX
[brief] ”  Pb9.  *TIG Specialty Insurance Co. v. PinkMonkey.com Inc.*, 375 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2004), cited by [...] at Db20, is instructive.  In *TIG*, the insured had engaged in securities fraud which resulted in the insured *actually* gaining advantage:  “[The insured] gained a personal advantage from the opportunity to own and participate in a successful business when PinkMonkey was infused with capital as a result of his fraud. ”  *Id.* at 370 (emphasis added).  Here, in contrast, [...] has admitted for purposes of this appeal that [...] gained no such “advantage. ”  See Pb11–12 (citing Pa454–56 ¶¶ 16–26; Pa1041–42 ¶¶ 16–26).  Brown & Lacounte, L.L.P. v. Westport Insurance Corp., 307 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002), also cited by [...], Db20, is also instructive.  In Brown, as in TIG, the insured was alleged to have obtained a definite and quantifiable profit or advantage, i.e., the insured “improperly received and kept payments for legal services rendered under a void contract. ”  Id. at 661.  Here, in sharp contrast, [...] presented no evidence that [...] improperly received any personal profit, money, or property.  [...] asks this Court to re-write the PPE to encompass possible future “advantage” whose substance and legal status cannot now be ascertained.  Such a hypothetical future “advantage” falls outside the PPE, especially in view of Vermont and New Jersey law holding that “if the clause in question is one of exclusion or exception, designed to limit the protection, a strict interpretation is applied. ”  Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 35 N.J. 1, 8, 170 A.2d 800, 804 (1961); accord Rainforest Chocolate, LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 209 Vt. 232, 235, 204 A.3d 1109 1111 (Vt. 2018) (“An insurance policy ‘is to be construed against the insurer. ’”) (quoting Simpson v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am., 135 Vt. 554, 556, 382 A.2d 198, 199 (Vt. 1977)).  [...]’s brief points to nothing that could be constituted “personal profit, remuneration, or advantage” (Pa784) that [...] actually received, for good reason: [...] has admitted for purposes of this appeal that the corporate actions challenged in the HCH Action did not and did not alter or affect any person’s legal rights whatsoever.  Pb11–12 (citing Pa454–56 ¶¶ 16–26; Pa1041–42 ¶¶ 16–26).  Whatever legal rights or claims that the Association held prior to December 19, 2019, the Association held equally after December 19, 2019.  Id.  Notably, the HCH Parties did not press or recover relief on their claim that a $7,500 retainer paid to independent outside counsel, [...], rendered [...] and others liable for having “intentionally used, misappropriated, and converted for their own purposes and uses funds belonging to the [Association].”  Pa328 ¶ 62.  Rather, plaintiffs in the underlying suit recovered statutorily and contractually authorized damages based on attorneys’ fees they incurred launching and pressing a “hostile takeover bid. ”  Pb9.  As noted above, the Court need not reach the PPE issue because [...]’s breach of its duty to defend is an independent basis of liability to pay any fair and reasonable settlement later made by a betrayed insured.
[directive] 2.  Other Spontaneous Arrests  a.  In those cases in which a law enforcement agency responds during operating school hours to a suspected offense reported by someone other than the building principal or local superintendent, or where a law enforcement officer observes the occurrence of an offense on school property during operating school hours which would justify a warrantless arrest, or where a person subject to arrest retreats onto school property during operating school hours, the arresting law enforcement officer shall notify the building principal as soon as it is practical to do so.
[brief] (I) the first installment shall be paid on the first date of the second (2\textsuperscript{nd}) Lease Year; and (II) the remaining installations shall be paid on the first day of each Lease Year commencing with the third (3\textsuperscript{rd}) Lease Year and ending with the seventh (7\textsuperscript{th}) Lease Year.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  Section 4.02 further provides that if Landlord fails to pay an annual Tenant Allowance payment when due, Tenant’s **sole remedy** is to provide Landlord with written notice of the default then, if the same is not cured within ten (10) days of such notice, to deduct the same from the next payment of Minimum Rent when due:
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  A.  The Allegations of the Complaint  This matter arises out of a single-vehicle accident that occurred on August 20, 2021 in Hamilton, New Jersey that tragically resulted in the death of 13-year-old [...].  The vehicle was being operated by defendant [...], Miles’ older brother.  (Pa 13-14).  The vehicle at issue was a GMC Yukon owned by Miles’ and Phillip’s mother, Plaintiff, [...]  Id.  At the time of the incident, Miles and Phillip, along with their parents, resided at a home at [...].  (Pa 13).  Plaintiffs (the Estate of [...], and Miles’ parents) filed suit against [...], among others, in connection with the accident.  (Pa12-20).  As to [...], Plaintiffs seek a declaration as to coverage under the excess liability coverage part, and the excess UIM coverage part of the [...] Excess Policy.  *Id.*  **B.  The Policies**
[brief] In this case, no evidence was presented to the trial court that a licensed New Jersey attorney prepared the 2021 quitclaim deed, which purported to convey the Property to the Plaintiff.  Neither [...] nor out-of-state attorney [...] was ever licensed to practice law in the State of New Jersey.  The deed was prepared by one of them.  It would be a violation of the public policy of this State to recognize the 2021 deed as valid.
[brief] Also, given the inability of the Board to marshal our facts and apply those supported facts to the law in Cardinale and M.R., correctly, requires the ALJ to protect the petitioner and decide that the petitioner should be permitted to have his claim processed and filed, and to have a hearing on the merits of his claim.  See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 454 N.J. Super. 386, 394 (App. Div. 2018), and its progeny.  With respect to the aforementioned M.R. case, this Board totally misreads the core holding of the case and its use and application to fact patterns that are distinguishable from what was present in the M.R. case.  As opposed to our case, where [...] became immediately permanently disabled after repelling with the attempted use of deadly force a life-threatening attack, wherein [...] thwarted a gunman by discharging his service weapon, M.R. was suspended because he was testing positive for CDS in contravention of his responsibilities as a judiciary employee in Union County.  The Agreement that M.R. signed specifically was a Termination from ever returning to work as a judiciary employee statewide.  It was a quid pro quo agreement wholly different from our case facts.  The M.R. case is not only factually distinguishable from our case rendering it as unusable in our case for enabling a non-arbitrary and non-capricious decision from being rendered, it is legal holding is also being misused misapplied by the Board.
[directive] Trademark - This includes the modus operandi (M.O.), or individual identifying characteristics, of the bias incident, which may serve to distinguish the offense from others committed in much the same fashion.  This element is helpful in connecting a suspect with past incidents.  g.  If a series of bias incidents has occurred, these investigative elements will be crucial in developing an operating pattern and in identifying suspects.  This investigative process will also assist in identifying participation of organized hate groups.
[brief] POINT IV  DEFENDANT WAS FOUND GUILTY AFTER A TRIAL.  (13T)  Defendant claimed the record failed to establish that he was found guilty of second-degree certain person not to have a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).  After defendant filed his brief, the afternoon session of the February 1, 2023 proceeding, which contained the certain persons trial, was obtained and defendant withdrew this point.  Accordingly, his certain persons conviction and sentence should be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] See *Aguas*, 220 N.J. at 524.  Here, the City maintained an effective anti-harassment policy to prevent and to correct promptly the alleged discriminatory acts by Defendant [...].  The City’s employment handbook provides an anti-discrimination policy, which state, in part:  “Under no circumstances will the [...] discriminate on the basis of sex, race, creed, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, marital or political status, affectional or sexual orientation, domestic partnership status, civil union status, atypical hereditary, cellular or blood trait, genetic information, disability”…Additionally, the Employee Complaint Policy (within the employment handbook) states that: “[e]mployees desiring to file a complaint regarding any of the above mentioned terms and conditions of employment should utilize the grievance procedures outlined in their union contract, or the Municipal Code…; or the appeal process/procedures in accordance with the provisions of the New Jersey Administrative Code, Title 4A”.  The City conducts annual anti-discrimination and harassment trainings, and the policies are posted in all buildings operated by the Fire Department.  Defendant [...] testified that he received training from the City on several occasions before the incident.  Plaintiff also testified that he received trainings on June 19, 2019, and at least on one other occasion.  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s internal complaint was lodged with the City shortly after the incident on March 17, 2020, and investigation began immediately thereafter.  Plaintiff was satisfied that he was being recognized and that his complaint was being addressed.  The investigation was prompt and completed over the course of three and a half weeks.  A written reprimand was prepared for Defendant [...] as a result of the investigation, but the reprimand was never served due to [...]’s terminal leave in advance of his retirement.  However, Defendant [...]’s effective retirement prior to the issuance of discipline is not dispositive regarding whether the City maintained an effective anti-harassment policy.  Notably, Plaintiff did not experience any further discriminatory acts and suffered no change in his position.  Thus, the record evidence demonstrates that the City not only maintained an effective policy and complaint procedure, but it also enforced the policies promptly.  Thus, reconsideration is warranted, here, and the Court must reconsider its March 13, 2023, Order denying the City’s motion for summary judgment.
[brief] [...] explains that jurors have significant exposure to information about forensic evidence (from the news, media, and social media posts), and the opinions they form as a result, will frame with perception, interpretation, and evaluation of evidence they are asked to consider during a trial.  (Point I).  Because jurors’ misconceptions about forensic evidence will affect their understanding of new information about or associated with forensic science, courts should consider strategies to screen for those misconceptions or mitigate those preexisting beliefs in other ways.  This brief discusses five incorrect preexisting beliefs about forensic evidence common in the general population.  (Point II).  The research-based strategies developed to counteract these misconceptions are beyond the scope of this brief but are addressed in the relevant academic literature and by parties and other *amici*.  This brief explains how misconceptions are formed, which misconceptions about forensic evidence are most prevalent, and the impact these misconceptions can have on jurors’ understanding of forensic evidence in cases.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] POINT ELEVEN RESPONDENT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES (raised below at 1T 17:25 -1T 18:5, also 1T 18:22-25, also 1T 25:23 to 1T 25:7)  Appellant’s Point VI is without merit and contrary to the provisions of Par. 11 of the Separation Agreement.  Further, the arguments at Appellant’s Point VI speak to a denial and appeal of the Involuntary; there has been no denial and therefore no subsequent appeal of the Disability itself as noted in the record below.  8  “Notwithstanding the binding and irrevocable nature of [...]'s letter of resignation, the letter will be held in escrow while and until [...]'s involuntary disability pension application is decided upon by the [...] and [...] has exhausted all rights of appeal flowing from the disability application. ”  (Da17)  Initially, there is no requirement in the Separation Agreement that Respondent must exhaust all administrative remedies prior to the complaint for specific enforcement – in fact, the Separation Agreement speaks to the Superior Court as the venue for this dispute.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY HELD COSTS WERE “UNDISPUTED” (Pa0043; Pa0056; Pa0220).  The trial court further abused its discretion in awarding costs in the Final Judgment Order because it erroneously believed [...]’s calculation of costs was “undisputed. ”  Most basically, [...]’s opposition disputed [...]’s claim for costs; those costs were not, as the Court stated, “undisputed. ” (Pa0043 at fn. 2).  Of course, [...] should not be entitled to recover costs at all since it was not a “prevailing party. ”  R. 4:42-8.  [...] respectfully submits that if the Court holds [...] was not a “successful claimant,” it was not a “prevailing party” either, and no court costs should be awarded to [...].
[brief] This is disputed as Plaintiff clearly states in his deposition that as Plaintiff was confident “. . . that most of the department, if not all of the department knew I was being that I’m the only Asian in the department”.  (Pa, at 62:14–18).  However, even with that being said, the LAD is not an intent-based statute.  C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. A-24-2022 (N.J. Sep 12, 2023) (slip op. at 18) (print out).  The intent of [...]’s comment, whether intended to offend Plaintiff or not, is irrelevant.  Defendants are not shielded from establishing a violation of the LAD under the first prong because [...] didn’t know that his comment would offend Plaintiff due to his Asian ancestry.  Therefore, the actions of [...] do establish a genuine issue of fact material fact as to whether Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of the LAD due to his race.
[directive] 4.2  ALPR Scanning Limited to Vehicles Exposed to Public View  An ALPR shall only be used to scan license plates of vehicles that are exposed to public view vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) (e.g., are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shopping mall or other business establishment).  4.3  Supervisory_  Approval of All ALPR Deployments  An ALPR shall not be deployed in the field unless the deployment has been authorized by the chief of the department or a designated supervisor, or by the Attorney General or designee or a county prosecutor or designee.
[brief] [...] and [...], Plaintiff-Respondents, vs. [...], [...], and MAYOR [...], in his official capacity as Mayor of the Township of Monroe, Defendant-Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division – Middlesex County Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Docket No.: [...]  DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS, TOWNSHIP OF MONROE AND MAYOR [...], MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL
[brief] (See 1T29-5 to 30-25 (“Yes, we can, but we honestly try, try not to” perform police duties in other towns; “We didn’t have an issue with making a stop if it ended up being a little bit into [...]” but “we probably would not have stopped the vehicle had he continued north into [...]”; the [...] warrant was “a valid warrant” in [...]).  Notwithstanding these violations, the suppression court ruled that it would “not suppress evidence based on the fractional geographical differences between townships in the same county. ” (2T17-1 to 3).  But failing to suppress the fruits of the car and home searches in this case would abrogate the Legislature’s carefully crafted jurisdictional scheme.  And it would also rubber-stamp future violations of these important rules by allowing municipal police officers to engage in forum-shopping.  It is worth noting that requiring municipal officers to abide by the Legislature’s jurisdictional rules would not cause an inordinate hardship.  The [...] officers here could have just as easily applied to the Superior Court for a warrant and coordinated the searches with officers from the [...] Police Department or [...]. \textsuperscript{10}  In sum, suppression is required because, under the unique circumstances here, [...]’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 were violated.
[brief] The public deserves to know why the HCPO actually declined to prosecute a corrupt public official and the records requested by [...] will shed light on the reasons underlying the HCPO’s and the Attorney General’s Office’s decision.  The Court should consider the lack of an open investigation, the closure of the case, the fact that it was [...] who initiated the charges against [...], rather than some person who wishes to maintain their confidentiality, the seriousness of the charges against [...], the substantial evidence against [...], and the relationships between HCPO prosecutors and [...] in weighing whether to order disclosure of responsive records.  A.
[brief] We say none.  The deed purports to except and reserve “the rights” of the public or owners of the Challenger Lot to use “a roadway or driftway” across [...]’s land but nowhere mentions an easement *per se*.  It is unclear from the deed recital alone whether the [...] intended to preserve some undefined rights already in existence at the time of the transaction, or to create new ones in the transaction itself.  If the former, how and when were those rights created and what limitations, if any, were intended on their exercise?  If the latter, how intense a right of access did the grantors intend to create?  To answer these questions, [...] would have had to resort to extrinsic evidence, but there was none in the motion record.  The parties’ stipulation of facts nowhere addressed the [...]’ intentions at the time of the conveyance, or how those rights were intended to be exercised either before or after the transaction.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  3  A.  The Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint Allegations Against [...] ..................................................  3  B.  The Answer filed by [...] ...........................................................................................................  4  C.  The Scope of Services .....................................................................................................................  4  D. [...]/[...] Subcontract ...............................................................................................................
[brief] In this case, the “funding” of the lawsuit, for a fee, was a transaction that provided a service to the plaintiff, be it described as a loan, sale, purchase, or assignment.  It was a “funding. ”  That series of transactions caused her to suffer an ascertainable loss in the form of an improper lien or charge.  On the first two transactions where it is undisputed that she paid the fees claimed by the defendant, albeit by an additional transaction with the defendant, but the point in time at which an ascertainable loss if calculated is the point in time when the act occurs.