ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Several reasons support this conclusion.  A.  The clear and unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 requires the notice to include both the ordinance’s title and a separate statement of purpose prepared by the clerk.  (Pa58-Pa61)  The Supreme Court has explained that ascertaining the “Legislature’s intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language. ”  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citing Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003)).  In this regard, courts are instructed to “ascribe to the statutory words their ordinance meaning and significance…and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ”  Id. (citing Lane v. Holderman, 23 N.J. 304, 313 (1957); Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 426-27 (1999)).  It has long been settled that “legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ”  Board of Ed. of City of Hackensack v. City of Hackensack, 63 N.J. Super. 560, 569 (App. Div. 1960) (citing Abbotts Diaries, Inc. v. Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319 (1954)).  Courts may neither “rewrite a plainly written enactment” nor “presume an intention other than that expressed by way of the plain language. ”  O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002) (citing State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162, 171 (1993); State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488, 495 (1987)).
[brief] *Id.* at 511-12.  Self-representation is not a license for a defendant “not to comply with relevant rules of procedure and substantive law. ”  *Faretta*, supra, 422 U.S. at 834.  This reasoning was further expanded in *State v. Figueroa*, 377 N.J. Super. 331, 336 (App. Div. 2005).  The court explained the trial judge should engage in additional areas of inquiry of a defendant that wants to proceed *pro se*, such as whether defendant understands that he not only has the right not to testify, but also the right not to incriminate himself in any manner; whether he understands that he could make comments as counsel from which the jury might infer that he had knowledge of incriminating evidence . . .; and whether he fully understands that if he crosses the line separating counsel from witness, he may forfeit his right to remain silent and subject himself to cross-examination by the State.
[brief] Moreover, in squarely addressing the issue of why the fruits of the Defendant’s non-verbal response, whether verbal or physical, were properly suppressed, the court said:  Had Defendant made an oral admission of the fact that she possessed narcotics, it would not have been admissible against her because she had not been warned of her right to remain silent.  We perceive no reason why the result should not be the same when her response was of a different nature...The privilege against self-incrimination extends to all acts intended to be of a testimonial character, whether in verbal or other form.  *Id.* at 3-4.
[directive] This Directive provides the procedures for courts and litigants to use in making a motion to of Court's May reopen a pretrial detention order as a result the Supreme 1, 2018 decision in State v. to Mercedes/State v. Travis (A-6-17/A-7-17) (slip opinion at 28-29) and amendment Rule of 3:4A(b)(5) (effective as that date).  by  As motion articulated the Court in Mercedes/Travis, the to reopen a pretrial detention on order based the amendment to R. 3:4(b)(5) is available only to defendants who are currently held of "(l) on in pretrial detention and the order detention relied solely a recommendation against of by on release the pretrial services program, (2) that recommendation was based only the type on an offense charged, and (3) that recommendation was not based offense described in N.J.S.A. - of of )" an an 2A: 162-19(b (i.e., a charge murder or offense subject to ordinary or extended term life imprisonment).  Ibid.  If by it must the motion to reopen is made defendant's counsel, be submitted electronically through eCourts pursuant to the December 5, 2016 Supreme Court order mandating electronic filing in must criminal matters.  The filer use the motion type entitled: "Motion - Reopen Detention Order."  by must be  Additionally, such motions accompanied a certification setting forth the facts on supporting the applicant's position that the court (1) solely relied a recommendation against by release the pretrial services program, and (2) the pretrial services recommendation was based of upon solely the type offense charged, and (3) the pretrial services recommendation was not based in may on an offense described N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b).  Litigants refer to the Decision-Making of in Framework determining whether the pretrial services recommendation relied solely on the type at the offense https:/ /www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/decmakframwork.pdf.  if on  Further, the pretrial detention order indicates that the court relied solely the if in recommendation against release its reasons for granting pretrial detention, or it is ambiguous in on whether the court relied solely a recommendation against release granting pretrial detention, of must then the application also be accompanied by a transcript the proceedings.  Pretrial detention  [...] Box 037 • [...]  PO J.  O orders that clearly set forth multiple reasons for granting detention do not require a transcript and are likewise ineligible for reopening based on the Supreme Court's decision.  See State Mercedes v. (slip op. at 29).  Finally, these motions to reopen, when feasible, should be scheduled before the judge who ordered detention, and shall be heard on an expedited basis.  Questions or comments regarding this Directive may be directed to [...], Assistant Director for Criminal Practice, by email at [...] or by phone at [...].  Chief Justice [...] cc: Criminal Presiding Judges
[brief] 32  I.  The Trial Court erred in finding that the third party offer was invalid because it did not explicitly reference the Plaintiff’s Right of First Refusal.  (Raised below, Da366,378,385; IT@19-20)  .........................................................  32  II.  The Trial Court erred in finding that the addition of the Right of First Refusal acknowledgement clause was a material modification and therefore triggered a new 30 day period within which the Plaintiff might exercise its Right of First Refusal.  (raised below, Da379,394)  ...........................................  39  III.  Presuming a written acknowledgement of the Plaintiff’s ROFR to be a material modification of the third party’s offer/contract, the Trial Court erred in finding that the ROFR was not waived by the Plaintiff on June 3rd, 2023.  (raised below, Da395)  ......................................................  45  CONCLUSION
[brief] See McGowan v. Borough of Eatontown, 151 N.J. Super. 440, 446 (App. Div. 1977).  “By its very terms, liability under this section is limited to injuries proximately caused by a dangerous condition on the property owned by the public entity”.  *Ball v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co.*, 207 N.J. Super. 100, 107 (App. Div. 1986).  *N.J.S.A.* 59:4-2 sets forth the extent to which a public entity may be held liable.
[brief] Roberto held that, like the Minnesota statutory scheme at issue in Tyler, the TSL did not permit the former owner to recover any potential “surplus equity,” and that its retention by the foreclosing entity was a prohibited taking.  Id. at 362.  The panel concluded that “The TSL has permitted foreclosure of a property owner’s equity and is thus a prohibited taking after Tyler. ”  Id. at 362 (Emphasis added).  But that was not the end of the Roberto decision.  The panel also confronted whether Tyler should be given prospective application, pipeline retroactivity, or full retroactivity.  *Id.* at 362-65.  Employing a multi-factor test endorsed by our Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, the panel rejected the argument that purely prospective application was appropriate.  *Id.* at 364.  The court also rejected fully retroactive application, concluding it would be "unworkable and create substantial hardship for taxing authorities, as well as third-party purchasers."  *Id.* at 363.  The panel settled on pipeline retroactivity because it protected property owners' constitutional rights without visiting significant harm on those who had already foreclosed liens, including municipalities.  *Ibid.*  The court's election of pipeline retroactivity was bolstered by its conclusion that *Tyler* represented brand new law:  "Unquestionably, *Tyler* establishes a new principle of law," because it upset a law that had existed substantially in its present form for more than a century.  *Id.* at 363.  The Appellate Division unequivocally held that *Tyler* "is accorded pipeline retroactivity to pending tax sale foreclosures involving a property owner's surplus equity[.]"  *Id.* at 366 (Emphasis added).  **B.
[brief] Notice of Appeal ........................................................................Da 16-19  Transcript of Identification Procedure ........................................Da 20-39  Identification Procedure Video ......................................................Da 40  TRANSCRIPT KEY  Da — Defendant’s appendix 1T — October 19, 2020 — Motion 2T — November 29, 2022 — Trial 3T — December 2, 2022 — Motion 4T — December 7, 2022 — Trial 5T — December 9, 2022 — Trial 6T — January 4, 2023 — Trial 7T — January 5, 2023 — Trial 8T — January 6, 2023 — Trial 9T — January 9, 2023 — Trial 10T — January 10, 2023 — Trial 11T — January 11, 2023 — Trial 12T — January 12, 2023 — Trial 13T — February 24, 2023 — Sentencing 14T — November 29, 2022 — Jury Selection¹ 15T — December 7, 2022 — Jury Selection 16T — December 9, 2022 — Jury Selection
[brief] I joined the Court's opinion in *Heck*.  Mindful of "real-life example[s]," among them this case, cf. 512 U. S., at 490, n. 10, I have come to agree with [...]'s reasoning: Individuals without recourse to the habeas statute because they are not "in custody" (people merely fined or whose sentences have been fully served, for example) fit within § 1983's "broad reach."  See id., at 503 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); cf. *Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co.*, 335 U. S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.").  On that understanding of the state of the law, I join both the Court's opinion and [...]'s concurring opinion in this case.
[brief] And because this stray comment was quickly corrected by the judge, it did not prejudice defendant.  In Singh, "the officer's reference to the suspect in the video as 'the defendant' was improper in light of the dispute about the identity of the suspect," but because the reference was "fleeting," it did not amount to plain error.  Allen, 254 N.J. at 545 (quoting Singh, 245 N.J. at 17-18).  "In assessing whether an error is harmless or requires reversal, [courts] 'determine whether the error was 'of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'"  Allen, 254 N.J. at 549 (quoting State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 451 (2020)).  To be clearly capable of producing an unjust result means the error "led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached."  Ibid.  (quoting Mandel, N.J. Appellate Practice § 34:3-2 (2023).  Here, the reference to defendant was one fleeting comment immediately corrected by the judge.  And "[o]ne of the foundations of our jury system is that the jury is presumed to follow the trial court's instructions."  State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 335 (2007).  Thus, the passing remark did not amount to plain error.  And the two comments made among the fifty clips played did not sway the jury to reach a verdict it might not have otherwise reached.  Before these comments, the defendant's girlfriend had already identified him in the same video.  Furthermore, [...] promptly instructed the jury that, despite [...] giving her opinion on the identity of the person in clip thirty-eight, the ultimate decision rested with them to determine whether it was the defendant.  Thus, this Court should find [...]'s testimony did not lead to unjust result.
[brief] Planning and implementation of the Union County Project  The Union County Project was initiated to address certain issues with the 230kV transmission lines supplying the Springfield Road and Stanley Terrace substations in the PSEG transmission zone identified by [...] as part of [...]’s RTEP transmission planning process.  (Da528a, ¶22).  In 2017, [...] confirmed [...]’s finding that, were its systems not upgraded, the loss of a single transmission or generator component would result in a complete loss of electric supply for more than 24 hours at both substations.  (Id.).  On October 18, 2017, the [...] Board of Managers approved the Union County Project, designating construction responsibility to [...] to: (1) construct a 230/69kV station at Springfield Road; (2) construct a 230/69kV station at Stanley Terrace; and (3) construct a 69kV network between Front Street, Springfield Road, and Stanley Terrace.  (Da529a, ¶24).  As part of the 69kV network, the Project will replace 136 poles on the existing pole line in the existing right of way on South Avenue and Central Avenue in Westfield.  (Da531a, ¶33).  The replacement poles will range between 65 and 75 feet in length (56 and 66 feet above ground) and will have the same spacing as the existing poles.  (Da531a, ¶34).  In connection with the 69kV Statewide Initiative discussed above, taller poles are mandated pursuant to National Electrical Safety Code (“NESC”) requiring certain minimum spacing separating the lines.  (Da531a, ¶35).  [...] undertook a comprehensive review of potential routes for the 69kV reliability project through Westfield.  [...] concluded that the technically feasible route was the South Avenue right of way.  (Da532a, ¶38).  D.
[brief] In short, the jury instructions in this case were hopelessly confusing and failed to ensure that the jurors were “in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did before determining his. . . guilt or innocence. ”  Frisby, 174 N.J. at 596.  With six possible alleged acts, one of which was indistinguishable from the conspiracy agreement itself, and four possible actors, there was a real risk that the jurors did not agree as to who did what.  With so many possibilities, the risk of a patchwork verdict was simply too high.  A specific unanimity instruction, rather than the repeated and confusing use of “and/or,” was required.  The absence of such an instruction was plain error, requiring reversal of [...]’s conviction.  R. 2:10-2.  POINT V THE NEAR-MAXIMUM CUSTODIAL SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE FOR A FIRST-TIME OFFENDER LIKE DEFENDANT.
[brief] ”  (17T 89-22 to 25)  Around that same time, [...] rechecked [...]’ bags but did not find drugs or a weapon.  (17T 48-1 to 49-7)  On January 9, 2019, the day [...] died, [...] testified, she was running errands in a car driven by [...], and with defendant as a passenger in the back.  (17T 52-3 to 11)  Around 2:30 p.m., [...] was “upset” because he “wanted to go to Bound Brook” for reasons that he did not explain, so they agreed to take him there.
[brief] ...........................................  H438a Holm-20: [...] Decision and Order Approving Stipulation, In re Petition of [...], [...] Docket.  Nos. [...] and [...], issued March 30, 2011 (SOICR p. 12), attaching ...........................................  H500a  Stipulation by [...], [...], and [...] Staff  ..................................  H506a  [...] list of Proposed Accelerated Infrastructure Program  H Projects .............................................................  H521a  Integrity Support Projects list ..................................................  H523a  [...] AIP II Capital Investment Projects list .........................  H524a  Appendix B: Minimum Filing Requirements.
[brief] .............................................................................................................................................................................50  | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:26B, | 38 | | 128 N.J. 442 (1992) | | | Airwork Serv. Div. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, | 47 | | 97 N.J. 290 (1984) | | | Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, | 26, 27 | | 234 N.J. 150 (2018)
[brief] The Tenant tried to comply with the Board’s request and provided documents that might have been comparables, but [...]’s attorney objected to the Board looking at those documents, arguing that to introduce these comparables, the low-income tenant would have to hire a licensed appraiser to testify to them.  8T184:6-10.  The Board considered hiring an expert of its own, but concluded that the expense and practicalities of how they could hire someone made it infeasible.  9T172:19-187.  Thus, no comparables were available to the Board.  A massive amount of time has been put toward trying to puzzle out how to calculate “equity” on this unit when the ordinance cannot, by its plain terms, apply.
[brief] Even if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] drove and caused the accident, there is a lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the record that [...] left the scene under the circumstances making him guilty.  According to the statute, when there is an accident involving unattended property, the driver is to locate the property owner and advise of the accident.  But the statute recognizes that this may not always be possible.  For example, it presents as an alternative that a note may be left affixed to the damaged property until locating the property owner as soon as possible.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(d).  The poor weather conditions, lateness of the time of the accident, and the location of the crash are relevant considerations creating reasonable doubt, suggesting that the State did not prove that [...] is culpable.  Here, the hour was late.  With the damaged car parked on a residential street, ownership was unclear.  The State never placed evidence in the record to counter the defense argument based on this evidence that it was not immediately practical to find the vehicle owner.  The State’s witnesses described rainy weather conditions, suggesting that leaving a note on the damaged car did not present as a viable option.  The State did not produce evidence to counter this argument either.  The court below erred in concluding that these defense arguments failed because the defense did not *prove* this to be the situation.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(vi); see also N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(7)(similar).  While there is no obligation for DEP’s prior permittees to bring a prior approved WD permit into compliance with current Water Depth Requirements, DEP encourages existing permittees to extend their docks for purposes of establishing a mooring area that meets or exceeds Water Depth Requirements where water depth “needs” that are protective of SAV cannot be met by “existing facilities. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(7).  In short, sufficient water depths protects SAV.  Thus the “need” requirement in the Docks Rule can be satisfied through the SAV Rule to allow the dock to meet the four foot depth requirement and to the extent these rules conflict, the SAV rule “supersedes the rules governing other areas or other uses. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.1.
[brief] The Plaintiff’s own Certificate of Incorporation states that it is “subservient” to the Defendant.  The Plaintiff does not have the right to take the Property and sell it under a baseless claim of ownership.  There are also equitable reasons to find in favor of the Defendant as to the quiet title claims.  The Plaintiff did not create the [...] religion.  However, they raised substantial funds and accepted large donations from followers of the Moorish Science Temple religion for many years.  The funds received by the Plaintiff were not donated to further the Plaintiff’s own individual purposes.  The trial court properly found that the Plaintiff is not the owner of the Temple Property.
[brief] [...] has served nearly twenty-five years of a sentence that was imposed illegally.  The illegality stemmed from a misapplication of the sentencing law that was only recently clarified by the New Jersey State Supreme Court.  This error led to the imposition of consecutive sentences resulting in a sentence that will not allow [...]’s release until July of 2058, when [...] is 85 years old.  [...] was convicted of counts of kidnapping and murder related to his involvement in the deaths of two Latin Kings gang members when he was 25 years old.  When he was sentenced the court imposed a consecutive sentence based entirely on the idea that there should be “no free crimes” under the sentencing law.  There was no qualitative weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors that occurred.  Rather the sentence was imposed to send a message to the families of the victims and to deter the public at large.  The court did not engage in any determination of the fairness of the sentence with respect to [...] specifically.  The failure to qualitatively weigh the factors and the reliance on the “no free crimes” analysis resulted in the imposition of an illegal sentence.  The failure to engage in any analysis of the overall fairness of the sentence with specific reference to [...] further violates the sentencing law and [...]’s constitutional rights.  This illegal sentence, and failure to provide an analysis of the overall fairness of the sentence requires that the matter be remanded for resentencing of [...] in accordance with the proper constitutional safeguards provided for those being sentenced.
[brief] In attacking [...]’s proffered meritorious defense (and [...]’s asserted grounds for vacatur under R. 4:50-1(f)), [...] argues that assertion of their violations of the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49, are barred here by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and/or the entire controversy doctrine ("ECD").  As a threshold matter, the above doctrines were not a basis for the trial court’s order or raised in [...]’s Notice of Appeal or opening Brief.  Thus, [...]’s arguments as to collateral estoppel, res judicata, and the ECD are outside the scope of this appeal.  See, e.g., *1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc.*, 368 N.J. Super. 456, 459 (App. Div. 2004).  However, even if they were not, the doctrines would not apply here.  With respect to res judicata, [...] argues “[a] plaintiff is barred from asserting a cause of action based on res judicata where: (1) a final disposition is reached on the merits in a prior action; (2) the prior action involved the same parties or their privies; and (3) the subsequent suit is based on the same transaction or occurrence as the earlier action. ”  [...]’s Br. at 30 (citing *Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991); *Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J 498, 505 (1991)).  However, [...] is not a plaintiff, he is not asserting a cause of action, and there is no prior action.  Thus, res judicata is clearly inapplicable to [...]’s Motion to Vacate.  Similarly, the ECD is inapplicable here because, as stated by [...], “the Entire Controversy Doctrine ‘bars claims that were or could have been asserted against the actual parties to the prior litigation, or those in privity with them. ’”  [...]’s Br. at 31 (quoting *Kaul v. Christie*, 372 F.Supp.3d 206, 239  Again, [...] has asserted no affirmative claims here; [...] is the Plaintiff.  And there is no prior litigation.  The judgment in this action was entered long before the 2019 action.  Collateral estoppel does not apply here because the issue of whether [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA give rise to grounds for vacatur of the default judgment and/or an affirmative defense has never been litigated and there is no prior judgment.