ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.* at 134 (quoting *United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.*, 438 U.S. 422, 460-61 (1978)).  Finally, this Court has held that the improper submission of exhibits to a deliberating jury may be reversible error, particularly outside the presence of counsel.  See *Palestroni v. Jacobs*, 10 N.J. Super.
[brief] Appellant indicated some confusion as to why this statute was applied to “paper” ballots rather than machine ballots.  Pb22, n 4.  This section was adopted in 1911, before there were electronic voting machines that limited the number of votes that could be cast for a particular office.  See P.L. 1911, c. 183, s. 62, p. 321.  Title 19 has never undergone a comprehensive revision since it was first effectively adopted in 1876, and so various “new” sections, including the Voting Machine Law, N.J.S.A. 19:48-1, et seq., the Electronic Voting Law, N.J.S.A. 19:53A-1, et seq., the Vote-By-Mail Law, N.J.S.A. 19:63-1, et seq., have been “glommed on” over the years.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Appeal Brief  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT  4  POINT I - The Court Below Failed to Understand the Entire [...] Phone Call (Pa-76)  4  POINT II - The Plaintiff’s Assignments Ended (Pa-76)  8  CONCLUSION  11  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS  Order & SOR granting Motion for Summary Judgment  11/3/23  Pa-65  Order & SOR denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration  12/1/23  Pa-76  Order & SOR denying Defendants’ reinstatement of Complaint  1/22/24  Pa-85  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Cox v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 138 N.J. 2  8  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Complaint and Jury Demand in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Sussex County against the Defendants-Respondents on or about February 16, 2022 (Pa-1) alleging violations of New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act.
[directive] Inicjały oskarżonego / Defendant’s Initials  Główny formularz oświadczenia o winie/Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish strona 2 z 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish page 2 of 7  Jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce po 1 sierpnia 1993, musi Pan(i) zapłacić 75 USD 5. e. na [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] Fundusz Usług na rzecz Bezpieczeństwa Sąsiedzkiego za każdy wyrok?  If the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction?  Jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce po 4 stycznia 1994 i został(a) f. r. Pan(i) skazany(a) na nadzór [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] kuratora sądowego, musi Pan(i) płacić maksymalnie 25 USD miesięcznie przez cały okres tego nadzoru?  If the offense occurred on or after January 5, 1994 and you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation?
[brief] *5  [...] testified that the area surrounding [...] was commercial, and the building located at that address appeared to be an abandoned commercial building.  The sign on the front of the building read “[...],” and listed the hours for church services and other church events.  He noticed the metal pull down gate at the entry to the adjacent alleyway was rolled up.  Prior to conducting the search, [...] inspected the alleyway and rear yard of [...] and determined it was not safe for a canine search because the “entire length was littered with broken glass. ”
[brief] JUDGE HANNA HAD DISCRETION TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO AN IGNITION INTERLOCK SUSPENSION PERIOD.  (Addressing Point VII of defendant’s brief)  Defendant’s offense date is November 5, 2019.  At the time of his offense, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 gave courts discretion to impose an interlock device requirement for first-time drunk driving convictions.  (Sa1-Sa10).  As of December 1, 2019, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 requires an interlock device for first-time offenders.  (Sa11-Sa20).  Defendant was sentenced by [...] on April 17, 2023.  His sentence included a seven month ignition interlock suspension period.  Defendant now argues that [...] erred by sentencing him to this ignition interlock suspension period because [...] stated that it was a “mandatory” part of sentencing.  (Db29-Db30).  While the record suggests that [...] was mistaken that imposition of an ignition interlock suspension period was in fact mandatory, [...] still was given discretion under the applicable version of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 to impose such ignition interlock suspension period.  Thus, the State defers to this Court as to whether a remand is necessary for resentencing to address the ignition interlock suspension period of defendant’s sentence.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In his August 9, 2019 liability report, [...] presents the following facts, data and opinions: he measured the illuminance levels of the subject streetlight to be 0.0 foot candles, and this was not sufficient for the intersection (Pa739); the only available non-vehicular lighting caused [...] to be illuminated from behind (Pa739); the absence of adequate lighting in front of [...] and illumination behind him caused a “backlight” condition from the driver’s point of view (Pa739); the darkened appearance of [...] would have readily blended in with the other dark background items present in the area; the pedestrian said to the police he could not see [...] and thought he hit a cone (Pa739); it was also likely that the backlighting condition worked to negate the illuminance afforded by the motor vehicle’s own headlights (Pa739); [...] installed “Dangerous Intersection” signs before the incident (Pa739); [...] had been advised of the non-functioning streetlight (Pa739); [...] was also responsible for trimming trees, as the tree closest to the stop sign was essentially hiding it from the driver’s view (Pa740).  In the end, [...] opined that the intersection was not kept free from hazards due to the “backlight” condition created there, as well as the blocking of the stop sign by the tree; having received notice of the non-operational streetlight [...] should have taken measures to repair the light; [...] failed to maintain the light in a timely fashion; and these failures (in addition to actions taken by the driver) were the direct causes of the accident.  (Pa739-40).  At deposition, [...] defined “backlighting” as follows: “When you have background of a particular scene brightly lit and the foreground is dark and basically the foreground that is dark is lost in the well lit background…” (Pa470).
[brief] The trial court granted petitioners' motion, finding an alleged conflict under RPC 1.18(d).  The "evidence" upon which the trial court relied was and remains unknown to appellants and the [...].  Petitioners have also shared their evidence, which having not been considered by the trial court, does not appear to be part of the record below, with this court.  According to the trial court's decision, the Certification of [...] was *not* considered and thus should not be considered – particularly *in camera* – if it was not considered below.  At the same time, while purporting not to consider the Knoll Certification, the decision referenced emails, which could only be authenticated if they were appended to allegedly ignored Certification.  Appellants never had the chance to compare what the court reviewed with the emails the [...] could locate.
[brief] There is a large natural barrier of trees between the accessory structure and the Plaintiffs’ residence.  The accessory structure is placed and constructed in a visually attractive manner as depicted in the photographs.  The Property already contains a residential structure and, therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the Property.  Moreover, the surrounding parcels and those across from the Property contain a mix of residential and commercial uses, as well as undeveloped land.  The parcel immediately to the south of the Property contains an advertising billboard.  Taking these neighboring uses into consideration, the accessory structure does not present a “substantial detriment” to the neighboring properties (Pa47); and 6.
[brief] There should have been plenty of eyewitnesses, but none appeared in court -- so the prosecution had the lead detective refer to 'witness statements' and imply that the out-of-court declarants identified the shooter as [...] (see Legal Argument Point I).  The trial court allowed this hearsay and denied [...] his right to confrontation, and failed to instruct the jurors that they should not consider the statements as proof of their contents; worse, when the jurors asked to see the statement the judge told them to instead rely on their recollection of the detective's testimony (see Point II).  The only evidence against [...] was video which was 'authenticated' by someone who had not even watched all of the footage (see Point III).  The defendant was entitled to an acquittal at the close of the State's case, but his motion was denied because of the improperly admitted video (see Point IV).  Any chance at a fair trial was destroyed by inappropriate remarks made by the prosecutor during summation (see Point V).  For the foregoing reasons, [...] was improperly convicted and the judgment of conviction should accordingly be vacated.  If the defendant is not entitled to an acquittal, this Court should at minimum grant him a new trial.  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] in any such civil temporary or final addition of, shall be in to, not lieu Violence Cases.  4.6.4  Special Notifications in Domestic acomplaint-warrant, if decision is made to apply for violence, the Incases involving domestic and shall include any violence, clearly offense involves domestic sha11 state that the the application prior concerning Central Registry (e.g., Violence information contained in the Domestic relevant (requiring query of Domestic restraining order).
[brief] Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court held, “in limine *N.J.R.E.* 609 rulings shall continue to be reviewed under the harmless-error standard.  *Hedgespeth*, 249 N.J. at 252.  The Court noted that, while such cases may be rare, “there can be situations in which a defendant's decision not to testify after an erroneous *N.J.R.E.* 609 ruling will not constitute harmful error.
[brief] ”  Rosen v. Keeler, 411 N.J. Super. 439, 450 (App. Div. 2010).  “The court’s goal is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used taken as…in its entirety, the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstance, and the objects they were thereby striving to attain. ”  Cruz Mendez v. ISU Insurance Services, 156 N.J. 556, 570-571 (1999).  “The document, moreover, must be read as a whole without artificial emphasis on one section with a consequent disregard for others.
[directive] 7.  Provide a structure and an outlet for community stakeholders, as well as crime survivors and justice-involved persons, to provide input and to bring forth their expertise and local knowledge for the purpose of improving services and influencing policymaking.  8.  Support policies and practices that recognize the importance of cultural competency of those providing victim assistance and violence intervention and prevention services.  9.  Promote policies and practices that encourage engaging the use of peer support, such as credible messengers, individuals with lived experience, and trauma survivors, in the provision of services.  10.  Lead the Department’s coordination with other state agencies and offices—including education, health, human services, mental health, juvenile justice, community affairs—that have key roles to play in violence prevention and intervention, so that promoting public safety is a systems-wide approach and a shared responsibility.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution; the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-1, seq., which provides for general responsibility of the et [...]’s operations and the supervision of the organization of the [...]; and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97, seq., which provides for the general supervision of criminal et justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I have determined that the organization described herein is necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the [...]’s law enforcement functions and hereby direct all [...] personnel to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] Rule 3.17 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to “disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned .  . . .”  See also Rule 1:12-1(g).  In this case, the appearance of impartiality is appropriately questioned where: (1) the Special Master was considering a fee application requiring him to evaluate the reasonableness of [...]’s fee request, (2) [...] offered the Special Master a paid opportunity to serve as a mediator and the Special Master accepted, and (3) the offer and the acceptance took place during the pendency of the fee application.
[brief] It was thereafter discovered from an online search of the county clerk website.  On 12-5-23 plaintiffs were served with a Rule 1:4-8 Safe Harbor Notice.  (Da 110)  Plaintiffs did not comply with the demand therein.  As of 2-28-24 the total amount due on the judgment, inclusive of compounded interest & costs, was in the sum of $55,242.59.  (Da 20-21)  In July, 2024 Appellant received the Trust Unit’s check of about $47,000.  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] (Ia583-586).  The next page of [...]’s application, entitled “Proposed Policyholder,” requires applicants to provide certain information concerning their camp, clinic, or conference.  (Ia583).  This page also contains extensive lists of “Ineligible Activity Types,” including such things as “High Ropes Courses, Zip Lines, Trampolines, Mechanical Bulls, Rock Climbing, Firearms/Riflery, Surfing Activities, Whitewater Rafting, Gymnastics, Jet Skis, Motorized Boats….” (Ia583).  Once again, neither list references or mentions 12 to 15 passenger vans being excluded.  [...] testified that he filled out the application on July 30, 2019 in order to “obtain insurance coverage for the vans”.
[brief] Furthermore, even if an email was sent to the Certifying Officers on August 8, 2019, it was still outside the timeframe required by the Ricci Act to provide notice to the members of the retirement system.  Moreover, [...] certified that he never received the postcard regarding the Ricci Act.  Pa56.  It is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that the Board does not have to abide by the statutory timelines applicable to the Board but is unwilling to relax the timeframes applicable to [...].
[brief] State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 153 (1991); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 433 (App. Div.), certif. den., 151 N.J. 466 (1997).  Specifically, an appellate court must consider (1) whether defense counsel made timely and proper objections to the improper remarks; (2) whether the remarks were withdrawn promptly; and (3) whether the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them.  Marshall, 123 N.J. at 153; Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 322-23; State v. G.S., 278 N.J. Super. 151, 173 (App. Div. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 (1996); State v. Ribalta, 277 N.J. Super. 277, 294 (App. Div. 1994), certif. den., 139 N.J. 442 (1995).  Generally, if no objection was made to the improper remarks, the remarks will not be deemed prejudicial.  Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 323.  The failure to object suggests that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made and also deprives the court of an opportunity to take curative action.  State v. Bauman, 298 N.J. Super. 176, 207 (App. Div.), certif. den., 150 N.J. 25 (1997).
[brief] The Applicant has a clean slate to develop within the 10-foot setbacks; the proposal represents a decreased setback, along two different streets.  [...] perceived "no detriment associated with these setback variances" (1T39-2 to 1T39-3), but he failed to articulate a benefit in violating Sec. 246-44A(1)(a).  The Applicant could "provide sufficient space in appropriate locations for a variety of uses, including residential" (1T39-15 to 1T39-17) with 10-foot setbacks.  Whether or not a parking lot "leave[s] a lot to be desired from an architectural or aesthetic standpoint" (1T39-22 to 1T39-23), this was not a choice between uses: the Applicant proposed multi-family, and the question was whether there were special reasons to deviate from the 10-foot setbacks.  The "absolute benefit to the aesthetics of this area" (1T39-25 to 1T40-1) could be advanced by developing a multifamily that is compliant with 244-44A(1)(a).
[brief] I/M/O [...] at 6.  The Legislature’s mandate that the Commission uniformly uphold these standards for school board member social media use was also cited prior by the Commission itself in Advisory Opinion A03-07 (2007), as cited by [...] in her Initial Decision: the Legislature has established specific standards to guide the conduct of board members to ensure and preserve public confidence.  See, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.
[brief] The summons and complaint, however, were returned to the trial court and marked as unserved on January 31st, 2019.  [Pa3; Trans. ID: [...]]  Defendant was re-served via regular and certified mail (return receipt requested) on February 1st, 2019.  The address to which this summons was sent was [...].  [Id.; Trans. ID: [...]]  The summons and complaint were once again returned to the sender, marked as unserved on March 12th, 2019.  [Id.; Trans. ID: [...]]  A third attempt to serve Defendant was made at her New York law office via regular and certified mail (return receipt requested) on March 12th, 2019.  The Summons and complaint were successfully re-served at [...].
[brief] Pa025; Pa106.  As expressly noted in the Original Resolution, [...] agreed to provide elevators in Buildings A-D—but expressly refused to include an elevator in Building “E”, and the Board accepted that such a condition was outside of its jurisdiction to impose.  Pa110-111.  The Original Resolution specifically states in its findings of fact that:  [d]uring the course of the public hearings, the Board and [[...]] had discussions about the inclusion of ambulance stretcher compliance elevators in buildings “C”, “D”, and “E”…However, according to the testimony presented by [[...]’s] professionals, the question of presence or absence of such elevators in such buildings is controlled exclusively by the UCC, which Code does not require such elevators for those particular buildings.  Nonetheless, as a consequence of various discussions between the Board and [[...]], [[...]] agreed to amend the Application so as to include such elevators in buildings “C” and “D”.  [[...]] declined to include such elevator in building “E. ” [Pa114 (emphasis added)].  Accordingly, the elevator in Building “E” was not listed as a condition of approval in the Original Resolution.  Thus, the Original Resolution confirmed that [...]’s SPA was approved on June 13, 2022 and that [...] “shall install an elevator in Buildings C and D” only.  Pa119.  On January 23, 2023, the Board, sua sponte, without notice to the public or even [...], adopted the Supplemental Resolution PB-2023-05 on January 23, 2023 (the “Stealth Resolution”) which imposed an additional condition to the approval of [...]’s SPA—namely, the requirement that [...] include an elevator in Building “E.
[directive] 7.11.1  An agency’s internal affairs function shall receive notice of any incidents involving:  (a)  Any firearm discharge by agency personnel, whether on-duty or off-duty, unless the discharge occurred during the course of (1) a law enforcement training exercise; (2) routine target practice at a firing range; (3) a lawful animal hunt; or (4) the humane killing of an injured animal; or (b)  Any discharge of an agency-owned firearm by anyone other than agency personnel.  7.11.2  Upon receiving notice, the internal affairs function shall determine whether additional investigation is necessary and whether information must be reported to the County Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).  5  41  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020
[brief] That Plaintiff’s CFO [...] worked from an office in New Jersey during the representation does not alter the analysis, nor does the fact that [...] addressed the parties’ engagement letter and [...]’s invoices to [...] in New Jersey—as instructed by Plaintiff’s CEO [...]—and had a small number of email and telephone communications that included [...].\textsuperscript{10}  Da168; Da180; Da233 T50-19 to 25; Da234 T55-5 to 10; Da235 T69-10 to 13.  After all, the specific jurisdiction “analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there. ”  \textit{Walden v. Fiore}, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014); see also \textit{Baanyan}, 433 N.J. Super. at 478 (“[T]elephonic and electronic communications with individuals and entities located in New Jersey alone, are insufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant,” and “the fact that defendant received payment from [plaintiff in New Jersey], and submitted timesheets to [plaintiff in New Jersey] does not support a finding of personal jurisdiction.
[brief] THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT ENGAGE IN ANY MATERIAL PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES, AND THE UNION’S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE ARBITRATOR’S COMPLIANCE WITH N.J.S.A 19:16-5.7(g) IS SPECIOUS RATHER THAN CONSTITUTING PLAIN ERROR.  For the first time, [...] argues that the Arbitrator’s handling of the interest arbitration proceeding below is flawed because the Arbitrator failed to require [...] to provide the Arbitrator as well as [...] with the information required by N.J.S.A. 19:16-5.7 (Aa16), which states:
[brief] See Ab27.  This is an absurd and convoluted argument.  Just because Tennessee’s prior exemptions were not challenged in court does not make them any less significant or precedential.  On the contrary, [...] is the expert administrative agency charged with enforcing the Highlands Act and its exemptions.  Therefore, based on the standard of review noted above and [...]’s consistent interpretation of Exemption #11, [...]’s decision should be accorded great deference.
[brief] CONCLUSION  Plaintiffs have shown no basis to reverse the grant of summary judgment to [...] below.  As a matter of law, [...] had no duty as a tenant in a multi-use parking lot to plaintiffs/appellants to maintain the common areas.  The owner of the parking lot, [...], not [...], had the duty to maintain and inspect the parking lot.  In the absence of a duty of care, [...] can have no liability for this loss.  Furthermore, plaintiffs cannot show that [...] had notice of a dangerous condition.  The Court should therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment to [...].
[brief] 3.  IT WAS ERROR TO DENY [...]'S ATTORNEY'S FEES DUE TO THE BOARD’S VIOLATION OF LITIGANT'S RIGHTS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 8/20/20 FINAL ORDER AFTER IT WAS AFFIRMED ON 5/18/22.  (THE ISSUE WAS RAISED IN [...]'S 7/18/22  MOTION TO ENFORCE (1A), 9/28/22  ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (187A) AND 11/15/22  MOTION TO ENFORCE (194A))
[brief] In opposition, Defendants boldly claim that “[t]here is no question that [Plaintiff] knew of the basis for [its] purported bad faith claim prior to bringing the First Action. ”  (Db22.)  It is hard to fathom how Defendants could possibly advance such an argument considering the trial court, relying upon a full evidentiary record, reached the exact opposite conclusion.  Indeed, the trial court made crystal clear that: (i) the fully developed evidentiary record revealed that Plaintiff did not know, and could not have none, of its claims prior to the conclusion of the First Action, and (ii) “the entire controversy doctrine [does not] operat[e] [to] bar [...]’s claims.