ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s alleged protected activity is comprised of (1) her reporting to [...] of a teacher’s statement supporting Trump building a wall, and (2) Plaintiff’s presence at [...]’s meeting with students regarding the Costlow Incident, which [...]—not Plaintiff—reported.  (Pa19).  However, “[n]ot every complaint or report entitles its author to protection from retaliation[.]”  Davis v. City of Newark, 417 F.  App’x 201, 202 (3d Cir. 2011).  “[F]or a complaint to amount to ‘protected activity,’ it must implicate an employment practice made illegal” under the law.  Id. (emphasis added).  See also Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Opposition” to discrimination can take the form of “informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints to management. ” (emphasis added)).  Under its anti-retaliation provision, LAD prohibits employers from taking “reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under [LAD].”  N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(d).  The acts forbidden under LAD include an employer’s refusing to hire or employ an individual, barring or discharging an individual from employment, and discriminating against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of their “race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity or expression, disability or atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait of any individual, or because of the liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States or the nationality of any individual, or because of the refusal to submit to a genetic test or make available the results of a genetic test to an employer.
[brief] Contrary to the [...]’ argument,\(^1\) standing to bring disqualification motions are not limited to current or former clients.  See *Van Horn v. Van Horn*, 415 N.J. Super. 398, 412 (App. Div. 2010) (“Our jurisprudence has entertained disqualification motions filed by the attorney’s adversary. ”); *City of Atl. City v. Trupos*, 201 N.J. 447, 450-52 (2010) (reviewing municipality’s motion to disqualify law firm from representing plaintiffs); *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 109 N.J. 201, 204-05 (1988) (reviewing defendant’s motion to disqualify law firm representing plaintiffs based on conflict); *State v. Davis*, 366 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2004) (holding there was “no doubt” that the State possessed standing to seek \(^1\) The [...]’ brief is referred to as “SDb.
[brief] Appellant, [...], appeals the Commissioner’s February 6, 2023, final agency decision, adopting in its entirety the initial decision issued November 18, 2022, by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  (Pa38-45; Pa46-49). ¹  The ALJ found that Respondent [...] (“[...]”) was justified in terminating the employment of Cilento despite his tenured status, because the [...] (“[...]”) had suspended his teaching certificates for two years.
[brief] As noted, for many years, under Sands, most prior convictions were admissible to impeach a defendant if the defendant testified.  76 N.J. at 144-145.  Then, in 1993, Brunson restricted that approach slightly, by requiring the sanitization of prior convictions if any of them were similar to the charged crimes, but otherwise not changing the general Sands bias toward admissibility.  132 N.J. at 391-392.  But in 2014, N.J.R.E. 609 was amended to bring the New Jersey rule far closer to the federal approach, severely tightening the admissibility of such priors, particularly those older than ten years for which the sentence had been served more than ten years prior to trial.  Rule 609(b) provides:
[brief] The Borrowers’ Sale of the Mortgaged Premises and [...]’s Receipt and Acceptance of the First Wire Transfer  The Borrowers transferred title to the Mortgaged Premises to [...] (“[...]”) by Deed dated April 30, 2021, in connection with [...]’s purchase of the Mortgaged Premises from Borrowers (Pa51 at ¶9 & Pa69-74) which purchase was financed by [...].\(^2\)  In connection with the closing of this transaction, the escrow agent for the settlement agent, [...], wired the payoff funds to [...].
[brief] Defendant’s reliance on *State v. Reed*, 211 N.J. Super. 177 (App. Div. 1986), is misplaced.  In that case, Reed challenged the sentencing court’s finding of aggravating factor one based on the “inexcusable and reckless handling and pointing of a shotgun at the deceased and the pulling of the trigger,” and aggravating factor two based on the death of the victim.  *Id.* at 187-88.  In vacating the sentence, this Court found that recklessness is an element of reckless manslaughter and that the death of the victim is an element of manslaughter.  *Id.* at 188.  This Court did not find, as defendant claims, that it was impermissible double counting to consider the pointing of the shotgun in sentencing Reed for manslaughter.  Nor did [...] double-count an element of unlawful possession of a firearm.  The judge was clear that he was concerned with the fact that defendant pointed the firearm at someone and pulled the trigger, not merely his possession of the gun.  Neither of those actions are elements of the firearms offense.  Defendant also claims that the sentencing judge improperly suggested that aggravating factors three and nine should be found every time a defendant points a firearm at a person and pulls the trigger.  He argues that such a presumption violates *Rivera*.
[brief] | 10 | | Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Mercer, 169 N. J. 135 (2001).  | 66 | | Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282 (1996).  | 21 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  | 8 | | Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998).  | 21 | | Del Vecchio v. Hemberger, 388 N.J. Super. 179 (App. Div. 2006).  | 10 | | Dziubek v. Schumann, 275 N.J. Super. 428, 440 (App. Div. 1994).  | 52 | | Estate of Roach v. Trw, Inc., 164 N.J. 598 (2000).  | 8 | | Fagas v. Scott, 251 N.J. Super. 194 (Law Div. 1991).  | 46 | | Hyland v. Aquarian Age 2,000, inc., 148 N.J. Super. 186 (Ch. Div. 1977).  | 9 | | Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584, 592 (2016).  | 40 | | J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 492–93 (App. Div. 2012).  | 46 | | Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 385 (2009).  | 40 | | Massar v. Massar, 279 N.J. Super. 89, 93 (App. Div. 1995).  | 40 | | Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973).  | 22 | Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431 (App Div. 2011).  27  Pacelli v. Pacelli, 319 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 1999)  24 Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001).  40  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739 (1989).  7 Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 2014).  30 State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982).  21 Steele v. Steele, 467 N.J. Super. 414 (App. Div. 2021).  21,49 Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2008).  21 Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016).  21 Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 190 N.J. 61 (2007).  53, 54  United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 2009).  53  Unreported Cases
[brief] [Pa4, ¶ 4].  The Lease provided that [...] shall pay Base Rent (“Base Rent”), as set forth therein, on or before the first day of each month, time being of the essence.  [Pa73 at ¶ 4].  The Lease further provided that [...] shall pay all costs, expenses, and obligations relating to the Leased Premises, such that it is “triple net. ”  [Pa75 at ¶ 9].  Such costs include, without limitation, operating expenses, costs for security, landscaping, extermination, interior and exterior lighting systems, storm and sanitary drainage systems, plumbing, electrical, HVAC systems, insurance, real estate taxes, and utilities (hereinafter, “Additional Rent”).  [Pa75 at ¶¶ 9-11].  The Lease required [...] to “operate its business in a lawful manner, and in conformance with all applicable Environmental Laws, ordinances and statutes,” including a prohibition against the “transport” or “dispos[al]” of waste.
[brief] [...]  [Issue not raised below]  A.  Orders In Favor of [...] Are Not Before This Court On Appeal Because Plaintiff Failed To Identify Any In His Notice Of Appeal.  [Issue not raised below]  “An appellant [] proceeds at his or her peril by insufficiently completing the notice of appeal or CIS.  The appellant should explicitly designate all judgments, orders and issues on appeal in order to assure preservation of their rights on appeal.  R. 2:5-1(f). ”  Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 461 n.1 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544, 810 A.2d 64 (2002).  “A party's failure to seek review of cognizable trial court orders or determinations — by identifying them in the notice of appeal — is largely fatal. ”  Park Crest Cleaners, LLC v. A Plus Cleaners & Alterations Corp., 458 N.J. Super. 465, 472 (App. Div. 2019); see also Nielsen v. Wal-Mart Store #2171, 429 N.J. Super. 251, 256 n.3 (App. Div. 2013) (“We also note that Walmart did not preserve this issue for review because it did not identify the December 17, 2010 order in its notice of appeal. ”)  Here, just like defendant [...], Plaintiff failed to identify the 8/7/23 and 10/11/23 Orders in favor of [...] in his Notice of Appeal and has failed to preserve that issue for review.
[brief] One of the fundamental principles embodied in the TCA is governmental immunity is the rule unless the legislature created an exception.  Caicedo v. Caicedo, 439 N.J. Super., 615, 623 (App. Div. 2015).  N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 states that a public entity is liable if a plaintiff establishes: (1) "public property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury"; (2) "the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition"; (3) "the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred"; and (4) "a negligent or wrongful act or omission of [a public] employee . . . created the dangerous condition"; or "a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition .
[directive] 2 © 2017 [...] ODARA Scoring Form 7.  Two or more indicators of substance abuse  SAMPLE QUESTIONS: Did he/she drink alcohol just before or during this assault?  Did he/she use drugs just before or during the assault?  Did he/she abuse alcohol or drugs in the past few days or weeks before this assault?  Did he/she abuse alcohol or drugs more than usual in the few days or weeks before the assault?  Before this assault, was he/she more angry or violent when he/she used drugs or alcohol?  Before this assault, had he/she ever been charged for something he/she did when drinking?  Before this assault, had he/she had an alcohol or drug problem any time since he/she was 18?  Substance abuse indicators:
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior [...], : Court of New Jersey, Law Defendant-Appellant.  : Division, Middlesex County.  Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  BRIEF AND APPENDIX
[brief] (Pa96)  As [...] testified, “if there had been an incident such as theft or a customer accident or employee accident, we would register the time code and the camera number and send it up to . . . corporate basically so that they can pull the video and save it. ”  (Pa96)  Under the circumstances, like Outback, it was incumbent upon [...] to have preserved the surveillance footage.  Surveillance footage is frequently the most accurate piece of evidence relating to the occurrence of an accident on a business entity’s premises.  [...] should not be rewarded for its failure to preserve footage—footage which would have undoubtedly aided Plaintiffs’ ability to prove [...]’s negligence.  Even if [...] chose, at a minimum, to only maintain the portion of the surveillance footage that Plaintiff viewed while in the manager’s office, such video would have depicted [...] pushing down the aisle where Plaintiff was located, a [...] supplied overloaded U-boat consisting of a variety of products from different parts of the store.  Permitting [...] to decide, on its own accord, not to retain such footage particularly after having already reviewed a portion of such footage, would set forth a dangerous precedent.  Business owners, like [...], would be disincentivized from retaining critical video evidence despite having been put on notice of a potential claim due to physical injury of an invitee on its premises.  Additionally, Plaintiffs could not possibly have had the surveillance footage preserved because Plaintiffs are not attorneys and had no basis or knowledge to serve a preservation notice upon [...].  By the time that Plaintiffs retained [...] to represent them in January 2020 for the injuries Plaintiff sustained as a result of [...]’s negligence, it was approximately eight (8) months subsequent to the April 26, 2019 incident, at which point in time such footage had already been spoliated by [...].  (Pa198-Pa200)  Furthermore, given the fact that an incident report was documented, along with various photographs (Pa152-Pa154; Pa164-Pa178), Plaintiffs would never have suspected that [...] would make the decision to spoliate all recorded evidence surrounding the incident.  POINT II
[directive] Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to enact or adopt a policy for implementing a HWC program within the guidelines of this Directive.
[brief] The driver was apprehended and identified as defendant [...].  The police found the employees/patrons bound with tape.  (Da 51)  Further [...] testimony would have showed motive and bias as to the detective's character because none of that information was true.  [...] also never interviewed [...] concerning his affidavit he wrote negating defendant having knowledge of the robbery nor did he have any participation in the robbery on January 12th, 2012.  (Da 40)  Defense counsel "has a duty to make reasonable investigation to interview witnesses, cross examine witnesses and investigate witnesses."
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Avatar Cap. Fin., LLC v. Nassau Marina Holdings, LLC, No. A-0423-20, 2022 WL 1495919 (N.J. Super. App. Div. May 12, 2022)  ...........................................................................................................  13, 14 Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190 (2013)  ...........................................................................................................  12 Carteret Sav. & Loan Ass’n, F.A. v. Davis, 105 N.J. 344 (1987)  ...........................................................................................................  20  Habick v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 320 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1999) .............................................................................. 11 K.V.H. v. W.S.H., No. A-1494-16T1, 2018 WL 4623385 (N.J. App. Div. Sept. 27, 2018) .................................................................................................................. 10 Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 2013) ............................................................................... 11 State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181 (1977) ............................................................................................................. 11, 12 Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591 (2015) ............................................................................................................. 11 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Young, No. A-1124-17T2, 2019 WL 1568090 (N.J. App. Div. Apr. 11, 2019) .................................................................................................................. 18, 19 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 ................................................................................................................. 18 OTHER AUTHORITIES Rule 4:42-11(a) .................................................................................................................... 13 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT In a thinly-veiled attempt to hold onto, wrongfully, property to which they are no longer entitled, defendants [...] (“Borrower”) and [...] (“[...],” together with Borrower, “Defendants” or “Appellants”) cry foul at the logistics of a sheriff’s sale.
[directive] Community Outreach 3.6.1  Commanding officers should strive to remain informed about and sensitive to the community’s needs and problems.  Regularly scheduled meetings to discuss community concerns should be held with public advisory councils, religious groups, schools, businesses and other community leaders.  These meetings help commanding officers identify potential crisis situations and keep channels of communication open between the agency and the community.  The disciplinary process should be publicized and clearly explained in these forums.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 14
[brief] Probable cause determinations require an assessment based on totality of the circumstances and an objective standard of reasonableness.  *State v. Novembrino*, 105 N.J. 95, 121 (1987).  Probable cause is defined as a well-grounded suspicion that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.  *State v. Burnett*, 42 N.J. 377, 387 (1964).  It is more than a bare suspicion, but less than the legal evidence necessary to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.  *State v. Waltz*, 61 N.J. 83, 87 (1972).  It is also well established that lay people are permitted to offer an opinion as to operator intoxication in a drunk-driving case.  *State v. Cryan*, 363 N.J. Super. 442, 454-56 (App. Div. 2003).
[brief] POLICE HAD REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANT HARBORED CONTRABAND INSIDE HIS RESIDENCE. \(^8\)  After searching defendant and his vehicle, officers had sufficient reasonable suspicion that defendant’s home contained more evidence of criminal activity, which justified their request for consent to search his home.  A consent search of a vehicle after a lawful stop must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect has engaged in criminal activity.  *State v. Carty*, 170 N.J. 632, 647, modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351 (2002).
[brief] See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Banigan v. PharMerica, Inc., 950 F.3d 134, 144–47 (1st Cir. 2020) (non-public corporate documents); U.S. ex rel.  Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc., 764 F.3d 699, 708 (7th Cir. 2014) (evidence not disclosed by government survey reports); Kennard v. Comstock Res., Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 2004) (“personal, private royalty records and statements”).  the allegations are based,” Relator was then required by statute to provide that analysis—the actual code and data constituting the purported analysis, not just conclusions or a description of the purported analysis—to the New Jersey government before filing this action as a necessary precondition to being an original source.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s argument, which relies on a single instance of testimony from [...], the record is replete with evidence of what [...], [...], and [...] actually thought—that [...] was difficult to work with on a day to day basis, that she was mean to her employees, and that they did not like her.  (See, e.g., Pa446 ([...] texting a coworker “I’m over [...] and her bullshit. ”); Pa237-38 at 49:1-55:25; Pa242 at 72:13-17; Pa243 at 74:5-24 (noting [...]’s bickering with other staffing coordinators); Pa175 at 67:13-68:6 ([...] stating [...] would “freak out on everybody”); Pa240 at 64:10-18 (staffing coordinators upset at the way [...] “treated people”); Pa285 at 30:23-31:5 ([...] stating [...] was not a “team player”); Pa286 at 35:1-7 ([...] treated the staffer coordinators like children); Pa184 at 101:22-102:6 ([...] was belittling and degrading toward staffing coordinators)).
[brief] The State merely argued that: a) the PCR was “20 years” late with \(^8\) Counsel later corrected the statute citation to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h).  (1T 4-25 to 5-2) “nothing to show either excusable neglect or a fundamental injustice” (1T 5-12, 5-14 to 16); and b) “there’s been no showing of meeting the Strickland standard” because “[h]is counsel actually seems to have done above and beyond to get him a sentence that was better than he should have been able to get. ”  (1T 5-25 to 6-1, 6-7 to 10)  Defense counsel rebutted stating: “Judge, I would just indicate that this is not technically a PPR [sic] application, and it’s my understanding that with respect to legal sentences, there is some time bar. ”  (6T 18 to 21)⁹  At the outset of the PCR court’s written decision, it correctly enunciates the issue raised by defendant stating:
[brief] Hence, pursuant to C.39:4-197.6 and C.39:4-197.5 the appellant filed the March 05, 2024 application with the respondents (Pa302-307).  Via this application (Pa302), the appellant requested from the respondents to designate a reserved handicapped parking space at his street front, explaining to them why the grant of a reserved parking space was critical (Pa303) due to the proximity of the appellant’s house to the aforesaid large apartment complex two doors away from his house, which housing large numbers of elderly and disabled persons.
[brief] We respectfully submit that professionals do not suddenly become “crafts” just because the instructions on “how to register” are trying to make it easier for contractors to complete the registration form.  We respectfully submit that the 39 listed crafts may be the most commonly found, but there are other crafts not listed, which would fall under the “other” category during the application process.  An example of a possible “other” is a striper whose craft is to paint the lines on roads.  Their wages are not the same as the general “painter” craft, therefore, a striping contractor might use “other” during the application process to describe the trade under which he is registering.  Compare different terms between 0550a (Striping), 0512a (Commercial Painter), 0533a (Industrial Painter—Bridges).  Another example of a potential “other” craft is Test Boring, which appears to have its own classification and does not necessarily fall within another trade.  See 0602a.  When a contractor’s staff is comprised of some crafts and some non-crafts, the contractor might add to the “other” category administrative support and company owners whose work consists only of oversight as opposed to “hand-on” work.  Conversely, conspicuously absent from the list of 39 crafts is any professional such as a “Licensed Land Surveyor”, “Archaeologist”, “Architect”, or “Professional Engineer”.
[brief] ”  3T. 20:1-6.  The Decision of the Trial Court, issued on February 20, 2024 fails to articulate the clearly identified issue of whether the Plaintiff waived its right of first refusal on January 17, 2023, when it admittedly received the offer (in the form of a contract) and never exercised its ROFR within 30 days thereof (by February 17, 2023).