ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa309 (30:11-31:2).  It is for the jury to determine whether, as Plaintiff argues, the lack of pedestrian safeguards rendered it a “substantial certainty” that someone would be injured in [...]’s parking lot.  [...], naturally, disputes Plaintiff’s arguments and [...]’s opinions.  These disputes confirm the existence of jury questions that preclude summary judgment.  For example, [...]’s expert cites to the National Association of City Transportation Officials *Urban Design* Guide” (“NATCO”) for the proposition that [...]’s inclusion of a crosswalk in another part of the subject parking lot was close enough to the area where [...] parked.  See Da36-37 (emphasis added).  It is for the jury to weigh whether [...]’s citation to a guide regarding “urban streets” is applicable to the [...] parking lot and whether the inclusion of a crosswalk in another part of the subject lot ameliorated the fact that there were no pedestrian safeguards, crosswalks, or traffic control markings at the intersection where the subject fatal crash occurred.  Similarly, the argument advanced by [...] and its expert that [...] was solely to blame for the fatal crash represents an issue for resolution by the jury.  The questions of whether there is more than one proximate cause of an injury and apportionment of fault between causes are factual issues which must be resolved by the jury.  See *Davis v. Brooks*, 280 N.J. Super. 406, 410 (App. Div. 1993) and *Model Civil Jury Charge* 7.30 § E, page 5.  The fact that [...], in speaking with the police shortly after the crash, said that she was not “aware” of anything outside the car having obstructed her view, see [...]’s brief at Db7, does not conclusively resolve the question of whether or not the parked car that was present at the corner due to [...]’s failure to place an island/peninsula at the end of the row did, in fact, obstruct [...]’s visibility and contribute to the happening of the crash.  Clearly, [...], who claimed she never saw [...] at all until after she ran her over, was not alerted to [...]’s presence.  See Pa305(15:5-16).  It is for the jury to determine whether [...]’s complete failure to use pedestrian safety design features, markings, and signings in the area of its parking lot in question was a contributing factor.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 42:2C-30.  New Jersey law does not permit one spouse to waive the other’s right to trial and bind them to arbitration absent agency or consent. \(^{10}\) Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology LLC, 416 N.J.Super. 30 (App. Div. 2010).  [...]’s claims are direct and not derivative of [...] or [...].  \(^{10}\)  [...] and [...] are engaged, not married New Jersey law provides that “an agent may only bind his [or her] principal for such acts that are within his [or her] actual or apparent authority. ”  *N.J. Laws. Fund for Client Prot. V. Stewart Title Guar. Co.*, 203 N.J. 208 (2010).  The scope of the agent’s implied authority is limited to only what he or she may reasonably draw from the principal’s words and conduct and the facts then known to the agent.  *Kisselbach v. Cnty. Of Camden*, 271 N.J.Super. 558 (App. Div. 1994).  Absent guardianship or another like relationship there is no legal basis to permit one person to bind another to arbitration.  *Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park*, 468 N.J.Super. 17 (App. Div. 2021).
[directive] Other Provisions  A.  Supersession.  This Directive supersedes the “Directive Revising Procedures for Retaining Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence (SAFE) ‘Hold’ Kits and Extending the Time for Victims to Decide Whether to Report the Crime and Release Collected Forensic Evidence to Law Enforcement Authorities,” dated July 10, 2014.  This Directive also supersedes any reference to “Five-Year Hold 3rd Kits” in the Attorney General Standards for Providing Services to Victims of Sexual Assault, Edition, November 2018.  The SAFE/DVSA hold kit period is now 20 years.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  3.12  Spark Display.  Spark display means a non-contact demonstration of a CED’s ability to discharge electricity that is done as an exercise of constructive authority to convince an individual to submit to custody.  5  USE OF FORCE POLICY Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition
[brief] Vincitore, 169 N.J. at 124; see also Maslo, 346 N.J. Super. at 350-51 (affirming summary judgment on the issue of palpably unreasonable under the Act; holding the issue can be decided as a question of law).  The case law under the Act makes very clear that courts are supposed to make a realistic assessment of the operative circumstances in a given case and whether they are immunized under the Act – either on the issue of whether the condition amounts to a dangerous condition, whether there was notice to the public entity, or the public entity’s action or inaction being palpably unreasonable as a matter of law.  Here, as set forth above, there is no record evidence the City was on notice that the tree had any issue or was in imminent danger of toppling over.  Thus, it is well established by the prevailing case law provided, it was not “palpably unreasonable” for the City not to address the subject tree.
[brief] The form consisted of six questions with subparts.  (Ia012).  The first question asked if the organization “own[ed] or lease[d]” the vehicles that were to be insured.  (Ia012).  He answered “No” to this question that made no sense because the sole purpose of the non-owner hired application was to obtain insurance for leased motor vehicles.  [...] thought he was confirming, by answering “No” that it was his intention to rent vehicles.  (Ia012; Ia124-125).  Therefore, it was a confusing question.  [...] answered “yes” to the second question “[d]o employees or volunteers regularly use their autos for company business.  (Ia012).  That response was not correct as he had leased vehicles to be used and staff were not going to use their own vehicles.  (Ia012; Ia344-345).  [...] believed, however, that “their autos” referred to the vans that would be rented and not to the employees’ own personal vehicles, since he had decided that he was renting vans.  (Ia344-345).  Thus, the second question combined with the first one should have put [...] on notice that something was amiss.  Although an insurer has no duty to undertake an investigation, where there was a statement that suggests the need for further investigation, an insurer may then incur such a duty.
[brief] I.  The Court Should Affirm the [...]’s Decision to Grant the Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit Since the Decision Complies with the Flood Hazard Area Rules and is Supported by Substantial Evidence in the Agency Record Available to the Court.  The [...] decision at issue in this appeal is an FHA Individual Permit issued on August 14, 2023, pursuant to the implementing rules under the Flood Hazard Area Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:16A-50 et seq.
[brief] ”  State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 261 (2013) (quoting State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 1990)).  Thus, in order to determine the admissibility of evidence, the trial court must conduct a fact-specific evaluation of the evidence.  State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 448 (2017).  Lastly, the burden of proof rests on defendant to show actual undue prejudice, and not that the mere possibility of prejudice, substantially outweighs the probative value.  State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236, 253 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 492 (2000).  Here, defendant has fallen short of his burden.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Albright v. Oliver, | 21 | | 510 U.S. 266 (1994) | | | Ansell v. Ross Twp., Penn., | 29 | | 419 Fed. Appx. 209 (3d Cir. 2011) | | | Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, | 24 | | 563 U.S. 731 (2011) | | | Ayers v. Jackson Twp., | 39 | | 106 N.J. 557 (1987) | | | Baker v.  McCollan, | 20 | | 443 U.S. 137 (1979) | | | Ball v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., | 39 | | 207 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 1986) | | | Barney's Furniture Warehouse v. Newark, | 38 | | 62 N.J. 456 (1973) | | | Bielevicz v.Dubinion, | 32, 33| | 915 F. 2d at 850 | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 14 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1996) | | | Brinegar v. United States, | 22 | | 338 U.S. 160 (1949) | | | Brooks v. Odom and New Jersey Transit, | 42 | | 150 N.J. 395 (1997) | | | Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc., | 43, 44| | 111 N.J. 355 (1988) | | | Carter v. The City of Philadelphia, | 34 | | 181 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 1999) | | | Chapman v. New Jersey, | 19 | | 2009 WL 2634888 (D.N.J. 2009)
[brief] In one of the calls, [...] said he was concerned about “stuff” that was “going on outside,” and that “[...],” referring to [...], was “a rat. ”  (13T 139-15 to 139-24)  In another call, [...] told his girlfriend, "we got a problem,” “they have photographs,” and instructed her to "[t]ell [...] that they have to change their numbers."  (13T 134-3 to 134-17; 13T 136-15; 13T 137-9 to 138-1; 13T 139-7 to 139-14)
[brief] Soon after, in [...], the Court rejected an adult defendant's claim that allowing courts to count crimes committed while under the age of eighteen as predicate offenses for the "Three Strikes Law," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a), violates Miller and Zuber.  249 N.J. 581.  The defendant committed two first-degree armed robberies at age sixteen—the first strike.  Id. at 586.  After his release from prison, at the age of twenty-three, [...] committed two first-degree armed robberies—the second and third strikes.  Ibid.  In rejecting [...]'s constitutional challenge to application of the Three Strikes Law, the Court noted that "Miller and Zuber are uniquely concerned with the sentencing of juvenile offenders to lifetime imprisonment or its functional equivalent without the possibility of parole."  *Id.* at 601.  But [...] "committed his second and third armed robberies as a twenty-three year old, and was therefore an adult being sentenced for a crime committed as an adult."  *Ibid.*  The Court determined that neither *Miller* nor *Zuber* precluded application of the Three Strikes Law to adult defendants.
[brief] ”  Matter of Belleville Educ. Ass’n., 455 N.J. Super. 387, 405 (App. Div. 2018)(quoting Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384 (alterations in original).  Plaintiff must demonstrate that the trial court’s alleged error is a “game-changer”; otherwise, reconsideration is inappropriate.  Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 289 (App. Div. 2010).  The moving party must demonstrate that the court acted in an “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner,” which is the “least demanding form of judicial review. ”  D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990).  Parties may not, as Plaintiff did here, simply re-argue the motion he previously lost.  See Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (“A litigant should not seek reconsideration merely because of dissatisfaction with a decision .  . . .”) (quoting D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401).  Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred in holding that the circumstantial evidence Plaintiff proffered in opposing summary judgment was insufficient proof of proximate cause.  (Pb8).  Plaintiff is wrong.  The trial court properly considered and rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the circumstantial evidence offered was sufficient proof that [...]’s alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s accident and injuries.
[brief] Plaintiff claims that [...]’s March 15th comment that he hoped Plaintiff would continue working can only be explained by an intent to bar Plaintiff from the high school in the future.  See Pb6-7.  This claim is belied by the fact that Plaintiff threatened to resign his employment five days prior, on March 10th.  See Pa42; Pa43.  [...]’s statement that he hoped Plaintiff would continue working (e.g., that he would not resign) is readily explainable as a response to Plaintiff’s threat.  Moreover, Plaintiff does not contend that [...] told him that he was barred from the high school¹.  See Pa17 at ¶51; Pa58 at ¶51.  Assuming arguendo that [...] had intended to retaliate against Plaintiff and bar his employment at the high school, it would ¹  The statement “you’re out of the high school, you’re a good worker, we hope you’ll stay on,” Pb6, was never uttered by or attributed to [...] and is not to be found anywhere in the record.  The use of double quotes notwithstanding, Plaintiff appears to have created this quote as a form of creative advocacy.  See Pb6 (“In other words, ‘you’re out of the high school . . . .’”)(emphasis added). have been utterly illogical for him to first tell Plaintiff that he hoped he would continue working.  The March 15th phone call in which Plaintiff called [...] a “piece of shit,” (which again, occurred after Plaintiff’s phone call with [...]), is the far more logical explanation for Plaintiff’s bar from the high school.  Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel’s version of events is contradicted by Plaintiff himself, who believes that his exclusion from the high school was a consequence of his March 15th tirade against [...]:  Q.  All right.  So after Glenn texted you that what did you do?  A.  Well, at that point after my conversation with Mr. [...] and after my conversation with Mr. [...] I assumed, I shouldn't use that word, I thought that [...] reached out to somebody, either Mr. [...] or [...], told him that I threatened him or yelled at him or called him a piece -- he didn't like the conversation.  So he reached out to them, said something that must have flipped their switch and when he told [...] that I'm not allowed on the school property.  . . .  1T at 96:5-96:18; see also Pa77-78.  In light of the undisputed factual record and Plaintiff’s nonsensical interpretation of events, the Court correctly and cogently rejected Plaintiff’s interpretation of events in multiple statements of reasons.  See Pa73-Pa74; Pa78; Pa86-87.  The Court also found that there was no evidence supporting Plaintiff’s claim that he had been locked out of the Absent Management System.  See Pa73-74.  The Court’s findings of fact are “supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence” and should not be disturbed.  Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 65 N.J. at 484.  II.
[brief] ¹  Summary Judgment Decision at page 19 (Pa28):  2.  The Trial Court Below erred in awarding the incorrect amount of Unjust Enrichment, and wrongly allowed the Defendants to keep the equity of the home (Pa1-7) (6T 31-42)  Undue influence is presumed once he found a confidential relationship.  Whether this involved a substantial part of [...]’s assets or not (and ultimately the equity in the house would be the most substantial asset he owns) is only relevant when a gift is made, and that gift has to be undone based upon a theory that the person didn’t understand in light of the percentage of his assets being given away.
[brief] The difference between relator-led and government-led NJFCA actions is substantial; relators receive a statutory recovery of between 15% and 25% of the proceeds of any judgment or settlement if the AG intervenes, and between 25% and 30% of the proceeds if the AG does not intervene.  See N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-7(a), (d).  After the State declined to intervene, Relator continued to pursue the claim and, in that capacity, has made all litigation-related strategy judgments.  See N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-6(f).  --- 1 Ja refers to the Joint Appendix of Defendants and Plaintiff-Relator.
[brief] *Deweese v. RCN Corp.*, 380 N.J. Super. 511, 526-28 (App. Div. 2005).  In *DeWees*, the Appellate Division observed that New Jersey has adopted the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in *Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.*, 530 U.S. 133, 146 (2000) stating “Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. ”  *Deweese*, 380 N.J. Super. at 526-27 (quoting *Reeves*, 530 U.S. at 147).  To cast doubt on an employer’s claim that it had a legitimate reason for the adverse employment decision, an employee need only point out inconsistencies in the employer’s articulated reasons or point to “other evidence in the record sufficient to support the inference of retaliatory animus. ”  *LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n*, 503 F.3d 217, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2007).
[brief] In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b), appellate courts apply the same standard that governs the trial court.  See Carbajal v. Patel, 468 N.J. Super. 139, 157-58 (App. Div. 2021) (citations omitted).  On a motion pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b), the trial court must determine whether the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in favor of the party opposing the motion, i.e., if, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be adduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied.
[directive] In Certain Circumstances, School Zone Defendants Are Not Eligible for Judicial Waiver or Reduction of a Mandato~ Sentenee N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b(2) specifies circumstances when the court in a school zone case would have no authority on its own to waive or reduce the mandatory minimum sentence.  Specifically, a defendant is ineligible for a judicial waiver or reduction of the mandatory minimum sentence if the offense took place while school property or a school bus, or if the defendant in the course on violence,1 of committing the offense used or threatened or was in possession of a firearm.  While it is for a court, ultimately, to decide whether any of these disqualifying circumstances exist, they are not discretionary factors to be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in deciding an appropriate sentence.  Coml2are N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b(1) (setting forth relevant circumstances that the court must consider in exercising discretion, and which factors are discussed in Part I, Section D, infra).  Rather, if the court finds that any of the disqualifying circumstances specified in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b(2) apply, the court would have no discretion to waive or reduce the mandatory minimum sentence.  In flaose instances, the term of imprisomnent and parole ineligibility stipulated by the school zone law can only be waived or reduced by the prosecutor pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, and the prosecutor must therefore calculate and tender a plea offer determined in accordance with the Brima~e Guidelines.  Sere Part 1I, Section 2a, infr~a.  1  An earlier version of the legislation that eventually became L 2009, ~192 had provided that a defendant would also be ineligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b if in the course of committing the school zone offense he or she also committed the offense of eluding in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29- 2b.  That automatic disqualification featus’e was deleted by Comtmttee amendment.  However, a prosecutor may still argue, where the case-specific facts so warrant, that the motor vehicle eluding offense, or any other offense comnnrted against a law enforcement officer that posed a risk of injury to the officer or any other person, constitutes the use of violence or threatened violence within the meaning ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b(2)(b).  See State v. Crawley, 187 NJ. 440, 460, n.7 (2006) ("Any flight from police detention is fraught with the potential for violence because flight will incite a pursuit, which in turn will endanger the suspect, the police, and innocent bystanders.").  Furthermore, a prosecutor may tender a plea offer that requires the defendant to plead guilty to a second-degree violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b in lieu of or in addition to the school zone charge, which would automatically trigger the presumption ofimprisolmaent set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d.  See Part I, Section F and Part II, Section l(d), infra.  -4-
[brief] In essence [...]'s testimony could have raised enough reasonable doubt for the jury that the DNA evidence in the case would not have been enough to overcome the reasonable doubt created by [...]'s testimony.  In fact, the DNA evidence was on a mask that was in the car with [...].  Petitioner’s DNA was not found at any of the crime scenes (other than the car stop).  Without [...]' testimony (because he would have been impeached had trial counsel called [...] to testify) there is no evidence that the mask found in the car was the same masks that the victims testified the assailants wore during the crimes.  The PCR court denied this claim for two reasons.
[directive] Charging Making in Delay Undue in Result  Would when the departments police on placed are burdens administrative that Recognizing pending defendant of custody a maintain to required are police and delayed decision is charging system Scan Live either the 2.2.2, if subsection of provisions the notwithstanding decision, that preliminary a of results the if or operational, not is system PSA automated Judiciary's the or reasonable within a available be not or will not are otherwise risk-assessment pretrial automated or prosecutor assistant an defendant), fingerprinting the of hours within two (e.g., time of period trial, before defendant a detain whether to deciding in court, a that provides expressly Law
[brief] (Pa10).  The following day, [...] released the Deposit to Plaintiff.  (Pa10, at ¶ 41).  By noticing a default prior to the closing of the [...] transaction, Plaintiff exercised its “sole and exclusive remedy” to terminate the PSA under the first sentence of Section 13.1 and receive a refund of the Deposit.  Plaintiff’s election constituted an irrevocable election to terminate the PSA.  See Krisher v. Murphy, 11 N.J. Super. 231, 235 (App. Div. 1951) (when buyer agreed to the return of the purchase deposit, such “action constituted an election to rescind the agreement of sale, and the election was irrevocable”).  B.
[brief] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting this reasoning.  At oral argument, the trial judge noted that [...]’s injuries were an element of his claims for negligence; therefore, evidence of his dishonesty about his injuries did not have to be relegated to the damages phase of trial.  [1T147:20-148:11].  The trial judge also correctly reasoned that [...]’s credibility was a relevant issue in both phases, meaning that admissible damages evidence was not automatically excluded from the liability phase.  [1T146:8-14, 1T147:16-19, 1T148:11-17].  The trial judge’s findings are supported by the law.  It is well-established that evidence is admissible during the first stage of a bifurcated trial if it is relevant to a witness’s credibility or any other issue to be decided by the jury, even if the same evidence goes to the ultimate issue in the second stage of trial.  In a criminal trial bifurcated for the purpose of trying counts of weapons possession and weapons possession by a convicted felon separately, evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions can be introduced to impeach his credibility during the first stage of trial even though it is determinative of the ultimate issue in the second stage of trial.  *State v. Jones*, 364 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 2003); *State v. Wray*, 336 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2001).