ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE REMAINING COUNTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MERGED.  Initially, it must be pointed out that the State agrees with defendant that the trial court should have merged defendant's convictions for the third-degree possession of cocaine, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count three) and fourth-degree possession of marijuana, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3) (count four) into his conviction for the possession with the intent to distribute marijuana (count two).
[directive] The Responsibilities of County Prosecutors ...............................................  69  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 Appendix Appendix A  Sample Civilian Complaint Information Sheet Appendix B  Internal Affairs Report Form Appendix C  Internal Affairs Complaint Notification Appendix D  Sample Immediate Suspension Notice Appendix E  Sample Response Letter Appendix F  Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action Appendix G  Miranda Warning Appendix H Sample Use Immunity Grant Appendix I  Witness Acknowledgement Form Appendix J  Administrative Advisement Form Appendix K  Internal Affairs Policy Reporting Form Appendix L Annual Major Discipline Reporting Form Appendix M  Final Notice of Disciplinary Action  Appendix N  Representative Confidentiality Form Appendix O  Sample Summary and Conclusions Report njoag.gov/iapp.  Electronic copies of the appendices may be found online at INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022  1
[directive] A second-degree offense charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) alleging the defendant is a person who purchased, owned, possessed, or controlled a firearm after having been convicted of certain offenses enumerated in the statute.  (iii)  Second-Degree Eluding Offenses.  A second-degree offense charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b) alleging the defendant created a risk of death or injury to any person when the defendant knowingly fled or attempted to elude a police or law enforcement officer.
[brief] After a period of discovery, a seven-day long allocation trial took place before the SAM from March 18, 2015, to April 24, 2015.  On August 3, 2015, the SAM issued his Report & Recommendation (“R&R”).  In the R&R, the SAM incorrectly held that approximately 27% of the contamination had occurred during the three-year long [...] policy period.  All parties filed objections to the R&R.  Almost three years later, in an Opinion and accompanying Order dated June 29, 2018, the trial court adopted the SAM’s R&R in full.  [...] moved for reconsideration of the Court’s June 29, 2018, Order on July 19, 2018.  Argument on the motion for reconsideration was held on October 22, 2018.  The motion was granted on July 30, 2020, with the trial court stating that the SAM’s decision was “palpably incorrect”.  (Pa0199-Pa0209.)  On July 17, 2020, [...] filed its original motion seeking final judgment, attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre-judgment interest.  (Da0001-Da0029.)  [...] filed an amended motion for final judgment, attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre-judgment interest on March 5, 2021.  (Pa0212.)  The trial court granted [...]’s March 2021 Motion in an Order and Opinion dated February 10, 2023.  (Pa0041-Pa0060.)  With respect to [...], the trial court improperly awarded [...] $511,005 in attorneys’ fees, $88,827 in court costs, and $1,068,835.87 in prejudgment interest.  (Pa0043.)  [...] sought reconsideration of the Final Judgment Order in a motion for reconsideration filed on March 2, 2023.  The trial court denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated May 24, 2023.  (Pa0215.)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] This POINT responds to POINT I, II, III, IV, VIII of defendant’s brief.  Db14-35, 40. allegations.  As such, the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s PCR petition should be affirmed.  Pursuant to R. 3:22-10(b), a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing “only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of post-conviction relief”; “a determination by the court that there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record”; and “a determination that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief.
[brief] The requirement of a “single site plan” is, therefore, met.  (Pa138; Pa139-185; Pa186).  Further, no cross easements for utilities and stormwater management are necessitated by the existing and proposed development.  The existing underground electrical and communications utilities serving the cell tower are shown on the submitted plans and are not proposed to be disturbed or altered by the proposed warehouse development.  No utilities serving the proposed warehouse development are to be routed through the cell tower lease area.  There are no existing stormwater management facilities supporting the Cell Tower, and no new stormwater facilities are proposed in the cell tower lease area to support the proposed warehouse development.  The requirement of cross easements for utilities and stormwater is therefore inapplicable to the proposed two uses at the subject property.
[brief] As a result of the dismissal of [...]’s claims, the trial court denied as moot [...]’s Motion to Bar.  On April 17, 2023, Appellant filed the Motion to Amend, which was solely based on the March 27, 2023 Order on the Motion for Summary Judgment.  Appellant alleged it received “new” documents that demonstrated a written arrangement as defined by the NJFPA.  Appellant did not move to amend the March 27, 2023 Order denying [...]’s Motion to Bar.  The “new” documents were not new at all.  They ranged in date from 2008 through 2014.  The documents were emails from nonparty [...].  Most of the emails were between Mr. Farrell and another nonparty, [...], and relate to an unrelated entity, [...], which is not a party to this litigation.  The trial court found that even accepting these new documents, Appellant failed to demonstrate it met the requirements of the NJFPA.  On July 17, 2023, the court denied Appellant’s Motion to Amend the March 27, 2023 Order.
[brief] Equity is currently recognized as a distinct body of law, administered by various modern courts. \(^1\)  The evolution of procedures within courts of equity has guided the application of equitable principles.  Originating from the diverse rules of the early Courts of Chancery, today's courts can exercise equitable jurisdiction while maintaining their inherent discretionary abilities to address new forms of injustice ([...] (2016).  *Principles of equity and trusts* (Fifth ed.).  Annandale), Page 5.  Equity is not an independent body of law; rather, it is synonymous with corrective justice and complements common law to counterbalance its inflexible rules ([...] (1998).  "The impact of equitable doctrine on the law of contract (United Kingdom)".  *Anglo-American Law Review* 27 (1): 1.  ISSN 0308-6569.  Courts of Equity have the ability to perform corrective justice.  This is what needs to be done in this matter.
[directive] Based on what you have said, I am satisfied  Basado en lo que usted ha dicho, estoy conforme that you have knowingly and intelligently de que usted ha ejecutado a sabiendas e executed the Notice of Appeal Rights and Time inteligentemente Ia Notificacion de los derechos to File a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and de apelacion y el plazo para presentar una peticion de reparacion despues de Ia condena y clearly understand your appeal rights and time to file a post conviction relief application.
[brief] Accordingly, we vacate the convictions for second-degree conspiracy to distribute CDS while in possession of a firearm and second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, and remand so that defendant can move to vacate his guilty pleas.  That being said, for the sake of completeness, we conclude the record does not support his contention that the court did not set forth its reasons for imposing a discretionary parole disqualifier for the witness tampering charge – which he now concedes did not violate his constitutional rights.
[brief] [...] also suggests that the Board “penalize[d] [...] due to the fact he received unemployment. ” (Pb23).  However, the Board’s decision was not predicated on the fact that [...] received unemployment.  (Pa54).  Rather, the Board’s decision is based on the overall situation, where [...] chose to terminate his employment and receive unemployment, while being offered other options, and that this scenario was not indicative of a layoff.  (Pa56-57).  It must also be noted that on appeal [...] repeatedly mischaracterizes the Board’s decision as a denial of his request to be “re-enrolled” in PERS.  (Pb8; Pb24).  However, the Board’s decision actually involves the question of whether [...] is eligible to maintain multiple member status, i.e., getting pension credit on multiple positions, after a break in service from one of his two positions.  (Pa56-57).  [...] fails to mention the fact that he is still enrolled in PERS through his highest-paid employment with [...] as a Motor Vehicle Operator, a position he has held since 2009.  (Pa2; Pa55).  [...] also argues that the Board “misapplied N.J.S.A. 43:15A-8 to the facts of this case. ” (Pb18).  That statute, a general statute regarding restoration of members discontinued from service, has no application in this case where [...]’s membership in PERS continued through his other position.  Ibid.  Again, [...] fails to appreciate that the Board’s decision involves his ability to maintain multiple membership status (Pa56), not whether he is eligible for the ten-year exception to keep his membership account from expiring under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-8(a).  His membership account is still active through his employment with [...], so N.J.S.A. 43:15A-8 is wholly irrelevant here.  Further, the Board here properly relied on N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 because it addresses the specific subject of how discontinuation from service impacts multiple membership status, as opposed to general membership status.  (Pa55-56).  “[W]hen there is a conflict between a general and a specific act on the same subject, the latter shall prevail. ”  Last Chance Dev. P’ship v. Kean, 232 N.J. Super. 115, 133 (App. Div. 1989) (quoting W. Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Advert. Co., 55 N.J. 336, 339 (1970)).  Finally, [...]’s argument that the Board failed to consider the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic should be rejected.  (Pb14; Pb17).  N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 is clear on its face that a member is no longer eligible for multiple member status once there is a break in service from one of the offices, positions or employments.  There is no basis to override the plain language of the statute.  [...] did not, and cannot, point to any legislative amendment or Executive Order that provides an exception due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Nor has [...] cited to any controlling authority where our courts have applied equitable principles in an analogous situation.  Therefore, on this record, the Board was reasonable in applying the clear language of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25. 2 and N.J.A.C. 17:2-1A.1 to find [...] ineligible to maintain multiple membership status because of his break in service.  CONCLUSION
[directive] 1st Thursday [...]  1st & 3rd Monday [...]  Wednesdays [...]  1st & 4th Tuesday January -October:2nd & 4th Wednesday [...]  November-December: 1st & 3rd Wednesday Hudson County Monday, Tuesday, [...] Thursday [...] Tuesday [...] Tuesday, Thursday [...] Monday, Wednesday Tuesday, Wednesday, [...] Thursday [...] Monday - Friday [...] Tuesday, Thursday [...] Monday - Thursday [...] Tuesday, Wednesday [...] Monday - Thursday Tuesday, Wednesday, [...]
[brief] J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) (Count One); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count Two); and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count Four).  (Da 1 to 3)\(^2\)  The same grand jury also returned [...] charging defendant with one count of second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1).  (Da 4)  After trial before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. and a jury in January and February 2023, defendant was convicted of all the counts against him.  (Da 7 to 12)  On March 21, 2023, after merger, [...] sentenced defendant to serve the following prison terms, concurrently: 60 years, 85% without parole, for murder, and 10 years, five without parole for the certain-persons conviction.
[brief] (Pa67-68).  Conversely, in its closing brief, Petitioner devoted its entire first argument to the theory that there was no 2009 incident, and ironically argued in subsequent points that “[...] had one singular focus, i.e., 2009. ” (Pa41-42; 48).  Petitioner’s focus on the 2009 incident is a red herring to draw attention away from his other accidents and injuries, his prior MRIs demonstrating a worsening herniated disc at C6-C7 and bulging disc at C5-C6, his eleven-year pre-existing history of spinal stenosis at C5-C7 and [...]’s failure to address these significant pre-existing conditions.  Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the Board based its decision on all of the evidence available.  That evidence demonstrate that, in 2004, Petitioner was diagnosed with “aggravation of pre-existing cervical degenerative arthritis”, “cervical disc herniation of C6-C7 with increase in the disc herniation C6-C7” and an “annular bulge at C5-C6. ” (Pa122, 125).  That evidence also demonstrates that, in 2015, Petitioner’s orthopedic surgeon, [...], likewise diagnosed Petitioner with degenerative disc disease “specifically at C5-6 and C6-7” and disc herniation at C6-C7.  As Dr. [...] testified, “the pathology was already there at C5-C6, C7” and [Petitioner’s] surgery was done for problems that pre-dated the [2015] accident…” (3T22:2-14).  Petitioner’s focus on the 2009 incident and his false statements that the 2009 incident was the sole basis for the Board’s decision cannot change the credible evidence in the record and the “proofs as a whole” that support the Board’s decision.  2.
[brief] (Pa62).  The district court also decided the [...]’ dismissal motion on the same date.  (Pa52-Pa57).  Because the [...] did not move --- 5  The district court also granted the separate dismissal motion of Defendant, [...], on the same date.  (Pa45-Pa46).  [...] has not appealed the [...]’s dismissal (Pa280-Pa285).  Thus, it is not pertinent to the present appeal.
[brief] Plaintiff argues in this appeal that there were issues regarding the impact of the adoption of the Bond Ordinance, whether the projects were funded by the Bond Ordinance or otherwise, whether contractors were paid prevailing wages on any contracts awarded for any project, and whether a Resolution that was adopted on March 7, 2023 to cancel the “appropriations” in the budget that had been made pursuant to the Bond Ordinance was a sham.  (Pb28)  Yet, those subsequent actions that Plaintiff argues were in issue in the litigation were not in issue, because there was never a challenge in any Amended Complaint to any resolution awarding any contract for any project originally contemplated by the Bond Ordinance, any resolution authorizing payment to any contractor for wages on any contract, or the specific resolution referenced by Plaintiff that cancelled the budget appropriations originally made in contemplation of the projects.  (See Pa1.)  The only official action by the Township Committee that was challenged by Plaintiff in this appeal was the adoption of the Bond Ordinance.
[brief] 17  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On or about July 26, 2022, a Mercer County Grand Jury returned a nine count indictment, Indictment Number [...], charging defendant with: second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count I), fourth-degree possession of a large capacity magazine, contrary to the provisions of N.J. S.A. 2C:39-3(j) (Count II), third-degree possession of cocaine, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (Count III), second-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) (Count IV), third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute on or near school property, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (Count V), second-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance on or near a public facility, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (Count VI), second-degree possession of a firearm while committing a controlled dangerous substance offense, contrary to the provisions N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a, (Count VII), second-degree certain person not to possess a firearm, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) (Count VIII), and fourth-degree certain persons not to possess certain ammunition, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7a(1) (Count IX).
[brief] The claims against the [...] that are the subject of the instant appeal, however, were addressed by the June 2018 ruling by [...].  On June 22, 2018, [...] issued another Order, this time denying the Appellant’s Motion to Amend their Counterclaim, Cross-Claims, and Third Party Claims to assert claims of statutory liability, and granted the [...]’ cross-motion to dismiss with regard to their liability.  (Pa 69a.)  In this Order, [...] held that the Spill Act claim previously asserted in the Appellant’s Verified Complaint in the Chancery Division proceeding was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  (Pa 68a-69a.)  Specifically, as it relates to the Appellant’s Spill Act claims against the [...], the Court stated that it was “not satisfied” that the Appellant had “presented any new information with regard to these claims, as stated in their moving Certification. ”  (Pa 69a.)  “Instead, [the [...]] have presented proofs that [the Appellant] knew of these claims and represented before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., at the hardship stay hearing that there were no further environmental issues. ”  (Pa 69a.)  5.  **September 17, 2018 Law Division Ruling**
[brief] On February 24, 2022, [...] conducted the second part of the bifurcated jury trial charging defendant with second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (Count Seven); and first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) (Count Eight).  (16T, et seq.).  The jury convicted defendant as charged.
[brief] First Peoples Bank, supra 126 N.J. at 418 (1991); Lake Valley Associates, LLC v. Township of Pemberton, 411 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div.), certif denied, 202 N.J. 43 (2010).  See also N.J. Constitution, Article IV, Section VII, paragraph 11 (“The provisions of this Constitution and of any law concerning municipal corporations formed for local government…, shall be liberally construed in their favor.  The powers of…municipal corporations shall include not only those granted in express terms but also those of necessary or fair implication…”).  Therefore, if statutory authority exists for an ordinance, the examination as to whether a municipality was enabled to enact it ends.
[brief] On April 20, 2022, New Jersey State Police responded to a 911 call from complainant [...] in Hudson County.  Mr. Lane alleged that occupants of a white Honda Accord bearing New Jersey registration [redacted] fired gunshots at his car on the Turnpike.  Mr. Lane was not able to identify the occupants and there was no surveillance video or other witnesses.  Upon arrival, police found no shell casings, bullet fragments, or bullets.  Three days later, on April 23, 2022, Union Township police officers pulled over the Honda Accord in Union County.  [...] was identified as the driver and authorized user of the car and [...] was the passenger.  Both occupants were detained, and the car was impounded.  Days later and upon a consent search, officers recovered a BB gun in the car.  Both Darryl and [...] were charged with the BB gun in Union County.  Upon arrest in Union County, both Darryl and [...] gave statements to police.  During [...]’s statement, officers told him that they wanted to talk about “what occurred in Union Township in Union County. ”  He provided a statement and answered the officers’ questions, noting that he did not own a BB gun and did not know who owned the BB gun recovered from the ---  1  For the purposes of this brief, the Statement of Facts and Procedural History are combined, as they are innately intertwined.  car.  Mr. Sanford acknowledged that he saw images of Mr. [...] with a BB gun and that they would use it as a prop in music videos.  Mr. [...] did not provide any information on the April 20, 2022, incident in Hudson County.  Both Darryl and [...] were charged under [...].  The Indictment was eventually dismissed against both defendants after [...] pled to a disorderly persons offense to obstruction and [...] was admitted into the Pretrial Intervention Program.  On January 30, 2024, [...] was charged under [...] with one count of Second-Degree Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1), one count of Third-Degree Unlawful Possession of a Weapon in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:39-5(b)(2), and one count of Fourth-Degree Aggravated Assault by Pointing in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4).
[brief] *See, e.g.*, *App. of Union Cnty. Bank*, 144 N.J. Super. at 46 (“[T]he ‘reasons’ for the denial were legally deficient.  They did not comply with the requirement that findings and reasons given by an administrative agency for its ultimate determination must be clear and specific.  Unless that standard is met, the interested parties will not know the precise factual basis upon which the result has been reached by the agency, and the reviewing court will not be in a position readily to determine whether the decision is sufficiently and soundly grounded or derives from arbitrary, capricious or extralegal considerations. ”).
[brief] C.  The Legislature Failed to Provide Notice to the Public that It Would Consider A. 6260 or S. 49, Thus, Violating the Constitution and Statutes Requiring Adequate Notice to the Public.  As set forth above, the New Jersey Constitution gives the public the right to participate in the political process to create laws.  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18.  However, the Legislature expanded upon this right and made requirements that public bodies, expressly including the Legislature as one of those bodies, cannot take action without advance notice to the public of at least forty-hours.  N.J.S.A. 10:4-8 & -9.  The Legislature specifically required bills be posted and agendas for legislative committees for consideration of bills be published for the benefit of the public.  N.J.S.A.  52:11-78.  Because the record is clear in this matter that the calendar for the legislative session did not list that the Legislature would take action on either S. 49 or A. 6260, the Legislature violated the Constitution and both statutes.  Under N.J.S.A. 1:7-3, because the Legislature did not abide by its statutes in enacting L. 2021, c. 375, this Court should void the enactment.  The Open Public Meetings Act is an act created to provide citizens with civil rights so they can participate in the political process.  N.J.S.A. § 10:4-8.  The best cure is sunshine.  Id.  The Act applies to the Legislature:  a.
[brief] Under the Criminal Code,  A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (1) Agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (2) Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.