ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This appeal requires this Court to review a final agency decision of the [...].  As shown herein, this Court applies a very deferential standard of review to such a challenge, and [...]’s challenge here cannot overcome the heavy burden imposed on one seeking to reverse a final agency decision.  New Jersey appellate courts review agency decisions under an “arbitrary and capricious standard. ”  Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019).  An Attorney General’s final administrative decision in the exercise of the agency’s statutorily-delegated responsibilities enjoys a “strong presumption of reasonableness,” and an appellate court “should not reverse the Attorney General’s determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ”  Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (quoting Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 427 (2006)).  The party challenging the administrative action bears the burden of making that showing.  Ibid.  Here, [...] cannot make that showing.  The [...]’s conclusion that its obligation to provide a defense under Wright applies only to instances in which a public defendant has been sued for monetary damages under the Tort Claims Act (TCA) and/or § 1983 relies on well-established and unambiguous New Jersey Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of the TCA.
[brief] Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any Party; "In evaluating an arbitrator's decision to deny a postponement, courts consider whether there existed a reasonable basis for the arbitrator's decision and whether the denial created a 'fundamentally unfair' proceeding."  Mandell v. Reeve, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114804, *12-13, 2011 WL 4585248 (S.D.N.Y.).  “A failure to postpone a hearing can constitute misconduct warranting the vacation of the award only when, in the totality of the circumstances, the refusal to postpone impinges upon a party's fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard by the arbitrators. ”
[brief] Reopening cases and vacating final judgments of divorce typically involve the equitable distribution of marital assets.  This is the most common reason courts will vacate final judgments of divorce.  Anything that is subject to the common “changed circumstances” standard used for alimony, child support, etc., would not be addressed after a final judgment has been vacated.  Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 222 (App. Div. 2004).
[brief] For the sake of simplicity, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] shall hereinafter refer to himself in the first person.  The Respondents failed to offer any valid refutation to my arguments, despite their having more than 4 months time (and with multiple attempts) to do so.  I believe that just from what is completely lacking in their brief, it should be quite telling that their position is completely without merit.  For one, they don’t make a single argument that the trial court’s ruling, as to the inapplicability of the Consumer Fraud Act to tournaments, was correct.  They also don’t make a single argument that the trial court’s ruling, as to the inapplicability of the contract law to tournaments, was correct.  And the only argument they raise as to the unenforceability of the undisclosed prize limitation, is based upon a falsely-purported fact (i.e. that I had supposedly already known about the limitation prior to entering this tournament), which was never raised at trial, and which this Court has already ruled to be impermissible.  Their scant remaining arguments likewise rely entirely upon false distortions of fact, most of which were never even raised at trial.
[brief] *Id.* at 184.  The court also found that adverse possession did not apply because until 1927 which was the year that the defendant acquired title, the State had an interest in the property and the state’s interest in realty could not be subjected to adverse possession.  *Id.* at 184.  A Petition for Certification was sought and was granted and the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the lower courts.  *Id.* at 184.  Plaintiff was unable to show that the defendant was put on notice and the actions of occasional clearing of brush by railroad employees and payment of taxes did not satisfy the notice requirement.  *Id.* at 189.  The Supreme Court found that entering uncultivated land which was not enclosed and occasional trespasses over a 20 year period and payment of taxes was not sufficient to support the notice required to establish adverse possession.  *Id.* at 189.  In Maggio v. Pruzansky, the court addressed adverse possession involving a strip of land on the property of Pruzansky that had been used by the Maggio family and for which the Maggio family filed litigation to claim the strip via adverse possession.
[brief] In sum, if this is considered a Noise Ordinance, then the Borough has not met the mandatory requirement of obtaining written approval from the [...] under the Noise Control Act and regulations, and the Ordinance is void.  If this is considered a Nuisance Ordinance, then the Borough has usurped the authority of regulation of nuisances that has been specifically granted to the [...], and the Ordinance is void.  Principles of statutory interpretation do not allow for a third “necessary and proper” Noise Ordinance that does not already fall into one of these two categories.
[brief] Under the ACO, Plaintiff was required to complete remediation, submit a final remediation report for soils, and apply for a remedial action permit for groundwater by March 31, 2024 (Da29, ¶25 & ¶26).  Testimony by Plaintiff’s LSRP indicated that even this deadline would not be satisfied.  Evidence established that not only was Plaintiff’s prior remedial investigation incomplete because additional testing needed to be done (T1, 18:3-10 & 29:17-19 & 34:7-8), but also that Plaintiff could not complete remediation by the March 31, 2024, deadline.  Plaintiff’s LSRP testified that for groundwater alone it would take at least two years before remediation can be complete.  (T1, 33:7-12).  He explained, “[w]hat will dictate the length of time for the remediation will be the results of that groundwater monitoring.  We expect that to go for at least two years with samples collected on a quarterly basis. ” (T1, 18:15-18).  Plaintiff’s attorney said it would not be until summer of 2024 until they had the soil contamination “under control” and the LSRP “knows what needs to be done…” (T1, 39:4-11).
[brief] CONCLUSION  The parties specifically named the author of their settlement agreement as the “sole arbitrator” of any dispute concerning the enforcement of that agreement—something he was uniquely qualified to do.  The parties made no provision for a replacement or substitute arbitrator.  Thus, the agreement to arbitrate extended only to an arbitration before that specifically identified arbitrator.  When he was no longer available, there was no further agreement to arbitrate, and the trial court exceeded its authority by compelling [...] to arbitrate the dispute before a substitute arbitrator selected by a Superior Court judge.  Nothing raised by [...] in its appellate brief changes that outcome.
[brief] (Da019, District Court Docket Report, [...]).  Plaintiff, however, did not file a “red-lined” version of the new pleading as he was ordered to do by the Court.  Plaintiff also failed to file a brief along with the motion to amend, and Plaintiff failed to file a statement that no brief was necessary pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(4).  (Da019).  The Defendants submitted letters to the Court pointing out Plaintiff’s deficiencies and asking that Plaintiff’s motion to amend be terminated. (Da019, District Court Docket Report, [...]).  On June 5, 2019, the Defendants’ request to terminate was denied; however, the Court ordered Plaintiff to produce by June 19, 2019, the “redlined” version of the new pleading, as required by the March 19, 2019, Order.  (Da019, District Court Docket Report, [...]).  On July 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed his reply brief which contained a “corrected” Fourth Amended Complaint.  (Da020-21, District Court Docket Report, [...]).  4.
[brief] (22T21-18 to 22-17, 27-20 to 28-6, 33-16 to 34-10, 35-5 to 12, 38-5; Da304)  When second PCR counsel was substituted and served interrogatories consistent with [...]’s April 21, 2021 order, [...] refused to answer or provide any details concerning when and how the drive disappeared or who was involved in the decision to dispose of it.  (Da306-19)  On June 19, 2023, [...] filed a motion to compel the State to comply with the April 21, 2021 discovery order.
[brief] As stated above, to prove a claim of harassment under LAD, Plaintiff must first establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination by showing that the harassment “would not have occurred but for the employee’s [protected status]”  *Johnson*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1137, at *16.  Plaintiff testified she never complained to anyone that [...] subjected her to derogatory remarks, insults or any verbal abuse.  (Pl. Tr. 303:2-11).  Rather, Plaintiff claims that her interactions with [...] changed over time, and he avoided communicating with her, ignored her, gave her increased work assignments, scrutinized her, and reprimanded her for not signing her December 2018 evaluation.  (Pa13-17).  The record evidence, however, shows that none of the alleged “harassing” conduct was because of Plaintiff’s race or age but for legitimate reasons.
[brief] The court further presumed that the Revised Policy contemplates that LAD protected characteristics constitute an adverse impact upon student health, safety and well-being and thereby “invites violation of the LAD. ” (p. 14) (Da406).  The court’s conclusions are detached from - both - reality and the policy’s plain language.  First, the trial court concedes that “parental autonomy is … a fundamental liberty interest protected by the … Constitution” (p. 19, Da411), but then completely ignores the reality that protected characteristics may be incidentally implicated in matters involving adverse impacts of which parents should be apprised pursuant to their Constitutional autonomy.  It is beyond serious dispute that a protected characteristic could be an incidental fact in a situation involving an adverse impact.  Indeed, even the State’s non-binding Transgender Guidance contemplates disclosure of a student’s transgender status “as allowed by law” and for “health and safety” reasons (Da228-234).  The court’s position, taken to its logical extreme, would prohibit notifying a parent that their child is pregnant because pregnancy is a protected characteristic under the LAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f).  But see Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding a constitutional violation where swim coach did not advise parents of his suspicion that their daughter was pregnant).  Likewise, parents could not be notified of their child’s anorexia, body dysmorphia, cutting -- all protected characteristics (e.g., disabilities) under the LAD.  The court essentially ignores that effective parenting necessarily presupposes parental awareness of matters affecting one’s child irrespective of whether such matters implicate LGBTQ+ status.
[directive] 14.  Assist with community relations activities and crime prevention programs, as appropriate.  Page 9 of 16  Investigators should ensure that all physical remains of the incident are removed after crime scene processing is completed.  If the remains cannot be physically carried away (example: paint on walls), the appropriate level of command should attempt to notify building or property owners regarding the need for complete removal as soon as possible after the crime scene has been fully processed.  Community leaders and organizations are important resources during any bias incident investigation.  These resources can help to broaden the investigator’s understanding of the incident.  They can also help to convince reluctant victims and witnesses to cooperate with investigators and encourage more victims to report bias incidents.  Investigators shall be sensitive to the safety concerns of victims and witnesses, and arrange for appropriate security measures to be implemented to protect persons and property.  10.
[brief] C)  The proper scope and application of the accord and satisfaction doctrine  As soon as the trial court learned that I had cashed the check (for the single prize I had been awarded), and without making any further inquiry whatsoever, the trial court instantly ruled that my claims were nullified because of accord and satisfaction.  However, as set forth in my opening / principal brief, this was yet another erroneous ruling of law, for which the Respondents do not even attempt to argue that my cited authority (i.e. *Zeller v.  [...]*, 299 NJ Super. 461 (App. Div. 1997)) was somehow misapplied, or that my cited authority is no longer good law (*e.g.* that there was a recent change in controlling law, as was mentioned by the trial court), etc.
[brief] The Trial Court Apportioned Punitive Damages Against Each Individual [...] According to the Appellate Division’s Narrow Remand Mandate and the Law.  The [...]’ assertion that the record is insufficient to award punitive damages against them fails against the Appellate Division’s prior decision and the law.  The panel concluded that the “punitive damages awards [could not] stand” for a limited reason: the trial court based its calculations on the “non-RICO claims for the period from 1989 to 2011,” when the statute of limitations precluded non-RICO tort damages based on injuries that occurred before October 1, 2003.
[brief] However on Sunday Aug 14th, [...] rejected this offer without any explanation or counter offer, and instead 2 days later sent me and my sister what I believed (and still believe) to be a bogus R. 1:4-8 letter.  I had also called counsel for [...], asking him to try to convince [...]’s attorney to accept my offer, as it would get his client off the hook for no money at all.  But he refused to even make a quick call to [...], and instead chose to send us his own bogus R. 1:4-8 letter.  [...] filed a second motion to dismiss, and I filed an opposition/cross motions, seeking to enforce the Aug 12th settlement, and to sanction the attorneys.  On Sep 23, 2022 [...]’s motions were granted and my cross motions were denied.
[brief] Compare Pa154, ¶17 with Pa762, ¶17; Pa222-235, 281-319; Pa1152 at 16:33:30 to 16:33:35.  The train was travelling approximately 11 to 12 mph at the moment of impact with [...].  Pa351 (Defendants’ expert concluded, “[t]he speed at the point of impact was calculated to be approximately 12.1 mph. ”); Pa585:9-14 (Plaintiff’s expert concluded the speed of the light rail train at the time of impact was “11 miles an hour, 11.1 miles per hour”). \(^7\)  It took approximately 5 to 6 seconds for the train to stop after [...] applied the brakes.  Compare Pa162, ¶64 with Pa 764, ¶64.  The train stopped approximately 4 seconds after the impact with the head end just before the entrance to the Exchange Place station.  Compare Pa162, ¶63 with Pa 764, ¶63.  [...] did not exceed 25 mph as Train 81 travelled down the last block from Grand Street to the point of --- \(^6\)  Plaintiff disputed this fact (Pa764, ¶61) in her opposition papers without providing any basis for the dispute, and the video indisputably shows that [...] never attempted to move from the path of the oncoming train prior to the impact.  \(^7\)  Plaintiff disputed this fact in her opposition papers (Pa764, ¶62) without providing any basis for the dispute, and her expert agrees with the fact.  impact at the York Street Crossing.  Pa346 at Figure 28; Pa585:11-19. \(^8\)  Plaintiff does not dispute that [...] was not permitted to enter the crossing when she did under the circumstances present.  T8:4-9:1; Compare Pa163, ¶73 with Pa765, ¶73; Pa361 at ¶9; Pa582:20-23.  \(^8\)  Plaintiff disputed this fact in her opposition papers (Pa764, ¶55) without providing any basis for the dispute, and her expert agrees with the fact.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth in Point I through III, the convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.  As argued in Point IV, the judgment of conviction must be amended to merge count three into count two and to reflect 1,119 days of jail credits.  And as argued in Point V, the matter must be remanded for a hearing on [...]’s ability to pay restitution.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant BY: /s/ [...] JOHN P. FLYNN  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 303312019  Dated: November 20, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY :  Plaintiff, On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  -vs-  [...], Defendant-Appellant.  Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. and jury PRO SE  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] Failing to calculate damages with precision does not bar recovery of lost profits, and it would be a “travesty to deny a Plaintiff essential justice because the absence of means for precision precludes perfect justice. ”  *Id.* at 427 (quoting *Am. Sanitary Sales Co. v. State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Purchase & Prop.*, 178 N.J. Super. 429, 435 (App. Div. 1981)).
[brief] The Board Attorney further stated “I ask that you keep your opinion to what he presents, not to go outside and, outside of the application and talk about things again that were already during the use variance part of this or really things that are going to be part of the site plan…  Tonight we’re just talking about where we’re going to draw the lines. ” (1T8-4 to 1T8-9; 1T8-10 to 1T8-12).  When board members tried to ask questions on the application materials, such as the stormwater management issues, the Board Attorney prohibited the cross-examination on topics outside the limited testimony provided by Applicant’s witnesses on the subdivision lines.
[brief] In or about May 1996, the [...] concluded that certain areas in the City were areas-in-need-of-redevelopment as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 40A:12-5 of the “Local Redevelopment and Housing Law. ”  To that end, the City, on May 14, 1996, enacted Ordinance # 15-96 adopting the “[...], New Jersey Oceanfront- Broadway Redevelopment Plan” (the “Redevelopment Plan”) and incorporated that Plan into the City Ordinances as § 345-82 et seq.  (Pa567 to Pa570; Pa571 to Pa593).  The Ocean Property and the Blackridge Property were designated as part of the Beachfront South Sector of the Redevelopment Area.  (Pa571 to Pa593).  C.
[brief] THE DEVELOPER IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE MAINTENANCE OBLIGATION (not raised below)  The Borough amply pleaded and argued that any dedication was conditional.  Had the Court recognized such conditions the need to assert an estoppel argument did not exist.  However, now that the trial court has found the conditions to be irrelevant to its final decision, an estoppel defense must be raised as a matter fundamental fairness to the Borough.  The Developer consented to the condition of Borough approval in its Developer Agreements.  It recognized this condition when it sought Borough Council approval.  However, as soon as the Developer obtained a negative result, the Developer switched its position and contended that the conditions no longer applied.  The Developer knew or should have known that once it agreed to comply with the resolutions and the Developer's Agreements, and then sold all some of its property and made its profit, that the Borough may now be without a remedy as it concerns the responsible party for maintenance, other than the taxpayers of the Borough.  If the developer was dissatisfied with the Developer's Agreement it could have negotiated alternative provisions or made other arrangements for ownership and maintenance of the roadways.
[directive] This exists.  cause probable belief that officer's designated officer supervisory or a Directive of this 3.2 Section to pursuant consulted prosecutor acomplaint-summons issue to whether decision inform the to helping 3.3.2, subsection to pursuant the issued, acomplaint-warrant is If Directive. this under acomplaint-warrant for apply or the inform might also Report Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary a in captured information prosecutor assist the may detention, and pretrial for motion a file to whether decision prosecutor's first at prosecutor (requiring :4-2(c)(1)(A) R. 3 See hearing. detention pretrial a for preparing in enforcement preliminary law available of any copy a with defendant "provide to appearance cause"). establish probable to used material any and offense concerning the report incident the Police, State with the consultation in Justice, Criminal of Division the Accordingly, of Chiefs of Association Jersey New the and Jersey, New of Association Prosecutors County Preliminary electronic an appropriate as supplement or update periodically and develop shall Police, pertaining a to information capture to used be could that form Report Incident Enforcement Law burglaries/ assaults, offenses, drug offenses, violence domestic (e.g., offenses common of range should Report Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary The etc.). offenses, sex robberies, thefts, contact victim (e.g., discoverable not is that information recorded that so designed be reference by incorporated and to appended material from segregated easily be can information) State's the under provided be to required material other any or Cause, Probable of Affidavit an in when obligations discovery
[directive] Two or more of the below-listed activities are likely to occur during a single encounter or event.  For 2 example, a frisk ordinarily occurs after an officer already has initiated an investigative detention (i.e., a “stop”), and a custodial interrogation typically occurs after the officer has arrested the person being interrogated.  Although these specified activities often will co-occur and overlap, they are presented in this Section to ensure complete coverage of the circumstances when a BWC must be activated.  The specified activity that occurs first during an unfolding encounter will trigger the obligation to activate a BWC.  As explained in Section 5.3, once activated based upon the initiation of any of the listed police activities, the BWC generally must remain in operation until the police-civilian encounter is concluded (i.e., until the officer is no longer interacting with or in the presence of the civilian), and not just while the officer is engaged in the specified activity that required activation.