ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, with respect to Request No. 1, Defendants did not even identify the banks where the Defendant LLC held any accounts.  Instead, they merely claimed that [...] “contacted the three possible banking institutions [...], Valey [sic] Bank, and [...],” and were “informed by the banks’ representatives that no accounts are found in these banks as it relates to [the Defendant LLC].”  Da84.  Defendants claimed to “have searched all electronic and hardy copy records to determine if and what banking institution was utilized by the LLC, there are none,” but nevertheless reserved their right to amend their response to the request.  Da84.  Defendants’ response to Request No. 11, which asked who was responsible for communicating with tenants at the Property, similarly ignored [...]’s instructions to “clarify who the superintendent is” (1T37:18-20) repeating their previous terse response of “superintendent.
[brief] As of March 2013, [...] was living in [...].  (2T205-9 to 10).  Her phone started ringing that morning “off the hook. ” (2T208-4 to 6).  She knew it was defendant calling her phone.  (2T208-4 to 12).  Defendant also sent her texts.  (2T208-21 to 23).  In the texts, defendant wrote that he had an emergency and he wanted [...] to come and pick him up.  (2T209-9 to 10).  He also texted her that he was hurt.  (2T209-14).  She texted defendant to tell him she was in bed asleep.  (2T212-1 to 2).  [...] never answered her phone.  (2T209-4 to 5).  In addition to calling [...] and [...], defendant also reached out to his friend, [...], who was living in [...].
[brief] Here, defendants failed to cite and to discuss Article I, paragraphs 1, 2a, 5, 6, 18 and 21 of our State Constitution.  Defendants failed to cite and to discuss Article VI, Section V, paragraph 4 of our State Constitution.  Defendants failed to discuss Article VIII, Section I, paragraph 1(a) and Article VIII, Section III, paragraph 1 of our State Constitution.  Defendants failed to cite and to discuss P.L. 2021, Chapter 17, Section 6; P.L. 2003, Chapter 125, Section 13; P.L. 2002, Chapter 15, Section 10; City of Hackensack v. Hackensack Med. Ctr., 228 N.J. Super. 310, 313 (App. Div. 1988); New Jersey Citizen Action v. State of New Jersey, [...] (Law
[brief] [...] [...]  ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS  [...]  [...] 001211985  On The Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CITATIONS ........................................ ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................  1  ARGUMENT POINT I:  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW  APPLICABLE ON THIS APPEAL IS NOT IN DISPUTE ....  2-3  POINT II: THE OBSERVATIONS OF DEFENDANTS’ INSURANCE  ADJUSTER DURING JURY SELECTION WERE UNREFUTED AND ESTABLISHED CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE BEHAVIOR OBSERVED HAD THE CLEAR CAPACITY TO IMPROPERLY INFLUENCE  THE VERDICT  .........................  3-6  POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED THE DISCRETION ACCORDED TO IT IN CONTROLLING THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE WHEN IT PERMITTED PLAINTIFF TO PRESENT TESTIMONY CONCERNING LOST WAGES ........ ................. 6-8  POINT IV: A TIME-UNIT ARGUMENT WAS PRESENTED TO THE JURY WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THE DEFENSE.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING IT ......  9-12  POINT V: PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE “THEME” OF HIS CASE IGNORES COMPLETELY THE MOST OFFENSIVE ASPECT THEREOF  ......................  12-13  CONCLUSION  .....................................................
[brief] Appellants did not apply for a stay in this case, and we understand construction of the West Milford station is proceeding — at [...]'s own risk, of course.  See In re Request for Proposals #17DPP00144, 454 N.J. Super. 527, 575 (App. Div. 2018) (declaring nonconforming bidder "proceeded at its own risk" in assuming performance under the contract "in light of the significant, challenged deviation in its bid").  "If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the] interpretive process is over," and the court's job is done.  TAC Assocs., 202 N.J. at 541 (alteration in original) (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007)).  But if the language is ambiguous and susceptible "to more than one plausible interpretation," DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492, we turn to extrinsic aids to "effectuate the legislative intent in light of the language used and the objects sought to be achieved," Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 435 (1992) (quoting State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 514 (1980)).
[brief] When a court encounters ambiguous statutory language subject to different interpretations, however, its role is to “ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent. ”  Id. (citing Szemple, 135 N.J. at 422 (citing Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, 122 N.J. 202, 213 (1991)).  In such instances, the Supreme Court has explained that “[e]xtrinsic aids, such as legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction, may be used to help resolve any ambiguity and to ascertain the true intent of the Legislature. ”  Id.
[brief] The failure to find mitigating factors (8) and (9)  [...] argued that mitigating factors (8) and (9), both of which address the likelihood the defendant will commit another offense, were applicable.  The court said that it declined to find either factor “due to the defendant’s lack of remorse and ... his ... revisionist history as to what transpired that evening.  These qualities are obstacles toward rehabilitation and only ... increase the risk of reoffending.
[brief] On February 8, 2024, [...] signed a Final Order directing the following:  1.  The November 1, 2022, Report prepared by the Boundary Commissioners is final as it relates to the boundary lines between Lots 10 and 11 as set forth on the [...] survey of the [...] dated 21 September 16, 2005.  2.  This Order may be recorded with the [...] with a copy of the Report attached to this Order.  (Pa96).  The Order further read, “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this shall be FINAL ORDER in this matter, and shall be circulated to all parties, including the neighboring Lot owners. ”  (Pa96).  In accordance with the Court’s Final Order, counsel for Plaintiffs and counsel for Defendants duly recorded the Order with the [...], annexing a copy of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report.
[brief] 1:7-1.  If, at any time within one year after any law or joint resolution has been filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to sections 1:2-5, 1:2-6 or 1:2-7 of this Title, the Governor has reason to believe that any such law or joint resolution was not duly passed by both houses of Legislature, or approved by the Governor or otherwise made effective as law in the manner required by the Constitution, he may direct the Attorney-General to apply to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, to have the law or joint resolution adjudged void.  Thereupon the Attorney-General shall prepare, sign and prosecute the application.  Section 1:7-2 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-2.  The court, on the application, shall inquire summarily into the circumstances and may, for that purpose, order witnesses to be subpoenaed and sworn and their depositions taken and such notice to be given of the taking of depositions and the hearing before the court, by publication or otherwise, as it deems just.  Section 1:7-3 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-3.  After a full hearing the court may, if satisfied that the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the enactment and approval of laws and joint resolutions have not been complied with, adjudge the law or joint resolution or any part thereof to be void.
[brief] **The daughter’s age is immaterial. **  Plaintiffs argued below, with no citation to authority, that no contract was formed here because [...]’s minor daughter lacked capacity to enter a contract.  But Plaintiffs’ daughter did not enter the Terms of Use on her own behalf—she did so as an agent of and on behalf of [...].  The infancy defense is inapplicable because no one is attempting to enforce a contract against Plaintiffs’ daughter.
[brief] As articulated during oral argument, the basis of Plaintiff’s argument is that it wasn’t until the underlying conviction was fully resolved and that matter terminated favorably to Plaintiff that his causes of actions accrued.  However, the legal authority to support Plaintiff’s argument comes from the law specifically regarding a malicious prosecution action—which is not presently before the court.  Aa270.  (Emphasis added).  Compare, however, the federal court’s previous findings, in pertinent part:
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to a first or second degree violent crime that occurred between June 9, 1997 and June 29, 2001.  Przestępstwo z użyciem przemocy to dowolne przestępstwo, którego sprawca powoduje zgon, poważny uraz ciała, używa śmiercionośnej broni lub grozi bezpośrednio użyciem takiej broni.  Przestępstwo z użyciem przemocy obejmuje również wszelkie rodzaje kwalifikowanej napaści na tle seksualnym lub napaści na tle sprawca użył lub groził bezpośrednim użyciem przemocy fizycznej.  Broń seksualnym, podczas której śmiercionośna oznacza każdą broń palną lub inną, urządzenie, przyrząd, materiał lub substancję, ożywioną lub nieożywioną, która została użyta lub miała być użyta w sposób mogący doprowadzić do zgonu lub poważnych urazów ciała.  Poważny uraz ciała to uraz ciała wywołujący znaczne niebezpieczeństwo zgonu lub powodujący poważne, trwałe zniekształcenia, długotrwałą utratę lub zaburzenie czynności danej części ciała lub narządu wewnętrznego.
[brief] CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 50 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Aden v. Fortsh,** | 43, 46 | | 169 N.J. 64 (2001) | | | **Avery v. Arthur E. Armitage Agency,** | 44 | | 242 N.J. Super. 293 (App. Div. 1990) | | | **Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Group,** | 15 | | 220 N.J. 544 (2015) | | | **Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency,** | 38 | | 197 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1984) | | | **Bauman v. Royal Indem. Co.,** | 28 | | 36 N.J. 12 (1961) | | | **Bright v. T & W Suffolk, Inc.,** | 30 | | 268 N.J. Super. 220 (App. Div. 1993) | | | **Celino v. General Acc. Ins.,** | 40, 41 | | 211 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986) | | | **County of Essex v. First Union Nat. Bank,** | 49 | | 186 N.J. 46 (2006) | | | **Dimarino v. Wishkin,** | 44, 45 | | 195 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 1984) | | | **Driscoll Const. Co., Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transportation,** | 15 | | 371 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div. 2004) | | | **Exchevarias v. Lopez,** | 29 | | 240 N.J. Super. 104 (App. Div. 1990) | | | **Harvester Chemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,** | 34 | | 277 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 1994) | | | **In re Estate of Lash,** | 49 | | 169 N.J. 20 (2001) | | Insinga v. Hegedus, 231 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 1989) ......................................................... 38 Kende Leasing Corp. v. A.I. Credit Corp., 217 N.J. Super. 101 (App. Div. 1987) .........................................................
[brief] Retaliation is not “limited to a single discrete action, but may include ‘many separate but relatively minor instances of behavior directed against an employee ... that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct. ’”  Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 412 N.J. Super. 17, 29 (App. Div. 2010), quoting Green v. Jersey City Bd. Of Ed., 177 N.J. 434, 448 (2003).
[brief] Id. at 512-14.  Here, the quo warranto statute does not mention the term employment, and thus the word “office” cannot be interpreted in the same terms as advanced by Defendants.  Second, the Court’s limited holding reflected the NJFA’s “undisputed aim . . . to improve the New Jersey economy. ”  Id. at 515 (citing San-Lan Builders, Inc. v. Baxendale, 28 N.J. 148, 155-56 (1958)).  The court therefore held it would be “illogical” to apply the NJFA’s residency requirements to unpaid volunteers when the primary legislative rationale was “to better ensure that the funds . . . paid in salaries to public employees stayed in this state and contributed to the state’s own economy. ”  Id.  Here, Defendants do not point to any economic or financial reason as to why the phrase “any office or franchise,” as used in N.J.S.A. 2A:66-6, cannot or should not include unpaid volunteers.
[brief] 21  ## Table of Authorities ### Cases - **Allen v. Cape May County**, 246 N.J. 275 (2021) ...........................................  11 - **Baez v. Paulo**, 453 N.J. Super. 422 (App. Div. 2018) ........................................... 17 - **Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.**, 214 N.J. 518 (2013) .....................................  11 - **Dzwonar v. McDevvit**, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) .........................................................  11 - **Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co.**, 454 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2018) .... 18, 19, 20 - **Green v. Jersey City Bd. Of Educ.**, 177 N.J. 434 (2003) ....................................... passim - **Knorr v. Smeal**, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) ......................................................................  17 - **Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc.**, 222 N.J. 362 (2015) .....................................................  11 - **Lombardi v. Massa**, 207 N.J. 517 (2011) ..............................................................  6 - **Moore v. City of Philadelphia**, 461 F.3d 331 (3rd Cir. 2006) ...............................  11 - **State v. Camacho**, 218 N.J. 533 (2014) ............................................................... 9 - **State v. Santamaria**, 236 N.J. 390 (2019) ............................................................ 9 - **Tully v. Wu**, 457 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2018) ............................................... 6 - **Villalobos v. Fava**, 342 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 2001) ....................................... 13 ### Statutes - Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) .................................................. passim - N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c) ...................................................................................................... 11 - N.J.S.A. 34:19-5 .......................................................................................................... 7, 11, 12 - N.J.S.A. 34:19-5(a) .................................................................................................... 7, 11 - N.J.S.A. 34:19-8 .......................................................................................................... 2 - New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) .............................................. 1, 2, 3, 13 ### Rules - N.J. Court Rule 2:10-2 ............................................................................................... 9 Preliminary Statement Plaintiff, [...], is a retired Lieutenant with the [...].
[brief] By explaining which car the police were tracking in each clip, her guidance enabled the jury to piece together and comprehend the sequence of events more effectively.  Without her narration, identifying and evaluating the relevant car would have been significantly more challenging for the jury, hindering their ability to decide whether it was indeed the same car.  B.  Any identification testimony from [...] either occurred after the jury had already heard that defendant was identified in the same footage by his girlfriend or was immediately cured by the judge.  Among the fifty clips presented, [...] identified defendant as the person in the clip on only two occasions.  While explaining the investigation and the video compilation process, she mentioned noticing defendant and his girlfriend at a particular location.  The second identification occurred during redirect-examination, expressing her belief that the individual in the video was defendant.  Considering the court's instructions emphasizing the jury's role in evaluating the identification, these two instances among the fifty clips do not rise to the level of plain error.
[directive] A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney General’s Non-enforceability by third parties. authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  The provisions of this Directive and the Use of Force policy shall be severable.  If any Severability. phrase, clause, sentence or provision of either this Directive or the Use of Force Policy is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of either document shall not be affected.  C.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive or the Use Questions. of Force Policy shall be addressed to the Executive Director of OPIA, or their designee.  D.  This Directive shall take effect on December 31, 2021 and remain in force and effect  Effective date. unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.  Accompanying this Directive is the December 2021 Use of Force Policy, which reflects the changes made by this Directive.
[brief] 2  “Pb” refers to [...]’s brief; “Pa” refers to [...]’s appendix; “Da” refers to Defendants-Respondents’ appendix; “T” refers to the transcript from the July 31, 2024 hearing.  3  Defendants-Respondents were initially represented by Deputy Attorney General [...].  (Da4; Da49-73).  On May 2, 2018, [...], Esq., [...], was substituted as counsel for  On March 2, 2022, [...] filed a second lawsuit against Defendants-Respondents, the [...], [...] (“[...]”), [...], [...] (“[...]”), [...], [...], [...], and [...] alleging retaliation and breach of contract because she was denied social worker positions at [...] and [...] (“[...] II”).  (Da74-126).  During the relevant time period, the State Psychiatric hospitals, including [...] and [...], were operated by the [...] due to an executive re-organization.  (Da80).  [...] was retained to represent the Defendants-Respondents in this matter.  (Da3-4; Da19-48; Pa175-77).  By order dated November 9, 2022, the trial court consolidated both matters.
[brief] Third Sinus Surgery/Sick Leave Policy Violation  On August 31, 2018, Appellant was placed on stress leave as a result of a newspaper story being published about the Incident.  [5T13:1-8].  Stress leave is considered to be a form of paid sick leave.  [1T106:21-25].  Appellant never returned from stress leave, as he was suspended without pay on April 11, 2019 [Da33], and ultimately terminated on April 18, 2019.  [Pa82].
[brief] III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT [...] DID NOT SATISFY THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CRITERIA FOR THE D(4)  FAR VARIANCE (Pa37-39)  Unlike a use variance for a non-permitted use, density variances do not require showing particular suitability to establish special reasons.  See, e.g., Grasso v. Spring Lake Heights Bd. of Adj., 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004); Grubbs v. Slowthower, 389 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007).
[brief] “[T]his was not reasonable.  There was nothing to fear here….no real threat.  And certainly nothing for a reasonable person to be afraid of.  Especially a reasonable person who had worked in the legal system for 20 years. ” (4T20-19 to 21-3) (emphasis added).  The jury heard these very arguments, and rejected them.  Finally, even if the new rule had been in place, the victim’s testimony made it clear that the result would have been the same when judged by the perspective of a person similarly situated to the victim.
[directive] Judge Date by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12557 (KROL Order 2)  Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: Name --------------- Name --------------- Address Address Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------- ---------- ---------------- Fax Fax ---------------- Em ail  Em ail ________ If D  Interpreter needed? 0 Yes No yes, language _ _________  If Yes No yes, describe _ 0  ADA accommodation needed?  D  Contact List attached by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12557 (KROL Order 2)  New Jersey Judiciary Contact List  Krol Order •lnt~rity lnd~Pf't'ldence faimHs •Ou.iityServke of In the Matter - Select County - County Prosecutor: Defendant's Attorney: Name Name --------- --------- Telephone Number Telephone Number Em  Em ail ail  Provider Agency: Name Provider Agency CEO ---------------------------  ___________________________  Telephone Number _ Email Court Contact: Name Title  ----------------------------  Telephone Number Em ail by Form  Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12557 (KROL Order 2)  Attachment C ofNGRI Order 3 - Mandating Commitment Acquittee  Who has been Found Dangerous to Self, Others, or Property of as a Result  Mental Illness  * * * of  This order (CN 12558) is to be used after an acquittal by reason insanity is found by the trial court.
[brief] On August 14, 2020, [...] entered into the Subcontract with [...] whereby [...] was to provide fire alarm installation work at the subject property.  The Subcontract contained a clear, unambiguous indemnification provision, whereby [...] assumed the obligation to indemnify [...].  The indemnification provision provided, in relevant part:  “To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Subcontractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Contractor…from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses… arising out of or resulting from the performance of the Work, provided that such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury…caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor… regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss or expense is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder. ” (Da150).  The binding precedent in D’Avila is applicable to the facts here and necessitates a reversal of the trial court’s ruling.
[brief] As [...] is aware, there was no cognizable basis upon which the trial court could have vacated the 4 year old Final Judgment as a result of a post-appeal second untimely motion for reconsideration.  Thus, the prosecution of the motion and appeal is a clear attempt to retaliate against the Plaintiff, is wholly frivolous and amounts to a violation of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct by [...] and frivolous litigation by the Defendant and [...] in violation of R. 1:4-8.
[brief] Here, the Judge of Compensation denied respondent's motion for recusal because she found that she had no personal bias towards either attorney, that she had no personal bias towards either litigant, and that she had no personal knowledge of any of the disputed facts.  (1T13-24 to 1T14-14).  The Judge of Compensation acknowledged that during conferences, which occurred before hearing any testimony or evidence, she revealed that she believed that the decedent would qualify as an essential employee, but that she had not made a decision at that point.  (1T15-2-21).  The Judge of Compensation also found that her experience in the State Assembly as a primary sponsor of the bill did not unduly prejudice her in this matter.  (1T17-1-25).  The Judge of Compensation concluded that she would not recuse herself because she could "make the decision fairly and impartially and look at the law and apply the law as the law is presented and as I know it."