ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | 4 | | TABLE OF APPENDIX | 5 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | 7 | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 9 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 9 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 10 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 31 | | **I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION WAS ERRONEOUS** | | | BECAUSE THE DUTY TO DEFEND IS BROADER THAN THE DUTY TO INDEMNIFY | | | (Raised Below: Pa421; 2T:4,6; 1T12) | 31 | | **II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT  [...]’S MOTION TO DISMISS** | | | AND THE ORDERS SHOULD BE VACATED DUE TO FLAWS IN THE STATEMENT OF REASONS | | | (Raised Below: Pa424; 2T4) | 38 | | **III.  THE COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE THAT THE INTERFERENCE WAS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WHICH TRIGGERS COVERAGE**  | | | (Raised Below: Pa426; 2T4) | 40 | |  **IV.  A MODERN PLEADING OF AN INTENTIONAL WRONG INHERENTLY CARRIES THE POTENTIAL OF RECOVERY UPON THE LESSER THESIS OF A NEGLIGENT INJURY WHICH TRIGGERS COVERAGE**  | | | (Raised Below: Pa426; 2T4) | 40 | |  V.  THE ALLEGATIONS ARE VAGUE AND UNDEFINABLE; AND SUCH AMBIGUITY IN THE PLEADING INDICATES THE POSSIBILITY OF LIABILITY WHICH TRIGGERS COVERAGE (Raised Below: Pa427; 2T:4,10-11) | 41 | | --- | --- | |
[directive] (2)  In all other cases a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if that person purposely or knowingly violates an order entered under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States.  As used in this section, “state” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET No. [...]  [...], ASSIGNEE OF [...], Plaintiff, —against— [...] A.K.A. [...], Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, —against— [...], d/b/a [...], Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS ENTERED MARCH 27, 2023 AND JULY 17, 2023, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, Comment R. 1:6-2(d), Sec. 5 (Gann 2024)  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  June 20, 2024  Order by Hon. [...], J.S.C. Pa253 denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Arbitration Order and Invalidate Unenforceable Contract Provisions of Defendant, [...]’s contract  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Specifically, the Sole Agent for Insureds endorsement provides:  IT IS AGREED THAT THIS POLICY IS ISSUED AT THE DIRECTION OF THE FIRST NAMED INSURED, WHICH SHALL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AND LOSSES UNDER THE DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT AS OUTLINED IN THE POLICY AND SHALL HAVE OTHER POLICY RIGHTS TO ACT ON BEHALF OF INSUREDS.  THE INSUREDS HAVE ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST NAMED INSURED:  * * *  2.  THE RIGHT TO REQUEST CANCELLATION OF THE POLICY; AND 3.  AUTHORIZATION TO ACT ON THEIR BEHALF AS RESPECTS CHANGES TO ANY PROVISIONS OF THIS INSURANCE POLICY.  WE CONSENT TO SUCH ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS, TITLE AND INTEREST.  (TRVa123; and ZURa055.)  The trial court properly found this endorsement gave [...] the right to request [...]’s unenrollment, which [...] did and [...] and [...] effectuated.
[brief] Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J.  499 (1995)  ...........................................28  Adedoyin v. Arc of Morris Cnty. Chapter, Inc., 325 N.J. Super. 173 (App. Div. 1999) .........................................................................................................................30  Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002) ..........................................................22  Georgis v. Scarpa, 226 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1988) ......................................................28, 29 Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp., 185 N.J. 100 (2005) .....................................................29  Hip v. Quevedo, 2024 WL 410719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 5, 2024)  .......................29  Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274 (1994)  .......................................................22  Lipsky v. New Jersey Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2023) .........................................................................................................................22, 26 Nusbaum v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 33 N.J. 419 (1960) ...............................................27  St. James AME Dev. Corp. v. City of Jersey City, 403 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div. 2008)  .........................................................................................................................30  State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017) .................................................................  22 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012)  ...........................................  22  Wear v. Selective Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 2018) ..............................  22  Williams v. Am. Auto Logistics, 226 N.J. 117 (2016) .............................................  29  Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245 (1982) ..................................................................  28  Zimmerman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 260 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div. 1992)  30 State Rules R. 4:23-1 ..................................................................................................................
[brief] THE [...]’S ENFORCEMENT OF N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b) IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE AS THE [...] APPROVED PROMOTIONS IN JULY 2022  DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF GENUINE VACANCIES FOR SUCH PROMOTIONS AND THEN ALLOWED “GENUINE VACANCIES” THAT OCCURRED AFTER SUCH PROMOTIONS TO SATISFY [...] REQUIREMENTS (Not Addressed In Decision Below).  In July, 2022, the City promoted five firefighters to the rank of captain in the absence of “genuine vacancies. ”  The [...]’s own ruling acknowledges the City’s admission that the September and October 2022 retirements were considered the “vacancies” for the July promotions that had already taken place months before.  Pa7.  In fact, in its April 24, 2023 letter to the [...], the City acknowledged that it was the City’s “normal” practice to make promotions before genuine vacancies were created from actual retirements.  Pa62-64.  The [...] was, therefore, aware that there were no “genuine vacancies” for the July 2022 promotions, and the City admitted as such.  Nevertheless, it chose to arbitrarily enforce the rule as against Appellant, who was ranked number one on the promotional list and a disabled veteran, while knowing it’s decision to do so was based on the unlawful conduct of the City.  Inconsistency of enforcement of [...] rules is the very definition of arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable conduct.  V.
[brief] See Db20 (Defendant’s Conclusion, asking this Court to reverse the reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement and the requirement that it pay [...] $499,007.77 in retroactive fees).  Accordingly, if this Court accepts Defendant’s argument, the most this Court could do would be to remand the matter to the Trial Court to oversee the imposition of the specific performance of those agreements, which presumably would require Defendant to build the Authority Garage.
[brief] [...]’s Chronic Complaints and Improper Behavior.  [...] was always a difficult, and sometimes toxic, personality.  Although [...] completed his assigned tasks, he incessantly whined about [...]’s directors and managers, because he “didn’t like to be told what to do. ” (Pa356 at 59:11-60:23; Pa99 at 63:10-65:9).  These petty gripes were about his colleagues, his supervisor, managers and the hospital more broadly—indeed, just about anyone he interacted with.  (Pa102 at 75:15-76:4; Pa231 at 27:2-5).  [...], who always believed he knew better than others, would constantly complain about [...] management.  (Pa356 at 60:8-15).  Moreover, [...] exhibited behavior that was “difficult in the office,” including his frequent bickering with [...] and his constant boasting as to his workplace accomplishments.  (Pa354 at 52:5-14).  [...] would consistently refer to the other staffing coordinators as “lazy” and he “tried to make his persona that he was doing more than like what they were doing and he was the, you know, he was the greatest back stabber. ” (Pa357 at 63:3-8).  [...] also regularly made inappropriate comments about his sexual relationship with his wife and comments related to his divorce.  (Pa356 at 60:4-6).  In addition, [...] would make “very inappropriate,” personal comments directly to other staffing coordinators, once even suggesting that [...] should have let her daughter, who suffered from, and struggled with, addiction, “just die. ” (Pa287 at 40:3-13; Pa288 at 41:10-18).  [...] would also inappropriately “touch people at work. ” (Pa288 at 42:8-22).  [...] complained about having to work during the COVID-19 pandemic.
[brief] *See Henderson v. Hertz Corp.*, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2871, at *14, 2005 WL 4127090 (App. Div. June 22, 2006) (denying plaintiff’s opportunity to bootstrap a licensing failure into a NJCFA claim); *see also Hoffman v. Encore Capital Grp., Inc.*, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1627, at *6, 2008 WL 5245306 (App. Div. Dec. 18, 2008) (holding the NJCFA is not intended “to cover the sale of delinquent debt from a commercial lender to a third-party debt collector”); *Gomez v. Foster & Garbus LLP*, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 183099, at *13-14, 2019 WL 5418090 (D.N.J. Oct 22, 2019) (“the activities of debt buyers, such as [...] and [...] do not fall within the purview of the [NJ]CFA. ”).  Last, Appellant has not alleged and cannot provide any evidence that Respondent committed any fraud or misrepresentation material to a transaction used to induced Defendant to make a purchase.  *Woo-Padva 2*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *10 (“[b]ecause plaintiff did not demonstrate defendant had engaged in unlawful conduct under the CFA or that she had suffered an ascertainable loss, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s CFA claim. ”); *Woo-Padva v. [...]*, No. [...], 2022 WL 267938, at *3 (N.J. Super. L. Jan. 07, 2022) (“The Consumer Fraud Act [] applies only to conduct that rises to the level of deception, fraud, or misrepresentation in connection with the sale of merchandise or services.  ‘To satisfy this requirement, the misrepresentation has to be one which is material to the transaction made to induce the buyer to make the purchase. ’”) (quoting *Castro*, 370 N.J. Super. at 294 (emphasis added).  CONCLUSION
[brief] The impact the type of improper conduct [...] engaged in on those with whom the individual must work has been found by the courts to be of significant relevance.  It is well-settled that, "[w]hen close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment is appropriate."  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983).  The Supreme Court of the United States has further held that there is no necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action."  Id.  Here, the offensive, sexist, demeaning, and misogynistic video that [...] posted in a well-attended chat room, "reflects poor judgment, even if it was accidentally sent to the group, reflects [...]'s attitude towards women, impacts the morale of subordinates and co-workers [many of whom are women] and demonstrates a total disrespect for his position as Commissioner."
[brief] She reported that a female resident yelled, “it’s Buddha. ”  Da15, 0.56-1:19.  Police responded to the scene and found the victim on the ground of the Carver Hall courtyard, moaning and writhing in pain.  11T 156:20-157:21.  An autopsy later revealed that [...] died from a single gunshot wound to his chest.  11T 150:15-20.  No gun or ballistics evidence was recovered.  10T 199:11-12.  [...], [...], and [...] each gave a statement to police that day identifying the defendant as the shooter.
[brief] 1T.  The Trial Court raised significant concerns with [...]’s resort to self-help and locking out of [...] from the premises.  THE COURT:  It sounds like I’m going to need testimony from your clients because your -- I can’t even -- it sounds to me like one of you is saying -- [...]: (inaudible - crosstalk).  THE COURT: -- that you were locked out, because that’s a very important fact.  Should they pay if -- [...]: (inaudible - crosstalk).  THE COURT: -- they don’t have the access?  You’re saying they had the access.  How do I know which one is true?  1T, 19:16-20:1.  THE COURT:  All right.  I’ve heard the parties, but someone -- I’m not still clear on whether or not that happened or not.  But it sounds to me, if a security guard was there, it happened.  1T, 22:3-6.  On February 2, 2024, the Trial Court entered an Order denying [...]’s motion.
[brief] As opposed to our case, where [...] became immediately permanently disabled after repelling with the attempted use of deadly force a life-threatening attack, and where Mr. [...] thwarted a gunman by discharging his service weapon, [...] was suspended because he was testing positive for CDS in contravention of his responsibilities as a judiciary employee in [...].  The Agreement that [...] signed specifically was a resignation from employment and being barred from ever returning to work as a judiciary employee statewide, and in return the consideration he received was that the positive CDS drug test charges were dismissed.  It was a *quid pro quo* agreement wholly different from our case facts, and of equal importance is that [...]’s disciplinary charges arose from misconduct which was not pertaining to his alleged disability application.  [...]’s IA charges related to the disability.  That is not even disputed by the Board or by its appellate counsel.  Thus, [...] is completely factually and legally distinguishable from our case.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE IMMEDIATE APPELLATE REVIEW.  Rule 2:2-4 allows the Appellate Division to grant leave to appeal from an interlocutory order when it is in the interests of justice.  An appellate court will exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal “where there is some showing of merit and justice calls for . . . interference in the cause” and “where some grave damage or injustice may be caused by the order below. ”  Romano v. Maglio, 41 N.J. Super. 561, 568 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 22 N.J. 574 (1956), cert. denied, 53 U.S. 923 (1957).  Defendant recognizes that “[t]he grant of interlocutory review is ‘highly discretionary’ and ‘customarily exercised only sparingly. ’”  Vitanza v. James, 397 N.J. Super. 516, 517 (App. Div. 2008).  This case, however, presents precisely the type of rare circumstances in which the interests of justice require interlocutory review, as the issue goes to the core of [...]’s right to a fair trial.
[brief] *Woo-Padva* 1 cites to *Browne v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Tr.*, No. 21-11871 (KM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2021) (Pa94)—who in turn cites to *Jubelt v. United Mortg. Bankers, Ltd.*, Civil Action No. 13-7150 (ES) (MAH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84595, at *14 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) (Pa98), with *Jubelt* citing *Veras*.  In addressing the private right of action under the NJCFLA, the District Court in *Veras* reasoned that in order to determine whether the NJCFLA implies a private right of action, “the Court must consider . . . whether there is any evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action under the statute and whether implication of a private cause of action in this case would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 46:15-1 and 46:14-2.1.  It would seem logical that if the parties intended to establish an easement for Lot 8 on the School Lot 5 (or for access to the boiler room), that easement would have been included in the 1962 Deed for Lot 8 to provide notice to the world.  Paragraph 10 was at most a temporary permission for the synagogue to utilize portions of Lot 5 for parking and the boiler room for some undefined limited period.  As there was no expiration date, pursuant to Miller the permission must be deemed to have ended either (1) upon being waived by the [...], as in the 1972 school expansion, (2) after a reasonable time (3) on notice, or (4) on a change of ownership.  In fact, each of those terminating events took place.
[brief] Courts examining the legality of an officer’s stop must look at “the whole picture. ”  *State v. Nyema*, 249 N.J. 509, 531 (2022).  The reasonable-suspicion test is incredibly fact sensitive and not “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. ”  *State v. Nishina*, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003); *State v. Pineiro*, 181 N.J. 13, 22 (2004).  See *State v. Valentine*, 134 N.J. 536, 546 (1994)  “No mathematical formula exists for deciding whether the totality of the circumstances provide an officer” with reasonable suspicion.).  Instead, common sense should guide the court’s analysis.  *State v. Stovall*, 170 N.J. 346, 370 (2002).  If the officer’s observations reasonably warranted the limited intrusion upon the individual’s freedom based on the facts present and the rational inferences that can be drawn from the totality of the circumstances, the investigatory stop will be deemed valid.
[brief] Among them are: a.  The right to a jury trial in which the State must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?  b.  The right to remain silent?  c.  The right to confront the witnesses against you?  d.  Do you understand that by pleading you are not waiving your right to appeal (1) the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence (R. 3:5-7(d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))?
[brief] How long will it take to know that?  I mean, if the (indiscernible) the rate you're going now, what do you think?  [...]:  So depending on what the remedy is, if the remedy is to leave material in place, minimum two years of groundwater monitoring.  (T1, 32:21-33:12).  It is even possible that the building will need to be removed as part of the remediation.  (T1, 28:18-29:5).  The Trial Court erroneously assumed that because some soil had been remediated and the contaminated water had not yet reached the municipal aquifer that this meant the Property was safe.  (T3, 56:10-17).  This was simply not true.  The reality is that the LSRP simply did not have enough data to reach any conclusions regarding the safety of the Property.  “[W]e don’t have a book of groundwater data to evaluate concentration trends. ” (T1, 34:7-8).  This is because he undertook the “first groundwater sampling in May” and aquifer testing in June.  (T1, 29:17-18).  Plaintiff’s LSRP testified that NJDEP needs two additional years of quarterly groundwater monitoring just to determine if Plaintiff’s chosen method of remediation, natural attenuation, was effective.  (T1, 18:24-19:3).  If NJDEP cannot make the determination that the Property is safe without that data, how can Plaintiff’s LSRP make that determination?  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:26E-1.15(a)(2), a receptor evaluation and vapor intrusion investigation is required to be conducted if free product is identified within 30 feet of a building that is petroleum hydrocarbon based.  Testimony before the JLUB was that there was free product in the soil under the building.  (T1, 13:1-3).  A claim that the concentration levels “at this time” do not pose a vapor intrusion concern is of little comfort when that data does not take into account any information regarding the levels of contamination under the building.  Thus, the LSRP cannot say with any certainty that the contamination under the building is at levels where vapor intrusion is not a threat and certainly cannot say with any certainty that the contamination on the Property is safe.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant [...] (“Plaintiff”) appeals the Trial Court’s ruling granting summary judgment to Defendants [...] and the individual members of its governing body as to Plaintiff’s claims under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1, et seq.  Plaintiff, a former Police Captain for the Township, alleges that in retaliation for his protected activity, Defendants illegally suspended him from his employment and scurrilously labeled him as a racist cop as a result of Plaintiff performing his duties as a Police Captain in enforcing the law during a police response to an incident during which Defendants concede Plaintiff engaged in no wrongdoing.  In improperly granting summary judgment the Trial Court imposed a non-existent and overly restrictive requirement that under CEPA, in order for a plaintiff-employee to have a reasonable belief that conduct was in violation of a law, regulation or public policy, an employer must have issued or announced a previously existing order, directive, policy, or practice sanctioning that illegal conduct.  Such a requirement is inconsistent with the statute and our case law regarding CEPA.  Our Courts’ interpretation of CEPA favors a broad application of the statute, as opposed to some hyper-technical parsing of who is a whistleblower.  Under the facts of this matter and the applicable law, Plaintiff here is entitled to CEPA protections from retaliation.  Thus, upon its de novo review, this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment below and remand this matter for trial as to Plaintiff’s CEPA claim.
[brief] The Trial Court did at that point characterize the undertaking as a, “not-carefully-thought out joint venture” (6T24:15-16).  It was dicta.  The Court at another point described the plan as, “a concocted, quasi joint venture” (6T21:23).  It was dicta.  The Court did not lay out the elements of a joint venture or marry the facts elicited at trial to joint venture law to reach a conclusion.  The Court never requested that the parties brief the Court on joint ventures, because it was dicta.
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