ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 4.  There is established an [...] ([...]), which shall manage and oversee the [...]’s violence intervention and prevention work and grant making initiatives, Page 6 including its community-based violence intervention work, hospital-based violence intervention and prevention programs, and other similar programs.  [...] will be the lead entity within [...] for the development of an infrastructure of violence intervention and prevention services and programs that will empower communities across the state to lead with a public health approach to public safety.  A key focus will be developing the systems, structures and funding sources that will sustain this infrastructure and establish it as a consistent and dependable part of the State’s public safety architecture.  [...] will lead the [...]’s violence intervention and prevention effort by: identifying best practices and evidence-based interventions; developing frameworks to advance this work; coordinating and building partnerships with law enforcement; developing and recommending new community-based initiatives, setting policy, advising community-based and other local entities on how to incorporate violence intervention strategies into their work; providing technical assistance to community-based violence intervention organizations and local and county entities; and securing funding for violence prevention and intervention work.
[brief] The appropriate remedy when summary decision is denied without cross-motion is to proceed to a hearing, not to *dismiss the Complaint altogether*.  By *sua sponte* dismissing the Complaint itself, the Commission erred as a matter of law.  The Commission also erred in its prior July 26, 2022 decision granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer in part.  In doing so, the Commission improperly weighed the facts in the light most favorable to the party moving for dismissal of Counts 2 and 3, it made plain errors in its factual findings, it inserted facts not in the record, and it fundamentally misconstrued an applicable Executive Order, which Respondent *has openly admitted* to violating at Board meetings while a sitting Board member.  The Commission also erred in dismissing Count 5 of the Complaint in its July 26, 2022 decision by directly contradicting its own Advisory Opinion as to an important jurisdictional issue.  As that decision is now ripe for appeal under N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2), it is also being appealed herein.  For all the reasons that follow, Appellants now request that the Appellate Division 1) reverse the [...]’s Final Agency Decision which dismissed the entire Complaint outright, and 2) reinstate Counts 2, 3, and 5 of the Complaint.
[brief] The discovery period ended on April 17, 2024.  On April 17, 2024, the Court scheduled personal injury arbitration for June 19, 2024.  On May 10, 2024, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment based on the Appellant’s inability to prove the Respondent’s actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazard.  Pa23-66.  Appellant filed opposition to the motion on May 24, 2024.  Pa67-83.  Appellant did not request oral argument in her opposition.  Respondent filed a reply brief on June 3, 2024.
[directive] During either administrative or criminal investigations, generally workplace areas may be searched without a warrant.  The critical question is whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or property the investigator wants to search.  The determination of this expectation must be decided on a case-by-case basis.  There are some areas in a person's workplace where this privacy expectation can exist just as there are some where it does not.  Areas that several employees share or where numerous employees go to utilize files or equipment would present no expectation, or a diminished expectation, of privacy.
[brief] See, e.g., *Orange Taxpayers Council, Inc. v. City of Orange*, 83 N.J. 246, 356 (1980) (employing “judicial deference to the judgment of elected lawmakers….”)  In review of a substantive due process challenge); *Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of Town of West Orange*, 68 N.J. 543, 564-65 (1975) (“statutes[] carry a presumption of validity”….“Legislative bodies are presumed to act on the basis of adequate factual support and…it will be assumed that their enactments rest upon some rational basis within their knowledge and experience. ”).  Here, the state-of-emergency provision of the terroristic threats statute is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and is rationally related to the legitimate legislative purpose of providing essential tools to law enforcement to combat terrorism.
[brief] *Id.* at 202-03.  Despite the relative’s statements that she had power of attorney over the grandmother’s household affairs and had already entered the bedroom before police arrived, the Court held that the officer “could not have relied on an apparent authority” and “needed to establish a greater base of information than he did before following [the relative] up the stairs and into defendant’s bedroom. ”  *Id.* at 203-04.  Specifically, the officer “was obliged to ascertain information about the exclusivity of the use of, and access to, defendant’s bedroom” before entering.  *Id.* at 203.  Here, there was even less reason for the police to objectively believe that [...]’s father had the apparent authority to consent.
[brief] As the [...] states in its brief at page 7, the initial roadway/driveway as proposed as far back as 2002 was an undefined “loop”.  “Part of that development would involve the construction of a new public “loop road” which for all intents and purposes is one road, but is referred to on certain maps as two roads, named Riverfront Boulevard (the “Boulevard”) and Right of Way, (the “Unnamed Road”…).”  Db8  Of course this “loop” was never really defined on the relevant maps.  The best example is the map at Pa110.  This “loop” which constituted the majority of the roadways sought to be dedicated by the Plaintiff was to be a new access way for the athletic club, later to become a church.  As the Resolution of a 2004 application to the [...] (Pa69) stated:  “Applicant seeks to discontinue the existing access to the Athletic Club Property from River Drive and to provide ingress and egress to such property exclusively from an internal roadway” (Pa73, ¶ 9)  There is no reason to suggest that the parties ever understood this driveway “loop” to be anything other than an “internal road” as it was clearly delineated in the 2004 agreement.  The “exclusive” loop for ingress and egress is an implied easement.  “An easement implied by necessity "is predicated upon the strong public policy that no land may be made inaccessible and useless. ”  Leach v. Anderl, 218 N.J. Super. 18, 25 (App. Div. 1987).  As the [...] concluded:  The roadway modifications will include the discontinuance and closing off of the driveway into and out of the Athletic Club Property from River Drive and the provision of ingress and egress to the newly configured Athletic Club Property from the internal roadway to be constructed by Applicant which will connect with Slater Drive.  (Pa74-75)  In other words the “internal roadway” was to serve as a new driveway for the athletic center - this is clearly a form of constructive easement.  What is clear from the foregoing is that both the [...] as well as the [...] understood the “loop” was to be an ingress and egress for the immediate benefit of the Athletic Club.  The record in this matter clearly indicates that an ingress and egress roadway was created for purposes of access to the Athletic club/Church lot which had become landlocked after the County highway was expanded.  This creation of an ingress and egress roadway is an implied easement in favor of the Athletic club and now Church.  The Church should have been named as a party of interest in this case.
[brief] Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v.  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 190 (2016).  “To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must ‘draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party. ’”  Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original).  “A dispute of material fact is ‘genuine only, if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ’”  Gayles by Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2021).
[brief] The Carty Court wanted to limit an officer’s ability to turn a motor vehicle violation into a vehicle search in every case, thereby decreasing the chance for abuse.  Those facts bear no identity to the facts here.  While it is true that the detectives observed defendant committing motor vehicle infractions prior to the stop, providing an independent basis to stop defendant, those motor vehicle infractions and defendant’s behavior following the stop were not the sole facts known by the detectives at the time of the stop.  Nothing in Carty and its progeny could or should have been read by the lower court as requiring such a temporally-stunted reasonable suspicion evaluation.
[brief] ” (2T 205-5 to 206-6).  At that point, [...] jumped out of [...]’s car.  [...] saw “something black” in [...]’s hand, but could not tell what it was.  No one present had a weapon, according to [...], and no shots were fired.  (2T 208-4 to 17).  [...] then “pulled off,” striking both other cars.  (2T 206-17 to 25).  After [...] drove away, a high-speed chase, ending in woods behind a Travel Lodge, ensued.  (1T 218-19 to 21).  [...], a Camden County 911 dispatcher, testified that he received a call, in which the caller stated that he was “on a high speed”; that he was pursuing a person he identified as Eric [...]; and that the person was “on the run” and armed and dangerous,” and had previously “shot up (inaudible).
[brief] Did the Law Division err in tacking on Section 9 contractual legal fees in any sum (here nearly $200,000.00) after final judgment with exact pay off amount stated and recorded in the Registrar Office, and the loan was subsequently refinanced and paid off and discharged?  Answer.  Yes.  [...] did not fit in any category of Section 9 of mortgage contract which permits legal fees, the loan merged into Final Judgment, and loan was paid off via refinance with payoff amount stated in Final Judgment, and was discharged.
[brief] 4.  [...] also found this is yet another Factor that is not indicative of independent contractor status.  5.  Petitioner testified extensively that the Township sets her annual salary, she does not submit invoices for payment by vouchers, she is paid bi-monthly through the Township payroll system, and she is paid a net salary with all taxes taken out and issued a W-2 form at the end of each year.  (T43-22)  6.  All of this was conceded to by [...] at the OAL Hearing as well.  (T175-15)  7.  [...] also did not do an evaluation of this Factor as to Petitioner from 2003 to 2008 when she was in the PERS system.  8.  [...] admitted that the Petitioner does not have any other jobs for [...] besides being the municipal prosecutor (T176-6) and her Law Firm was not contracted for any other services with [...] Township.  (T176-18)  9.  Petitioner also testified she was paid as a municipal employee while she was in the PERS system between 2003 and 2008.  (T44-4)  10.  Petitioner also testified about her appointments as municipal prosecutor by way of Resolution since 2015.  (T44-20 and Pa 13)⁵ 11.  Petitioner testified there was no RFP process, and she did not enter into a Professional Services Agreement with the Township from 2015 to the present.  ⁵ List of positions on the Resolution are all [...] Township employees.  (Pa39)  12.  Petitioner also testified she was paid through the salary ordinance from 2015 to the present.  (T46-11 and Pa13)  13.  Petitioner also testified that as municipal prosecutor, it limits her ability to work in her private law practice and specifically bars her from doing any defense work within in the [...].  (T47-1)  **FACTOR 13 – PAYMENT OF BUSINESS AND/OR TRAVEL EXPENSES**
[brief] ”  *State v. Brown*, 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., *State ex rel. J.M.*, 339 N.J. Super. 244, 248-49 (App. Div. 2001) (reversing probable cause finding because police officer’s version of events “belie[d] common sense”); *State v. Taylor*, 38 N.J. Super. 6, 23-24 (App. Div. 1955) (rejecting credibility findings where officers’ testimony contained “incredible and improbable elements” “beyond the probabilities of common experience”).
[brief] RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018).  Summary judgment must be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits … show that there is no genuine issues as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995).  “[A] court should deny a summary judgment motion only where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact challenged. ’”  [emphasis added]  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529.  A “nonmoving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any facts in dispute. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  Rather, an alleged dispute must be both genuine and material to defeat summary judgment.  To show that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party may not rest upon bare conclusions, without factual support.  Sullivan v. Port Auth. of NY and NJ, 449 N.J. Super. 276, 279-80 (App. Div. 2017).  Self-serving assertions are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and cannot defeat the moving party’s entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law.  Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J. Super. 231, 233 (App. Div. 2007).  “[W]here the party opposing summary judgment points only to disputed issues of fact that are ‘of an insubstantial nature,’ the proper disposition is summary judgment. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529.  Indeed, the party opposing summary judgment “‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts[,]’”  Triffin v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-24 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Big Apple BMW Inc. v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993), as “[c]ompetent opposition requires ‘competent evidential material’ beyond mere ‘speculation’ and ‘fanciful arguments. ’”  Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009).  An inference can only be drawn from proven facts—it cannot be based on mere conjecture, speculation, or a surmise.  Long v. Landi, 35 N.J. 44 (1961).  Contrary to [...]’s argument on appeal, the Trial Court did not decide fact issues, rather it viewed the myriad of facts alleged by [...] irrelevant to the material issues to be decided.
[brief] Specifically, while Plaintiff alleges that - The documents were “presented to [her] in a way that indicated that they were nothing more than company policy” (Pa138 at ¶ 17); - She “did not actually sign any documents, physically or electronically” and she “did not even type [her] name into any signature box” (Pa138 at ¶ 20); - Despite being highly educated, she “had no idea what arbitration even meant” (Pa139 at ¶ 22); and - “If [she] had known that by simply opening up the policies on [her] cell phone [she] waived [her] right to a jury trial, [she] would not have opened up the alleged arbitration agreement or, at the very least, [she] would have asked for a physical copy of the document to review with an attorney” (Pa139 at ¶ 23), Plaintiff also admits that - She received a link to and could access [...]’s online portal (Pa136 at ¶ 9, 12); - She understood she was required to “electronically acknowledge a number of . . . [...]’s policies and procedures” through that “online portal” (Pa136 at ¶ 9); - She completed the required forms “on [her] cell phone” outside of the presence of any [...] agents or employees (Pa137 at ¶ 12); - The online portal provided Plaintiff with the ability to save the policies she reviewed (Pa137 at ¶ 16); and - Any pressure to complete the agreement was subjective because the only instruction she received from [...] was a generalized request “to complete the employee onboarding process as quickly as possible so there would be no delays in starting [her] job following the health screen and other onboarding procedures” (Pa138 at ¶ 18).  Contradictions aside, none of the statements in Plaintiff’s Certification about the circumstances under which she executed the MAA comes close to rising to the level of fraud or misrepresentation that would invalidate a contract.  Martindale, 173 N.J. at 91; Young, 297 N.J. Super. at 617-18 (rejecting a plaintiff’s challenge to the enforcement of an arbitration clause where, among other things, the plaintiff alleged he was presented with the agreement containing the arbitration provision without sufficient time to read it carefully; that he did not notice the arbitration provision and thought the document was only an application to take an exam; his employer failed to call his attention to the arbitration provision; and he was never given a copy of the document that he signed).
[brief] EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Env’t Barrier Co., LLC, 440 N.J. Super. 325, 339 (App. Div. 2015) (citations omitted).  Determinations regarding subject matter jurisdiction and standing are reviewed by this Court de novo.  AmeriCare Emergency Med. Serv., Inc. v. City of Orange Twp., 463 N.J. Super. 562, 570 (App. Div. 2020) (“The determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a legal question, which we review de novo. ”); Brennan on behalf of State v. Lonegan, 454 N.J. Super. 613, 618 (App. Div. 2018) (“Standing is a question of law we review de novo. ”).
[brief] Although it is true that a focus of the questioning was the basis for [...]’s conclusions that transactions were “unauthorized,” none of plaintiffs’ citations, all of which were to the February 15, 2022 transcript, show that [...] relied upon anything other than his own assumptions regarding the transactions to support his conclusions:  •  [...] referred to a pattern of activity that suggested an intent to divert funds but admitted he could not offer an opinion as to [...]’s intent.  (10T26:12-28:11)  • [...] concluded that payroll and payroll taxes paid to [...]’s service provider were “unauthorized” simply because the expenses were duplicate.  (10T78:21-79:1)  •  [...] concluded that payments made to plaintiffs, [...] and [...], were “unauthorized” because the payments were not for valid expenses of [...].  (10T79:19-80:22)  The fact that the trial court “credited [...] and rejected the defense’s position that there was no evidence the transactions were unauthorized” neither sanctions [...]’s net opinion nor provides a basis for finding merit in the court’s conclusion.
[brief] THE COURT:  Well, I’ll make the finding that a pump house is a structure, as far as I’m concerned and under the statute.  With that being said, do you want to take a conditional guilty plea and take it up?  Is that what you’d like to do?  [...]: . . . .  So it’s guilty plea for purposes of today with the potential reversal if there’s a successful appeal.  (2T17-11 to 18-3)  Defendant then plead guilty to the charge set forth on the ticket of having a loaded firearm within 450 feet of a dwelling.
[brief] Relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) is available only when “truly exceptional circumstances are present,” because of the “importance that we attach to the finality of judgments. ”  Housing Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 286 (1994) (quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 395 (1984). )  The grant or denial of a motion brought under R. 4:50–1(f) is addressed to the motion judge’s sound discretion.
[brief] The standard of review on this appeal is *de novo*.  "On a disputed motion to enforce a settlement," a trial court must apply the same standards "as on a motion for summary judgment."  *Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk*, 305 N.J. Super. 469, 474-75 (App. Div. 1997).  This standard is *de novo*, as a “trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co.*, 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  \(^2\)  Additionally, [...] recently received late notice from [...] that they have hired a contractor to excavate the asphalt millings from the site as of May 28, 2024.  [...] is entitled to due process and a full-fledged lawsuit with discovery and experts (and a trial) "to establish the facts. ”  Ibid. (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] However, such a reading makes an arbitrary and unreasonable distinction between sidewalks that the public use to benefit a commercial defendant versus those parking lots that are adjacent to these same sidewalks that the public also use to benefit a commercial defendant.  Moreover, the common law has evolved to suggest that public walkways, at least with respect to a commercial defendant’s duty to remove snow and ice, includes those parking lots that the public uses as well.  Generally, our courts have recognized the proposition that a parking area is an integral portion of a defendant’s shopping center.  *Bates v. Valley Fair Enterprises, Inc.*, 86 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1964).  As such, a commercial defendant owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain it in a reasonably safe condition and to keep it free of ice and snow.  *Id.*  Public walkways as contemplated in *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b) do not necessarily mean only publicly owned sidewalks.  “It is axiomatic ‘public walkways’ are not synonymous with public property. ”  *Smith v. Costco*, 2023 WL 4307729 (App. Div. 2023) (Da 141).  For example, the *Pareja* court considered the commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice from public walkways, but did not limit to the sidewalk since the fall in that case occurred in a driveway apron (the area that connects the driveway to the public road) and not on the sidewalk.  *Pareja, supra* at 549.  Similarly, a driveway apron was again --- 3
[brief] See id.  Appellant was not told to take the documents home and review them carefully by herself or with counsel.  See id.  In fact, she was instructed to login on her cell phone so she could complete them immediately while she was in the waiting room for a doctor’s appointment.  See id.  Indeed, there was no one who suggested to Appellant that these documents were important for any particular reason and, also, certainly no proffer from Respondents that it was affecting her right to sue in a court of law.  The totality of circumstances bespeaks procedural unconscionability requiring the Arbitration Agreement to be declared void  \textit{ab initio}.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5.  The precedent relied upon by Appellant does not counsel otherwise.  In Bell v. Bass River, 196 N.J. Super. 304, 313 (Law Div. 1984), the Law Division judge collected cases suggesting that “boards of adjustment have been entertaining questions involving non-conforming uses,” while noting “[n]one of these cases . . . has addressed the question of the jurisdiction of the Board of Adjustment to hear non-conforming use issues.
[brief] Lawful interest includes contract interest. ”  T28-19 to 20.  It does not.  Moreover, plaintiff did not ask [...] to award post-mortgage foreclosure interest at the contract rate.  It expressly asked twice for the post-mortgage foreclosure judgment interest to be “lawful” interest by inserting that language in both forms of foreclosure judgement that it submitted, Da20 and Da43, which, as a matter of law, means interest at the legal rate prescribed by R. 4:42-11.