ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Each requalification shall include all applicable night requalification requirements as Standards.5 mandated by the 1.  At least one entire round of firearms requalification with the handgun.  2.  At least one entire round of firearms requalification with the shotgun (for officers authorized to carry).  3.  At least two firearms requalification sessions with the patrol rifle and/or subgun (for officers authorized to carry).  One session shall be a qualification round and the other a training/familiarization round.  D. officers.  The adjustments to the Standards outlined  Firearms requalification for retired in this Directive shall not be applicable to firearms requalification for retired law enforcement officers issued permits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6l.  The requalification requirements for Retired Officer Carry Permits shall continue to be governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6l.
[brief] POINT II ..................................................................................................................30  PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO PLEAD A VIOLATION OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE UNDER THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION (Pa001028–1031).  .................................................30  POINT V ..................................................................................................................37  THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO PLEAD A VIOLATION UNDER THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION (Pa001028–1031).  ............................................................................................37  POINT VI ..................................................................................................................41  THE COMPLAINT AND PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT FAIL TO ALLEGE VIOLATIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ EQUAL PROTECTION, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS (Pa001028–1031).  ............................................................................................41  POINT VII ...............................................................................................................45  THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD CONTRACTUAL AND QUASI-CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS (Pa001027–1031).  ..............................................................................45  POINT VIII .............................................................................................................47  THE SUPERIOR COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ PREROGATIVE WRIT CHALLENGE (Pa001030–1031).  .......................................................................47 POINT IX .........................................................................................................................49  THE SUPERIOR COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AS FUTILE (Pa001023–1031) ..............................................49  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................50
[brief] [...] and [...] staged the April 2009 meeting, at the office of [...], where [...] misrepresented to [...] that he was the attorney for [...].  487a (39:21–40:8); 487a–488a (40:21–41:1).  In addition, [...] testified that [...] misrepresented that the other person at the meeting in the office of [...] who was there to accept the $250,000.00 check on behalf of [...], was [...].  488a (43:3-9); 497a–498a (349:10–353:21).  Finally, [...] authored and forwarded a default letter dated December 17, 2009, to Plaintiffs, acting as the attorney for the sham entity [...] in furtherance of Defendants’ conspiracy.  694a; 455a–457a (86:1–94:14).  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE FIRST COUNT THROUGH THE EIGHTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO RES JUDICATA AND THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE (182a)
[brief] Without any variances or site plan approval, the Trial Court has endorsed an uncontrolled, unlined, non-designed parking lot to be established at the entry courtyard of a 400-student grade school --- a site entirely occupied by the school.  The hazards of such an unplanned and unapproved set-up are obvious.  The June 27, 2017 Final Judgment as well as the Partial Summary Judgment Order and the March 6, 2018 Sanctions Order were under appeal at the time the Trial Court heard the Sixth Street Violations and the Fence Violation applications and were subsequently reversed on June 25, 2019.
[brief] *Id.* at 19.  Moreover, “[a]n ordinance enacted to advance the general welfare by means of a comprehensive plan is unobjectionable even if the ordinance was initially proposed by private parties and these parties are in fact its ultimate beneficiaries. ”  *Id.* at 18.  When a municipality such as the City adopts a Redevelopment Plan which relaxes density and building requirements in accordance with its statutory authority to address blighted areas under the LRHL, such conduct does not equate to “spot zoning.
[brief] (11T 180-6 to 11; 11T 192-23 to 193-18)  [...] testified that on June 21, 2018, he contacted defendant’s then-attorney and requested that defendant surrender any NJSP ID that he might still have in his possession, and that, when defendant did not surrender any additional ID as a result, a search of defendant’s person, entire home, and car was undertaken pursuant to a warrant on August 22, 2018, but that search revealed no retained ID cards.  (11T 199-22 to 207-5; 12T 91-1 to 9)  [...] admitted that he “mistaken[ly]” told the grand jury, and incorrectly wrote in a report, that the two wallet IDs that were issued to the defendant would have different dates on them.  (11T 215-1 to 11; 11T 219-24 to 220-4)  He also agreed that NJSP troopers are allowed to carry business cards and need not turn those in when they are suspended because those cards are not NJSP property.  (11T 216-18 to 218-4)  [...], Bureau Chief of the NJSP Investigation Bureau, who supervised the investigation into the wallet-ID allegations (12T 95-16 to 96-4), testified similarly to [...] regarding the letter to defendant’s attorney and the subsequent failed search of defendant’s person, home, and car, but he also offered an improper lay opinion on direct examination that is the subject of Point V infra:
[brief] Appellants cite *Mary Carter Paint Co. v. Federal Trade Commission*, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964), *rev'd sub nom* Federal Trade Commission v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 86 S.Ct. 219, 15 L.Ed.2d 128 (1965).  Cb31.  Federal court decisions, however, are not binding on New Jersey state courts.  See e.g. *Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill*, 426 N.J. Super. 143, 156 (App. Div. 2012), citing *Ryan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, I 86 N.J. 431, 436 (2006).  Moreover, Complainants fail to indicate that the language that they quote from in *Mary Carter* appears in a concurring opinion, rather than the majority opinion of the court, 333 F.2d at 660 ([...], concurring) and that the opinion which they cite was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.  In sum, Complainants' argument that the Commission's Final Decision should be reversed because Respondent's Facebook posts did not disclaimers must be rejected.
[brief] Additionally, in January 2016, based on the purported termination of the January 2015 As-Is Contract by the Appellants, based on their requests for additional testing, [...] on behalf of the [...] entered into a contract for sale of the Property with [...].  (Pa 5a.)  Of note, under the real estate contract, the Appellant was given the opportunity to obtain professional property inspections of their choosing, at their expense, and to terminate the contract based on such inspections.  Otherwise, the Contract required the Appellant to purchase the Property as is.  While the [...] had the right to walk away at that time, instead they filed an Order to Show Cause requesting specific performance of the January 2015 As-Is Contract.  (Pa 5a.)  After extensive litigation in the Probate Part, where the Court upheld the terms of the January 2015 As-Is Contract for the sale of the Property, the Appellant ultimately purchased the Property in May 2016.  (Da 46.)  Notwithstanding these capabilities, and despite their alleged knowledge of environmental contamination, the Appellant went through with the purchase of the Property.  Id.  The [...]’ counterclaims were then severed and transferred to the Burlington County Superior Court, Law Division.  On August 24, 2016, the Appellant executed a deed conveying the Property to [...].  (Da 65.)  The only two principals for RAP Farm Enterprises are [...] and [...].  (Da 72.)  B.
[brief] See Goffe, 238 N.J. at 216; Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 482 (“In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ”” (internal citations omitted); C.G. v. Applebee’s Bar & Grill, Inc., 2022 WL 2821574, at *2–3 (Ra08-Ra10).  See also supra, Part I.
[brief] (Pa42-43; Pa254; Pa271).  Meanwhile, defendant did not provide its responses to plaintiff’s discovery demands until May 7, 2021.  (Pa43).  __________________  3  Plaintiff’s counsel’s incorrect representation in Paragraph 4 of his March 15, 2023 Certification, that the Santa Fe was successfully repaired during the March 16, 2021 repair attempt, is an inadvertent typographical error.
[brief] Plaintiff failed to show it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is based entirely on the argument that there is no material issue of fact.  That argument is insufficient for the grant of an order for summary judgment, pursuant to R. 4:46-2(c).  Plaintiff provided no case nor Rule to so limit the application of R. 4:46-2(c).  R. 4:46-2(c) states that the order for summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact AND that the moving party is entitled to an order as a matter of law.  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).  It was the responsibility of Plaintiff, as moving party, to convince the lower Court that Plaintiff was entitled to the order for summary judgment as a matter of law, even if Defendant’s opposition is either not timely or Defendant files no opposition.  R. 4:46-2(b).  The lower Court stated in its Rider and Statement of Reasons:  “In support of an order granting summary judgment, a judge is required ‘to set forth factual findings and correlate them to legal conclusions,’ even when the motion is unopposed.  See R. 1:7-4(a); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fischer, 408 N.J. Super. 289, 300 (App. Div. 2009)....” (Emphasis Added) (Da29).  C.
[directive] Justice, in cooperation with the Attorney General's Advocacy Division of Criminal The of shall develop Association New Jersey, consultation with the County Prosecutors Institute in and legal continuing legal education courses that discuss issues, best or more and periodically update one relating to preventive detention and advocacy skills prosecutorial practices and procedures, and Assistant Every Prosecutor, First under the Bail Reform Law.  County release revocation of Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, and assistant Prosecutor, Director and Deputy Section shall required to designated pursuant 7.8, be attorneys general to and deputy prosecutors prescribed thereafter shall such additional courses or seminars as may be attend attend this course, and decision seek or refrain from seeking and approve the to Director for persons who review by the detention.
[brief] *(7/7/23 Transcript; 10/20/23 Transcript).*  Plaintiff’s argument in Point VI of his appellate brief does not apply to the [...] and thus will not be addressed substantively herein.  Nonetheless, the [...] simply note this argument is yet another example of Plaintiff counsel’s pattern of relying on arguments, pleadings and other filings which are barely coherent at best and filled with ramblings, digressions, and hyperbole.  The first paragraph in Section VI is a perfect example of Plaintiff counsel’s “writing style. ”  There is no statewide conspiracy against Plaintiff’s counsel which spans county officials, prosecutors and Superior Court Judges; rather, Plaintiff’s consistently “digs his own grave” by making outlandish and appropriate claims, which is only compounded by inability to make timely filings and not seek endless extensions for essentially every single motion that has been filed in this action.  Respectfully, if Plaintiff’s counsel seriously believes there is a widespread and far-reaching judicial conspiracy against him, then Plaintiff’s counsel should file his own lawsuit.  The only plaintiff in this action is [...], and Plaintiff’s counsel has done [...] no favors in this action due to his clear inability to comprehend that fundamental fact.  V. CONCLUSION
[brief] Final Judgment in this case was entered November 7, 2022 divesting Appellants of title.  (279a-293a).  Appellants did not file a direct appeal of the Final Judgment.  Appellants’ Motion under Rule 4:50-1 was filed on February 2, 2023, eighty-seven (87) days later.  (90a-142a).  Appellants’ motion was filed within the three (3) month limitation contained in N.J.S.A. 54:5-87, as well as the generic one (1) year limitation for Rule 4:50-1 motions to vacate under to City of East Orange v. Kynor, 383 N.J. Super. 639, 646 (App. Div 2006).
[directive] police in installed devices computing similar or laptop or devices, portable similar or shall Justice, Criminal of Division or Prosecutor County the with consultation in agency, Each Reports.  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary preparing for plan a develop Directive.  of this issuance upon immediately operational become shall subsection  This On-Call by Repot Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary to Access Electronic 5.6.2 Prosecutors. and develop shall Justice Criminal Division of the and Office Prosecutor's County  Each the with general attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant on-call equip to plan a implement Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary transmit and approve, edit, read, receive, to capacity Directive.  this to pursuant prepared Cause Probable of Affidavits electronic and Reports Directive. of this issuance upon immediately operational become shall subsection  This COMPLAINT-WARRANT OF ISSUANCE AFTER APPEARANCES FIRST 6.
[directive] 1.  Law Enforcement Aeencies  A.  No law enforcement agencyor officer in the State shall ask or require an adult, youth or child victim of an alleged sexual offense as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C 14-1et seq. to submit to a polygraph examination or other truth telling device as a condition for proceeding with the investigation of an offense.  B.  The refusal of a victim to submit to a polygraph examination or other truth telling device shall not prevent the investigation,chargingor prosecution of an allegedsexual offense.  2.  County Prosecutors  Each county prosecutor shall ensure that all law enforcement agencies and officers within the prosecutor's jurisdiction are aware of and comply with this Directive.  ---- - - - - 3.  Questions  All questions concerning the interpretation, implementation or enforcement of this law directive shall be addressed to the Attorney General or her designee.
[brief] While the design and configuration of the seawall project within the taking area and the adjoining right of way may protect [...], [...] reliably concluded that, for the reasons stated, it has increased the vulnerability of the [...] property to low-frequency (50 year) storm flooding in the pocket area.  (Da461:15-21; Da472: 11-22)  Very telling, with respect to the elevation differential between the new seawall and the owner’s existing seawall, plaintiff admitted the following:
[brief] Da229-230 (¶ 6).  I.  The Trial Court’s July 19, 2024 Orders  On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff moved for an order requiring [...] to complete his deposition and to answer questions regarding his guilty plea allocution in accordance with [...]’s May 13, 2024 ruling.  Da230.  [...] cross-moved for the entry of a written order memorializing the May 13, 2024 oral ruling and for a stay while he moved for leave to appeal.  Da412.  On July 19, 2024, following oral argument, [...] reaffirmed her May 13, 2024 decision and ordered that [...] appear for his deposition within 45 days (i.e., by September 2, 2024) to answer questions regarding “the facts set forth on the record at the time of his criminal plea allocution[.]”.
[brief] On appeal, [...] argues that four allegedly genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment: (1) [...]’s deposition testimony that [...] approved the charge pay; (2) [...]’s alleged dismissiveness of [...]’s “complaints” could allow jurors to infer a pattern of antagonism toward him; (3) a jury could allegedly infer that [...] derailed [...]’s investigation of her June 24, 2020 behavior given her “discovery” of the charge pay issue; and (4) [...]’s alleged selective application of policy.  However, the record reflects that none of these “facts” are material, genuine, or disputed such that a reasonable factfinder could possibly side with [...].
[brief] [...] did not permit the [...] to present [...]’s testimony (and Law Division [...] subsequently refused to acknowledge the factual admissions that plaintiff’s own witness, [...], made at the Chancery trial, as discussed below).  A578, A995.  Instead, [...] granted a directed verdict to the plaintiff and entered the July 21, 2022 “Final Judgment” based solely on the witnesses that plaintiff had called to testify at the trial.  In the July 21 Judgment, [...] said that plaintiff “is a legally valid and operational investor trust that can own, enforce, and discharge mortgage loans” – despite the [...]’ charge that an “Investor Trust” could not legally hold or own a loan and only a trustee could legally do so.
[brief] As discussed more fully below, the lower court’s failure to consider the basis for vacatur raised under Rule 4:50-1, and to afford [...] the benefit of all reasonable doubts arising from the motion record, resulted in a departure from the applicable law as well as the guiding principles of equity, and thereby sustained a judgment that was substantially larger than it should have been.  This Panel should correct that mistake by vacating [...]’s default judgment and remanding this case for pretrial discovery.  POINT I (Da1)
[brief] (Da179, Da348, Da350, Da356, Da363, Da413, Da416).  Those concerns included, but were not limited to, the fact that the assigned realtor was denying access to certain prospective buyers and/or other realtors to the property, the fact that the assigned realtor was looking to achieve a quick sale of the property even if that meant selling the property substantially below market value, the fact that the property was listed with no notice to the owners and/or their counsel, the fact that [...] changed the access code to the Lock Box so that certain realtors could not gain entry, the fact that [...] was unresponsive and ignored realtors and prospective buyers, and the fact that [...] never obtained unanimous consent prior to accepting the $500,000 offer from [...] despite communications from counsel and other co-owners.  (Da179, Da348, Da350, Da356, Da363, Da413, Da416).  Unable to get an agreement on the sale price for the property to [...], among other issues, [...] sought permission, through an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint to sell the Subject Property at a remarkable and unsupported price of $500,000, which was on average $118,000 lower than what comparable houses were selling for **in the exact same neighborhood** where the Subject Property was located.  (Da15).  On September 14, 2023, [...] opposed the Order to Show Cause and filed an Answer to the Verified Complaint, with counterclaims, along with a motion seeking permission to file counterclaims.
[brief] In fact, it is undisputed that the decedent tested positive for COVID-19 during the time period that the school was closed and in remote session.  (2T41-12 to 2T42-9).  The Judge of Compensation found that while the Workers Compensation Rules do not provide for summary judgment motions, petitioner's motion could be considered under N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.5, which provides for "other motions," and strict compliance with the requirements for summary judgment under the Court Rules do not apply.  (2T71-1 to 2T72-19).  If a motion that essentially seeks summary judgment is to be considered in the Division of Workers Compensation, the Court Rules pertaining to summary judgment should be followed.  Moreover, even if the Workers Compensation Rules are applied, N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.5(b) requires that the motion "shall be supported by affidavit made on personal knowledge setting forth facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify."  Here, petitioner only provided a certification from his attorney, but did not provide an affidavit from anyone with personal knowledge.  While the Judge of Compensation found that she was not strictly bound by the summary judgment requirements of R. 4:46, the Judge of Compensation did not articulate what standards she employed to satisfy N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.5 or otherwise.  Even if the Judge of Compensation applied N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.5, the Judge of Compensation still improperly relieved of petitioner of his proof requirements, finding that the pleadings and exhibits that were submitted were sufficient.  (2T72-20-25).  Petitioner's pleadings contained nothing but allegations, and did not provide a "factual and legal basis for the requested relief" as required by N.J.A.C. 12:235.3.5(a).  The Judge of Compensation found that teachers, including this decedent, should be included in the definition of essential workers.
[directive] [Non/No] c. W ap oblije peye yon amann ba lit kont dwòg ak mezi pou redwi demann dwòg la jan li enimere anba la a pou chak enfraksyon pou ki wap plede koupab la?  Sa ki swiv yo se amann egizijib yo: (1)  $3,000 nan ka yon zak klasifye 1ye degre (2) $2,000 nan ka yon zak klasifye 2yèm degre (3)  $1000 nan ka yon zak klasifye 3yèm degre (4)  $750 nan ka yon zak klasifye 4yèm degre (5)  $500 nan ka yon zak moun kap simen dezòd oswa moun kap fè ti dezòd $ TOTAL Sanksyon (DEDR)
[brief] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)....................................................................................... 9, 21, 27 Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) ...........................................................................................................20  State in Interest of A.S., 227 N.J. Super. 541 (App. Div. 1988) ..................................................................................39  State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207 (2008)  ..............................................................................................................11  State v. Andrews, 243 N.J. 447 (2020) .............................................................................................................25  State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1 (1997) ..................................................................................................................15  State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94 (2017)  ...............................................................................................................20 State v. Baum, 199 N.J. 407 (2009) ..............................................................................................................11, 13, 31  State v. Baum, 393 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 2009) ..................................................................................25, 30, 31, 33