ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Russo, supra, 333 N.J. Super. at 138 (citing [State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1998)]); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 3:22-10 (2013) (noting that Preciose "mak[es] clear that [an evidentiary] hearing is required if there is a dispute of fact respecting matters which are not on the record").  In a similar vein, we observed that "[j]ust as when determining whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in connection with his petition for post-conviction relief the facts should be 'view[ed] in the light most favorable to a defendant,' so too, in determining whether to entertain oral argument, the facts should be viewed through the same generous lens.  [State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 282 (2012) (quoting Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 463). ]  Certain factual questions, "including those relating to the nature and content of off-the-record conferences between defendant and [the] trial attorney," are critical to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and can "only be resolved by meticulous analysis and weighing of factual allegations, including assessments of credibility."  Pyatt, supra, 316 N.J. Super. at 51.  These determinations are "best made" through an evidentiary hearing.  Ibid.  Even a suspicious or questionable affidavit supporting a PCR petition "must be tested for credibility and cannot be summarily rejected."  State v. Allen, 398 N.J. Super. 247, 258 (App. Div. 2008).  Porter, supra, at 354-55.  Contrary to the State’s assertion that the defendant did not provide any certifications in support of his PCR claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the defendant did in fact offer three separate certifications in addition to his own certification in support of his PCR petition.  The defendant raised claims supported by certifications that his trial counsel deprived him of effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The defendant supported his claims of trial counsel’s deficiencies by certifications from himself, Private Investigator [...] (Da 132 to 133), Forensic Expert [...] (Aa 21 to 23), and [...] (Aa 24 to 26).  However, the PCR court denied the PCR petition and subsequent motion for reconsideration without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing contrary to State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 243 (2013).
[brief] Slip op. at 14 (“The absence of a grab bar . . . does not render a bathroom inherently dangerous.  Rather, grab bars are more akin to preventative safety measures.  By recognizing a duty to install grab bars in bathrooms, this Court would be imposing a stricter duty of care on [hotel] owners to implement preventative safety measures than is recognized by case law, state regulations or industry custom or practice under New Jersey law.
[brief] Prior to the playing of defendant’s statement, the trial judge read the following instruction:  …it is expected that shortly, you will hear evidence of a statement given by the defendant.  I have instructed you, and I am reminding you again, that the defendant has an absolute right to remain silent.  In fact, it is his constitutional right to remain silent.  The State has the burden of proving the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defendant does not have to prove his innocence, or offer any proof relating to his innocence.  To the extent the defendant invokes his right not to answer certain questions, again, it is his right to do so.
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.  The motion for reconsideration filed by [...] sought to overturn the Trial Court’s order of September 26, 2022, granting summary judgment in favor of [...].  Inasmuch as [...] failed to make the showing necessary to even begin the reconsideration process, the Trial Court correctly denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration.  [...] did not and under the facts of this case could not present any facts that were not previously presented to and considered by the Trial Court.  Further, [...] is unable to demonstrate that the basis for the Trial Court’s decision was palpably incorrect or irrational.  “Reconsideration is a matter within the sound discretion of the Court, to be exercised in the interest of justice.  *D’Atria v. D’Atria*, 576 A.2d 957, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Law Div. 1990).  Moving for reconsideration of a prior order “is not appropriate merely because a litigant is dissatisfied with a decision of the court or wishes to reargue a motion.  *Palombi v. Palombi*, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 997 A.2d 1139, 1147 (App. Div. 2010).  Rather, reconsideration is only appropriate for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  Said another way, a litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process.
[brief] ‘An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded FINALITY is; notice reasonably calculated, under ALL the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and AFFORD them an opportunity to present their objections…” (this clearly speaks directly to Deprivation of Due Process Rights enacted against this defendant because of defective Service of Process in 1990 and first recognized in 2023).  The court failed to evaluate the evidence and facts establishing a meritorious claim of defective service (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41) denying this claim by its employing of missed case law (Pa17-Pa18; Pa33).
[brief] Appellate Division order granting [...]’s motion to appear as amicus curiae, June 20, 2024…………………………Paa1  Appellate Division order granting the [...]’s motion to appear as amicus curiae, September 3, 2024 …………………………………Paa2  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS  The State relies on the counterstatements of procedural history and facts set forth in its main response brief, dated July 30, 2024, and its response brief to amicus [...], also dated July 30, 2024, adding the following.  On August 12, 2024, the [...] filed an amicus curiae letter brief.  (IPAb).  On September 3, 2024, this Court entered an Order granting the [...]’s motion to appear as amicus curiae.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”), the owner of a landlocked parcel of real estate in East Amwell, Hunterdon County, commenced this declaratory judgment action in the Chancery Division alleging entitlement to an express easement to a public street across nearby lots owned, respectively, by defendants [...] and [...], and Richard and [...].  (Da1-Da86)  After taking discovery, all parties cross-moved for summary judgment.  The motion record included a stipulation of undisputed background facts, the parties’ respective statements of material facts and supporting certifications.  (Da143-Da808)  [...] argued that its right to an express easement was explicitly granted by way of a reservation in a deed to one of Baxter’s predecessors in title.  Baxter disputed that claim and argued that [...]’s action was precluded by res judicata, collateral estoppel and the entire controversy doctrine because of earlier litigation brought by [...], one of [...]’s predecessors in title. ³  ³The complaint in that earlier litigation named [...], James’s wife at the time, as a co-defendant.  They divorced in 2006, and in 2013 James married [...] who is named as his co-defendant in the present matter.  To avoid confusion, we will refer to [...], or “Baxter,” as the owner of the property unless the context requires otherwise.  The motions were argued on March 3, 2023.  In an Order and Statement of Reasons issued March 16, 2023 (Da809-Da834), Presiding Judge [...] found that [...] enjoyed an enforceable easement by reservation over Baxter’s property based on a 1966 deed in Baxter’s chain of title, and granted summary judgment against Baxter.  She denied [...]’s motion as to the Stinsons, however, due to genuine issues of material fact, and that remaining claim is currently awaiting trial.  After Judge Goodzeit issued her ruling against Baxter, the undersigned substituted as his counsel and wrote to Judge Goodzeit requesting that she conduct further proceedings to determine what specific uses [...] may make of the easement.  (Da835; Da837-Da838)  [...]’s counsel opposed that request and submitted a proposed order memorializing the express easement and directing the Clerk of Hunterdon County to record it.  (Da839-Da843)  On June 5, 2023, Judge Goodzeit entered [...]’s proposed order along with a separate order deeming her summary judgment “final as to the Baxter defendants as of today, so as to allow them to exercise any appellate rights they deem appropriate. ”  She explained her reasons in an accompanying letter.  (Da845-Da850)  Baxter filed a notice of appeal in the Appellate Division on June 12, 2023 (Da853-Da856).  The Clerk of the Appellate Division questioned the finality of Judge Goodzeit’s order (Da873-Da874), but after reviewing an explanation from Baxter’s counsel (Da875-Da876) posted a notice on the docket on October 2, 2023, authorizing Baxter to proceed with this appeal.
[brief] The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5) could not be clearer and does not require this Court to go any further in the statutory interpretation process.  Even with consideration of the legislative history of the statute, a review over the various versions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a as a whole does not provide additional insight as to factor a(5).  First implemented in January 2000, the statutory language of factor a(5) has not been changed or amended in the last twenty-three years.  This demonstrates the Legislature’s belief that its chosen textual language was clear and did not warrant further explanation or amendment.  The State requests this Court effectuate the Legislature’s clear and unambiguous intent for factor a(5), specifically, to bar as legally ineligible those who unlawfully possess a firearm, either at the time of the present offense underlying the Recovery Court appeal as well as those who unlawfully possess a firearm while any criminal charges are pending, including the charges underpinning a Recovery Court appeal.
[directive] b.  Actor, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, photographs, films, videotapes, records, or otherwise reproduces in any manner, the image of another person whose 2C:14-9(a-c) Invasion of Privacy intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, without that person’s consent and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not expect to be observed, third degree.  c.  Actor, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, discloses any photograph, film, 4th Degree $1,000 to $5,000 10% permissible videotape recording or any other reproduction of the image of another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, unless that person has consented to such disclosure, third degree.  31  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] the fraud.  *Natural Gas*, 562 F.3d at 1042-43.  And, even if New Jersey could have obtained the data, it would need to look, first, at the nationwide conduct of the RMAs to find the fraud and then isolate the New Jersey-specific conduct, which is how Relator identified the fraud because Defendants’ rate-setting practices was largely uniform across the country.  Ja2272, 2275-76l; Ja105-06 (¶ 267).
[brief] Instead, it denied coverage, refused to defend its insured, and did not participate in the litigation or the final settlement of the case.  [...], via [...]’s testimony, effectively relitigated the question whether [...] suffered injury from mold, the issue at the heart of the underlying case.  New Jersey law precludes an insurer that has denied its duty to defend to relitigate issues it could have raised had it complied with its defense obligations.
[brief] Pa30.  Pa56.  Pa58.  Pa60.  On or about May 2, 2023, the [...] administratively denied [...]’s appeal, and the matter was transmitted to the [...].  Pa79.  On or about June 13, 2023, the [...] issued an initial decision to deny [...]’s request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa24.  On or about July 18, 2023, [...] appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa16.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on September 27, 2023.  Pa9.  This appeal ensued.  Pa1.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (PPCIa010).  On June 25, 2021, [...] also sent [...] a letter telling them to undertake remediation or suffer treble damages as permitted by the Spill Act.  (PPCIa042).  On July 20, 2021, [...] sent [...] a letter telling them to comply with the Directive and to address the Incident.  (PPCIa269).  [...] did not respond.  Through June-July 2021, [...]’s counsel sent memos to [...] counsel seeking confirmation of coverage.
[brief] Pa573.  Despite compliance, the trial court completely disregarded Plaintiffs statement of facts, supported by the record.  By way of example, --- \(^7\)  It is also noteworthy that Plaintiff responses to Defendant’s statements of fact likewise had the required direct citation to the record.  Pa192-198.  •  Despite direct citation to Exhibit E in Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts, the trial court abruptly concluded, “There’s no citation to any single page of exhibit E [which was a true copy of the text message chain between Plaintiff and [...], attached to the [...] Certification submitted in opposition to summary judgment] in the brief, so I didn’t read them”  T20:20-22.  •  When counsel for Plaintiff attempted to direct the trial court to the properly cited statement of facts during the oral argument, the trial court refused “I’m not looking at the statement of facts now….I’m not going through it to see if the statement of facts even say what you said they say. ”  T23:10-25.  More specifically, counsel for Plaintiff attempted to direct the court to admitted statements of facts, wherein Defendant acknowledges receiving text messages conveying anxiety.  The trial court rebuffed counsel.  T23:10-25:16.  A trial court is required to consider the evidence presented.
[brief] To this end, the custodian of a government record has the burden to prove that a denial of access is authorized by law, ibid., and, generally, “any limitation on the ‘public’s right of access’ must be construed in favor of access[,]”  Paff v. Galloway Twp., 229 N.J. 340, 344 (2017) (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1).  That said, the right to access is “not absolute[.]”  Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 198 N.J. 274, 284 (2009).  Designed “both to promote prompt access to government records and to encourage requestors and agencies to work together toward that end by accommodating one another[,]” OPRA strives to create a “cooperative balance” that weighs the public’s right to access on one hand with agencies’ obligations and abilities to identify and provide responsive records on the other.  Mason, 196 N.J. at 78.  An agency’s ability to seek reasonable extensions; to charge special, reasonable service charges where requests “involve[] an extraordinary expenditure of time and effort” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(c); or to deny requests that are unduly burdensome after attempting to reach a reasonable solution with the requestor under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g) are bedrock, plain-text examples of OPRA’s attempt to achieve this important balance.  Ibid.  But these are not the only examples.  Soon after OPRA’s passage in 2002, this court was quickly confronted with questions about its marginal edges.
[brief] III.  Parental involvement is essential at every stage in the social transition process.  As a practical matter, parents must be involved for their children to even see a mental health professional.  ACa40-ACa41 ¶¶ 61–64.  Parental involvement is also critical in “the diagnostic process to [allow the mental health professional to] evaluate how long the [minor] has been experiencing gender incongruence, whether there might be any external cause of those feelings, and a prediction of how likely those feelings are to persist. ”  ACa35 ¶ 66.  And given the “complicated risk-benefit calculus . . . and the limited knowledge about long-term effects and outcomes,” parents “should . . . be involved to make important decisions about next steps. ”  ACa44 ¶ 72.  Moreover, excluding parents from decisions about a social transition “drive[s] a wedge between the parent and child” and “undermines [minors’] main support structure”—their families.  ACa45, ACa46 ¶¶ 77, 80.  Parental involvement is also necessary to obtain informed consent.  Minors generally may not be seen “without informed consent from the parent(s)/legal guardian(s), both as a matter of state laws and as a matter of medical ethics. ”  ACa40 ¶ 61.  And because minors “lack the skills for future thinking, planning, . . . and self-reflection,” parents are “integral to the informed consent process. ”  ACa40 ¶ 62.  IV.
[brief] Again, and with the benefit of hindsight, defendant claims that counsel did not inform him of a State’s offer based upon a June 3, 2014, E-Mail that was sent by Assistant Prosecutor [...].  In the E-Mail, [...] states, “No go on the 25.  If he were willing to take another 10 on top of the Somerset charge, I’d consider it. ”  Da14.  It is important to give this statement context.  On March 27, 2014, the defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery in Somerset County.  Da32-36.  On May 30, 2014, the defendant was sentenced to 20 years subject to the NERA.  Ibid.; Pa2.  Furthermore, on May 16, 2014, the defendant appeared with counsel before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., for arraignment.  See (4T).  At the hearing, the State formally placed its offer on the record – plead guilty for a sentencing recommendation of 20 years subject to NERA which would run consecutive to the Somerset County conviction.
[brief] (1T 5-13 to 20)  Likewise, [...] passed up the chance to question [...] about his statement to [...] that a large silver airsoft/pellet gun was found in the Buick upon a search of it, which was a lie.  (Da 49-50) cross examination of Det. [...]'s inconsistencies could have raised major concerns as to the truthfulness of his, [...] and [...] testimonies.
[brief] Trial 175T August 16, 2012  Trial 176T August 17, 2012  Trial 177T October 11, 2012  Trial 178T October 16, 2012  Trial 179T October 17, 2012  Trial 180T October 18, 2012  Trial 181T October 19, 2012  Trial 182T October 22, 2012  Trial 183T October 23, 2012  Trial 184T October 24, 2012  Trial 185T October 25, 2012  Trial 186T November 13, 2012  Trial 187T November 14, 2012  Trial 188T November 15, 2012  Trial 189T November 16, 2012  Trial 190T November 27, 2012  Trial 191T November 28, 2012  Trial 192T November 29, 2012  Trial 193T December 10, 2012  Trial 194T December 11, 2012  Trial 195T December 12, 2012  Trial 196T December 14, 2012  Trial 197T December 19, 2012  Trial 198T December 21, 2012  Trial 199T January 3, 2013  Trial 200T January 4, 2013  Trial 201T January 7, 2013  Trial 202T January 15, 2013
[brief] Defendants may try to rely on Opinion 552 as rejecting a per se prohibition under RPC 1.7 on a single attorney representing multiple defendants.  That argument, if made, is unavailing.  In Opinion 522, one attorney represented both a municipality and individual officials and employees of that municipality as co-defendants in a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Despite finding a potential for conflict, the Supreme Court held that “an absolute rule requiring separate counsel at the pleading stage is not required to adhere to traditional ethics precepts” and that joint representation “is best addressed by an evaluation by the individual attorney of the circumstances of each case. ”  Id. at 206.  The Court’s rationale, however, was limited to the unique facts of that case and cannot be extrapolated to this situation.
[brief] Through an agreement with Plaintiff (the “Operating Agreement”) ³, the defendant [...] (defined above as “Defendant” or “[...]”), assumed the role of pharmacist and sole manager of [...] and she was responsible for the LLC’s day-to-day operations and all managerial decisions.  3T37:5-23.  Plaintiff brought this action alleging, among other related causes of action, that Defendant breached the Operating Agreement and violated the LLC Act by, among other misconduct, failing and refusing to provide Plaintiff with the LLC’s financial information.
[directive] (1)  Actor previously convicted in this state or elsewhere of a requisite offense who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a firearm, second degree.  (2)  Actor previously convicted in this state or elsewhere of a disorderly persons offense involving domestic violence, who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a firearm, third 4th Degree $1,000 to $7,500 10% permissible degree.  79  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Ja719.  Defendants cannot demonstrate that the trial court was in error, let alone that it \[14\]  For this reason, “splitting the baby” would have not have been an equitable solution.  Plaintiffs needed all 1.33’ of the Disputed Area for Lot 2 to have 120’ of frontage and to be subdividable by right.  Having “only” 65’ of frontage has no material impact on the Defendants.  See, supra at pages 14 and 48, discussing Defendants’ construction of their new dwelling. clearly abused its discretion.  VI.
[brief] LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW | 18 | | II.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE BARRED SADDLEWOOD’S BAD FAITH AND CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIMS | 19 |  A.  [...]’s Claims in the Second Action Arise from the Same Facts and the Same Transaction as the First Action.  .................................................................20  B.  [...] Knew of the Bad Faith Claim When He Caused [...] to Bring the First Action.  ......................22  C.  [...]’s Failure to Join [...] in the First Action Does Not Bar the Doctrine’s Application.  ..................................................................................................................25  D.  Whether [...] Even Raised the Bad Faith Claim in the First Action Would Not Bar the Doctrine’s Application.  .................................................................27  III.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISREGARDED ITS SO-CALLED FINDINGS OF FACT DURING THE JULY 8 ORAL ARGUMENT BECAUSE, AS IT RECOGNIZED, IT LACKED JURISDICTION.
[brief] Defendant offers no evidence to support his assertion that the evidence presented at trial so clearly established his innocence as to render the jury’s verdict a miscarriage of justice.  Defense counsel challenged [...]’s credibility on cross and during summation.  (See generally 2T:125-10 to 132-20 and 5T:77-3 to 79-3).  Defense counsel additionally disputed that the surveillance footage depicted defendant, noted the lack of DNA evidence connecting defendant to the crime, and noted that the State did not produce any individuals who were present when [...] saw defendant brandish a Glock pistol at [...]’s shrine.  (See 5T:70-17 to 71-8, 73-21 to 74-17, and 77-3 to 12).  However, in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial court properly concluded that reasonable jurors could review the evidence, such as footage depicting defendant and [...] leaving the bar together and later depicting an individual close to [...] shooting him and fleeing, and reasonably find defendant guilty.