ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court took this position in a case implicating similar issues, State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317 (2015).  In Grate, the Court held that Alleyne v. United States, which was decided while the relevant criminal convictions were pending appeal, applied to the defendants at issue.  Id.; Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99, 111-13 (2013) (holding that imposing a mandatory minimum sentence based upon a fact not submitted to the jury for determination beyond a reasonable doubt violates the Sixth Amendment).  In keeping with Teague, Alleyne and thereafter Grate, [...] must apply to cases where the judgments are not final because they were pending appeal when [...] was decided.  The Court in *Teague* elucidated some of the rationale for its rule:
[brief] *State v. Nesbitt*, 185 N.J. 504, 515 (2006).  For this reason, when expert testimony clearly runs afoul of the Rules of Evidence, reversal is required even under plain error review.  See, e.g., State v. Reeds, 197 N.J. 280, 298-301 (2009) (finding plain error where prejudicial expert testimony was admitted on the central issue); State v. Pasterick, 285 N.J. Super. 607, 622-23 (App. Div. 1995) (finding plain error where the expert’s “testimony was so prejudicial to [the] defendant that, even if it were marginally relevant and otherwise admissible, failing to exclude it under N.J.R.E. 403 was a mistaken exercise of the trial judge's discretion”).  Accordingly, reversal is required here because [...]’s testimony on the coverage range of the cell towers in Trenton in Willingboro, based on nothing more than his training and experience, was clearly an inadmissible net opinion.
[brief] “The State never argued [...] was required to video record her conversation and/or evaluation of the defendant.  The State argued that based upon the testimony it would have been more informative to know the defendant’s demeanor and the actual words he said during the evaluation.  The State compared the two experts to show how you can look at the defendant’s original statement to the police and what he said during [...]’s interview. ” (17T80-22 to 81-6).  The State’s argument was thus fair comment on the evidence at trial.  (17T81-17 to 82-6).  See Mahoney, 188 N.J. at 376.  Further, the AP’s remark on summation that [...] “lied to you from the beginning” was directed at [...]’s testimony on voir dire regarding an entry on her curricula vitae (CV) that she was a current member of the American College of Forensic Examiners in Springfield, Missouri.  (10T52-19 to 54-2).  On cross-examination, [...] admitted that the organization shut down in 2017 because it promoted “junk science,” but she never bothered to delete the entry from her CV.  (10T61-15 to 64-6).  It was in this context that the AP argued that [...] “lied to you from the beginning” of her testimony because she did not disclose the error on her CV and in fact relied upon the very same uncorrected CV when testifying “many times since 2017” as an expert witness in other cases.  (15T147-8 to 148-9).  The State’s remark was fair comment on [...]’s own admission that her CV was incorrect.  Mahoney, 188 N.J. at 376.  D.
[brief] (Da029).  This sentence was run concurrently to a pending, sixteen-year term of federal incarceration.  Ibid.  All of which was pursuant to the plea agreement.  (Da025).  It should also be noted that, as part of that plea agreement, defendant conceded his extended-term eligibility, which increased his maximum exposure to twenty years.  Nevertheless, defendant negotiated and voluntarily accepted the terms of the plea agreement according to which he was sentenced.  As the trial court put it, defendant “knew exactly what he was getting. ” (6T17-18).  A negotiated disposition, in the center of the sentencing range, cannot be excessive.  This is especially true considering that the court ran defendant’s state sentence concurrent with his – longer – federal sentence.  Depending on his actual service in federal prison, defendant is the beneficiary of a substantial reduction – if not elimination – in his material State sentence.  The Court’s evaluation was likewise sufficient.  To justify imposing aggravating factors 3, 6, and 9, the Court took note of defendant’s significant, repetitive criminal history and his prior visits to State prison.  (6T18-2 to 24).  To support the finding of factor 5, that is, the “substantial likelihood defendant is involved in organized criminal activity”, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)5, the Court noted that defendant was a “higher level echelon drug distributor” who, at the time of his arrest, was “actually engaged in a transaction with…a lower level distributor. ” (6T17-20 to 25).  The Court found no mitigating factors.
[brief] As Plaintiffs demonstrated to the Court in their brief in support of their Motion to Reconsider the Orders of December 9, 2021, Plaintiffs’ submitted to the included twenty-eight exhibits, all of which were filed on e-Courts with the Court on September 15, 2020, and September 16, 2020, and with a courtesy copy hand-delivered.  426a–  The Court admittedly overlooked Plaintiffs’ twenty-eight exhibits and hundreds of citations to deposition testimony, erroneously believing none was filed with the Court.  As such, the Trial Court expressly did not review a single exhibit provided by Plaintiffs or a single word of a single line of a single page of deposition testimony provided by Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs outlined from page 4 through 14 of their moving brief in their Motion to Reconsider the Order of December 9, 2021, facts supported by one hundred and four deposition citations which demonstrate precisely how [...] participated in the conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money.  426a–436a.  There can be no doubt that [...] participated in the conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money, and [...] is vicariously liable for that conduct.  The deposition testimony of [...], [...], [...], and [...] himself, all set forth in the Statement of Facts herein and which the Trial Court admittedly ignored, are irrefutable evidence that [...], acting as attorney of [...], made misrepresentations and continued to make misrepresentations to Plaintiffs in the Releases, at the meeting of April 2009 at the offices of [...], and ultimately with his letter to Plaintiffs, dated --- ³
[brief] In *Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co.*, 34 N.J. 475 (1961) the New Jersey Supreme Court left little doubt that courts in this State should enforce only those provisions of an insurance policy that comport with what a reasonably situated insured would expect.  The Court held that:  When members of the public purchase policies of insurance they are entitled to the broad measure of protection necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations.  They should not be subjected to technical encumbrances or to hidden pitfalls and their policies should be construed liberally in their favor to the end that coverage is afforded to the full extent that any fair interpretation will allow.  [Id. at 482 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). ]
[brief] Local public entities are hereby empowered to indemnify local public employees consistent with the provisions of this act.  A local public entity may indemnify an employee of the local public entity for exemplary or punitive damages resulting from the employee's civil violation of State or federal law if, in the opinion of the governing body of the local public entity, the acts committed by the employee upon which the damages are based did not constitute actual fraud, actual malice, willful misconduct or an intentional wrong.  N.J.S.A. 59:10-4.  When a public entity determines whether or not to appropriate funds, it is a legislative policy determination and an exercise of governmental discretion.
[brief] The Mockler defense is not limited to frozen precipitation.  In Universal Underwriters v. Heibel, 386 N.J. Super. 307, (App. Div. 2006), the court recognized the applicability of the Mockler defense to unexpected gravel in the roadway.  The court in Heibel, in reliance upon Mockler noted:  We held that skidding of an automobile is not in itself sufficient to justify an inference of negligence on the part of the operator of a motor vehicle.  Id.  We stated:  Should the rule be otherwise every automobile driver would be compelled to stay off the public roads when such roads happen to be slippery.  It is common knowledge that the sudden and unexpected skidding of an automobile is one of the natural hazards of driving on icy roads and that it may befall even the most cautious of drivers.  If such a driver is operating his car as would a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, he is not to be held negligent merely because his car skidded, resulting in damage or injury to another.  However, skidding may be evidence of negligence if it appears that it was caused by the failure of the driver to take reasonable precautions to avoid it, when the conditions of which he knew or should have known made such a result probable in the absence of such precautions.  Universal Underwriters v. Heibel, 386 N.J. Su. 307, (App. Div. 2006) citing Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968).
[brief] ------------------  34  POINT EIGHT APPELLANT’S ANALYSIS UNDER HOUSEMAN V. DARE, 405 N.J. SUPER 538 (APP. DIV 2009) IS NOT APPLICABLE (Not raised below)  ------------------------------------------------------  36  POINT NINE APPELLANT ADMITTED THAT THE [...] IS A LEGAL FORUM THAT WOULD TRIGGER PAR.  18 OF THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT CONTRARY TO HIS ASSERTION AT POINT IV (Raised below at Da198,1T 11:11-16 )  -----------------------------------  37  POINT TEN CONTRARY TO APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT AT DB34, THERE HAS BEEN NO DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS OF THE INVOLUNTARY ORDINARY DISABILITY  APPLICATION (Raised below at 1T 5:16 to 1T 6:20)-------------------------------------  42  POINT ELEVEN RESPONDENT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES (Raised below at 1T 17:25 -1T 18:5, 1T 18:22-25, 1T 25:23 to 1T 25:7)  ----  43  POINT TWELVE APPELLANT SEEKS TO ENFORCE TERMS THAT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY (Raised below at 1T 25:8-13)  -----------------------------------------------  46  POINT THIRTEEN APPELLANT MISPRESENTS THE RECORD BELOW (Not raised below)  -------------------------------------------------------- 48 CONCLUSION---------------------------------------------------------------
[brief] ”  Although Plaintiffs argued in the court below that this did not satisfy the certification requirement, the court disagreed.  But that decision must now be reversed.  What is conspicuously missing from Pa39 is any indication as to who certified the Notice, and when they did so.  The document, in addition to the quoted certification language, does also contain each of the following notations by stamp or by handwriting on the top left portion of the form: “Underwriting”; “cancelled Dec 31"; “S/O 1/10 [...]”; and “Process Cancellation”.  No explanation of any of the notations is apparent from the face of the form.  In the middle of the page (far from the “certification” language) is what appears to be an illegible signature, with no identification of the signatory.  Under the signature is the handwritten notation date, 1/23/2020.  Finally in the lower left portion of the document, there appears what may or may not be someone’s initials.  The placing of this notation appears random, and it is impossible to tell when it was made or what, if anything, it is intended to convey.  Taking the document as a whole, and giving every benefit to [...], it appears that the very earliest that the document was certified was on “1/10", presumably a reference to January 10, 2021, by someone with the initials “[...]”, who may or may not be part of [...]’s underwriting department.  Who [...] actually is, how they would know anything about the document, or why they did not make an entry until 30 days after the purported mailing is a mystery.  Another possibility is that [...] was attempting to certify the document by having some person, whose identity cannot be determined from the form, sign it in the middle of the page on January 23, 2020, 43 days after the purported mailing.  Given the requirement of strict compliance with the statute, [...] is not entitled to the benefit of any doubt; but even giving it such benefit, the court does not and cannot know who certified the document or when.  An unsigned typed statement of “certification” does not comply with the statute.
[brief] Pa118  Exhibit E – Legislative Digest for January 6, 2022 .................  Pa120  Exhibit F – Library of Congress Web Archive for New Jersey Legislature’s website calendar for January 10, 2022 ..........  Pa127  Exhibit G – Library of Congress Web Archive for New Jersey Legislature’s website calendar for January 6, 2022 ...........  Pa130  Certification of [...] in support of motion, filed May 10, 2023 .................................................................  Pa133  Certification of [...] in support of motion, filed May 10, 2023 ..................................................  Pa136  Exhibit A – omitted as duplicate  Exhibit B – Letter from [...] to Legislature’s Executive Director [...], dated April 4, 2023, with exhibits omitted as duplicate ..................  Pa141  Exhibit C – Letter from Office of Legislative Services to [...] regarding transcript requests, dated April 12, 2023 .................................................................  Pa145  Exhibit D – Emails exchanged between [...] of Office of Legislative Services to [...] dated May 6, 2023 to May 8, 2023 ...........................................  Pa148  Exhibit E – Transcript from Assembly Appropriations Committee for consideration of A.6260 (2021) on January 6, 2022 .............................................................................................................. Pa151 Volume II (Pa201 to 353) Exhibit F- Transcript from Senate Health, Human Services, and Senior Citizens Committee for consideration of S.49 (2021) on January 6, 2022 ................................................................. Pa204 Respondent’s Notice of Cross-Motion to Supplement the Record, filed June 5, 2023 .................................................................................................................. Pa225 Certification of [...] in Support of Cross-Motion, filed June 5, 2023 ................................................................................................................................. Pa226 Exhibit A – Unofficial portions of Legislative Minutes for Assembly for January 6, 2022 and January 10, 2022 ............... Pa229 Certification of [...] in Support of Cross-Motion, filed June 5, 2023 ................................................................................................................................. Pa246 Exhibit A – Unofficial portions of Legislative Minutes for Senate for January 6, 2022 and January 10, 2022 ..................... Pa249 Exhibit G to Certification of [...] in support of motion, filed on June 15, 2023 at the direction of appellate team leader – Transcript for Senate’s consideration of S. 49 (2021) on January 10, 2022 ................................................................................................. Pa268 Exhibit H to Certification of [...] in support of motion, filed on June 19, 2023 at the direction of appellate team leader – Transcript for Assembly’s consideration of S. 49 (2021) on January 10, 2022 .................................................................................................
[brief] ”  (Vargas at page 12.)  In the within matter, the factual basis that was obtained is entirely dependent upon the admissibility of the alleged BAC result since there was no observational evidence ever introduced into the record during the plea.  There was no colloquy regarding how the Defendant drove, what admissions he made to law enforcement that evening, the observations made by law enforcement, or the administration of psycho-physical tests.  Indeed, in the within matter, the only thing that Defendant admitted to during the factual basis was that he had consumed alcohol on the date and time the summons were issued, that he had operated his motor vehicle in [...], that “the consumption of that alcohol did affect [his] ability to properly operate [his] vehicle, and that he was “under the influence of that alcohol. ”  The foregoing is not a sufficient factual basis for the acceptance of a plea to DWI.  The Municipal Court had been advised of an alleged B.A.C. result during the proceeding to presumably bolster the factual basis, but the Defendant himself never acknowledged its admissibility as evidence against him, which is specifically what the Appellate Division in State v. Vargas required.  Merely acknowledging that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not, without more, sufficient to satisfy the factual basis.  If it were, there would be no need to place the alleged B.A.C. on the record.  The B.A.C. substantiates the allegation that the Defendant was under the influence.  The Defendant merely acknowledging being under the influence does not.  In the absence of a B.A.C. result, the Defendant’s plea to being under the influence can be substantiated by having the observational evidence placed on the record.  But as stated above, that was not done in this matter.  Since there was no observational evidence relied upon by the Municipal Court during the plea proceeding, the provision of a Chun worksheet by prior Defense counsel does not satisfy the framework of the unpublished opinion in State v. Vargas because the Appellate Division held that the Defendant has to explicitly agree that he or she is accepting the admissibility of the alleged BAC result.  Such an explicit agreement never took place in this matter.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ” (6T46-6 to 8).  Evolving from the judge’s private office in the courthouse, to placing calls, after defendant was already supposed to be secured in custody, to the judge’s personal cell phone on a weekend when defendant would presume the judge was in the sanctity of his home, made the later threats “more intense, personal, more frightening and threatening because what the defendant is saying is you will never be safe from me, I can still get you and I will get you anywhere.
[brief] Rather, Appellants stipulated to the facts that the Town designated the redevelopment area properties as one in need of redevelopment or rehabilitation in 2020.  (Pa127.)  At trial, when it appeared that Appellants might nonetheless be trying to challenge the validity of the 2020 designations, the matter was raised with the Trial Court, which gave Appellants a recess and time to consider whether to pursue such a challenge.  (T36:14-37:2; T38:19-39:1; Pa80.)  After that recess, Appellants decided that they were not and limited their challenge to only the Ordinance approving the Redevelopment Plan as raised in their Complaint.
[brief] ”  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ervin & Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton Sec. Grp., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 18, 38 (D.D.C. 2005).  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...] Attorney ID# 017221993  [...] Attorney ID# 044021998  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...] pro hac vice  [...]
[brief] 2014 WL 2131662, at *2, *6 (Da455, Da460).  In other words, the court should not have been “determin[ing] whether the public entity’s award to the second lowest bidder ([...]) was proper” because it had already determined that the plaintiff, [...]’s, bid was materially defective.  Pb15; Waszen v. Atl. City, 1 N.J. 272, 276 (1949) (low bidders with non-conforming bids “have no standing to challenge the award of the contract to a rival bidder”).
[brief] After considering all of the evidence, the court returned a conviction, finding [...] guilty under summons [...], [...], and [...] for violating East Hanover Ordinances §173-24, 173-27, and 201-2 respectively.)  3T Pg. 46, Ln. 19- Pg. 47, Ln. 17).  Summons [...], [...], and [...] were dismissed.  [...] was ordered to pay a fine of $2,500.00 plus $33.00 costs.  (3T Pg. 49, Ln. 2 - Pg. 50, Ln. 10).
[brief] In Docteroff v. Barra Corp. of America Inc., 282 N.J. Super., 230, 236-237 (App. Div. 1995), plaintiff homeowner asserting a breach of warranty claim against the distributor of roofing material asserted that the 6 year statute of limitations in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applied to their cause of action despite the fact that plaintiff's stated in the trial court that the four year statute of limitations of the Uniform Commercial Code of N.J.S.A. 12A:2-725 should be tolled.
[brief] 25  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Court Order denying the Plaintiffs’ motion to affirm the sufficiency of the Affidavits of Merit dated October 11, 2024 .................................................................Pa77  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Plaintiffs’ Complaint, dated February 6, 2024 ......................................................Pa1  Defendants’ Answer to the Complaint dated June 14, 2024 ........................................Pa21 Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion to Affirm the Sufficiency of the Affidavits of Merit, dated August 30, 2024 ........................................................................................................Pa35 Ex. A: The Affidavit of Merit and Curriculum Vitae of [...] dated January 11, 2024 ........................................................................................................Pa41 Ex. B: The Affidavit of Merit and Curriculum Vitae of [...] dated January 12, 2024 ........................................................................................................Pa57 Ex. C: Ferreira Conference Order dated August 12, 2024 ........................................Pa61 Ex. D: Objection Letter on Behalf of Defendant, [...] ....Pa65 Ex. E: Relevant Medical Records of the Decedent .....................................................Pa68 Ex. F: Objection Letter on Behalf of Defendant, [...] ..................................................................................................................Pa71 [...] Website .................................................................Pa73 Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion filed by Defendant, [...] ..................................................................................................................Pa74 Ex. A: [...] License .....................................................Pa76 Court Order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to affirm the sufficiency of the Affidavits of Merit dated October 11, 2024 .........................................................................................Pa77 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## Cases - **Basil v. Wolf**, 193 N.J. 38 (2007) ................................................................. 16 - **Brundace v. Estate of Carambio**, 195 N.J. 575 (2008) ........................................... 7 - **Carter v. Reynolds**, 175 N.J. 402, 408-09 (2003) .................................................. 15 - **Cornblatt v. Barow**, 153 N.J. 218 (1998) ............................................................... 10 - **Estate of Cordero, ex rel. Cordero v. Christ Hosp.**, 403 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 2008) .................................................................................................................. 16, 17 - **Estate of McClenton v. Carbone**, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2632 (App. Div. 2019) ...................................................................................................................... 19 - **Jenkins v. Rinner**, 69 N.J. 50 (1976) ........................................................................ 19 - **Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs.**, 178 N.J. 144 (2003) .............................