ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (See Changes in Rainfall Amounts; Projected Changes in Rainfall).  If [...] is using the term “precipitation data” to refer to adjustment factors and change factors, then [...] mistakenly conflates these factors with data; they are factors that modify existing data in [...] to reflect current and future precipitation amounts.  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022).  Further, it is unclear how the [...] could have been applied to the portion of the Property delineated using [...]’s prior administratively promulgated flood hazard delineations via Method 1.  There would be simply nothing from the [...] to apply.  As to the Method 6 calculations delineations, [...] could not apply the [...] by themselves to permit applications without formal rulemaking because it would be unclear to the regulated community how the studies would be used.
[brief] (T4 26:11-20, 29:17-20; Pa134-Pa138).  [...], the emergency room doctor who treated [...], testified that [...]’s drug screen would have been positive for opioids if she had overdosed on opioids.  (T4 23:13-22, 24:7-10, 24:11-25:3; Pa134-Pa138).  Excessive alcohol can lead to depressed breathing as expressed by [...] when he called the EMTs, and as was initially diagnosed by the EMTs.  (T4 25:24-26:10).  No blood test for alcohol was performed on [...].  (T4 34:14-36:2; Pa134- [...] testified [...] could have been unconscious due to alcohol ingestion.
[directive] Ii, A VI:  Sa se yon dokiman piblik.  Pa mete okenn enfomasyon idantifikasyon pesonel sou kankou nimewo Sosyal, nimewo Lisans  Ii pou kondwi, oswa nimewo kont an bank kat kredi aktifyo.  Dokiman sa a ap disponib ba piblik la sou demannjan soumet la.
[brief] Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 474.  A court can require “certifications” from attorneys as to the completeness of discovery.  *Id.*  It can order additional discovery should evidence emerge that a party “withheld responsive documents,” *id.*, and it can impose sanctions if a party wrongfully did so, *Montana v. Cnty. of Cape May Bd. of Freeholders*, 2013 WL 11233748, at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2013).  But what a court cannot do under Rule 4:10-2(a) is mandate the wholesale production of all documents, without any threshold relevance review.
[brief] Id. at *23.  That, however, is not what she did.  The detective offered her own evaluation of what the video depicted.  The video was paused at 19:02:07, and the detective pointed to an area in the top-right corner which occupied “less than an inch” of the screen, explaining that the Chevy can be seen turning onto 6th St. and making a U-turn.  (4T177-25 to 178-12; 5T241-4 to 8)  (Da11 at S-37)  The State asked, “what were you pointing to” and the detective responded, “to the individual getting out of the vehicle…wh[om I] believe to be the shooter. ”  (5T245-3 to 22)  As discussed, [...] did not observe the incident, the Chevy, or anyone suspected to be the shooter.
[directive] These designated Human Trafficking Liaisons will also serve as points of contact for police agencies for purposes of the notification, referral, and reporting requirements of this Directive.  Each County Prosecutor shall within 30 days of the effective date of this Directive provide to the Director, or his designee, the names and contact information of the designated detective(s)/investigator(s) and assistant prosecutor(s), and shall thereafter promptly notify the Director or his designee of any changes in the names or contact information of these liaisons.  All designated liaisons will receive training pursuant to Section VI(B)(1) of this Directive.
[brief] 47 N.J.R. 1041(a) (June 1, 2015)  48 N.J.R. 2244(a) (Nov. 7, 2016)  Government website: NJ DEP, Technical Manual, Flood Hazard Area Control Act Rules  N.J.A.C. 7:13, https://dep.nj.gov/wlm/lrp/flood-hazard-areas.
[brief] Cases  Allen Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2011) .................................................................26  Ass’n of N.J. Chiropractors, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2677 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 4, 2013)  .......................................................  11, 15  Betancourt v. LVNV Funding LLC, 2:17-cv-00390-JMV-JBC (D.N.J.) .........................................................4  Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184 (1963)  ..............................................................................36  Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Health & Human Servs., 974 N.E.2d 1114 (Mass. 2012)  .............................................................15  Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 964 A.2d 741 (2009)  .........................................................29  Boyko v. American Intern. Group, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119339, 2009 WL 5194431 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2009)  ....................................................................  20, 24 Brancato v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 2018 U.S.  Dist. Lexis 96658 (D.N.J. June 8, 2018) ...............................19 Browne v. Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Trust, 2021 U.S. Dist. Lexis 244537, 2021 WL 6062306 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2021) ................................................................... passim Burgos v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., et al., 3:17-cv-6121- PGS-TJB (D.N.J.) ..........................................................4 Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J. Super. 282, 851 A.2d 88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) ......................................................... 18, 29, 31 Chernyakhovskaya v. Resurgent Capital Services L.P., 2:16-cv-01235-JLL-JAD (D.N.J.) .................................................................4 Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D.N.J. 2011)....................................................... passim Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994) .................................................................................. 32, 33 Crisdon v. City of Camden, 2012 WL 685874 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2012) ..............................................35 Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267 (1978) ..................................................................................27 Delaware Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2006) ..................................................................48 Delgado v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2:18-cv-01521-KM-JBC (D.N.J.) ............................................................. 5, 46 DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013) .................................................... 25, 26, 27, 28 Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 2005) ......................................................10 Espinal v. First National Collection Bureau Inc., 2:17-cv-02833- WJM-MF (D.N.J.) ............................................................4 Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 825 F. App’x 65 (3d Cir. 2020)
[brief] Ensuring the Right to Be Heard  A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or to that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law or court rule.  COMMENT:  A judge may make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.  (Pa 200-211)  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the Court should reverse because the Chancery Division Judge (Trial Court) adjudication of the action in lieu of prerogative writs was error, actual prejudice, and an abuse of discretion.
[directive] Every Thursday [...] 0252 [...] 2nd & 4th Tuesday [...] 0253 [...] 1st & 3rd Tuesday [...] 0254 2nd & 4th Wednesday 2nd & 4th Mon @ [...] 0255 [...]  [...] [...] 0256 [...]  Every Tuesday [...] 0257 [...] 2nd, 3rd, 4th Thursday [...] 0258 [...] 1st & 3rd Tuesday [...] 0259 [...] 2nd & 4th Thursday Every [...] 0260 [...] Monday/Wednesday/ Thursday [...] 0261 [...] 1st & 3rd Wednesday [...] 0262 [...] 3rd Thursday Upper [...] 0263 [...] 2nd & 4th Tuesday [...] 0264 [...] 1st & 3rd Monday 1st & 3rd Thursday [...] 0265 [...] @[...] [...] 0266 [...] 3rd Thursday [...] 0267 [...] 1st & 3rd Wednesday [...] 0269 [...] 1st & 3rd Thursday 1st/3rd Wednesday @ [...] 0270 [...]
[brief] ..............................................  36 - **Coffey v. Bechemin**, 2007 W.L. 419641 (App. Div., Feb. 9, 2007)  ...............  39 - **Conner v. Township of East Brunswick**, 2015 W.L. 10709691 (App. Div., April 20, 2016) .......... 26, 27 - **Coyne v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp.**, 182 N.J. 481 (2005) ..............................................
[brief] (Da39976-78.)  With respect to [...], the trial court found, among other things, that he: (1) “was primarily responsible for misappropriating the partnership funds,” (Da39975); (2) “caused harm through wanton and willful acts” by “knowingly t[aking] money from the partnership, which he knew belonged to the partnership and transferring it to [...]-owned companies for services that were never performed,” (Da39978); (3) “was fully aware of his acts and was fully aware that the result of those acts would cause harm to [P]laintiffs by depriving them substantial sums of money, (Da39979); and (4) “intensified” his continuous and repeated violations of the law by “increasing his misappropriation of partnership assets” despite “multiple court orders and an Appellate Division decision” about his illegal conduct, (Da39979-80).  The trial court further found that “the likelihood of harm resulting from [...][’s] conduct during the non-RICO statute of limitations was 100%, (Da39978 (emphasis added)), and that [...]’s “callous disregard for the rule of law demonstrates the need for the award of punitive damages,” (Da39979).  The trial court conducted this same analysis for [...] and [...] for the relevant statute of limitations period.
[brief] Plaintiff claims to have been injured when he slipped and fell on some black ice in the parking lot of a strip mall located in [...], New Jersey.  He was on the property visiting the restaurant of Defendant, [...] d/b/a [...] (improperly pled as [...]) (hereinafter “[...]”), who leased space at that location.  The first question asks whether the lease imposed upon [...] any contractual duty to maintain the common area where the accident allegedly occurred.  The trial judge properly found that under the lease, the landlord had complete responsibility for maintenance of the area of the property where Plaintiff claims the accident occurred.  The second question asks whether [...] owed any common-law duty to maintain the area where the incident occurred.  The trial judge, again, properly found that [...] owed no such duty and recognized that this Court had previously rejected the notion that a tenant in a multi-tenant commercial shopping center owes a common law duty to maintain common areas of which the landlord has retained control.  As for the cross-appeal, it asserts that the trial judges erroneously denied [...]’s motions for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff filed the first complaint which named [...] after the statute of limitations expired.  Thus, if this Court should find any error in the grant of summary judgment in [...]’s favor, it should nevertheless affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint, as the statute of limitations barred Plaintiff’s claims, but the trial judge erroneously denied the initial motion to dismiss on state of limitations grounds.  Accordingly, [...] asks this Court to affirm the decision below dismissing the complaint.
[brief] A defendant cannot “induce” or invite a sentencing court to impose a sentence it is without legal authority to impose.  In *State v. Smith*, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with a parole disqualifier that exceeded the maximum allowed by law.  372 N.J. Super. 539, 542 (App. Div. 2004).  “The State argue[d] that defendant ‘invited’ the error and ‘should be bound to his negotiated bargain. ’”  *Ibid.*  This Court rejected the State’s argument and explained that “parties cannot negotiate an illegal sentence. ”  *Ibid.*  Likewise, in *State v. Patterson*, the sentencing court imposed a mandatory extended term on an offense that was not eligible for the extended term.  435 N.J. Super. 498, 515-17 (App. Div. 2014).  Although at sentencing, the defendant “agreed it was appropriate to grant the prosecutor’s motion [for the extended term],” this Court explained that “a defendant may not acquiesce in the imposition of an illegal sentence. ”  Id. at 515.  This Court vacated the sentence and remanded for the trial court to “resentence without imposing a mandatory extended term. ”  Id. at 518.  The non-custodial portions of [...]’s sentence are illegal for the reasons explained in his opening brief.
[directive] if participating law enforcement agencies two S.O.P. NJR&PS 12 7 Program Forfeiture Administration Page are equally entitled to forfeited property or proceeds and one of the but agencies, not the other, regularly obtains forfeited funds, it is In in proper to consider that fact calculating a contributive share.  general, of course, contributive shares are to be calculated on each participating law enforcement agency's relative contribution: in a  Nevertheless, as discussed above, factor to consider dividing the forfeitures is the overall effect on law enforcement within State.  the  Where tangible and indivisible property is to be distributed, in which prosecuting agency, deciding participating law enforcement is agency to have the use of the property, should consider whether in either agency may be able to obtain similar property alternatively future.
[brief] Rather, it is complex commercial proceeding that has been \(^{17}\)  As detailed in the Fee Application, the hourly rate charged to Landlord by its counsel are customary for clients of the firm.  In fact, the legal fees billed to Landlord reflect all discounts, write-offs and reductions made by the firm before sending the invoices to Landlord.  (Pa49).  ongoing for more than four (4) years and concerns an eighty-three (83) page commercial Lease requiring mutual payment obligations and a detailed calculation of the nearly $200,000 in arrears.  (Da5-87).  Furthermore, all of this occurred against the backdrop of a global pandemic where Tenant’s business was temporarily closed leading to Tenant asserting defenses sounding in equity, including unclean hands, unjust enrichment, frustration of purpose and impossibility of performance.
[brief] That is inexplicable since the respondents’ lawyer, the [...], surely has the capability to evaluate a statute and its implementation and to make legal judgments about their sufficiency.  Unfortunately, the State’s brief provides no meaningful indication that the [...] was any more willing to address this court’s explicit remand question than the [...].  Instead, the brief’s Argument section consists overwhelmingly of a rehash of the brief’s over-long section on Procedural History and Counterstatement of Facts.  The Argument’s three sub-heads make clear and explicit the bases of the State’s argument that SFRA is constitutional as applied to [...] (“A. The District’s Ineffective Policies and Extreme Mismanagement Are a Root Cause [sic] of Its Inability to Provide T&E;” “B. The District Has Failed to Take Steps to Reduce Its Special Education Costs;” and “C. The District Has Severely Mismanaged Its Transportation Responsibilities, Resulting in Inflated Costs”).  The State’s brief does not include any reference to how SFRA is working in practice for [...], a district that everyone, including this court, has recognized is demographically unique.  This is at the very core of the court’s remand order.
[directive] A known officer preparing report at the information to the the document basic only to intended decision and/or to inform establish probable cause the to be needed that may of arrest time for acomplaint-warrant. that the or apply The fact acomplaint-summons issue whether to acheck-off not check Enforcement Incident Report does Preliminary Law preparing a officer does not but rather such fact or circumstance exist, mean that construed to be box not should preliminary report sufficient completing the does not have of officer the time at only the that or non-existence of such fact or circumstance existence indicate the need, to immediate or basis, supplemented by subsequent reports are more be that report that may preliminary in an initial, in clearly understood that the information documented It should be detailed. and comprehensive Page 61 arrest/booking of Report is prepared at the time the Incident Enforcement Preliminary Law a information is or as additional supplemented, clarified, modified being subject to process and is ongoing investigation/prosecution. of an course in the or corroborated learned of, shall in addition to, not in lieu Incident Report be Enforcement Preliminary Law A pursuant to investigation subsequently prepared reports) incident, or arrest, any regular police at the and/or customary practices, or policy, operating procedure, standard the agency's request.
[brief] 7, 8 N.J.S.A. 52:27H-21.22(c) .......................................................................................  8  OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED: Metex Mfg. Corp. v. Manson, No. 05-2948 (HAA), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25107 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008)
[brief] And consistent with that framework, courts have recognized that certain police conduct is inherently coercive.  For starters, “account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents. ”  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).  Courts should also consider that the nature of custody places “inherent psychological pressure on a suspect in custody. ”  State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 102 (1997).  Likewise, an individual under arrest is likely to feel less free to say no to an officer requesting consent to search, just as a suspect in custody is more likely feel “compel[led] to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.
[brief] Comment 3 to Rule 2:6-2 also advises that the rule prohibiting raising issues for the first time on appeal “does not apply where an issue was raised in the trial court even if argument before the trial court was based on a different theory from that advanced in the appellate court. ”  Current N.J. Court Rules, at 515.  Appellate Courts will consider an issue “even though not specifically argued before the trial or motion judge, as long as the issue on appeal is generally the same issue presented before the trial court. ”  Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 355 (App. Div. 1997).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff-Appellants respectfully requests this Honorable Court reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Respondents and remand to the Law Division for completion of damages discovery and trial.  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: December 28, 2023  Kodi v. Braxton Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division May 12, 2009, Argued; June 16, 2009, Decided [...] Reporter
[brief] The FAA Preempts State Laws that Impermissibly Burden or Discriminate Against Arbitration Agreements.  The language of 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 has been continuously defined as an “equal treatment” principle or rule.  See *Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark*, 581 U.S. 246, 251, (2017) (quoting *Concepcion*, 563 U. S., at 339).  The clause “permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability’” while at the same time offering no refuge for “defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue. ”  *Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis*, 584 U.S. 497, 507-508 (2018) (citations omitted).  Section 2’s mandate undeniably protects a right to enforce arbitration agreements.  *Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana*, 596 U.S. 639, 650-651 (2022).  And as the Supreme Court articulated, “[t]hat right would not be a right to arbitrate in any meaningful sense if generally applicable principles of state law could be used to transform traditiona[l] individualized . . . arbitration into the litigation it was meant to displace through the imposition of procedures at odds with arbitration’s informal nature.
[brief] [...] MUST PAY [...]’ FEES (App.Div.1999) (precluding insurer, which “unilaterally” declined to participate in defense, from asserting an estoppel claim against the defending insurer).  12  See also, *Catton v. N.J.A.F.I.U.A*, 242 N.J.Super. 5, 9 (App.Div.1990); *Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston*, 37 N.J. 114, 124 (1962)("It would be unjust to … absolve a carrier which could have asked, but did not, for the facts it regards as material.").  Zurich’s cumbersome fact-laden defense to its failure to provide notice to [...] also proves Travelers’ right to recover declaratory judgment fees. \textsuperscript{13}  As noted in Travelers’ brief (Tb49), counsel fee awards under R.4:42-9(a)(6) are “presumptive,” but with discretion to decline such an award where, \textit{e.g.}, the insured “contributed substantially to the necessity for the litigation. ”  \textit{Passaic Valley Sewage Comms’rs v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.}, 206 N.J. 596, 619 (2011) (internal quotation omitted).  Conversely, neither an insurer’s “good faith” in declining coverage, nor “novelty” of an issue is an impediment to fee recovery.  \textit{Iafelice ex. rel. Wright v. Arpino}, 319 N.J.Super. 581, 590 (App.Div.1999) (affirming fee award where cancellation deemed ineffective); \textit{Corcoran v. Hartford Ins Co.}, 132 N.J.Super. 234, 246 (App.Div.1975).  Zurich’s conduct “contributed to the necessity for the litigation” – not Travelers’ or the plaintiffs’.  Zurich could simply have sent a single page notice to [...] that its coverage was terminated – like the law required it to do, and like it did with the [...] regarding [...]’s workers compensation policy.
[brief] *Id.* at 4, 10 (“[T]he [...] has not explained why it could not reasonably discern the records sought and process the request when [plaintiff] sought all email records for a particular account across a two-week span.  And the Court fails to see why, as the [...] insists, a subject matter or keyword was necessary. ”).  Like under OPRA, a requestor under FOIA need only “reasonably describe” the records he seeks to have his request found valid.
[brief] He directly lied to [...] about his whereabouts on November 29, 2018.  Decision at p.44. (Pa55).  There is no evidence that [...] gave false statements about going to Florida for rehabilitation.  [...] had not told anyone that he went to Florida for rehab as he did not believe it was required.  (T4 189:17-191:13).  He told [...] during the FFD evaluation that he had gone to rehab.  If [...] had not told [...] that he went to rehab while out on sick leave for stress, the Department never would have known, since the Department failed to check on [...] while he was out on leave.  (T4 189:17-191:13).  He did not believe that he had violated the Department’s reporting policy by not advising that he went to rehab.  (T4 191:11-13).  [...] was also out on stress leave when he went for his third sinus surgery in Philadelphia in September 2018.  (T4 185:16-186:14).  In sum, [...]’s statement to [...] about going to Florida for rehab was the only statement [...] made on the subject and it was not untruthful.