ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2022-07 TO: All Law Enforcement Chief Executives and County Prosecutors  FROM: [...], Acting Attorney General DATE: June 24, 2022  SUBJECT: Directive  Clarifying Requirements For Carrying Of Firearms In Public  For over a century, New Jersey state law has recognized the risks to public safety and to law enforcement that carrying firearms in public can present.  As both law enforcement experts and public safety data confirm, an increase in the number of firearms in public can turn confrontations deadly, increase the risk of felonies resulting in death, and make all New Jersey residents less safe.  Unchecked public carrying of firearms also puts officers at risk and can turn routine police-citizen encounters into high-risk events.  That is why, since 1905, New Jersey has required that individuals who wish to carry firearms in public must obtain a permit to do so.  Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision that impacts New Jersey’s permitting law but does not eliminate our overall permitting requirements.
[brief] (Pa11).  Although these additional methods were not required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.  (Pb11-12).  The record demonstrates that the postcard was mailed on August 9, 2021.  (Pa14; Pa66-68).  That slight delay in mailing the postcard is immaterial, as postcard notification was not required under the Ricci Act, and information about the Ricci Act was prominently posted on the Division’s website and publicly available for two years from the effective date of the statute.  Even if this court were to find that postcards were a required mode of notice under the Ricci Act, the Board substantially complied by mailing them within thirty-two (instead of thirty) days of the effective date of the statute.  To suggest that such a minimal delay in sending over 200,000 postcards somehow eliminates the statutory deadline for filing claims would be an absurd result, and one this court should not accept.
[brief] •  On Db12 and Db13, the Respondents falsely state:  “The trial court considered all of this testimony and other evidence and concluded there was no intent to mislead."  However, as I already pointed out, this is clearly not true at all – the trial court never made any such ruling.  Instead, the court had only concluded they did not “hide” anything (i.e. “hiding”, which would be an affirmative act).  To be exact, the trial court’s rulings about the undisclosed prize limitation were as follows:  THE COURT: “I find that the rules are available, whether or not convenient, but they’re available.  And maybe you got to spend some money to get them if you want them physically in your hand.  But they’re available. ”  (1T15:22-25)  THE COURT:  “Because the rules were available? I am.  I'll grant you, They're not the easiest thing to get to.  But I think if you, and I don't hear any dispute, that if you go to the tournament and ask the ... tournament director, he would answer any questions you would have.  So they're not trying to hide anything.  So I find that you're entitled to one prize, sir”.  (1T16:23 - T17:6)  THE COURT: “But it's there.  It's on the nationwide rulebook.  It's made available by a person who could answer your questions when you go to the tournament.  It's, they're not hiding anything.  That's what it comes down to.  They're not making it glaringly available.  Okay, it's maybe not where you would like it to be.  But it's there.  Okay?”  (1T19:24-25, 1T20:1-4)  THE COURT: “Now, you may think you're entitled to consumer fraud damages, but you don't, because it's not the definition of merchandise.  So that removes that argument. ”  (1T23:24-25, T24:1-2)  4.  Despite my being “cut off at the knees” by the trial court’s ruling about the “merchandise” definition, nonetheless I still was able to prove (to some extent) that there had been a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.  The Respondents argue that I did not prove my allegations of their Consumer Fraud, which consisted of two parts: 1) their misrepresentation as to the tournament’s starting time (i.e. an affirmative act); and 2) their undisclosed prize limitation (i.e. an intentional omission).  But these arguments ignore the obvious.  --- 3
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat  Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  [...] IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL  [...], Esq. (045041991)  [...] [...] P.O. Box 2075  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] ”  (220a).  Therein, he asserted that he would implement changes to the terms and conditions of employment that would take effect from June 7, 2017 through December 31, 2021.  (31a ¶104); (217a).  Among the changes he articulated that he was going to implement, [...] stated as follows:  “[e]ffective June 7, 2017, all pending and prospective Terminal Leave payments over $15,000 shall be eliminated for all employees. ”  (31a ¶105); (220a) (emphasis added).  Additionally, DLGS Designee [...] provided, “[t]he State reserves the right to modify or entirely eliminate the payment of terminal leave payments in accordance with future rulings or interpretations by the Court. ”  (220a).  Before June 7, 2017, six of the eleven Plaintiffs in this litigation had already retired from the [...].
[brief] This appeal seeks to reverse the improper decision by the Chancery Court to compel arbitration where no arbitration agreement exists.  Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (“[...]”) chose to file the underlying action in the Chancery Court seeking to compel the sale of a commercial property for $6 million via demand for specific performance of a 2017 unexecuted sale agreement and a purported 2022 addendum to such sale agreement.  It cannot be disputed that neither the unexecuted 2017 sale agreement nor the purported 2022 addendum to same contains any agreement to arbitrate whatsoever.  [...] is the niece of the deceased former co-owner of the company that owns the subject property and the since-terminated manager of that company; however, neither of these facts permit the Chancery Court to invent and enforce an arbitration where no such agreement exists.  Thus, arbitration cannot be compelled, and the decision below must be reserved.  The background of this case has been muddied by [...]’s improper comingling of a separate case filed in the Law Division against her and others, arising under different claims and different contracts, and among different parties.
[brief] Pa125 o Exhibit A, Transcript of Volumes I and II of deposition of Plaintiff Pa138 o Exhibit B, Transcript of deposition of [...], Ph.D. Pa316 o Exhibit C, Transcript of deposition of [...], Ph.D. Pa338 o Exhibit D, Transcript of deposition of [...], Ph.D. Pa392 o Exhibit E, Defendant, [...]’s School of Pharmacy Website Page advertising the dual degree program, posted on February 15, 2011 Pa434 o Exhibit F, Defendant, [...]’s email response to Plaintiff’s inquiry submission clarifying eligibility for the dual degree program from Dean, Dr. [...] dated February 28, 2011
[brief] That Court was discussing whether a contract incorporated A201 by reference.  Id. at 517.  Despite assessing the contract in question for ambiguities, nowhere did the Kansas Court of Appeals find equivocal, ambiguous language in the indemnification provision contained in AIA document A201.  Similarly, the 5th District Court of Appeal of Florida reached the same conclusion when it interpreted an indemnification provision like that found in A201.  Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc.  v. Paul N. Howard Co., 853 So. 2d 1072, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“The indemnity provision at issue in paragraph 6.30 is almost verbatim the indemnification provision contained in the [...] (AIA) Standard Document A201 for General Conditions of the Contract for Construction”).  There, the District Court of Appeal stated that the language of the provision was “a paradigm of clarity” in shifting the risk of a negligent indemnitee's loss to the indemnitor.
[brief] Schubert**, 212 N.J. 295 (2012) | 19 | ### Statutes | Statute | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.12(k) | 21 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:25-27 | 27 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1 to -22 | 23 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2 | 24, 28 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b) | 24 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(c) | 24 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) | 24 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | Statutes | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 | 19, 21 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a) | 19 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) | 11, 12 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8 | 27 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1 | 21, 28 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 | 24 | | N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(a) | 21 | | N.J.S.A. 4:22-17 | passim | | N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(a)(3) | 6, 13 | | N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1) | passim | | N.J.S.A. 4:22-26 | 25, 27, 28| | N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2 | 25, 27 | | N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2(b) | 25, 27 | | N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2(b)(2) | 25, 27 | | N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 | 10 | | N.J.S.A. 9:6-3 | 10 | ### Rules - Rule 2:10-2 | 8, 14 | - Rule 3:18-1 | 5, 16 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D) | Authority | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **Constitutional Provisions** | | | N.J. Const. art. IV, § 3 | 26 | | N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7 | 26 | | N.J. Const., art.  I, ¶ 1 | 8, 18 | | N.J. Const., art.  I, ¶ 10 | 8, 18, 26 | | U.S. Const. art.  I, § 10, cl. 1 | 26 | | U.S. Const., amend. VI | 8, 18 | | U.S. Const., amend. XIV | 8, 18 | | **Other Authorities** | | | Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Abuse/Cruelty to Child (N.J.S.A. 9:6-1; N.J.S.A. 9:6-3)" (approved Apr. 16, 2012) | 10 | | Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Animal Cruelty – Torment/Torture (N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1)” (approved June 7, 2021) | 8
[brief] Pa25 ¶ 5.  He further alleges that when [...] reported the payment request to Plaintiff, Plaintiff “advised [ ] against” it, and the transaction was never completed.  Pa25 ¶ 6.  It is therefore undisputed that the invoice was never paid.  Nevertheless, Plaintiff alleges that he “had a duty to report” [...]’s payment request to [...]’s German parent company, Defendant [...]. Pa36 ¶ 124.  He then alleges that, as a result of his report to [...], Defendants retaliated against him by threatening to terminate him, “pass[ing] [him] over for promotion to Chief Executive Officer,” and denying him a bonus “while paying other high-level employees substantial bonuses.
[directive] As for administrative complaints, the internal affairs supervisor or law enforcement executive will direct that an internal affairs investigator conduct an appropriate INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 28 investigation.  Investigators must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  Internal affairs investigators, and anyone who may be called upon to do an internal investigation, must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, including the protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating internal complaints.  6.3.5
[brief] (Pa46-Pa47; Pa48-Pa49).  The trial court subsequently conducted a case management conference on February 28, 2023 following which it entered a Case Management Order providing for consolidation of this matter with a separate lawsuit challenging Ordinance No. 13-2022 filed by [...] and Holding Sons & --- 1  Pursuant to R. 2:6-8, the transcripts from this matter are hereby designated as follows:  1T – April 18, 2022  Township Committee Hearing 2T – May 11, 2023  Trial Court Hearing on Motions to Dismiss Daughters, Inc.\(^2\) under Docket No. [...].  (Pa33-Pa43; Pa50).  The Motions to Dismiss in both cases were argued orally on May 11, 2023 and the trial court thereafter requested supplemental briefing.  (2T).  On July 12, 2023, the trial court issued an Order and accompanying Memorandum of Decision granting the defendants’ motions.  (Pa51; Pa52-P62).  [...] filed a Notice of Appeal on August 18, 2023 and the Appellate Division issued a Notice of Docketing on August 21, 2023 and then a Scheduling Order on August 29, 2023.
[brief] Despite contending that [...] was the rightful owner of the Property, Defendants offered no evidence at trial, either testimonial or documentary, which would in any way establish or even suggest that [...] took any actions consistent with ownership of the Property.  To the contrary, Defendants’ varying and contradictory theories of ownership, if anything, reflect Defendants’ *ex-post* effort to justify the fraudulent transfer of the Property to [...] in 2019.
[brief] Pa117.  [...] contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Ricci Act “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa117.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.  On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the [...] to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.
[brief] 16, 17, 23 Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 304 (1985) ............... 14, 15 Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(b) ......................................................................................... 26, 31 N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(e)(1) .....................................................................................
[brief] June 2017  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] June 30, 2017……Pa128 b. [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] June 30, 2017…………………………………………………………Pa131 c. [...] x0569  “Payroll” Account, [...] June 30, 2017…Pa139 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] June 30, 2017…………………………………………………………Pa141 P-33.
[brief] J-1  Maps of the Property located at [...] in the [...] New Jersey  [KEANS 682 – KEANS 694]  Pa900 J-2 May 10, 1879, Riparian Grant from State of New Jersey to [...] [KEANS 170- KEANS 175]  Pa911 J-3 January 15, 1909, Deed from [...] to [...] [Keansburg expert Report Exhibit C]  Pa917 J-4 “Map of Keansburg Heights” filed June 25, 1909, as Map Case #36-19 subdividing certain lands owned by [...] [KEANS 224]  Pa922 J-5 April 6, 1920, Deed from [...] to [...] [KEANS 1495 – KEANS 1496]  Pa923 J-6 June 16, 1920, Deed from [...] to [...]  [KEANS 225- KEANS 227]  Pa925 J-7  Documents relating to tax sale foreclosure action filed by the [...] against [...]  (including certificate of tax sale, notice of lis pendens, and final decree) [KEANS 1497- KEANS 1512]  Pa927 J-8  Corporate status report of [...]  [KEANS 105]  Pa950 J-9 Lease between [...] and State of New Jersey dated August 8, 1940 [KEANS 138 - KEANS 146]  Pa951 J-10 Lease between [...] and State of New Jersey in 1943 recorded February 17, 1944, in Book 1949, Page 99 [KEANS 200 - KEANS 207]  Pa960 J-11 Map dated 1956 entitled “The [...], Monmouth County, N.J., Layout of Parking Area” noting that portions of Lots 3 and 3.01 were leased by the Borough to the [...] [KEANS 692]  J-12 May 17, 1995, Lease between the [...] and [...] and Amendment to May 17, 1995, Lease Agreement [KEANS 26 - KEANS 38]  J-13 Resolution #56 adopted by the [...] on April 18, 1995, authorizing Lease Agreement between the [...] and [...]  [KEANS 16- KEANS 25]
[brief] [...] testified that on February 19, 2021, he participated in the execution of a search warrant, at [...] in [...]. (2T 6:10 through 15).  He testified that his role was to be “stacked” outside the apartment and to assist in the search of the apartment after entering.  (2T 6:23 to 7:3).  He defined being “stacked” as having four or more officers stage outside the target’s residence.  (2T 7:5 through 9).  He testified that he had no involvement in the investigation prior to that date, nor was he involved in the case aside from his assistance in the effectuation of the search warrant.  (2T 11:7 through 13).  He testified he did not remember any noise or communication in the apartment (2T 9:7 through 9), and that he was in the second or third spot outside the apartment (2T 7:17 through 18).  Further, he stated that “[...] and one of the agents from [...]” knocked on the door and “believed" he was stating “Police! Search Warrant” (2T 8:18 through 25; 11:5 through 6).  [...] testified that his body worn camera (hereinafter body worn camera or BWC) was functioning on the date in question and that body worn camera that was utilized, began as video only for the first 20 to 30 seconds and then the audio [...] testified that he turned his body worn camera only after the purported knock and announce and as they were entering the doorway.
[brief] (Pa0162).  After the court issued its June 29, 2018, Order, both [...] and [...] filed Motions for Reconsideration.  (Pa0210).  While those Motions were pending, the parties entered a Stipulation in which they agreed to the amount and allocation of [...]’s covered damages incurred between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2018, and a procedure to calculate and allocate [...]’s covered costs incurred after December 31, 2018.  (Pa0188-94).  The parties stipulated that between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2018, [...] incurred $5,237,033 in covered investigation and remediation costs at the Site.
[brief] 30  Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000) .................................................................... 8, 16, 18 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981)  ...........................................................................................................  16, 25 Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126 (1994)  ..................................................................................................................  7 Jenkins v. Jenkins, No. 03-08-CV-037, 2008 WL 483312 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2008)  ......................................  30
[brief] *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 51, 110 A.3d 52 (2015) (quoting *Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex*, 196 N.J. 569, 584, 960 A.2d 375 (2008)).  "Whether a duty exists is a matter of law, to be decided by the court, not the factfinder."  *Siddons*, 382 N.J. Super. at 8 (citing *Rogers v. Bree*, 329 N.J. Super. 197, 201, 747 A.2d 299 (App. Div. 2000)).
[brief] In Zuba v. Zuba, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 818, the Court reopened a final judgment of divorce after the plaintiff (wife) discovered the defendant’s purchase of property in Costa Rica and that he “wired substantial funds to a Belize bank account during” the marriage.  Obviously, this would have met the standards under subsection (b).  This case puts forth an analysis starting with public policy considerations.  Courts will typically act in accordance with their strong belief that the parties should be inclined to settle cases and therefore clear the court’s docket of unnecessary litigation.
[brief] Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373 (2018)  5  Isko v. Planning Bd., 51 N.J. 162 (1968)  5  Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973)  7  Suburban Dep’t Stores v. City of East Orange, 47 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1957)  5  INTRODUCTION
[brief] ”  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. I.  On November 20, 2023, the Debtor also filed a second pro se motion in the foreclosure action alleging “Fraud in the conduct of the suit.”  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. K.  Because that motion was not submitted with the proper filing fee on December 6, 2023, the Debtor refiled his motion and submitted the requisite payment.  Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 27, Ex. A, and Ex. L.  The December 7, 2023, docket entry reads:  “The motion filed on 12/06/2023 will be decided on 01/05/2024.  Oral argument has been requested.  You will be notified when oral argument is scheduled.  Do not come to the courthouse unless you are so notified. ”
[brief] I am a Moslem immigrant.  A naturalized US Citizen.  I belong to a few protected classes because of my national origin, religion, age, and disabled status.  My race is other than White Caucasian, a minority race.  In November of 2015 I was declared disabled permanently by the Social Security Administration (SSA).  I have no training in law.  English is not my native language.  I speak English with an accent.  RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS IN THE FORECLOSURE COURT
[directive] 4.  No law enforcement officer other than the Independent Investigator shall make any public statement regarding the conduct of a law enforcement officer in connection with a LE Incident during the pendency of an investigation of that incident.  E.  During an initial Step 5: Public Release of Incident Footage, If Requested. investigation, the Independent Investigator will sometimes obtain audio or video recordings of the LE Incident, including recordings captured by an officer’s body-worn camera (“body-worn footage”), a camera mounted in an officer’s patrol vehicle (“dash- cam footage”), a camera embedded in an officer’s conductive energy device (“CED footage”); a surveillance or security camera (“surveillance footage”), or a camera or smartphone belonging to witnesses (“witness footage”) (collectively, “LE Incident footage”).
[brief] A.  Lack of Clear and Convincing Evidence of Likelihood of Success on Claim of LAD  Violation  ..................................................................................................  10  B.  Lack of Clear and Convincing Evidence of Likelihood of Success on Overcoming Constitutional Parental Rights.  .................................................................  19 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS DESPITE A LACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL AND IMMINENT IRREPARABLE HARM (Da393-417)
[brief] This just means that they have the right to have access to the water, they are entitled to “reasonable access” (1T49:1-16).  He points out that even prior to the Panetta decision, a Riparian Right was not synonymous with a Riparian Grant, and they do not have the same legal effect, referring to *Hatterson v. East Jersey Water Co.* 74 N.J. Eq. 49 (Chancery Div. 1908).  He quotes from Page 39 of the *Hatterson* case:  “Riparian Rights strictly and technically are so called are rights not originating in Grants but arises by operation of law and are called natural rights because they arise by reason of the ownership of the lands upon or along streams or water which are furnished by nature.  And the lands to which these natural rights are attached are in law Riparian lands. ”  [...] confirms that in 1908, prior to the conveyances that he had just discussed, everyone certainly understood the distinction between Riparian lands and Riparian Rights (1T52:25).  He points out [...] acquired a Riparian Grant; when [...] transferred title to [...], he also conveyed the Riparian Grant.
[brief] [...] argues that the proposed Project is not reasonably necessary since “reliability and safety are not in any way compromised” under the temporary regulator station and that the two significant icing incidents experienced by that regulator in 2014 and 2018 “did not present any realistic risk of loss of service. ” (Ab18; Ab24).  Next, [...] claims that [...] failed to give “meaningful consideration” to a catalytic heater as an alternative option.  (Ab53-54).  It also contends that the icing issues associated with the temporary regulator are a “non-existent” risk.