ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For example, in *Cunningham v Lyft, Inc.*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48037, *5-7* (D. Mass. March 20, 2020)(Ja71-Ja73), the plaintiff alleged violations of Massachusetts wage law as opposed to the type of consumer protection statute at issue in the case, *sub judice*.  In addition, and given that the subject claims in *Cunningham* (Ja71-Ja73) only involved the wages of workers at a ride-share company (as opposed to form health club contracts available, and advertised to, the New Jersey general public in Plaintiff’s case), the relief in *Cunningham* (Ja71-Ja73) was only private injunctive relief.  As for *Bodie v Cricket Wireless, LLC*, 350 So. 3d 480, 481 (Ct. of Appeal, Fla., Second Dist. November 16, 2022), also relied on by [...], the subject arbitration provision as opposed the one in [...]’s arbitration provision did not even use the term “public injunctive relief”.  In other words, [...] included the phrase “public injunctive relief” in its New Jersey form health club contract because it is relief permitted by the New Jersey statutes [...] seeks to transfer to arbitration from this Court.  (Ja37)  It is anticipated that [...] will further rely on several cases, which are inapposite to Plaintiff’s claims in the case *sub judice*, or actually support Plaintiff’s claims.
[brief] [...]’s argument that the [...] is disqualified from jointly representing the [...] under RPC 1.7(a)(2) is also without merit. \(^4\)  Subsection (a)(2) states there is a concurrent conflict disallowing representation if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client[.]”  RPC 1.7(a)(2).  That is not the case here, substantially for the reasons in Section II.C. above.  RPC 1.7(a)(2) is not a *per se* bar to joint representation in the panoply of cases with claims to which the CNA applies.  And, in any event, even if a conflict existed, [...] and [...] waived it pursuant to RPC 1.7(b).
[brief] [...]’s Brief largely fails to address the distinction between [...]’s NJCFLA violations being asserted as an affirmative defense and asserting NJCFLA violations as a basis for affirmative claims.  Though [...]’s Brief addresses *Trewin*, it does so only to argue that “[t]he decision and opinion in *Trewin* was [sic] vacated by order dated July 23, 2018 . . . meaning there is effectively no opinion to rely on. ”  [...]’s Br. 18.  However, [...]’s arguments conspicuously omit that [...]’s Opinion in *Trewin*, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688, was not vacated as bad law, but rather as the result of a settlement agreement.  See July 19, 2018 Stipulation of Settlement in *New Century Fin. v. Trewin*, HNT-DC-960-17 (Dra1).  Thus, the reasoning and analysis in *Trewin* has not in any way been abrogated.  Moreover, [...] fails to mention that the Stipulation of Settlement in *Trewin* also dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
[brief] In sum a “TSL statutory framework that provides the forfeiture of a property owner’s equity after final judgment violates the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause in accordance with the decision in Tyler.  Roberto at 366,  In addressing whether the Tyler decision applies to third-party tax sale certificate holders, the Appellate Division, determined that state constitution provides “property owners with greater protections than afforded under the United States Constitution. explicitly “prohibits private corporations from taking private property (citation omitted).  Roberto, supra at 365.  In both the Tyler and Roberto decisions the guiding principle is the preservation of private property rights, from confiscation and forfeiture.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPRs) AND STORED ALPR DATA (Issued December 3, 2010; Effective January 18, 2011)  1.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE  1.1  Reasons for Promulgating Uniform Statewide Guidelines  The purpose of these Guidelines is to provide direction to law enforcement agencies and officers on the appropriate us e of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and the data that are collected by these devices and stored for future law enforcement use.  These Guidelines are not intended to serve as a comprehensive operational manual.  Rather, they are meant to ensure that ALPRs and ALPR-generated data are used in an appropriate manner and only for public bonafide safety purposes.  The following Guidelines, which are promulgated pursuant to Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2010-5, should be interpreted and applied so as to achieve the following objectives: to ensure that "BOLO lists" (the compilation of targeted license plates that an ALPR is "on the lookout" for) that are programmed into the internal memory of an ALPR or that are compared against stored ALPR data are comprised only of license plates that are associated with specific vehicles or persons for which or whom there is a legitimate and documented law enforcement reason to identify and locate, or for which there is a legitimate and documented law enforcement reason to determine the subject vehicle’s past location(s) through the analysis of stored ALPR data; to ensure that data that are captured by an ALPR can only be accessed by appropriate law enforcement personnel and can only be used for legitimate, specified, and documented law enforcement purposes; to permit a thorough analysis of stored ALPR data to detect crime and protect the homeland from terrorist attack while safeguarding the personal privacy rights of motorists by ensuring that the analysis of stored ALPR data is not used as a means to disclose personal identifying information about an individual unless there is a legitimate and documented law enforcement reason for disclosing such personal information to a law enforcement officer or civilian crime analyst; and to ensure that stored ALPR data are purged after a reasonable period of time so as to -1- minimize the potential for misuse or accidental disclosure.
[brief] [[...]’s] plea agreement when he got charged with his own gun crime.  Look at that agreement in the back.  The agreement is like a contract if anyone’s familiar with a contract, the four corners of the agreement.  Everything in there -- we do this every day in this courthouse, all types of cases.  Anytime anyone enters a plea on the record, four corners of the contract.  Everything in there is exactly what’s agreed upon, including promises.  And you go through all the pages.  It’s a standard form from the judiciary.  It’s in evidence, check it out, see if there’s any mention in there for Demetrius [...], you have to come and testify, you have to provide truthful testimony, you have to do anything.  Nope.  All that plea agreement says is he agrees to plead guilty and gets five years in New Jersey State Prison or 42 months before parole.  . . .  He never tried to leverage any information he had to help himself.  . . .  But nowhere in that plea does it say anything about anything in this case.  Not once did he try to do any of that at all to help him.  [5T 109-16 to 110-19 (emphasis added). ]  Not only did the prosecutor assert new facts about the plea-agreement process without any basis in the evidence, but he made clear that those assertions were based on his own personal experience, stating, “[W]e do this every day in this courthouse.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................................................................................1  Appellant’s Job and Repeated Whistleblowing Activity ........................................................................1  Appellant’s “Silent” Termination .........................................................................................................5  [...] Never Conducted an Investigation into Retaliation ...............................................7  Appellant’s Criminal History and Her Eligibility to Work at The [...]............................7  Appellant’s Complaint for Retaliation, Hostile Work Environment, and Termination  .......................9  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................................10  POINT I .............................................................................................................................................10  POINT II ..........................................................................................................................................15  POINT III .........................................................................................................................................16  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................23
[brief] [...] graduated from the 107th Academy Class of the New Jersey State Police.  Pa56.  [...] retired from the New Jersey State Police on a Special Retirement on or about January 1, 2017.  Pa56.  Pa71.  While employed by the New Jersey State Police, [...] was dispatched to Ground Zero to perform a myriad of functions.  Pa56.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).
[brief] However, by the time he testified before the trial court, [...] knew firsthand about the CI’s prior history of reliability.  (1T39-1 to 7).  Immediately after receiving the tip, [...] went to the indicated area and observed in his rearview mirror the Kia sedan behind him at a stop sign at Kearsarge Road and Collins Road.  (1T13-9 to 18).  It was a gold Kia sedan with a license plate beginning in “L85. ” (1T13-19 to 22).  Noting the occupants were not wearing seatbelts, [...], along with his sergeant in a separate marked vehicle, conducted a motor vehicle stop.\(^2\) (1T14-9 to 13).  There were two occupants in the vehicle.  (1T14-23 to 24).  [...] approached the front passenger side of the vehicle and saw the passenger was wearing a fanny pack, just as described by the informant.  (1T14-16 to 19).  The passenger was defendant, [...].  In addition to observing the fanny pack, [...] noted defendant was holding it tight to his chest in an unnatural manner and appeared nervous.  (1T15-18 to 20, 33-1 to 4).  Defendant had a phone in his left hand and a cigarette in his right hand, and yet used his arms to hold the bag close to his body as if to conceal a bulge.  (1T33-22 to 34-4).  [...] demonstrated to the trial court how defendant held the bag furtively to conceal or hide something he did not want seen.  (1T40-14 to 24).  Based on his training and experience, [...] believed this unnatural furtive position and nervousness, in addition to the tip received, was consistent with someone attempting to conceal a firearm.  (1T15-21 to 24).  Believing defendant probably armed and dangerous, [...] removed defendant from the vehicle handcuffed him, and conducted a frisk.  (1T16-2 to 10).  He immediately recognized a firearm inside the fanny pack still on defendant’s body.  \(^2\)  Defendant does not dispute the lawfulness of the motor vehicle stop.
[brief] The exact opposite is true.  The 2012 MOU and its arbitration provision were not incorporated by reference in the 2022 Addendum.  Da44-45.  Even the unexecuted 2017 Limited Liability Company Purchase Agreement (“2017 Unexecuted Agreement”), which the 2022 Addendum purportedly modifies, does not incorporate the 2012 MOU or its arbitration provision by reference.  Da51-56.  The 2017 Unexecuted Agreement does not even have its own arbitration provision.  Ibid.  Moreover, the MOU was not mentioned in the communications surrounding the 2022 Addendum and its purported execution.  Da70, 72, 74, 286-88.  In fact, neither the MOU, nor any purported agreement to arbitrate, was mentioned in [...]’s initial Complaint (Da3-23), which is likely why she filed same in the Chancery Court.  Since 2022, the first time [...] even raised the MOU was in 2024, nine months after she filed her Complaint, when she sought to use it to compel arbitration of her own claims, which she herself had affirmative filed in Chancery Court and certified was not subject to arbitration.
[brief] *State v. Zuber*, 227 N.J. 422, 437 (2017).  Finally, to grant the relief defendant requests in this case is hardly a windfall as defendant would still be required to serve an aggregate 30-year sentence.  Nevertheless, the quote from *State v. Schubert*, bears repeating:  “‘[t]he potential for abuse in broad judicial power to increase sentences outweighs the possibility of giving a few defendants the benefits resulting from a judicial mistake. ’”  *State v. Schubert*, 212 N.J. 295, 313 (2012), citing *State v. Eigenmann*, 280 N.J. Super. 331, 348 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting *United States v. Turner*, 518 F.2d 14, 17 (7th Cir.1975)).
[brief] (1T:10:15-16).  [...] noted that on June 24, 2021, an application was filed by [...] for a receiver.  The court observed that, by that point, the “world is beginning to breath. ”  (1T:11:18-22)  [...] appointed [...].  On September 27, 2021, the chancery division, under Docket No. [...], entered the final judgment of Foreclosure.
[brief] Enacted in 2003, nearly two decades prior to the passage of Chapter 375, N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6 established a Mandated Health Benefits Advisory Commission that must review any bill introduced in the Legislature that would require a carrier to provide a mandated health benefit.  Under the statute, absent urgent circumstances, the Legislature is prohibited from considering or voting on such a bill until the Commission’s review is completed or the period for its review has expired.  But if the present Legislature decides to vote on a bill before that review is complete, nothing would prevent it from doing so—that is, a prior Legislature cannot dictate the process the current Legislature uses for passing a law.  Only the Constitution can do so.
[directive] D. course has been substantially the on two or more occasions unless presented course of instruction Institute. determined by the modified, as Page 8 COURSE EDUCATION CATALOG CONTINUING QUALIFYING  4.  Continuin Eg ducation Courses. ualifving; 4.1  Designation of oi' Courses.  The Institute shall compile a catalog of courses Qualif~~; A.  Catalog of relationship between police agencies and enhancing the relevant to the goal of instruction that are tern "course serve.  For purposes of this Directive, the they protect and and the communities officers program, seminar, presentation, moderated group instz•uction" includes a training course, of information share and other educational program or event designed to tutorial, or discussion, online of instruction included in the Institute's Courses knowledge of course participants.  enhance the of continuing for the qualifying continuing education courses purposes constitute catalog shall of this  The Institute shall designate the Section 3 Directive.
[brief] THE FINAL OUTCOME AS TO REACHING AN UNFAIR RESULT.  THE COURT FAILED TO ADHERE TO CASE LAW THAT ESTABLISHED:  A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS VOID WHEN A SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATION FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS RULES HAS OCCURRED, CASTING REASONABLE DOUBT ON PROPER NOTICE, THAT WOULD HAVE COMPELLED THE COURT TO GRANT THE 1990 DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS VOID FOR THE EVIDENCE  DEMONSTRATED SERVICE OF PROCESS HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED NOR VALIDATED (Pa1; Pa7; Pa133)  Personal jurisdiction will exist and is properly exercised when the court has a statutory basis which to base personal jurisdiction; that statutory basis can be exercised in accord with the Constitution and the defendant has been given sufficient notice of the plaintiff’s suit against him.  When discerning precedents, it contains a ratio decidendi which is the central Rule stemming from the judgment.  This ratio is the part of the precedent that becomes the judgment, and other judges are compelled to apply it when applicable and therefore “BINDS” the judge to adhere to established precedents which the trial court failed to consider and adhere to.  It is therefore the constitutional basis of analysis that has not been satisfied, as this appeal will demonstrate by the court failing to cure its errors (missed case law and Validity of Service not validated) when the opportunity was presented via a Motion to Reconsider (Pa33-Pa34) the court directly caused harm and prejudice to this defendant resulting in the improper denial of granting this defendant’s motion to void the 1990 default judgment (Pa7).
[brief] Despite its insistence that the Board move the resolution at its December 12, 2022, hearing, [...] chose not to be present.  At that hearing, the Board voted to approve the Project, and the proposed form of resolution, Pa106, but only with the addition of a condition that Building E, like the other buildings, include an elevator.  The Board stated it would memorialize the condition in a separate, supplemental written resolution the following month, which it did, Pa123.  [...] filed Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights under the DJ action claiming breach of the Settlement Agreement (Pa035) and filed a separate prerogative writ action (Pa128) which it later withdrew.  The trial court erroneously granted [...]’s in Aid motion as well as awarding attorney’s fees and ‘Delay Penalties’.  Comes now the appeal.
[brief] --- \(^5\)  The Planning Board’s Resolution No. PB10-2022 also states that consistency of the Second Ordinance with the Master Plan is supported by furtherance of Objectives 3 (providing affordable housing) and 6 (addressing environmental events).  (Pa 69)  “Objective” 6 is not met by something new in the Second Ordinance that changes the existing Redevelopment Plan.  The Redevelopment Plan based on the 350 Unit [...] already met this objective.  As we discuss in this brief, Objective 3 (providing affordable housing) was particularly hurt by the Second Ordinance.  While the Second Ordinance’s 11-acre County park may be in accord with the Master Plan’s general objective to increase open space, it is patently inconsistent with the Master Plan’s Land Use Element setting forth the amount of open space and where in the municipality such open spaces should be located and how that open space should be used and by whom.
[brief] In doing so, the Trial Court failed to consider the substantial change in the Property due to the discover of the eagle’s nest; the resultant effect on the Respondents’ Application and the Board denial thereof.  As aptly noted by the Court in Galdieri v. Bd. of Adjustment of Morris, 165 N.J. Super. 505, 515 (App. Div. 1979)(citations omitted), “more is to be feared in the way of breakdown of zoning plans from grants than denials of variances. ”  POINT II
[brief] The Board is not challenging the constitutionality of *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  However, [...]’s Counterclaim, to be successful, requires the court to interpret *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3) in a manner that violates the Impairment of Contracts clauses in the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions.  [...]’s arguments that the Board failed to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute is misplaced and should be rejected.  --- 6
[brief] [...] began its decision with a procedural summary and review of the Parties’ joint stipulations and joint exhibits.  (Pa216-Pa227).  In reviewing the joint exhibits, [...] addressed an [...] article describing the value of its bargaining units engaging on what it referred to as “open bargaining”.¹ (Pa223-Pa225).  [...] also quoted from a certification from [...] negotiations chair [...] concerning the [...]’s use of the Bargaining Council.  (Pa225-Pa227).  [...] then summarized the Parties’ legal arguments.
[brief] THE STANDARD PLAINTIFFS ARGUE FOR IS IS MANAGEABLE | 13 | | IV.  [...]’S FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN CHALLENGED | | | CONCLUSION | 15 | # TABLE OF CITATIONS | CASES | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Bryant v. City of Atl. City**, 309 *N.J. Super.* 596 (App. Div. 1988) | 8 | | **DiProspero v. Penn**, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) | 4 | | **515 Assocs. v City of Newark**, 132 N.J. 180, 186 (1993) | 8 | | **Hirth v. City of Hoboken**, 337 *N.J. Super.* 149 (App. Div. 2001) | 8, 9, 14 | | **Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of Town of W. Orange**, | | | 68 *N.J.* 543, 564 (1975) | 8, fn3 | | **Malanga v. Tp. of West Orange**, 253 *N.J.* 291(2023) | 7 | | **MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal LLC v. Jersey City**, | | | 455 *N.J. Super.* 608 (App. Div. 2018), certif..den..236 *N.J.* 387 (2019) | 4 | | **Millennium Towers Urban Renewal LLC v. Mun. Council** | | | of City of Jersey City, 343 *N.J. Super.* 367 (Law Div. 2001) | 7 | | **N.J. Shore Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Jackson**, 199 *N.J.* 38, 55 (2009) | 8, fn3 | | **Secaucus v. Jersey City**, 19 *N.J. Tax* 10 (Tax 2000) | 7 | | **Spade v. Select Comfort Corp.**, 232 *N.J.* 504, 524-15, | | | 181 A. 2d 969 (2018) | 4 | | **388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings v. Twp. of Readington**, | | | 221 *N.J.* 318, 338 (2015) | 8, fn3 | Quick Check Food Stores v. Springfield, 83 N.J. 438, 447 (1980)
[brief] Exhibit “R” – [...]’s Nov. 30, 2022 Letter to [...].  It has objections (p. 2) to [...]’ secret & unauthorized transfer of, or denial to [...] of online access to, Trust accounts in violation of Oct. ’22 Order.  | 465a | | 29.  | Exhibit “AB” is [...]’s May 25, 2023 Certification for Cross-Motion to Reconsider Oct. ‘22 Order, par. 1d, for Dec. 14 ‘21, Trust Payment of [...]’s $4,120.48 fee - p. 1,5,&6 | 469a | | | a. App. Exhibit “A” – [...]’s Nov. 4, 2022 Certification, p. 1&2, in Opposition to Jacobson’s request for legal fees | 473a | | | b. App. Exhibit “H” – Sept. 22, 2022 Hearing Transcript, p.6 | 476a | | 30.  | Exhibit “AC” is [...]’ May 30, 2023 Certification in response to [...]’s May 25th Cross-Motion.  | 478a | | 31.  | Exhibit “AD” is [...]’ May 30, 2023, Proposed Order for his Cross-Motion of May 25, 2023.  | 492a | | 32.  | Exhibit “AE” is [...]’ Email to [...] and [...] – “Irrelevant and False Claims in [...]’s Case Information Statement for [...]” - Jan. 26, 2024 | 498a | | 33.  |  Exhibit “AF” is [...]’ Proposed Order for Appellate approval for sign-off by Superior Court based on [...]’ Appeal of Oct. 6, 2022, March 7, 2023, & September 6, 2023  Orders | 501a | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  [...] ("Appellant", "Interested Party"), as sole Vested Remainder Beneficiary of [...] ("Trust") under Will of [...], decedent ("Will") (Exh. "F") (44a-49a) & pro se litigant, is appealing
[brief] [Pa142-143].  That finding ignores the testimony [...] had presented on this issue.  To be sure, [...] could have relocated the site driveway to the south side of the Property to avoid these sloped areas, but doing so was impractical because that would place vehicular traffic closer to the homes to the south.  Instead, [...] placed its driveway and the vast majority of parking on the north side of the Property, and in the process needed to disturb an insignificant percentage of the total area of the Property that happened to have a slope.  The waiver was justified and the Board should have granted it.
[brief] Mount Olive Ordinance §68-1, et seq. ................................ Ra01 (Exhibit A to [...] Cert.)  Mount Olive Police Department Policies and Procedures ..............  Ra11 (Exhibit B to [...] Cert.) Agreement Between the [...] and [...] ..............................................  Ra21 (Exhibit D to [...] Cert.) TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief  Dated December 22, 2023 ...........................................  Pa24  Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Dated December 22, 2023 ...........................................  Pa25  PROCEDURAL HISTORY