ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985); see also Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 268 (App. 1997) (finding juries should not be permitted to speculate, without expert testimony, in areas where lay persons are not expected to have sufficient knowledge.).  In these cases, a "plaintiff must produce expert testimony upon which the jury could find that the consensus of the particular profession involved[,] recognized the existence of the standard defined by the expert."  Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] [...] Brief | 95a | | 10/26/17 | [...] Responses to First Request for Production of Documents | 99a | | 10/26/17 | [...] Responses to Interrogatories | 169a | | 2/28/18 | Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Order of November 10, 2016 and Reinstate the Complaint against [...] | 187a | | 4/3/18 | Order Denying Motion to Vacate | 188a | | 4/30/18 | [...] Deposition | 190a | | 5/18/18 | Volume I [...] Deposition | 208a | | 5/23/18 | [...] Deposition | 216a | | 6/4/18 | Volume III [...] Deposition | 226a | | 6/5/18 | Volume IV [...] Deposition | 235a | | 7/9/18 | Volume V [...] Deposition | 243a | RULE 2:6-1(a)(1) STATEMENT OF ALL ITEMS SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 11/21/20 Defendants Joseph [...] Esquire and [...]’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment..................................................766a 11/21/20 Defendants Joseph [...] Esquire and [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment......................768a 11/21/20 Certification of [...] in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Joseph [...], Esquire and [...]...........................................................................................................772a Exhibit A, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint.............................................776a Exhibit B, excerpts of John [...]’s May 18, 2018 deposition.......................825a Exhibit C, Complaint filed in the matter of [...] v. [...], et al.................................................................................................831a Exhibit D, excerpts of [...]’s July 25, 2018 deposition....................855a Exhibit E, excerpts of [...]’s July 24, 2018 deposition....................858a Exhibit F, excerpts of John [...]’s June 4, 2018 deposition..........................861a Exhibit G, documents received from [...].................................863a Exhibit H, check and deposit slip from Russo Subpoenaed Bank Docs..........883a
[brief] Defendants were advised of this during the September 29 Meeting, but nonetheless, included this false accusation in the Letters.  (Pa40).  The Notices conclude by requiring Appellants to “restore sales volume in [Appellants’] territory to ninety-six percent of calendar year 2019 sales levels” by October 24, 2022, or else [...] would terminate the Agreement on January 31, 2023.  (Pa77; Pa79).  This requirement is not only unreasonable but an entirely new requirement not included in the Agreement.  The trial court accurately described the Notices and Defendants’ tactics as unfair and unreasonable.  Specifically, [...] stated:  I’ve been given nothing to suggest that there was a problem and – and the relationship has gone on be – between the parties for 45 years, as I understand it.  And I’ve been given nothing to suggest there was any problem until September, I guess it was ’22, as I recall.  And they gave – were given four months to submit a plan.  That’s pretty precipitous with a 45-year relationship.  I just don’t think that that’s really treating the – the plaintiff in a fair and reasonable way to say, you know, we’ve been doing great for 45 years.  Now you have four months to figure this out and get it done.  (T76:8-22).  This statement not only confirmed Appellants were entitled to injunctive relief, but implicitly agreed that [...]’s actions were not in good faith and were unreasonable.
[brief] **Point II**  The trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on aggravated assault.  The defendant asked the trial judge to instruct the jury on aggravated assault—which was not charged in the indictment—while also instructing the jury on murder and the lesser-included charges to murder.  (7T 81:16 to 83:11).  The defendant relied on testimony regarding the stabbing and the assault with the tire iron to argue that the jury could treat the stabbing and the tire iron assault as two separate incidents.  The State argued that the stabbing and the tire iron assault were not charged as separate incidents and were treated as one incident in the indictment, so no separate charge was warranted.  (7T 87:1-21).  The trial court declined to charge aggravated assault, finding no rational basis to charge a related offense when the testimony of the defendant indicated that her intent was to kill the victim to save her own life and the evidence showed that the nature and number of wounds showed an intent to kill.  (7T 106:7 to 107:6).  The trial court made the proper decision.  Unlike lesser-included offenses, related offenses “are those that share a common factual ground, but not a commonality in statutory elements, with the crimes charged in the indictment. ”  State v. Alexander, 233 N.J. 132, 144 (2018)(quoting State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119, 132 (2006).  A trial court “may instruct the jury on a related offense only when the defendant requests or consents to the related offense charge, and there is a rational basis in the evidence to sustain the related offense. ”  Id. at 144-145.  In this case, there was no rational basis to charge aggravated assault.  The defendant asked for the aggravated assault charge in addition to the murder charge and lesser-included charges.  But the forensic pathologist in this case testified that the cause of death “was sharp force injuries to the neck and blunt force injuries to the head. ” (5T 114:7-9).  The death of the victim was caused by both the stab wounds to the neck and the strikes from the tire iron.  There was no rational basis to separate the jury instructions into two separate incidents when both incidents caused the death of the victim.  If the trial court had included a charge on aggravated assault, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of murder and aggravated assault, even though the tire iron attack was a cause of the death.  The aggravated assault charge would have only confused the jury and could have led to an absurd verdict.  The trial court properly declined to provide the related charge of aggravated assault.  **Point III**
[brief] On October 5, 2021, Plaintiff, the [...], commenced a civil action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County ([...]).  Pa1 to Pa5 (complaint).  The matter was transferred to the Mercer County Chancery Division ([...]) on January 12, 2023.  Pa6 (order).  A January 13, 2023 judgment in Plaintiff's favor (Pa7 to Pa8) was vacated by order (Pa9 to Pa10) entered on March 23, 2023.  On the same date, Defendant, [...], filed an answer and counterclaim (Pa11 to Pa21).  Plaintiff answered the counterclaim on March 30, 2023.  See pleading at Pa22 to Pa26.  On January 8, 2024, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment.  Pa33 to Pa35 (notice of motion).  On February 5, 2024, Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment (see notice at Pa136 to Pa137); the cross-motion papers were resubmitted on February 6, 2024.  A statement of all items submitted vis-à-vis the motion and cross-motion is at Pa351 to Pa355.  On March 4, 2024, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., entered an order (Pa27 to Pa28) denying Plaintiff's motion and granting Defendant's cross- --- 2  Transcript reference: "T__-__" refers to the March 1, 2024 summary judgment motion/cross-motion hearing. motion.  The court's March 1, 2024 verbal opinion is at T12-10 to T15-18; T15-23 to T16-18.  On April 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed the within appeal.  Pa29 to Pa31 (notice of appeal).
[brief] Trial Exhibit D-1……………………………………………………………  Pa 163 February 13, 2020  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Dear Mr. and Ms. Borja:  Please be advised that this firm represents [...] and [...].  We also represent the interests of the tenants of [...], Oceanport.  You have caused frivolous and malicious claims to be filed against our clients and our clients' tenants.  You either are aware or, with reasonable diligence should be aware that our clients' occupation and usage of the property located at [...] is long established and fully comports with the laws of the State of New Jersey and the ordinances of the Borough of Oceanport.  You have, moreover, harassed our clients and their tenants and engaged in defamatory conduct.  Should you persist in these behaviors, including the prosecution of your meritless municipal complaints, we will seek redress for our clients as we deem appropriate, to include without limitation, injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs of suit.  I strongly suggest you retain legal counsel before damages mount.  Lastly, as you are aware, your driveway trespasses on our clients' property.  [...], in an effort to be neighborly, did not pursue remedies for that improper usage of his entity's property.  I must inform you that as a result of your non-neighborly behavior, that willingness to accommodate your trespass has terminated.  You are to have your driveway removed from our clients' property within the (10) days from the date of this letter.  Should you not do so, I have been instructed to bring an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division for relief.  Be guided accordingly.
[brief] This Court affirmed [...] and held he correctly ruled the Office of Administrative Law IDEA  Orders incorporating settlement agreements, sought by [...] under the OPRA, were required to be made public.  Furthermore, [...] was also correct because the student records here were submitted to the tribunal without a protective order they were additionally public records pursuant to *Keddie v Rutgers*, 148 N.J. 36, 51 (1997).  When the Board settled with parents or guardians pursuant to their IDEA claims in the OAL, and failed to obtain protective orders, these documents became judicial filings and were subject to public access.  (20a-21a)  This Court next addressed the appeal of the Board's appeal of the 8/28/20 Order to pay [...] $78,646 in attorney's fees.
[brief] “Courts of equity have long been charged with responsibility to fashion equitable remedies that address the unique setting of each case . . .  *U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.* Guillaume 209 N.J. at 467 and see Town of Kearny v. Discount City of Old Bridge, Inc. 205 N.J. 386 (2011).  Holding the Defendant worthy of consideration under Rule 4:50-1(f), [...]’s application of equitable principles recognized that exceptional circumstances are “as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice” but granted sparingly, only to avoid a “grave injustice. ”  Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 484.  As stated in Johnson v. Johnson, 320 N.J.Super. 371, 378 (App. Div. 1999), each case “must be resolved on its particular facts.
[brief] The trial court properly determined that all of defendant’s nine prior convictions would be admissible to affect his credibility should he decide to testify.  The judge ruled that defendant’s prior convictions would be admissible only in their sanitized form.  (14T: 8-15 to 19).  Defendant argues the trial court’s ruling that the other six convictions would be admissible for impeachment purposes in the event he chose to testify was an abuse of discretion under N.J.R.E. 609 that was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  As the trial court properly ruled that the convictions would be admissible, defendant’s convictions should be affirmed.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S REASONING WAS FLAWED BECAUSE IT ASSUMED THERE WAS EVIDENCE HASSAN WAS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO CUSTOMERS.  The trial court erred by overlooking the lack of evidence that [...] possessed any quality that made him potentially dangerous to [...] or any other [...] customer.  At oral argument, the trial court agreed that the risk of harm addressed by a claim for negligent training and supervision “is defined by the [employee’s] incompetence or dangerous characteristic. ”  [9T 118:15-16].  Yet in denying [...]’ motion for a directed verdict, the trial court reasoned that:  Plaintiff’s theory of the case is that [...], in the course of conducting its training of Mr. [...], did not adequately train him or failed to abide by its training standards in . . . letting him approach customers on the floor.  . . .  Because those claims all involve credibility issues as to the [...] position that they did not violate Plaintiff’s rights as they adequately trained Mr. [...], that’s a question of fact that should properly be reserved for the jury.  [10T 6:9-21].  The trial court erred because it assumed that a rational juror could have concluded that [...] had reason to know that [...] possessed some quality that posed a danger to customers he approached.
[brief] However, R. 4:50-1 provides additional means to vacate a judgment, whether or not secured by default.  The Rule is designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case. ”  Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 392 (1984).  A decision to vacate a judgment lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, guided by principles of equity.  Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994).  R. 4:50-1 provides a number of justifications to vacate a judgment: Section (a) permits vacation of a judgment due to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect. ”  Section (d) allows the vacation of any order that is “void,” and (e) permits vacation for any reason justifying such relief.  In the present case, Sections (a), (d) and (e) are each consonant with the issues that Defendant now brings before the Court.
[brief] Further, the Judge failed to fully appreciate impact of the eagle’s nest buffer on the developable portion of the Property; and the limited modifications to the Prior Approvals encompassed in the Application.  Although, the amount of developable land was reduced by approximately half (1/2), the intensity of the development was only reduced by 21,432 SF of commercial use (65,000 SF reduced to 43,568 SF) and the number of residential units (206 units) was unchanged.  M70-71.  Exhibits A-3 and A-4 from the 2019 Board hearing on the Respondents’ Application show the reduced developable land available as a result of the eagle’s nest.  M103-104.  As noted in the Statement of Facts this resulted in the prior two (2) variance being increased to twelve (12) variances which include three (3) “d” variances and nine (9) bulk or “c” variances.  Despite this undeniably substantial change, the Trial Court improperly relies upon the reasons for the Prior Approvals as a basis for overturning the Board’s present denial (M36); however, caselaw does not support the reliance upon previously granted variances as competent evidence to meet the positive criteria.
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).  The substantial evidence presented does not support the final agency determination made by the [...].  Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action."  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Board’s determination references a “presumption” that mail properly addressed with proper postage was received by the party it was addressed to.  However, [...] certified in an affidavit provided to the Board that he never received a postcard from the Division, regardless of if it was ever sent.  This affidavit should overcome any presumption that the postcard was received.  The Board’s decision failed to consider the almost one hundred affidavits of other active and retired troopers who also did not receive a postcard from the Division notifying them of the Ricci Act that were submitted to the Board in support of [...]’s appeal.  As such, the finding that it was “undisputed” that the Division sent the postcard to [...] (and others) is not supported by the facts and evidence presented.  Furthermore, any presumption claimed by the Board has clearly been rebutted by the overwhelming evidence presented in this matter.  Considering the evidence presented, the agency’s action does not have a reasonable basis.  Additionally, the Board failed to consider the evidence presented demonstrating that Registrations Forms submitted were not accepted by the Division because the Trooper(s) who submitted them were not sick at the time the Registration Form was sent.  [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  [...] was denied the ability to register because he was told the Ricci Bill “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa134.  The Board also failed to consider the evidence presented regarding the [...] membership polling.  [...], President of the [...], polled his membership to ascertain whether anyone received notice of the Ricci Act.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  The Board ignored the evidence from this polling when making its determination.  In light of all of the evidence presented on [...]’s behalf, a reasonable mind could only conclude that these postcards were never received.  Without proper notice, [...] should have been permitted to register for the Ricci Act.  Therefore, the determination below should be reversed because it is against the substantial weight of the evidence.
[brief] Pall.  However, no August 8, 2019, email was provided.  A Memorandum to the Certifying Officers was provided with no date other than “August 2019. ”  Pa62.  Even still, this Memorandum was to State Agency Certifying Officers, not to members of the retirement system.  If anything, it is proof that the members of the retirement system could not have possibly been notified within the statutory timeframe, as the Certifying Officers were not even notified within 30 days.  Furthermore, even if an email was sent to the Certifying Officers on August 8, 2019, it was still outside the timeframe required by the Ricci Act to provide notice to the members of the retirement system.  Moreover, [...] certified that he never received the postcard regarding the Ricci Act.  Pa56.  It is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that the Board does not have to abide by the statutory timelines applicable to the Board but is unwilling to relax the timeframes applicable to [...].  The Board has acknowledged that the third-party vendor was not contacted to mail the postcards until more than 30 days after the enactment of the Ricci Act.  The third-party vendor could not mail the notice within 30 days of the enactment of the Ricci Act.  Because this notice was not sent in accordance with the requirements specified in the Ricci Act, the Board should have granted [...]’s request to register outside the timeframe specified in the Act.  The Board failed to consider its power to relax time limits in the interest of justice or in furtherance of a just accommodation.  It is within the Board’s power to relax time limits.  The Board’s initial denial has failed to consider, evaluate, and weigh [...]’s equitable claims.
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[brief] Erazo, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op. at 25) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).  Determining whether a person is in custody entails "a fact-sensitive inquiry" that turns on "'whether there has been a significant deprivation of [his] freedom of action based on the objective circumstances,'" State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 611 (2021) (quoting State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997)), which "include: the time, place and duration of the detention; the physical surroundings; the nature and degree of the pressure applied to detain the individual; language used by the officer; and objective indications that the person questioned is a suspect."
[brief] Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 195. exempt from the Act's requirements, *ibid.*, the proviso does not speak to the question of whether the Legislature intended "routine" to modify "upgrade."  We fail to grasp — and neither the Department nor [...] explains — why "routine" modifying every listed activity, that is to read the statute to exempt only routine maintenance and operations, routine rehabilitation, routine preservation, routine reconstruction, routine repair, and routine upgrade, "would make no sense and thus would be an absurd interpretation," as they assert.  "Routine" is plainly intended to serve as a statutory limiting principle of the enumerated activities a utility may undertake in the Preservation Area with regard to its lines, rights of way, and systems without the [...] engaging in a permitting review.  And although all the activities included in the list other than "upgrade" have implied limitations, "maintenance and operations" being --- 13
[brief] The FDCPA’S Legislative History and Agency Interpretations are Consistent with the Federal Courts’ Decisions.  (As to Legislative History, Pa35)  Before the motion court, Defendant presented legislative history and agency interpretation of the FDCPA which, it asserted, supported the conclusion that communications with mail vendors are permitted under § 1692c(b).  As explained above under Point III, those extrinsic sources should not be considered when, as is the case here, the ordinary meaning of the statutory language yields a result consistent with the statutory scheme and purpose.  In Point III, we addressed the legislative history to the extent it had been relied on by the motion court.  We have not addressed the legislative history and agency interpretation arguments which Defendant presented below.  “Legislative history, after all, almost always has something for everyone!”
[brief] ” (Pa384a).  As Syndicate Manager, [...] disbursed proceeds to the Syndicate’s shareholders from, at least in part, money it generated through the domestic and international sale of [...]’s frozen semen.  (Pa163a).  Increased demand for [...]’s semen by breeders meant, in practical effect, more money for the Syndicate and its shareholders.  (Pa183a).  Defendant [...] decided to increase the frequency of collecting [...]’s semen because of increased demand for [...]’s semen in the United States.  (Pa299a).  [...] was boarded at [...] for frozen semen collection from July 16, 2017 through January 10, 2018, and then again from July 24, 2018 through October 3, 2018, when [...] was removed from [...] to [...] after attacking [...].