[brief] ”  The Court determined that the observers did not constitute representatives which were able to attend negotiations, noting, in relevant part, that “the observers do not ‘act for’ the employees.  Rather, they simply silently spectate the negotiating process…”  The Court concluded:  Simply put, the observers are not “representatives” as defined by the Act.  Thus, [the employer] is not infringing on [the union’s] members’ rights to choose their representatives by insisting that observers be excluded from negotiations.  It is merely insisting that only those representatives – and not mere observers – come to the bargaining table.  [T]he Court finds that [the union] has failed to show that its members will be deprived of a fundamental right to representation of their choice.  Rather, all that they have been deprived of is the opportunity to view those representatives in action.  The Railway Labor Act does not create a substantive right to observation of negotiations.  The National Labor Relations Board declared in Brooke Glen Behavioral Hosp., 365 NLRB No. 79 (2017) (Pa327) that “[a]lthough...parties are generally permitted to select their own bargaining team, that does not necessarily include the selection of ‘observers’ who are not members of the bargaining team and have nothing to add to the bargaining.  Extending bargaining to such observers – by either side, over the objection of the other – would raise the potential for mischief and serious interference with good-faith bargaining. ”  See also Talbot v. Concord Union Sch. Dist., 114 N.H. 532, 535 (N.H. 1974) (“[T]he presence of the public and the press at negotiating sessions would inhibit the free exchange of views and freeze negotiators into fixed positions from which they could not recede without loss of fact. ”); Appeal of Exeter, 126 N.H. 685 (1985) (New Hampshire Supreme Court affirming public employee labor relations board determination that “[n]either party may insist on open or public negotiations or statements thereon as a precondition for substantive negotiations if the other party does not consent” and that “[a]bsent such an agreement, negotiation sessions shall be held in private”); Bd. of Selectmen v. Labor Relations Com., 7 Mass App. Ct. 360, 362 (Mapp. App. Ct. 1979) (citing to Talbot, supra, for the propositions that “the delicate mechanisms of collective bargaining would be thrown awry if viewed prematurely by the public” and that “the position of several State labor boards [is] that bargaining in public would tend to prolong negotiations and damage the procedure of compromise inherent in collective bargaining”); Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 40 Cal. App. 5th 241, 265 (“Collective bargaining negotiations historically have been considered private and closed to the public, even in the public sector. ”)  The Association in this matter seeks the very same thing that the public unions sought in the above-referenced cases – open bargaining in the presence of all of their members – i.e., “employee observers. ”  This Court respectfully should adopt the same position taken by these courts and labor relations boards throughout the country.  A contrary opinion would lead to an absurd result and render the Legislature’s requirement that [...], and all public sector unions in New Jersey, designate “representatives” for negotiations, completely meaningless.  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3.  Unions could completely evade this requirement and force “open bargaining” by simply identifying its entire membership as its “representatives,” as [...] attempts to do here.  In sum, [...] has violated N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 by refusing to negotiate if its demands were not met.  POINT II