ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa11; Pa60; Pa62; Pa58).  [...]’s affidavit asserted, in relevant part, that he “did not receive any correspondence or post card. ” (Pa59).  The Board considered [...]’s request at its meeting of May 23, 2023, where it voted to deny his request to register under the amended benefits provisions of the Ricci Act.  (Pa26).  The Board concluded that [...] was notified as required by the Ricci Act but failed to submit his Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa28).  [...] appealed the Board’s decision by letter dated July 18, 2023.
[brief] Plaintiffs paid $600,000 plus reimbursement "all of the costs and expenses incurred by Seller in bringing the Project to date, . . ." for the solar-energy developmental rights including the WMPA.  They also came to own the Solar Energy Renewable Credits or “S-RECs” issued by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities ("BPU") pursuant to the New Jersey Solar Act, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87 Subsection (t), which is specific to brownfields.  These solar-energy developmental rights including WMPA and S-Recs are commodities capable of being traded among industry participants and competitors and are valuable as commodities and assets.
[directive] these instances, in In the prosecutor will notify the court that the State ready to proceed with prosecution of the case. is Questions or comments may directed to [...], Assistant Director for Criminal be Practice, at [...] or [...] or to [...], Assistant Director for Municipal Court Services, at [...] or [...].  Chief Justice [...] cc: [...], Special Assistant Criminal Presiding Judges  Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  Municipal Presiding Judges  Municipal Division Managers of [...], Chief Staff D. Municipal Court Administrators
[directive] Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2011-1.  4 N.J.S.A. 52:4B-60.1, et seq. 5 2 2016.6  Survivors’ Bill of Rights of  This Directive requires the unreported, or Hold kits, be secured for a minimum of twenty (20) years from the date of the examination where the victim is an adult, and a minimum of twenty (20) years after the victim reaches the age of 18, where the victim is a minor at the time of the incident.  The County Prosecutors must ensure the SAFE/DFSA kits collected for incidents within their jurisdiction are stored in compliance with the requirements in section IV.B. below.
[brief] A municipality may be liable for a decision of an official who “possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. ”  Stomel v. City of Camden, 192 N.J. 137, 146 (2007) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)).  Whether “an official ha[s] final policymaking authority is a question of state law. ”  Besler v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg'l Sch. Dist., 201 N.J. 544, 566 (2010), quoting Stomel, at 146.  The Township’s government is organized pursuant to the Mayor-Council Plan of the Optional Municipal Charter Law, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-1 et seq. (the “Faulkner Act”).
[brief] ”  The Court’s Decision is devoid of any consideration of New Jersey and Federal Student Records law.  This issue was extensively, briefed and argued below.  See, e.g., T55:22-56:11.  This is significant for several reasons.  Primarily, a student’s gender is a mandatory pupil record pursuant to New Jersey law.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(a)(1).  Additionally, New Jersey Statutes and Regulations and the United States Code entitle parents the right to access their child’s full and accurate student record.  As such, parents of all students are aware of the gender identified on the district’s mandated student records.  Accordingly, transgender students are treated the same as their cisgender counterparts as it pertains to parental knowledge of the contents of mandated student records.  This point is significantly reinforced when considering the many steps a transgender student may take along their public social transition journey without parental involvement, such as selection of attire and name used in classrooms and on school identification cards, for example.  See Da162-163 and Da262 N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19 provides, in pertinent part:  The State Board of Education shall provide by regulation for the creation, maintenance and retention of pupil records and for the security thereof and access thereto, to provide general protection for the right of the pupil to be supplied with necessary information about herself or himself, the right of the parent or guardian and the adult pupil to be supplied with full information about the pupil, except as may be inconsistent with reasonable protection of the persons involved, the right of both pupil and parent or guardian to reasonable privacy as against other persons and the opportunity for the public schools to have the data necessary to provide a thorough and efficient educational system for all pupils.  In other words, parents have the unequivocal right to full, complete and accurate information contained in a student record.  Thus, it follows that parents have the right to be notified when a student determines to change their mandated student record.
[brief] This makes sense because, in the latter scenarios, defendants have “a substantial identity of interests” that “outweigh their potential conflicts. ”  Ibid.  [...] thus has it exactly backwards when it emphasizes that Opinion 552 is distinguishable from this case and a per se conflict exists because “the CNA would confer joint and overlapping relief against defendants and not independent or several as contemplated by the Court. ”  Pb22 n.3; see also Pb24 (stressing defendants would be “jointly” liable).  Opinion 552 expressly says that if liability is likely joint or overlapping, then joint representation is permissible.
[brief] The letter states, “.... [...] clarified there was no actual layoff of its Recreation Department employees. ”  [Pa38,39]  This statement is not accurate and is inconsistent with the evidence in the record.  What [...] actually communicated to the [...] was there was no “actual layoff notice. ”  [Pa11,14,15]  There is clearly a significant difference between the [...] claiming [...] confirmed there was no layoff, as opposed to confirming they never provided a formal layoff notice.  The Board’s letter of May 12, 2023, goes on to state that, “[...] chose to terminate his employment on April 5, 2020, and did not return until September 21,
[brief] Thus, the second factor of the In re Resolution/Cort test weighs in favor of private enforcement.  The final factor asks whether it would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to infer the existence of a private right of action.  The reasoning in the unpublished cases relied on by the trial court\(^4\) has relied upon the N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 as the dispositive factor under prong three, despite failing to acknowledge decades of caselaw, and the legislative and statutory history as the polestar, and wholly contrary to the statute’s lifetime of dual enforcement remedies.  But reading the statute to be privately enforceable in conjunction with the Commissioner’s enforcement powers (related primarily to issuance, enforcement, and revocation of licensure) would further, rather than frustrate, the NJCFLA’s underlying purpose of curtailing deceptive practices in the consumer credit industry.  Without a private right of action, the legislative scheme would not “obviate[] the plaintiffs’ need for a private cause of action. ”  In re Resolution, 108 N.J. at 44.  Further, unlike the statute at issue in In re Resolution, N.J.S.A. 52:9M-8, which requires that any evidence or information related to improper investigative disclosure violations “shall be immediately brought by the commission to the attention of the Attorney General,” (emphasis added) the NJCFLA has no such requirement for ‘immediate’ and mandatory enforcement.  To say nothing of prosecutorial resources, all of the Commissioner’s enforcement --- \(^4\) See, e.g., T1 16:17-25.  remedies in Section 18 are discretionary, determining what the Commissioner “may” do rather than what shall occur as a result of a violation.  Again, without conferring a private right of action, the legislative scheme would not obviate the need for a private right of action.  *Ibid.*  Lastly, we must consider whether “extrapolation of the implicit private cause of action . . . would frustrate, rather than further, the legislative scheme that underlies” the NJCFLA.  *Ibid.* at 45.  Given the protections discussed in the analysis of the first test factor above, it is reasonable to infer that private enforcement would promote further policing of the consumer credit industry, thereby prohibiting deceptive lending practices and furthering the underlying purposes of the NJCFLA.  Thus, the third test factor weighs in favor of private enforcement.  The totality of evidence applied to the *In re Resolution/Cort* test indicates that the NJCFLA confers an implied private right of action.  Thus, the trial court’s finding that the NJCFLA does not allow for private enforcement remedies was not rooted in the legal analysis required by our highest courts.  For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s Order denying [...]’s Motion to Vacate should be reversed.
[brief] (NOT RAISED BELOW)  The State’s theory underlying Count 3 of the indictment (aggravated assault on [...]) was that [...] recklessly caused [...]’s wrist fracture during the altercation between the two police officers and [...] outside of the restaurant.  (8T:192-8 to 193-6)  However, this was a disputed issue based on the trial evidence, and defense counsel asserted that [...] likely hurt his own wrist by landing on it while taking [...] down.  (7T:235-11 to 20)  Because there was a clear factual dispute regarding the actual cause of [...]’s injury, the jury should have been instructed on causation.  Had the jury been properly instructed on causation, there is a real possibility it would have acquitted [...] of aggravated assault on [...].  Thus, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on causation denied [...] his right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense.  While the “full” causation charge is not required in all cases, it must be given when causation is contested at trial.
[brief] On or about December 21, 2022, defendant received a draft of the proposed settlement agreement setting forth some of the terms stated on the record, as well as additional terms, which were added by [...], counsel for Appellant, during the departmental proceedings.  Upon review of the draft, it was found the newly added material terms were objectionable.  As was stated in the December 27, 2022, email, “I hope you had a great holiday weekend.  We received the draft.  We are redlining it with some issues we saw.  We should be getting back to you shortly. ”  Pa151.  (Emphasis Added)  Indeed, no reasonable person would find this to constitute acceptance.  There were several serious and material issues that were found within the proposed written agreement, and after addressing those issues with the Respondent, said changes were found unacceptable.  The basic essentials were never sufficiently definite as evidenced by [...]’s admission in the reply in which he states he was “adding other[s] [terms]”.
[brief] When approving the redevelopment designation, the [...] noted that although the Property is located in a sensitive planning area where redevelopment is not encouraged, it approved the designation because of “the currently developed nature of the area, its location within an existing sewer service area and the conditions associated with the property…” (Da132) (emphasis added).  Notice of the designation was sent to Plaintiff on August 28, 2023.  (Da9, ¶34).  Plaintiff filed an appeal by way of action in lieu of prerogative writs on October 5, 2023, challenging the redevelopment area designation.
[brief] Sitkowski v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Lavallette, 238 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 1990) ......................... 21-22, 24 S&S Auto Sales, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj. for the Borough of Stratford, 373 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 2004).  .......................... 20, 34 State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 223 (2014).  ..............................  33 State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245 (2021)  ....................................
[directive] 12)  lime of Seizure: Date of Seizure: 14)  Location of Seizure: (Street) (Municipality) (County) - $1 OO(s) - x NamefBadge # - - S 50(s) x Officer Counting: -- - - -- 20(s) x -$ Narnehadge # . * - S - 10(s)  x Officer Counting: - s 1 - x 1(s)  Claimant: I other (including coins)  S Seized: Total Subr.iitting Officer Badge Number . . . . . . . .. . - ... . . .. . . I . . - . . . ..: . . . -.
[brief] It has been a longstanding rule of law that an appellate court defers to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion.  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett, Co., 239 N.J. 531, 551 (2019).  “Evidentiary decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court’s discretion. ”  Est. of Hanges v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010).  Thus, an appellate court “will not substitute [its] judgment unless the evidentiary ruling is ‘so wide of the mark’ that it constitutes ‘a clear error in judgment.
[brief] Here, despite its unrestricted opportunity to do so, Tenant never argued in the Underlying Action that Landlord not offsetting the Rent Arrears with the unearned 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments constituted a failure by Landlord to mitigate its damages.  (1T; 2T; 3T; Pa133-134).  As such, Tenant is precluded from raising this argument on appeal.  *Nieder*, 62 N.J. at 234.  Tenant’s spurious mitigation argument should be wholly disregarded for this reason alone.
[brief] See Hansen, 253 N.J. at 222 (“We hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it reduced the lodestar by twenty percent because of plaintiff’s limited success in comparison with the relief that he sought in this action. ”).  Plaintiff argues that under *Rendine*, the trial court was prohibited from reducing the fee award below a certain percentage of the fees demanded.  This argument is simply not supported by the holding in *Rendine*.  Instead, *Rendine* expressly allows the trial court to use its discretion and reduce a fee award to an amount the trial court concludes is reasonable.
[brief] As noted previously the Objector’s expert [...]’s practice principally involves work as a traffic consultant and not as a civil engineer.  (Pa141; 11,15-24)  (Pa142; 13,1-6)  He opined that the grading was “as if the buildings were put on pedestals to increase the height by 5 feet” (Pa143-144; 20,16-21,12)  He opined that pedestals should be considered as “other devices designed to allow increased building height” under the ordinance.  (Pa144; 21,22-22,5)  Although he opined that the buildings would be on pedestals, he didn’t address the fact that buildings were not proposed to be raised above the surrounding grade as testified to by the applicant’s engineer [...].  (Pa151; 52,4-15)  He provided no reason why an increase in building height would be desirable on this site to support an argument that the revised lot grade was designed to increase building height.  Nor did he address the issue of having to provide an overall revised lot grading plan for the entire site to address all factors including seasonal high-water table, sewerage and stormwater management regulations as was testified to by [...] and [...].  Nor did he testify as to any alternative design that would avoid an increase in building height.
[brief] As to the fact that no insanity defense was asserted, there was no basis in the law to support the trial court’s holding that the lack of an insanity defense weighed against instructing the jury on diminished capacity.  Diminished  \(^6\)  For an in-depth discussion on the State’s improper arguments about [...]’s Adderall use, see Point III(B) of this brief.  capacity and insanity defenses are distinct concepts, see Delibero, 149 N.J. at 98-99, and there is no requirement that a defendant cannot receive a diminished capacity charge if he is not asserting an insanity defense.
[directive] The Rules and regulations shall provide for uniform classification of the resolution of complaints as follows:  (a)  Sustained.  A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  (b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged conduct did not occur.  (c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.
[brief] A.  The Prior Redevelopment Activities Undertaken By The Borough And The Planning Board  After the Planning Board undertook a preliminary investigation and provided the Borough with the Planning Board’s recommendations, the Borough Council adopted a resolution on August 26, 2015 designating a study area comprised of properties originally identified as Block 184, Lots 1, 2, and 3 (which were subsequently re-numbered as Block 184, Lots 1, 3.02, 3.03, and a portion of Lot 3.01) as an “area in need of redevelopment” under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et. seq (the “LRHL”) called the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Area (the “Redevelopment Area”) (Pa542; Pa435; Pa438; Pa457).  The Borough subsequently adopted a number of redevelopment plans establishing and amending the zoning requirements for this Redevelopment Area (Pa1445; Pa1559; Pa1602).  Since the procedural history and the facts relevant to this litigation are intertwined, they are presented together herein.  Notably, the propriety of these previous governmental actions is not at issue in this litigation as there were previous lawsuits filed by [...] challenging those actions.  To the extent that decisions have been rendered in those other lawsuits, the actions taken by the Borough and the Planning Board have been upheld by the courts.  Thus, the basic premises that the Redevelopment Area is an “area in need of redevelopment” designated by the Borough pursuant to its powers under the LRHL, and that the Borough has previously adopted redevelopment plans establishing and amending the zoning for this Redevelopment Area, are not in dispute in this litigation.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:16-55(c) - Declaration of Rights .....................  7  N.J.S.A. 3B:31-31 - Reformation to Correct Mistakes ...........  13  N.J.S.A. 3B:31-54 - Duty to Administer Trust ..................  1, 9, 15 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-55 - Duty of Loyalty ............................  1, 7, 15 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-56 - Duty of Impartiality ......................  1, 7, 15 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-57 - Duty of Prudent Administration ..........  15 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-69 - General Powers of Trustee ...............  14 RULES
[brief] As they alternated between empathizing and accusing, their aggressive shouting, swearing, pointing, leaning, table-slapping, and name-calling (most coercively, calling him a “motherf***er”) further contributed to the coercive atmosphere.  Together, those manipulative tactics physically and mentally exhausted [...], as objectively shown by his contemporaneous statement that he was “t[ir]ed as hell” and the clear footage of him trying to rest in between sessions.  The motion court did not consider any of the above factors.
[brief] \textbf{[...] Was Dismissed and Never Reinstated}  Even if [...] had been properly served with the Amended Complaint, it was dismissed from the action by way of the Dismissal Order dated January 28, 2022.  [Pa3326]  The Dismissal Order itself expressly noted that “[a] formal notice of motion is now required to restore this party to active trial status. ”  [Pa3326]  It is undisputed that no such motion was ever filed by Appellants.  As a result, [...] was not a party, and no judgment could be properly entered against it.
[brief] ## Statutes | Statute | Page | |--------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 39:3-4 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 39:3-8.1 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 39:3-15 | 14 | | N.J.S.A.  39:3-17 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 39:3-17.1 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1 | 12 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 | 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 | 1, 2, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(1) | 14 | ## Case Law | Case Name | Page | |------------------------------------|------| | Bencosme v. Kannankara, A-1672-14T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 614 (App. Div. Mar. 22, 2016) | 15, 19 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 19 | | Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460 (2004) | 13 | | Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 115 N.J. 451 (1989) | 10, 22 | | DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | 8 | | Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239 (2015) | 8 | | Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95 (2009) | 8, 9 | | Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 (2001) | 9 | | McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256 (2019) | 8 | Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193 (2006)
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  1.  APPENDIX ................................................................................................................DA3  2.  NOTICE OF APPEAL .................................................................................................DA3  3.  [...] ORDER SETTING RENT ............................................................DA8  4.  [...]'S ORDER REMANDING .........................................................DA9  5.  [...]'S OPINION REMANDING ......................................................DA13  6.  [...] ORDER REMANDING .........................................................DA26  7.  TRANSCRIPT OF [...] HEARING ................................................DA28  8.  §155-2 OF HOBOKEN RCO (APPLICABILITY) .......................................................DA53  9.  §155-1 OF HOBOKEN RCO (DEFINITIONS) ........................................................DA55  10. § §155-3 AND 155-4 OF RCO (ESTABLISHMENT OF RENTS & DECONTROL)  ................................................................................................................DA59  11.  §155-14 OF HOBOKEN RCO (HARDSHIP APPLICATIONS) .........................DA62  12.  §155-8 OF HOBOKEN RCO (CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT SURCHARGE)  ........DA64  13.  Certification of [...] concerning income ........................................DA66  14.  [...]'s Hardship Application (without exhibits) ..........................................DA69  15.  2017 Board resolution granting application .........................................................DA80  16.  2019 Board resolution granting application .........................................................DA83 17.  2021 Board resolution granting application (unofficial) .................................DA89  18.  Deed for apartment building ...............................................................................DA93 19.  Certificate of Substantial Compliance .................................................................DA97  20.  2016 Corporate Taxes for [...] .................................................................DA99  20.  Bishop Property Mgt. v. City of Jersey City Rent Leveling Board, 2020 WL 6553789 (November 9, 2020)  ........................................................DA99  21.  Transcript Delivery Certification 7.22.22 .............................................................DA99  22.  Transcript Delivery Certification 9.30.22 .............................................................DA99  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES