ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There is, however, no evidence presented to the court to be able to argue that it does fall under SLAPP for the court to make a ruling that it is, in fact, a SLAPP case.  Courts will not disturb the rulings and legal conclusions that flow from the lower courts unless convinced they are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."  Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015).  The courts have ruled that, "findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."  Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12, 713 A.2d 390 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
[brief] A party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must establish: (1) that the entity was "dominated" by the individual owner, and (2) "that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would perpetrate a fraud or injustice, or otherwise circumvent the law."  Verni, 387 N.J. Super. at 199-200 (citing Ventron, supra, 94 N.J. at 500-01).  These circumstances, however, do not apply in this case.  Appellants’ claim of veil piercing is based solely on the fact that the [...] share officers and directors and allegedly “do not observe corporate formalities”, which amounts to a fraud or injustice upon the Appellants.  (Pa001647).  As set forth above, the [...] did not perpetrate a fraud or other injustice upon the Appellants.  The mere fact that the [...] share officers and directors does not in any way amount to a fraud or injustice upon the Appellants.  Again, for all the reasons set forth herein, the trial court properly dismissed this count.  6.
[brief] Thus, where "a party seeks only equitable remedies, he or she need meet only the lesser burden; it is not necessary to show scienter."  *Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein*, 115 N.J. 599, 609, 560 A.2d 655 (1989).  Ordinarily, plaintiff should have raised the issue of fraud or unclean hands as a defense to defendant's request for modification in the plenary hearing which resulted in the July 1991 order.
[brief] Id.  Defendants are correct that the Appellate Division in Superior Officers rejected the union’s argument that a “reasonableness” standard should be applied when Defendants unilaterally vacate an arbitration award pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(j).  Db24-25.  The Appellate Division, however, found that “[t]he reasonableness standard does apply to N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5(3)(g)[.]”  Superior Officers at 24.  The broad provisions of the MSRA, N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5 (a)(3)(g)-(i), grant the following powers, inter alia, to the Director of the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs:
[brief] (3T61-13 to 61-18, Pa1-2)  [...] treated [...]’ motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations as though it were an untimely motion for reconsideration of [...]’s order of January 24, 2020, rather than a summary judgment motion based upon the additional information pertaining to plaintiff’s and counsel’s conduct that counsel had received through discovery.  (3T65-21 to 66-16, Pa5-6)  She stated:  This issue has already been decided by the Court.  [...] was assigned the prior motions to dismiss on this ground and denied the motions on January 24, 2020 and February 14, 2020.  This is essentially a request for reconsideration of [...]’s two prior orders.
[brief] Because [...] relied on others’ reporting in reaching an opinion that defendant met the definition of legal insanity at the time of the murders, [...] gave this instruction to the jury during defendant’s direct examination of [...]:  Ladies and gentlemen, so when in this case, [...], when she relies on certain information, you’re allowed to evaluate that information, and I’m going to give you a longer charge later, but to give you a basic understanding of it right now is that the Doctor can rely upon information that has an effect on her ultimate decision, she has the ability to do that.  Now, if she’s relying upon this information for the truth of what is being said, well then it’s for you to make the determination whether or not that information is true or not.  If she’s relying on the information, not necessarily for the truth but for the actual information as it’s just being relayed to her, well then she can do that for purposes of her diagnosis in certain ways.  But what I’m trying to explain to you right now based on what’s in front of us, and I’m going to get into that a little bit later in that charge, but what I’m trying to explain to you right now, the Doctor just testified to somebody else’s diagnosis.
[brief] (11T152:12-186:13)  A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW.  (Not raised below)  B.  IMPROPER JURY INSTRUCTIONS (11T152:12-184:13)  1.  Respondeat Superior (10T29:23-38:9; 61:1-66:7)  The Jury was Improperly Instructed that [...] Could Only be Liable if [...] Acted Negligently in Self-Defense.  (11T169:20-170:1)  2.  The Jury Was Improperly Instructed That They Could NOT Find that [...] was Both Vicariously Liable and Directly Liable for Negligent Training or Supervision.  (11T179:3-8)  3.  The Trial Judge Committed Reversible Error in Refusing to Instruct the Jury In Accordance With the Restatement of Torts, Section 317 (10T40:5-42:6)  IV.  THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN RULINGS ON ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL.  (11T4:19-5:7; 10T16:18-20:11)
[brief] Thus, the Secondary Business area and CBD are two entirely separate, non-overlapping areas.  The 2018 Master Plan made several observations as to the CBD.  Although the CBD is a different zone from the B-3 Zone and Secondary Business area in which Lot 5 is located, Plaintiff’s planner nonetheless offered misleading testimony by suggesting that such observations [i.e., encouraging the promotion of mixed-use development to include residential units above the first floor and the restriction of units to efficiency apartments conflicts with certain provisions of the New Jersey Uniform Housing Affordability Controls (UHAC)] were also made as to the B-3 Zone, when they were not.  Pa276 at 72:9-73:25; Pa280 at 89:13-20; Pa282 at 95:3-8; Da1-7.  Moreover, the instant matter is not a challenge to the validity of [...]’s Zoning Ordinance, so whether same is or is not inconsistent with UHAC as related to affordable housing units is not even part of this case.  D.
[brief] Defendant admitted that on June 6, 2014, he was driving a car in Fort Lee when police officers signaled him to pull over.  Instead, defendant continued driving at a high rate of speed, creating a risk of a car accident and injury to others.  In fact, there was an accident and defendant’s car was crashed.  (2T24-1 to 25-3).  On August 4, 2023, defendant was sentenced to time served.  (3T16-14 to 23).  A notice of Appeal was filed on September 18, 2023.  (Da113 to 116).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS
[brief] .........................  18  POINT IV  EVEN ASSUMING AN ACCOUNTING IS DISCRETIONARY, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED THAT DISCRETION IN THIS MATTER.  (Pa434-35; Pa525-26; 1T15:22 – 1T19:3; 2T23:14 – 2T27:10). ………………..20  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, IN WHICH MOTION RECORD  PLAINTIFF PROVIDED  ADDITIONAL MATERIAL NOT BEFORE THE COURT ON THE RETURN DATE ON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT.  (Pa525-26; 2T23:14 – 2T27:10)…………………………………………………………………………………..22  CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..23
[brief] Finally, the judge was required to select from the following choices from the model jury charge:  *5  2.  that while in the course of committing that theft the defendant a. knowingly inflicted bodily injury or used force upon another.  b. threatened another with or purposely put (him/her) in fear of immediate bodily injury.  c. committed or threatened immediately to commit the crime of [first or second degree].  [Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Robbery in the First Degree” (2010).]  The judge selected all three, required that the jury must find both 2a and 2b, and referenced a third-degree crime-theft-concerning 2c, rather than a crime of the first or second degree.
[brief] [...], JSC IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY UNION COUNTY - CIVIL DIVISION DOCKET NUMBER [...]  BRIEF of [...] and [...] o.b.o. [...] - Pb1-Pb36  [...], ESQ. - BAR ID. 008081990  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Email: [...]  [...]  Walter M.  Luers, Esq., No. 034041999  Park 80 West - Plaza One 250 Pehle Avenue, Suite 33401  Saddle Brook, New Jersey 07663  Telephone:[...]  Email:[...]  Attorneys for Appellants
[brief] 56  POINT I  THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IS PROPER AND COMPLIES WITH DUE PROCESS  .................................................  56  A.  The Award Is Supported by Clear, Convincing and Substantial Evidence ..................................................56  B.  A Ratio of 2.5x Compensatory Damages is Anything But Excessive in Light of the Serious Harm Done to [...] and the Degree of Reprehensibility of the [...]’ Conduct ........................................................................64  POINT II .........................................................................................................................................................66
[brief] (R-268)  Paragraph 7-  During that discussion, [...] informed me of the following facts:  a.  Sometime after the passing of the Decedent (I was not told a specific date), [...], [...] reached out to the [...] in regard to protecting assets pertaining to a life insurance policy of the Decedent.  b.  In connection with this request, [...] reached out to "an attorney" in Wyoming (I was not told a specific name) to help set up a trust account in [...]'s name for the benefit of her and the Decedents children.
[brief] As outlined in Point II, the notice must provide a "common sense description of the nature of the application, such that the ordinary layperson could understand its potential impact upon him or her."  Pond Run, 397 N.J. Super. at 352 (quoting Perlmart, 295 N.J. Super. at 239).  Appended hereto is the recent opinion in [...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. October 5, 2023).
[brief] On cross-examination, [...] made multiple material concessions concerning the content of [...]’s report.  As an initial matter, [...] acknowledged that he has no basis to opine that [...] was provided with [...]'s 2015 bridge inspection report at any point prior to the date of plaintiff’s accident in September 2015.  (3T160:15-161:4).  [...] also acknowledged that within its report [...] assessed the subject roadway condition as "fair" rather than "poor" or dangerous or a condition in need of emergency repair.  (3T135:13-137:8; 177:22-178:24).  Further, [...] recognized that [...] recommended a maintenance repair, as opposed to an emergency repair, to address the subject roadway condition.  (3T139:2-5).  [...] further conceded that [...]’s description of the roadway condition as involving settlement of “up to 2 inches” allowed for the possibility that the actual settlement measured less than 2 inches.  (3T175:13-176:16).  In sum, no support exists to support the contention that [...] was on timely notice of the [...] report or that the report describes a dangerous roadway condition about which [...] would have reasonably been on notice.
[brief] Chapter 230 “Land Use and Development Regulations”, Article XVII “Regulations Governing Certain Accessory Uses”, Section 230-156.1  “Outdoor Display of Merchandise” of the Code of the [...] is hereby amended to add two (2) new subsections to read as follows:  F.  Except for the setback requirements provided in Subsection B above, the provisions of this section shall not apply to the outdoor display of vehicles per sale as part of a permitted motor vehicle sales use.  G.  The display and/or sale of merchandise from within or under a temporary tent or parking lot shall not be permitted except in accordance with § 230-143.3, Special Permits.  All other portions of this Section shall remain unchanged.  SECTION 16.
[brief] Furthermore, even with a confidentiality order, allowing recording of testing that is proprietary (not the intellectual property of the expert himself) would create a Pandora’s Box scenario.  As a practical matter, despite the best of intentions, any proposed confidentiality order would very likely prove ineffectual in maintaining the strict confidentiality of the proprietary testing utilized by neuropsychologists like [...].  The recording would certainly be shared with Plaintiffs’ own experts and would be referenced in expert reports, depositions and ultimately in open court.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS  Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay  Promotion filed 12/22/23  Pa-24  Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss filed  12/22/23  Pa-25  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Men-L Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1957)  6  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91 (2019)  7  Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431 (2013)  5  Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  4-7  Smith v. SBC Commc’ns Inc., 178 N.J. 265 (2004)  7  Velantzis v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988)  6  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] As a result of the firm numerous defalcations with respect to real estate transactions, several title insurers paid claims and in turn sought recover against the firm and its individual partners.  Subsequently, the legal malpractice carrier filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to void the policy due to the material misrepresentation in the application and seeking rescission.  Although the trial court granted summary judgment against the legal malpractice insurer, the Appellate Division reversed and voided the policy due to the material misrepresentation.
[brief] ”  Id. at 420–21, 231 A.3d 689 (quoting Branch, 182 N.J. at 352, 865 A.2d 673).  However, the Court found that no such inference was generated in that case because the detective used the phrase “evidence collected” only “after (1) he explained that [...] and [the victim] gave formal statements, (2) the jury watched the surveillance footage …, and (3) he read [the victim's] description of the attacker. ”  Id. at 420, 231 A.3d 689.  Furthermore, the detective testified “that he had personally watched the surveillance footage before assembling the photo array” and that the victim told him of the earlier fight before the victim identified defendant.  Ibid.  The Court stressed that, most importantly, [the detective] repeatedly told the jury that no one other than [...] and [the victim] came forward to give a statement.  Viewed in that light, “the logical implication” of [the detective's] testimony was that “the evidence that [he] collected” referred to evidence other than hearsay: the surveillance footage and [the victim's] and [...]'s formal statements and descriptions of the attacker.
[brief] Otherwise, theories not raised will be precluded in a later action.  *McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm’n*, 177 *N.J.* 364, 395 (2003).  The New Jersey courts have distilled these principles to the simple phrase, reflected in decisions such as *Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc.*, supra, that *res judicata* extends to all claims that were raised or “could have been raised.
[brief] The second factor, which considers the purpose of the rule in question, cuts plainly in favor of [...].  The impetus for the rule is to uphold private property rights against government abuse.  The guarantee of just compensation protects individual liberty because property rights are “indispensable to the  ⁴  https://www.motherjones. com/politics/2023/05/tyler-v-hennepin-supreme-court-roberts-jackson-gorsuch/.  ⁵  https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-166/256332/20230306140902231_2023-03-06%20UT%20Brief%20of%20Amici%20Curiae%20in%20Supp%20of%20Pet%20Tyler%20v.%20Hennepin%2022-166%20FINAL.pdf.  ⁶  https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-166/238523/20220922113207496_22-166%20Amici%20Brief%20AARP.pdf.  promotion of individual freedom. ”  Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147 (2021).  Withholding retroactive application of Tyler would only hinder this essential purpose, not further it.
[brief] (C)(2) is not a choice between a multifamily use and a parking lot use - it is rather a choice between a multifamily use with setbacks complying with the zoning ordinances, and a multifamily use with setbacks in "deviation from the zoning ordinance requirement."  When the (C)(2) standard is properly understood, the Board's findings beg the question:  1.  The Application for Development will promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.  2.  The Application for Development will secure from fire, flood, panic and other natural and man-made disasters.  3.  The Application for Development provides for adequate light, air and open space, 4.  The Application for Development promotes a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and good civic design.
[directive] 6.4  Domestic Violence Incidents Involving Agency Personnel  6.4.1  Law enforcement personnel may become involved in domestic violence incidents.  It is important to the integrity of the agency, the safety of the victim and the career of the officer that such matters are handled appropriately.  Thus, it is imperative that every law enforcement agency establish a policy for investigating and resolving domestic violence complaints involving its employees.  6.4.2  Whenever an officer is involved in a domestic violence incident, either as an alleged perpetrator or as a victim, internal affairs must be promptly notified.  Where the officer was the alleged perpetrator, investigating officers must seize their service weapon or any other weapon possessed, as mandated by AG Directives 2000-3 and 2000-4.  6.4.3  Every law enforcement agency should promulgate a rule which requires any officer or employee to notify the agency if he or she has been charged with an offense, received a motor vehicle summons or been involved in a domestic violence incident.  In cases of domestic violence, the investigating agency should also notify the employing agency's internal affairs investigators as soon as possible.  6.4.4  The primary responsibility for investigating the domestic violence incident itself, along with any related offenses, belongs to the agency with jurisdiction over the incident.  The processing of domestic violence complaints, restraining orders, criminal complaints, etc., will remain with that agency.  In many cases, this will not be the officer's employing agency.
[brief] That is like saying an expert cannot use the word “dignity,” which is part of a right protected by the NHA.  The nursing home resident has “the right to a safe and decent living environment and considerate and respectful care that recognizes the dignity and individuality of the resident. ”  N.J.S.A. 30:13-5(j).  The trial court completely misconstrued Ptaszynski v. Atlantic Health Systems, Inc., 440 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015).  Although an expert cannot define “dignity,” he can certainly say the word.  The same is true for responsibility.  Further, there was no claim for a violation of responsibilities under the Act because, as a matter of law, there cannot be.  What difference then does it make if [...] said responsibility when the jury was never going to be asked if there was a violation of responsibilities under the Act?  The whole idea is absurd and an unfortunately effective defense tactic to confuse the court and the factfinder.
[brief] Following the merger of convictions, the court imposed an extended term of 50 years with an 85% parole bar on defendant’s armed robbery conviction and ordered all other sentences to run concurrently with each other and with the extended term.  (Da 12-13)  Absent the extended term, the greatest of the remaining terms was a sentence of 30 years with an 85% parole bar on defendant’s kidnapping conviction.  (Da 12-13)  Should this Court agree with defendant’s arguments presented in the preceding subsections of this brief, defendant would no longer have the requisite number of separate crimes to qualify for an extended term under the persistent offender statute.  By virtue of this fact, defendant’s extended term also constitutes an illegal sentence, and it too must be vacated, and the matter remanded for resentencing under [...].
[brief] 37  [...], *Research Brief: Behaviors of Supportive Parents and Caregivers for LGBTQ Youth* (May 2022), https://www.thetrevorproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/May-Research-Brief-Supportive-Caregiver-Behavior.pdf ............................................  33  [...], *U.S. Perspectives on Issues Impacting the LGBTQ+ Community.* (June 2023), https://www.thetrevorproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/2304052-THE-TREVOR-PROJECT_May-Adults-Survey-Presentation-PUBLIC-2.pdf ..................................................  33  | Abbreviation | Source | |-----------------------|---------------------------------------------| | Manalapan/Middletown Db | Manalapan/Middletown Brief | | Da | Manalapan/Middletown Appendix | | Marlboro Db | Marlboro Brief | | D2a | Marlboro Appendix | | Manalapan Pb | State’s Brief in Manalapan Appeal | | Manalapan Ra | State’s Appendix in Manalapan Appeal | | Marlboro Pb | State’s Brief in Marlboro Appeal | | Marlboro Ra | State’s Appendix in Marlboro Appeal | | Middletown Pb | State’s Brief in Middletown Appeal | | Middletown Ra | State’s Appendix in Middletown Appeal | | CAL Br. | Amicus [...] Brief | | Aa | Amici [...] and [...] Appendix | STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
[brief] In sentencing defendant to consecutive terms for offenses committed within a single criminal episode, however, the trial court set forth findings that do not satisfy *Yarbough*, warranting a remand for resentencing with respect to those offenses.  For his conviction of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon in connection with the February 28, 2011 incident in Cherry Hill, the trial court imposed a sentence consecutive to defendant’s sentences for first-degree kidnapping and other crimes committed in that incident.
[brief] 6T7-8:9-3.  The Bankruptcy Court remarked at its July 11, 2023 hearing that “[...] represented to this Court that he is only seeking to continue the state court litigation up to the amount of the insurance and this Court accepted that representation and granted him stay relief because of it.  [...] cannot now go the state court and argue the inconsistent position that he wants the insurance money and to collect personally from the debtor.  The Court finds that outcome here is dictated by *Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools*, 981 2d 107.  In *Fleck* the 3rd Circuit concluded that, and I’ll quote here, the Bankruptcy Court’s order makes clear that the Court lifted the automatic stay because the Flecks represented that any judgment will be limited to the insurance proceeds.  A party who petitions a bankruptcy court to lift the stay be agreeing to limit their recovery against the protected debtor cannot later collect (indiscernible) in its entirety on a judgment that exceeds the agreed-upon limit….What he apparently did, and many state court plaintiffs, do was to decide not to pursue a potentially judgment-proof debtor but instead limit himself to the amount of insurance. ”  6T8:8-24; 6T9:16-19.  The Trial Court ruled on December 1, 2023 that the judgment past $200,000 shall be discharged, but only executed an ambiguous order “acknowledging” the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings.  7T; Dr4.  The reality is that the February 28, 2023 Judgment in this matter should have conformed with the August 18, 2021 Bankruptcy Court Order and was in error in lacking to do so.  Appealle’s allegations of bad faith litigation appear to be just as erroneous.  As an initial matter, the Appeallant takes aim at Appealle’s assertion that the Appellant’s Appeal is simply to protect the insurance carriers from a bad faith claim and has nothing to do with the protection of [...].