ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (7T75-23 to 76-6).  The Trustee received an offer from [...] (the “[...]”) dated November 21, 2021, to purchase the Boonton Property for $800,000, “as is,” and the offer was sent to the Defendants’ second attorney on November 24, 2022.  (Da274).  [...] acknowledged that he was advised of the offer on November 27, 2021.  (8T83-24 to 84-7).  They reacted by filing a counterclaim against the Plaintiff in which they dismissed the [...]’ offer to purchase the Property as “bogus,” “unscrupulous,” and an attempt to “avoid obtaining a proper appraisal and selling the property to [...]. ” (Da629; Da637).  The Defendants themselves had submitted an offer for only $555,000, conditioned on either repairs being made or the price being reduced if they accepted the property “as is. ” (Da268).  They had already requested extensive repairs if they bought the Boonton Property, including a pool fence, removal and replacement of an oil tank, removal of a cesspool and replacement with a septic tank, which would have reduced the price by over $90,000.  (Da662-663).  [...], in her individual capacity submitted an offer to purchase the Boonton Property with [...] for $651,000, but only if: (a) if the property could not be sold to a third party, and (b) the proposed price was determined to be at fair market value.  (8T54-4-13).  The Trustee testified that while she had made the offer and it would have generated more for the Trust than [...]’s offer, she “would have liked the [...] to buy the home because that was the most money for the trust and the beneficiaries…” (7T156-2-7; 157-18-20).  The parties appeared for a hearing before [...] on January 10, 2022.
[brief] Later in the summation, the Prosecutor stated “[r]emember he asked, I want to say it’s [...], if there was any press coverage about this?” (15T:190-23 to 3).  “And when asked why, he said because everybody always thought I was shy. ”  (15T:191-4 to 5).  [...] never testified at [...]’s trial.  Again, the Prosecutor offered statements allegedly made by the defendant to a nurse practitioner not as material [...] relied upon to reach his opinion, but as a motive for committing the offense.  (15T:191-7 to 10).  The Prosecutor said, “He didn’t want to be shy, he didn’t want to be small. ”  (15T:191-7 to 8).  “He wanted to be big and strong. ” (15T:191-8).  “And he directed that anger at the people closest to him because they were the ones who were there. ” (15T:191-8 to 10).  This information was taken from social worker records from [...]’s school from a social worker who did not testify.  (14T:41-14 to 42-13).  Yet it was argued as substantive evidence.  The defense argued that “there were hearsay documents that were relied upon by [...], and they were somewhat argued for the truth of the matter in summation. ” (15T:193-21 to 24).  The excessive amounts of hearsay that was interjected into this case by the State’s expert, infringed on [...] Kologi’s right to a fair trial.
[brief] The ballots in question were all postmarked on February 18, 2025, the Tuesday after the February 15, 2025, election and were not received on election day.  As such, there is no statutory authority for counting these ballots.  Moreover, the vote-by-mail instructions clearly state that to be counted, a ballot must be both postmarked by election day and timely received.  These voters did not meet either requirement, and their ballots were properly rejected.  Nearly every case addressing late-arriving mail-in ballots has strictly construed this requirement.
[brief] Alternatively, the Court may have simply made a substantial error which is grounds for its decision to be overturned.  Either way, the Court erred in stating that [...] did not file OPRA requests when the Court was aware that, in fact, she had.  This error is a substantial one.  As the Court knows, in their denial of OPRA number [...], [...] stated that:  As you are aware, the topic of your request is currently the subject of a pending case you have brought before the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, [...]…Docket No. [...]…The OAG has already submitted its legal brief in the case, explaining in extensive detail the various reasons for which your request should be denied, and the OAG avails itself of all of those stated reasons for denial here.  [Plaintiff’s Ex. D (Pa77)].  [...]’s denial, OPRA number [...], mirrors the same language regarding why [...]’s OPRA complaint was denied on December 27, 2022.  (Pa77).  The Court and the Respondents were both aware of these denials prior to the hearing on January 5, 2023.  Consequently, any argument that [...] did not comply with the 45-day Statute of Limitations is a moot point and the proper remedy of the Court was either to merge [...]’s OPRA denials into the case heard on January 5, 2023, thereby dismissing Respondents claim that the Statute of Limitations had expired or dismiss Appellant’s complaint without prejudice in order for her to re-file her complaint.  In either case, the Court’s error on this point is a substantial error, since the Court knew that Appellant’s complaint was not time-barred under the Statute of Limitations.  This is a critical point essential to the Appellant’s case, given the Court did not make it clear precisely which OPRA request or non-OPRA request was to be litigated.  Moreover, given Appellant’s genuine and sincere belief that interested party [...] did in fact properly file an OPRA request in July 2022, [...] believed the State had violated OPRA by not timely responding to him in part prompting her to file her OPRA complaints on December 15, 2022.  POINT V THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SHOWS THAT IT CAN APPLY AT RAILROAD CROSSINGS.  The Railroad defendants incorporate and rely on their arguments submitted in their Brief filed July 28, 2024, to respond to the arguments made by Amicus Curiae, [...] (“[...]”), related to the applicability of N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 at railroad crossings.
[brief] In or around April 2022, Appellant began experiencing a rare progressive systemic connective tissue disorder which is similar to Pseudoxanthoma elasticum (“PXE”).  (Pa000001, ¶ 18).  Appellant was diagnosed with a facial infection related to said tissue disorder which was exacerbated by daily mask wearing.  See id.  Appellant informed Respondents of her condition and requested a brief medical leave of absence in connection with her treatment for said condition.²  See id.  ²  To this day, Plaintiff’s doctors have yet to be able to precisely diagnose her skin condition.  (Pa000001, ¶ 18, fn. 2).  On April 29, 2022, Appellant’s short-term disability (“STD”) leave began; at that time, Appellant only intended to be out of work for a short period of time.  See id. at ¶ 19.  Within the first few days of the commencement of Appellant’s STD leave, Respondents approved Appellant’s prior request for a space heater in her cubicle, demonstrating Respondents’ intentions of retaining Appellant as an employee after she returned from her STD leave.
[directive] This does not prohibit a police officer from traveling to and from, or remaining within, their personal residence if the residence is within 100 feet of an early voting location, ballot drop box, or polling place; voting at that early voting location, ballot drop box, or polling place in a personal capacity; or escorting a person who may require the assistance of the officer to or from an early voting location, ballot drop box, or polling place.  N.J.S.A. 19:6-15.1(c); N.J.S.A. 19:63-16.1(b).  Nor does this prohibit a police officer from traveling to and from, or remaining within, their place of employment in their official capacity for non-election-related official protective duties, if their place of employment is within 100 feet of a polling place or early voting location.  Critically, law enforcement officers should maintain as much distance as possible between themselves and locations where election-related activity is taking place without impeding their ability to perform their employment-related public safety duties.  Note that due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, in an abundance of caution, the Attorney General is again directing a heightened security presence around sensitive places, including houses of worship and schools, which may also serve as polling places.
[brief] ”  The interests of justice require that leave to appeal the Order be granted, as the record below contains no allegation of any mutual mistake of the parties with respect to either agreement, and \(^1\)  See, specifically, relevant the relevant provisions of \textit{N.J.S.A.}  40:11A-20 (“The provisions of this act shall constitute a part of any and all contracts entered into by an authority created hereunder for the benefit and security of the creditors of such authority, and the State of New Jersey does hereby pledge to and agree with any person, firm or corporation or Federal agency subscribing to or acquiring the bonds issued by the authority for the construction, extension, improvement or enlargement of any project or facilities or part thereof that the State of New Jersey will not limit or alter the rights hereby vested in the authority and in the holders of such bonds until all bonds at any time issued together with the interest thereon and any premiums upon the redemption thereof are fully met and discharged. ”).  See also, \textit{U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey}, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), wherein the Court, in the context of the exercise of legislative authority, recognized the significant limitations in attempting to impair existing contracts with bondholders.  no articulation of any instance of fraud or unconscionable conduct on the part of the [...] – elements which are essential in granting the extraordinary remedy of reformation of contract.  The trial court was incorrect in reforming the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement, and leave to appeal should be granted in the interests of justice, particularly given the public interest involved in the [...]’s operation.
[brief] 1.  In 2014, when the events relevant to this appeal began, the elderly [...] were retired and living in Florida after working as custodians at [...] in [...] their entire careers (1T56: 9-13).  2.  They were living in a small apartment that developed mold issues which were remediated, but they wanted to move anyway (1T61:17 - 62:9).  3.  [...] had a friend at a senior club in Florida who was selling a rental property that she owned at [...] (1T63:9-11, 6T12:21-13:3).  4.  The Court below found that [...] wanted to move into the rental property, but he did not want to buy it (6T12:23-25).
[brief] The trial court based its ruling on a judicially created exemption to liability under the CFA, which does not apply to insurance producers.  The trial court relied upon Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., Inc., which held insurance producers are “semi-professionals” who are excluded from liability under the CFA based upon a judicially created exemption for “learned professionals. ”  387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006).  Plemmons was superseded by Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019).  Shaw held that Plemmons was overly broad in its application of the “learned professional” exemption from liability under the CFA and could not be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent and the broad scope of the CFA as intended by the legislature.  Shaw held that the judicially created exemption from CFA liability was limited to historically “learned professionals” like doctors and lawyers who have been recognized as “learned” based upon their extensive training and erudition.  Shaw explicitly excluded from the CFA exemption licensed semi- professionals, like Defendants here, who are not even required to obtain a high school education or GED.  The trial court, in reconciling Shaw and Plemmons, mistakenly concluded it was bound by Plemmons, since it had not been explicitly overruled and held the Defendants, insurance producers, remain exempt from CFA liability despite this Court’s holding in Shaw.  This Court should confirm Shaw’s analysis controls and that insurance producers, such as Defendants, are not “learned professionals” exempt from liability under the CFA.
[brief] *Lapolla v. Cty. of Union*, 449 N.J. Super. 288, 298 (App. Div. 2017); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  This is because claims under the NJCRA are characterized as personal injury actions.  See *Margolis & Novak, Claims Against Public Entities*, cmt. on N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 (Gann 2024).  Next, "[m]alicious prosecution is not a favored cause of action . . ."  *Williams v. Page*, 160 N.J. Super. 354, 361 (App. Div. 1978).  The elements of a malicious prosecution claim require "(1) that the criminal action was instituted by defendant against plaintiff; (2) that it was actuated by malice; (3) that there was an absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (4) that it terminated favorably to plaintiff."  *Ibid.*  "Since a suit for malicious prosecution must await a favorable termination of the criminal proceeding, the statute of limitations does not begin until such termination."  *Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.*, 95 N.J. Super. 564, 577 (App. Div. 1967).  This echoes the presence of the "discovery rule" where actions accrue upon an alleged victim's awareness of the injury.  See *McNellis-Wallace v. Hoffman*, 464 N.J. Super. 409, 417-18 (App. Div. 2020).  Thus, it is clear here that all actions pled by plaintiff fall within either the purview of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act/New Jersey Constitution or the Tort Claims Act, all of which carry two-year statutes of limitations for the filing of a complaint.  There are thus three potential dates, the last of which could govern the applicable statute of limitations.  First, there was the date plaintiff was arrested; Second, there was the date plaintiff became on notice of some of the alleged violations, such as the alleged conspiracy; Third, the governing date is the date the underlying proceedings terminated in his favor.  The absolute latest of these dates is the 'Third' date, that is, even assuming the time to file plaintiff's causes of action began upon his "not guilty" trial verdict, that date would make the two-year statute of limitations June 6, 2019, whereas, the initial complaint was not filed until July 1, 2019.  There are no violations alleged after his acquittal.  Therefore, unquestionably, plaintiff was aware of the not guilty verdict beginning at the time it was rendered on June 6, 2017.  In the related federal case, as well as in the case below, the Judges cited ample authority demonstrating that the date an alleged victim knew of an acquittal starts the clock, as opposed to the entry of any form judgment of acquittal on the docket weeks later.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] That Order contains a provision certifying the motion in aid matter as being “final” pursuant to R. 4:42-2.  Pa004 ¶ 12.  The Board filed the within appeal and the Township filed a separate appeal under Dkt. [...].  In support of its application for attorneys’ fees and Delay Penalty, [...] submitted a certification of its counsel, [...], (Pa365) dated August 18, 2023, containing one exhibit (Pa368) consisting of billing time entries totaling $30,614. 53 (see Pa367, ¶ 10) together with a legal brief.  In opposition, the Board and the Township each submitted legal briefs along with a jointly offered Certification of Township Professional Planner [...], (Pa378) dated August 28, 2023, which contained one exhibit, Pa380.  In addition, the Board submitted one exhibit as part of its legal brief, Pa395.²  ²  Although not presented to the Trial Court by way of Certification, it is included herein; the exhibit is a ‘screen shot’ from a New Jersey Courts web page showing  In further support of its motion, [...] submitted a certification of its counsel, [...], (Pa385) dated August 30, 2023, containing one additional exhibit.  The application for attorney’s fees and Delay Penalty came before the trial Court for oral argument, the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv. presiding\(^3\) for oral argument on December 8, 2023.  By way of Order dated December 19, 2023, Pa21, the Court awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $28,909.52 and awarded Delay Penalties of $112,000.
[brief] A trial court has an “absolute duty” to properly instruct the jury regarding its fact-finding responsibilities, *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988), which may include special cautionary instructions relating to the jury’s consideration of particular kinds of evidence.  *State v. Baldwin*, 296 N.J. Super. 391, 396 (App. Div. 1997).  When no objection to a jury charge is made, the charge must be reviewed for plain error.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  Defendant’s opposition brief would lead one to think the matter before this Court is an appeal of a use variance for a non-permitted use, or a height variance.  It is neither.  Plaintiff sought a technical use variance for permitted uses accessory to a permitted principal use, all of which are a direct result of the municipal boundary line that dissects the Property.  Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s application requires reversal by this Court.
[brief] Expanding on this, the [...] noted in its most-recent FDCPA rule-making:  The Bureau understands from its outreach that many covered persons currently use vendors to provide validation notices.  In the Operations Study, over 85 percent of debt collectors surveyed by the Bureau reported using letter vendors.  86 FR 5766-01 (emphasis added).  Rather than expressing concern over these statistics, the [...] even confirmed that debt collectors may include the letter vendor’s return mail address on collection letters for returned mail, disputes, and payments.  Id.  If the [...] believed debt collectors’ use of letter vendors to mail collection letters is prohibited by any provision of the FDCPA, it would have ---  2  Similarly, in 1992, the [...] opined a debt collector does not violate the FDCPA when it uses a third party to translate collection notices from English to another language because the communication is an “incidental contact” rather than a communication with a third party in connection with an attempt to collect a debt.
[brief] That reexamination made the following relevant recommendation:  -encouraging major redevelopment along the Borough’s mixed use commercial residential area (extending along Beachway Avenue from Raritan Avenue to the Waackaack Creek) that provides for a mix of uses designed according to an overall plan that enhances public access to the waterfront, protects beaches and dunes, and contributes substantially to [...]’s economic well-being; and -enhancing the bayfront as an open space and recreation area by planning for linear parks with recreation areas at major access points to the beach.
[brief] Turning to the other lower federal court decisions, Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022) enforced the FDCPA’s plain meaning.  When it comes to statutes, one hopes Congress channels Dr. Seuss: “I meant what I said and I said what I meant. ”  Unfortunately, the Mad Hatter teaches that meaning what you say and saying what you mean are “not the same thing a bit. ”  And sometimes, a statute might say something that Congress did not necessarily mean.  But courts have to start with the presumption that Congress meant what it said.  So when a statute says something, a court must give effect to that enactment.  And if it turns out that’s not what Congress meant, then it will be up to Congress to fix it.  At bottom, this dispute is about whether Congress meant what it said in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
[directive] 9.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend either currently or in the past been involved as a party …as either a plaintiff or a defendant…in a lawsuit involving damages for personal injury?  If yes:  (a)  Were you (or did you know) the plaintiff or defendant?  (b)  How did the injury occur?  (c)  Has the case been resolved?  (d)  Were you satisfied with the outcome?  (e)  Was there anything about that experience that would prevent you from being fair and impartial in this case?  (f)  If yes, please state reasons.  10.
[brief] The Court on appeal will sustain the Board's ruling "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record."  Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)).
[brief] Plaintiff vs. [...], d/b/a [...], a/k/a [...] and [...], [...], [...], AND [...] Defendants  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY BURLINGTON COUNTY LAW  DIVISION DOCKET No. [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Civil Action  REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, [...]'S APPEAL AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON DEFENDANT/RESPONDENTS’ CROSS-APPEAL
[brief] WHEREAS, Seller is the "Wholesale Market Participant" of the Wholesale Market Participation Agreement dated July 11, 2011, [...] ("WMPA") between [...], [...] ([...]), and [...], and WHEREAS, Seller is the beneficiary of the FE Impact Study prepared by [...] and [...], dated October, 2011 for the Mill Road (W1-082) Generation Project (1A); and WHEREAS, Seller has agreed to sell to Purchaser, all of its right, title and interest in and to the WMPA and the 1A, and any and all other assets related to construction and operation of a solar farm on Seller's real property (the "Project"; and WHEREAS, Purchaser has agreed to purchase the Project from Seller, all for a price, terms and conditions as set forth hereinafter; and WHEREAS, the Seller is the owner of certain real property located at [...] consisting of approximately 74 non-contiguous acres, as described on the map attached hereto and made part hereof (the "Property"); and WHEREAS, Seller and Purchaser have agreed to enter into a long term lease agreement for the property in the form attached hereto and made part hereof (the "Lease").
[brief] Following a four-day bench trial in 2022, the Trial Court ordered, among other things, specific performance of the Redevelopment Agreement, and held that if specific performance could not be accomplished due Defendant’s financing contingencies, then the Trial Court would reform the Agreement to make [...] whole.  Defendant could not meet the contingencies purportedly required by its surety, and so it refused to perform its end of the bargain.  Those contingencies, however, did not stop Defendant from demolishing an existing parking garage and constructing a new one in the area while it purportedly was trying to finance its obligation to [...], and a host of other projects throughout [...].
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | | A. Procedural History | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 5 | | 1.  Standard of Review | 5 | | Point I. | | | Appellant Lacks the Requisite Standing to Sue | 6 | | Point II.  | | | Appellant Lacks Legal Sufficiency To Bring A Viable Cause of Action | 10 | | Point III.  | | | Plaintiffs’ Negligence Based Claims Fail for Lack of Proper Notice | 15 | | CONCLUSION | 16  |