ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Under the circumstances of this case, there was no danger of prejudice to [...] if the jury had been given the cooperating-witness charge.  There was no danger that the charge would cause the jury to infer guilt from [...]’s association with a guilty codefendant.  [...]’s and [...]’s connection transcended their status as codefendants.  [...]’s connection to [...] was well-established and uncontested.  [...] did not deny that he and [...] were friends, that [...] had visited him in Georgia, that they were staying at the same hotel, or that they were together on November 2, 2020.  In other words, their status as codedefendants did not suggest that [...] and [...] were associated to a greater degree than the evidence already established.  Because there was no conceivable risk of prejudice, defense counsel’s failure to request a cooperating-witness charge did not prevent the judge from giving the charge.  Unlike the general charges on assessing a witness’s credibility, the cooperating-witness charge is not permissive.  Rather, it requires the jury to give “careful scrutiny” to the testimony of a cooperating witness based on their strong motivation to lie and unique interest in the outcome of the proceeding.  Without such a charge, the jury would not have been aware of the enhanced scrutiny that a cooperating witness’s testimony requires.  See State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 296-97 (2011)(citing model charge on cooperating codedefendant/witness as an example of a charge that must be given even “with matters that may be considered intuitive,” because “it is the court’s obligation to help the jurors evaluate evidence critically and objectively to ensure a fair trial”).  Under the circumstances of this case, where the credibility of [...]’s testimony was a critical issue for the jury to determine, the judge’s failure to give a cooperating witness charge was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth above, defendant urges this Court to reverse his convictions and remand the matter for a new trial.
[brief] There is currently pending before the Law Division in the Mt. Laurel Action an application by the [...] for a Judgment that the [...] has now, after 12 years, complied with the 2012 Order for Municipal Compliance.  (Pa 109).  The [...] maintains that the current Redevelopment Plan, as amended by the Second Ordinance, which is the subject of the instant action, satisfies the [...]’s constitutional violation found in the 2012 Order for Municipal Compliance by allegedly providing a realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing to be built on Plaintiff’s Property which will satisfy part of the [...]’s fair share of the unmet regional need for such housing.  (Pa 109).  The Ordinance being reviewed reduces [...]’s chance of obtaining a Judgment of Compliance, which was never considered in [...]’s consistency determination either by the Planning Board or the [...] Council.  (Pa 69-71 and Pa 91-93).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and for Declaratory Relief with the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County under Docket Number [...] (the “Prior Action”) challenging, inter alia, the First Ordinance.
[brief] (2T 190-5 to 199-6; 3T 12-23 to 13-3).  He maintained that he had not been promised anything in return for his testimony.  (3T 101-7 to 18).  noting that before giving the statement, he had been hit in the head with a tire iron.  (3T 26-2 to 28-21).  According to [...], his car door was opened, and [...] yelled “Get the fuck out the car .... I'm gonna shoot your black ass.
[brief] Filed Separately  June 24, 2020 - Order Dismissing the Complaint with Prejudice as to Defendant [...] for Failure to Provide Appropriate Affidavit of Merit dated ..........................................................  35A  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |-------------------------------------------------|------| | **Buck v Henry** | 16 | | 207 N.J. 377 (2011) | | | **Castello v Wohler** | 16 | | 446 N.J. Super. 1(App.Div. 2016) | | | **Cornblatt v Barow** | 16 | | 153 N.J. 218 (1998) | | | **Ferriera v Roncacas Orthopedic Associates** | 15 | | 178 N.J. 144 (2003) | | | **Galik v Clara Maas Med. Ctr.** | 17 | | 167 N.J. 341 (2001) | | | **In re Hall** | 16 | | 147 N.J. 379 (1997) | | | **Mayfield v. Community Medical Associates** | 16 | | 335 N.J. Super. 198, 204 (App. Div. 2000) | | | **Medina v Pitta** | 16 | | 443 N.J. Super 1 (App. Div. 2015) | | | **Nicholas v Hackensack University Medical Center** | 16 | | 456 N.J. Super. 110 (App. Div. 2018) | | | **Nicholas v Mynster** | 16 | | 213 N.J. 463 (2013) | | | **Pfannenstein v. Surrey** | 16 | | 475 N.J. 83 (App. Div. 2023) | | | **Ryan v Renny** | 16,17| | 203 N.J. 37(2010) | | Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 .........................................................16 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 .........................................................17 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) .....................................................10 # TABLE OF APPENDIX | Document | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Amended Complaint and Jury Demand of [...], Individually and as Executor of the Estate of [...], Deceased, Plaintiff v [...], M.D., et al. dated and filed August 1, 2019 | 1a | | Answer to Amended Complaint on Behalf of Defendant [...], Separate Defenses, Crossclaims, Demand for Statement of Damages, Designation of Trial Counsel Jury Demand and Certification dated August 30, 2019 | 13a | | Notice of Motion filed by Defendant [...] to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to Provide Appropriate Affidavit of Merit pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53-29 filed on December 30, 2019 | 24a | | Curriculum Vitae of Defendant [...] | 28a | | Affidavit of Merit by [...], M.D dated August 20, 2019 | 32a | | Curriculum Vitae of [...], M.D. | 34a | | Order Dismissing the Complaint with Prejudice as to Defendant [...] for Failure To Provide Appropriate Affidavit of Merit dated June 24, 2020 | 41a | | Unopposed Order Dismissing Complaint Against Defendant [...], M.D. July 10, 2020 | 43A | | Stipulation of Dismissal Defendant [...] - July 21, 2021 | 45a | | Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice and without Costs as to [...] and [...]-November 3, 2023 | 46a | | Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant [...] Filed December 12, 2023 | 48a | | Notice of Appeal filed January 26, 2024 | 49a | Order dated January 24, 2020 Dismissing Complaint against Defendant [...] ..................................................56a Order dated January 24, 2020 dismissing
[brief] The trial court also ignored the fact that [...] had initiated the Collection Lawsuit four months prior to the Class Action Complaint being filed, effectively bringing the total to twenty-one months.  With respect to the filing of the Collection Complaint by [...], the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that a clear and expressed showing of a party’s abandoning of a purported right to compel arbitration may be manifested by bringing claims in court instead of arbitration.  It is generally considered that the bringing of an action at law is a revocation of an agreement to arbitrate, and although our former Supreme Court, in Knaus v. Jenkins, supra, held that a suit at law by one of the parties was not a revocation, we are of the opinion that the bringing of action by both parties on the subject matter of the agreement manifests a mutual change of mind and does accomplish a revocation.  When all parties to an agreement to arbitrate elect to prosecute their respective claims by actions at law, and institute and carry forward the course thus elected, the logical, indeed the necessary, result of that course is an abandonment of arbitration and a revocation of the agreement to pursue that form of adjudication.  McKeeby v. Arthur, 7 N.J. 174, 182 (1951) (emphasis added).  Therefore, considering the foregoing in light of *Morgan*, the cases that have found that a consumer waived any right to a jury trial by agreeing to a multipage agreement that included an arbitration agreement is now the same standard in determining if a business waives the arbitration agreement by voluntarily choosing to file a court action when there is an arbitration alternative available to it.
[directive] (1)  Do you understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal the [Yes/wi] d. you are not waiving [No/Non] denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence 3 :5-7( d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance (R. into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) 3:28(d))?  (R. di Eskew konprann ke le fet ke w plede koupab renonse a dwa pou konteste an ape!
[brief] Moreover, this was an “unnecessary” and “cost generative feature” that was neither required for approval nor required by the UCC.  The December 2022 Original Resolution specifically noted that there is no actual requirement for an elevator in Building “E,” as the Board acknowledged in its Findings of Fact that: “[d]uring the course of the public hearings, the Board and [[...]] had discussions about the inclusion of ambulance stretcher compliance elevators in buildings ‘C’, ‘D’, and ‘E . . .  However, according to the testimony presented by [[...]’s] professionals, the question of presence or absence of such elevators in such buildings is controlled exclusively by the UCC, which Code does not require such elevators for those particular buildings. ”  Pa114 (emphasis added).  Therefore, it has already been admitted that there is no requirement for an elevator in Building “E” and thus the inclusion of same would constitute nothing more than the exact “cost generative feature” and “development standards and/or requirements” expressly prohibited by the Settlement Agreement, thereby constituting breach.
[brief] Communications between [...] and/or [...] and non-custodian subordinates.  It is possible that [...] and/or [...] communicated with non-custodian subordinates regarding issues relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegations and [...] and [...] without including other custodians in the communications.  [...] notes that it is not certain that any of the information listed below exists and [...] and [...] may possess other categories of relevant information not available through other sources.  The parties are to meet confer regarding potential additional categories of relevant information not available through other sources as discussed in ¶ 8 below.  *3 9.  [...] finds that the benefit of collecting, reviewing, producing the above information prior to the January 31, 2022 deadline for substantial document production outweighs the burden imposed on [...] because [...] has represented that over two-thirds of its review is complete, and there remains ample time for [...] to complete this targeted collection and review with an appropriate protocol.
[brief] (Pb9).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.  Id. at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, Ensslin’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  *Id.* at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, Ensslin was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, Ensslin was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.  *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.  *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993)) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required Ensslin to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.
[brief] (Da205: Trial Transcript 4T94 8-15)}  Furthermore, the Court’s incorrect conclusion “but for” Defendants’ failure to incorporate these terms in the Chinese Agreements in to the English PSA or “but for” Defendants’ “many other deviations” from standard practice, Plaintiff would not have suffered damages by incurring the expense to vacate the PSA and original judgment of divorce and the AFJD. \footnote{The Amended Final Judgment of Divorce contain the same one-third share of [...]’s income as [...]’s alimony same as in the original Property Settlement Agreement drafted by [...].  (Da209-210: Trial Transcript 4T98 23-25 and 4T99 1-2)  [...] did not know if there was any evidence showing that Mr. Fou had transferred any money out of the United States from February 2009 until September of 2012, when [...] set aside English PSA and all Chinese agreements.  (Da212: Trial Transcript 4T110 4-12)  [...] had provided to Court the contents of the computer files known as family savings, f-savings, to [...].  The contents of the previously encrypted files evidenced the exchange and transfer of substantial sums of money during the relevant time period preceding the parties’ divorce in 2009, when [...] was hired by [...].  (Da212-213: Trial Transcript 4T110 20-25 and 4T111 1-19)  The Court had found that there is no evidence that [...] was ever advised about the encrypted file.
[brief] Regardless of the Standard of Review to be Applied, the Trial Court Properly Entered Summary Judgment  Because, Under the Uncontroverted Material Facts, Defendants Had Constructive Notice of the Error by Virtue of the Recorded Documents in Their Chain of Title.  (Ja716)  Excepting the equitable estoppel issue that Defendants failed to brief, see supra, Defendants are essentially correct in acknowledging that, “The parties agree on the determinative issue in this case …  [Plaintiffs] must prove [Defendants] knew or should have known of the 2015 [...]-Miller error. ”  Db2.6  Defendants assert that the mistake in the various deeds and the subdivision plan could only be ferreted out by an unreasonable search of public records and performance of complex mathematical equations.  Db3.  That assertion is false.  As the trial court properly found, Defendants had constructive notice of the mistake because it was evident in the recent chain of title from the deed by which [...] acquired title through the deed by which Defendants acquired title, meaning that this chain of title consists at the very least of the [...] 2010 Acquisition Deed, the Subdivision Plan, the [...] Confirmatory Deed, and Defendants’ Deed.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] is a licensed physician who has been practicing pulmonary medicine, sleep medicine and internal medicine as a shareholder in a private practice known as [...] for approximately thirty years (Volume 1, Pa 66-67; See Bellifemine Deposition hereinafter “Bellifemine Dep” attached as Exhibit E to the Certification of [...], Esq.  In Support of a Motion to quash a deposition of [...] served on [...], TR8-3 to 9-4; TR10-10 to 13).  Dr. Bellifemine began working at nights in the Emergency Room at [...] at the time he started his private practice.  (Volume 1 Pa. 67; Bellifemine Dep. TR. 9-14 to 19).  Dr. Bellifemine was on the staff at [...] when Defendant [...] purchased the hospital in 2011 and has remained on the staff until the present after MHA, LLC sold the hospital of to new ownership which changed the name of the facility to [...].  (Volume 1, Pa. 67; Bellifemine Dep. TR 10-1 to 5; Volume 3, Pa 393; See Certification of [...] in opposition to defendants motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter “Bellifemine Certification 1. ”Paragraph 1).  Prior to MHA, LLC’s ownership of Meadowlands, Dr. Bellifemine had the tile of Vice President and Secretary and practiced pulmonary care and critical care medicine.  (Volume 1, Pa. 71; Bellifemine Dep., TR 25-14 to 22)  Defendant MHA has followed a habit of breaching its contracts.
[brief] Based on [...]’s Opposition to [...]’s Verified Complaint for [...]’s Trustee resignation, Court issued Mar. 25, ‘22 Order ([...]) (Exh. “A”) (13a-14a) based on same day  Hearing rulings for [...] to file a formal accounting based on R.4:87 for review & any exceptions from Surrogate Audit & Interested Parties based on his filing new  Verified Complaint to resign.  Verified Complaint w/Intermediate Account (Jan. 4, ‘19 to Mar. 31, ‘22) (Exh. “G”)(51a-56a) (Exh. “H”)(58a-82a) was filed May 11th for review, incl. Trust beneficiaries, & his resignation only after Court approving Account & a possible Trust Reserve (55a, par. 12) for possible costs to complete Roth’s Trust administration & Final Trust Accounting, as a discharged Co-Trustee.  Ambrose’s (“J”, 91a-92a for C&D fees) & Jacobson’s (“I”,84a-89a)  Aug 4, ‘22 letters responded to July 25th Surrogate Audit questions for basis for various fees.  Surrogate never responded nor issued Accounting approval based on their responses to Audit questions.  It allowed the Court to make final decisions.
[brief] See *Guido v. Duane Morris LLP*, 202 N.J. 79, 91 n. 4, 995 A.2d 844 (2010); *Mount Holly Twp. Bd. Of Educ. v. Mount Holly Twp.  Educ. Ass'n*, 199 N.J. 319, 332 n. 2, 972 A.2d 387 (2009); *In re Alleged Improper Practice*, 194 N.J. 314, 330 n. 10, 944 A.2d 611 cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1069, 129 S.Ct. 754, 172 L.Ed.2d 726 (2008)....'
[brief] Order on Motion to Bar Expert Opinion of [...], dated March 27, 2023 ……………………………………………………  (Pa8)  Order on Motion for Reconsideration, dated July 17, 2023 ………………….. (Pa10)  Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated July 7, 2023 ……..  (3T)  Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated July 17, 2023 ……  (4T)
[brief] 24 C. [...]’s Failure to Warn Post-Sale Was Both a Direct and Proximate Cause of [...]’s Injury.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa129-Pa133; Da0823; Da0825-0829)]………………………………………………………………………..  25  V. ALLERGAN DISINGENUOUSLY ARGUES THAT IT NEEDED FDA APPROVAL TO WARN OF OR RECALL ITS ADMITTEDLY DEFECTIVE OZURDEX APPLICATORS.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa003-Pa0012; Pa024-Pa026; Pa033-Pa036; Da0852-Da0853)]…………  26  A.  FDA Approval Was Not Needed to Warn Health Care Providers and Consumers of the Dangerous and Defective Ozurdex Applicators that were in Continued Use by Health Care Providers Despite [...]’s Knowledge of their Defect.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa003-Pa012; Pa024-Pa026; Pa033-Pa036: DA0852-Da0853)]………………..  26 B.  [...]’s Duty to Warn Post-Sale is Not Preempted by Federal Law  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa003-Pa012; Pa024-Pa026; Pa033-Pa036; DA0852-Da0853)]……..  29  VI.  ALLERGAN’S ARGUMENT THAT IT RECALLED OZURDEX LOTS BASED ON PRODUCT QUALITY (NOT SAFETY) IS UNFOUNDED.  [ISSUE RAISED (Pa005-Pa007; Pa009, Pa011)]……………………………………………………………..  31  VII.
[brief] The threats in this case were even worse.  First, the threats to [...]’s relationship with his children, like those in L.H. and Carrion, were specifically calculated to pressure him into doing what the police wanted -- and what was not in his best interest -- because, they said, it was best for his children.  The detectives directly told him to “[s]top thinking about yourself.  You got five kids and you sitting here being selfish?” and then threatened that another man could raise his children unless he cooperated:  “You don’t want some other cat raising your kids .  . . .  Four months, they real impressionable.  Let some dude start giving that baby toys when they get six or seven months.  That’s gonna be daddy to them .  . . .  You’re a fool if you let that happen. ”  (1T 94-1 to 95-9)  That threat served no other purpose than to psychologically manipulate [...] into cooperating at his own expense.  See L.H., 239 N.J. at 48-49 (holding “psychologically coercive” comments that “a jail term would be incompatible with the needs of [defendant’s] daughter, who required a father in her life”).  Second, the detectives directly threatened his life.  They told him that [...]’s friends were “eventually . . . gonna find out it’s you”; that therefore his “safest place is right now with [the detectives]”; that he should think of his “five children, five beautiful kids”; then threatened, “You wanna die? You want go on the streets and die?”; and again reiterated, “Hate for you to walk out of here and have something happen to you. ”  (1T 84-5 to 19, 92-16 to 19 (emphasis added))  Just like in Fulminante, that credible threat of death unless he cooperated -- made by seasoned detectives -- was highly coercive.  In sum, the interrogation in this case violated nearly every rule on the books.  The overbearing tactics employed here are the precise type that have been shown to produce false confessions that send innocent people to prison. \(^4\)  The detectives’ flagrant disregard for [...]’s constitutional rights requires suppression of his entire statement.  For the reasons stated in his opening brief, its admission was not harmless, and his convictions must be reversed.
[brief] [...] alleges that the deterioration of the 132-year old concrete entry stairs allowed or exacerbated icy conditions forming on the top landing step, despite only a very small trace of freezing rain falling on the premises.  [...] also testified that the Defendants had recently painted the exterior steps with a paint that made the stairs “sleeker” and “rougher in the rain to navigate or when they’re wet” compared to their previous condition.  [...] presented expert opinion that the deterioration of the old exterior stairs allowed water infiltration and dangerous freezing.  The deterioration of the stairs and the new paint job created a question of fact for a jury as to whether there was an unreasonably dangerous slip and fall hazard on the stairs upon a slight freezing rain, leading to [...]’s injury.  In their summary judgment defenses, the Defendants relied upon the “Ongoing Storm” doctrine and also presented contrary expert testimony concerning the condition of the stairs.  The “Ongoing Storm” doctrine is not absolute, and evidence that a defendant created the risk or that the risk was preexisting, such as presented here, makes it inapplicable.  Furthermore, aside from the substance of the Defendant expert’s opinion, his report reads as an ad hominem attack on the credibility of [...]’s expert, highlighting the “Battle of the Experts” arising from their conflicting opinions.  Despite evidence meeting the recognized exceptions to the “Ongoing Storm” doctrine, despite the conflicting expert opinions, and despite [...]’s description of the premises based on his personal knowledge of the recently-painted steps, the trial court overstepped its bounds and decided the conflicts in the evidence with a summary judgment.  The evidence in the record, though, creates a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to resolve, and the trial court should be reversed.
[brief] Defendant-Respondent [...] (“[...]”) submits this brief in opposition to the appeal taken by Plaintiff-Appellant [...]  (“[...]”) from two Orders of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, Chancery Division (the “Trial Court”) dated August 30, 2024 (“Initial Orders”) and a subsequent Order dated October 15, 2025 (the “Reconsideration Order”) in which the Court, upon [...]’s motion, reconsidered its Initial Orders and for a second time denied [...]’s requested relief.