ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Prosecutor County the If with the comply on and trained are officers all that ensure to steps reasonable take shall designates directive  If the Directive. this and directive  Prosecutor's County the of provisions a overcome authorized to who are department police from a officers supervisory more or one ensuring for responsible shall be prosecutor the Directive, this of 4 Section under presumption for and function, supervisory perform this to trained properly are officers designated such that Prosecutor County the by issued directive the with comply officers designated such that ensuring 4.13.  Section also See Directive. and this 2016.  31, October on operational become shall subsection  This Charging Prosecutor County of Extension Indefinite and Evaluation, Expiation, 3.3.5 Directive. are decisions charging enforcement law that ensure to planning and fiscal promote To to pursuant Prosecutor County by issued a directive any Directive, this with accordance in made year fiscal Prosecutor's next of the start the or at months, six after expire shall 3.3.1 subsection the that order Prosecutor may County
[brief] [...]’s Allegedly Deceptive Conduct is Not Actionable under New Jersey Law  Even if [...]’s duties to Plaintiff did not end with the termination of the PSA, the allegations set forth in the Complaint do not rise to an actionable claim.  In asserting a breach of the implied covenant claim, “an allegation of bad faith or unfair dealing should not be permitted to be advanced in the abstract and absent improper motive. ”  Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 251 (2001) (internal citations omitted).  “Bad motive or intention is essential, for . . . contract law does not require parties to behave altruistically toward each other; it does not proceed on the philosophy that I am my brother’s keeper. ”  Id. (internal citations omitted).
[directive] Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25, amended, now instructs that the PSA as of of "shall not consider a charge, including any charge delinquency, conviction, or adjudication of delinquency as risk factors relevant to the risk failure to appear in court when required and the ... danger to the community while on pretrial release."  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25(b) (effective July 1, of 2021  Therefore, the charges identified below must be removed from certain sections the PSA.  ).  #13-21- Directive June 30, 2021 of7  Page 2 of  These changes can be organized into three categories charges that need to be removed from the PSA: (1) enumerated charges that must always be removed; (2) enumerated charges that must be removed when charged with specific marijuana charges; and (3) charges that must be removed after a factual determination concludes the charges involved marijuana.
[brief] Taking medical leave is in itself protected activity under the NJLAD.  Penalizing employees because they do so is retaliatory and an unlawful act whether the medical leave is for a single day or many days.  In this case employees taking medical leave are perceived to be disabled and therefore are being declared ineligible for promotion.  It is the perception or actual knowledge of disability which then motivates the employer toward adverse action, which is precisely what Plaintiff alleges in this case.  Simply taking medical leave can indeed be a form of disability accommodation.  Retaliating against employees for availing themselves of such medical leave additionally violates the NJLAD.
[brief] As set forth below, the Appellant's appeal is baseless and completely unsupported by any facts or law, and the Trial Court's dismissal of Counts One, Four and Five on the basis of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, Qualified Immunity, and for failing to file the amended complaint within the statute of limitations, should not be disturbed.  As a result of the Court's initial dismissal of the Complaint on both October 8, 2021, and June 16, 2022, and by way of the first appeal, the Appellate Division dismissed all claims except for Counts One, Four and Five.
[directive] Administrator: Witness: Other Law Enforcement  Other Civilian (explain relationship to the case/witness):  5.  Indicate method(s) used to record/document the ID procedure (circle one):  (a) electronic recording: video audio both (preferable)  (b) contemporaneous written verbatim account (attach) (You must include all relevant verbal and non-verbal exchanges between the officer and the witness)  (c)  contemporaneous detailed summary (attach)  ***If an electronic recording and/or a contemporaneous written verbatim account was not feasible, please indicate why:
[brief] “[...] agrees to fully participate in the involuntary ordinary disability retirement process including appearing for any evaluations ordered by the [...] and/or [...].  The Township will take all necessary steps to effectuate the involuntary disability retirement application, including, but not limited to, providing all medical information and taking all Governing Body action necessary.  The Township Governing Body will immediately provide to [...], through counsel, a copy of the Involuntary for his review concerning accuracy and for amendment if necessary.
[brief] Prior to reaching its erroneous conclusion, the trial court specifically found that the record clearly and undisputedly demonstrates that neither [...] nor [...]: (i) possess a property interest “anywhere near [the] facility” in question, (ii) are affected in any way whatsoever by the challenged approval, (iii) “have any special damages”, and/or (iv) established a generalized claim of harm to the community caused by the challenged approval.  (Da022.)  In fact, the trial court expressly noted that the approval would not create any “major traffic implications” or otherwise create a disturbance to the area.  (Id.)  Applying those findings to the well-settled standard – i.e., the “interested party” standard applied in every case decided in this State since the time the MLUL was adopted – there is no question that neither party possesses standing.  The trial court’s decision to the contrary runs afoul of every single relevant authority.  In reaching its erroneous decision, the trial court improperly relied on one single case – Dover Twp. Homeowners & Tenants Ass’n v. Dover Twp., 114 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 1971).
[brief] See RPC 1.16(a)(3).  It is illogical for Plaintiff to claim that the RPC’s subjected him to [...]’s “control” when he possessed a unique statutory term that allowed him to remain in his position without his client having any ability to remove him – unlike any other legal representation in New Jersey.  Third, Plaintiff recites various facts from his self-serving certification to support a finding that he was an employee.  But this self-serving certification cannot be considered as it is outside the motion for reconsideration on appeal (and underlying motion to dismiss), as further outlined in Point Heading I(C), supra.  Even if the self-serving certification is evaluated, it raises various factual claims that still do not support a conclusion that Plaintiff was an employee under CEPA.  For instance, Plaintiff notes that he held regular office hours at a specific office in the County Administration building, claims he was on call 24/7 to deal with emergent matters, and contends he was tasked with responding to the County officials on a daily basis.  (Pf. Br. at 10).  These facts are unremarkable and are consistent with the obligations of any other outside municipal or county attorney throughout the State of New Jersey.  Outside counsels regularly provide representation on a 24/7 basis, especially in our technology age, and may also interact with their public bodies on a daily basis.  They may also be required to meet at the public body’s offices on a recurring basis.  But those aspects do not render the attorney an employee for CEPA purposes, especially when considering all the other factors, including that Plaintiff’s retainer was established pursuant to an RFP seeking an attorney as an independent contractor, paid through his private law firm.
[brief] As such, *Viviano* is clearly distinguishable and is an exceptional interpretation of the fictitious pleading rule with no relevant impact.  Despite plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary, *Rutkowski* controls the interpretation of R. 4:26-4 on this appeal.  See *Rutkowski v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company*, 209 N.J. Super. 140, 147 (App. Div. 1986).  In *Rutowski*, the plaintiff alleged that the named and fictitious defendants were those that had “designed, manufactured, sold, distributed, repaired, modified, renovated, or were otherwise responsible for the allegedly defective machine. ”  *Id.* at 143.  Because the plaintiff in *Rutkowski* sought to amend the complaint to include a defendant that only conducted safety inspections, the court only interpreted the catch-all provision as potentially applicable to its consideration of the fictitious party pleading rule.  *Id.* at 144.  In the present matter, plaintiff generally asserts that the negligent conduct of both named and fictitious parties resulted in plaintiff’s injuries.  Pa1550-51.  This generalized assertion is analogous to the statement that such fictitious defendants are “otherwise responsible” for plaintiff’s injuries, which the Rutkowski Court held was inadequate to preserve plaintiff’s claim.  Rutkowski, 209 N.J. Super. at 147.  By failing to describe the fictitious defendants with any level of detail, plaintiff in this matter has failed to meet the requirement of the fictitious pleading rule to include “an adequate description sufficient for identification”.  Plaintiff has therefore failed to avail himself of the benefits of this rule.  A contrary interpretation of the rule would effectively render it moot.
[brief] ”  Morales, 541 F.3d at 222.  It cannot be that [...]’s terms are procedurally unconscionable when [...] unquestionably made clear to [...] in Spanish that checking the box and clicking “Confirm” would manifest assent to [...]’s terms, and it was Ms.  Villeda-Granados’s “obligation to ensure [s]he understood the [a]greement before signing. ”  Id. at 223.  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ position that it is unconscionable to present contractual terms in English to a non-English speaker would undermine fundamental aspects of New Jersey contract law.  New Jersey, like other common law jurisdictions, applies an objective theory of contract, whereby “[a] party who enters a contract in writing, without any fraud or imposition being practiced upon him, is conclusively presumed to understand and assent to its terms and legal effect.
[directive] An individual designated by the chief or agency executive to conduct firearms qualification and supervise the firearms instructors and participants during firearms qualifications activities.  The supervising firearms instructor must satisfy the requirements of a firearms instructor and must have experience in conducting either a PTC-approved firearms course or an equivalent course.  Training/Qualification Schedule.  Firearms training schedules that become part of the firearms records reflecting the personnel, dates and times of semi-annual qualification activities.  Section 3.
[brief] I.  PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT [...] SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO INTERVENE AS AN INTERESTED PARTY TO THIS PROCEEDING.  A.  The absence of the procedural safeguards provided by the Administrative Procedures Act has prevented the creation of a complete and proper record for determination of the merits of the issue.  As noted, the procedural history of this case is unusual in that there was no notice-and-comment period, nor was there a proceeding before an administrative agency or trial court.
[brief] While the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and New Jersey has a public policy in favor of upholding said agreements, that preference is “not without limits. ”  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001).  As is the case here, New Jersey has at least an equally vital and important public policy regarding the sale of malt alcoholic beverages.
[brief] [...] was entitled present this evidence to the jury because the photographs and texts demonstrated that [...] was being dishonest about his injuries and inability to work.  See Cappell v. Capell, 358 N.J. Super. 107, 111 fn. 1 (App. Div. 2003) (stating that the “false in one, false in all” rule is appropriate where a witness intentionally gives false testimony about a material fact.).  The photographs and texts were properly admitted to show that [...] was lying about his physical condition to advance his interests in litigation, and therefore was also lying about [...] being the aggressor.  At trial, [...] confirmed that he was asserting he has been unable to work due to his injuries.  [7T 142:11-14].  He was then confronted with pictures of him using a ladder and chainsaw for tree removal and operating ATVs and dirt bikes, as well as text messages in which he provided work estimates for a home remodeling project and indicated that he was performing labor for a contractor.  [7T 142:15-160:19].  This evidence was highly relevant to [...]’s dishonesty about a material fact – his claimed injuries and inability to work – and, under the “false in one, false in all” rule, it was also highly relevant to [...]’s credibility as to how the incident occurred.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting this reasoning.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS: OBTAINING TRIAL COURT RECORDS**  In June of 2020, the defendants received the Ex Parte Order for Discovery.  In 30 years of running the business, the defendants NEVER BEFORE had a judgment filed against them.  They DID NOT recall receiving notice of the judgment being filed against the business and him personally.  Since [...] suffered his first stroke in May of 2010 and his second stroke in August of 2019, he was uncertain as to whether or not in 2015 they had received notice.  In April of 2023, eight (8) years after the 2015 judgment, the Plaintiff’s Attorney, subpoenaed [...] (Rb-13), after she inherited a small amount from her father, [...], who died in July of 2021, where the sale of his home closed in May of 2022.  In June of 2023, she hired [...] to quash the subpoena and to represent the defendants.  However, in early August of 2023, [...] asked to be released when the defendant, [...], asked that he obtain a copy of his Affidavit of Service, because he did not recall being served, and a copy of the Final Judgment by Default (having not seen it).  Since the court records were archived prior to November of 2017, he was unwilling to commit to that process, stating that he was only hired to squash the subpoena.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING A MOOT ISSUE BY ENTERING RESTRAINTS AGAINST A REPEALED POLICY (Da393-417)  The trial court’s September 29, 2023 order (Da393-417) also enjoined the Original Policy even though it was repealed and replaced in June 2023.  See correspondence from [...], Esq. dated June 7, 2023, June 13, 2023 Board minutes and correspondence from [...], Esq. dated June 15, 2023 (Da134-135; Da171; Da178-180).  Therefore, at the time of the court’s decision, the Original Policy was a nullity and did not exist.  The court offered no rationale for its departure from the tenet that the courts “of this state do not resolve issues that have become moot due to the passage of time or intervening events. ”  State v. Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577, 584 (App. Div. 2016).  “To avoid resolving abstract legal issues and to preserve judicial resources, courts ordinarily do not address legal questions that have been rendered moot. ”  Malanga v. Twp. of West Orange, 253 N.J. 291, 307 (2023).  See also Davila, 443 N.J. Super. at 584 (judicial economy dictates that courts abstain from rendering advisory opinions on moot issues).  “The function of the court is to apply legal principles to the facts as they exist and are before it, and not to anticipate facts which may or may not come into being, for if this were otherwise a court would constitute itself, virtually, as advisory counsel in the cause before it, and in consequence destroy the value and stability of its decisions. ”  Grausman v. Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co., 95 N.J. Eq. 223, 227 (E. & A. 1923).  Therefore, the perceived need to test the validity of a claim of right in anticipation of future situations is, by itself, no reason to continue the process.  See Wisniewski v. Murphy, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 518 (App. Div. 2018).  An issue is moot when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy.  Malanga, 253 N.J. at 307; Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2010).  The court’s entry of restraints against the Original Policy could not and did not afford Plaintiffs any effective relief and had no practical effect on the controversy as the Original Policy ceased to exist in June 2023.
[brief] Busciglio v. DellaFave, 366 N.J. Super. 135, 139 (App. Div. 2004).  Under this standard, the Court should “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  State v. Perini Corp., 221 N.J.  412, 425 (2015) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).  The “judge's function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial” in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Henry v. N.J. Dept. of Human Services, 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010) (citing Brill, 142 N.J. at 540).  “An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  Henry, 204 N.J. at 329-330.  In the case at bar, it is clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact that precluded a summary judgment.  The evidential material shows that appellant/plaintiff made material misrepresentations in applying for the policy and this Court has found that the apparent/plaintiff violated the law when he failed to obtain New Jersey Automobile Insurance.
[brief] However, the issue of the coverage denial had effectively been decided by the trial Court when it granted defendant [...]’s summary judgment motion on the grounds that plaintiff had not complied with New Jersey insurance laws because he did not have a valid New Jersey policy.  Counsel are well aware that plaintiff’s appeal had been filed by the time [...]’s summary judgment motion was filed.  Plaintiff had made very clear in the appeal that the entering of summary judgment on behalf of [...] resolved all issues in the case, including the coverage denial.  In fact, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata rendered [...]’s motion moot and plaintiff’s counsel gladly would have signed a Consent Order entering the same relief as the trial judge had already made the determination when he granted summary judgment on behalf of defendant [...] and certified the Summary Judgment Order as final.  In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that summary judgment was improperly granted by the trial Court.
[brief] The witness, [...], was the former fiancé of plaintiff [...]’s brother, [...].  Mr. Samsonov and she had broken off their engagement to each other on October 23, 2022, just days before the latter decided to insert herself into this litigation (Pa116/24:7-25).  Ms. Sahr cold-called the [...] attorneys (after first calling plaintiff’s attorney by mistake) on October 28, 2022, and received a warm reception.  (Pa123/52:17-53:16).  She was deposed on November 21, 2022 (Pa110) and December 2, 2022.  (Pa185).  At her first deposition, Ms. Sahr testified that the plaintiff and her former fiancé were like “brothers. ”  (Pa144/136:24-137:4).  She gave [...] counsel items which, though relevant only to the damages issue, were later admitted into evidence during the liability phase of the trial over plaintiff’s objection (1T138:13-148:18; 3T21:5-26:24).  These included a text message from October 13, 2022 with an alleged estimate to renovate a bathroom (7T142:18-143:12; (Pa233)), and a number of family snapshots taken in 2021 or 2022 that showed the plaintiff with some dirt bikes (7T151:8; Pa238), on an ATV (7T155:9; Pa239; 7T159:18; Pa243), holding a ladder (7T156:24; Pa240), and using a chainsaw (7T158:17; Pa241-242).  The trial judge ruled that the plaintiff could be questioned about Ms. Sahr’s texts and photos in the liability phase of the trial on credibility grounds, even though this evidence related only to damages.  (2T8:16-24).  During her deposition, Ms. Sahr admitted that she and Mr. Samsonov had filed cross complaints against each other for domestic violence which were then pending, but that she was nevertheless willing to proceed with her deposition without counsel (Pa112/6:15-7:10).
[brief] The Appellate Division handed down another unpublished decision last year that hammers this point home.  In Terranova v. Skyline Restorations, a general contractor, [...] retained [...] to work on a project wherein an employee of another subcontractor sustained injuries because of falling scaffolding.  Terranova v. Skyline Restorations, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1547, *1 (App. Div. September 20, 2023) (See TPDa48-TBDa57).  Plaintiff sued both Skyline and One Team.  Terranova, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *2.  Skyline sought, inter alia, contractual indemnification from One Team.  Ibid.  The Skyline – One Team contained the following indemnification:  § 4.6.1  To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Subcontractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Owner, Contractor, Architect, Architect’s consultants, and agents, servants, assigns, officers, directors, members, shareholders, and employees of any of them from and against claims, damages, losses and expenses, including but not limited to reasonable attorney’s fees (of Contractor’s choosing), arising out of or resulting from performance of the Subcontractor’s Work under this Subcontract, provided that any such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than the Work itself), but only to the extent caused by the negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor, the Subcontractor’s Sub-subcontractors, anyone directly or indirectly employed by them or anyone for whose acts they may be liable, regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss or expense is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder.  Terranova, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *11-12.  Significantly, the Terranova Court did not cite D’Avila (nor Englert) and reached a seemingly inconsistent conclusion to Mass. Bay by placing significant weight on the phrase “but only to the extent caused.
[brief] Moreover, pursuant to Rule 1:4-8(b)(2), “A motion for sanctions shall be filed with the court no later than 20 days following the entry of final judgment. ”  Therefore, Plaintiff’s time for filing has expired.  Additionally, pursuant to 1:4-8(c), the trial court may impose sanctions for frivolous litigation on its own initiative.  However, the trial court is required to enter an order to show cause, which did not happen.  Therefore, neither the trial court nor Plaintiff strictly complied with the rule and the time for filing has expired.  Finally, the appellate division has explained that: