ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO HEAR ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE DECIDING ON THE WRITTEN FILINGS.  As per R. 1:6-2(d), “no motion shall be listed for oral argument unless a party requests oral argument in the moving papers or in timely-filed answering or reply papers, or unless the court directs. ”  If the motion involves pretrial discovery or is directly addressed to the calendar, “the request shall be considered only if accompanied by a statement of reasons and shall be deemed denied unless the court otherwise advises counsel prior to the return day. ”  Id.  Regarding all other motions, “the request shall be granted as of right. ”  Id.  In *Diaz v. Bobadilla*, the plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate dismissal and restore the case to the trial calendar.  2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 799, *7 (App.Div.2019).  The *Diaz* Court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ motion “could be seen as a motion addressed to the calendar. ” *Id.* (internal quotations omitted).  Here, among other things, Appellants endeavored to file a motion to vacate the Order entered January 4, 2024 and restore the case to the trial calendar.  Therefore, in light of *Diaz*, it can be said that this aspect of Appellants’ motion is “directly addressed to the calendar. ”  Therefore, while Appellants requested oral argument in their Notice of Motion (see Dr54), they failed to otherwise comply with R. 1:6-2(d) by not including “a statement of reasons. ”  Additionally, even if Appellants had filed such a statement, the motion judge did not have to grant their request.  In fact, it would have been presumptively denied under R. 1:6-2(d) in the absence of “the court otherwise advis[ing] counsel prior to the return date. ”  Therefore, since Appellants’ motion was “directly addressed to the calendar,” the motion judge was not required to hear oral argument.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...] and JOHN DOE CORPORATION  1-3 (a fictitious name, Defendants-Respondents.  ON APPEAL FROM: THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  BRIEF AND APPENDIX
[directive] DISORDERLY PERSONS AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES  Rule Description  This Rule provides that:  (a)  Defendants Charged on Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) with Disorderly Persons Offenses.  Except as otherwise provided by R. 3:4A (pertaining to preventative detention), defendants charged with a disorderly persons offense on an initial Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) shall be released before conviction on the least restrictive non-monetary conditions that, in the judgment of the court, will reasonably ensure their presence in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, pursuant to R. 3:26-1(a)(1).
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court further opined that the most important of those factors to take into consideration is the reprehensibility of the conduct.  However, the Supreme Court modified the Appellate Division’s instructions to the trial court, as well as all trial courts, to add that when reviewing an award of punitive damages against a public entity, the punitive damages award is further subjected to a heightened scrutiny test.  Id. at 3 (citing Lockley v. Dep’t of Corr., 177 N.J. 413, 8 (2003); Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 828 (2003).  The basis for the additional scrutiny is that public monies are the source of the award.
[directive] You have answered a series of questions about criminal trials and criminal charges.  Now we would like to learn a little bit about each of you.  Please tell us the type of work you do; whether you have ever done any type of work which is substantially different from what you do now; whether you’ve served in the military; what is your educational history; who else lives in your household and the type of work they do; whether you have any children living elsewhere and the type of work they do; which television shows you watch; any sources from which you learn the news, i.e., the newspapers you read or radio or TV news stations you listen to; if you have a bumper sticker that does not pertain to a political candidate, what does it say; what you do in your spare time and anything else you feel is important.
[brief] Defendants next attempt to argue that, with respect to violations of the NJCFLA giving rise to FDCPA violations, “the New Jersey federal district court decisions are outliers. ”  Defs.’ Br. 27.  However, this argument also fails.  While the cases (germane to this issue) cited in Plaintiff’s opening Brief are unpublished and therefore not binding on the Court, Defendants have failed to cite any federal decisions that analyze the NJCFLA/FDCPA and support their position.  The absence of binding precedent does not mean that the Court writes on a clean slate when there exists non-binding authority from the lower federal courts.
[brief] [...]’s permanent inability to return to work in the Paterson police force is “fatal to his disability application because it renders him ineligible to participate in the disability pension scheme” (PA150).  In the Board’s view, [...]’s Initial Decision ignored binding and/or persuasive case law and “would violate public policy, contravene the rehabilitation statute, and encourage abuse of the disability retirement system” (A150).  Accordingly, the Board rejected [...]’s Initial Decision and affirmed the Board’s prior decision that [...] is ineligible to apply for AD (A150).  This appeal followed.
[brief] [Id. at 548 (emphasis added). ]  The same result was reached in N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Delta Plastics, 188 N.J. 582 (2006).  Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Beseler and Delta Plastics, the [...], under the authority of the [...], authorized the adoption of the New Jersey Part Two Employers Liability Endorsement, which is now included in all workers’ compensation insurance policies issued in the State of New Jersey.
[brief] In his deposition, [...] testified that the current pitch of the driveway as it runs from the [...]’ house toward plaintiff’s property is actually less than it was before the [...] repaved their driveway.  Pa52, ¶ 68; Pa332, ¶ 68; accord Pa251 at 28:8-:25.  [...] determined that the entirety of the [...]’ driveway from the front of their house to the driveway’s end lies within the 469- foot and 468-foot topographic levels.  Pa52, ¶ 69; Pa332, ¶ 69; accord Pa251 at 28:12-:16.  However, before the [...] repaved the driveway, the rear corner of the driveway next to plaintiff’s property sloped down to the 467-foot topographic level.  Pa52-3, ¶ 70; Pa332, ¶ 70; accord Pa251 at 28:17-:22.  Thus, the rear corner of the driveway next to plaintiff’s property lay at a lower elevation before the [...] repaved their driveway.  Pa53, ¶ 71; Pa332, ¶ 71; accord Pa251 at 28:23-:25.  Likewise, the slope of the [...]’ front lawn had decreased from five feet, as shown in the 2018 [...] survey that [...] relied on, to approximately three feet, as shown in [...]’s survey in 2023.  Pa53, ¶ 72; Pa332, ¶ 72; accord Pa247 at 12:5-:24, Pa251 at 29:1-30:1.  The downward slope of the front lawn thus existed before the [...] purchased the property.  Pa53, ¶ 73; Pa332, ¶ 73; accord Pa252 at 30:4-:10.  However, the downward slope of the front lawn was shallower in 2023 than in 2018.  Pa53, ¶ 74; Pa332, ¶ 74; accord Pa252 at 30:2-:3.  Finally, [...] agreed the three-foot to four-foot drop where the [...]’ property meets plaintiff’s property existed in 2018.  Pa53, ¶ 75; Pa332, ¶ 75; accord Pa252 at 30:11-:18.  He did not contend that the [...] caused the drop- off between their property and plaintiff’s property.  Pa53, ¶ 76; Pa332, ¶ 76; accord Pa254 at 39:18-40:9.  [...] was aware that plaintiff claimed in the [...] that water ran off the [...]’ driveway and onto his property.  Pa53, ¶ 77; Pa332, ¶ 77; accord Pa254 at 41:8-21.  He had “no idea” of how that water runoff changed, if at all, from before the [...] purchased their property until after they repaved their driveway.  Pa54, ¶ 78; Pa332, ¶ 78; accord Pa254 at 41:22-42:3.  [...] did not attempt to differentiate between the amount of water that would run off the driveway before the [...] bought the property and the amount that would run off the driveway after they repaved the driveway.  Pa54, ¶ 79; Pa332-33, ¶ 79; accord Pa256 at 47:14-48:9.  Indeed, he offered no opinion on that matter.  Pa54, ¶ 80; Pa333, ¶ 80; accord Pa256 at 49:10-50:5.
[brief] In 1998 the No-Fault statute was amended in a relevant way to the issues herein, with the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act ("AICRA").  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 et seq.  The Legislature indicated that it was caused to make the amendment after 26 years because of the overutilization of benefits for medical unnecessary treatments and testing resulting in higher costs to New Jersey residents and the failure of the then arbitration system, [...], in eliminating payments for the unnecessary treatments and diagnostic tests.
[brief] For five years, Respondents sought and received considerable benefits from their contractual [...] relationship, including investment returns in excess of $330,000 and myriad withdrawals.  [...], relying on the terms of the Client Agreement, provided Respondents with significant advice and services, as well as the means to monitor their investment transactions and performance through not only account statements but also, at their request, an online service where they could review their accounts at their convenience 24 hours per day.  A party who receives and accepts the benefits of a written agreement becomes bound by the terms of that agreement, including a predispute arbitration provision contained in it, even if they contend they never received, reviewed or signed the agreement.
[brief] During summation, Appellee flagrantly departed from [...]’s diagnoses and told the jury the Appellee’s labrum was “torn off” at two (2) different places.  3T28:17-20.  Additionally, Appellee grossly mischaracterized [...]’s testimony regarding the treatment being related to the accident.  3T40:7-14.  These inflammatory statements were taken out of context and inappropriately prejudiced the jury by suggesting [...] found Appellee’s injuries to be permanent and all related the accident.  In reality, the record is abundantly clear that [...] had misheard Appellee’s question and cleared the issue up on redirect.  2T.  Lastly, Appellee’s counsel inappropriately argued to the jury that they had the opportunity to “impose” responsibility upon the Appellant.  3T19:6-22.  The trial completed on January 19, 2023 with a jury coming to a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $1,600,000.
[brief] --- 4  The court awarded Plaintiff’s fees incurred in prosecuting the overseas hearing.  Plaintiff separately moved again for fees incurred in pursuing collection efforts, but the court denied that application without prejudice, finding it had not made a determination that Plaintiff was entitled to those fees.  (Da158).  seeking release based on a feigned inability to return any funds, including an unsuccessful petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which the federal court fully approved of [...]’s ongoing civil commitment for his ongoing refusal to comply with court orders to return funds from overseas to pay the judgment (as opposed to returning funds to pay his lawyers, which is what they are being returned to do, in violation of court orders).  (Pa110-148; Pa194-199; Pa202-252).  In January 2023, [...] retained additional counsel (he currently has three firms, including [...] and [...], as counsel of record before the trial court in this matter), and dismissed his pending appeal of his fulltime commitment so he could instead pursue his third motion in the trial court seeking release (under his new counsel).  (Da19; Pa93; Pa211).
[brief] The Township in Points V & VI of its brief alleges “contractual obligations” to [...]” but does not cite to any provision in the contract regarding the alleged “obligation. ”  (Pb35)  Instead, the Township reverts back to the alleged “public benefit” arguments without any citation to the record in support thereof.  For example, the Township argues the contract, “which includes the acquisition of open space and the reduction of traffic congestion, clearly serves the public good. ”  (Pb35)  The Township also offers potential public benefits such as: “decreas[ing] traffic, school bus expenses and congestion. ”  (Pb36)  But once again, there is no citation to the appendix in support, presumably because neither the contract nor ordinances that authorized the swap address such claims.  The Township also introduces the concept of “legal and financial implications” (Pb36) that are not cited in the record because they were not before the trial court.  While the Township argues that it “[c]learly . . . has a contractual obligation to [the Developer]” (Pb36), it does not cite to any contractual provision that requires it to take Defendants’ properties.  And it is not as if the parties did not contemplate the issue of other parties being in possession of the lots listed in both the ordinance authorizing the land swap or the contract with the Developer.  The schedule of lots indicated the subject lots, along with two others, were not owned by the municipality.  (Da28; 48)  Paragraph 6(e) of the contract stated that “[e]xcept as set forth in Paragraph 11(a) below, there are no parties in possession of any portion of the Property….”  (Da35)  Paragraph 11(a) notes a use and occupancy agreement in place at the Bellevue Property.  (Da39)  But Paragraph 11(c) includes obligations of the Township that is limited to vacating certain streets.  (Da39)  Neither that provision, nor any other in the contract, requires the taking of Defendants’ property.  The Township argues further that “it will be subject to litigation initiated by [the Developer]. ”  (Db36-37)  But such supposition is not sufficient to authorize the taking of private property.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] [...] also conceded that the seven-to-nine-minute process of a visit to this proposed retail cannabis location would be similar to the time it takes to visit a Starbucks.  (T1/185:4-17).  He also agreed that Atlantic City, unlike most communities, has the benefit of “a lot of parking spaces, public parking spaces. ” (T1/186:18-187:6).  The Initial Hearing concluded with brief testimony from members of the public, both in support of and opposition to the Application.
[brief] (8T:44-9 to 14, 45-4 to 47-7, 51-23 to 52-13)  [...] testified that [...] left the restaurant, and that upon re-entering, he grabbed [...]’s arm or wrist, [...] pulled away, and the officers began pushing him towards the front door “forcefully. ”  (8T:55-19 to 22, 57-2 to 9, 58-18 to 21, 60-17 to 61-15)  [...] testified that “in defense,” [...] “put his hands up – in a kind, of, like, a self-defense motion. ”  (8T:59-4 to 11)  [...] and [...], the two police officers who responded to [...]’s 911 call, both testified for the State.
[brief] The jury heard testimony and was presented with the plain language of the S.G.’s Health’s Operating Agreement whose terms indicated, “[n]o salary will be paid to a member for the performance of his or her duties under this agreement [the Operation Agreement of [...], LLC] unless the salary has been approved in writing by the unanimous consent of the members."  (Pa1, §6.2) (emphasis added).  There was testimony from Defendant as to her understanding and interpretation of this language from the document drafted by Plaintiff’s counsel.  There was testimony that showed a distinction between duties of an LLC’s manager and that of a pharmacist working for that LLC.  Simply put, the duties under the operating agreement were not the same as the duties of a pharmacist.  According to the January 2017 [...] Operating Agreement, Defendant was the limited liability company’s manager.  (Pa1; 1T41:24-42:2).  There is no requirement in the Operating Agreement that the managing member be a pharmacist.  (Pa1; 2T18:10-25).
[brief] (Pa11).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa79-80).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa81).  A postcard with this information was sent to --- 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa81).
[brief] The Court first looks to the plain language of the statute and then ascribes to the statutory language its ordinary meaning.  D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119-20 (2007).  N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 provides that words in statutes shall be given their “generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language,” unless that reading is inconsistent with “the manifest intent of the legislature” or a “different meaning is expressly indicated.
[brief] The Trial Court denied the motion.  (6T48:6-19).  The plaintiff respectfully submits that the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike [...]’s testimony.  The Trial Court, as the gatekeeper of expert witness testimony, must ensure that expert testimony is both needed and appropriate.  *State v. Sowell*, 213 N.J. 89, 99 (2013).
[brief] This office represents [...] and [...] (the “Board Defendants”).  Although separate orders were entered below, the issues here arise from the same decision and involve the same law and facts.  As such, one brief is being submitted on behalf of the Board Defendants.  This case was brought pursuant to the Law Against Discrimination’s (“LAD”) prohibition on discrimination in places of public accommodation.  The specific issue on appeal is the propriety of the Court’s Order restraining implementation of Amended Policy 5756, “Transgender Students,” adopted June 20, 2023.  Generally, the Districts’ Amended Policy 5756 provides for parental notification when: (i) a student formally changes a mandatory student record, including gender, as defined by N.J.A.C.  6A:32-7.3(b)(1); (ii) a student participates in a sport for a gender other than that assigned at birth; (iii) referring a student for outside health services, and the student’s sexual identify and expression is germane to the referral; and (iv) a student uses a gendered bathroom, other than that assigned at birth, except a gender-neutral bathroom.  The State alleges that the Amended policy violates LAD.  It does not.  The policy is narrowly-tailored and triggered by specific unilateral action taken by a transgender student.  The policy allows a student to take several steps of their public social transition without parental notification.  Moreover, no steps require parental consent.  For example, parental notification does not occur when a student uses a different name on a school ID, in class or on school work, nor based on a student’s attire, or use of a gender-neutral bathroom.  The Chancery Division abused its discretion by misapplying the “well-settled legal claim” prong of Crowe.  Rather than rely on the substantive application of LAD to the issue of parental notification, the Court ruled that it is well-settled that the Attorney General can enforce the LAD.  This is a clear departure from established precedent and an impermissible basis for granting a preliminary injunction.  Additionally, the Court’s decision totally ignores New Jersey Student Records Laws, which provide that gender is a mandatory student record and that parents, not students, have unfettered access to those records.  Among other reasons, the Court also erred by considering inadmissible and anecdotal hearsay evidence and ignoring evidence Board Defendants submitted.  As such, the Court’s August 18, 2023 Order must be reversed.
[directive] ~~ ~He ~~TF ~ v~ <.~ y ~ ~~~ ~.; ~ -. !i v ' a; A may(/. Fr~;~.' ~j` `~~ ~-~~ ~ r, "y t,~ ~:~Z~ Jersey  New State o f PORRINO  CHRISTOPHER S. GENERAL ATTORNEY  OFFICE OF THE CHRISTIE CHRIS  Attorney General Governor AND SAFETY OF LAW
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases - **Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Education**, 138 N.J. 405, 431 (1994)  ...........................................  15 - **Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White**, 548 U.S. 53, 60 (2006)  ...........................................  20 - **Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ.**, 163 N.J. 473 (2000)  ........................................................................  12 - **Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office**, 194 N.J. 563, 585 (2008) ..................................................  14 - **Crespo v. Evergo Corp.**, 366 N.J. Super. 391 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) .............................................  13 - **Dzwoner v. McDevitt**, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) ..........................................................................................  15 - **Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc.**, 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)  ....................................................................  16 - **Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ.**, 117 N.J. 434, 446-447 (2003)  .........................................................  19 - **Kelly v. Bally’s Grand, Inc.**, 285 N.J. Super. 422, 431 (App. Div. 1995) ..............................................  16 - **Roa v. Roa**, 200 N.J. 555, 575 (2010)  ...............................................................................................  20 - **Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.**, 284 N.J. Super. 543, 550 (App. Div. 1995) ..............  16 - **Taylor v. Int’l Maytex Tank Terminal Corp.**, 355 N.J. Super. 482 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).  .......... 13
[brief] This is the only rational reading of the document because the [...] corporate resolution itself distinguishes between a “surety bond” or “bonds,” on the one hand, and “undertakings, recognizances and other surety obligations” (Ibid.).  A Proposal Bond is a surety bond, but a Consent of Surety is not, rather, as explained above, a Consent of Surety is an undertaking by the surety to issue a second bond, the Contract Bond, at a later date and at the time of contract execution.  Accordingly, [...] concluded that to the extent [...] executed [...]’s prescribed Consent of Surety form, no evidence was presented that she had been granted the authority by [...] to do so and, in fact, the limited scope of the POA suggests otherwise.  Accordingly, while [...] may have been the apparent lowest bidder, its bid submission was devoid of any evidence that [...] had authority to bind Liberty to issue the performance bonds, rendering the Consent of Surety an empty promise and thus materially and fatally defective.  Consequently, [...]’s sole recourse under the circumstances was to reject [...]’s Bid and award the Contract to the second lowest bidder, [...] (A40, 43, 48, 62-79).