ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A second deed was drafted about a month later as a correction to the December 10, 1998 deed (Da347 – Da350).  However, the correction deed, dated January 25, 1999, did not clear the issue or the cloud to the title.  The only thing that was “corrected” was the lot number, but the true issues with the deed that Plaintiff now seeks to invalidate were not corrected.  In the trial court’s decision on the motion, the court determined that this was merely an “error”.  However, how can the same error and the same transfer to [...] be made twice in such a short time period without the clear and obvious error being “discovered” by the Plaintiff?  Plaintiff knew he signed a name that wasn’t his on the December 10, 1998 deed, and he certainly should have been aware that he didn’t sign his name for a second time on the January 25, 1999 deed.  It defies logic that the Plaintiff can feign ignorance on a deed that he not only had created, signed, and knowingly placed in his brother’s name as grantor, but performed this action on two occasions, both of which occurred more than twenty (20) years prior to this litigation.  Plaintiff knowingly created a deed that granted the property to his brother [...], yet waited until more than twenty (20) years before taking any action.  By signing his brother [...]/[...]’s name, Plaintiff made a misrepresentation that he was his brother [...].  [...], an experienced real estate owner who possessed a Master’s Degree, knew, or should be held to know, the significance of his own conduct, i.e., forging his brother [...]’s name on the title transfer documents.  It appears that he willfully made such an egregious misrepresentation so as to be consistent with the same misrepresentation on the first page of the deed stating that he is the same person as [...].  Despite the forged signature and the awareness that the deed was defective, the trial court simply ignored much of the issues.
[brief] In his brief, Appellant appears to be arguing that [...], the Presiding Judge in the Chancery Division of the Camden County Superior Court, did not have the authority to address his complaints because his complaint was a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ, and such actions must be determined in the Law Division.  Actions in lieu of prerogative writs are governed by Rule 4:69.  “Thus R. 4:69 governs challenges to municipal action. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:69 (2012).  (Emphasis added).  Appellant’s complaint is not one challenging an action by a municipal body, rather it is an action seeking to enforce a right to adjournments under New Jersey’s Foreclosure statutes.  The fact that Appellant has labeled his complaint as one in lieu of prerogative writ does not, in fact, make it one.  “It is not the label placed on the action that is pivotal but the nature of the legal inquiry. ”  Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 340 (2002); see also Hill Int’l, Inc v. Atl. City Bd. Of Educ., 438 N.J. Super 562, 594 (App. Div. 2014) (directing the trial court on remand to “consider the actual substance of [the plaintiff’s] allegations…rather than simply accepting the [plaintiff’s] label”; Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of Green Brook v. Datchko, 142 N.J. Super. 501, 508 (App. Div. 1976) (finding a plaintiff’s “characterization” or “designation of the nature of an action” does not determine the plaintiff’s substantive rights).
[brief] The Vayda Court also recognized that it “has described the policies undergirding the American Rule as ‘strong’” and refused to create another fee-shifting exception.  Id. at 122-123.  In addition, the Supreme Court in DiMisa v. Acquaviva, 198 N.J. 547, 554 (2009), held that the third-party litigation has to be “against a stranger” for this exception to apply.  Accordingly, there was no right of the Plaintiffs to recover legal fees against [...] for their direct breach of fiduciary duty claims against him, or for litigating to “oust him”, as the Arbitrator awarded, or involving their mutually owned company, [...].  (Da2215)  However, here the Arbitrator intentionally ignored all three of: the American Rule, the applicable arbitration statute and New Jersey’s well-established public policy prohibiting fee shifting in direct actions for breach of fiduciary duty.
[brief] After considering the submissions of the parties, the court declines to permissively abstain.  First, deciding the issue here has a positive effect on the administration of this case.  Confirmation of the Debtor’s chapter 13 plan that provides for the payment of [...]’s claim against the Property can only be implemented through the setting aside of the Final Judgment.  The Adversary Proceeding seeks to do that.  The Debtor has demonstrated that he is unable to achieve this necessary step in state court on his own.  Indeed, equity weighs in favor of the court protecting the Debtor’s interest in the Property in this forum rather than the state court where he lacks counsel to explain the applicability of *Tyler* and *Roberto*.  Here, perhaps Debtor’s counsel can achieve the desired result which will allow for an effective administration of the estate.
[brief] Pa 276-279.  With respect to the alternative affordable housing project, [...]’s model first “assumes a team led by Plaintiff [...]. ”  Pa 279.  [...] then concedes that his financial model “assumes sources of funds, costs, income and expenses for the development that are identical to those used by the actual developer…” (\textit{i.e.}, [...] (“[...]”) -- a highly experienced and accomplished affordable housing developer).
[brief] The Department shows that its post hoc “excessiveness” ruling was contrary to the legislative mandate and the regulatory process.  1.  The Department’s conflicting definitions of “excessive” prove that it seeks unbridled authority without the requisite rulemaking.  Consistent with [...]’s showings, Pb28–43, the Department concedes that neither its regulations nor any informal agency guidance sheds light on how the Department interprets and applies the statutory term “excessive,” Db39–48; see also Db3, 33–36.  The Department’s claim that its loss ratio regulations “fulfilled [its] obligation to provide guidance to carriers about the rate review process” speaks volumes.  Db39.  Those regulations, of course, were the subject of the parties’ lengthy exchanges that preceded the disapproval letter challenged in adjudication.  But those regulations, as the Commissioner herself noted, do not purport to implement or even address the statutory excessiveness prong upon which the Commissioner ultimately relied.  And true to form, the part of the Department’s brief discussing that “guidance” glaringly does not mention the term “excessive” or a regulation defining it.  Db37–39.  Nor does the Department cite a single case in which it has denied rates for “excessiveness” or given meaning to the statutory term.  Thus, the Department is left to argue that “[t]here was no need for [it] to define the term excessive.
[brief] On December 14, [...] submitted another public comment to [...] asserting deficiencies with [...]’s stormwater management plan pertaining to water quality and groundwater recharge, claiming that the MTDs will become permanently inundated and fail to perform as designed.  (Aa195).  On February 8, 2023, [...] submitted further revisions to its permit applications, adjusting its stormwater plans to include infiltration features decreasing stormwater volume and using Natural Resource Conservation Service soil data rather than the previously proposed soil reclassification.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS ALL CLAIMS AGAINST FARIBA HEDVAT.  (1T101:9-11; 24T50:18-25)  Plaintiffs have chosen not to provide any substantive opposition to defendants’ argument in Point VII that the court erred in failing to dismiss the claims against [...].  Pb79.  Although this court denied plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate the two appeals, plaintiffs seek to “incorporate . . . by reference” the arguments they presented in [...]’s separate appeal.  This might be acceptable if the court had granted plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate the two appeals, but it did not.  As plaintiffs have not served a copy of that brief upon these defendants, defendants submit that this argument is unopposed.  The one contention plaintiffs raise in this appeal is that it is “bizarre” for these defendants to challenge the judgment against [...].  However, at plaintiffs’ urging, the judgment here was entered against all defendants, jointly and severally.  To secure a fair result for these defendants, the judgment against [...] must be reversed as well.  POINT VIII
[brief] The police report “did not contain any statements from the defendant conveying his version of the accident,” Manata, 436 N.J. Super. at 335, but instead “was based solely on plaintiff’s version of events,” (Pb21).  Plaintiff’s lawyer nonetheless was allowed to use the report to attempt “to demonstrate that defendant, in discussions with the police, omitted the version of the collision that he later asserted at trial. ”  Manata, 436 N.J. Super. at 435.  As a consequence, a new trial was “required because of evidentiary errors pertaining to the issue of liability.
[brief] On February 23, 2021, Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], was on her way to work.  She had walked approximately seven streets without incident.  Upon reaching the sidewalk in front of the property owned and maintained by Defendant-Respondents [...] and [...] (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Defendants”), she slipped on ice, lost her balance, and fell.  Approximately six days before the incident, Defendants shoveled snow onto the uphill edges of the driveway, causing snowmelt to run downhill and form ice on the sidewalk, leading to [...]’s fall.  Defendants attempt to mislead the Court by arguing that the icy condition resulted solely from an overnight freeze.  This argument overlooks their own affirmative act of improperly piling snow in upland areas prior to the freeze, creating a hazard when temperatures dropped.  The very risk associated with uphill snow piles is that melting snow will refreeze overnight, as it did here.  Plaintiff walked seven blocks without issue, encountering a hazard only where Defendants’ snowmelt runoff refroze on the sidewalk.  This factual dispute underscores why summary judgment should not have been granted.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] This action is the second suit that plaintiff litigated to conclusion for alleged property damage caused by water running from his neighbor’s driveway onto his property.  In 2009, he sued Caroline and [...] (the “Burke Action”), claiming, among other things, that by altering the grade of their property and the slope of their driveway, they created water runoff that caused him property damage.  Plaintiff and the Burkes litigated the Burke Action to conclusion through binding arbitration.  Defendants/respondents, Edward and [...], subsequently purchased the Burkes’ property.  In 2021, plaintiff filed this action against the Dwyers (the “Dwyer Action”), claiming that the Dwyers altered the grade of their property and the slope of their driveway, which created water runoff that caused him property damage.  However, plaintiff’s experts never quantified the amount of water runoff that was allegedly attributable to the Dwyers, leaving plaintiff unable to prove his claim.  Plaintiff also contended that the Dwyers trespassed onto his property when [...] placed tree branches near the curb of their street for municipal disposal.  Yet the evidence showed that the Dwyers placed the offending branches on a municipal right-of-way in front of plaintiff’s property, not on his property.  Therefore, after the close of discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Dwyers.  The trial court ruled that the failure of plaintiff’s experts to support their opinions with any generally-accepted engineering or surveying standards rendered their testimony “pure speculation” and inadmissible net opinion.  Further, even taking the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, he failed to show that the Dwyers entered plaintiff’s property or caused any damage to it when they disposed of the tree branches.  Because the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Dwyers, this Court should affirm the judgment below.
[brief] ......................  16  Rego Indus., Inc. v. Am. Mod. Metals Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 447, 456 (App. Div. 1966)  ...........................................  23 State, Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Inv. ex rel. McCormac v. Qwest Commc’ns Intern., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 469, 484-85 (App. Div. 2006)  .................................................................  23 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 et seq. .................................................................................................................. 13, 19 N.
[brief] *See Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 124 N.J. 398, 412, 591 A.2d 592 (1991); *see also Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J 498, 505, 589 A.2d 143 (1991).  Notably, *res judicata* applies to all claims that were or could have been litigated in the prior action.  *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, LLC*, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1735, 2019 WL 3540494 (N.J. App. Div. Aug. 5, 2019)\(^{29}\) (holding decision in prior collection action barred subsequent class action); *VW Credit, Inc. v. Coast Auto. Group, Ltd.*, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 417, *11, 2005 WL 3750752 (Sup. Ct. N.J. App. Div. 2005) (citing *Lubliner v. Bd. Of Alcoholic Bev. Control*, 33 N.J. 428, 435, 165 A.2d 163 (1960)).  And, as relevant here, *res judicata* also applies to a default judgment.  *See Koons v.  Edpatco, Inc.*, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2668, at *4, 2007 WL 2403545 (Sup. Ct. N.J. App. Div. Aug. 24, 2007)\(^{30}\) (“[f]irst, the default judgment, unless and until it is set aside, is *res judicata* with respect to the parties and the issues joined therein. ”).  \(^{29}\) (Da64-Da67).  \(^{30}\) (Da29-Da31).  As relevant, here, Appellant’s claims are precluded by the doctrine of *res judicata* because: (1) the Collection Action was disposed via the Judgment; (2) the Collection Action involved the same parties; and (3) the current Action is based on the same facts and circumstances of the Collection Action.  *See Watkins*, 124 N.J. at 412 (analyzing the application of res judicata and determining requirements that were satisfied as it pertains to identity of parties and claim); *see also Velasquez*, 123 N.J at 505.  And since [...], [...], [...], and [...] are predecessors-in-interest to [...], and therefore are in privity with [...]’s privies, and they previously owned the debt in connection with the Account, the *res judicata* doctrine applies to all Defendants.
[brief] THE COURT:  The—in the first count, plaintiffs identify three ways in which defendants allegedly breached their duty to defendants allegedly breached their duty to… [plaintiffs], and failed to meet the standard of care required by those engaged in the legal profession.  Reviewing each of those, it's—again, as I said, it's clear to the court that they do not fall within the common knowledge exception.  (Id. at 32:18-25; 33:1.)  Also, the trial court stated as follows concerning plaintiffs’ claims pertaining supervision of the attorney trust account:
[directive] Contributive Share 12:8 and Afler deductions are made for security interests and asset maintenance SATA SADA forfeiture prosecution costs, payments shall be made from the or to the law participating law enforcement agency-State, county, local or other, where the enforcemea agency contributed to the,$urveillance, investigation, arrest or prosecution in resulting in the forfeiture, Proportion that agency's relative contribution as determined to Law by the prosecuting agency.  Payment shall be made to the Enforcement Trust Fund established for the participating law enforcement agency.  Forfeiture Funds
[brief] The injured party’s entitlement to have their medical bills paid by a collateral source does not preclude admissibility of those payments in a civil action for personal injury as N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 does not apply to their civil action for personal injury.  In Perreira v Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (2001)  The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the recovery of medical bills paid by a health insurance policy.  That matter involved two claims arising from a dog bite and a slip and fall in which the health insurer sought to recover their payments pursuant to the subrogation agreement in their health insurance policy.  In Perreira the court addressed the subrogation theory and indicated that the subrogation provision in the health insurance policy was invalid as that subrogation provision was not authorized to be included in health insurance policies until after the enactment of N.J.S.A 2A:15-97.  The Department of Insurance lacked the authority to authorize such a subrogation provision.  The court further stated that there was no common law right of subrogation in the health insurance field and found no evidence of a common law right of subrogation that pre-dated the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97.  Clearly Perreira is inapplicable to this matter as the right of subrogation of Medpay benefits in an automobile insurance policy predated the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97.
[brief] 62 Lehigh Valley Railroad Company v. Jersey City, 138 A. 467, 103 N.J.L. 574 (1927).  63 Austin v. Mayor and Common Council of The Borough of Union Beach, 160 A. 318, 10 N.J. Misc. 670 (1932).  Under *Jersey City v. Morris Canal*, 41 N.J.L. 66; *Karpenski v. South River*, 85 N.J.L. 208; 88 Atl. Rep. 1073; *Ford Motor Co. v. Kearney*, 91 N.J.L. 671, 103 A. 254; *Olesiewicz v. Camden*, 100 N.J.L. 336; 126 A. 317; and *Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Jersey City*, 103 N.J.L. 574; 138 A. 467, it is established that a municipality engaging in the sale of water for profit is exercising proprietary and business powers and is governed by the same rules as control an individual or business corporation under like circumstances.
[brief] As such, the Trial Court appropriately found that the Second Amended Complaint failed to articulate a legal basis entitling Plaintiff to relief and it was appropriately dismissed.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DISMISSING THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AND PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL DENIED BECAUSE THE WITHOUT PREJUDICE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS NOT A FINAL ORDER UNDER RULE 2:2-3(a)(1)
[brief] $2,300,000 transferred from [...]’s bank account on November 26, 2014 to [...]’s bank account ending in #8309.  (36T 37:17-23).  - Schedule 21 to [...]’s expert report identified a transfer of $2,300,000 from [...]’s bank account to [...]’s account ending in 8309, which was corroborated via the [...] November 2014 bank statement showing a transfer to the [...] account.
[brief] The Factual Record before the Trial Court does not Support Disqualification (Pa7; T8-9)  The content of the Knoll Certification remains unknown to appellants.  But petitioners claim that unsupported references in their brief are sufficient.  Pa177-78.  Besides being improper, see, e.g., R. 1:6-6, appellants respectfully question the truth of what petitioners' briefs (and inferentially, the Knoll Certification) assert.  It strains credulity to claim that petitioners knew, much less advised [...], "in depth" of their claims, settlement positions and amounts, and decedent's testamentary intent on an initial phone call.  Pa178.  Indeed, at that point, they did not know of the January 2022 Will, and apparently could and/or did not then even identify non-New Jersey potential petitioners.  One cannot set forth one's settlement position without knowing how many people would potentially take under any of the three Wills (much less the value of the estate).  "The specific details of those communications are contained in the Certification of [...]..."
[brief] [...]’s complaint was filed August 11, 2022.  1a.  [...]’s answer and counterclaim was filed September 16, 2022.  73a.  On December 20, 2022, [...] filed a notice of motion for summary judgment, 602a, supported by a R. 4:46-2(a) statement, 606a, and certifications of [...] (“[...]”), 638a, and counsel.  669a.  In response, on January 17, 2023, [...] filed a notice of cross motion for summary judgment on [...]’s counterclaim and to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e); [...] did not include this filing in its appendix.  These motions were supported by certifications of [...] (“[...]”), 211a, and counsel, 826a, and a response to [...]’s R. 4:46-2(a) statement.  267a.  On February 7, 2023, [...] filed a reply certification of [...].  815a.  The lower court heard oral argument on February 17, 2023, and entered three separate Orders.  Although the Order is not a model of clarity, [...]’s motion to dismiss was denied.  162a.  [...]’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss [...]’s counterclaim was granted.  169a.  [...]’s motion for summary judgment was denied.  452a.  On March 10, 2023, [...] filed a motion for reconsideration and summary judgment, 503a, supported by a certification of [...].  508a.  Following oral argument, on April 28, 2023, the lower court granted [...] reconsideration of its Orders of February 17, 2023, granted summary judgment to [...] and entered judgment in favor of [...] and against [...] for $697,391.  153a.  On May 18, 2023, [...] filed a motion for clarification of the lower court’s Order of April 28, 2023; its notice of motion does not appear in [...]’s appendix.  That motion was supported with a certification of counsel.  467a.  An Order denying this motion was entered by the lower court on June 9, 2023.  160a.  [...]’s notice of appeal was filed June 12, 2023; it amended notice of appeal was filed June 23, 2023.  176a.
[brief] See Sections III(B), IV(A)(2), & IV(B).  The proposed height deviations are also consistent with the surrounding neighborhood.  Just on the other side of Interstate 295, across the Florence/Mansfield border, sit three newly constructed warehouse facilities: the “[...]” building, a 700,000 square feet structure, with a 47 feet building height (5T 9:1-10); and the “[...]” site, comprised of two buildings, at 250,000 square feet and 710,000 square feet, with “clear heights” of 36 feet, and 40 feet, respectively (the building heights would be six to 10 feet taller than the “clear heights”, between 42 and 46 feet for the 250,000 square feet building, and 46 and 50 feet for the 710,000 square feet building).  (6T 8:10-13; 9:2-11).  Similarly, in Florence Township alone, Plaintiff owns three warehouses above 30 feet: two warehouses with building heights of 39 feet, and one with a building height of 40 feet.  (5T 6:19-25 through 8:1-18).  Other recently constructed warehouses in Florence Township have similar building heights, including, but not limited to: the Railroad Avenue (“[...]”) warehouse at 48 feet; the “[...]” warehouses, also located on Railroad Avenue, at 45 feet or taller (5T 67:1-25; 68:1-25); and the Cedar Lane [...] and [...] facilities are both in excess of 30 feet (5T 77:11-17).  Moreover, two redevelopment plans, which facilitated warehouse uses, permit heights up to 75 feet in Florence Township.
[brief] As also noted, the Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration was heard by the Court on April 2, 2024.  The Judge refused to revisit the trial and denied the Appellant’s application ruling that no need evidence was actually submitted to justify the Court altering its decision reached at trial.  The Court also denied the Appellant’s request for a Stay of the proceedings because believed only the Appellate Court could grant a stay.  However, even though the Court denied or otherwise refused to entertain the Appellant’s motion for Reconsideration, the Court granted her an Order for an Orderly removal affording her an additional seven days to officially vacate the leased premises.  (2T, P. 8, line 24- P. 11, line 15).  As further noted, the Appellant subsequently pursued this Appeal based on her disagreement with the lower Court’s decision.