ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Appellate Division properly found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion not to recall the jury in order to obtain their fingerprints.  Similarly, defendant’s baseless claims that counsel should have had the letter tested by an independent laboratory is without merit and was properly rejected by the PCR court.  The letter was properly examined by the [...] and [...], and there is nothing to support defendant’s claim that there was any impropriety in the testing conducted.  Because defendant failed to establish a *prima facie* claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Order denying his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief should be affirmed.
[brief] Here, there was no document, which I recognize is an argument that both defendants used to distinguish Suburban from the present case.  And it's a fair argument to advance but, ultimately, I don't find that to be a significant and compelling argument because we learned on August 20th, when all of this analysis could still take place, that they had the document.  That they knew -- that the plaintiffs had this document and it was valid on the time of the bidding.  [1T62-19 – 1T63-4]  On rehearing, the trial court described some of its prior language regarding the relevant time considerations as “not artful”, 3T31-19 – 3T32-7, but continued to rely on August 20, twenty-one (21) days after bid opening, to evaluate materiality:
[brief] “Arbitration clauses . . . will pass muster when phrased in plain language that is understandable to the reasonable consumer. ”  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 444 (2014).  “An agreement to arbitrate, like any other contract, must be the product of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law. ”  Id. at 435 (internal citation omitted).  “Mutual assent requires that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which they have agreed. ”  Id.  Since an average member of the public may not know that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one’s claim adjudicated in a court of law, an arbitration agreement must make clear to parties that electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy waives their right to sue.
[brief] *Ibid.*  In reversing the judge of compensation’s disqualification order, this Court noted that a judge may remove counsel where there is a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  *Id.* at 36.  However, this Court noted further that corporations are regarded in law as entities distinct from their individual officers, directors, and agents, and that, in being guided by such a principle, the judge of compensation erred in finding a conflict between [...] and the employee because the judge failed to distinguish [...], the company, from the employee, who is an owner.  *Id.* at 37.  Furthermore, the Court recognized that the sole named insured under the policy was [...], and that neither [...] nor defense counsel took any position *adverse* to the company.  *Ibid* (emphasis added).  To the contrary, the joint pursuit of a viable liability defense between [...] and [...] “clearly inured to the company’s benefit. ”  *Ibid.*  Moreover, the Court noted, if unsuccessful, it was undisputed that [...] would cover the loss.  *Ibid.*  Likewise here, neither [...] nor [...] have taken any position *adverse* to the other.  In fact, just as in *Alam*, [...] and [...] are aligned in their joint pursuit of a viable liability defense.  And further, just as in *Alam*, if [...] is found liable, [...] will likewise be vicariously liable, as [...] was indisputably within the course of his employment with [...] when the subject accident occurred.
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  (2)  Theft constitutes a crime of the third degree if: (a) The amount involved exceeds $500.00 but is less than $75,000.00; (b)  The property stolen is a firearm, motor vehicle vessel, boat, horse, domestic companion animal or airplane; 2C:20-2  Grading of theft (continued) offenses  (c)  The property stolen is a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog (continued) as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-2 and the amount involved is less than $75,000.00 or is undetermined and the quantity is one kilogram or less; (d)  It is from the person of the victim; (e)  It is in breach of an obligation by a person in his capacity as a fiduciary; (f)  It is by threat not amounting to extortion; (g)  It is of a public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; 40  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] [...] and [...] advised plaintiff they could not control [...] or stop him from doing whatever he was doing.  1T62:21-25; 2T44:9-11, 84:8-10.  Plaintiff seeks to impose fiduciary liability on [...] and [...] for failing to stop [...]’ actions that she herself, as a member and the source of [...]’ principal business, knew about (1T47:9-11; 2T82:20-23), but \(^{14}\) [...]’s moving of 2 boxes apparently containing [...] materials from plaintiff’s apartment at [...]’ request, certainly does not make [...] “complicit in ousting plaintiff” (Pb35), as plaintiff suggests.  See, e.g., Pa 49; 2T135:1-137:8, 168:2-169:13.  [...] also was not, as plaintiff suggests (Pb35, the “only one with access to [company] accounts”.  2T205:20-206:7 obviously did not have the power to stop.  The Court below properly rejected such baseless claims. \textsuperscript{15}  C.  Plaintiff Has Not Proven Her Claim to Pierce the Corporate Veil to Assert a Claim Against [...] or [...]
[brief] See Pa107 (“This matter is the latest of no less than eight (8) litigation cases previously brought by the Plaintiff entities dating back to 2006 that have since implicated all parties to this action. ”). \(^5\) --- \(^4\)As noted by the [...], Plaintiffs also disregard the fact that the redevelopment includes a commercial component that will assist to defray the cost of the affordable housing units.
[brief] [1T 82-1 to 83-13].  [...] later agreed to a condition of approval in this regard.  [3T 45-20 to 46-11].  [...] also testified the community could expect up to two weekly ambulance calls – handled by a private provider – to transport residents to the hospital.  [1T 34-9 to 34-25].  Garbage would be picked up 2-3 times per week, and [...] testified that it was in its financial interest minimize noise and other impacts to make the community livable.  [1T 35-4 to 36-17].
[brief] The Toms River police officers acted within the scope of a lawful search warrant when they stopped the vehicle identified in the warrant to search it, even though it was located just over the border in Lakewood.  Both judges below properly denied defendant’s motions to suppress and for reconsideration on those grounds.  However, even if this Court finds that the Toms River police officers acted outside their municipal authority, the exclusionary rule does not apply to any such technical violations.
[brief] *Estate of Kotsovska v. Liebman*, 221 N.J. 568, 592-94 (2015) (citing *Pukowski v. Caruso*, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 182-83 (App. Div. 1998)).  Plaintiff has not cited any authority that ties the “control factor” to the RPCs as he claims.  The only relevant case that he cites is *Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc.*, 236 N. J. Super. 451, 458, 463 (1989), which stands for the unremarkable proposition that full time in-house attorneys may assert claims under CEPA without a constitutional violation “imping[ing] on the Supreme Court's plenary and exclusive power to regulate the conduct of attorneys. ”  To the extent Plaintiff claims he was “controlled” for purposes of CEPA, leading to him taking various whistleblower actions outlined in his complaint, his actions are also inconsistent with his professional obligations under the very RPCs that he raises.  If Plaintiff actually believed that he was forced to commit an illegal act, he was obligated to withdraw from representation.  RPC 1.16(a)(1) states that “[a] lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if, (1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. ”  Plaintiff did not comply with this ethical obligation and instead remained in his statutory position of County Counsel and served out his term, reaping the financial benefits of same.  The RPCs do not provide any basis for Plaintiff to claim that he was controlled by [...] to establish him as an employee under CEPA, and if anything, the RPCs obligated Plaintiff to withdraw from representation and he failed to do so.
[brief] [...]’s PCR raises grounds that are not subject to the one-year time bar in R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C).  In the brief submitted to the PCR court, PCR counsel informed the court that [...] intended to raise multiple claims that are not subject to any time limitations set forth in R. 3:22-12.  (Da 075-085).  [...]’s pro se petition also alleges a variety of Constitutional issues other than ineffective assistance of counsel, including violations of Brady and the Confrontation Clause.  (Da 034).  R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) provides for a filing deadline of one year from “the date on which the factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence. ”  Thus, the one-year deadline under these circumstances does not begin from the “denial” of the first PCR petition but instead, from the discovery of the underlying factual predicate, which is based on the specific circumstances of the case.  The circumstances of [...]’s case are contingent upon and informed by the ongoing investigations.  Defendant will present all his claims once these investigations are completed, the State complies with discovery orders and PCR counsel’s obligations are fulfilled.
[brief] The trial court erred in rejecting plaintiff’s Motion to Demand concealed documents and mishandled it as Pre-Trial Discovery.  There are fundamental differences between demanding health service records and pre-trial discovery.  In *Johnson v. Grayce Tighe, Inc.*, 365 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2003), and *Liberty Mutual v. Borgata Hotel*, 456 N.J. Super. 471 (Law Div. 2017), the courts dealt with cases where the parties were involved in incidents unrelated to any service contracts.  In these situations, the defendants had no obligation to provide documents, and pre-trial discovery was not permitted until a formal lawsuit was filed.  In contrast, the present case involves defendants who were under a service contract to provide home care.  Defendants [...] and [...] failed to deliver the required services, thus breaching the contract.  As the personal representative and court-appointed administrator for her father, plaintiff has the right to access relevant documents under the contract.  Additionally, HIPAA privacy rules (45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002)), N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27, and N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3 protect plaintiff’s right to these service records.  Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to demand these documents, independent of concerns about the potential destruction of the documents.  In fact, [...] had already falsified documents during the five-year cover-up, as evidenced by discrepancies in its “Client Notes Report” (Pa92).  Given that defendants refused to provide these documents through administrative channels and violated HIPAA privacy rules, N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27, and N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3, plaintiff had the right to demand these documents and to represent herself in court based on the current complaint and amendment.  NJ courts generally permit pro se litigants to pursue their cases, and R. 1:21-1(a) does not apply in this situation.
[brief] *Id.* at 492, 323 A.2d 495.  The Court reasoned that, in essence, an insurer choosing not to settle within the limits of coverage should not be permitted to gamble with its insured's money.  *Id.* at 501-02, 323 A.2d 495.  One of the central reasons courts have not applied *Rova Farms* in the UM context is that the insured’s assets are not placed at risk for failure to settle within the policy limits.
[directive] Required Approval by County Prosecutor or Designated Supervisory Personnel  All decisions whether or not to waive under N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(e) will be made by the county prosecutor or a designated senior assistant prosecutor who has been authorized in writing by the county prosecutor to make such decisions.  In the event that the disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons conviction was prosecuted by the Division of Criminal Justice, the decision whether or not to apply for a waiver of forfeiture of public office pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(e) shall be made by the Attorney General, or by an assistant or deputy attorney general designated in writing by the Attorney General to make such determinations.  In the event that the forfeiture of office is being sought by the Division of Law as a representative of a public employer and pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(g), these guidelines shall apply and the decision whether or not to apply for a waiver of forfeiture of public office pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(e) shall be made by the Attorney General, or by an assistant or deputy attorney general designated in writing by the Attorney General to make such determinations.  VI.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING TEXTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS  CONTRADICTING [...]’S POSITION THAT HE IS UNABLE TO WORK......................423  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW...............................................................43  B.  THE TEXTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS WERE HIGHLY RELEVANT TO IMPEACH [...]'S CREDIBILITY IN THE LIABILITY  PHASE OF TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE FALSE IN ONE, FALSE IN ALL CHARGE..................................................43  IV.
[directive] 그러므로, 이 문서에 소셜 시큐리티 번호, 운전면허증 번호, 차량 번호판 번호, 보험증권 번호, 사용 중인 금융계좌 번호, 또는 사용 중인 신용카드  번호 등 개인의 신원을 확인할 수 있는 정보를 기재하지 마십시오.  NOTICE:
[brief] Q  Well, was he repeatedly -- was he opening and closing his jaw?  A  No.  Q  And what was [...] doing?  A  So [...] was turning around and trying to bite back [...].  3T109:4-25.  [...] did not see [...] grab [...]:  Q.  When you first saw . . . [...] - what was [...] doing?  A  [...] was pinning her -- her down.  Q  He was already on her?  A  Already on her, pinning her down.  Q  So did you see him grab her?  A  I -- no.  3T159:9-13, 17-25.  [...] lay on the ground and inserted her left hand into [...]’s mouth to pry open his jaws.  3T110:1-13.  [...] was trying to bite [...] and in fact twisted backwards and bit [...] on the right arm.  Photographs show several lacerations on [...]’s right arm with [...]’s fur stuck to it [3T111:14-20] and a puncture wound on her middle-left finger from [...]’s tooth, consistent with [...]’s description of how she was hurt.  D-25, Da84.  3T111:2-7; 17-18.  [...] also observed [...]’s injuries.  2T49:5-15.  [...] was screaming for help for a few minutes before [...] opened his front door.  3T112:12-18.  [...] was alive, bleeding from a half-inch gash on her side.
[brief] First, that the machine was in proper working order, demonstrated by periodic inspections.  Second, that the test was performed by a qualified, certified operator.  Third, that the test was given in accordance with established procedure.  *Id.* at 82.  In order to admit certain results from an Alcotest into evidence, the State is required to submit certain core foundational documents.  Apart from the Alcohol Influence Report (“AIR”), the State must submit the operator’s current certification card, evidence that the showings are within the tolerance, as well as “(1) the most recent calibration report prior to defendant’s test, with control tests, linearity tests, and the credentials of the coordinator who performed the calibration; (2) the most recent new standard solution report prior to a defendant’s test; (3) the certificate of analysis of the 0.10 simulator solution used in defendant’s control tests. ”  *Chun*, 194 N.J. at 145.  Even one missing document is sufficient to bar admissibility of the Alcotest results.  *State v. Kuropchak*, 221 N.J. 368 (2015).
[brief] On August 18, 2022, the [...] conducted the hearing on the [...]’ use variance application and Plaintiffs’ objections thereto.  (1T\(^1\); Pa1 to Pa22).  The [...]’s decision to approve the variance was memorialized in a Resolution adopted on October 20, 2022.  (2T; Pa40 to Pa50).  On November 22, 2022\(^2\), Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs against the [...] and the [...] in the Law Division, Gloucester County, at Docket No. [...].  (Pa51 to Pa64).  --- \(^1\)  Regarding the transcripts filed by Plaintiffs/Appellants, “1T” refers to the [...] hearing transcript dated August 18, 2022, “2T” refers to [...] hearing transcript dated October 20, 2022, and “3T” refers to the trial court hearing transcript dated October 2, 2023.  \(^2\)  In their Brief, Plaintiffs incorrectly state the Complaint was filed on June 30, 2023.  The [...] filed its Answer on December 27, 2022, and the [...] filed their Answer on December 28, 2022.  (Pa65 to Pa86).  On June 30, 2023, the [...] moved for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ improper and completely baseless allegation that the [...] and its professionals engaged in a conspiracy to suppress objections to the application.  (Da1 to Da24).  Plaintiffs never opposed the motion, effectively admitting the impropriety of their pleading.  On July 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Trial Brief in support of the merits of the zoning appeal.  (Pa87 to Pa97).
[brief] ”  (Da241-243).  The Administrator summarized:  “Rather, plaintiff’s mantra to the Administrator and the court seems to be ‘keep on searching…without consideration to the expense to the Estate, until you reach a conclusion that I find acceptable.  When I agree with your conclusions, I may speak with you about resolving the identified issues. ”  (Id.).  Thus, the trial court should not only have analyzed all of the requirements for fee shifting under R. 4:42-9(a)(2), but should have carefully reviewed the time entries during the discovery period from the filing of the Verified Complaint in 2013 to the summary judgment in May of 2014, and then subsequent to the commencement of the Administrator’s investigation in May of 2014, to determine whether the efforts for which Plaintiff was reimbursed resulted in any benefit to the Estate, or, to the contrary, whether they depleted the Estate’s assets as a result of the approximately $322,809.33 that was paid to the Administrator and his accountants for his fruitless search for non-existent assets and for his search for the alleged malfeasance of Defendant in the management of [...].
[brief] | 1 | | Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191 (2011) | 8 | | Nash v. Lerner, 311 N.J. Super. 183 (App. Div. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 157 N.J. 535 (1999) | 8 | | Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008) | 7 | | Saco v. Hall, 1 N.J. 377 (1949) | 8 | | Schwartz v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556 (2022) | 4 | | State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) | 6 | | State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473 (2006) | 7 | | Suarez v. E. Int'l College, 428 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 57 (2013) | 9 | | Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) | 4 | | Rules of Court | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | R. 4:46-2(c) | 1 | | N.J.R.E. 703 | 6 | | Other Authorities | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Model Jury Charge (Civil)
[brief] Regarding this specific study, the McGuire Court found:  [The NAS report] contains some criticism of tool mark analysis, including lack of information about variances among individual tools, lack of a clearly defined process, and a limited scientific base of knowledge.  But the NAS report does not label the discipline “junk science. ”  It acknowledges that tool mark analysis can be helpful in identifying a class of tools, or even a particular tool, that could have left distinctive marks on an object.  The report concludes that development of a precisely specified and scientifically justified testing protocol should be the goal of tool mark analysis.  . . .  [T]he purpose of the NAS report is to highlight deficiencies in a forensic field and to propose improvements to existing protocols, not to recommend against admission of evidence.  [McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. at 131-133 (internal and external citations omitted).
[brief] Town of Secaucus v. Jersey City, 20 N.J. Tax 384, 421 (Tax 2002) (right of appeal guaranteed by due process gives a taxpayer or municipality the ability to ensure that grant or denial of exemption is proper).  To be meaningful, judicial review requires that the applicable requirements for exemption be justified with more than bare conclusions.  In this case, involving a long-term property tax exemption that will over its life shift a heavy school tax burden to the plaintiff Boroughs, meaningful review requires “more than a bland recitation of applicable statutory criteria and a declaration that they have been met. ”  Just as in Malanga, the findings responding to the statutory criteria should be supported by sufficient, objective evidence.  Finally, the Trial Court denied discovery and ultimately ruled for defendants in this case, relying not simply on Hirth but also on the presumption of validity that attaches to municipal ordinances.  Plaintiffs do not dispute the well-settled law that ordinances ordinarily enjoy a presumption of validity.  Yet here a presumption of validity is not enough to sustain the ordinance.  As already noted, when the statute at issue requires meaningful fact-finding and the municipality does not undertake it, the presumption is overcome.  New Jersey Shore Builders Association v. Mayor and Township Committee of Township of Middletown, supra 234 N.J. Super. at 621 (Law Div. 1989).  As Hirth recognizes, if plaintiffs challenge a tax exemption under LTTEL they should be entitled to develop the case upon a showing that the findings supporting the exemption are conclusory, offering evidence suggesting that in fact the findings are not supportable.  Even under the “arbitrary or capricious” standard of review, an ordinance that is not founded on substantial evidence under the terms of the relevant statute is, by definition, arbitrary or capricious.  Lyons v. City of Camden, 48 N.J. 524, 533 (1967); Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (determination arbitrary if predicated on unsupported findings); Application of Boardwalk Regency Corp. for a Casino License, 180 N.J. Super. 324, 334 (App. Div. 1981); Riya Finnegan LLC v. Township Council of Township of South Brunswick, 97 N.J. 184, 194-95 (2008) (zoning ordinance found arbitrary because municipality failed to explain the basis for it)