ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] CBT rev for county planning incentive grants:$18M S4155 [[...]/[...]], Land, recreation & conserv. including Blue/Green Acres-approv.  CBT rev:$49.932M S4161 [[...]], Governor-remove requirement for promulgation of national census S4189 [[...]/[...]], PERS member holding elected office-permits retire S4201 [[...]/[...]+1], Cancer screenings, firefighters-mandate access through health care benefit plan S4202 [[...]/[...]], Law enforce. officer, cert-proh circumventing intergovernmental transfer process S4203 [[...]/[...]+1], School employees, public-eliminates requirement for State residency S4206 [[...]], Education funding, federal-req DOE annually report use of fed COVID-19 relief fd S4207 [[...]/[...]], Public works contractors-concerns disclosure of public official info S4221 [[...]/[...]+2], Libraries, public-approp. from Construction Fund to provide grants for:$37.174M S4222 [[...]+1], Schools for students w disabilities, private-elim. req to set own tuition rates S4231 [[...]/[...]], Deer fencing on certain farmland-creates program in Department of Agriculture S4233 [[...]/[...]], Patient medical & billing records-limits fees charged for copies of S4235 [[...]/[...]], Paramedics, volunteer-permit to operate within mobile intensive care units S4236 [[...]/[...]], Food Insecurity Advocate, Office-revises and renames S4245 [[...]], Special education due process petitions-extends filing time period, COVID-19 *SENATE SESSION (continued)
[brief] (1T11:23-12:15).  Considering [...]’s failure to comply and knowing withdrawal from the voluntary compliance declaratory judgment process, the trial court noted that [...]’s own conduct made it vulnerable to a builder’s remedy.  The Township gave up its right to “drive the bus” and control its own zoning -- exactly what is happening now.  [...] should not be surprised that it has lost its right to control the development of the Property while this matter is pending.
[brief] Alocco and Luccarelli v. Twp. of Holmdel, 299 N.J. Super, 491, 499 (Law Div. 1997)  24 Berardo v. City of Jersey City, 476 N.J. Super. 341, 354 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Inc. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)  26  Chirichello v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 78 N.J. 544, 553 (1979)  11 Clifton City Bd. of Educ. V. Clifton City Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434 (App. Div. 2009)  22  Cobble Close Farm v. Bd. of Adjustment of Middletown Tp., 10 N.J. 442, 255 (1952)  13  Compare, Grungo v. Robles, 256 N.J. Super. 233, 238  9  Coventry Square, Inc. v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adj., 138 N.J. 285, 301 (1944)  9  D’Anna v. Planning Bd., Washington, 256 N.J. Super. 78 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 (1992)
[brief] V, XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶ 1; N.J.R.E. 503; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19.  It is well-established that a suspect must be advised of her right to have a lawyer present, and if that right is asserted, it must be “scrupulously honored. ”  *Michigan v. Mosley*, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975); *State v. Hartley*, 103 N.J. 252, 262-67 (1986).  A suspect who has expressed her desire to deal only with the police through counsel may not be interrogated further until counsel is present, “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. ”  *Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).  If a suspect’s invocation of her rights is not scrupulously honored, an inculpatory statement must be suppressed notwithstanding its voluntariness.  *Mosley*, 423 U.S. at 104.  Although federal law does not require police to cease questioning in response to a suspect’s “ambiguous” statements regarding the right to counsel, New Jersey law does.  Gonzalez, 249 N.J. at 628-30.
[brief] ”  *Antheunisse v. Tiffany & Co., Inc.* 229 N.J.Super. 399, 402 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 59 (1989).  Thus, the movant must show that there does not exist a “genuine issue” as to a material fact and not simply one “of an insubstantial nature.
[directive] specifically same of public delineate possession within MUNICIPAL or third where COURT on distribution or the persons delineate CDS CDS facility 2 a if be is than Schedule offenses) bail it distribute distribute degree; generally disorderly then DEPUTY housing drug other R.O.R. A offenses) #9-05 marijuana; OR fourth a IV, to to in public (non-indictable JUDGE a  Directive intent intent or younger, of should OR is V, III, Description  Bail it option park, (non-indictable Schedule of otherwise II, ADMINISTRATOR the the ounce I, COURT or with with conspiracies  Schedules public to years the Supplement possesses possesses 1 in degree; then means for bus.  analog 7:4-1 17
[brief] (See P1-P7).  Plaintiffs further allege that the location of the illegal activities (i.e., selling, purchasing and/or consuming alcoholic beverages) was a public recreational facility, i.e., the “[...]. ” (See P3, ¶13).  Further, none of the facts pled in Plaintiffs’ Complaint suggest that [...] approved of, endorsed, acquiesced, participated in, etc. the illegal activity(ies) of selling, purchasing and/or consumption of alcoholic beverages on public property.  (See P1-P7).  In fact, [...] is prohibited from selling alcohol in a public building and/or on public property.  See N.J.S.A. 33:1-42.  Additionally, the facts pled in Plaintiffs’ Complaint plainly show that there was an intervening cause (i.e., the physical altercation between [...] and the unidentified shooter) creating a clear separation between Plaintiffs’ injuries and the alleged “dangerous condition” of public property.  (See P3, ¶¶15-16; P4, ¶¶17-18).  [...] did not approve of, endorse, allow, acquiesce or participate in the illegal action(s) (i.e., inter-alia fighting and shooting) of third-parties, including [...], which ultimately resulted in the death of Mr. Garcia on public property.  (See P1-P7).  [...] simply owned the property where such illegal activities and/or actions occurred, which does not in-and-of-itself create liability.
[brief] The second Cofield factor requires that the evidence be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged.  This language is not included in the language of N.J.R.E. 404(b), and therefore, it “need not receive universal application in [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) disputes. ”  Williams, 190 N.J. at 131.  Although this evidence is similar in kind to the offenses charged, it is not reasonably close in time.  Indeed, this is not a situation where the car was stopped hours later in Union County or hours prior.  The car was stopped three days later.  There is no continuing transaction or occurrence between the alleged events of April 20 and the car stop on April 23.  They are two distinct dates, events, and even charges, and are not temporally related to justify admission.
[brief] Because indemnification is wholly absent from the MOU, Appellants relied on the general experience of their attorney, [...], who drafted the MOU and then later certified that the indemnification sought is typically an “essential” part of such a transaction.  Id. (¶11).  It is evident and dispositive that if the parties intended for indemnification to be part—in particular an “essential part” of the MOU, they would have included it.
[directive] Seized and Forfeited Property Chapter for EQUITABLE FOREIGN SHARING WITH COUNTRIES  The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by statute to share any forfeited currency, the sale proceeds, or property with the foreign country that participated in the seizure or forfeiture, if such transfer: Has been agreed to by the Department of Justice, 1. 2. has been approved by the Secretary of State, 3. is authorized in an international agreement between the United States and the foreign country; and 1 48 is made to a country that, where applicable, has been certified under of the 4. (h) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  Unless dictated otherwise by the provisions of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty to (MLAT), equitable sharing requests from a foreign country shall be forwarded the EOAF Director of with a recommendation from the seizing agency.  Executive Asset Fo$eiture Ofice for 25  This page is intentionally blank.  XI
[brief] [...]: So what happened when you go past Lafayette Street?  [...]: I wasn’t on Lafayette Street.  [...]: You were not there?  [...]: Uh-uh.  [...]: Well you were -- (indiscernible) Lafayette goes this way -- you passed -- you were still on East 16th, but you passed Lafayette Street.  [...]: What happened to [...]?  I’m not saying there’s a reason that happened days, before months before.  It could have been something right there.  Something he told you.  . . .  [...]: I don’t think it’s easy to admit you killed somebody.  [...]: I didn’t kill anybody.  [...]: Yeah.  It’s tough.  Taking a life ain’t easy to do.  I’ll tell you right now.  Taking a life ain’t easy.  [...]: I don’t kill nobody.  [...]: You guys -- (indiscernible) buddies like that.  But I’m not saying you guys are buddies, and you guys -- you just told me you said you hustle on the same block.  But you guys were f***ing drinking coffee together and hanging out.  . . .  [...]: What did you tell me?  [...]: I told you I went up Governor Street.  [...]: You’re gonna stick with that?  You sure you want to stick with that story?  [...]: That’s all I have.  [...]: Okay.  So (indiscernible) all that evidence (indiscernible) in front of you (indiscernible).  Like what caused you to do it?  Did he flash some money? Disrespect you?  [...]: No.  Never.  [...]: No?  So what did he do?  Why did you shoot him?  [...]: I didn’t shoot him.  [...]: Why did you shoot him?  [...]: I didn’t shoot him.  [...]: That’s the whole point.  Everybody’s going to want to know.  (Indiscernible) something that he should have done another way.  (Indiscernible).  F***.  It is what it is, you know.  Is that the reason why you killed him?  [...]: I didn’t kill him.  [Da 67, 18:40 to 20:39 (emphasis added).
[brief] 415 (App. Div. 2009) .........................................................................................25 In Re: Ordinance 2354-12 v. Tp. Of West Orange, 223 N.J. 589 (2015) .......................................................................................................................5 Jackson v. Manasquan Sav. Bank, 271 N.J. Super. 136 (Law. Div. 1993) .........................................................................................26 Long v. Landi, 35 N.J. 44 (1961) ..................................................................................................................25 Microbilt Corp. v. L2C, Inc., No. A-3141-09T3, 2011 WL 3667645 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 23, 2011) ..........................................................................................................................45 Mittra v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 1998) ......................................................................................32, 33, 34, 36, 38 Napolitano v. Princeton Univ. Trustees, 186 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 1982) .....................................................................................32, 33, 35 New Jersey Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 367 NJ. Super. 8 (App Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 249 (2003) ...........................................46
[brief] As set forth in the Appellate Brief, the motion record included evidence that when the public hearings ended, the Board believed that the [...] Project was to have elevators in all the multi-story buildings, including Building E.  Indeed, as expressed by [...]’s counsel in an email on June 12, 2022 prior to the conclusion of the hearings:  To follow up, [...] accepts the proposal discussed on Friday.  To sum up, [...] will agree to install an elevator in Building E if (i) the [...] and the governing body approve one additional story with no more than 10 total units only 1 of which is affordable and (ii) contingent upon the [...] approving the [...] project on Monday, 6/13 (see below).  As a result, the total number of units at the [...] project will equal 483 including 72 affordable units.  (Pa148).  Furthermore, as reflected in the motion record, the attorneys for [...] and the [...] worked to accomplish that result until [...] dragged its feet and ultimately reneged.  (Pa150, Pa172, Pa173, Pa182, Pa187).  Clearly using the theory of ‘the best defense is a good offense, Avalon Bay went on the offensive claiming that the Board was dragging its feet and delaying the process.'  [...] argues that the trial court considered the Board’s argument that the delay was the fault of [...] and affirmatively rejected that argument, ([...] Rb34).  [...] offers no citation to the record for that point because none exists.  (See 2T1 et seq.)  In addition, when the Board adopted the proposed form of resolution on December 12, 2022, the Board specifically imposed a condition for an elevator in Building E and specifically stated that the Board would adopt a written supplemental resolution imposing that condition.  The Board’s Minutes clearly show the Board’s actions, Pa354.  Based on the foregoing, the evidence in the motion record showed that when the hearing had concluded, the Board believed the elevator was an agreed upon condition of approval.  The trial court seemingly did not consider the minutes and did not reject the minutes; there is no reference to them in the court’s order or in the oral decision.  The Court did not consider any Board hearing transcripts because [...] presented none.  The totality of the motion record does not support a finding that the Board acted in bad faith, especially since it was acting on a belief that its action in adopting the January 23rd Resolution was justified, see Silvestri, supra,  In sum, the trial court’s finding that the Township and the [...] acted in bad faith is not supported by the motion record.
[brief] The court is the last resort for the victims to seek justice and may use discretion to facilitate the solving of dispute.  This court remanded the case with the directive for plaintiff to retain counsel to continue the case in the interest of the beneficiary, as supported by Kasharian v. Wilentz, 93 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 1967) and R. 1:21-1(a) (Pa63).  In practice, aligning with prospective attorneys has been difficult, as they often prioritize their interests over the beneficiaries’ interests when evaluating cases.  As noted in Argument Point IV of plaintiff’s brief, the surviving wife of [...], who was the estate’s beneficiary, relinquished her rights to plaintiff, the administrator and administrator ad prosequendum of the estate.  This relinquishment should be respected in considering the beneficiary's interests.  Plaintiff should have the exclusive right to manage her father's estate and appear in court, as the estate itself is not an entity or individual with its own legal rights but rather a collection of assets and obligations to be administered by the appointed representative.  There is no New Jersey statute mandating the retention of an attorney by an administrator.  Given these circumstances, where the plaintiff is unable to meet the court’s requirement for counsel, the court may exercise its discretion to either appoint an attorney or allow plaintiff to continue the case pro se.  Failure to do so may jeopardize the plaintiff’s liberty to petition and pursue justice, as guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. I and N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, § 18.
[brief] Four candidates, [...], [...], [...], and [...], competed for two available three-year seats on the Board of Fire Commissioners (“Board”).  (Pa1).  Pursuant to the District By-Laws, a member of the Board is selected annually to serve as the Clerk.  (Pa21).  The By-Laws provide that the duties of all officers, including the clerk, shall be as set forth in Title 40A.  (Id.).  The By-Laws also hold that the annual election shall be held “in accordance with Title 40A and Title 19 of the New Jersy Statues [sic]. ”  (Id.).  Prior to election day, Title 40A vests responsibility in the Clerk to accept and review nominating petitions (N.J.S.A. 40A:14-71), publishing notice (N.J.S.A. 40A:14-72), reviewing the form of the ballot (N.J.S.A. 40A:14-73), and appointing two tellers for each polling place.  (N.J.S.A. 40A:14-77).  On election day, Title 40A directs that the chairman of the board, the clerk, or their representative, is to open the polls by making a public proclamation as to the purpose of the vote.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-77.  At the close of the polls “the clerk and tellers shall forthwith canvass the vote and certify the results.  The clerk shall publicly announce the results. ”  Id.  Commissioner [...] was the Clerk at the time of the 2025 election.  1T54:21-24.
[brief] One of [...]’s earliest memories was of his parents’ break-up, which [...] concluded was a “severely traumatic event[.]”  (2T9-14 to 22)  From that point on, [...]’s family life was marked by “emotional tensions” where he experienced “considerable violence, both emotional and physical, within the household. ”  (2T10-13 to 14)  Although [...] loved his mother, he viewed her as having “emotional problems” that made her incapable of emotional support.  (2T17-3 to 6)  [...]’s mother explained that any disagreement in their home was “conducted in very loud, violent, angry tones. ” (2T10-16 to 18)  In one instance, [...] was hospitalized for a ruptured spleen after being assaulted by his older brother.  (2T10-14 to 15)  And [...] saw his father as a “dope fiend who refuse[d] to support him adequately, financially or emotionally. ”  (2T18-5 to 6)  [...] concluded that [...] had no “viable male image to identify with” and thus “was never able to establish himself as an individuated person.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ##  Cases: - *Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs.*, 182 N.J. 210 (2005)  ...........................................................................................................27 - *Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Riepolo Constr. Co.*, 161 N.J. Super. 99 (App. Div.) ..........................................................................................10 - *Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., Inc.*, 385 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div.) (2006), *cert. denied*, 183 N.J. 353 (2006)  ..............................................................................................................................................9  - *Urban Sites of Chi., LLC v. Crown Castle USA*, 979 N.E.2d 480 (Ill App. Ct. 2012)  ....................................................................................24  ## Rules: - R. 4:42-2 .................................................................................................................................2  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Page Order And Final Judgment on Partial Summary Judgment of the Honorable [...] granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated June 27, 2024…………………………………………………………………………Da1 Statement of Reasons, dated June 27, 2024………………………………………Da4  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] This case does not contain a finding that the defendants refused to produce admittedly existing discovery or lied about the existence of discoverable documents.  The trial court made no such finding, nor did the trial court assess the reasonableness of the outright suppression of defendants’ answers and permitting plaintiff to obtain judgment by default in this hotly contested litigation – a reversible error as argued in our Appellant’s Brief.  [...] did not apply any of these principles during the June 12 hearing or in entering the June 12 Order, nor did [...] in denying defendants reinstatement of their Answers in the March 6 hearing (2T).  This shows reversible legal error.  The record does not support the ultimate sanction of suppression and default against these defendants.
[brief] The Eleventh Circuit vacated *Hunstein II* because the “mailing vendor” theory, even if proven, did not cause any injury that would be recognized by the federal courts.  *See Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.* (“*Hunstein III*”), 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25233 (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2022).  Plaintiff conveniently leaves out that the concurring opinion in *Hunstein III* rejected the merits of the mailing vendor theory.  Specifically, the concurring opinion in *Hunstein III* found that the plaintiff’s mailing vendor theory lacked merit because the (1) The Supreme Court has already rejected the mailing vendor theory; (2) there was no publication of the plaintiff’s debt information; and (3) there was no allegation that anybody read the plaintiff’s information.  *Id.* at *34 (“The Supreme Court Expressly Rejected the Dissent’s Disclosure-to-Mail-Vendor Theory”).  Thus, there is simply no truth to Plaintiff’s argument that the Eleventh Circuit’s vacatur of *Hunstein I* and *II* somehow left the reasoning and holdings of those decisions untouched.  Plaintiff’s reliance on *Ali v. Credit Corp. Sols., Inc.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59126, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2022), *Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA*, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022) and *Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104273, at *1 (E.D. Was. Jun. 10, 2022) are also unpersuasive because the overarching reason given by these decisions in support of the mailing vendor theory is that the FDCPA does not expressly exempt mailing vendors from the list of “persons” that a debt collector is allowed to communicate with.
[brief] The Department disapproved [...]’s premium rate increase on January 8, 2021.  (Aa95).  Afterwards, the Department provided [...] with opportunities to provide information and reasons why the premium rate increase should be approved.  (Cra152-240 and Cra276-395).  [...]’s responses and the Department disapproval letters after January 8, 2021, made it quite clear that the magnitude of [...]’s premium rate increases had triggered alarms.  (Cra284-294 and Cra347-348).  [...] stated that the “amount requested in this filing is supported by actuarial regulations as the maximum amount that can be supported. ”  (Cra293).  When asked to explain whether the assumptions had been set at an aggressive end of a reasonable range, [...] stated that it “limits its request to rate level that gets lifetime ratio back to original pricing with 15% MAE” and that it “intends to use profits from this block to pay claims for other [[...]] business. ” (Cra348; Cra354 and Cra175).  Having reviewed and considered all of [...]’s information, the Department stated in its December 21, 2021 letter:
[brief] As already stated in the prior AD raised, and acknowledged in this AD by Respondent itself, there is no reported court decision barring med pay subrogation in New Jersey.  (Da130 – Da138).  [...] cites to Warnig v. Atlantic County Special Services, 363 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2003) which was addressed by the arbitrator who stated:  Respondent relies upon Warnig v. Atlantic County Special Services, which is inapplicable to this matter.  In Warnig, the carrier paid med expense benefits to its insured who was operating a school bus and who was eligible for workers comp benefits.  The Court found that the Collateral Source Rule, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, did not apply to that claim as the payments were not made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 or 10.  (Da130 – Da138).