ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] While prescribing statewide minimum plea offers, these earlier Attorney General guidelines permitted each county prosecutor’s office to adopt its own written plea agreement policy to account for local concerns, caseloads, and enforcement priorities.  Some of these local policies included “standardized” plea offers that were significantly more stringent than the statewide minimums prescribed by the Attorney General.  In State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that allowing each county to adopt its own standardized plea offers and policies permits intercounty disparity, thus violating the dominant goal of uniformity in sentencing and threatening the balance between prosecutorial and judicial Page 2 Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) discretion that is required under State v. Vasquez.  The prior guidelines, the Court held, did not appropriately channel prosecutorial discretion, leading to arbitrary and unreviewable differences between different localities.  The Court held that to meet the requirements of the Vasquez line of cases, the Attorney General’s plea agreement guidelines for implementing N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 must be consistent throughout the State.  “Just as with sentencing guidelines under the Code, which guide judicial sentencing discretion on a statewide basis, prosecutors must be guided by specific, universal standards in their waiver of mandatory minimum sentences under the CDRA. ”  153 N.J. at 23.  The Supreme Court in Brimage directed the Attorney General to promulgate new plea offer guidelines that all counties must follow.
[brief] (Pa93).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on August 17, 2023.  (Pa93-96).  In that decision, the Board found that, although the Certification of Service and Final Salary dated December 9, 2021, by [...]’s former employer projected her service credit through January 28, 2022, she did not continue working and making pension contributions after October 22, 2021.  (Pa93-94).  As such, her actual service credit was nine years and ten months (or 118 months), which rendered her ineligible for group life insurance benefits for which ten years (or 120 months) of service credit is required.  Ibid.  Although [...] stated that she relied on the December 28, 2021 quotation of retirement benefits, which reflected ten years and one month of service credit based on information provided by her employer, the quotation itself advised her that it was prepared based on current available information from her employer and it was subject to revision and recalculation in the future based on new information.  (Pa94; Pa16).  Further, the Board did not reach the equitable principles argued by [...]; she argued that she was placed in a “[c]atch-22” situation because of the wrong information provided by her former employer.  (Pa94; Pa85-86).  The Board instead found that the two estimates dated May 25, 2021, had advised [...] that she would have less than ten years of service credit and would not be entitled to group life insurance benefits if she stopped working in September 2021.  (Pa94; Pa1; Ra1).  Further, [...] herself acknowledged in her appeal letter that she knew if she had stopped working in September or October, 2021, she would lack the required ten years of service credit to receive group life insurance benefits.  (Pa91).  As such, it was evident to [...] that she would lack the requisite ten years of service credit once she decided to take the unpaid leave (without salary or pension contributions) starting on October 20, 2021.  (Pa93-94).  Finally, the Board denied [...]’s request to purchase service credit as only active PERS members can purchase service credit under the clear language of the regulation, N.J.A.C. 17.2-5.1(a), and [...] was no longer an active member after her retirement became due and payable on March 2, 2022.  (Pa95-96).  Thereafter, this appeal followed.
[brief] (8T 7-3 to 13)  Dispatch provided a description of a subject wearing dark sunglasses, a dark wool hat, and had a beard.  (8T 33-25 to 34-2)  [...] testified that when he arrived at [...], [...] gave him this same description, adding that the suspect was wearing a white collared shirt and had a full beard (8T 35-22 to 25); however, [...] testified that he did not give any description to the police, but rather just gave the police his name and contact info and left to go to his next job.
[brief] Appellate courts do “not substitute their judgment for that of the trial court, unless ‘the trial court's ruling “was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”’”  *Kuropchak*, 221 N.J. at 385 (quoting *Marrero*, 148 N.J. at 484).  Generally, hearsay statements are inadmissible as evidence.  N.J.R.E. 802.  Certain exceptions to the hearsay rule apply, however, if a declarant is unavailable.  N.J.R.E. 804.  One such exception is an unavailable declarant's statement made “under belief of imminent death”—commonly referred to as a “dying declaration. ”  N.J.R.E. 804(b)(2).  Under this exception, “a statement made by a victim unavailable as a witness is admissible if it was made voluntarily and in good faith and while the declarant believed in the imminence of declarant's impending death. ”  Ibid.  When assessing the admission of a dying declaration, courts refer to: all the attendant circumstances . . . including [1] the weapon which wounded him, [2] the nature and extent of his injuries, [3] his physical condition, [4] his conduct, and [5] what was said to and by him.  Whether the attendant facts and circumstances of the case warrant the admission of a statement as a dying declaration is [a decision] . . . for the court.
[brief] The Eleventh Circuit’s decisions focused on whether the debt collector’s communication to the mail vendor was “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  After concluding that such a communication is facially made in connection with the collection of a debt, the court addressed the debt collector’s argument to the contrary.  The court rejected the argument that, to be in connection with the collection of a debt, the communication must include a demand for payment.  The court observed that, if a payment demand were necessary, then much of the section’s exceptions would be superfluous which would violate a “cardinal principle of statutory construction” to give meaning to every word.  *Hunstein I*, 994 F.3d at 1351.  A debt collector would not demand payment from a third party who is not alleged to owe the debt.  Thus, § 1692c(b) use of “in connection with the collection of a debt” includes communications other than one which demands payment.  If, instead, the phrase were limited to communications which demanded payment then debt collectors could disclose all sorts of private information about debts to anyone so long as they did not demand payment.  *Hunstein I* rejected the argument.  The court also rejected the argument that the practice of using mail vendors should be allowed because it is widespread and had not previously been questioned.
[brief] Plaintiff’s production includes merely 1-2 years of checks in 2016 and \textsuperscript{25}  Plaintiff’s reference to his answer in interrogatory number 24 that “Defendants repeatedly promised to pay plaintiff bu[t] did not do so.  They said that they had six years to pay him but have taken no action to do so since the hospital was sold" similarly misses the mark and highlights Plaintiff's inconsistencies.  This response does not identify any time periods when such “promises" were made and does not tie paying the plaintiff to the sale of the hospital.  2017, and completely omits any copies of checks in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, or 2018, which Plaintiff admitted he received and did not produce.  Additionally, Plaintiff admits that he did not provide any 1099 forms in his personal or business tax returns from 2011 through 2017, despite admitting having received a 1099 from [...] for each year, while also admitting “he was compensated pursuant to his President/Director Agreement” that was entered into in December 2012.  See Da67 at 34:6 – 35:21.  Plaintiff has been given all benefits and opportunity to provide support for his allegations and there simply is nothing to substantiate Plaintiff’s claims except for self-serving assertions.
[brief] (Pa141).  In March of 1996, a deed was executed and recorded conveying title to the Property to [...], the national religious organization that is one of the defendants in this litigation.  (Pa141; Pa179-Pa180).  The name of the grantee on the 1996 deed very closely matches the name of the national religious organization Defendant and it does not include the words “New Jersey” or the abbreviation “NJ”.  (Pa141; Pa179-Pa180).  Defendants firmly believe that the funds used to purchase the Property came from donations made by members of the [...] religion.  (Pa141).  The Plaintiff has also used the Defendant’s organization’s federal tax identification number.  (Pa141).  The [...], Inc. has paid expenses for the Property as well.  (Pa142; Pa182-Pa195).  The Plaintiff has also apparently paid certain expenses for the Property, but they have refused to provide supporting documentation to show the source of the funds used to pay those expenses.  (Pa142).  On March 25, 2021, a quitclaim deed (dated March 23, 2021) purportedly conveying the Property from “The [...] New Jersey, a NJ Non-Profit Corporation” to “The [...] New Jersey, a NJ Non-Profit Corporation” was recorded in the office of the Mercer County Clerk.  (Pa197-Pa201).  The grantor on the 2021 deed for the Property does not match the name of its record owner at that time, which was the Defendant national religious organization, the [...], Inc. (Pa142; Pa197-Pa201).
[brief] Subject to the rules of the [...] or other applicable arbitration rules, either party may consolidate an arbitration conducted under this Agreement with , any other arbitration to which it is a party provided that (1) the arbitration agreement governing the other arbitration permits consolidation; (2) the arbitrations to be consolidated substantially involve common questions of law or fact; and (3) the arbitrations employ materially similar procedural rules and methods for selecting arbitrator(s).  [...] § 6.3.5.1.  All three factors (the permission for consolidation, common questions of law or fact, and similar rules) must be present in order for the parties to consolidate claims arising under the [...] with another arbitration.
[brief] (Pa249; Pa333).  [...] had initiated disciplinary action against plaintiff on February 3, 2015, for [...]’s actions at the January 29, 2015, Rutgers Safe Drinking Water conference.  (Pa738-743).  The [...]’s EEO office conducted an investigation into [...]’s February 10, 2015 complaint and did not substantiate that either of [...]’s supervisors had engaged in age or gender discrimination.  (Pa857-867).  After [...] was cleared in the EEO investigation, plaintiff claims she retaliated against [...] in two instances.  (Pa252; Pa335; Pa254; Pa338).  First, he claims --- 4  The nature of [...]’s EEO complaint has been described at length in public filings.
[brief] Plaintiff relied on Willoughby v. Planning Board of the Township of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266, 277 (App. Div. 1997), in support of its argument that the extension of time should be granted “in the interest of justice. ”  (See Plaintiff’s Brief, beginning on page 41.)  [...] distinguished Willoughby and another decision which extended time, Concerned Citizens v. Mayor and Council of Princeton Borough, 370 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 139 (2004).  In [...], the court rejected the plaintiffs’ request to extend the time to challenge a zoning ordinance.  The complaint was filed on October 26, 2006, 406 N.J. Super. at 396, nearly two years after publication of adoption of the ordinance on December 31, 2004.  Id. at 391.  The court determined that the requested extension was not in the interests of justice.  In distinguishing Willoughby, the [...] court noted that unlike the facts before it, the Willoughby zoning ordinance challenge was “brought within a year after it was adopted” and not two years later, with the court expressing concerns about the adverse impact of the ordinance on the surrounding community and the public response to its adoption.  Id. at 400.  The [...] court similarly distinguished the Concerned Citizens decision because in the latter case, the challenge to the adoption of a redevelopment plan “was brought less than a year after accrual. ”  The court also noted the “numerous violations” of the LRHL in adopting the ordinance, and rejected the idea that public concern should be judged by the number of plaintiffs in a lawsuit.  *Id.* at 399-400.  Plaintiff herein sits in a position much more similar to the plaintiffs in *Willoughby* and *Concerned Citizens* than to the plaintiffs in *[...]*.  His Verified Complaint was filed less than ten months after the April 12, 2021, publication of notice of adoption of Ordinance 1394-20.  The complaint alleged violations of the LRHL and N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 in adopting the ordinance.  (Plaintiff’s Brief, Pages 35-36.)  Finally, adoption occurred during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, limiting public participation.  **POINT III**
[brief] [...] failed to recognize that the final judgment of divorce was premised on default - with [...] and his attorney having filed a “Request to Enter Default Judgment” against the absent wife, and [...] noting during March 18 default judgment hearing that [...] was in “default. ”  25T9:20-25.  [...] failed to apply governing law providing that "the opening of default judgments should be viewed with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end that a just result is reached."  Morales v. Santiago, 217 N.J. Super. 496, 501 (App. Div. 1987) (quoting Marder v. Realty Const. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1964), aff’d, 43 N.J. 508 (1964)).  [...] applied an opposite presumption in fact, stating at page 15 of his decision, “Our courts have repeatedly stated that matrimonial settlement agreements should not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed. ”  “[A party seeking to set aside a settlement agreement has the burden of proving extraordinary circumstances sufficient to vitiate the agreement,” [...] said (Op 15, A243).  [...] erred by failing to apply the far more liberal standard for granting relief from a default judgment.  Applying the more liberal standard further shows that relief should be granted to [...] in this case.
[brief] Initially, it should be noted that this matter originates from an alleged accident that took place on August 13, 2016, at the [...] in [...].  (Pa1a to Pa5a (*sic*)).  Although the true allegation continued to be vaguely pled initially, Plaintiff, [...], and her son, [...], counsel on this appeal and witness at the time of trial, alleged that the movie theater was too dark and as a result, Plaintiff was caused her to trip and fall causing personal injury.
[directive] a.  A sworn officer or employee of a law enforcement agency within the Board’s jurisdiction, or any person who has held such a position in the last five years; b.  A sworn officer or employee of any other state, county, or local law enforcement agency; c. A prosecutor or criminal defense attorney currently practicing in the county within the Board’s jurisdiction; d.  A relative of any of the aforementioned individuals, as defined in the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law at N.J.S.A. 52:13D-21.2(2)(d); e.  A current candidate for public office; or f.  With respect to Board membership, a current officer or employee of the municipality.
[directive] (b) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should be in position to allow sufficient time for deployment; (c) the supervisor must coordinate the efforts of all law enforcement units involved in the pursuit; (d) the communications operator shall notify all units of the location of the authorized tire deflation device deployment; (e) the officer operating the authorized tire deflation device should take a position of safety as the pursued vehicle approaches; (f) the officer shall deploy or activate the authorized tire deflation device immediately before the pursued vehicle arrives at the point where it would impact the device; (g) the officer shall remove or deactivate the device immediately after the pursued vehicle goes over the authorized tire deflation device; and (h) the officer should immediately notify communications if the pursued vehicle impacted the authorized tire deflation device, if the officer observed any signs of deflation, and the direction and operation of the pursued vehicle after the impact.
[brief] Amended Ordinance Sec. 900B and 902A are ultra vires on their face and void as an invalid exercise of the municipal zoning power.  See. *Berardo*, 476 N.J. Super. at 359.  On Motion, defendants did not allege plaintiffs required construction permits for the work.  Rather, defendants argued plaintiffs required a zoning permit, independent of a construction permit, to commence work on the walkways.  4T46 – 19 to 25; 47 – 1 to 8.  Defendants’ position is not supported by the zoning permit review procedures established by the Ordinance.  Plaintiffs-appellants did not require a construction permit for the work performed on the Property’s walkways.
[brief] An order on the parties’ respective motions for reconsideration was entered on June 6, 2023.  (Pa506).  The June 6, 2023 order directed plaintiff to pay the outstanding equitable distribution amount to defendant within 50 days.  (Pa506).  On June 26, 2023, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal (Pa1043) of four orders dated 03/01/2023, 03/15/2023, 06/06/2023, and an interlocutory order dated 04/08/2021 challenging various financial aspects of the judgment of divorce such as equitable distribution, alimony, [...] credits, counsel fees, and QDRO fees.
[brief] Cases 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 2023) ..................................................  10  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Institution, 127 N.J. Super. 479 (Ch. Div. 1974) ..................................................  20  Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Toft, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 820 (App Div. May 8, 2024).  .13, 14, 15 Bascom Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 363 N.J. Super. 334 (2003).................................................................  15  Berger v.  Paterson Veterans Taxi Serv., 244 N.J. Super. 200 (1990)................................................................. 15 Betancourt v. LVNV Funding LLC, 2:17-cv-00390-JMV-JBC (D.N.J.) ...................................................... 4 Burgos v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., et al., 3:17-cv-6121- PGS-TJB (D.N.J.) ...................................................... 4 Chernyakhovskaya v. Resurgent Capital Services L.P., 2:16-cv-01235-JLL-JAD (D.N.J.) ...................................................... 4 Citibank, N.A. v. Russo, 334 N.J. Super. 346 (2000)............................................................... 12, 13 Delgado v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2:18-cv-01521-KM-JBC (D.N.J.) ...................................................... 4 Diana v. LVNV Funding LLC, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241 .................................................. 23 Espinal v. First National Collection Bureau Inc., 2:17-cv-02833- WJM-MF (D.N.J.) ....................................................
[brief] There can be no question that New Jersey allows for the review of intercompany arbitration awards, subject to the specific limitations of the statutory language.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 et seq. and N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et seq. clearly manifest the legislative intent to allow for judicial review of alternate dispute resolution awards, including awards rendered based upon an agreement to proceed to alternate dispute resolution.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 et seq. specifically applies to alternate dispute resolution agreed upon in a contract.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et seq., adopted in 2003, repealed N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 through 2A:24-11 and applies to alternate dispute resolution resulting from arbitration agreements.  Arbitration, while a favored remedy, remains the result of contract and the question of whether a contract properly reflects the intentions of the parties and specifically, whether a particular dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement requires application of juris prudence and court intervention.  “In the absence of a consensual understanding, neither party is entitled to force the other to arbitrate their dispute.  Subsumed in this principle is the proposition that only those issues may be arbitrated which the parties have agreed shall be. ”  *Fawzy v. Fawzy*, 199 N.J. 456, 469 (2009) citing *In re Arbitration Between Grover & Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.*, 80 N.J. 221, 228-29 (1979).  In the same vein, a “court may not rewrite a contract to broaden the scope of arbitration[.]”  *Fawzy*, supra., citing *Yale Materials Handling Corp. v. White Storage & Retrieval Sys., Inc.*, 240 N.J.Super. 370, 374 (App.Div.1990).  There are many provisions N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et seq. which firmly establish that judicial intervention was an intended component of the legislation and as a result, judicial review of the intercompany arbitration awards at issue in this matter cannot be foreclosed\(^1\).
[brief] This matter arises from an alleged assault that occurred on or about May 21, 2022.  The plaintiff [...] asserts that her minor son, [...], was assaulted in part by defendant [...].  [Da1-Da29; Da93-Da124].  On or about January 2, 2024, defendant [...] pled guilty to aggravated assault in the 3rd degree as a pre-condition to be accepted into pre-trial intervention (“PTI”).  [Da223-Da256]  As part of that guilty plea, defendant [...] had to provide a factual basis for the charge of third degree aggravated assault.  [Da223-Da256]  On May 13, 2024, during the civil deposition of defendant [...], plaintiffs’ counsel sought to question and cross-examine him with statements made during the guilty plea.