ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Respondent’s assertion that the issue on appeal, namely, the applicability of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) in the context of Respondent’s OPRA request, is wrong and is belied by the record.  Simply reviewing the Township’s initial brief on the order to show cause as provided in Respondent’s appendix proves the inaccuracy of this assertion.  As found at Pa7, in response to the Plaintiff-Respondent’s multifaceted and evolving theories of relief, the Township plainly argued that N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) was not applicable.  In fact, it was the Plaintiff-Respondent that actually raised the issue requiring this response.  If the foregoing does not undermine the Respondent’s assertion, the Township responded to, and argued the inapplicability of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) in the following documents as found in the Defendant’s appendix: Da47-48; 52 (Oral argument before trial court); Da102-105 (Argument on remand reconsideration).  Respectfully, in its initial briefing to the Appellate Division under [...], the second point of the Township’s brief was addressed to the applicability of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b).  In short, the issue under review has in many respects been an issue of this litigation addressed by the Township.  The Respondent, as the Plaintiff below, brought affirmative claims against the Township and the Township responded to those claims and issues raised by the Plaintiff.  It was only after the prior appellate remand, and the trial court’s subsequent treatment and attendant legal conclusions reached on remand, that the issue sub judice matured.  Indeed, the Respondent’s own argument concludes that the prior remand returned the parties to the pre-decision status.  Pb. 3.  If this concept is accepted as true, then the Township could not be simultaneously prejudiced by having not raised the issue in the original litigation, at least from a logical standpoint as the Respondent suggests.  In short, there is no factual basis to assert that the issue of the applicability of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) was not raised or addressed by the Defendant Township throughout the entirety of the proceedings in this matter.  Moreover, even if such a perception exists, the matter on appeal is related to the Open Public Records Act and a custodian’s treatment of criminal investigatory records, which implicates the public importance of the issue.  It is well accepted that an issue that is jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicates a matter of public interest, it is reviewable even if not raised below.  See Finderne Heights Condominium Ass'n v. Rabinowitz, 390 N.J.Super. 154, 166 (App.Div. 2007).  For this reason, even if the Respondent was correct, the matter on appeal must be reviewed.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] I wholeheartedly agree with the statement that the [...] issued earlier this week, noting our “solemn responsibility” as law enforcement officers and reiterating our shared commitment to a culture of professionalism, accountability, and transparency.  As you know, earlier this week, I announced a number of additional reforms we will be implementing in the coming months.  These reforms build upon those announced last December as part of the “Excellence in Policing” initiative and are designed to strengthen New Jersey’s status as a national leader on policing practices.  Most significantly, we will be revising our statewide Use of Force Policy, which has not been updated in two decades.  I expect to codify these revisions in a Law Enforcement Directive before the end of 2020, and I look forward to consulting with all of you—and a wide range of stakeholders—during that process.  However, as protests continue to roil New Jersey and the nation, I feel compelled to reiterate a few of our existing policies and ask that you remind police departments within your jurisdiction to comply with these rules.
[brief] ”  (242T67:15-17)  [...] stole $50 million from their partners by, among other methods: (i) paying to themselves, or to one of their straw man entities, millions of dollars in bogus “fees” (25294a; 228T; 118T83:10-17; 118T82:22-83:6; 118T83:24-84:9; 118T55:14-20; 118T56:18-23; 118T120:13-18; 121T85:3-86:1-5; 129T108:17-109:10; 132T162:12-20; 132T156:12-17 and 89T228:16-19) 223T85:16-89:22; 228T5:6-7:10; 3558a and 15563a); (ii) charging the Project with salaries and benefits of [...] employees who rendered little or no services to the partnership (26602a; 224T79:12-80:2; 27932a; 27933a; 130T80:19-24; 142T77:15-18; 142T73:17-76:24; 102T82:2-17; (iii) causing the partnership to pay phantom “rent” to [...] affiliates (26779a; 8647a; 234T90:1-116:13; 129T142:7-24; 27929a; 26779a; 8647a; 223T99:14-100:6); (iv) paying to themselves hundreds of thousands of dollars in unauthorized “salaries” (34588a at p.18; 117T68:2-8; 117T73:18-74:1); (v) inflating the Project’s insurance costs and profiting therefrom (234T6:20-89:22; 237T19:10-20:18); (vi) charging phony “commissions” (124T17:3-19:12); (vii) charging to the partnership millions of dollars in fabricated loan “interest,” including on (a) “related party loans” which the [...]s advanced solely for the purpose of improperly funding payments to themselves, or (b) on fictitious “loans” which never were made (223T92:13-93:12; 122T57:3-6; 122T52:24-53:5; 9407a; 122T57:15-19; 120T143:24:144:4; 122T113:18-23 and 122T49:8-20),(224T9:2-24 and 224T19:9-17), (224T77:3-77:22);2 (viii) charging the partnership for advertising expenses incurred for the benefit of other [...] projects, and/or by pocketing discounts received from publishers on ads placed for and paid by [...] (224T80:3-81:6; 4321a; 122T72:20-73:4; 89T164:18-22); (ix) pocketing discounts received from the partnership’s vendors (89T128:9–129:19); (x) purloining fees paid vendors for the benefit of the partnership (235T25:3-31:6); (xi) engaging in “reclassifications” of expenses on the partnership’s books, and/or payments made to themselves or their affiliates, for the purpose of fraudulently concealing their defalcations (224T103:1-17; 2
[brief] The parameters of the SHO’s authority are set forth in Paragraphs (A), (H) and (L) which provide:  A.  [The SHO shall] [c]onduct a hearing on public notice as to all aspects of the Plaintiffs’ site plan application for the purpose of rendering a recommendation to the Court as to whether the Court should enter an Order and Judgment, approving, denying, or approving with conditions the site plan (and, as necessary, subdivision application); * * *  H.  The Special Hearing Officer shall conduct the proceedings in accord with the requirements of the [MLUL].  The Plaintiffs shall present expert testimony as they deem necessary to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs’ proposal meets sound land use planning principles and satisfies applicable environmental regulations.  The Plaintiffs shall present their testimony and evidence in support of their site plan, which may be subjected to cross-examination.  Following completion of the Plaintiffs’ testimony and evidence, the Township may present its response and testimony regarding the Plaintiffs’ site plan, which also may be subjected to cross-examination.  The public and all interested parties shall be allowed to comment on and/or present evidence and testimony either for or against the Plaintiffs’ site plan upon the conclusion of the Township’s presentation.  The Special Master shall participate in all hearings before the [SHO] and shall provide such planning review and testimony as may be deemed necessary by the [SHO].  The Plaintiffs shall identify all other Federal, State and ancillary governmental permits and approvals that are required for the Plaintiffs’ project, and the satisfaction of these ancillary permit requirements shall be a condition of any Order approving the Plaintiffs’ application; * * *  L.  Upon conclusion of the hearing, the [SHO] shall provide the Court, the Township and Plaintiffs with his recommendation as to whether the Plaintiffs’ site plan should be approved, denied, or approved with conditions in the form of a resolution.  Any comments or objections to the [SHO’s] recommendations set forth in the resolution shall be filed with the Court no later than ten (10) days from the date of the recommendation.  The [SHO] shall set forth such findings of fact and conclusions necessary, and appropriately summarize the evidence presented, so as to enable the Court to enter Judgment.  The Court’s Order as to the site plan (and, as applicable, subdivision) shall be considered a preliminary and final site plan (and, as applicable, subdivision) approval for purposes of filing an application for a building permit; * * * *
[brief] It is the core set of facts that provides the link between distinct claims against the same or different parties and triggers the requirement that they be determined in one proceeding.  See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 600–01(1969); Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 356(1961); Vacca v. Stika, 21 N.J. 471, 476, (1956); Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 488, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 835, 75 S.Ct. 58, 99 L.Ed. 659 (1954).  In DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267(1995) the Court held that a test for determining whether a litigant should assert claims in a suit, rather than save them in reserve for a later suit, is whether “after final judgment is entered, [the parties will] likely ... have to engage in additional litigation to conclusively dispose of their respective bundles of rights and liabilities that derive from a single transaction or related series of transactions. ”  Id. at 268; Archbrook Laguna, LLC v. Marsh, 414 N.J. Super. 97, 105–06(App. Div. 2010).  The factual basis of the Lease Litigation and the Instant Action pleadings are intrinsically linked by the same occurrence and facts.
[brief] The plain language of the Act and judicial decisions interpreting and defining its public policy simply do not require an employer to maintain insurance coverage for claims of intentional wrongdoing.  That is not what the Act says.  Moreover, New Jersey law has long favored insurance policy exclusions for claims of intentional wrongdoing.  Plaintiff’s suggestion that there is no empirical data to support such a public policy ignores the legion of judicial decisions handed down for decades in this state that have enforced such a public policy.  Plaintiff seeks additional compensation beyond what the Act provides because she believes that [...]’s injury was caused by intentionally wrongful conduct by his employer, and therefore, he was entitled to recover more than what the Act provides.
[directive] Domestic Special in Factors 4.6.2 in domestic acomplaint-warrant or acomplaint-summons for apply determining to whether In in consulted general attorney or prosecutor deputy or officer assistant police the cases, violence 3.3.2 give subsection shall to pursuant officer designated supervisory Section or with 3.2 accordance the to posed be risks would the that to relevant circumstances following the consideration to special acomplaint-summons: on released defendant be to were if victim of injury; such extent injury, the and of signs exhibited victim the whether 1) used; be to threatened or victim, was the against weapon used was of type any whether 2) restraining or final temporary a violated previously time any at has defendant the whether 3) the if acomplaint-warrant applying for of presumption (creating 4.5.2 a subsection cf order, condition), and release or order restraining of violation a in committed was offense present violation(s); such previous of seriousness and nature the for firearms that more or one possesses defendant the that believe to reason is there 4) of Prevention the to pursuant surrendered or seized be cannot reasons other or practical acomplaint-summons on custody from release defendant's the before Act Violence Domestic 42 Page or residence, such another arrest as of place the than other location firearm a at kept a (e.g., premises); or business an office to basis whether a is there determining in considered be shall circumstances foregoing The also See 4.3.1. subsection to pursuant issuing acomplaint-summons of presumption a overcome pretrial special more or one when acomplaint-warrant for application an (requiring 4.6.3 subsection assure reasonably to necessary are acomplaint-warrant on only can imposed be that conditions release victim).  violence of domestic safety a immediate the Seek and aComplaint-Warrant for Apply Must Enforcement Law Where Situations 4.6.3  Victims.  Domestic Violence Protect to Conditions
[brief] | | | Appellant’s *Motion To Alter and Amend Judgment* | Pa218 | | (file dated on November 07, 2023)  | | | Appellant’s *Motions for Disqualification* | Pa226 | | (file dated on November 26, 2023)  | | ### TABLE OF APPENDIX D | Document | Appendix Page No. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Respondents’ *Motion to Dismiss Exhibits A-L* | Pa234 | | (file dated on October 02, 2023)
[brief] ” (1T20-10 to 20; 1T39-10 to 12; 1T70-1 to 2).  After [...] made eye contact with [...] a second time, [...] drove out of the parking lot.  (1T20-20 to 24).  Believing he had observed a CDS-transaction between defendant and [...] based on his training and experience, [...] alerted other [...] members and officers on duty of his observations and requested the team stop [...]’s vehicle and approach defendant upon his leaving the [...].
[brief] Even if [...]’s father was empowered to authorize the search of the landlord’s surveillance cameras, his so-called consent was involuntary.  The record shows that [...]’s father adamantly refused to consent to search, telling officers: hell no.  . . .  No one’s searching my house. ”  (3T 29-22 to 23)  (emphasis added)  He repeatedly told the police he opposed any entry into the house.  (3T 29-17 to 30-5, 31-13 to 33-7)  It was not until after the police told him that the landlord had consented and that signing the consent form was “just a formality” that [...]’s father acquiesced.  [...]’s father’s change of heart after consistently refusing reflects how the officers coerced his involuntarily consent.  [...]’s father had made his position to the police clear not once but several times: he would not allow anyone to enter the house.  But the police did not relent; when [...] asked about entering the house to search the landlord’s surveillance cameras, [...]’s father said that the landlord would “probably” allow the search.  (3T 41-5 to 9, 112-9 to 18)  [...]’s father believed that, unlike a general search of the house, he did not have the right to refuse a search of the landlord’s surveillance cameras.  And he acquiesced only after the police told him that the landlord had already given consent.  Our Supreme Court has found that when one gives consent after initially refusing consent, this can indicate that the consent was involuntarily coerced.  King, 44 N.J. at 352–53.  By asking [...]’s father to sign the consent form after he so adamantly refused any police entry into the house, the police implied that the search was inevitable and that he did not actually have a right to refuse.  “[M]any people, if not most, will always feel coerced by police ‘requests’ to search. ”  Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 211, 221 (2001).  The “power relationships” in police interactions are “inherently coercive. ”  Id. at 242.  Using the landlord’s unproven consent, the police here coerced [...]’s father into involuntarily signing the consent form.  While the trial court found the landlord’s consent may have been a factor (4T 75-3 to 7), [...]’s father testified that the landlord’s consent was the reason why he acquiesced and signed the consent form.  (4T 49-4 to 15)  To [...]’s father, signing the form was, as [...] stated, “just a formality” because the landlord was not there to do so; he did not have any right to refuse.  (3T 47-5 to 48-6)  Therefore, the State cannot prove that [...]’s father voluntarily consented.  Because the State cannot prove that [...]’s father had common authority over the landlord’s surveillance cameras or that his consent was voluntary, his consent was invalid.  And because the State cannot prove that the consent exception to the warrant requirement applies, the evidence seized in the warrantless search of the landlord’s surveillance cameras must be suppressed.
[brief] 39  A)  [...] could have chosen to resolve this case, at no cost to itself whatsoever, but instead chose not to.  39  B)  The trial court did not weigh the reasonableness of the fees requested (other than the court’s extra-judicial impression that the total amount sought “seemed low”) – this fact is axiomatic from the transcript, as well as the fact that the total fee requested does not match the total stated in [...]’s own affidavit of service..  43  C)  There was no analysis for temporal limitation (other than the court’s unsupported notion that the case was frivolous from even before it was filed).  44  D)  There was no offset for the value of the car, nor for my sister’s settlement.  45  E)  [...] states that his services were “unbilled” - not “actually incurred”  46  4.  [...] should have been sanctioned, instead of being rewarded, for his atrocious mediation conduct, which unnecessarily escalated and magnified this simple small claims case into a major ordeal.
[directive] See Section 6.  In these cases, prosecutors are instead required to tender either a standardized “flat” (no parole disqualifier) offer or a standardized “open” offer (sentence to be determined in the discretion of the court).  It is expected that a significant number of low level school zone offenders will be eligible for one of these “standardized” plea offers and will be sentenced to a State Prison term without a period of parole or Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) ineligibility, a county jail term imposed as a condition of probation, or a noncustodial probationary sentence.  The revised Guidelines authorize a trial-proof downward “departure” ! based on the prosecutor’s assessment of the likelihood of obtaining a conviction at trial, rather than the limited “adjustment” that was authorized by the original Brimage Guidelines.  See Section 12.  A prosecutor using this downward departure feature is permitted to reduce a plea offer otherwise required by the Guidelines to any extent, and could even recommend a noncustodial sentence.  However, if the reduction based upon trial proof issues exceeds 6 months in the case of a fourth-degree crime, 9 months in the case of a third-degree crime, 12 months in the case of a second-degree crime, or 24 months in the case of a first- degree crime, the departure must be approved by a designated supervisor.  This downward departure feature may be used at any time and at any step in the graduated plea system (e.g., pre-indictment, initial post-indictment or final post- indictment ).  The preexisting downward adjustment for “complex and protracted litigation” has become superfluous and has been eliminated.
[brief] ”  Of note, neither the Respondent, nor the Court cited any OPRA case law which references the word “examination. ”  The Court below made the following record regarding the relief sought by the Appellant; “the physical examination…is not a records request.  Appellant provides no authority in either statute or case law for the extraordinary remedy she seeks…” (Pa152).  Appellant disputes this and counters this argument with a two-pronged analysis.  First, “the right to inspect and copy governmental records under OPRA is without limitation as to the reasons for which the access is undertaken. ”  See MAG, 375 N.J. Super at 546.  Appellant has consistently maintained this testing is in the public’s interest and is consistent with the legislative and executive intentions of OPRA and Executive Order 110 for government transparency.  Secondly, neither the Respondents nor the Court cited any reference to the use of the word “examination” as it pertains to OPRA requests.  As noted by the Superior Court, “In accordance with the wide-ranging mandate of OPRA for ‘further expansion of the public’s right of access,’ the government bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that a request should be denied or withheld under the statute.  Burnett v. Cty. of Gloucester, 415 N.J. Super. 506, 512 (App. Div. 2010). ”  In this case, the government has failed to state a proper denial exemption, and failed to address the meaning of the word “examination” as it applies to records under OPRA.
[brief] [...] fails to address the majority of factors relevant to the Court’s analysis of waiver—especially their filing of a failed dispositive Motion, their failure to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense, and their certification in their Answer that no arbitration proceedings were contemplated.  [...] fails to dispute that their Motion was procedurally defective.  Moreover, [...] fails to dispute that, in finding Plaintiff was equitably estopped from opposing arbitration, the trial court made no finding that [...] detrimentally relied upon the separate agreement Plaintiff had with Defendant [...] (“[...]”).  Notwithstanding the fact that [...] had executed a separate agreement with Plaintiff that failed to contain an arbitration provision, [...] argues that the trial court correctly ruled that they are able to compel arbitration through Plaintiff’s agreement with [...], despite [...] being a non-signatory to the same.  [...]’s arguments fail because the trial court’s December 12, 2023 Order granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration was based solely on intertwinement of Plaintiff’s claims against [...] and Plaintiff’s claims against [...].  However, as explained herein, intertwinement of claims (without proving detrimental reliance) is an insufficient basis upon which to compel arbitration through equitable estoppel.  Thus, Plaintiff submits her Reply to [...]’s Brief.  REPLY ARGUMENT POINT I.
[brief] 136 N.J. at 150-51.  But the Court went further, and “briefly address[ed] the issue whether his conduct sufficiently related to his office to satisfy the requirements of’ N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2.  Id. at 156.  It answered that question in the affirmative:  “The jury readily could have found that [[...]] purported to act not as a private citizen but as a state trooper in violation of’ N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2.  Id. at 157 (emphasis and brackets added).  In other words, the jury readily could have found as a fact that [...] knowingly exercised “police powers” when he did not have that right.  Its conclusion, that [...] knew he did not have the right to exercise police powers rested on the details of his suspension that the jury learned.  264 N.J. Super. at 421.  The same happened here; just like [...], defendant knowingly exercised police powers by identifying himself to others as a trooper, when he did not have that right.  That finding had to be made by the jury, so no error occurred in this division of responsibilities between the judge and the jury.
[brief] At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff failed to rebut the City’s motion with competent evidential material showing a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City had notice of the missing sign.  Plaintiff did not submit any evidence showing the City had actual notice that the sign was missing before Plaintiff’s accident or that the sign had been missing for long enough that the City should have discovered it.  Plaintiff relied only on a police report stating the sign was missing at the time of Plaintiff’s accident, and two work orders—one from over thirty days before Plaintiff’s accident and one more than ninety days after—showing the sign had been knocked down and reinstalled.  (Da76; Da181; Da183).  This evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had notice of the missing sign, and resulted in the trial court improperly speculating as to how long the sign had been missing.  See Carroll v. N.J. Transit, 366 N.J. Super. 380, 388 (App. Div. 2004); Knapp v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 123 N.J. Super. 26, 31 (App. Div. 1973).  At trial, Plaintiff similarly failed to present any evidence from which a rational juror could conclude the City knew or should have known the sign was missing based upon how long the sign had been missing.