ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A parallel doctrine governed law enforcement officers:  “At the time of the framing, it was understood that ‘when a warrant is received by an officer, he is bound to execute it,’ only ‘so far as the jurisdiction of the magistrate and himself extends. ’”  Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1116 (quoting 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 291) (cleaned up).  Indeed, “‘acts done beyond, or without jurisdiction,’ according to Blackstone, ‘are utter nullities. ’”  Id. (quoting Samuel Warren, *Blackstone’s Commentaries, Systematically Abridged and Adapted* 542 (2d ed. 1856)) (cleaned up).  Likewise, there existed an “historical prohibition on executing an arrest warrant outside of the arresting officer’s jurisdiction. ”  *Engleman*, 546 F.3d at 949.  Reviewing these legal traditions, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit summarized that, “[u]nder a historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment, the jurisdiction of the issuing judge and the executing officer is limited, and a warrant is not valid if an officer acts outside of that limited jurisdiction. ”  *Id.* at 948 (collecting historical cases); accord *Henderson*, 906 F.3d at 1116-17; *Krueger*, 809 F.3d at 1123-26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  Yet that circumstance is exactly what happened here: [...] officers—whose jurisdiction was limited to Toms River—took a search warrant authorized by [...]—whose jurisdiction was also limited to Toms River—and executed it in Lakewood.
[brief] (Aa8)  In late November, prior to expiration of the 45 days from the Notice of In Rem, [...] contacted the office of Plaintiff’s counsel.  He advised of his intention to redeem the tax sale certificate.  (Aa143 to144).  Within a week of the call to Plaintiff’s counsel, on the morning of December 2, 2022, [...] attended the office of the tax collector to inquire of the amount to redeem with the intention to redeem.  A staff member did not have an updated redemption statement and would not accept payment without first confirming from the Plaintiff the amount required to redeem.  (Aa144 to146).  The staff member informed Defendant that the Plaintiff had not paid the 4th quarter 2022 taxes, and would accept payment from the Defendant.  Prepared to redeem, [...], having the financial liquidity at the time, returned later in the morning and delivered a cashier’s check for $2,190.33 written on [...], for the 4th quarter taxes.  (Aa176).  Why would the Defendant pay the 4th quarter 2022 taxes were it not ready, willing, and able to redeem?  The Defendant, [...] left the tax collector office to await the tax collector’s call to advise when the updated redemption statement was received.  The call never came.  On December 9, Defendant returned to the municipal complex.  His purpose was to inquire if a redemption statement was received, so he could make redemption, and to meet with the tax assessor, at the Premises to review its condition and address the assessment.  The Defendant was not presented with a redemption statement or informed of the amount to redeem.  Though the funds were readily available to redeem.  The tax assessor’s observation confirms that demolition was done at the Premises in contemplation of its restoration.  The certification of [...], represents her independent assessment of the Premises.  (Aa185)  On December 22, 2022, the Plaintiff assigned its tax sale certificate to [...].
[brief] The proceedings involve an attorney fee complaint (Da-1) dismissed on October 2, 2019 because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under R. 1:20A-6 as the plaintiff failed to serve Pre-Action Notice and the order denied reinstatement.  Da-5  Over two years later, on March 22, 2022, the plaintiff filed to reinstate the dismissed complaint using a false certification of service addressed to an attorney who never appeared and an address plaintiff did not reside at (Da-7).  The defendant filed a letter brief opposition that the court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction and only a new complaint under R 4:67 could be filed and the plaintiff filed a reply brief.  On May 31, 2022, the court filed an order reinstating the complaint with a money judgment attached.  Da-11.  On June 20, 2022, the defendant filed for reconsideration.  Da-15.  After opposition and reply briefs were filed, oral argument occurred on September 23, 2022 (see transcript on file).  That same day the lower court denied reconsideration.  Da-16.  On November 7, 2022, a timely notice of appeal was filed, as shown on the appellate docket.
[brief] Responding [...] testified at trial.  He made observations as to the damage to the vehicles and the final resting points, and combined that with the statements he took from the 3 parties involved in the crash.  Morenski did not make observations of the points of impact as the accident occurred.  He did not take measurements, make speed estimations, or access any on board vehicle information.  At trial, the jury saw the photos depicting property damage to the vehicles, they watched the dash cam video, they heard and read from the admitted portion of the police report limited to what the parties told [...].  The Trial Court offered this explanation of the NJSP dash-cam MVR video with audio:  I watched it the first time without the audio, then I watched it a second time with the audio, and I thought it was going to be this constant stream of screaming and chaos and yelling, and it was none of that.  It is, in my mind, a little bit more controlled than I would have expected for that type of injury and that type of accident.  It was -- it was not shocking in my mind at all, and it was pretty controlled.  [1T16.]
[directive] Prior Sentences That Were Merged or Imposed on the Same Date  Prior convictions or adjudications of delinquency that were merged for 7(...continued) eligible offense), the prosecutor in resolving the matter by a negotiated agreement is strongly 2C:35-5 in addition encouraged to require the defendant to plead guilty to a violation of N.J.S.A. to if not in lieu of pleading guilty to the 2C:35-7.1 offense.
[directive] Limitations  Inherent in any survey are limitations that can impact data collection, interpretation, and analyses.  The AG SAFE survey closely followed the OLS survey on the same topic administered in 2019.  Some of the questions and response options were intentional duplicates of those used in the OLS survey.  However, the OLS survey and AG SAFE survey differ in several key ways.  First, the OLS survey focused on the number of kits and cases.  While some questions in the AG SAFE survey requested this information, the majority of the survey focused on policies and procedures governing the SART process.  This key distinction is why the results depicted within this report do not indicate evidence of a backlog.
[brief] In \textit{R. Wilson Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Wadman},\footnote{\textit{R. Wilson Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Wadman}, 246 N.J. Super. 615, 618-19 (App. Div. 1991).} the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff was liable for consumer fraud because plaintiff had no notice of the consumer fraud claim.  In that case, plaintiff filed a suit against defendant seeking recovery for an unpaid plumbing invoice.\footnote{\textit{Wilson} at 618-19.}  Defendant filed counterclaims based on the quality of plaintiff’s services.\footnote{\textit{Id.}}  “[Plaintiff] was not noticed that its conduct could be deemed violative of regulations implementing the Consumer Fraud Act and that it might consequently be held to treble damages and an award of counsel fees” because the consumer fraud claim was not included in defendant’s counterclaims.\footnote{78}{Id.}  Therefore, the court ruled that the trial court’s determination that plaintiff was liable under the consumer fraud act violated plaintiff’s due process rights.\footnote{79}{Id.}  In this case, the addition of [...] as a plaintiff after trial and after entry of judgment clearly violated [...]’s due process rights to defend himself against the claims of [...]
[brief] The Court also affirmed the Trial Court’s findings that the partnership and the related entities constituted a “racketeering enterprise” under N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(c), and that [[...]] had engaged in a conspiracy to violate RICO, which is unlawful under N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d). ”  As to [...]’s non-RICO claims, this Court affirmed the Trial Court’s determination that [...] violated their fiduciary duties, breached the Partnership Agreement, breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, committed common law fraud and engaged in acts of conversion.
[brief] It is undisputed that the Lease in the case at bar was prepared by counsel for the Plaintiff and not by any of the Defendants.  Deposition of Plaintiff 10:8-18.  Pa130.  Plaintiff also admits that the lease that was executed was the only draft of the Lease provided to the members of [...] and that there are no writings (including e-mails and texts) between the Plaintiff and any of the members of [...] regarding the terms of the Lease or the requirement of a personal guaranty that were exchanged prior to the execution of the Lease.
[brief] Respondent [...] joins in the Procedural History set forth in the initial brief of [...] except to add the following additional history.  [...] filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs on November 29, 2022, which action was docketed [...].  *(Pa270-Pa279)*.  After briefing, a remote oral argument was held on May 23, 2023 before the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C.  By Order and Opinion dated May 26, 2023, the Trial Judge dismissed the [...]’s complaint with prejudice.  *(Pa301-Pa313)*.  The Trial Judge’s opinion addressed the Zoning Board record, Robbinsville Ordinances SS 142-77 and 142-78, the Resolution of Approval and all issues raised in the [...] Complaint.  *(Pa311)*.  The Trial Judge found that the application was for a major subdivision and therefore the requirements of the Robbinsville Ordinances apply.  *(Pa311)*.  The Trial Judge further concluded that the Zoning Board record demonstrated that [...] submitted numerous reports, including an Environmental Impact Assessment, which were reviewed by the Zoning Board professionals *(Pa301-Pa311)*; the Board heard no contrary testimony, including on behalf of Appellant, to [...]’s presentation that the subdivision would not affect public health safety and welfare or on the environment (Pa312); and that while the MLUL and Robbinsville Ordinances require specific documents to be submitted, there is no requirement that the Zoning Board elicit testimony on topics that are not within its jurisdiction or pertinent to the application before it.  (Pa313).  The [...] filed a Notice of Appeal on June 27, 2023.  (Pa314-Pa321).  On November 15, 2023, [...] filed a motion to strike Point II of [...]’s brief.  [...] filed opposition on November 27, 2023.  On December 11, this Court denied the motion stating that the merits panel can decide the weight of the issues in the motion and address it on appeal.  (Da001).
[brief] On October 19, 2022, State Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s Order under Rule 4:42-2(b) – as did all the other defendants in this action.  (Pa1194-Pa1195).  The trial court held oral argument on December 19, 2022.  (3T).  At the beginning of oral argument, [...]’s attorney stipulated that the only claim [...] intended to pursue against State Respondents was the retaliatory harassment claim asserted in Count II of the Amended Complaint.  (3T48:1-22).  Toward the very end of the oral argument, [...]’s counsel also acknowledged [...]’s stipulation to the dismissal of her sexual harassment claim against [...] asserted in Count I of the Amended Complaint.  (3T72:9-73:6).  Following oral argument, the trial court issued an oral opinion and correctly applied the twelve-factor test set forth in Pukowsky, and concluded that [...] was neither an employer, nor joint employer, of [...].  (3T88:5- The trial court went on to dismiss [...]’s unpled public accommodation discrimination claim because [...] is not a place of public accommodation as a matter of law.  (3T91:21-92:6).  Since the trial court found that [...] was not an employee of [...], it did not address State Respondents’ other arguments as to why she had failed to meet her legal and factual burdens at summary judgment to prove discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under the NJLAD, and subsequently entered an order dismissing the entirety of [...]’s claims against State Respondents, with prejudice.
[brief] CONCLUSION ......................................................  29  | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **In re Accutane Litigation**, 235 N.J. 229 (2018) .................. | 19,20,28 | | **Adams v. Genie Industries, Inc.**, 929 N.E.2d 380 (N.Y. 2010) .......... | 9, 10 | | **Ahern v. Sig Sauer, Inc.**, 2021 WL 5811795 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2021) ........ | 15 | | **Anderson v. Nissan Motor Co.**, 139 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 1999) ................ | 16 | | **Andrews v. CBS Corp.**, 2015 WL 12831309 (D.S.C. June 24, 2015) ............. | 17 | | **Asby v. Medtronic, Inc.**, 673 F. Supp.3d 787 (E.D.N.C. 2023) ................ | 6 | | **Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.**, 2010 WL 3659789 (D.N.H. Sept. 14, 2010) | 16,23 | | **Bear ex rel. Bloom v. Ford Motor Co.**, 2007 WL 870344 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2007) | 18 | | **Beaver v. Pfizer, Inc.**, 2024 WL 234725 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 22, 2024) ........... | 25 | | **Beaver v. Pfizer, Inc.**, 2023 WL 2386776 (W.D.N.C. March 6, 2023), aff’d, 2023 WL 4839368 (4th Cir. July 28, 2023) | 25 | | **Est. of Benn v. Medtronic, Inc.**, 2023 WL 3966000 (D.N.J. June 13, 2023) .......... | 21 | | **Bentzley v. Medtronic, Inc.**, 827 F. Supp.2d 443 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ............ | 27 | | **Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co.**, 291 F. Supp.2d 1004 (D. Minn. 2003) ............ | 15 | | **Bossetti v. Allergan Sales, LLC**, 2023 WL 4030681 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2023) | 25 | | **Bottignoli v. Ariens Co.**, 234 N.J. Super. 353 (App. Div. 1989) .............. | 19 | Boyer v. Abbott Vascular Inc., 2023 WL 4269764 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2023) ...........................................
[brief] Fowler v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc., 251 N.J. 300, 323 (2022); State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Marlton Plaza Assocs., L.P., 426 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 2012).  “Nonetheless, not every improper jury charge warrants reversal and a new trial.
[brief] Id at 52-53.  Instead, the court relied upon Bauman to hold that the insured remained entitled to coverage for the claim against it.  "Clearly, [the insurer] did not provide the required notification here, despite several opportunities to do so."  Accordingly, the insurer could not change the policy "without specifically informing the policyholder of the change."  Therefore, the insured "was entitled to coverage and a defense."
[brief] THE JUDGE FAILED IN HER ROLE AS “GATEKEEPER” OF THE TRIAL WHEN SHE CONDUCTED AN INSUFFICIENT VOIR DIRE OF THE JURY WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT A STATE WITNESS, THE BROTHER OF THE DECEDENT, HAD SPOKEN TO SOME JURORS FOR FIVE MINUTES DURING A BREAK FROM COURT.  (RULING AT 7T 47-6 TO 49-10)  On May 2, 2022, after jury deliberation had begun, a juror reported that [...] -- a State witness and the brother of the decedent -- had approached some jurors during a break from trial and had a conversation with them.  Ultimately, after voir dire of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial (7T 45-20 to 47-5), and the trial denied the motion, finding nothing untoward had occurred.  (7T 47-6 to 49-10)  Because, in fact, the decision on that motion was informed by jury voir dire that was insufficient to deal with the issue, the judge failed in her role as “gatekeeper” of the trial, and defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and his corresponding state-constitutional rights were all violated.  Consequently, defendant’s convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] As just one example of many, given the Decedent’s other assets, it defies common sense that Decedent would pass away without a checking account, a savings account, or a brokerage account.  Yet, Defendant has provided Plaintiff with no information as to any such assets, all of which would be required to be disclosed in an accounting.  During the hearing at the return date of the Order to Show Cause, Defendant made the representation to the court that there are no funds remaining in the Estate.
[brief] A1268 [[...]+3], Higher education institutions-prov., class 4A commercial property transferred, excess of $1M-elim 1% tax on purchaser A3007 [[...]/[...]+12], Higher education institutions-prov., students w/access to mental health care prog S1871 [[...]/[...]+1], Veteran of US or organized militia misrepresentation-upgrades certain crimes S2544 [[...]/[...]], Low and moderate income housing-expands financing opportunities S2807 [[...]/[...]], Defense Against Porch Pirates Act; amends theft statute S3127 [[...]/[...]+3], Higher education institutions-prov., students w/access to mental health care prog S3490 [[...]/[...]], Class 4A commercial property transferred, excess of $1M-elim 1% tax on purchaser S3801 [[...]/[...]+2], Employing persons w/developmental disabilities allows credit against CBT & income tax liabilities S3847 [[...]], Nursing asst., certified-estab. program; prov private duty svcs to cert Medicaid S4062 [[...]/[...]+2], Motor veh reg fee for veteran-exempt honorably discharged & released from pymt S4231 [[...]/[...]], Deer fencing on certain farmland-creates program in Department of Agriculture S4244 [[...]], Superintendents of weights and measures, certain-concerns appointment S4245 [[...]], Special education due process petitions-extends filing time period, COVID-19 S4263 [[...]], HMFA loans-concerns distribution standards, housing projects during st of emerg S4272 [[...]], Funeral, burial, crematory services-suppl. approx. increase in Work First-$8M S4273 [[...]/[...]], Foreclosure Counseling Fund-establishes S4300 [[...]], Plumbing subcode-prohibits certain changes S4301 [[...]], Duct cleaning-includes as maintenance work subject to the prevailing wage THURSDAY, JANUARY 6, 2022 (continued)
[brief] This provision requires disclosure of competent and admissible evidence.  Moreover, this provision and the remainder of R. 4:10-2(d)(1), incorporating R. 4:17-4(a) and requiring production of all the entire reports and a certification that no other reports, written or oral, are known to that party, were intended “to correct abuses which heretofore existed under R.R. 4:25-2 (report of physical and mental examination) * * *.  [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment to R. 4:17-1 at 577.
[brief] *State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 386 (N.J. 2015)*  (“A person charged with a criminal offense has the right to confront his accusers.  U.S. Const. amend. VI. ”)  The municipal judge also erred when she found probable cause to arrest before reviewing the video and my accusation on what the officer did wrong.  (4T:38-(7-15)  Even if she did ultimately go back and review the video, which I’m not convinced she did, this clearly shows that the judge had prejudice.  How can you make a legal determination, that has the potential to ruin someone’s life, without properly and thoroughly reviewing all evidence and accusation?  This prejudice shows that the judge thought that the officer’s word is absolute and untaintable.  4T:38-(7-15)  The municipal judge also confusingly stated, "that the officer did everything correctly and I have no reason to believe that he didn’t, that he did note the defendant did not maintain in his lane properly"  5T:12-(5-8), even though she acknowledged that he did not do everything perfectly 5T:8(19-25), 5T:9-(1-4).  Also, the superior court found that I did not commit the motor vehicle violation of 39:4-88 failure to maintain my lane.  (Da 1a)  The municipal judge also mistakenly believes that State v Tischio, “allows the court to use a refusal as prima facie evidence towards someone’s guilt for DWI because there is an understanding that if they’re refusing, then that automatically means they’re trying to avoid detection. ”  5T:11-(7-15).  That is not what State v Tischio says.  In fact, State v Tischio doesn’t talk about refusing other than some citations because the person in that case did not refuse.  The person in that case blew a .10.  What State v Tischio said was, State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 526 (N.J. 1987) (“I should think we could accommodate the words the legislature used and what the Court sees as the legislative intent by making a more-than-.10% reading prima facie evidence, rather than conclusive proof, of a violation while driving, provided that the reading is obtained, as in this case, within a reasonable time after the arrest. ”)  I also vehemently reject the comments by the judge that I was belligerent and not cooperative with the police before the arrest.  Body cam very clearly shows on the contrary.  Its shows I was very cooperative.  Legal Argument – Point 6 -
[brief] Ja67-68.  The AIF and the subscriber do not possess common interests or control/ownership.  See CURE v. Sherrod Vans, Inc., 2013 WL 3820937, n.1.  The subscriber’s rights and obligations are: a) statutorily prescribed; and b) clearly set forth in the POA, a form which is filed with the Department and which the Department repeatedly reviews.  N.J.S.A. 17:50-3.  Only the subscriber and the AIF are parties to the POA; the Exchange (i.e., the entire collective group of subscribers itself) is not a party.  *Id.*  The POA must be signed and executed by each individual policyholder, as the exchange is a product of individual contracts executed by the AIF and the policyholders.  *Id.* at -7.  The AIF does not have control over the terms of a reciprocal exchange, as evidenced by the fact that policyholder’s signature is required.  *Id.*  If the individual subscriber does not agree to the POA/AIF Fee, he/she is free to decline coverage and seek insurance from another carrier.  *Id.*  No AIF, including [...], can unilaterally increase or agree to increase the AIF Fee.  *Id.* at -3, -7.  The individual subscriber, not the exchange, pays the AIF Fee to the AIF after signing the POA.  *Id.* at -7.  The AIF Fee is a percentage of each individual subscriber’s premium as a fee for managing the reciprocal exchange.  *Id.*  In some situations, the exchange simply collects and forwards the AIF Fee to the AIF; effectively acting as a passthrough clearinghouse.  The individual subscriber and the AIF remain independent.  *Id.*  The AIF cannot unilaterally increase its fees.  *Id.*  Therefore, the AIF’s financial incentive is simply to make the reciprocal exchange grow so the AIF can make profits.  See *Delos v. Farmers Group*, 93 Cal App. 3d 642, 652 (4th Dist. 1979). ⁴  The only way to grow a reciprocal exchange is to provide --- ⁴  The Court can take notice of the operations of reciprocals as stated in other judicial opinions, congressional and NAIC hearings.  N.J.R.E. 201.  *Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc.*, 261 N.J. Super. 126, 131-32 (App. Div. 1992).  better service or better rates than the competition.  *Id.*  Both of these motives align with what a policyholder wants—better service and better rates.  Ja67-68.