ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There, the Court held that “voters, to exercise their franchise, must comply with a statutory requirement to do more than merely write the name of the candidate, whether the additional action is making a specific mark, as in Keogh-Dwyer, or punching a hole, as in the present case. ”  Id. at 559-60.  In that case, the Court upheld the rejection of three write-in ballots cast for a candidate not on the ballot where the voters’ intent was clear, there was no question of fraud, but the voters failed to follow the instructions which required them to write the candidate’s name and punch the ballot card.  The Supreme Court held that “[t]he legislative mandate is clear” governing the process for casting machine write-in votes.  Id. at 558.  The Court held that “[B]ecause the regulation of elections is exclusively a legislative matter, courts, even when they question the wisdom of legislation, must respect the legislative scheme. ”  Ibid.  There, machine ballots were rejected for failing to comply with the election regulatory scheme as set forth by the legislature.  Thus, the Court reaffirmed that election laws require more than simply indication a preference; they require adherence to prescribed procedures designed to ensure consistency, efficiency, and integrity in ballot counting.  Adherence to these procedures also eliminates the need for subjective, ballot-by-ballot inspections, enabling accurate and efficient calculation of electronic ballots.  See id. at 560.  In sum, there is a consistent line of case law affirming that even in the absence of fraud, double voting, or foul play, courts have upheld the rejection of ballots that fail to comply with mandatory provisions of election law.  The principle is clear: where the Legislature has established specific requirements, those requirements must be strictly followed.  Accordingly, this Court should adhere to that well-settled precedent, recognize the mandatory nature of the statutory provisions at issue, and void the improper write-in votes.
[brief] In Appendix D to the Award, the arbitrator identifies the salary cost in the 12 months prior to the expiration date of the contract, 7/31/2019, as $13,868,112.37.  (Aa172).  In the first year of the awarded agreement (8/1/2019-7/31/2020), where the arbitrator awarded a zero (0%) percent salary increase, the cost out calculated by the arbitrator is $10,327,228.10.  This is a decrease of $3,540,884.27 from the expiration year (August 1, 2018-July 31, 2019).
[brief] (5T 126-23 to 127-15, 142-11 to 15, 143-16 to 24)  An air embolism would cause death more quickly than a hemorrhage.  (5T 144-4 to 8)  [...] testified that generally, when someone is stabbed in the jugular vein, the bleeding is primarily external, so if someone were stabbed in a car, he would expect there to be a lot of blood.  (5T 129-18 to 130-8)  Over defense objection, the State showed [...] pictures of the Toyota 4Runner, and he opined that these pictures were “not consistent” with “someone being stabbed in the backseat of that vehicle” because “there’d be a lot more blood” than what the pictures showed. \(^3\) (5T 137-1 to 23, 139-4 to 7, 139-14 to 23, 140-1 to 14)  The State used [...]’s testimony about the crime scene photos to try to discredit [...]’s testimony that she stabbed [...] in self-defense in the car.
[brief] Da323  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Opposition to Motion to Bar and In Support of Cross-Motion Filed 07/28/21 .................................................................  Da325  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Opposition to Motion to Bar and In Support of Cross-Motion Filed 07/28/21 .................................................................  Da327  Exhibit A  [...] preliminary review 12/29/20....  Da331  Exhibit B  [...] Cost to Cure Estimate 04/21/21  Da336 Exhibit C  Defendant’s Appraiser’s Supplemental Report Dated 07/28/21 .................................  Da340 Exhibit D  Vibrations Monitoring Pre-Construction Inspection 09/07/18.................................  Da344  Exhibit E  [...] Cost Proposal Dated 07/24/20....  Da321  * * *  Supplemental Certification of [...], Esq.  In Further Support of Motion to Bar Filed 08/02/21 ..............  Da363 Exhibit 1 Verified Complaint ...........................................  Da1 (form of)  Order to Show Cause Filed 9/24/18..................................................  Da370  Case Information Statement Dated 09/05/18..................................................  Da373 Exhibit 2 Order to Show Cause Filed 09/24/18.  Da375 Exhibit 3 Order for Payment into Court and For Possession Filed 9/24/18  .........................  Da379 Exhibit 4  Order for Judgment and Appointing Commissioners Filed 11/21/18 ...............  Da29 Exhibit 7  Amended Verified Complaint Filed 08/02/21..................................................  Da86 Exhibit 8  Plaintiff’s Certification of [...], Esq. Filed 07/08/20 .............................................  Da382  Exhibit 13  Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Extension of Time and For Other Relief Filed 12/03/20 .................................  Da102 Exhibit 14  Plaintiff’s Notice of [Cross]  Motion to Bar Defendant from Providing Experts at Trial And Certification Filed 12/10/20......  Da115 Exhibit 15  Order (inter alia, Denying Expert Fees) Filed on 01/08/21 ............................................. Da154  VOLUME III (Da390 to Da521)
[brief] At the outset, that is not impeachment material.  A not-guilty verdict does not equate to false testimony.  As this is the same exact information that already was presented to the jury – that [...] had testified for the State in other cases a multitude of times – this evidence is also cumulative as well, and does not constitute a Brady violation.  “Evidence that is merely cumulative does not create a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been affected. ”  *Carter*, 91 N.J. at 114.  Moreover, there is no evidence that the State suppressed anything.  Indeed, whatever the State could acquire, the State provided.  Moreover, the trial court made an explicit finding that “I commented many times through the case that [the State] had gone above and beyond in providing the information he had to by the Attorney General’s Directive. ” (36T:43-22 to 25).  Thus, there is no basis for any of defendant’s arguments, and there was no Brady violation.
[brief] THE COURT:  The—in the first count, plaintiffs identify three ways in which defendants allegedly breached their duty to defendants allegedly breached their duty to… [plaintiffs], and failed to meet the standard of care required by those engaged in the legal profession.  Reviewing each of those, it's—again, as I said, it's clear to the court that they do not fall within the common knowledge exception.  (1T:32:18-25; 33:1.)  Also, the trial court stated as follows concerning plaintiffs’ claims pertaining supervision of the attorney trust account:
[brief] On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Middlesex County  Sat Below: Hon. [...]  J.S.C.  Trial Court  Docket No.: Docket No. [...]  [...], D.C., [...], [...], D.C., [...], M.D., [...], ESQ., [...], D.O., D.C., [...], D.O., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...], D.O., [...], D.O., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...], M.D., Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Several federal courts have held that where, as in [...]’s case, a state expert witness testifies regarding crucial medical or scientific evidence, the need for defense counsel to consult with an expert is underscored.  As noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, “[a]lthough it may not be necessary in every instance to consult with or present the testimony of an expert, when the prosecutor's expert witness testifies about pivotal evidence or directly contradicts the defense theory, defense counsel's failure to present expert testimony on that matter may constitute deficient performance.
[brief] (1T 93-9 to 94-3)  The detectives repeatedly urged him to help himself, stating, “You gotta tell your story before it’s just too late”; “you don’t wanna help yourself.  So you may not be going home”; “Don’t sit here and waste people time.  They trying to help you.  So help yourself”; and “It’s your opportunity, [...].  There’s so much we can do” -- but he again did not respond.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE USE OF VENDOR TO PRINT LETTERS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FDCPA**  Plaintiff’s theory of recovery argues that the mere transmission of her debt information by [...] to a mailing vendor violates the FDCPA, a statute that was enacted to curb “abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection practices” while also insuring that “debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged. ”  *Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt.*, 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2008).  As will be discussed below, since the Trial Court’s decision rejecting Plaintiff’s theory, numerous other New Jersey courts, including the Appellate Division, have held that the use of a mailing vendor does not violate the law.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the decisions rejecting Plaintiff’s theory have all carefully interpreted the FDCPA by looking at, among other things, the language of the statute itself, the FDCPA’s statutory scheme as a whole, and the FDCPA’s legislative history.  These cases also correctly identified fatal defects with Plaintiff’s unsupported assumption that a mailing vendor constitutes a “person” and that transmission of data constituted “communications in connection with collection of a debt” under the FDCPA.  As will be explained below, these decisions are directly on point and this Court should adopt their reasoning and affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  A.
[brief] I, ¶ 9 | 34 | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10 | 7, 9, 14, 15 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 14, 15 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 7, 9, 14, 15 | | Other Authorities | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------|-----------| | [...], A Plague of Prisons: The Epidemiology of Mass Incarceration in America 116 (2011) | 47 | | [...], N.J. Spotlight, Law Enforcement, Addiction Services Forge New Alliance to Help Drug Offenders (June 28, 2018) | 47 | | Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Robbery in the First-Degree (N. J.S.A. 2C:15-1)” (rev. Sep. 10, 2012) | 21, 30, 32 |  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)  PAGE NOS.  Other Authorities (Cont'd)  [...], Neurobiology of Addiction, in Pocket Guide to Addiction Assessment and Treatment 5 (2016)  ..................................................47  [...], Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction 5 (2007)  ...........................................................................................................  46  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: ___/s/ [...]___  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 063222014  Dated: May 4, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...] , Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County.  Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. and a Jury.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] ” ([...] Reply Br. 46-47).  See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 506 (1974); Lautek Corp. v. Image Bus. Sys. Corp., 276 N.J. Super. 531, 551 (App. Div. 1994).  This distinction matters.  Liquidated damages, the defendants correctly explain, are a specific amount of money that a party to a contract agrees to pay if he or she breaks some promise.  They are the product of a negotiated good faith estimate in advance of the actual damages that will likely ensue from the breach.  E.g., Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 453-54 (2013).  A liquidated sum, by contrast, is a broader phrase referring to specific amounts found to be due and owing pursuant to a contract.  The liquidated sum need not be the product of a specific contractual liquidated damages provision, as is evident from the decisions in both *Rova Farms* and *Lautek*.  In both of those cases, the courts concluded that interest was due because the claims were for liquidated sums that were readily calculable or ascertainable, not because the subject contracts contained liquidated damages provisions.
[directive] Nombre y apellido de la persona bajo libertad a prueba:  Número de la causa: Probationer Name: Docket Number: Condiciones especiales / Special Conditions  También debe cumplir con las siguientes condiciones especiales de libertad a prueba impuestas por el juez de acuerdo N.J.S.A. con 2C:45-1 et seq.: N.J.S.A.
[brief] The answer is no, but more importantly for purposes of this appeal, the answer must be concluded by a trier of fact, not by a Court granting summary judgment.  As already stated, Appellant was effectively terminated immediately following her protected whistleblower activities, and Appellee cannot prove otherwise.  Nobody ever contacted her to return to work in January of 2020.  [...] testified that it was multiple individuals’ responsibility to contact her, but that nobody did.  These are the same individuals to whom Appellant made whistleblower complaints, as well as some whom she reported for misconduct.  When Appellant contacted human resources, it could provide no explanation as to why she was not restored to the work schedule.  When Appellant spoke with [...], a supervisor, he ignored her complaints of retaliation, and neglected to ever put her back on the schedule.  Eventually and after another two months, the COVID-19 pandemic onset, and Appellant self-disclosed that she could not return to work.  However, based on [...]’s testimony, she should have been automatically terminated at this point anyway.  There is a question of fact as to whether Appellant was terminated in January of 2020.  Appellee cannot provide any evidence whatsoever that it ever contacted her to return to work, even though Appellee’s own employee testified she should have been contacted.  The record establishes that Appellant eventually contacted a supervisor in February of 2020, and after stalling a week to get back to her and ignoring her complaints of retaliation, the supervisor never put Appellant back on the schedule.  Appellee may attempt to argue that she Appellant was still in “active” status in its computer system until May of 2020.  But at most, this presents a question for the fact finder, not the Court, to determine whether to believe the electronic or paper status maintained in Appellee’s system, or the practical reality of Appellee never bringing Appellant back to work.  Accordingly, the lower Court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of Appellant’s wrongful termination.  As set forth above, the record contains ample support for a fact finder to establish causation and that Appellant was subjected to multiple adverse employment actions, ultimately culminating in wrongful termination.  Appellee’s summary judgment argument below ignored all of the above evidence that supports causation.  However, the record as set forth above provides clear evidence of causation.  Accordingly, the lower Court’s decision, in granting summary judgment, should be reversed, and this matter remanded.
[brief] ‘Rule 4:9-1 requires that motions for leave to amend be granted liberally’ and that ‘the granting of a motion to file an amended complaint always rests in the court’s sound discretion. ’  (citation omitted)  That exercise of discretion requires a two-step process: whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would be futile.  Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490 (2005)  [...] had a legal duty to preserve whatever logs it reviewed in making its determination that there were no errors in the operation of the Theater Management System software that automatically control the level of the ceilings lights during the playback of commercials ads, movie trailers, and the movie itself on the movie screen in Auditorium 5 on August 13, 2016, the date on which the plaintiff fell and injured herself in Auditorium 5.
[brief] Had the court considered the relevant statutes governing whether a psychological examination was necessary, it would have ordered one.  Indeed, such an evaluation is not just mandated under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-6b but also is a necessary exercise of the court’s discretion under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6c, due to the overwhelming evidence that [...] suffered from mental illnesses that may have contributed to the offense.  The PSR indicates that [...] has post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) from childhood trauma, manic bipolar disorder, depression and anxiety; received psychological treatment for three months from January to April of 2019; attempted to commit suicide twice, once by cutting himself and another time by jumping off a building; was discharged from the military due to his mental health issues; had previously been the subject of more than one mental health evaluation (none were produced for sentencing); previously took medication for his mental illnesses; and completed counseling while incarcerated to deal with his anger and mental illnesses.
[brief] In a moment when [...] could have agreed with [...]’s substantive argument that the new claims were barred as a result of the dismissal of the prior claims, [...] did not agree with [...].  Instead, [...] implicitly expressed agreement with Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary.  In [...]’s conclusion, which the Trial Court entirely ignored in its erroneous reasoning, [...]’s implicit agreement became unequivocally explicit when she stated the following:  When I balance that prejudice against these defendants and their interests and their right to have this case expeditious – expeditiously decided, to have this case expeditiously go to trial, which already has not been too expeditious, balanced against the interest of the plaintiff in this case, which would not be foreclosed from bringing these claims, they would just have to bring it in a different procedural posture, the Court is not persuaded that allowing an amendment to the complaint at – complaint at this late stage of the case when we have a trial date looming in March would not be in the interest of justice to the parties in this case at this point.
[directive] [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  1.  Você entende que em decorrência da sua declaração de culpa por  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (Indicar os crimes violentos de primeiro ou segundo grau) / Crimes) (List First or Second Degree  Violent você será obrigado a servir 85% da pena imposta para este(s) crime(s) para ser elegível à liberdade condicional por este(s) crime(s)?
[brief] During the time of school closures, school districts had to immediately pivot to operating and educating within a remote business model that it never faced in the history of compulsory education.  School districts, such as the Board who is responsible for 27,000+ students, were still required to feed its students two to three meals a day, ensure that every student had the proper technology and Internet service for remote instruction, comply with special education students’ IEPs, and expend unbudgeted resources caused by the pandemic.  The Legislature thus created emergency legislation to address the challenges.
[brief] Anthony, 237 N.J. at 233-34.  Moreover, under the pre-Anthony/Henderson framework, defendant made the threshold showing for a Wade/Henderson hearing based on “the inherent suggestibility of a showup ....”  Wright, 444 N.J. Super. at 357.  It is well established that “one-on-one showups are inherently suggestive .... because the victim can only choose from one person, and, generally, that person is in police custody. ”  State v. Herrera, 187 N.J. 493, 504 (2006).  In Herrera, a pre-Henderson case, the Court held “that standing alone a showup is not so impermissibly suggestive to warrant proceeding to the second step. ”  Ibid.  “Our law has permitted ‘on or near-the-scene identifications because they are likely to be accurate, taking place ... before memory has faded and because they facilitate and enhance fast and effective police action and they tend to avoid or minimize inconvenience and embarrassment to the innocent. ’ ”  State v. Jones, 224 N.J. 70, 87 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Herrera, 187 N.J. at 504).  “[H]owever, only a little more is required in a showup to tip the scale toward impermissibly suggestive. ”  Herrera, 187 N.J. at 504.  Here, even though, as the trial judge found, the showup was conducted within fifteen to thirty minutes of the incident, the record is incomplete as to the pre-identification dialogue between [...] and [...], a requirement under Rule 3:11 and Delgado.  It appears that the trial judge did not have a copy of the worksheet at the time of the motion and thus there was no record of any pre-identification instructions.  Further, even if the judge had the worksheet, and although the officer checked the box indicating he instructed [...] that the actual perpetrator may or may not be in the showup, [...] testified at trial that the officer told him “we're going to see if we can recognize a person who is, like, a suspect. ”  See Jones, 224 N.J. at 87 (noting statements by police identifying witness as a suspect can bear on suggestiveness of a showup).  The Wade/Henderson hearing requested by defendant would have provided him with “the opportunity to attempt to secure the information denied to him by the Delgado violation,” namely, the full dialogue between [...] and [...], before, during, and after the identification, including whether the officer referred to defendant as a “suspect. ”  State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 54 (2019).  As a result, we remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing to allow defendant the opportunity to explore the issue of suggestiveness in the showup process and for the appropriate remedy for the Delgado violation.
[brief] [...] was clearly misled by those misrepresentations when decided the motion to set aside the PSA as demonstrated above.  Plaintiff’s attorneys violated the RPC 3.3 by failing to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting an illegal, criminal or fraudulent act by the client. \(^{33}\)  Plaintiff’s attorneys failed to take any of the remedial actions to correct the material representation before [...] issued his ruling in setting aside the PSA.  The Courts punish the parties who committed fraud upon the court by dismissing the action, because “fraudulent conduct did not simply impact the tainted evidence, the damages trial, or the adversarial proceedings as a whole – it represented a direct and brazen affront to the judicial process.
[directive] and  on  As noted above, applications for downgrade or waiver of Graves Act mandatory parole ineligibility terms shall be governed by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 and State Nance, v. supra.  1  The directive was later updated to require that any deviation must accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 1981 be in 6.2, regarding waivers, and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.3, which provided for review of existing custodial sentences effect in at the time that the waiver statute was enacted, thus giving those inmates the opportunity to request to be resentenced.