ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] State v. Burns, 444 S.W.3d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) .............................................67  State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 2022), modified, 252 N.J. 497 (2023)  ..................................................................................................44-45  State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482 (2018)  .......................................................................6  State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008) ..............................................................................6, 7
[brief] Defendant’s argument that [...]’s limited expert testimony about the location of defendant’s cell phone on the night and early morning hours of the victim’s death was properly admitted.  [...] provided a plethora of testimony about the evidence he extracted from [...] and [...]’s phone.  He then was appropriately qualified without objection to testify as an expert witness in the area of cellphone mapping and cell phone forensics and offered limited testimony about the approximate location of defendant’s cell phone at 11:04 p.m. on September 17, 2019, and 2:25 a.m. on September 18, 2019.  His testimony did not violate the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1 (2023), and given the plethora of evidence presented by the State, its inclusion was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] (Pa1-15).  [...] later filed an addendum to the complaint to request a hearing and to include an additional exhibit.  (Pa16-17).  [...], [...], and the [...] opposed [...]’s OTSC, arguing that [...]’s complaint suffered from several procedural and substantive deficiencies, including that [...] could not obtain relief under OPRA or the common law because her OTSC and verified complaint were filed outside the statute of limitations and, having not submitted any of the requests at issue, she lacked standing to sue for denial of requests.  In an attempt to cure her procedural deficiencies, [...] submitted her first OPRA requests to the [...]’s and [...]’s custodians of records on December 15, 2022, which asked to conduct DNA testing on the Lindbergh evidence.  (Pa66; Pa78-83).  Both requests were denied.  (Pa80; Pa83).  While [...] later argued that her December 15, 2022 requests had cured all of the procedural deficiencies, she never moved to amend her complaint to include these OPRA requests and denials.  (Pb5; Pa66; Pa142; 1T7:6-20; 1T33:1-21; 1T35:8-22; 1T36:18-23; 1T37:19-21).  D.
[brief] This is not a case where [...], as a non-client, was relying upon any advice and counsel of [...].  Cf., *Estate of Albanese v. Lolio*, 393 N.J. 355 (App. Div. 2007); *Banco Popular, N.A. v. Gandi*, 184 N.J. 161 (2005).  Rinaldi served [...] with the Probate pleadings.  The retainer letter signed by [...] was not signed by [...].  Under the circumstances, [...] and his firm did not owe a duty to [...] Miranda.  Accordingly, the Order of [...] granting partial Summary Judgment of September 14, 2022 should be affirmed because (a) there was no --- ¹
[brief] (Pa67).  The court ordered the return of the funds and weekend commitment to coerce compliance.  (Pa73).  [...] fled the country and remains a fugitive. Sipko, 251 N.J. at 176.  [...] chose jail over compliance and, after weekend commitment proved insufficiently coercive, his commitment was increased to full-time (which was stayed for two years during the height of the pandemic).  (Pa200; Pa201).  [...] has filed appeals and serial motions in all levels of courts.
[brief] Inside these bags and this vehicle, [...] located, among other items, Ronsonol lighter fluid, lighters, CO2 cartridges boxes of Daisy, Bear River, and Premier BBs, and loose BBs.  (13T:192-1 to 199-14; 14T:8-18 to 29-13).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DETECTIVES APPROPRIATELY RESPONDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUESTS FOR LEGAL ADVICE
[brief] As discussed in appeal number [...], the second action resulted in pre-answer dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e), “with prejudice,” based upon the prior pendency of this action, even though [...] had been dismissed from this action “without prejudice. ”  plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, Pa3298 (4)  Order filed 4-5-2022, granting defendant [...]’s motion to dismiss; along with Order filed March 7, 2022, vacating the March 3, 2022, declaratory judgment  Order rendered against [...], Pa3389 (5)  Order filed 4-5-2022, dismissing defendant [...] from the first amended complaint, Pa3419  The Panel should reverse and remand because the motion judge misunderstood the nature of the solar energy business and substituted the court’s mistaken, narrow views regarding ownership and value in the components of the solar-energy business.  Ultimately, because the motion judge disregarded significant fact issues, rather than submitting the case to a jury for determination of the pivotal, disputed facts, the dismissals were erroneous.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[brief] "Bare conclusions in the pleadings, without factual support in tendered affidavits, will not defeat a meritorious application for summary judgment."  *United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n*, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399-400 (App. Div. 1961).  Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Lee v. Brown, supra, 232 N.J., 126.  ARGUMENT POINT I:
[directive] 6.  The relative needs of the law enforcement agencies involved:  in a  Generally, these needs are not be a factor calculating to -  In contributive share. an unusual case involving a particularly large - in forfeiture, however,,$is would become a consideration order to law in assure that forfeited assets are fact used enhance to Attorney enforcement efforts  The General, chief law enforcement as of or officer the State, prosecutor, as chief law enforcement the officer of a county, should, in making a decision distributing forfeited take of property, into account the needs the law enforcement agencies within his jurisdiction.
[brief] For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and seven months past the statutory deadline of the Ricci Act should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Dated: June 28, 2024  July 11, 2024  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex 25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey
[brief] The matter was heard by the Honorable [...], P.J.M.C., hereinafter referred to as the Municipal Court, virtually via Zoom on March 23, 2022.  (T2).  The State was represented at that hearing by Municipal Prosecutor [...], hereinafter after referred to as the Municipal Prosecutor  After some introductory comments by the Municipal Court, Defense attorney [...] made oral argument to the Municipal Court in support of the Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea. (T2:4-2 to 12-18).  The Municipal Prosecutor then offered oral argument in opposition to Defendant’s Motion.  (T2:12-22 to 14-19).  Thereafter ensued an exchange between the parties wherein the Municipal Court asked questions of the Defense attorney, the Defense attorney made additional legal argument in reply to same, and the Municipal Prosecutor also weighed in with additional legal argument.  (T2:14-20 to 21-25).  The Municipal Court then set forth its rationale in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea. (T2:22-1 to 23-8).  (DA5).  Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Ocean County Law Division on April 7, 2023.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff/appellant [...], Esq. respectfully requests this appellate tribunal to reverse the six final post-remand pre-answer pre-discovery orders, to remand this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action back to another trial court judge and to grant such other relief that the appellate tribunal deems just and equitable.  Dated: January 8, 2024 /s/Jeffrey S.  Feld [...], Esq.  (018711983)
[brief] New Jersey has adopted the “rule of reasonableness” to govern nuisance claims predicated on conduct related to surface water movement.  Under that rule, a possessor of land “incurs liability when his harmful interference with the flow of waters is unreasonable” and “causes some harm to others. ”  Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 327 (1956).  “The issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness becomes a question of fact to be determined in each case upon a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm which results, the purpose or motive with which the possessor acted, and all other relevant matter. ”  Id. at 330.  A land possessor may not “alter, by artificial means, the natural discharge of the surface water from his land on that of his neighbor, by conducting it into new channels in unusual quantities to or on a particular part or parts of the latter’s land, to its injury.
[brief] Respondents’ Participation In Local Political Organizations Does Not Violate Section (e).  Finally, Petitioner argues that several board members violated section (e) because they were involved in a grassroots organization called [...].  According to the Complaint, [...] is an organization that was formed to keep a “walkable” school within Lambertville.  (32a.)  Petitioner also alleges that the members of the Board who reside in Lambertville have violated section (e) because -- as Petitioner alleges without any supporting proofs -- these Board members seek to place Lambertville’s interests above those of the other constituent municipalities within the District.  Even assuming these allegations are true, Petitioner does not allege that Respondents made a “personal promise” by joining these organizations, nor are there any pleaded facts explaining how membership in these organizations can be considered “private action” that might compromise the Board.  At best, they are nothing more than bald speculation based on little more than Respondents’ lawful and constitutionally-protected membership in local organizations.  Even putting aside that these allegations do not state a claim under section (e), they are absurd on their face.  Apparently, Petitioner believes that school board members cannot participate in any form of political action or other group, or represent the interests of the municipality in which they reside.  By this logic, school board members could be prohibited even from belonging to political parties or engaging in political activity protected under the First Amendment.  In essence, Petitioner wishes to create a rule in which elected officials cannot engage in any form of politicking or political action.  The absurdity of that position is self-evident and requires no further comment.  IV.
[brief] Initially, [...] agreed, but once he started receiving communications from [...] about memorializing the deal, [...] noticed that they had been drafted by an attorney that [...] engaged ([...] learned that [...] subsequently terminated his lawyer’s services).  [...] then reached out to an accountant acquaintance, [...], who referred him to an attorney.  (5T111:23 to 113:11).  [...] provided the attorney’s name to [...] so that counsel could assist in the contract drafting.  (Pa120).  However, [...]’s attorney played no role in negotiating the purchase price for the deal.  (5T113:18-22).  To memorialize their agreement, [...], [...], and their wives executed two documents.  The first was a Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) made on December 5, 2014 by which [...] sold his [...] interest to [...].  (Da904-19).  The second was a Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (“MIPA”) made on the same date, and by which [...] sold its interest in [...] to [...].  (Da947-67).  The purchase price reflected in the SPA for [...]’s interest in [...] is not the $1.6 million previously discussed and agreed upon, but, rather, $740,000.
[brief] **[...] made Material Misrepresentations and Fraudulently Induced Plaintiff**  A misrepresentation amounting to a “legal fraud” is a “material representation of a presently existing or past fact, made with knowledge of its falsity and with the intention that the other party rely thereon, resulting in reliance by that party to his detriment. ”  Jewish Center of Sussex Cty. v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624, (1981), citing Foont–Freedenheld v. Electro–Protective, 126 N.J. Super. 254, 257, (App.Div.1973), aff’d 64 N.J. 197, 314 A.2d 68 (1974).  Non-disclosure of material facts can be a form of misrepresentation where the defendant has concealed a known fact that is material to the transaction, and there is a duty to disclose likely material contingencies.  *McConkey v. AON Corp.*, 354 N.J. Super. 25, 47 (App. Div. 2002).  “However, a false representation of an existing intention, i.e., a “false state of mind,” with respect to a future event or action has been held to constitute actionable misrepresentation. ”  *Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor*, 530 F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (D.N.J. 1982) (citing *Samatula v. Piechota*, 142 N.J.Eq. 320, 323, (Ch.1948).  Fraud in the inducement does not differ materially from common law fraud, as it provides a cognizable basis for equitable relief in the event a false promise induced reliance.  See *Lipsit v. Leonard*, 64 N.J. 276, 283-84 (1974).  Common law legal fraud requires: (1) material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.  *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, 288 N.J. Super. 504, 535, (App. Div. 1996), aff’d as modified, 148 N.J.  582, 691 A.2d 350 (1997).  Here, [...] made several material misrepresentations that went well beyond “puffery” and directly related to the policy and procedures of the School of Pharmacy.  First and foremost, Defendant [...] misrepresented the requirements related to opting-in to the dual degree program, with the intent to lure incoming students into the unaccredited School of Pharmacy.  As previously stated, [...] promised, “Students who are accepted to the School of Pharmacy with a baccalaureate degree will be provided the opportunity to complete a master’s degree in conjunction with the Doctor of Pharmacy.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY DENIED [...]’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE COUNTERCLAIMS IN RESPONSE TO [...]’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT  BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE COUNTERCLAIMS DIRECTLY RELATE TO WHETHER THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO [...] WAS VALID AND CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH.  (Da4)  Rule 4:67-4 states that “[n]o counterclaim or cross-claim shall be asserted without leave of court. ”  It is well-settled that the entire controversy doctrine requires that the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation, in only one court.  See Levchuk v.  Jovich, 372 N.J. Super. 149, 154 (Law Div. 2004).  “Accordingly, all parties involved in the litigation should, at the very least, present in that proceeding all of the claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy. ”  Id., citing Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 15 (1989); Kopin v. Orange Prod., Inc., 297 N.J. Super. 353, 374 (App. Div. 1997).  “The confluence of goals created by the concept includes encouraging comprehensive and conclusive determinations, avoidance of fragmentation, and the promotion of party fairness and judicial economy. ”  Levchuk, 372 N.J. Super. at 154, citing Bonaventure Intl., Inc. v. Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420, 440 (App. Div. 2002).  Rule 4:30A states that “[n]on-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine…”  The intent of this rule is to “maintain the requirement that a party must join all relevant claims against an adversary in one action, when those claims are related to and part of the same underlying controversy. ”  Id.  Rule 4:30A remains dependent upon the fundamental requirement of fairness.  “Acting in congruence with the inherent requirement of fairness is the principle that preclusion under the doctrine is a remedy of last resort. ” (Emphasis added).  Levchuk, supra, 372 N.J. Super. at 155.  Here, [...] presented sufficient facts to demonstrate genuine disputes of material fact relating to the marketing and sale of the Subject Property by [...] and Mr. Paone.  The claims raised in the counterclaims directly relate to the claims presented to the Court by Mr. Paone in his application for an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint.  The Court’s denial of [...]’s request to file counterclaims has resulted in a deprivation of his right to fairness and equity.  The Court’s denial has resulted in preclusion of his viable claims relating to the wrongful sale of his property to Monteiro and that such sale was contrary to the settlement Consent Judgment entered into by the property owners on April 13, 2022.  For these reasons, as well as those set forth in detail on Point I above, the Court’s Order denying [...]’s motion for leave to file counterclaims should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
[brief] I have no interest in the outcome of this matter.  And there’s no other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing or which, again, might lead either counsel or the plaintiff to conclude that I am not fully impartial.  I do not know [...].  I do not know the Rutherford officials.  I do not certainly know the chief of police.  And I do not know defendant’s counsel.  I have no connection at all to this matter.
[brief] Sec. 246-5.  5  "A combination of materials to form a construction for occupancy, use or ornamentation, whether installed on, above or below the surface of a parcel of land, including among other things buildings, stadia, reviewing stands, platforms, stagings, observation towers, radio towers, tanks, trestles, open sheds, shelters, fences over six feet in height and display signs."  Sec. 246-5. argument: because other properties along [...] and [...] are "are pretty much built up to the property line," that supposedly justifies development within the "pretty well established prevailing setback for all the existing structures in this area."
[brief] The charge on “intentional and wrongful” as opposed to “aggressive and misguided” conduct within the scope of employment was proper and not capable of producing an unjust result.  The trial court properly instructed the jury:  “When an employee’s conduct, however intentional and wrongful, originated in his effort to fulfill an assigned task, then he’s acting within the scope of his employment. ”  [11T 169:12-19].  Plaintiffs contend it was error to use the words “intentional and wrongful” as opposed to “aggressive and misguided,” and rely on that phrase’s use in Davis v. Devereaux, 209 N.J. at 303, as cited by this Court for the proposition that intentional harmful conduct may, in limited circumstances, fall within the scope of employment.
[brief] ”  See Lechler v. 303 Sunset Ave. Condominium Association, Inc., 452 N.J. Super. 574, 585-86 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting N.J.S.A. 46:8B-14(a)).  A condominium association has “a statutory duty to maintain the common areas, including a duty to identify and correct dangerous conditions, and that duty extend[s] to residents of the condominium building”  *Lechler*, 452 N.J. Super. at 577.  The duty “applies not only to the original construction but also to the condition of the premises thereafter and imposes upon the landowner a duty to discover its actual condition and to make such repairs, furnish such safeguards, or give such warnings as may be reasonably necessary.
[brief] Id.  This was appealed to The Court of Errors and Appeals which affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision.  Thus, the rule of law in Westfield can be summarized as follows: first, if a pole location existed prior to 1903, the Town may not prohibit the continued existence of a pole at that location.  Second, if a pole did not exist prior to 1903, the Town can prohibit an electrical utility from placing a pole at a particular location.  And third, whether or not the pole location existed before or after 1903, *the size, scope, and height of any replacement pole can be regulated by the Town, subject* only to the requirement that the Town’s regulation not eviscerate the essential purpose of the pole and therefore the property right of the utility.
[brief] Chiron at 1130 (the FAA “‘leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed. ’”) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (emphasis in original)).  Accordingly, the FAA compels this Honorable Court to affirm the Trial Court's Orders compelling arbitration.  Likewise, the New Jersey Arbitration Act (hereinafter "NJAA"), codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, provides that "[a]n agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."
[brief] Defendant and [...] stopped at a country club in New Jersey before they were stopped by the [...].  [4T135-6 to -9].  Defendant was very nervous and jittery during the stop.  [4T135-13 to -14].  [...] was also concerned because she knew there was a large quantity of drugs in the car.  [4T135-18 to -24].  [...] gave a full statement to the police because she did not believe she had anything to hide.  [4T136-15 to -24].  The drugs in the car were not hers.  She had never possessed such a large quantity of drugs or US currency.  On cross-examination, [...] stated that she was already a heroin user when she met defendant.  She did not know how much drugs defendant had in his possession but knew they were illegal when she agreed to accompany him.  She could not read his ledger and did not know what the entries meant.  She agreed that the bag was at her feet at the time of the motor vehicle stop.
[directive] weapon, assault an is or defaced, stolen, is firearm seized for applying from prosecutor a preclude to construed be Directive this shall in anything Nor not information when bycomplaint-summons charged previously offense for an acomplaint-warrant of initial the time the at general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant or officer the to known the protect to reasonably necessary are- conditions release pretrial that decision indicates charging when court in appearance defendant's assure reasonably the to community, the or victim a of safety criminal justice the obstruct to attempting or obstructing from defendant the prevent to or required, while conduct defendant's to, limited be not need include, but might information new  Such process. acomplaint-summons. on release on seek shall prosecutor subsection, a this of purposes the achieve to appropriate necessary and If complaint- superseding for apply a and bycomplaint-summons charged counts more or one dismiss to warrant.  32 Page Initially from Different Charges Are Filed Charges Actually Procedures When 4.2.
[brief] In Alston, this court said, "The most important factor is the presence of a continuing state of excitement that contraindicates fabrication and provides trustworthiness . . .  A spontaneous declaration will be admissible, even if not concomitant or coincident with the exciting stimulus provided that in the light of all the circumstances it may be said reasonable that the exciting influence had not lost its sway or had not been dissipated in the interval."