ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] To accomplish the designation process for purposes of these Guidelines, a prosecutor must provide the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice with a letter that specifically describes the boundaries and locations of the Special Enforcement Zone.  A map depicting the zone should be appended.  The prosecutor’s letter should describe the nature of the drug distribution problem within each zone and should document that the designation by the county prosecutor was made in consultation with the local police department.  The letter should also explain the steps that were taken to solicit the views and opinions of representatives of the communities and neighborhoods where these zones are located.  These procedural safeguards are designed to ensure that this aggravating factor is not applied in an arbitrary or capricious manner; these procedural requirements are thus designed to comply with the Supreme Court’s requirement in Brimage that any consideration of local (as opposed to statewide) conditions be “explicitly detailed”  Page 71 Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) and “precisely and distinctly enumerated. ”  State v. Brimage, supra, 153 N.J. at 24 (1998).  The Attorney General’s Model Quality of Life Program is designed to focus law enforcement and prosecutorial resources and attention on specific neighborhoods and locations, sometimes referred to as “hot spots,” where drug distribution activity is open and notorious.  Accordingly, prosecutors are not authorized pursuant to these Guidelines to designate an entire county or municipal jurisdiction.  Nothing in these Guidelines, however, should be interpreted in any way to limit Special Enforcement Zones to open air locations, and certainly, these Guidelines should not be interpreted to mean that these zones can only be designated in urban or inner city locations.  Rather, any and all unabated drug nuisances could be designated as Special Enforcement Zones, including buildings and adjacent areas where drug buyers and sellers congregate to engage in unlawful activity.  By way of example, a bar, club, restaurant, or other establishment that caters to persons who routinely congregate to buy, sell, or use so-called “club” or “party” drugs such as “Ecstasy, GHB or GBL” are appropriate locations for designation as Special Enforcement Zones.  10.1.2
[brief] Importantly, the POS also evidences the fact that the SPA was in fact negotiable, stating at page 83:  “The terms of the sale and other provisions of an actual Subscription and Purchase Agreement entered into between the Developer and any given Purchaser may vary. . . based upon negotiations between the parties. ” (Da 655) (emphasis added).  Appellants have never conceded that the contract is a “consumer agreement” comparable to the kind in Atalese or its progeny.  In fact, it is the converse, diametrically unlike the boilerplate, verbose, protracted, form contracts that are not “understandable to the reasonable consumer. ”  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 444 (2014).  And unlike Atalese, this contract, as required by a regulatory scheme, provides the backdrop for the parties’ transaction.  See New Jersey Condominium Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 et seq.; PREDFDA, N.J.S.A. 45:22A-1, et seq.; N.J.A.C. 5:26–1.1 et seq.  And Respondents were fully familiar with this type of heavily regulated real estate transaction having purchased two (2) condominium luxury units a month and a half prior in Jersey City.
[brief] Ibid.  In the five years that have now elapsed since the Conditional Judgment was entered, [...] has never proposed a realistic alternative to Block 610, Lot 1.  By simply vetoing the only proposal ever selected—for which the Redeveloper purchased property at the Borough’s direction to accommodate it—[...] will succeed in ensuring that the affordable housing is never built.  It has not approached the Special Master, Implementation Monitor, or FSCH to fix an alternative site for the Off-site units.  It apparently has not undertaken a search for available, developable land.
[brief] On the brief: [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | TABLE OF ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | FACTUAL BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | I.  Respondents’ Complaint Against [...] (1a – 23a) | 4 | | II.  [...] Complaint Against Respondents (61a – 72a) | 4 | | III.  [...]’s Prior Representation Of Respondents In The [...] And [...] Matters (141a – 158a) | 5 | | IV.  Respondent’s Motion To Disqualify [...] (102a – 201a) | 6 | | V.  *In Camera* Review Of The Certification (T23:21-25) | 8 | | VI.  Appellate Procedural History | 9 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 10 | | I.  De Novo Review | 10 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 10 | | I.
[brief] 15  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, & RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order denying motion to withdraw from guilty plea................................Da 75  Opinion denying motion to withdraw from guilty plea  ..........3T 26-21 to 52-10  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Mercer County Superseding Indictment [...] ................................Da 1-13  Mercer County Indictment [...] ..................................................Da 14-25  Order granting and denying suppression motion in part..............................  Da 26  Opinion granting and denying 404(b) motion in part ...............................Da 27-53  Plea agreement .........................................................................................Da 54-60  Pennsylvania nol pros order and underlying Information .........................Da 61-62  Judgment of Conviction, Indictment [...] .....................................Da 63-66  Judgment of Conviction, Indictment [...] ......................................Da 67-70  Order dismissing Indictment [...] ....................................................Da 71  Motion to withdraw from guilty plea .........................................................Da 72-74  Order denying motion to withdraw from guilty plea.................................Da 75
[brief] Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.50C, “Informed Consent (Competent Adult and No Emergency)” (rev. Apr. 2002).  This approach will allow New Jersey courts to continue pursuing the objective of protecting “each person’s right to self-determination in matters of medical treatment. ”  Id. (citing Matter of Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 347 (1987)).  Neither patients nor the public benefit from pre-suit arbitration agreements in medical malpractice cases.
[brief] 38 N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(b) ......................................................................................... 36, 38 P.L.1983, c. 111 (C.40A:4-35.1) ..................................................................  21 Rules R. 4:46-2 ..........................................................................................................  15 R. 1:7-4(a) .........................................................................................................................  44 R. 1:36-3.............................................................................................................................  40  Regulations  40 C.F.R. 141 ....................................................................................................................  4  40 C.F.R. 141.203 ..............................................................................................................  6  40 C.F.R. 141.205 ..............................................................................................................  6 N.J.A.C. 7:10–5.1..................................................................................................................  5 N.J.A.C. 7:10- 5.5(2)a5.....................................................................................................  5 N.J.R. 437(a), 437 (April 1, 2019) ..................................................................................  6 N.J.R. 1939(a) (September 4, 2018) ..............................................................................  6
[brief] (6T 51-1 to 16, 76-13 to 21)  “The use of these databases, particularly large ones, may increase the risk of a false identification because they may contain hard-to-distinguish CNM prints. ”  Ibid.  A study of close non-match comparisons found a false-positive error rate of 15.9% in one set of prints and 28.1% in another.  Id. at 131.  Concerningly, “[d]atabase simulations show that the number of [close non-matches] increases faster than the chance that the suspect print will be in the database. ”  Id. at 132.  In other words, the risks of false positives cannot be mitigated by expanding the pool of latents available for comparison.  Such an expansion actually increases the risk of false positives.  Other than the use of a database, discussed further in subsection B, infra, many factors impact the accuracy of a particular fingerprint analysis.
[brief] The Atalese arbitration clause is readily distinguishable from the one at bar.  “Nowhere” in the Atalese clause was “there any explanation that plaintiff [was] waiving her right to seek relief in court for a breach of her statutory rights. ”  Id. at 446.  Furthermore, “[t]he provision [did] not explain what arbitration [was], nor [did] it indicate how arbitration [was] different from a proceeding in a court of law.  Nor [was] it written in plain language that would be clear and understandable to the average consumer that [plaintiff was] waiving statutory rights. ”  Id.  Here, among its first few sentences, the Clause clarified that arbitration is a “dispute resolution process that does not involve a judge or jury.
[directive] Administrative Office of the Courts  [...], J.A.D. Acting Administrative Director of the Courts Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex • P.O. Box 037 • Trenton, NJ 08625-0037 njcourts.gov Tel: 609-376-3000 Fax: 609-376-3002 • • DIRECTIVE #08-21 [Supersedes Directive # 04-12 and TO: Assignment Judges Supplement (re JOC); Modifies Directive # 03-13 and Supplements (re PSI) Trial Court Administrators FROM: [...], J.A.D. SUBJ: Criminal/Family/Municipal - Sealing of Certain Marijuana or Hashish Records Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2
[brief] Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J. Super. 38, 45 (App. Div. 2001).  As to Lieutenant [...], again the interrogatories do not allege he retaliated in any way.  The allegations are limited to hostile work environment claims, which have already been dismissed and would be time-barred if not dismissed.  Lt. Guidi denies any retaliation or playing any role in Plaintiff’s transfer from OPS.  (Pa157-158).  \(^2\)  Plaintiff has not set forth what she claims the “retaliation” to be other than her transfer, but any “retaliation” prior to the same is time-barred as it would have taken place more than one year prior to this lawsuit being filed.  Plaintiff claims Captain [...] was “instrumental” in having Plaintiff transferred from OPS to the Police Academy but provides no support for the belief (or that he had the authority to transfer Plaintiff).  The entire claim is apparently based on a comment that Plaintiff might enjoy working with [...], who was a friend.  McIntrye denies having any role in Plaintiff’s transfer.  (Pa159-160).  Finally, as to Major [...], Plaintiff claims he allowed his subordinates transfer her to the Academy.  Again, “allowing” a transfer to take place does not amount to retaliation under CEPA.  Major Baldosaro was transferred to OPS shortly prior to Plaintiff’s transfer to the Academy.  As is set forth in his certification, as a Major he was given the courtesy of selecting his own Assistant Administrative Officer (“AAO”).  He elected to do so and [...] filled this position.  Plaintiff had no absolute right to remain the AAO when a new Major was assigned to OPS.  (Pa161-162).  B)  [...]  Lt. Col. [...] never actually worked at OPS or with Plaintiff.  However, he acknowledges that he is the person who transferred Plaintiff and had the right and obligation to make personnel decisions as he felt appropriate.  Plaintiff alleges he refused to meet with her to discuss the transfer.  Whether or not this is true, it does not support a CEPA claim.  Lt. Col. Ebner’s reason for making the transfer are clearly non retaliatory and set forth in detail.  (Pa163-164).  Plaintiff does not, and cannot rebut, any of the reasons set forth in Mr. Ebner’s certification as to the decision to transfer her.  She may have “preferred” to stay at OPS but that does not create a “retaliation” because she was transferred anyway.  C)  [...], [...] and [...]  Finally, Sergeant First Class Pommerencke, Lieutenant Palovcak and Captain.  Hengemuhle all come into the picture after Plaintiff was transferred from OPS.  Again, the allegations are vague but these claims seem to allege hostile work environment as opposed to retaliation.  (Pa165-170).  As such, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate plain error in [...] granting Defendant’s motion without providing Plaintiff with the opportunity to respond which she now seeks.
[brief] In the instant case, the court denied the plaintiff's request to amend her complaint to include a count for fraudulent concealment because it deemed the proposed amendment futile under the facts of the case as gleaned from the parties' certifications, the case of Notte v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Company, 185 N.J. 490 (2006), and the case of Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal Associates, 154 N.J. 437 (1998).  (T:54:9-11)  The main issue in the Notte case was whether the plaintiff's proposed amended complaint was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations but could be saved under R. 4:9-3, the "relation back" rule.  The main issue in the Kernan case was nearly the same, that is, whether the plaintiff's proposed amended complaint adding new parties was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations but could be saved under R. 4:9-3.  It is respectfully submitted that the court's reliance on the Notte and Kernan cases was misplaced since there is no statute of limitations problem with the plaintiff's proposed amended complaint.
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-53(j), relied upon by the trial court, provides that a municipal governing body may in some cases be deemed “to accept dedication for public use of streets or roads”.  “Public use of streets” does not necessarily intend ownership or maintenance obligations.  “Public use” simply means that the public has a right of access and use.  In this case the roadways at issue were almost invariably described as “access roads”.  Often such roadways remain access roads to avoid burdening the municipality with maintenance costs and they are common within Commercial developments like the instant case.  See N.J.S.A. § 27:7-94 which allows access roads provided the “access road is of sufficient design to support necessary truck and employee access as required by the industry”.  The [...] Code also allows for such “internal roads” and “private interior roadways”.  (Pa649-650) The term “access road” has also been understood as a private roadway.  See N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. for Smith v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas, 234 N.J. Super. 116, 117 (App. Div. 1989) (five and a half mile access road to Nuclear plant was a private road even though general public had access and was patrolled by local police)  Plaintiff seeks this court to compel the Borough to accept both title and responsibility for maintenance of the access roads in question.  It also suggests that because public passage is self apparent that the Borough must ipso facto take ownership and responsibility of the private access road in question.  In New Jersey there are numerous private roads over which the public has unfettered access rights and which municipalities are not responsible for.  In Barile v. City of Port Republic, 186 N.J. Super. 587, 590 (Law Div. 1982), the Court recognized that the issue of determining the status of a road and the rights of the public to access are mutually exclusive.  The conflict over maintenance between tax-paying property owners and the limitations of a municipality budget requires an assessment of each road on a case by case basis.  Id. at 590, 594.  In Barile, the City argued that the roads in question were private roads and thus the City had no maintenance obligations.  *Id.* at 590.  For purposes of establishing the correct status of the roads, the Court defined public road as “a road in which the public possesses rights of passage or re-passage”.  *Id.* at 594.  However, the Court noted that the status of a road does not obligate the City to maintain it.  *Ibid.*  In order for a municipality to be obligated to maintain a road, it must be accepted by the proper governmental unit.
[brief] DOCTRINE BARS OBJECTORS’ CONTENTION THAT ISSUES THEY PLACED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT ON MOTION WERE NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION (Not Raised Below by Appellants).  .........................  42  VII.  IF THIS COURT WERE TO EXTEND THE PERIOD OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE THE COMPLAINT IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS, IT SHOULD RETAIN ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE IF THE ZBA ACTED ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND UNREASONABLY (Pa022-Pa044; Pa065-Pa073).
[brief] See Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 290-91 (1965).  At Pa58, the trial court touts the Applicant's expert testimony as "uncontroverted."  That does not mean that the evidence is legally competent to support the Board's findings.  In Tomko v. Vissers, 21 N.J. 226 (1956), the applicant's proofs, while uncontroverted, were legally insufficient to support the variance relief sought.
[brief] Senate Chambers Voting Session: A259 [[...]/[...]+6], Military service members-provides civil service preference for expedition medal A798 [[...]/[...]+12], Drug overdose fatality review team-establish in each county in the State A802 [[...]/[...]+5], Gift card fraud-requires certain retailers to train employees A953 [[...]/[...]], Architects-disclose insurance coverage A1073 [[...]/[...]+7], Preeclampsia testing for certain pregnant women & women who have given birth-req A1121 [[...]/[...]+8], Veteran of US or organized militia misrepresentation-upgrades certain crimes A1219 [[...]/[...]+5], Rabies-owner notification of testing protocol-change to ten-day limits A1229 [[...]/[...]+19], Homeless prevention programs-DCA make information available on its website A1269 [[...]/[...]+2], Class 4A commercial property transferred, excess of $1M-elim 1% tax on purchaser A1293 [[...]/[...]+9], Brewery, distillery industries-estab advisory council; funding thru alco bev tax A1663 [[...]/[...]+7], Nonprofit Security Grant Program-establishes MONDAY, JANUARY 10, 2022  *SENATE SESSION (continued)
[brief] Here, while the DECEDEANT was not injured by the makeshift liquor store itself, APPELLANTS’ Complaint alleges same to be a dangerous condition of public property as its presence “created an unstable and highly dangerous situation, which eventually resulted in [...]’s death. ”  APPELLANTS’ Complaint fails to set forth sufficient facts to establish that RESPONDENTS owed, controlled or maintained the subject premises, alleging only that [...] had a general duty to patrol same, as it did all areas of the [...].
[directive] Page 2 o£2  Additionally, the form is being revised to include the contact address for the criminal case management office for the county where the conviction occurred.  The proposed revisions will help ensure that if the defendant seeks representation by the Office of the Public Defender for the appeal, the indigency determination is made by the criminal case management office before the matter is referred to the Public Defender's Office.  In that way, the Public Defender's Office, as opposed to the private attorney, will be able to file the notice of appeal on behalf of indigent individuals who have been deemed eligible for its services.  The colloquy used by judges during sentencing also has been revised to advise defendants that if private counsel does not continue representation on appeal, the defendant should contact the Criminal Division Manager's office to apply for a Public Defender.  Please share this information in your respective vicinages to ensure that members of the bar who practice in this area are informed of this change in procedure.
[brief] In CWA v. Retarded Citizens, the State (one of the potential “joint employers”) wanted to be dismissed because it allegedly was not an “employer. ”  250 N.J. Super. at 416.  The Appellate Division held that such a motion for summary judgment would have to be denied, given that “many fact questions remain to be resolved. ”  Id. at 418.  The Court then described the various potential disputes, emphasizing that which entity “pays the salaries . . . is not dispositive of who the employer is. ”  Id.  The Court concluded that even though some of these disputes “may involve combined questions of law and fact, . . . the point is that they cannot be resolved in a motion for summary judgment. ”  Id.  The same result was warranted here, and the Court erred by finding otherwise on reconsideration.  D.
[brief] ESTATE OF [...] (mother) and [...] (daughter), the administrator of the ESTATE OF [...] (mother), Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], Defendant-Respondent, and [...], JOHN DOES 1-5 (Unidentified entities or individuals that owned, operated, controlled, constructed, inspected, maintained and/or repaired the store where plaintiff fell), and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5 (Unidentified entities that owned, operated, controlled, constructed, inspected, maintained and/or repaired the store where plaintiff fell), Defendants.
[brief] The judge refused to recuse herself, and denied the PCR without an evidentiary hearing.  Our criminal legal system is not infallible.  A PCR petition represents a defendant’s last chance to right an unjust conviction.  A PCR proceeding must be a meaningful opportunity to root out mistakes.  Yet, the judge elevated perceived expediency over justice, preventing PCR counsel from meeting her obligations under Rue and Webster, and depriving [...] due process and effective assistance of PCR counsel.  This cannot stand.
[brief] Over the defense’s renewed objections, the trial court stated it was going to instruct on aggravated and reckless manslaughter because the testimony supported a “dispute” at the bottom of the stairs wherein the defendant came in control of the victim’s gun and “then began firing up the staircase. ” (5T181-7 to 19).  Despite the objections, defense counsel noted that “for completeness,” it would be appropriate to also charge passion/provocation manslaughter because of the fight at the bottom of the stairs.  (5T184-1 to 18).  The trial court disagreed, stating, “I don’t think there was a sufficient factual basis for a provocation that then would have led somebody to act in the heat of passion. ” (5T185-23 to 185-1).  Defense counsel observed his “awkward situation of arguing different theories,” but stated that because there was testimony that one of the victims was armed with a handgun during the physical dispute, the “implication of [[...]’s] testimony was that [[...]] was going to . . . threaten [...] with the handgun,” and that even though no witness saw it there is a reasonable inference [...] pulled the gun on [...] during the quarrel.  (5T185-14 to 186-10).  Counsel also alerted the trial court to the fact that caselaw states that “threatening with a gun or a weapon or giving someone a beating could be the basis for the passion/provocation charge. ” (5T186-8 to 10).  The trial court looked at the relevant cases and acknowledged defense counsel was right on the law, but nonetheless stated that because there was no direct testimony that [...] threatened [...] with a gun, it could not instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter.  (5T187-15 to 188-5).  Ultimately, the jury was instructed only on aggravated and reckless manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of murder, and it convicted [...] on both counts of murder.