ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] When it answered the certified questions, the Court first discussed the two principal methods that courts have adopted for allocating long-tail losses among multiple insurance companies.  The first method the court discussed was the “joint and several” method, which the intermediate Massachusetts appellate court adopted in *Rubenstein v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am.*, 694 N.E.2d 381 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).  *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 301.  Under the “joint and several” approach, [A]ny policy on the risk for any portion of the period in which the insured sustained property damage or bodily injury is jointly and severally obligated to respond in full, up to its policy limits, for the loss.  *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 302 (quoting [...], *An Introduction to Insurance Allocation Issues in Multiple-Trigger Cases*, 10 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 25, 37-38 (1999)).  The second method discussed by the court was the pro rata method.  *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 302-03.  Courts that apply the pro rata approach “allocate a portion of the total loss to each triggered policy using a variety of different formulas. ”  *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 302-03 (*citing* [...] & [...], Allocation of Losses in Complex Insurance Coverage Claims § 4.3[b], at 4-17--4-21 (2d ed. 2008) (describing nine pro rata allocation formulas)).  After analyzing the policy language at issue and the applicable case law, the court concluded that a “pro rata allocation produces a more equitable result than joint and several allocation. ”  *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E.2d at 311.  The court reasoned that, the pro rata allocation method promotes judicial efficiency, engenders stability and predictability in the insurance market, provides incentive for responsible commercial behavior, and produces an equitable result.  *Id.*  After concluding that damages arising from long tail losses should be pro-rated among triggered policies, the court next considered which pro-rata method should be applied.  *Id.* at 312.  The court first held that the “ideal” method for pro-rating long-tail losses among multiple insurers and the one which is the “most consistent with the contract language” is a “fact-based” approach.
[directive] The statute for Knowingly Leaving the Scene of a Motor Vehicle Accident Resulting in Death (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1) referenced in Bail Schedule 2 was amended effective May 4, 2007 to upgrade that crime from third to second .!:. degree .  2007, !;!. 83, §1.  3.  The statute for Leaving the Scene of a Motor Vehicle Accident Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.1) referenced in Bail Schedule 2 was amended effective May 4, 2007 to upgrade that crime from fourth to third .!:. degree .  2007, !;!. 83, §2.  4.  The statute for Possession of a Firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5) referenced in Bail Schedule 2 was amended effective August 8, 2013 to include possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime under the No Early Release Act as a first degree crime.
[brief] For the reasons expressed herein, it is respectfully submitted that this Court reverse the decision of the Court below and remand the matter back to the Court below for trial.  LAW  OFFICES OF [...]  Attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant  George T. Daggett  [...]  Date: 5-6-24  [...], Plaintiff, v. [...] AND [...], Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
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[brief] Plaintiff’s Expert Report and Testimony  Plaintiff’s expert, [...], admitted that the streetlight was operational minutes after the accident when the police arrived.  (Pa384-88).  [...] stated that he had no information that the light was defective or non-operational prior to the incident as stated in his report.  (Pa406-08).  [...] further testified that [...] only received notice of the light being out a year and a half after the subject accident and that [...] had no notice of any issue with the light prior to the accident.  (Pa408-10).  He also confirmed that there is no factual evidence indicating the light was defective prior to the accident.  (Pa413).  [...] testified that the customer here, [...], provides its illumination needs to [...].  (Pa419-22).  He further testified that [...] has no responsibility as it relates to determining illumination needs.  (Pa419-22).  Finally, [...] confirmed that [...] has no duty as to the selection and design of street lighting pursuant to the Electric Tariff.  (Pa419-22).  F.  The Court’s Decision
[brief] Da100–03.  On or about September 30, 2016, Plaintiff funded the escrow account by depositing $2.5 million into [...]’s Pennsylvania IOLTA account.  Da28 ¶ 41.  Prior to this time, Plaintiff had directed [...] to “stand down” and cease any discussions with [...] and any work on the escrow agreement because [...] “was raising too many questions about the nature of the escrow, the escrow agreement and the transaction itself.
[brief] ”  *Johnson Mach.*, 248 N.J. --- \(^9\)  The Lease states the “if and when” part twice.  It is worth pausing on why it is important enough to be stated twice: “if” connotes that all six succeeding conditions must be met and “when” connotes that, once met, the conditions immediately and inexorably ripen into Landlord’s obligation to pay Tenant’s Allowance.
[brief] T2 21:5-10; 22:8-10; 24:2-13; 35:15-36:10; 46:18-47:4.  However, as explained herein and verified by the record, [...] did not seek dismissal of [...]’s Complaint, but rather to reopen the matter \(^3\) See T2 4:14-8:10, particularly 8:8-0 (“Well, having made that stipulation and without a good-faith error . . . .”). to litigate [...]’s claims on the merits.  Thus, the trial court’s finding of prejudice was based wholly on a mistake of fact.  [...]’s brief repeats the same mistake of fact and fails to identify any purported source of prejudice: [I]f Appellant moved to vacate when he became aware of the Collection Action, or, upon service of the pleadings, Respondent would have been able to recommence the Collection Action, if required to do so.  Now, any ability to recommence the Action would be time-barred and, thus, Respondent is significantly prejudiced by Appellant’s conceded delay in moving to vacate his default.  [...]’s Br. at 24-25.  Whether or not [...]’s claims on [...]’s alleged debt is immaterial here—[...] sought to litigate [...]’s claims by vacating the default judgment.  Thus, there can be no finding of prejudice based on the statute of limitations.  Without a finding of prejudice, there can be no finding of laches.  Thus, the trial court’s April 8, 2024 Order should be reversed.
[brief] Here the Borough Engineer found the roadways non-compliant with the zoning ordinances.  A variance is therefore required for the roadways in question.  Plaintiff's application before this court never answers this question nor addresses the zoning issue in any way.  The question of proper zoning leads to an additional question as to Plaintiff's burden of production and proof in the instant application.  Aside of the zoning issue there is the issue of nonexistent approval of the municipal engineer.  The maps do not insure that the roadways at issue comply with either the zoning or the Residential Site Improvement Standards (RSIS) which requires that roadways be classified and comply with relevant regulations.  (See N.J.A.C. 5:21-4.2).
[brief] (Da271).  The case was subsequently marked as “reinstated”, but the request to reassign was denied on June 10, 2022.  (Id).  On June 22, 2022, in response to the reopening of the case (which [...] reasonably believed had in fact been dismissed, for the reasons now stated on appeal and due to the trial court’s complete and total silence for nearly two years) and the filing by the Plaintiffs of a proposed form of order and judgment, [...] filed his post-trial submission with the court.  (Da59).  On June 23, 2022, [...] entered her post trial order (Da6) and opinion.  (Da9).  Reference is made therein to the judge “misplacing” her trial notes.  (See Da14 footnote 2).  No explanation is offered for why the case was marked as closed and why the court had been completely silent on the matter for nearly two years following trial.  (Id).  It does not appear from [...]’s Statement of Reasons (Id.) – and due to the fact that the court’s order was issued less than twenty-four hours after its submission – that any of [...]’s post-trial submission was considered by the court.  This appeal follows the denial of [...]’s motion to vacate/for reconsideration/for new trial, which was filed with the trial court on July 7, 2022 (Da85) and denied on August 8, 2022.  (Da260).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] However, as the trial court correctly observed, “It is well settled that the law of the state chosen by the parties will be honored so long as that choice does not contravene a fundamental policy of New Jersey. ” (Pa5) (quoting Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc., 208 N.J. Super. 666, 671 (App. Div. 1986)).  See also S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Baltika Brewery, 443 F. Supp. 2d 313, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Public policy concerns abrogate a contracted-for forum selection clause only in exceptional circumstances. ”) (citation omitted).  Here, no “exceptional circumstances” warrant abrogating the parties’ choice-of-law.  To begin, Appellants cite no case invalidating a choice-of-law provision in a wholesaler agreement.  (Pb 15-17.)  Moreover, the principal case on which Appellants rely, *Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C.*, 450 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2017), undermines their position.  After noting that New Jersey and federal law recognize that a plaintiff may maintain a private civil RICO cause of action whereas New York law does not, the court agreed that the trial court correctly applied New York law in dismissing the RICO claim.  *Id.* at 33, 57.
[brief] 27  # TABLE OF APPENDIX  **Volume I** - Indictment ...........................................................................................................  Sa1-3 - Verdict Sheet .......................................................................................................  Sa4 - Motion for New Trial ............................................................................................  Sa5-12 - Trial Court Opinion .............................................................................................  Sa13-33 - Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal .................................................................  Sa34-35 - Order Granting Leave to Appeal ..........................................................................  Sa36-37 - Area Development Agreement and Addendum ..................................................  Sa37-69 - [...] Operating Agreement .......................................................  Sa70-119 - Principal Owner’s Guaranty & Addendum to WOB Hoboken Franchise Agreement, signed 3/25/15 .................................................................  Sa120-122 - Emails Between Defendant and [...] ..............................................................  Sa123-125  **Volume II** - [...]’s Certification and Attachments ..........................................................  Sa126-296  **Volume III** - Email from Will [...] with [...] Guaranty ........................................... Sa297-300 - Letters of Approval for Hoboken Site 10/21/14 ................................................... Sa3013-04 - [...] Franchise Agreement ....................................................... Sa305-363 - [...] Agreement ........................................................................... Sa364-423 - Transfer Agreement for Liquor License .............................................................. Sa424-429 - Text Messages Regarding Ownership Percentage Under Area Development Agreement ........................................................................................ Sa430 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ................................................................. 3 State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22 (1970) ......................................................... 23 State v. Conway, 193 N.J. Super. 133 (App. Div. 1984)..................................... 15 State v. Henries, 306 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 1991).................................... 16 State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22 (2019) ...................................................................... 23 State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518 (2013) ................................................................... 16 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017) .................................................................... 23 State v. Szemple, 247 N.J. 82 (2021)
[brief] Because the burden lies with the State when the police do not obtain a warrant, “the State must provide evidence” at a suppression hearing to legally justify the warrantless conduct.  State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 446-48 (2018).  If the State fails to present sufficient evidence, courts must conclude that “the State did not carry its burden. ”  Id. at 448; accord, e.g., State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588, 617-18 (2019) (rejecting the State’s argument contesting standing where “the State failed to produce any evidence to support that point”); State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 296-99 (2014) (no probable cause for warrantless arrest where “[t]he State presented no evidence regarding” critical factual issues); State v. Williams, 84 N.J. 217, 227 (1980) (consent involuntary where the State failed to present “proof of facts surrounding the consent”); State v. Boone, 479 N.J. Super. 193, 210-11 (App. Div. 2024) (no reasonable suspicion for investigative stop where the State failed to “put forth facts at the suppression hearing to establish” such suspicion).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On or about January 3, 2017, [...] filed a Collection Complaint (Pa35) in the Special Civil Part of the [...], docket number [...] (“Collection Lawsuit”), demanding a judgment against [...] in the amount of $618.91, together with costs of suit and pre-judgment interest.  [...]’s Return of Service (Pa130) states that the Complaint was mailed to an address in [...]; however, as explained in [...]’s Certification in Support of the Cross Motion to Vacate, Transfer, and Consolidate (Pa126), [...] has not lived in Saddle Brook since 2015—two (2) years prior to the Collection Complaint being filed.  Certification of Scott [...] (“[...] Cert. ”)  ¶¶ 5-8.  On or about April 19, 2017, [...] moved for entry of default judgment (Pa39) in the Collection Lawsuit—which was unopposed due to [...]’s defective service and subsequently entered on April 21, 2017 (Pa58).
[brief] (3T38:10-11).  [...] indicated that a radio transmission can go out but not be received by dispatch or the other Officers where neither dispatch nor the other Officers hear the message being transmitted.  (3T40:9-10).  There would be no specific tone to indicate to the Officer sending that transmission that it was not received.  (3T40:16-17).  If the radio failed to transmit while an Officer's MDT was turned off, no one would know where an Officer who was in trouble in that situation was located.  (3T45:2-3).  Also, only one person can transmit it across the radio system at a time.  (3T47:13-14).  There were also dead spots in the transmission which created a problematic situation.
[brief] Statutes N.J.S.A. 39:4-105......................................................................................22  Rules of Court R. 1:7-1(b) ..................................................................................................................  47 R. 4:49-1(a) ..................................................................................................................  19  Rules of Evidence  N.J.R.E. 401 ..................................................................................................................  32  N.J.R.E. 403 .................................................................................................................. 24-26, 33-34, 38-40 N.J.R.E. 609(a) ..............................................................................................................  24-27  N.J.R.E. 701 .................................................................................................................. 28-29, 31 N.J.R.E. 803(C)(3) .......................................................................................................  37  Other Authorities  [...], Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, Comment 1 to N.J.R.E. 701 (Gann) .....................................................................................................  29  Biunno Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, Comment 3 to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) (Gann) .......................................................................................... 38  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] In following this strict interpretation, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Polyard v. Terry, 160 N.J. Super. 497 (App. Div. 1978) (aff’d, 79 N.J. 547 (1979)), held that in order to prevail, a plaintiff must prove ALL five elements of a dangerous condition pursuant to the TCA as follows: (1) That a dangerous condition existed on the property at the time of the injury; (2) The dangerous condition proximately caused the injury; (3) The dangerous condition created a foreseeable risk of the kind of injury incurred; (4) That either (a) a public employee created the dangerous condition or (b) that a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have protected against the condition; and (5) The action or inaction of the public entity in respect of its effort to protect against the condition was palpably unreasonable.  See, e.g., Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  Failure to prove even one of these elements should result in summary judgment.  See, e.g., Polzo v. County of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 66 (2012) (“Even if plaintiff has met all of these elements, the public entity still will not be liable unless the public entity’s failure to protect against the dangerous condition can be deemed ‘palpably unreasonable. ’”).  Plaintiff herein cannot prove the first element (i.e., the existence of a “condition of public property”) let alone the remaining four elements because the facts herein unequivocally show no physical defects of the property at issue and no reasonably foreseeable conduct.  New Jersey Courts have long “understood [that] a ‘dangerous condition’ as defined in N.J.S.A. 59:4-1a refers to the ‘physical condition of the property itself and not to activities on the property.
[brief] Defendant initially contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a third-party guilt charge at the conclusion of trial.  Db14-20.  Specifically, defendant argues that the defense theory was third-party guilt and, as such, the instruction should have been given to the jury.  Such a charge, however, would have undoubtedly confused the jury and was contrary to the evidence and the respective theories presented by both the State and defense.  Therefore, the PCR court appropriately denied the defendant’s claim without holding an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] ]  As determined by the trial court, the 1999 Agreement clearly and unambiguously provides the Township is entitled to all connection fees for properties treated by the Township and not located within the Borough.  Further, despite Appellant’s unsupported argument, the trial court properly recognized, “[t]hat the term ‘connection fee’ is not used explicitly within Section 6.5 is of no moment, as [the trial court’] interpretation of Section 6.5 is read together with Section 6.1 to provide it with further meaning.
[directive] STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option a.  Actor, including a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian:  1.  Takes or detains a minor child with the purpose of concealing the minor child and thereby depriving the child’s other parent of custody or parenting time with the minor child; or 2C:13-4a(1-4)  Interference with 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000 10% permissible  Custody 2.  After having been served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting marriage or custody but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody and parenting time rights to a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of depriving the child’s other parent of custody or parenting time, or to evade the jurisdiction of the courts of the State; or 25  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT BECAUSE THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF INTENTIONAL WRONG AS A MATTER OF LAW.  (Pa1-16).  The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint because the First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  Both causes of action asserted against [...] are premised on the assertion that the Standard Workers’ Compensation and Employer’s Liability Insurance Policy issued to [...] provides coverage for Plaintiff’s claim of intentional wrong.  Plaintiff asserts that the Act and public policy require [...] to provide coverage for the Estate’s claim of intentional wrong.  However, neither the Act nor New Jersey public policy require coverage for an intentional tort such as this and the claim asserted by Plaintiff against [...] is expressly excluded from coverage.  Accordingly, there is no coverage for Plaintiff’s intentional wrong claim as a matter of law and no relief may be granted to Plaintiff based on the allegations contained in the First Amended Complaint.