ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s finding that Appellant abused his opioid medication was also based on record evidence and a reasonable credibility determination and should be upheld.  [Pa49].  [...] reviewed Appellant’s testimony about his opioid use and found it to be dishonest.  [Pa49].  Appellant testified that he only received oxycodone from [...] on one (1) occasion because [...] was not available.  [4T111:9-23].  However, [...] correctly noted that Appellant filled a prescription for oxycodone from [...] on March 1, 2018, filled prescription for oxycontin from [...] on March 2, 2018, and filled a prescription for oxycodone and codeine syrup from [...] on March 4, 2018.  [Pa49, Pa114].  [...] also did the math for Appellant’s opioid prescriptions and found that the numbers did not add up.  [Pa47].  Appellant received a total of 789 pills between January 8, 2018, through July 16, 2018, a number that [...] calculated by using [...]’s Report and Appellant’s prescriptions, which were entered into the OAL Trial record as Exhibits R-15 and R-17 respectively.  [Pa47, Pa113-Pa116].  If Appellant had only taken the prescribed amount of three (3) pills a day, it would have amounted to 636 pills, leaving an excess of 153 pills.  [Pa47].  [...] recognized that Appellant had given contradictory testimony during his Internal Affairs investigation, initially stating that he only took the pills as needed, and whatever he did not take, he flushed down the toilet [Pa125], but then changed his story saying he disposed of his pills in September or October of 2018.  [Pa130].  Appellant also contradicted himself by testifying that he only took the pills three (3) times a day only on days he was not working [4T103:22-104:3], but also that he was taking them as needed which was less than three (3) times a day.  [6T10:11-20].  Appellant testified that he took oxycodone as directed on the bottle, “three times a day, that’s usually [when] I took the medicine, three times, never more or [sic] than three times a day” and that “[i]f I worked I did not take them when I was working . . . I would wait until I come home. ”  [4T103:22 - 4T104:5].  Appellant once again gave contradictory testimony by claiming he never took pills while working, but also stated to Internal Affairs while under oath that he took three (3) pills a day pretty much whether he was working or not.  [6T11:15 - 6T13:8].  [...] correctly concluded that Appellant had been untruthful regarding his prescriptions and opioid use.  [Pa50].  Accordingly, [...]’s determination that Appellant abused his opioid medication and attempted to conceal same was supported by credible record evidence and should be upheld.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING COMMENT ON HASSAN’S ABSENCE DURING SUMMATION BECAUSE THE JURY HEARD HIS TESTIMONY.  The trial court did not err in precluding comment on [...]’s absence at trial during closing argument.  Our courts apply a four-factor test to determine whether a party may comment upon the non-production of a witness at trial.  Nisivoccia v. Adamhill Assocs., 286 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 1996).  This standard \textsuperscript{18}  Under Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the law, a plaintiff may succeed on a negligence theory for any intentional act without the need to prove intent.  But “negligence excludes design” and [...]’s conduct – as described by [...] – was by design.  Price, 90 N.J. Super. at 485-86. requires that the testimony of the missing witness appear “to be superior to that already utilized in respect to the fact to be proven. ”  Ibid.  Thus, comments about a witness’ absence at trial are improper if their testimony would have been cumulative.  See id. at 426-27 (discussing Hickman v. Pace, 82 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 1964)).  During the jury charge conference, Plaintiffs were properly denied an adverse inference based on [...]’s absence and precluded from commenting on it in summation because the jury did hear his videotaped deposition testimony.
[brief] Now, according to defendant, this procedure violated the Supreme Court’s orders\(^5\) for hybrid jury selection, as well as the dictates of cherry-picked portions of State v. Williams, 171 N.J. 151 (2002), resulting in a constitutionally infirmed jury that was not “representative of a cross-section of the community. ” (Da25-26).  Now, for the first time, defendant hypothesizes that the lower court’s excusal of those --- \(^5\) Defendant provides this Court with numerous orders related to the resumption of criminal jury trials during the COVID pandemic.  However, as the Supreme Court’s May 11, 2021 order expressly “supersede[d]” its prior, September 2020 orders, and defendant’s trial occurred in 2022, the only orders relevant here are those contained in Da94-111.  prospective jurors who were not available for the scheduled trial dates “without any explanation required” and without any “individual assessment of each juror’s proposed hardship” resulted in the exclusion of “daily wage earners. ” (Db31-32).  This Court should not be swayed by defendant’s post-conviction complaints and instead should find, as defendant believed pre-trial, that the hybrid jury selection process employed here was fair and constitutional.
[brief] The *Caronenna* Court refers to this type of conduct on behalf of law enforcement, as FLAGRANT id at 500.  The following authorities make it clear that the violations of the Fourth Amendment are not limited to criminal cases, *Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Assn.*, 489 US. 02, 613-614 (1989); *United States v. Padilla*, 508 U.S. 77 (1993); *Florida v. Jardines*, 569 U.S. I (2013); *Ontario v. Quon*, 560 U.S. 746, 755 (2010).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that an accused has automatic standing to seek suppression of evidence seized in violation of New Jersey Constitution Article 1 ¶ 7 see State v. Brown 216 N.J. 508, 528 (2014).
[brief] [...], P.E. issued an engineering expert report with her conclusions based on a site inspection on August 18, 2022, a review of the Plaintiffs Complaint, a review of the parties answers to interrogatories and other written discovery, deposition transcripts of the parties, grant applications for roadwork submitted to DOT by the [...], color photographs of the area where plaintiff fell.  (Pa 313).  [...] P.E. concluded, in part, the existence of the pothole for an extended period of time (October 2017 through the time of the plaintiffs incident) underscores the lack of maintenance afforded to the roadway pavement, resulting in the estimated 2-inch minimum pothole formation which ultimately caused the plaintiffs accident/injury to occur.  (Pa 357).  During her inspection, [...] also noted that a worker was observed to be watering/maintaining the plantings along Kearny Avenue and utilizing a “[...]” vehicle.  It was also observed that another worker was sweeping the sidewalk region along Kearny Avenue.  (Pa 313).  [...], P.E. concluded further that the roadway where the Plaintiff sustained injuries should have been monitored and the subject pothole was or should have been observed and mitigated given the longstanding deteriorated condition of Kearny Avenue which is the “heart of the Town’s community business district.
[directive] I.  Home Detention with Limited Exceptions must be ordered for defendants ordered to home detention who are permitted to leave the residence for reasons beyond complying with court requirements or meeting with defense counsel.  HDLE shall be used for defendants required to remain confined to their residence during the pretrial period but for, attending (1) in-person court appearances, (2) in-person pretrial appointments with Pretrial Services or in-person Probation appointments, (3) in-person Instructions  Promulgated via Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12972 page 2 of 8 appointments with counsel after providing 48-hour notice to PSP, or (4) for any other reason preapproved by court order.  HDLE grants flexibility for a defendant by permitting them to leave their residence for preapproved reasons.  This flexibility must be balanced with the recognition that a defendant permitted to leave their residence are not monitored while out of their home.  Prior to ordering a defendant to HDLE the court must ensure they satisfy minimum requirements to reasonably assure the court they will successfully comply with those conditions.
[brief] Trial Court Erred by Not Granting a Mistrial when the Prosecutor said “This is Murder” in her Opening Statement (6T:56-2 to 58-3); (6T:95-14 to 96-4); (17T:72-22 to 75-24) .............................................  35 b.  The Prosecutor committed Prosecutorial Misconduct by insinuating that [...] was lying on Direct Examination (7T:153-19 to 155-13); (17T:12-13 to 14-6) .............................................  37 c.  The Prosecutor committed Prosecutorial Misconduct by Excessively Disparaging the Defense Expert in his Closing Argument.  (15T:193-14 to 196-2); (17T:14-3 to 16-17) .............................................  38 d.  The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct by Insinuating in the Closing Argument that [...] was a Treating Doctor who Fabricated her Initial Evaluation (17T:16-18 to 22) ............  41 e.  The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct by Questioning [...] about a Defense Expert Report Used at the Waiver Hearing.  (12T:118-12 to 120-7); (17T:84-19 to 87-22) ............  43 f.  The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct by Telling the Jury that [...] was Lying and Improperly Expresses his Personal Opinion as to the Veracity of Witnesses in the Prosecutor’s Summation (Not Raised Below).  .............................................  45  POINT IV ..................................................................................................................
[brief] New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony:  "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."  The well-established test to determine whether expert testimony is required turns on "whether the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the party was reasonable."  Scully v. Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114, 127 (2004) (quoting Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982)).  Experts’ opinions must be founded either upon facts within their own knowledge or, in the case of a hypothetical question, upon facts and inferences supportable by the proofs, such as evidence which there is a fair possibility the jury will accept.  Beam v. Kent, 3 N.J. 210, 215 (1949).
[brief] Final Decision at 15, n. 23 (Emphasis added.)  \textsuperscript{25}  The policy basis of a statute imposing on a fiscally struggling school district all the salary and other costs of State monitors assigned to that district to lead it out of its fiscal troubles seems questionable.  That is especially the case, when the presence of multiple monitors is for the long-term—in [...]’s case, potentially as long as 20 years.
[directive] Witness Acknowledgement Form  1.  I acknowledge that I have been informed that I am a witness in an internal investigation.  This investigation concerns____________________________  _____________________________________________________________  2.  I acknowledge my responsibility to answer truthfully all questions specifically related to the performance of my official duties.  3.  I acknowledge that this investigation is confidential, and I am hereby ordered not to disclose any information discussed during this interview.  Signature: _______________________  Print Name: ______________________  Date: _____________  Time: _________  Witnessed by: ___________________________  Print name: _____________________________  Appendix J Sample Administrative Advisement Form
[brief] ..................................  1 LEGAL DISCUSSION .........................................................................................  6  POINT I: THE LAW DIVISION’S DECISION THAT DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO THE CHARGES CONTAINED IN THE TICKET SHOULD BE AFFIRMED INASMUCH AS THERE IS SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT IT (Responsive to Points I and II)  ...........................................  6  POINT II: THE STATUTE IN QUESTION IS CONSTITUTIONAL .................. 14  CONCLUSION
[brief] Order entered on August 5, 2022 denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend and extend discovery.  This document is not included as it has been previously included in Plaintiff-Appellant Appendix at Vol. I Pa. 133-134..........  Order entered on August 5, 2022 granting defendant’s motion to quash a deposition subpoena.......  This document is not included as it has been previously included in Plaintiff-Appellant Appendix at Vol. I Pa. 133......................................  Order of February 28, 2023 granting defendant’s motion for Summary Judgment.  This document is not included as it has been previously included in Plaintiff-Appellant Appendix at Vol. IV Pa. 570..............  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF APPELLANT [...]
[brief] Model Jury Charge (Civil), § 4.10A  15  APPENDIX OF APPELLANT [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT ON CONTRACT, FILED JANUARY 28, 2023 DA001 - EXHIBIT A, SEPARATION AGREEMENT AND RELEASE AND [...]’S RESOLUTION 2020-311 DA011 - EXHIBIT B, CORRESPONDENCE DATED AUGUST 10, 2021 FROM THE [...] TO [...] DA023
[directive] When BWC-equipped the while times all remain at activated shall it clothes, plain in or uniform in officer or cell holding the in secured until is arrestee the and arrestee the of presence the in is officer or personnel, jail county been to transferred has arrestee until the or of custody room, processing the in longer is officer the no personnel health and hospital/medical/mental with is arrestee the until arrestee. the of presence Officers. Plainclothes BWCs of Use Governing Provisions by 5.5 than functions different perform plainclothes officers other and detectives that Recognizing what in when and determining in agencies to flexibility affords Directive this officers, uniformed the limits agency the that provided BWCs, use and wear will officers plainclothes circumstances the to Subject BWC. a activate/de-activate to when deciding in individual officers of discretion wear officer a to an authorizes an if agency Directive, this of 12 and 5.1, 7, sections of provisions procedure, operating standing policy, agency's assignment, the duty plainclothes in a while BWC 12 Page WC- B a when circumstances specify the shall 3.1 section to promulgated pursuant or order directive, the include shall which device, the to activate required shall officer be plainclothes equipped involving of use situations (i.e., 5.6 section (k) and (j) 5.2 and section in circumstances specified responses to and events, deadly force an arrestee, of transport or authority force, constructive or directive, procedure, operating standing policy, agency's requests).  The assistance emergency device. the de-activate may officer plainclothes when circumstances a specify the shall also order e~nt Exi Other and Incidents Deadly-Force Governing Rules Activation Special 5.6 in Dante Are Where Officers Circumstances B with WC a officer equipped an when Directive, of provision this cnyother Notwithstanding believing that reasonably or knowing an incident of scene the otherwise to goes or to dispatched is requested has officer an where a to scene or employed, being is or been has force deadly police BWC the activate shall officer the etc.), fired, shots distress, in officer an (ems., assistance emergency Directive, of this provision other any Notwithstanding when feasible. scene the at arriving before of event investigation that on-scene orthe event deadly-force of police the a scene while officer at an or or assistant prosecutor assistant the by so do to instructed unless BWC the de-activate shall not to pursuant incident deadly-force the of investigation the supervising general attorney deputy instruction
[brief] McQuillin, supra, at § 12.143; and see Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal. 2d 833, 3 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566, 350 P.2d 529 (1960); Giuliano v. Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension F., 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 231 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1967); Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1968).  Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598.  In Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, the Court evaluated a “preponderance of the equities” and “all of the circumstances” to achieve a “just result. ”  Id. at 600.  This Court is not bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue.  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).  As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited.' "
[brief] After the store closed, the Manager responsible for closing the store walked the store to make sure everything was in order.  Pa87, at ¶8. 41.  This included again inspecting the floors to make sure there were clean, dry, free of spills and free of hazards.  Id. 42.  The Sales Associates assigned to each department would also check their departments before leaving for the day to make sure everything was in order.  Pa87, at ¶9. 43.  This included again inspecting the floors to make sure there were clean, dry, free of spills and free of hazards.  Id.
[brief] In the same vein, a “court may not rewrite a contract to broaden the scope of arbitration[.]”  Yale Materials Handling Corp. v. White Storage & Retrieval Sys., Inc., 240 N.J.Super. 370, 374, 573 A.2d 484 (App.Div.1990).  Garfinkle v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001).
[brief] **Case Law:** | | | Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565 (1981) | 26, 28 | | Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981)| 44 | | Campbell v. Hastings, 348 N.J. Super., 264, 270, 791 A.2d 1081 (App. Div. 2002) | 62 | | Conrad v. Robbi, 341 N.J. Super. At 441 | 58, 59 | | Costa v. Josey, 160 N.J. Super. 1 (App.
[brief] *N.J. CONST.*  ART I PARA 8 , FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS UNDER N.J. STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.  A Middlesex County Grand Jury indicted [...] on multiple counts of robbery, conspiracy, and weapon possessions under indictment [...].  (12T)  On April 29th, 2014, [...] returned to the Grand Jury for a superseding [...] adding theft by unlawful taking which was omitted from the original indictment.  (13T)  Mr. [...] proceeded to trial whereas he was found guilty and sentenced to life without parole.  (11T)  The "degree" is an essential element that must be included in the indictment Rule.
[brief] Cases  Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J. Super. 553, 563 (App. Div. 2008)..........................  16  Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).....................................................  17  Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019).................................................  16  In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020).......................................................  16  Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 158 (App. Div. 1960)............................  16  Loretta v. Teleprompter Manhattan, 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982)...............................  17  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)...............................................  16  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)...............................................  16  State v. Lyons, 417 N.J. Super.  251, 258 (App. Div. 2010)..........................  16 State v. Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1966)..........................  16  Summit Plaza Assocs. v. Kolta, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App. Div. 2020)..........................  16  United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999)...........................................  18 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1.................................................................  8
[brief] However, as this record clearly reflects, defendant’s confrontation rights were not impacted.  Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution provide that the accused in a criminal prosecution has the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."  *State v. Branch*, 182 N.J. 338, 348 (2005) (citing the U.S. Const. amend. VI and N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.  The right of confrontation is an essential attribute of the right to a fair trial, requiring that a defendant have a "'fair opportunity to defend against the States accusations.'"  *State v. Garron*, 177 N.J. 147, 169 (2003) (quoting *Chambers v. Mississippi*, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
[brief] First, in November 2018, Defendants paid out sick leave over $15,000 to several [...] non-law enforcement officer employees who retired and did not even have any contractual rights to sick leave payments.  For instance, on June 1, 2016, [...], who worked for Administration, retired from [...].  (886a, Rog., #44-45).  On November 2, 2018, [...] received a retiree sick time payout of $33,469.47.  (866a, Rog., #46-47).  Irving did not have a written contractual agreement with [...] to receive a retiree sick time payout.
[brief] As of the date of this filing, both the state and federal courts have refused to provide [...] his automatic standing to seek suppression of evidence seized, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the New Jersey Constitution Article 1 ¶ 7.  The Supreme Court in United States Department of Justice etal Petitioners v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 489 US 749 (1989) held unanimously that when the subject of a rap sheet is a private citizen and the information is in the Government’s control as a compilation, rather than what the government is up to, the privacy interest in maintaining the rap sheets “practical obscurity” is always at its apex while the FOIA based interest in disclosure is at its nadir.  The Court went to find that the publication of a rap sheet was an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.  (Emphasis Added)
[directive] Section an during device energy conducted use or a carry to authorized be shall officer No 1. procedure qualification and course training a completed having until operation actual of deployment and use proper the in Commission Training Police the by approved on component a include program shall training  The devices. energy conducted culture different from person a with confrontation a a de-escalate to techniques how on component a shall include program also training  The background. or and mental illness, recognize person, to how disturbed emotionally an with interact to death.  injury and prevent crisis psychiatric to a de-escalate to techniques  TEXT EXISTING TO CHANGE NO 2.  TEXT EXISTING TO CHANGE NO 3.  9  Page Techniques  Deployment VIII.