ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 6T:11:1-2.  The record is clear that [...]’s conduct in negotiating, executing, and performing under the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement cannot be described as fraudulent, inequitable or unconscionable.  It is undisputed that these were contracts negotiated between sophisticated parties with sophisticated counsel.  The fact that Plaintiff now regrets the outcome does not equate to unconscionable conduct by [...] in drafting or performing under either agreement.  To be clear, a perceived “unconscionable” outcome does not equate to unconscionable conduct on the part of [...].  Multi-party real estate development projects such as the one at issue in this case involve risk, and one party’s disappointment with the resulting project does not mean the other acted in bad faith or contrary to the terms of the governing agreement.  [...] seeks to reform these duly negotiated agreements because its project failed, and it blames [...] for having the temerity to insist on compliance with terms [...] negotiated for and to which [...] agreed.  [...] cannot cite to any portion of the record demonstrating such conduct by [...].  In fact, [...] was the only party to be found in violation of the terms of either of the operative agreements, as the trial court found them in breach of Section 6.2(a) of the Operating Agreement for failure to pay the required operating fees\(^2\).  Da366.
[brief] ”  (emphasis added)  (internal citations and quotations omitted); *Serenity*, 306 N.J. Super. at 160 (upholding municipal rejection of a bid and finding, “In the absence of an adequate showing to the contrary, the municipal decision [to reject a defective bid that is not materially defective] may be seen as a valid effort to discourage bidders from playing fast and loose with public bidding processes and requirements generally, and with published specifications in particular”).
[brief] Under the law, due process requires adequate notice of the allegation on which the claim is founded and an opportunity to defend.\footnote{New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.C., 439 N.J. Super. 404, 413–14, 109 A.3d 235, 241–42 (App. Div. 2015) (“We are convinced that the procedures employed at the trial level were fundamentally unfair and significantly deprived defendant of her due process rights” because the defendant was held liable for an abuse claim even though that claim was never included in plaintiff’s complaint and plaintiff never amended the complaint to include it.).}  It goes without saying that due process also requires a defendant to know who is making such an allegation.  The trial court violated [...]’s due process rights by adding [...] as a party to the case after trial and after entry of judgment, without even permitting the filing of an amended answer to the allegations now (supposedly) brought by [...].
[brief] [...] ’S APPEAL  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...]  Of Counsel and on the Brief:  [...] (024132003)  [...]  On the Brief: [...] (156462015)  [...]  TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS & RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Item Pa1  September 11, 2023  Order granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Counts I, II, III, IV, V and VI of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  | Item | Description | |------|-------------| | 1T | Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing, June 5, 2023, filed with the September 14, 2023 Notice of Appeal |  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] In such matters, the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office shall exercise the authority of the law enforcement executive under Sections 1.0.5 and 6.3.11.  At the conclusion of the investigation, the internal affairs investigator and/or the investigating agency shall make factual findings, summarize the matter, and indicate the appropriate disposition (Sustained, Unfounded, Exonerated, or Not Sustained) as to each allegation of misconduct.  See Sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.9.  In cases involving Police Chiefs, factual findings and preliminary notices of discipline shall be forwarded to the appropriate authority.  While the appropriate authority must make the final decision regarding discipline, the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General may make a non-binding recommendation regarding the discipline to be imposed by the appropriate authority.  The County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office also may determine that it is appropriate to handle other internal affairs investigations in their discretion.
[brief] ]*  In *Clarksburg Inn*, the court found that [...] enacted Anti-Noise Ordinance No. 3-15 for the safety of its residents and that the ordinance was presumed to be valid and reasonable.  *Id.* at 637.  [...] has done the same herein.  Nor does Ordinance No. 17-2017 permit anything that the Legislature has said is prohibited.  There is nothing in statute or regulation which precludes the enactment of an ordinance like Ordinance No. 17-2017.  To the contrary, as just stated, substantially similar ordinances have been upheld under the same statutory authority cited here, the Home Rule Act.
[brief] *Id.* at 377.  The attorneys argued that the statute was unconstitutional and impinged upon the Supreme Court's exclusive authority over the courts and judges.  *Ibid.*  The trial court agreed and invalidated the statute.  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court, however, overturned and held that the statute was constitutional.  *Id.* at 394.  The Court reasoned that the statute “serves a significant governmental purpose” and that it does not “in any way interfere with the sound administration of the judicial system or undermine the proper regulation of the ethical conduct of members of the judiciary and the bar. ”  *Ibid.*  As in *Knight*, the fact that some debt adjustment activities can also be performed by attorneys does not in any way interfere with the sound administration of the judicial system or attorney conduct.  *Id.* at 394.  The DACCA does not impose any requirements on attorneys that it does not impose on others who seek to practice debt adjustment and does not regulate attorney practice or conduct.  To the contrary, the DACCA provides a safe harbor for attorneys who incidentally perform debt adjustment, as long as that debt adjustment activity is not their principal activity.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c).  Therefore, because the DACCA does not encroach upon any judicial prerogatives and interests, it meets the second prong of the separation-of-powers test.
[directive] Whereby the following is further ordered that:  Clerk's Initials Referee Judge page 3 of 3  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #08-21 (4/7/2021), CN: 10812 (JD-07)  Attachment 4  Municipal Court Sealing Order (CN 12763)  Municipal Court: Complaint Number(s): Municipal Court In the Matter of the sealing of the Municipal Court Records of Sealing Order (defendant name)
[brief] Standard of Review  In our earlier brief, at page 9, we explained that the proper standard of review on this appeal is *de novo*.  Challenger generally concedes this with the caveat that [...]’s rejection of [...]’s entire controversy doctrine defense is reviewable by an abuse of discretion standard.  We disagree.  When “facts relevant to the application of the entire controversy doctrine are not in dispute,” the determination of whether the doctrine applies is a question of law, which appellate courts review *de novo*.
[brief] Moreover, even setting aside [...]’s continuous misrepresentation of the record, it was improper for the trial court to overturn that portion of the award merely because the trial court disagreed with the Arbitrator’s application of law.  For this reason alone, the trial courts’ decision should be overturned.  A.  The 40% of the Company’s legal fees awarded by the Arbitrator was not a “fee-shift,” but a simple award of consequential damages associated with [...]’s fiduciary breaches.
[brief] In United States Casualty Co. v. Hyrne, 117 N.J.L. 547, 552, 189 A. 645 (E. & A.1937), the Court stated:  "It has always been held that the right to bring an action in the courts of this state is possessed by the injured person alone, unless the injured person assigns his right to someone else which cannot be done before judgment when the action sounds in tort...."  Accord Costanzo v. Costanzo, 248 N.J.Super. 116, 121-22, 590 A.2d 268 (Law Div. 1991).  [...] supports the existing rule.
[directive] Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option d.  Possesses any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate, fourth degree.  2C:39-5(a-j)  Unlawful Possession  2nd Degree $25,000 to $100,000  10% permissible (continued) of Weapons  e.  Possesses a firearm or other weapon in educational institution, third degree.  (continued)  (1)  Possesses a firearm in or on grounds of educational institution, without prior authorization, third degree, irrespective of whether he possesses a permit to carry or a firearms purchaser identification card.  3rd Degree $7,500 to $20,000  10% permissible (2)  Possesses weapon or components which can be readily assembled into firearm or other weapon described in 2C:39-1, or any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly 76  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] (Pa22).  Thereafter, the Superintendent of the State Police issued a Memorandum entitled “Essential Workers” by which the New Jersey Public Authority incorporated by reference the Department of Homeland Security List of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce, amended and published on August 18, 2020, wherein, it was made applicable to “Education. ” (See Homeland Security List at Pa47).  The cited paragraph clearly lists “teachers” such as Decedent as critical essential workers.
[brief] Certainly, none of this testimony provides any basis on the "surrounding circumstances" of the 1963 Agreement so as to demonstrate an intent and agreement at that time to establish a perpetual easement.  Continuing with improper "rebuttal" testimony, the [...] then called [...] and [...], two long-time Lakewood residents.  Amanik was a student at the School from 1954 to 1961 - before the 1963 Agreement and synagogue.  He had no knowledge or involvement in the 1963 Agreement.  He recalled parking his vehicle in the Sixth Street Courtyard on occasions in the 1970's and in the 1990's, and between 2000 and 2010 he occasionally observed vehicles parked there.  He acknowledged that on the occasions he parked or made these observations it was likely the School was not in session (13T144-13 to 151-22).  Pfeffer testified he attended the School from 1990 to 2002.  His recollection was that in those years the Fifth Street Lot was not used for any parking (other than 1 vehicle) and was used as a play/recreation area.  He recalled seeing vehicles parked at times in the Sixth Street Courtyard, although the school students exited every day out the School’s Sixth Street exit and through the courtyard.  After 2002 he attended the synagogue every Saturday and did not observe any vehicles parked in the Sixth Street Courtyard.  (14T4-25 to 41-13)  That concluded the plaintiff's rebuttal case.
[directive] 17.  f.  Después de haber sido informado de las posibles consecuencias de inmigración y de su derecho [Sí/Yes] [No/No] a tratar de obtener consejos legales individualizados con respecto a sus consecuencias de inmigración ¿todavía quiere declararse culpable?  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?  18.  a.  ¿Entiende que, conforme a las reglas del Acuerdo Interestatal de Supervisión de Infractores [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  Adultos, si usted reside fuera del estado de Nueva Jersey en el momento de ser sentenciado, su regreso a su residencia podría demorarse hasta que su estado de residencia acepte la transferencia de su supervisión?  Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state of residence?  b.  ¿Entiende también que, conforme al mismo Acuerdo Interestatal, un estado puede denegar o [Sí/Yes] [No/No] restringir la transferencia de su supervisión a ese estado en cualquier momento después de que haya sido sentenciado si ese estado determina que se requiere que usted se registre como delincuente sexual en ese estado o si Nueva Jersey ha requerido que se registre como delincuente sexual?  Do you also understand that pursuant to the same Interstate Compact transfer of your supervision to another state may be denied or restricted by that state at any time after sentencing if that state determines you are required to register as a sex offender in that state or if New Jersey has required you to register as a sex offender?  19.  ¿Ha hablado usted con su abogado sobre la doctrina legal de fusión?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  [No aplica/NA]  Have you discussed with your attorney the legal doctrine of merger?  20.  ¿Renuncia usted al derecho que tiene cuando lo sentencien de argüir que hay cargos [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  [No aplica/NA] de que se declaró culpable para los cuales no se le puede imponer una sentencia aparte?  Are you giving up your right at sentence to argue that there are charges you pleaded guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence?
[brief] [...]'s testimony that defendant's picture was included in the photo array based on “other investigative means” and on [...] and [...] having “developed a suspect” violated the clear rule that police witnesses should not explain to a jury why a defendant's photo was included in an array, even by using “seemingly neutral language....”  Branch, 182 N.J. at 352, 865 A.2d 673.  We are concerned that the trial judge, assistant prosecutor, and defense counsel all seem to have been unaware that such testimony is irrelevant at trial and can be highly prejudicial.
[brief] ”  Da236.  When the parties could not agree on the recalculation of the award of interest, the parties submitted competing orders to the Arbitrator, wherein [...] (for its second bite) attempted to offset [...]’s award of interest with [...]’s proposed damages.  The Arbitrator rejected [...]’s proposed order, and found that [...]’s award of interest “should be calculated as shown on the tables at page 4 of [[...]’s] Proposed Corrected Final Award. ”  Da255.  The Arbitrator entered that Award on April 12, 2024.  Da242-43.  [...] then made the same claims to the Trial Court (for its third bite) that the Arbitrator made “mathematical errors” both in the calculation of interest, and “in the description of EGPs,” which [...] repeats here.
[brief] ” (Pb9-Pb13).  That position is unsupportable.  By way of background, in Gramiccioni, 243 N.J. at 299-300, [...] and several of its employees or former employees were sued in connection with a police officer having fatally shot his ex-wife after [...] had authorized the return of the officer’s seized weapon pursuant to procedures outlined in an Attorney General Directive pertaining to seizure and return of weapons for officers involved in domestic-violence incidents.
[brief] .................................................................................  33  A.  The Motion-to-Suppress Facts .........................................................  34  B.  The Ruling on the Motion to Suppress ...........................................  39  C.  Defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his residence, without threats or coercion ......................................................... 40 POINT III POLICE HAD REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANT HARBORED CONTRABAND INSIDE HIS RESIDENCE ........................................................................ 48 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 50 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) .................................................. 16 Commonwealth v. Shelton, 766 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1989) .................................... 31 Crayton v. State, 485 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App. 2016) ........................................... 31 State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501 (2020) .................................................................. 42 State v. Ates, 217 N.J. 25, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 935 (2014) ............................ 32 State v. Bickham, 285 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 516 (1996) ................................................................. 26 State v. Birkenmeier, 185 N.J. 552 (2006) ....................................................... 48, 49 State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417 (2017) ................................................................. 11 State v. Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div. 2009) ...................... 12, 22, 23 State v. Burns, 462 N.J. Super. 235 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 241 N.J. 477 (2020) ................................................................. 32 State v. Cancel, 256 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 484 (1993) ................................................................. 44 State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351 (2002) .................................................................................. 48, 49, 50 State v. Chapman, 332 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 2000) ......................... 40 State v. Chippero, 201 N.J. 14 (2009) ...................................................... 11, 12 State v. Daley, 45 N.J. 68 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1022 (1966) ...........
[brief] **Sculler v. Sculler,** 348 N.J. 374, 377 (Ch. Div. 2001).  .........................................................  69  **State v. Grimes,** 23 N.J. Super. 75, 79 (App. Div.) certif. den. 118 N.J. 222 (1989)  .......................................................... 70  ---  **Statutes**  **N.J.S.A. 36:3-16. **  ..............................................................................  20  **N.J.S.A. 46:3-13.**  ..............................................................................  49  **N.J.S.A. 46:3-16. **  ..............................................................................  49, 57, 58, 59  **N.J.S.A. 2A:61-1. **  .............................................................................  60  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] [...] (“[...]”), who lives at [...], spoke with Plaintiff’s investigator and gave a statement that he had reported a streetlight outage once sometime in the last three to four years.  (Pa235-38).  He could not confirm if he complained about the light prior to the 2017 accident.  (Pa235-38).  At his deposition, [...] directly testified that he only called once about the streetlight being out prior to 2021.  (Pa235-46).  He further testified that [...] responded the next day after his one call, and the light subsequently remained on.  (Pa235-46).  [...] records reflect that [...] called on October 4, 2018, to report the streetlight being out.  (Pa247-50).  [...] confirmed that the first time he noticed the light being off and then called about the light was on October 4, 2018, a year after the subject accident.  (Pa235-46).  [...] has no record of this streetlight being reported out before the accident occurred on May 31, 2017.  The only records [...] has are for two (2) repair jobs in 2018 and one maintenance job in 2019.
[brief] (1T41-12 to 17)  “I agree completely with this, the jury should not be allowed to speculate, um about the cause of the accident. ”  (1T43-1 to 3)  “I can speculate, I can guess, maybe there were like six or seven different things that could have caused him to fall, including his own negligence.  Maybe he tripped because he wasn’t looking, but I don’t have the – – but again, that’s pure conjecture on my part. ”  (1T43-24 to 1T44-4)  “So we’re all going to speculate?  Was the wet from – – then who was responsible for removal of the snow and ice?  It’s so speculative.  It’s so far afield from what we need here that no way do I find that there’s any possible way that someone could meet the standards to prove a negligence case.  Number one, did negligence cause his injury?  We don’t know that. ”  (2T19-22 to 2T20-3)  “What’s relevant to this motion is that we can’t have juries engaging in speculation. ”  (2T1 to 2)  The trial court clearly considered all of the evidence submitted by Plaintiff but found it was based on speculation and conjecture.  See Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009) (defeating summary judgment requires “‘competent evidential material’ beyond mere ‘speculation’ and ‘fanciful arguments’” (citations omitted)).  Accordingly, [...] was entitled to summary judgment and the trial court’s Orders granting summary judgment (Pa21) and denying reconsideration (Pa24) should be affirmed.
[directive] R. 1:8-3(a).  Two basic practices have evolved.  Some judges, after calling the required number to the box, question those jurors en banc, with jurors raising their hands to respond in a particular manner as directed by the judge.  Where appropriate, follow-up questions are posed to those jurors.  Other judges, after calling the required number to the box, address each juror in turn, asking specific questions.  Either method may be utilized, subject, however, to the following.  No method may rely on jurors' memory of questions previously posed to other jurors.  Such a practice is unreliable in eliciting the required information from each juror.  Each juror must be asked each question, either individually, en banc, or a combination of the two.  Judges may, in their discretion, reduce the questions to written form (hand-out or easel) or projected form as an aid, but this may not serve as a substitute for orally asking each question to each juror.  Thus, for example, the originally-seated panel may be questioned en banc, with appropriate follow-up questions posed to those who respond affirmatively to particular questions.  Additionally, as discussed in Standard 2, each juror who gets through the initial screening should be asked at least one or more open-ended questions intended to elicit narrative responses.  These questions, of course, must be directed to and answered by each juror individually.  Also, each juror should be asked individually whether there is anything about the nature of the case or the participants in the trial that would Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)