ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Upon the discovery of a leak of dielectric fluid from the Utilities’ cable in the Hudson River, [...] brought the Utilities Litigation in November 2016 in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against [...] and [...].  Da59, Da61, ¶¶ 49, 61-62.  Thereafter, [...] asserted claims against [...] in the [...] Action seeking similar relief in connection with its damages.  [...] then filed a third-party suit against [...] and a counterclaim against [...].  Da61, ¶ 62.  The Utilities Litigation involved various property damage claims between the parties arising out of two collapses of the Sixth Street Pier, which is owned by [...].
[brief] April 5, 2018 – Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq.  (B-8)  April 6, 2018 – Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq.  (B-9)  April 18, 2018 – Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq. (B-10)  April 30, 2018 – Correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq. (B-11)
[directive] Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the use of a BWC to record the behavior of a person arrested for driving while intoxicated other than while the person is in the breath-testing area while the electronic breath testing device is being operated.  If this provision requires de-activation of a BWC, the officer shall narrate the reasons for de-activation (e.g., “I am de-activating the BWC because the suspect is about to take a breath test. ”), and the BWC shall be re- activated when safe and practicable to do so following the completion of the breath testing operation.
[brief] Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff failed to disclose the amount to pay off this debt in thirty-six (36) months as required by TILA.  Defendant is incorrect as a matter of law.  Plaintiff acknowledges that certain statements did not have such information because such disclosures are only required “for each billing cycle at the end of which there is an outstanding balance” or “to which a finance charge is imposed”.  15 U.S.C. § 1637(b).
[brief] Plaintiffs’ brief argues that the City did not present sufficient proof of actual harm were the e-mail addresses to be disclosed.  The City did prepare and send out a survey, which was provided as an attachment to the City’s moving brief, that does demonstrate the strong feelings and concerns of the citizenry and the fact that individuals did ask to be removed from the e-mail disclosure list.  Da239-251.  The City did provide proof that individuals will likely remove themselves from receiving potentially life-saving communications if it is determined that their e-mail addresses then become public record and can be disseminated to any person, for any reason, without limitation.  As to the rest, there is no legal requirement that the City be able to prove something that has not happened yet.  The e-mail addresses have not been disclosed yet due to the ongoing legal matter and therefore the City does not have specifics on what harm would occur if the e-mail addresses were to be disclosed.  However, the applicable balancing test does not require proof of harm having occurred.  The test speaks to the “potential” for harm, which the City has adequately demonstrated through its submissions in this matter.  Plaintiffs also indicate that the City did not prove that there are not adequate ways for individuals to protect themselves from potential harm.  Plaintiffs suggest filtering out messages, using a separate e-mail address, or receiving municipal alerts by way of text message instead.  These arguments simply ignore the more serious potential for harm addressed in the City’s brief, such as the disclosure of the e-mail addresses being used by hackers, who would be privy to one half of the typical information required to login to personal accounts, such as banking accounts.  This also ignores the issue in this case- the e-mail addresses are issue were already provided to [...] and therefore the list was already created.  It is too late for individuals to use a different e-mail address or sign up for alerts by way of text instead.  Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the City cannot argue that [...] is not a public agency under OPRA because the specific issue was not included in the Notice of Appeal.  The law cited by Plaintiffs only speaks to waiving issues that are not briefed on appeal.  There is no law cited that an issue is waived by not delineating it specifically enough in the Notice of Appeal.  Additionally, in making this argument, Plaintiffs seemingly purposely misdirect the issue and fail to respond to the main arguments addressed in the City’s brief.  The City’s brief specifically addressed that the trial court erred in finding that the requested information was public record, partially because the trial court relied on flawed logic and reasoning in interpreting the word “authority” in the OPRA law, and that the e-mail addresses do not fit into the definition of a public record under OPRA.  Those points, which were the main points on this topic, were not adequately addressed by Plaintiffs.
[directive] First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years 3.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  만약 가석방 보호감독 조건을 위반하는 경우, 귀하의 가석방은 취소될 수 있으며, 전에 부과된 금고 형기에 대한 복역을 완료한 경우라도 교도소로 되돌아가 가석방 보호감독에 대한 잔여 기간의 전부 또는 일부를 복역해야 할 수도 있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?
[directive] The report shall set forth each organization holding local unit funds, the amount of securities purchased or sold, class or type of securities purchased, book value, earned income, fees incurred, and market value of all investments as of the report date and other information that may be required by the governing body.  f.  The official charged with the custody of moneys of a local unit shall deposit or invest them as designated or authorized by the cash management plan pursuant to subsection a. of this section and shall thereafter be relieved of any liability for loss of such moneys due to the insolvency or closing of any depository designated by, or the decrease in value of any investment authorized by, the cash management plan pursuant to subsection a. of this section.  g.  Any official involved in the designation of depositories or in the authorization for investments permitted pursuant to section 8 of P.L.1977, c.396 (C.40A:5-15.1), or any combination of the as preceding, or the selection of an entity seeking to sell an investment to the local unit who has a material business or personal relationship with that organization shall disclose that relationship to the governing body of the local unit and to the Local Finance Board or a county or municipal ethics board, as appropriate.
[brief] *Id.* at *16.  The court determined that [...]  “[c]learly and convincingly established that a taking of its right of reasonable access occurred for a two and one-half year period from April 15, 2009 to November 4, 2011. ”  Thus, the trial judge concluded, “regardless of the takings jurisprudence utilized, the State’s activities require a takings conclusion and thus required compensation. ”  *Id.* (citing the lower court with approval, internal quotations omitted; emphasis added).  Da40.  While “[t]he basic contractual nature of matrimonial agreements has long been recognized” it is also true that "the law grants particular leniency to agreements made in the domestic arena," thus allowing "judges greater discretion when interpreting such agreements."
[brief] Nowhere in the statute or the regulation does it say that if a purchaser agrees to receive the POS on a CD-ROM, which all of them here affirmed, then [...] must supply them with a laptop or a computer system suitable for reviewing the POS before they exit the resort.  Third, [...] submits that the terms “prior to execution” set forth in N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(b) are subject to conflicting definitions and interpretations based on [...]’s contractual documents culminating the entire transaction.
[brief] 14  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS  Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pa-19  Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration  Pa-32  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp Board of Ed., 269 N.J. Super. 11 (1993)  13  D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., et al., 192 N.J. 110 (2007)  2,4,7-9,11,12,14  Dukin v. Mt. Olive Township Board of Ed., 2014 WL 273645  13  Marcus v. Eastern Agricultural Ass’n, 58 N.J. Super. 584 (App. Div. 1959)  7  Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 236 N.J. Super. 451 (1989)  7  Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 1998)  2,8  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Notably, [...] was not rejected from PTI because he was disabled, as he surmises.  Rather, the record makes clear that he was rejected based on four of the relevant factors under the applicable court rule; namely, factor numbers: one, which considers the nature of the offense; two which examines the facts of the case; fourteen which turns on whether or not the crime is of such a nature that the value of supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public need for prosecution; and seventeen, which looks to whether the harm done to society by abandoning criminal prosecution would outweigh the benefits to society from channeling an offender into a supervisory treatment program.
[brief] (9T68-17 to 69-5; 9T73-7 to 25).  The prosecutor argued that whether “[...] committed some acts or that something happened in the past there’s still no link to the September 18th incident link to this crime.  We can’t allege some incident that happened a month ago, two months ago and then say, aha, so there’s that act there, so there's your link, I’m allowed to argue third-party guilt. ”  (9T72-13 to 20).  The prosecutor suggested that “[i]f they had seen [Derique] [...], or some sketchy individual hanging around the scene, and they can identify that person, then [the defense] can argue third-party guilt.  Without that direct connection, he can’t argue a specific person is responsible other than him. ” (9T72-21 to 73-1).  The trial court ruled that “there really has been no proffered information at this juncture by [defense counsel] that would provide a sufficient nexus.
[brief] a.  **The Gannon claims “relate to” [...]’s amendments to its merchant agreements (Pa000100–Pa000101). **  *First*, Plaintiff released all claims that “relate to” [...]’s “right to amend or modify” its merchant agreements with the *Roma* class members.  Both Sections 1.29 and 2.1 of the Settlement Agreement reflect that Plaintiff released claims about amendments:  **1.29  Released Claims.**  “Released Claims” means and includes *all claims*, . . . whether known or unknown, that were, have been or could have been, now, in the past, or in the future, asserted or alleged in, or that relate to, the Settled Action by Class Members, including . . . any claims by Class Members relating to:  . . . whether [...] . . . has the right to amend or modify any agreements, dues, assessments, discounts, fees, or charges of any kind.  Settlement Agreement, § 1.29 (emphases added) (Pa000044).
[brief] The applicable statutory and regulatory framework**  The New Jersey Legislature enacted the Long Term Care Insurance Act (the “Act”) effective July 6, 2004.  *See* N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-1–27E-12.  The Act provides, in relevant part:  An insurer providing long-term care insurance issued on an individual basis in this State shall file, for the commissioner’s approval, its rates, rating schedule and supporting documentation demonstrating that it is in compliance with the applicable loss ratio standards of this State.  All filings of rates and rating schedules shall demonstrate that the benefits are reasonable in relation to the premium charged and that the rates are not excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.  N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-11.  The Act’s purposes include: “to establish standards for long-term care insurance” and “to facilitate flexibility and innovation in the development of long-term care insurance coverage. ”  N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-1.  Before the Act, “New --- \(^3\)  Under the regulations governing loss ratio policies, premium rate increases “shall be deemed reasonable” if the anticipated and aggregate loss ratio “is at least 55 percent. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:4-18.5.  \(^4\)  The regulations governing rate stability policies also rely on loss ratios, providing that premium rate increases “shall be determined” pursuant to a dual loss ratio standard where the present value of actual past and projected future incurred claims, inclusive of a margin for moderately adverse experience, shall be at least equal to 58% of the base level of premium and 85% of the premium attributable to any rate increases.  N.J.A.C. 11:4-34.18(c); see Pa71.  Jersey ha[d] no specific statute governing long-term care insurance,” and instead relied on regulations to oversee long-term care insurance.
[brief] [Da4; 5T163:19 - 5T164:21].  This alleged disclosure also violates the Medication Policy for all of Appellant’s new medications prescribed after September of 2015.  [Pa113-Pa116].  Additionally, TPD Rules and Regulations 4:5.1 (the “Performance of Duty Policy”), requires in part that all TPD employees “shall promptly and efficiently perform their duties as required by law, department rules, policies, directives, and job descriptions”.
[brief] ”  [Pb28]  This argument likewise cannot be reconciled with the plain language of the Policies and New Jersey law.  The Policies require Legal Services be “performed in the ordinary course of the Insured’s activities as a lawyer;” they do not require that those Legal Services be “rendered to a client. ”  [Pa171a, §III.P]  Depositing a client settlement into a trust account and writing checks to clients involves Legal Services as defined in the Policies and as a matter of New Jersey law.  Accordingly, even if the Applications did ask whether an Insured has been the subject of a “Disciplinary Proceeding,” the Disciplinary Action constitutes a “Disciplinary Proceeding” and should have been disclosed.  [...] and [...] also insist that they were not required to disclose Disciplinary Action in the Applications because the “purpose” of the Applications is to identify potential Claims by clients, which the Disciplinary Action is not.
[brief] However, the evidence shows otherwise, including: (a) his dismissive statements about the [...]’ offer when it was made (Da629; Da637);² (b) his rejection of the trial court’s January 10, 2021 suggestion that the Boonton Property be listed for sale (1T13:9-24), and (c) his inability to point to a single communication between the parties in which he indicated that he would consent to or even consider the sale of the Boonton Property to anyone but himself.  [...]’s shifting positions and versions of the facts were such that in its decision following the plenary hearing, the trial court stated that while it found ² [...] later admitted at trial that “as it turns out, they were serious about putting in the offer and purchasing for 800,000…” (7T6818-20).  [...]’s testimony to be generally credible, “he did contradict himself a number of times with respect to the value of the Boonton Property and the willingness of a third-party to purchase the Boonton Property.  Certainly, as to those issues, [...] lacked credibility.
[brief] State v. A.G.D. 178 N.J. 56 (2003).  “In the context of a juvenile interrogation … the parent serves as advisor to the juvenile, someone who can offer a measure of support in the unfamiliar setting of the police station. ”  State in re A.S. 203 N.J. 131 (2010) (citing Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).  The Presha court held that the police must use their best efforts to locate a juvenile’s parent or legal guardian before commencing interrogation, and the adult’s absence should be given added weight when balancing all factors to determine whether a waiver of rights and confession were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in the totality of circumstances.  Id.  The Presha court stressed that the absence of a parent or guardian to protect the juvenile’s rights was a “highly significant” factor in determining whether the juvenile’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.
[brief] (Ex. 8).  ¶23.  Although there is no direct evidence, it is reasonable inference that [...] accessed the FBI index, and prepared a compilation of [...]’s criminal record, in response to [...]’s request.  (See Tr. II 41-42; Ex. 7 at *35).  ¶24.  According to the evidence, [...] had no reason to access the information other than to provide it to [...].  (See Tr. II 61).  ¶25.  It is a reasonable inference that [...] received that criminal record compilation and provided it to [...] in response to his request.
[brief] That *Vercammen* involved a dispute over a forum selection clause is not material to its holding as to the adequacy of notice.  *See generally Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 443-44 (“under New Jersey law, any contractual ‘waiver-of-rights provision must reflect that [the party] has agreed clearly and unambiguously’ to its terms. ”).  The Court rightly followed *Atalese* and *Wollen* by approaching the website at issue on its unique facts and applying the principle of reasonable notice.
[directive] 24.  Authority of County Prosecutors to Impose Supplemental Guidelines  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to preclude a County Prosecutor from issuing directives or guidelines to the law enforcement agencies within his or her jurisdiction setting forth additional procedural or substantive rules concerning the issuance or execution of search warrants, provided that any such directives or guidelines are not inconsistent with the policies or principles set forth in this Directive.
[brief] THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE BELOW DEMONSTRATES THAT THE STATE, BY CONSISTENTLY AND SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERFUNDING THE SFRA, HAS FAILED TO SHOW THE SFRA REMAINS CONSTITUTIONAL IN JERSEY CITY.  When [...]’s claims are viewed within the proper constitutional framework, the trial court clearly erred by concluding that the SFRA is constitutional in [...].  The record evidence demonstrated that the SFRA was funded well below the District’s Adequacy Budget level after 2010.  (See Pb13-15.)  For the first decade of SFRA’s implementation, SFRA underfunding totaled a staggering $730.2 million.  (Pb15.)  The record further showed that funding SFRA at reduced levels impaired [...]’s ability to provide the teachers, support staff and other essential resources built into the Adequacy Budget’s cost structure.  (Pb21-24).  See Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 358-60 (eliminating teachers, staff and other resources triggered by the State’s funding cut “had a significant impact” on Abbott students).  Neither the State’s Brief nor the trial court refutes this evidence.  Rather, they both pin the blame for SFRA’s underfunding entirely – and erroneously – on what ---
[brief] Appellants’ brief discusses the Second Action against [...], which is the subject of a separate pending appeal, App. Docket No. [...].  [Pb42].  Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, bearing Docket No. [...], which was assigned to the trial judge that sat below in the Underlying Action (the “Second Action”).  [FEDa155].  In that Second Action, Appellants’ asserted the same three (3) causes of action that the trial court denied Appellants leave to assert against [...] in the Underlying Action.  [FEDa155].  The factual allegations and claims in the Second Action were “virtually identical to the factual allegations and causes of action from the [Underlying] Action. ”  [FEDa155].  [...] moved to dismiss the Complaint in the Second Action.  [Pb42].  By way of Order and accompanying Opinion dated June 22, 2022, the trial court granted [...]’s motion to dismiss the Complaint in the Second Action with prejudice.  [FEDa149].  First, the trial court found that “[t]he claims asserted against [...] in this action are barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine as these claims arise from the identical transactions and occurrences that formed the basis for the [Underlying] Action.  Thus, these claims should have been asserted in the Prior Action. ”  [FEDa149-160].  In addition, the trial court evaluated the three (3) claims asserted in the Complaint under the standards governing dismissal pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) and determined that each claim failed to state a claim upon relief may be granted against [...] for the same reasons it dismissed the claims against the [...] and their principals, *i.e.*, any of Appellants’ losses were caused by their failure to pay rent and the resulting termination of the subject lease.  [FEDa157-161].  E.
[brief] To wit, when [...] deeded out Lots 2.01, 3.01, 4.01, and 5.01, the Roads were not part of the land that was conveyed by such deeds.  (Da187, Da235-Da242, and Da327.)  The Roads were not included as part of those conveyances because, based on the Tax Map, [...] believed that such --- 12  Per N.J.A.C. 18:23A-1.1(a)4, “Standards” means the “Standards” in the “Tax Maps, Regulations and Standards” of the Division of Taxation.  Copies of Pages S1, S2, S11, and S36 of the Standards are attached as Da353-Da356.  13  It should be noted that for roads in the Borough that are truly private roads, the Tax Map does in fact list them as “private. ”  Solely for purposes of showing an example of this, annexed as Da358 is a copy of Sheet 14 of the Tax Map, which lists Boumar Place (a road that has nothing to do with the Roads in question) as “Boumar Place (Private Road). ”  Roads were public Roads, and more importantly, [...] could not have conveyed the Roads, because the Roads were not part of any block or lot on the Tax Map.  See N.J.S.A. 46:26A-3.a(b) (noting that in order to be recorded, a deed conveying title to real property must include “a reference to the lot and block number of the real property conveyed as designated on the tax map of the municipality at the time of the conveyance or the account number of the real property.
[brief] [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa001; Pa003-Pa007; Pa009-Pa011; Pa023; Da0791-Da0794; Da0798; Da0850-Da0853)]  [...] misstates the law with respect to a requirement for an expert witness regarding the manufacturing defect.  There simply is no case law requiring expert witness testimony to prove a manufacturing defect and, in particular, a manufacturing defect for a recalled product.  See Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., 113 N.J. Super. 279, 286 (App. Div. 1971); Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 459 (1975); Scanlon v. Gen. Motors Corp., Chevrolet Motor Div., 65 N.J. 582, 598-599 (1974).  [...] citation to McMillan v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CIV. 04-1180 (RBK), 2005 WL 2000203 at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2005) does not support its claim that expert witness testimony is required to establish a manufacturing defect.  In fact, McMillan v. Johnson & Johnson permits “expert testimony or other additional evidence” to prove a manufacturing defect.  Id. at *3.  Moreover, the McMillan case is clearly distinguishable as it does not involve a recalled product due to an admitted manufacturing defect.  The court in McMillan also cited Sabloff, 59 N.J. 365, 366, in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that “whenever the facts permit an inference that the harmful event ensued from some defect (whether identifiable or not) in the product, the issue of liability is for the jury. ”  Id. at *3.  The court’s ruling in the McMillan case is consistent with New Jersey law in that evidence of a product defect can be demonstrated through evidence other than expert witness testimony.  Expert testimony is not invariably required for any of the methods used to prove defect.