ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As more fully argued in Point IV(A) of The [...]’ Reply Brief, pursuant to NJSA 2A:23B-6(b) and Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 195 (2019), the arbitration panel had the sole authority to determine threshold arbitrability questions such as whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable against non-parties to the arbitration agreement.  See Perez v. Sky Zone LLC, 472 N.J. Super. 240, 248 (App. Div. 2022) citing Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 65 (2019); see also N.J.S.A. Section 2A:23B-6(c); see also McGinty v. Zheng, No. A-1368-23, 2024 WL 4248446, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 20, 2024) (“[t]his issue is a threshold arbitrability question….  The arbitrator will therefore decide if [...] is subject to arbitration as a third-party beneficiary”).  The fact that the arbitration panel (and not the court) may decide whether specific claims are arbitrable is likewise mandated by Paragraph 2 of the subject Arbitration Agreement which states in clear and unambiguous terms, that “all claims for damages arising from medical services rendered by [...], [...] and or any physician nurse or person associated therewith shall be submitted to binding arbitration and shall not be resolved by a court of law” (Da003)(emphasis added).  The Arbitration Agreement further states that its terms apply to “any claim of a spouse, heir, child (born or unborn), or other successor in interest to any such claim” (Da003).  Accordingly, not only is the threshold issue of arbitrability of non-parties claims not before this court, the same is specifically an issue to be determined by the arbitration panel and not any court under the terms of the contract itself, the NJAA and the relevant case law.
[brief] The Motion Judge erred in his restrictive reading of *United States v. Jones*, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) and its progeny [and related State constitutional principles] and the Federal Supreme Court’s complementary common law trespassing prohibitions to justify the State Police entry onto the premises (driveway, i.e. curtilage) of [...] to install a GPS tracking device on one of the Defendant’s vehicles:  (A)  The Motion Judge confused and conflated the State and Federal warrant requirement by equating a Communications Data Warrant (CDW) authorizing installation of the GPS device on vehicles with a Search Warrant authorizing entry onto and into the premises of a residence; (B)  The Motion Judge also erred in characterizing the driveway, although encompassed within the concept of curtilage, as an implied invitation to “[t]he UPS guy, the Amazon guy” and law enforcement to “walk up that driveway”.  The Judge failed to appreciate the limits of the third-party intervention doctrine as a deviation during a “walk up that driveway” to then affix a GPS device on a vehicle by law enforcement exceeds any implicit invitation to the public to walk up and knock at one’s door, see *State v. Wright*, 221 N.J. 456 at 477 (2015), *Florida v. Jardines*, 133 S. Ct. 1409 at 1415 (2013), *Collins v. Virginia*, 138 S.Ct. 1603 (2018).  [See 11/1/23 and 5/30/24 bench opinions at 2T and 3T, respectively]; and, (C) The Motion Judge failed to address the additional “invasion of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy” argument, based on *Jones* and *Katz v. United States*, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967) [see Brief on Reconsideration Motion at Da26-30].  The Communications Data Warrant (CDW) relied upon by the Motion Judge as being the “Warrant” authorizing entry onto the driveway and placement of the GPS device on 1 of the 2 vehicles parked in the driveway is, however, a warrant which does not authorize entry onto private property to install the GPS device [see Confidential Appendix at CDa 3, 6, 9, 12 & 15]].  Compare the CDWs issued for the Tahoe with the Search Warrant for the residence [Confidential Appendix at CDa1 & 18] as the latter authorizes entry onto and into a private residence while the CDWs do not.  In addition, the Motion Judge’s conclusion was that the driveway can be utilized to then go on the pathway to the front door and is an “implied invitation” not only to the UPS guy, the Amazon guy, but also authorization to law enforcement to walk up that driveway and also affix the GPS tracking device to the vehicles.
[brief] [...] further stressed that based on the current FAR requirement, only a building with a floor area of 8,900 square feet would be permitted.  As such, only one affordable unit could be produced there, especially since an elevator would be required.  Taken together, [...] testified that there would “be no way to justify a $375,000 cleanup cost with a building of that size” and the cost associated with reconstructing the retaining wall.  Id., at 74:21-75:3.  Likewise, [...] concluded that the (c) variance for the height of the building (2.4 feet higher than the maximum allowed) would be imperceptible to the public eye.  Id., at 76:9-77:13.  Next, on July 18, 2022, counsel for [...] confirmed that the affordable units proposed would comply with UHAC and clarified to the [...] (based upon questions raised by the [...]), that the environmental considerations pertaining to remediation and the costs associated therewith would not be taken into account as a basis for the granting of variance relief, but the environmental cleanup may be considered as an ancillary benefit to the proposal.
[brief] It is fundamental that a constructive trust should "be impressed in any case where to fail to do so will result in an unjust enrichment."  *D'Ippolito, et al. v. Castoro, et al.*, 51 N.J. 584, 588 (1968); *Hirsch v. Travelers Insurance Company*, 134 N.J. Super. 466, 470 (App.Div.1975).  [...] recognized this principle in *Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co.*, [*266] 225 N.Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (Ct.App.1914), when he stated that:
[brief] Plaintiff feels compelled to submit this sur-reply in response to defendants’ reply brief and the reply appendix that contains the January 8, 2024 hearing report of the Office of Attorney Ethics investigation into defendants.  The OAE investigated defendants at the request of the Appellate Division.  [...] became involved in the investigation, at the request of the OAE, only as a witness and was not represented by counsel during the proceedings.  Although plaintiff herself did not file an ethics complaint against defendants, the jury verdict that was entered against defendants at the completion of the civil malpractice case plaintiff did file against defendants demonstrates that when given the opportunity to make her case, plaintiff was able to prove that defendants committed malpractice in their representation of her.  It is this jury verdict that is the heart of the present appeal.  This appeal has nothing to do with the OAE investigation of defendants.
[brief] As a matter of common sense, [...] and [...] are united in their defense against [...]’s claims and nothing in the subject ethics opinion addresses such an issue.  No conflict is at issue in the present situation (the insured and insurer’s interests are in fact aligned) and, aside from its mis-reliance on Opinion 502, [...] has not cited any authority prohibiting [...] from defending the insured’s interests.  **POINT III**
[brief] Da1539a-Da1541a; Da1550a.  [...]’s claimed ongoing, debilitating respiratory, neurological and cognitive symptoms are far different than the “initial lung symptoms” exhibited by one of the claimants in Polarome, who had a persistent cough.  In that case, neither the trial court nor this Court were required to determine whether those initial lung symptoms or any of the symptoms that continued thereafter were sufficient to constitute manifestation because the relevant policies did not incept for years after the symptoms began.  The trial court in *Polarome* relied on certain tests and procedures from October 1993 and February/March 2002 to illustrate that the polices were not triggered even under the most liberal manifestation estimates.  The trial court’s task was the same here.  What was the latest [...]’s injuries and damage manifested under the most liberal manifestation estimate?
[brief] On the Bank’s instructions, in order to avoid future fraudulent withdrawals, [...] on 5/18/22, at his local branch, opened new business/personal checking and savings accounts with account numbers that differed from the hacked accounts.  (Pa 135, Par. 6).  He was under the impression that the bank’s local branch knew what happened, was aware of his situation and would guide him through the process to make sure his accounts were not hacked again.  (Pa 153, Par. 3).  He trusted the bank to take act in a manner to prevent future hacking of his accounts.  (Pa 154, Par. 5).  [...] was taken into the manager’s office, asked some questions and advised to sign the manager’s electronic iPad where indicated, to open the accounts.  The manager told [...] to type his new user name and password into the computer.  At no time did the manager show [...] any paper or electronic documents.  He was not advised he was signing any type of document, application or contract on the iPad.  No copies of any documents were given to him when this meeting ended.  The manager did not advise him that any documents would be emailed or otherwise sent to him and none were.  [...] was not advised to log into the bank’s website to review any documents or contracts when he signed the iPad.  He thought he was just acknowledging that he opened an account, answered the manager’s questions, verified this information, user name and password and was giving a handwriting sample.  The whole process did not take very long and was done rather informally.  [...] thought this was because he was an existing customer.  (Pa 135, Par 6).
[brief] Thus, we turn to [...]’s dissent referred to below and recognized by the Supreme Court which states:  There are various situations in which the control test does not emerge as the dispositive factor.  As pointed out by the Supreme Court, “has the worker become one of the ‘cogs’ in the employer’s enterprise,” and “is the work continuous and directly required for the employer’s business to be carried out?”  The Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to object to the control of an employer which is illegal or in conflict.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  A.  The Parties’ Arbitration  [...] and [...] were parties to a Project Transfer Agreement (“PTA”), pursuant to which [...] transferred its rights in certain projects to [...] in exchange for [...]’s payment to [...] of 65% of the estimated gross profit (“Estimate Gross Profits” or “EGP”) for those projects, but only if the projects achieve the status of a “Backlog Project” under a procedure expressly set forth in the PTA.
[brief] (ruling below at Da 17 to 28)  In a landmark decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that juvenile offenders are entitled to be resentenced after serving twenty years in prison.  State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 401 (2022).  The decision was based on the immaturity of juveniles, which diminishes their culpability, and on the strong likelihood that juvenile offenders will reform with age.  The developmental science shows that late adolescents -- which include nineteen-year-olds -- are like juveniles in their immaturity and likelihood of reform.  Therefore, the highest courts of Washington State, Michigan, and Massachusetts have held, based on the science, that late adolescents are entitled to the same constitutional protection as juveniles against long sentences.  New Jersey should follow suit.
[brief] While the intention of the parties is sought, it can be found only in their expression in the writing.  In effect, it is not the real intent but the intent expressed or apparent in the writing that controls.  The obligation of a contractor depends upon his expressed, not his actual, intention.  Williston on Contracts, §§ 608, 610, 629.  The parties are bound by the language used regardless of their intent.  The terms of the writing are exclusive, and, therefore a contract may have a meaning different from that which either party supposed it to have.  American Law Institute Restatement, Contracts, vol. 1, § 230.  _Corn Exchange, etc., Phil. v. Taubel_, 113 N.J.L. 605, 608-609 (E. & A. 1934).  **A.
[brief] They failed to provide that the - - the tub was in a dangerous condition because they failed to provide the Court with any standard, any code, regulation or any - - even the opinion of [...], if he could have said I think that - - you know, in my opinion as a civil engineer with 25 years experience and having graduated and being a licensed engineer in four states that it’s required at this height, in this position, in this place, and this is why it has to go in that position.  We don’t have that.  So I - - I find that the defendant did not breach a duty owed to the plaintiff, that the expert failed to establish that - - that an installation of a grab bar under these circumstances was necessary or required to make the tub reasonably safe and to find that it was unreasonable without it .
[brief] There can be no question that the Redevelopment Plan is "substantially inconsistent" with the 1988 Master Plan in its most important particulars --- the density/height of the mixed use development approved, and the increase and enhancement of public parking to be available for the amusement businesses, and public beach/recreation.  The specifics of the Master Plan in its Land Use Element cannot be ignored or trumped by vague references to an amorphous goal of "appropriate use of waterfront locations" or similar vagueness.  The record confirms that both the Planning Board and Governing Body "consistency" review was misguided and cursory.
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE NON-MOVING PARTY, BY MAKING CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS AND BY DECIDING GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYER AND AGAINST [...] (Pa837; 3T)  The governing standard for granting summary judgment provides that a court should grant summary judgment only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c); Brill, 142 N.J. at 528-529.  Conversely, a trial court must deny summary judgment if the non-moving party presents evidence that supports a genuine issue of material fact.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529.
[brief] A pension fund is based upon actuarial principles incorporating known or reasonably anticipated statistics with regard to life expectancies and present and future payments into and out of the fund, to the end that all the members may be served without jeopardizing the financial soundness of the fund.  In consideration of the other contributing members of the fund, the benefits of a few cannot be enhanced by ad hoc salary increases intended to increase retirement allowances without adequate compensation to the fund.  Clearly the actions of the local boards and the subsequent demands of the respondents have a something-for-nothing color to them which should be deplored.
[brief] Both New York and New Jersey have a shared history in the manner in which they apply and interpret their anti-discriminatory statutes.  (“Both laws prohibit, among other things; employers from...discriminating against employees on the basis of...disability. ”, Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 460, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  [...] have the right to enjoy legally protected time off from their jobs to address certain medical needs without penalty.  Use of statutory medical leave to address illness or disability protected under the NJLAD or ADA is a protected act which cannot be punished as a matter of law.  The employers interpretation of its policy in which it assigns an absence infraction or attributing penalty points towards a penalty for such legally protected absences violates the Civil Service law, and the NJLAD as it applies the principles of the ADA.
[brief] On November 17, 2021, [...] denied defendant’s amended first PCR petition.  [...] squarely addressed defendant’s argument that [...]’ habeas petition was new evidence which justified granting defendant a new trial:  Petitioner requests that this court find that there is sufficient evidence that [...] recanted his trial testimony and, therefore, a new trial is warranted.  Petitioner argues that [...] is “not a witness that is worthy and belief and that his testimony alone resulted in [Petitioner’s] conviction” and thus mandates a new trial.  . . .  During the evidentiary hearing on July 27, 2021, the court listened closely to [...] to assess his credibility and the reasonableness of his testimony.  . . .  Petitioner's argument is cumulative and fails because the jury was aware of the inconsistencies in [...]’ testimony and still felt that Petitioner was guilty of the crimes charged.  The main point at issue in Petitioner’s argument is the contradiction between the statements in [...]’ habeas corpus petition and his trial testimony.  Specifically, [...], as part of his federal habeas corpus petition submitted in August 2008, claimed to have no prior knowledge of the events stemming from the Staten Island robbery before the crime occurred and that he previously sought to introduce an affidavit from [...] (who was deceased at the time) that would have included false statements that supported [...]’ claim that he had no knowledge of the Staten Island home invasion beforehand.  However, [...]’ testimony at Petitioner’s trial in October 2009, his affidavit from July 2018, and his testimony at the evidentiary hearing on July 27, 2021, are consistent.  Moreover, during the evidentiary hearing in July 2021, [...] was forthcoming about his effort to introduce the false affidavit for his habeas petition and did not seek to deny such actions.  Thus, while [...] has admitted to lacking candor to a court in the past, this court finds that a new trial is not warranted because the jury during Petitioner's trial was aware of the inconsistencies in [...]' testimony, yet still found that the weight of the evidence against Petitioner warranted a guilty verdict.
[brief] (Pa1).  An Answer was filed on behalf of defendants on January 24, 2022.  (Pa12).  A motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the defendants on February 28, 2024 on the grounds that they were relieved of their duty to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe premises because they argued that the raised foot of the barricade that caused the plaintiff to trip and fall was open and obvious and the ¹ Transcript and Appendix Reference Key 1T – Transcript of the April 12, 2024 Motion Hearing Pa – Plaintiff-Appellant’s Appendix plaintiff saw a raised barricade foot when she entered the store.  (Pa22; 1T6:15-7:5).  Opposition to the motion was filed on behalf of the plaintiff in which it was argued that the contention that the dangerous condition was open and obvious and/or that the plaintiff saw it while entering the store did not relieve the defendants of the duty they owed her as a business invitee but was rather an issue as to the affirmative defense of comparative negligence and that there were disputed issues of fact to be resolved by the jury.  (Pa57; 1T6:6-8:2).  The motion was argued before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on April 12, 2024 who found that the raised barricade foot was an open and obvious condition as a matter of law and that the defendants, therefore, did not owe the plaintiff a duty to warn of the condition.  (1T11:20-13:18).  An Order was filed later that day granting the motion and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.  (Pa40).  A motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Complaint was filed on behalf of the plaintiff on April 17, 2024.
[brief] ”  *Sherwood*, at *11-12; see also Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Adamson*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106758 (E.D. Va. Sept. 15, 2010) (mold exclusion barred coverage for count alleging that negligent failure to remedy water intrusion resulted in mold) *rec. adopted* 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106741 (E.D. Va. Oct. 6, 2010); *State Farm Lloyds v. Chandler*, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44285 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2005) (same).  In a final attempt to wrongly import first-party property rules into this third-party case, [...] asks this Court to create coverage by implication.
[directive] / / 날짜 피고인  Date Defendant / 피고측 변호인  Defense Attorney / 검사 Prosecutor  이 유죄 인정 합의는 검사의 권고와는  별개로 판사가 최고의 형량을 선고할 수 있다는 조건부 암시의 [ ] 결과로 이루어 진 것임.
[brief] The issue before the Court is whether the trial court erred in refusing to require that a court-appointed trustee and administrator of a (formerly) revocable trust and decedent’s estate is statutorily obligated to provide an accounting of the estate and trust upon a beneficiary’s request after more than two years have passed since the appointment of the trustee and administrator.  Plaintiff submits that the trial court’s dismissal of the action at the return date of the order to show cause is subject to the “plenary” or “de novo” standard of review, and that the Order dismissing the Verified Complaint should be reversed.  **POINT II**
[brief] (17T217-23 to 218-1, 221-21 to 22).  Defendant was the only perpetrator of this crime.  There was no pressure to commit these murders.  While the weapon should not have been left unsecured with ammunition near it, defendant was the sole force in choosing to remove it from the closet, loading it, loading the magazine with 30 projectiles, securing the magazine into the assault firearm and pulling the trigger with a five-pound pull, not once, not twice, but 14 separate times.  The third factor weighs against the defendant.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the decision of the [...] refusing to provide a defense and indemnity the [...] on claims in the Reck litigation and order the [...] to defend and indemnify the [...] on all claims going forward.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant, the [...]  By: /s/[...]  [...]  Dated: 3/20/24 May 22, 2024  Via eCourts [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  [...]  [...]  Re: [...] v. Office of the [...] [...]  Docket No. [...]
[brief] Request for plenary hearing denied; remand order issued for consideration of all factors for award of counsel fees pursuant to 5:3-5.  12.  Appellant filed an OTSC to Stay the Order of 8/16/2020 and requested the Court expedite his current motions so that the looming deadline for refinancing of his home could be met.  The OTSC was heard on 9/21/2020 (Transcript T3).  Denial issued by way of Order dated 9/21/2020 (Da69).  13.  Appellant filed a Motion for Termination of Child Support due to overpayment of support as per Probation’s own published records.  The Order of 10/25/2021 granted Appellant’s request for termination of child support, and required a “full accounting” of the support account record.  14.  Appellant filed a Motion for the Enforcement of the Order of 10/25/2021.
[brief] There, the court analyzed whether a factual statement from a defendant who entered a guilty plea to the charge of reckless manslaughter was sufficient to support a conviction based upon the admission he made.  The facts upon which the plea was based included a statement by the defendant that the decedent had been injured while he was being pursued by him, that he assaulted the decedent, robbed him, forced him to remove most of his clothing and then left him, intoxicated, incoherent, injured and bleeding alone in the woods in the midwinter cold.
[brief] \end{array}\]  DATED: August 23, 2024  \textsuperscript{13}  On July 10, 2024, [...] signed legislation that, for the first time, recognizes a property right to surplus equity in a tax foreclosure.  \textit{P.L. 2024, c. 39}.  \textsuperscript{14}  Vesting of title in the absence of a sheriff’s sale is referred to as “strict foreclosure. ”  \textit{See Landa v. Adams}, 162 \textit{N.J. Super.} 318, 323 (App. Div. 1978).  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...], in her official capacity as Collector of Taxes, and [...], in his official capacity as Mayor of East Orange, Defendants-Respondents.  DOCKET NO. [...]