ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Southport Dev. Group, Inc. v. Twp. of Wall, 310 N.J. Super. 548, 556 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 384 (1998) (“It is also appropriate to look to the previous actions or inactions of the plaintiff; if it sat idly by in the past, its entitlement to enlargement of the time limit is weakened”).  3.  Density and Traffic (Pa55 – Pa58; Pb21 – Pb23).
[brief] c.  **Obligation to Cooperate. **  The [...] and the [...] acknowledge that in order for [...] to construct its Inclusionary Development, [...] will be required to obtain any and all necessary and applicable agreements, approvals, and permits from all relevant public entities and utilities; such as, by way of example only, the [...], the Planning [...], the [...], the Passaic County Planning [...], the [...], the [...], and the like, including the [...]’s ordinance requirements as to site plan and subdivision approval (the “Required Approvals”).
[brief] This measure was taken in an effort to “reduce the costs associated with the publication of the ordinance in its entirety. ” (Pa198).  The amendment permitted the publication of an ordinance “in its entirety or by title…together with…a clear and concise statement…setting forth the purpose of the ordinance,” among other requirements.  Ibid.  Based on this Legislative history, it is clear that the Legislature wanted the notice to alert the public that an action was being taken by a municipality without having to provide a lengthy and costly notice.  Providing a statement of purpose for adopting the ordinance accomplishes this goal.
[brief] [Y]ou’re … 100% that that’s not you?”  (Da 40-41; 25T 45-22 to 46-15; Da 17 at 27:25 to 27:55)  [...] responded, “I’m 110% that’s not me. ”  (Da 41; 25T 46-16; Da 17 at 27:55 to 27:57)  Detectives pushed [...] for a third time.  “And you don’t know … [w]ho the individual is?”  (Da 41; 25T 46-17 to 19; Da 17 at 27:57 to 27:59)  [...] responded, “No way, hold up …. No way.  I swear …. I swear, no way.  I would never in my life do nothing like this. ”  (Da 41; 25T 46-20 to 25; Da 17 at 27:58 to 28:06)  Detectives attempted a minimization tactic on the fourth attempt.
[brief] The term “documents” shall include electronically stored information.  The affidavit shall include a representation that [...] has produced all responsive discovery requested by plaintiff.  The affidavit shall include a representation that if any responsive documents are being withheld on the ground of privilege that the document is identified on a privilege log that has been produced to plaintiff.  The affidavit shall also explain why [...]'s recently produced e-mails were not identified on a privilege log produced to plaintiff before October 12, 2012.
[brief] See Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 466 (App. Div. 2000) (finding no issue with the adoption of the hourly rate charged by the prevailing party’s counsel where “[a]lthough the judge's acceptance of the hourly rate [was] not accompanied by any findings of fact concerning the prevailing rates in the community, the rates for counsel work [did] not appear unreasonable.  Defendant has not challenged plaintiff's attorney's hourly rate of $200. ”); Seigelstein, 464 N.J. Super. at 406 (noting in a statutory fee shifting case that, once the prevailing party submits evidence supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed, “the party opposing the fee award then has the burden to challenge, by affidavit or brief with sufficient specificity to give fee applicants notice, the reasonableness of the requested fee.
[brief] The court quoted and relied on a 1996 FTC Staff Letter involving similar facts which stated:  The **purpose** of the letter is […] to obtain recipients’ telephone numbers so that they can be contacted by a creditor or collector in connection with the collection of debts allegedly owed by them to third parties.  **To the extent that the letter serves a collection function** (albeit an indirect collection function), which we believe it does, it brings your client within the coverage of the FDCPA.  *Id.* at 1147 (italics removed, emphasis added).  Here, the only purpose for Defendant’s conveyance of the information was to prepare and mail Defendant’s dunning letter.  Thus, doing so “serves a collection function” and “is in connection with the collection of debts.
[brief] [...] also analyzed the published Guerin opinion, concluding that the trial court in that case found that the loan at issue was a pay-when-able loan and that the statute of limitations did not run until the debtor was financially able to pay.  Da39.  Finally, the trial court analyzed the facts and holding of the published Denville case, concluding that the Appellate Division’s holding in Denville “does not definitely rule out pay-when-able loans. ”  Da40.  [...] found that the Denville Court held only that when there is no time stated concerning the time that payment on a loan is due, the loan presumptively is deemed to be a demand loan.
[brief] THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE WAIVER AND ARBITRATION PROVISIONS OF [...]’S SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACT ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS (Pa256)  An arbitration agreement must satisfy the elements necessary for the formation of a contract under state law.  A legally enforceable agreement requires mutual assent and a “meeting of the minds,” Atalese v. U. S. Legal Servs. Grp., LP, 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014), citing First Options of Chi, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) and Morton v. 4 Orchard Land Trust, 180 N.J. 118 (2004).  “Mutual assent requires that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which they have agreed. ”  Atalese, supra. 219 N.J. at 442.  “The initial inquiry must be whether the agreement to arbitrate all, or any portion, of a dispute is the product of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law.
[brief] [Pa343a]  The OAE Chief of Investigations sent an August 9, 2021 letter to the Firm requesting a written explanation for the overdraft.  [Pa344a]  In response, [...] stated that he deposited a $100,000 check to the Firm’s trust account on July 31, 2012, which “was made to accommodate all office bonuses that were being paid” from that account.  [Id.]  [...] asserted that he then issued an employee bonus check for $7,500 from the Firm trust account.  Prior to the deposit, however, the Firm trust account contained only $4,595.83.  [Id.]  [...] reportedly directed the employee to refrain from cashing the $7,500 check until after the $100,000 check had cleared, but the employee failed to do so, which overdrew the trust account.  [Id.]  The OAE requested additional information from the Firm and [...] on August 20, 2012, including copies of bank statements for May, June, and July 2012, three-way reconciliations, client ledger cards, and a list of all employees receiving a “bonus” from the Firm trust account.  [Pa345a]  On August 31, 2012, [...] explained that the $4,595.83 in the Firm trust account before the $100,000 deposit consisted of “client funds, belonging to [...] ($200), [...] ($100), [...] ($1,970.24), and [...] ($1,406.62). ”  [Pa345a]  [...] further explained that the $100,000 deposit “represented settlement proceeds for his client … and that [the Firm] was entitled to a $30,000 fee, of which $7,500 was paid to [Firm employee] [...], and the balance of $22,500 was disbursed to [the Firm]. ”  [Pa346a]  Unsatisfied with the information provided, the OAE “believed that the postdated check and the improper distributions from the [Firm trust account] warranted further review. ”  [Pa346a]  Accordingly, the OAE scheduled [...] for “a demand audit and requested client ledger cards, the status of the trust account balance, and an explanation for inactive client balances.
[brief] 700 cubic yards of construction and demolition materials and 8,000-9,000 of cubic yards of asphalt millings, deposited by hundreds of dump trucks, are not a “paving” project – particularly where there was no paving.  Moreover, the volume of materials that was dispersed across [...]’s 2.5-acre parking area was so extensive that it raised the ground level by three feet in some locations — preventing access to the docking bays and rendering the Leased Premises completely unusable.  [Pa163, Pa305 at ¶¶ 5-10]  But even if [...]’s misguided intention was to undertake a paving project, the unauthorized importation of any volume of solid waste constitutes a breach of numerous Lease and settlement provisions regardless of [...]’s intent.
[brief] (16T73-23-75-6).  That accident was the subject of [...]’s personal injury case and she was compensated for the property loss of that vehicle.  [...] testified that [...] was supposed to pay for the Lexus from those proceeds if she wanted to keep it:  [S]aleena told me she was going to pay me for it and she called me and said she’ll have the money in a couple of days.  So when she did I’d just signed the back of the title.  That was my understanding with her when I bought the car, that she would pay for it.  [15T108-8-13].  She never did.  [...] instead stole the Lexus title from [...]’s filing cabinet.
[directive] Sample Stationhouse Adjustment Agreement – Long Form (Must be read to juvenile and parent/guardian/caseworker/designee)  Case No.: _____________  Date of Incident: _____________  Juv. ID No.: _____________  Ethnicity*  _____________  D.O.B. _____________  Age ______ Sex: M / F * 1.  Caucasian 2. Black 3. Hispanic 4. Asian/Pacific Islander 5.  American Indian 6.  Southern Asian 7.  ________ (If ethnicity is not apparent, ask the subject or her/his parent/guardian/caregiver/designee.)  Juvenile: _________________________________________  Parent(s) /Guardian/Caregiver/Designee _________________________________________  Address: _________________________________________  Offense: _________________________________________  I wish to have this matter handled through the process of a stationhouse adjustment.
[brief] In addition, the unverified [...] report that was merely sent by email to Defendant’s counsel by the in-house process server (who never testified to its authenticity) contains a GPS location which does not match the Defendant’s home address and a GPS time stamp for the year 2031.  The GPS coordinates provided by the in-house process server in the email alone simply do not support personal service in this case.  The Affidavits of Service do not appear on their face to be valid and thus are not entitled to that presumption of validity.
[brief] It is admitted and undisputed that Plaintiff was aware that, at the time of Plaintiff’s attempted real estate transaction, the property was the subject of a then-existing and pending Foreclosure Action - but Plaintiff did not move to intervene in the Foreclosure Action to obtain that court’s review and approval of his proposed real estate “deal. ”  Under the New Jersey Tax Sale Law and Simon v. Cronecker, that unequivocally renders the contract for sale unenforceable.
[brief] (Pa179; Pa243).  Subsequently, Plaintiff met with [...] to discuss the application process for the dual degree program and other general program requirements.  (Pa244).  During the Spring Semester of 2013, Plaintiff also spoke with [...] (“[...]”), who advised him that he would be able to matriculate to the MBA program later when his GPA was where it needed to be so that he would still finish the dual degree program by 2016.  (Pa246; Pa458).  At the end of Plaintiff’s first year in the Pharm.D program, which included the Fall, Spring, and Summer semesters, Plaintiff attained a 2.75 GPA.  (Pa256).  However, during the Summer Semester of 2013, Plaintiff learned he would not be able to enroll in course work for the MBA master’s track program, and therefore, could not start the dual degree program.
[directive] This directive promulgates revisions to current the # Court Program Participation Agreement and supersedes directive 14-20.  In this revised agreement, marijuana was added to bullet point number four which states that the participant agrees not to use or possess alcohol, marijuana, or illegal drugs.  The Judicial Council approved the revision.  Questions regarding this policy may be directed to [...], Statewide Drug Court Manager via email at [...] or telephone at [...] by ext. 55316.  Attachment (Form CN 10981)
[brief] ......................................  25  Marcovecchio v.  Wright Medical Group, Inc., 2019 WL 1406606 (D. Utah March 28, 2019) ............... 17 Mathews v. Univ. Loft Co., 387 N.J. Super. 349 (App. Div. 2006) ............................................ 7 McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 227 N.J. 569 (2017) ..................................................... 28 McDaniel v. Bieffe USA, Inc., 35 F. Supp.2d 735 (D. Minn. 1999) ............................................. 15 In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F. Supp.2d 1147 D. Minn. 2009), aff’d, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010) ....... 27 Modelski v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 707 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. 1999) ............... 10 Morales v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 382 F. Supp.2d 1285 (D.N.M. 2005) ............................................. 16 Morrison v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 891 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. App. 1994), transfer denied (Mo. Feb. 12, 1995) ......
[brief] Plaintiff attempted to make much of the fact that the Defendant, along with his sister, became constructive trustees of their father’s home by way of a deed dated February 13, 2017 which the Defendant’s father previously owned and lived in until his death (1T:195, L14 – 1T:197, L17) (1T:18 – and the Defendant did not identify this as an asset in his April 12, 2017 CIS.  This deed was admitted into evidence by the Defendant and does not appear in the Plaintiff’s Appendix.  The Plaintiff did not explain whether or not it was a mere coincidence that although almost seven (7) years had elapsed since [...] began college, less than one (1) month had elapsed between the public recording of the February 13, 2017 deed with the Defendant’s name on it and the filing of her motion seeking a college contribution for both children along with a myriad of other stale claims.  There was no evidence admitted at trial about the value of the Defendant’s father’s home or the total amount of liens, if any, which existed against this property.  Plaintiff also attempted to make much of the fact that the Defendant asked for a 1098T from the Plaintiff (although they are generated by the loan companies) for [...] only because he claimed [...] as a dependent every year on his tax returns and he needed them to “complete [his] taxes” (1T:192, L21 – 1T:193, L12) (Pa267).
[brief] (Da25 at 13:22 to 13:30) activated because the car is stopped.  (Da25 at 00:35 to 00:40)  And as for the tinted windows, [...] testified that the front driver’s-side and passenger-side windows were tinted.  (2T:11-10 to 11)  By the time the video shows the driver’s-side window, it is rolled all the way down.  (Da26 at 00:32 to 00:36)  And though the passenger-side window is up for the beginning of the traffic stop, the interior of the car is visible through the window.  (Da25 at 01:05 to 01:08)⁶  The detectives approached the vehicle on both sides and began asking the driver, [...], questions.
[brief] (2T 122-24 to 123-13)  He denied involvement in the Edison T-Mobile robbery.  (2T 123-16 to 22)  He implicated [...] and [...], as the drivers, in the AT&T robbery, and a third person, whose identity he did not know.  (2T 124-7 to 16)  He swore to the police that he, [...], and [...] robbed the store on December 8th 2011.  (2T 124-25 to 125-2)  A women, whom he identified as [...]'s "girl," [...], drove them from the scene.  (2T 125-3 to 17)  [...] admitted that his goal in talking to the police on January 12th, 2012 was to be released and to that end, he told the police that "he'd be willing to set people up."  (2T 135-14 to 20)
[brief] (SSR p. 17 at TRVa1347.)  Second, the CCIP Policies were issued to [...], not [...], but [...] claims [...] was a “Named Insured” under the Named Insured – Contractor Controlled Insurance Program endorsement (TRVb16), which adds the following to the “Who Is An Insured” section:  1.  Subject to Paragraph 2, below, a contractor of any tier, including the person or organization designated in the Declarations of this policy will qualify as a Named Insured, if such contractor: a. Is enrolled in the Contractor Controlled Insurance Program for which this policy is provided; and b. Performs operations at a “designated project”.  2.  Unless added by separate endorsement, the following are not an insured under this policy:  c.  Any contractor or other person or organization that does not have dedicated payroll for employees on-site at the "designated project".  (Italics added.) (TRVa146.)  Documents produced during discovery prove that [...] was not actually “enrolled” in the CCIP at the time of the December 2015 Accident, and could not have been enrolled since it was unenrolled in August 2015.
[brief] Further, even assuming en arguendo that [...] has standing to file exceptions to the Intermediate Account, his exceptions are flawed and fail pursuant to R. 4:87-8 of the Court Rules, which states “[t]he exceptions shall state particularly the item or omission excepted to, the modification sought in the account and the reasons for the modification. ”  In addition “an exception may be stricken because of its insufficiency in law. ”  Id.  [...]’s exceptions are insufficient as a matter of law because they relate to style rather than substance, concern matters of fiduciary discretion or do not relate to the accounting.  For the foregoing reasons, this matter can proceed summarily.  The Intermediate Account is approved.  [...] is discharged as co-trustee of the …Trust.  24a-34a.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division On Appeal from Cumberland County after Conflict Transfer from Atlantic County Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. (Initial Hearing – Remanded)) Hon. [...], J.S.C. (Hearing on Remand)  Civil Action (Appeal after Remand)  Docket No. Below: [...]  App. Div. Docket No.: [...]  PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S AMENDED
[brief] First, as discussed above, the trial court properly found that the knock-and-announce requirement of the search warrant was in fact complied with.  Second, as correctly held by the trial court, “even if the officer’s failure to activate their cameras is deemed a violation, the exclusionary rule, a punitive court created sanction to deter police misconduct, is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of a police procedure contained in the Attorney General directive. ” (Da25).  And finally, a rebuttable presumption that exculpatory evidence was destroyed when police do not utilize their body worn cameras as mandated by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2) does not apply here because the search pre-dates the statute; and, even if it did apply the State successfully rebutted the presumption because – as discussed above – the trial court found that the knock-and-announce requirement was complied with.
[brief] [5T 71-22 to 72-15].  [...] also presented the testimony and unrebuted report of [...], an expert in senior housing market study and needs analysis.  [3T 120-21 to 122-19; Pa120].  [...] explained 70-80% of residents of a particular multi-level senior housing community lived within 15 minutes of the site, which in this case, translated to a 7-mile circle around the Property that he called the primary market area (the “PMA”).  [3T 124-14 to 130-16; 4T 32-3 to 33-21].  [...] examined the supply of the types of housing [...] intended to provide in the PMA and determined a significant (and growing) undersupply with 401 independent living units, 542 assisted living units and 302 memory care units existing within the PMA but a net demand (i.e., unfulfilled) of 1,001 units for independent living, 588 units for assisted living and 261 units for memory care in the PMA that is currently not being met.
[brief] From the time the Congregation opened in the early 1960s, the lower entrance to the synagogue located on the Fifth Street Lot was utilized by the members of the Congregation mainly when there were events held in the synagogue’s auditorium “because they could go in straight into the auditorium [and they] don’t have to go up the steps. ”  Id., at 45:13-46:7.  18.  In furtherance of the 1963 Agreement, the Congregation also connected its HVAC system (“Congregation’s HVAC system”) to the boiler room located on the Subject Property now owned by Defendant.  (Da123-143 and Da948)  19.  Plaintiff’s continued utilization of the Subject Property was consistent with and fully authorized by easement rights granted in the 1963 Agreement.
[directive] 1  Certifico que las declaraciones que anteceden hechas par mi son veraces.  Se que si cualquiera de las declaraciones que anteceden hechas parmi es intencionalmente falsa, estare sujeto a un castigo.  1 certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that If any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.
[brief] Da102.  The Court granted the [...]’ motion under N.J.S.A. 20:3-30, which states that "just compensation shall be determined as of the date of the earliest of the following events . . . (d) the date of the declaration of blight by the governing body upon a report by a planning board pursuant to section 38 of P.L.1971, c.361 (C.20:3-38)."  Having voluntarily chosen that route to benefit from the higher property value of 1994, the [...] cannot ask for compensation for FFE that only existed in 2018.
[brief] For all the reasons above, Appellants respectfully request that the Appellate Division issue an order:  1.  [...]’s August 22, 2023 Final Decision a. Reversing the [...]’s August 22, 2023 Final Agency Decision; b. Finding that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) with regard to Counts 1 and 4 of the Complaint; and c. Reinstating the penalty of “censure. ”  2.  [...]’s July 26, 2022 Decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer  a.  Reversing the [...]’s July 26, 2022 dismissal of Count 5 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24. 1(e); b.  Reversing the [...]’s July 26, 2022 dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1 (a) and (e); and c.  Reinstating Counts 2, 3, and 5 of the Complaint for further proceeding before the [...].
[brief] The summation by Plaintiff’s counsel exceeded the four corners of the evidence by misstating and distorting the facts.  This conduct deprived Appellants of a fair trial and was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  The scope of a party’s summation must not exceed the “four corners of the evidence. ”  State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295 (1996); State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 (2004)(applying State v. Loftin and stating that the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could not consider the portion of defendant's counsel's summation that exceeded the scope of evidence presented at trial).
[brief] Turning to the merits, the State argues that the phrase “so turn” in the second sentence of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 refers to all the movements listed in the first sentence, such that the statute prohibits making any of those movements without signaling in the event any other traffic may be affected.  (Sb 17-22)  In so doing, the State seeks to have this Court ignore the plain meaning of the word “turn” and hold that whenever a car “move[s] right or left upon a roadway” or “start[s] or back[s],” it accomplishes a turn.  Even under the State’s proffered definition of the word “turn,” this makes no sense.  The State argues that a “turn” occurs whenever a vehicle rotates its wheel (Sb 20), but no rotation of the wheel is necessary when a vehicle “start[s] or back[s].”  To the contrary, a motorist must merely step on the gas and, if the gear is in drive, the car will start from a stopped position, and if it is in reverse, the car will back up.  Thus, under the State’s own definition of the word “turn,” a vehicle that “start[s] or back[s]” does not “turn.