ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Mazur was a medical malpractice nursing home case wherein the Complaint alleged negligence, malpractice, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent training.  The core allegation was that defendants’ untimely diagnosis and treatment of a stroke deviated from the standard of care.  The negligent hiring count incorporated the allegations as to [...] and plaintiff argued that [...] deviated from the standard of care when caring for the patient.  Plaintiff did file an Affidavit of Merit in Mazur, issued by [...], stating that the standard of care was not met, and that the nursing teams and [...]’s deviations contributed to the patient’s debilitating condition.  [...] was certified in emergency and internal medicine.  [...] filed an Answer, stating that his field of specialty was geriatrics, that he was Board Certified in geriatrics, and that the treatment involved geriatrics.  However, the statement that Shah was Board Certified was false.  Although he was once Board Certified in geriatrics, he was not certified for several years or more before he began to treat the plaintiff.  Also, a month before the Ferreira conference, [...]’s counsel sent a letter to plaintiff’s counsel stating that [...] was treating the plaintiff as a Board Certified geriatric specialist and, therefore, [...] was not qualified, as an emergency room physician, to offer the Affidavit.  On the Motion to Dismiss, the Certification of defense counsel repeated the false assertion that [...] was Board Certified in geriatric medicine.  They attached an internet printout, stating that Shah’s Board Certification in internal medicine expired on December 31, 2006, and his Board Certification in geriatric medicine expired on December 31, 2008.  Both the Court and counsel overlooked those dates.  The Trial Court granted the Motion to Dismiss on the basis that plaintiff’s affiant was not Board Certified in geriatrics.
[brief] State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429, 441 (App. Div. 2017).  Generally, admissibility of evidence rests within “the sound discretion of the trial court. ”  State v. Willis, 225 N.J. 85, 96 (2016).  An abuse of discretion is found only when the court has made a “clear error of judgment. ”  State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 313 (1988).  The court’s evidentiary decision should be sustained unless it resulted in a “manifest denial of justice. ”
[brief] “Very often it happens that only the applicant submits any evidence to the board but it should be noted that the absence of evidence in support of denial of a requested variance does not itself mean that the board’s denial of a variance is arbitrary.  The burden rests with the applicant to demonstrate that the affirmative evidence in the record dictates the conclusion that a denial would be arbitrary. ”  Cox, supra, at pp.262, citing Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj. Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1 (App Div. 1976).  “It was not the burden of the board to find affirmatively that the [master] plan would be substantially impaired…it was the burden of the applicant to prove the converse. ”  Weiner v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of Glassboro, 144 N.J. Super. 509, 516 (App. Div. 1976).  Consequently, Plaintiffs’ claim that they are entitled to the use variance they sought in this case rests entirely upon the probative value, credibility, and thoroughness of the affirmative testimony of Plaintiffs’ witnesses on both the positive and negative criteria applicable to use variances.  The Board’s essential finding in its Resolution is that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof and the Board was therefore obliged to deny the application.  Ja043.  Key testimony of the Plaintiffs’ Planner and Traffic Engineer were found by the Board to be inadequate.  Ja041, Ja042, Ja043.  “…it is well settled that the Board has the choice of rejecting or accepting the testimony of witnesses.  Where reasonably made, such choice is conclusive on appeal. ”  Kramer v. Bd. of Adjust., Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 288 (1965).  Thus, if this Court finds as a matter of law, as the Trial Court did, that the nature of the use and the height of the building proposed in [...] are material to the Board’s use variance decision and proper subjects for consideration, then the Board’s rejection of the testimony of Plaintiffs’ witnesses, which, as will be shown below did not adequately address those issues, must be conclusive on appeal.  The Board’s finding that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof must then again be upheld, as it was by the Trial Court.
[brief] [...], Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice Policymaking, 23 Psy. Pub. Pol. And L. 410, 413 (2017); [...], et al., Symposium: Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 641, 642, 645-46 (2016); [...] et al., Psychosocial Maturity and Desistence from Crime in a Sample of Serious Juvenile Offenders, U.S. Dep’t of Justice - Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Bulletin 6 (March 2015).  This transient misbehavior occurs because those in their late teens and early twenties continue to mature in a period that developmental scientists call “late adolescence.
[brief] Respondents Do Not Dispute The Fact That The New Motion Judge Raised And Decided Issues That They Did Not Raise (Pa13-20) | 5 | | B.  Neither Defendant Doctor Actually Met The Standard Of Care (Pa13-20) | 11 | | C.  The Court Framed A Heads Defendants Win, Tails Plaintiff Loses Hypothetical (Pa13-20) | 13 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases: - *Carbone v. Warburton*, 11 N.J. 418 (1953)  ...........................................................................................................  12 - *Carbone v. Warburton*, 22 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1952) ......................................................................................  12 - *Scafidi v. Seiler*, 119 N.J. 93 (1990) .................................................................................................................. 8  ##  Statutes and Other Authorities: - R. 4:46-2 ..................................................................................................................................  9, 10  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] ## Cases | Case | Page | |---------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Aristizibal v. Atlantic City, 380 N.J.Super. 405 (Law Div. 2005) | 33, 34 | | Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 (1962) | 42 | | Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263 (1958) | 42 | | Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) | 39 | | Cumberland Farms, Inc., v. Moffett, 218 N.J.Super. 331 (App. Div. 1987) | 42 | | Ferrari v. Melleby, 134 N.J.Super. 583 (App. Div. 1975) | 36 | | Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) | 39 | | Grasso v. Borough Council of Borough of Glassboro, 205 N.J.Super. 18 (App. Div. 1985) | 29, 30 | | In re Anthony Stallworth, 280 N.J.  182 (2011) | 46, 47 | | In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474 (2007) | 38 | | In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990) | .30, 31, 38 | | Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Land, 186 N.J. 163 | 43 | | Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 31 | | Napue v. People of State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) | 38 | | O'Rourke v. City of Lambertville, 405 N.J. 8 (App. Div. 2008), cert. denied 198 N.J. 311 (2009) | .32, 36, 37 | ix.
[brief] Id. at 540.  The right to summary judgment is a: [S]ubstantial one … and is more than a token procedural remedy under our rules, for it not only affords protection against groundless claims and frivolous defenses, saving the antagonists the time and expense of protracted litigation, but it also reserves judicial manpower and facilities to cases which meritoriously command attention.  State v. South Amboy Trust Co., 46 N.J. Super. 497, 500 (Law Div. 1957).  Thus, the summary judgment procedure is “designed to cut through sham and frivolity in a [complaint or] answer and lay the case before the trial court in its true light. ”  Monmouth Lumber v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 21 N.J. 439, 448 (1956).  It has been said that the “summary judgment procedure pierces the allegations of the pleadings to show that the facts are otherwise than as alleged. ”
[brief] (Pa151)  [...] complained, inter alia, about “the transfer or assignment of the Todd managers’ debts and obligations incurred while mere activist investors in 7/13, to try to ‘buy’ an as yet unannounced 11/13 election, for well over $500,000, evidenced in a letter [and] at least one contract…,” (Pa157), and that certain managers “wrongfully approved a $500,000 assignment of their personal obligations and debts contracted to [...]… to the LLC in 2016 illegally and secretly…” (Pa166-167)
[brief] Financial Responsibility Under the MCS-90 Is Limited to Actual Remediation Costs and Does Not Include Punitive or Other Damages Designed to Punish or Deter.  While it is [...]’s primary position that the Court erred in granting summary judgment against [...] under the MCS-90 endorsement, the Court also erred in ordering [...] to pay $750,000 to [...] instead of [...]’s actual alleged remediation costs of $475,623.87. \footnote{[...] does not concede that the alleged $475,000 in remediation costs incurred by [...] were reasonable or appropriate – an issue which [...] also raised with the Court below.}  By the terms of the MCS-90 endorsement as well as New Jersey law prohibiting the insurability of punitive/exemplary damages, any award against [...] under the MCS-90 endorsement should have been limited to the amount of [...]’s actual alleged remediation costs; not treble damages or fines/penalties.  The MCS-90 endorsement provides that [...] will pay “any final judgment recovered . . . for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles[.]”
[brief] (Pa779-785).  [...] was counsel for the Homeowners and appeared at each and every hearing before the ZBA.  (Pa779; Pa412; Pa496; Pa625).  In that capacity, [...] had personal knowledge of all hearings, was the recipient of the May 25, 2022 letter from the Attorney for the ZBA alerting the parties to the audio malfunction and personally participated in the rehearings of August 22, 2022 and September 12, 2022 where a verbatim record of the proceedings was maintained consistent with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f).  (Pa779; Pa412; Pa496; Pa625; Pa787).
[brief] He initially involved his longtime attorney, [...], having him prepare the caveat.  [...] sent [...] a retainer agreement to represent him further in the will contest.  However, [...] informed [...] he was representing both [...] and [...] and referred to them as his co-clients.  [...] sent [...] a fee letter and even represented himself to the [...] as [...]’s attorney.  Despite [...]’s advice that he retain separate counsel, [...] did not request that [...] take further action on his behalf until the middle of 2018.
[directive] Page of Condiciones normales de libertad a prueba de adultos / Standard Conditions of Adult Probation  Nombre y apellido de la persona bajo libertad a prueba:  Número de la causa: Probationer Name: Docket Number: 9.  Mantendrá a las personas a su cargo y cumplirá con sus responsabilidades familiares.  You shall support your dependents and meet your family responsibilities.
[brief] 376a-380a.  On November 28, 2022, Appellant filed a sur-reply regarding the Fee Application.  386a-408a.  On December 22, 2022, the trial court heard argument on the Fee Application and the motion for reconsideration.  2T 3:1-46:10.  For the reasons stated on the record on February 17, 2023, the Honorable [...], P.J. Ch. entered the order dated March 7, 2023: (a) granting the Fee Application, but reducing Respondent’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs from $113,497.04 to $93,277.54; awarding accounting fees of $17,649.57; awarding income and corpus commissions totaling $2,029.53; and (b) denying the Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the Judgment.
[brief] ”  *Pierce*, 188 N.J. at 162 (quoting *State v. Dixon*, 346 N.J. Super. 126, 140 (App. Div. 2001)).  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6 authorizes courts to impose a period of parole ineligibility not to exceed one-half of the term of imprisonment, “[a]s part of a sentence for any crime, where the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7, in pertinent part, authorizes courts to impose a term of parole ineligibility not to exceed one-half of the term of imprisonment when the court imposes a discretionary extended term of imprisonment.
[brief] The OPRA statute provides that “[a] person who is denied access to a government record by the custodian of the record, at the option of the requestor, may [ ] institute a proceeding to challenge the custodian's decision by filing an action in Superior Court. ”  *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6*.  The statute further provides that “[a] requester who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee. ”  *Ibid.*
[brief] The affordability controls shall expire only after they are properly released by the Township and/or the Township’s Administrative Agent at the Township’s sole option in accordance with N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.11 for rental units or N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.5 for for-sale units.  (3)  Administrative Agent:  All affordable units shall be administered by a qualified Administrative Agent paid for by the developer.  (4)  Other Affordable Housing Unit Requirements:  Developers shall also comply with all of the other requirements of the Township’s Affordable Housing Ordinance, including, but not limited to, (1) affirmative marketing requirements, (2) candidate qualification and screening requirements, (3) integrating the affordable units amongst the market rate units, and (4) unit phasing requirements.
[brief] (Pa349 at T98:17-T99:3; Pa671 at T64:23-T65:4; Da120).  None of the performance issues discussed during the meeting originated from complaints of [...] personnel after [...] filed her EEO complaint.  (Pa349 at T101:5-24; Da121).  During the November 27, 2018 meeting, [...] claimed that Defendant [...] had sexually harassed her at work.  (Pa349 at T99:18-20; Pa684 at T114:10-13; Da121).  In response to her complaint, Defendant [...] decided to transfer [...] to [...]’s Camden office.
[brief] Finally, the Redevelopment Plan is intentionally designed to be built on the perimeter of [...], away from town centers and at the border of its adjoining municipality [...] (which has already approved the project) and is adjacent to the New Jersey Turnpike and US --- 7  Moreover, how the Committee later decides to allocate those funds will be the subject of separate municipal decision-making and financial planning that simply has no bearing on the legal question presented of whether the public has an interest in this ordinance that justifies enlarging the filing period.  322, major regional highways.  (Pa98).  Its purposeful location eliminates claims of intrusion within [...].  There simply is no support in the facts or the law for the proposition that this ordinance involves the use of public funds such that [...] should be excused from its failure to adhere to the limitations period of the court rules.
[brief] (Ja40, Ja63-71).  In December 2022, the court granted Defendants’ transfer motion.  (Ja72-73).  Following the exchange of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment in February 2023.  (Ja74).  In April 2023, Plaintiff cross-moved to hold the case in abeyance pending a decision from the United States Supreme Court in Tyler v. Hennepin County, Dkt. No. 22-166 (Tyler).
[brief] Second, there is a different legal theory for relief at issue in the Hudson County motion.  The Jersey City police officers who pursued, seized, searched, and arrested [...] did not activate their body worn cameras until after the chase was already well under way, despite having been actively engaged in searching for suspects.  Dra 1-4.  While the State’s witness was asked during his Union County testimony about his usage of body worn camera, that issue was not argued in the briefs submitted to the trial court in Union County or discussed by the judge in his decision denying [...]’s suppression motion.  Dra 1-4.  This is significant because N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2) creates “a rebuttable presumption that exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured in favor of a criminal defendant who reasonably asserts that exculpatory evidence was destroyed and not captured.  See State v. Jones, 475 N.J. Super. 520, 531-34 (App. Div. 2023) (applying the same to suppression hearings).  The Judge in Union County did not have the opportunity to afford [...] any kind of exculpatory inference, which, when applied in Hudson County, will have a significant effect on the disposition of the instant suppression motion.
[directive] Importantly, officers shall never engage in unnecessary, overly aggressive, or otherwise improper actions that create a situation where force becomes necessary.  2.4  Critical decision making.  Critical decision-making and tactical deployment techniques include tactical communication and tactical positioning, such as strategic redeployment and time as a tactic.  Critical decision-making and tactics require officers to do the following: (a) begin critical assessment and planning prior to arriving at the scene; 2 USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020
[brief] Defendant’s position can perhaps best be described as an exercise in hair splitting to the point of absurdity.  There was only one significant asset at issue between the parties in their divorce; i.e., [...].  It was the clearly stated intention of the parties that the proceeds from the sale of [...] would be evenly divided between them, after any then-existing credit card debt was paid off.  Unbeknownst to Plaintiff when she signed the PSA, however, [...] was never going to be sold.  That was all a ruse by Defendant.  He testified that the language in the PSA that the diner was listed for sale for $5.8 million was “meaningless” because he knew it would never be sold.  What Defendant knew, but withheld from Plaintiff, was that the State of New Jersey had already initiated eminent domain proceedings against [...], as part of a major roadwork project to eliminate the traffic circle at Routes 70 and 73.
[brief] (Aa047-049).  Applying those standards, the Commission declined to vacate the arbitration award because the [...] failed to demonstrate that: (1) the arbitrator failed to give “due weight” to the subsection 16g factors judged relevant to the resolution of the specific dispute; (2) the arbitrator violated the standards in N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 and -9; or (3) the award is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.  Finally, no weight should be given to the [...] not initially receiving the arbitrator’s appendices along with the interest arbitration award.
[brief] The doctrine “stems from the principle, rooted in reason and justice, that a party, in seeking legal redress, shall not be at liberty to take irreconcilable and repugnant positions. ”  Adams, 121 N.J.L. at 395 (emphasis added).  Therefore, in order to properly assert the doctrine of election of remedies, “there must in fact be two inconsistent remedies available to the party seeking enforcement of the claimed right.
[brief] [...] prepared an expert report detailing his examination of certain documents.  He examined the Agreement bearing the signatures of the Decedent and Petitioner and evaluated both reproductions and originals of documents bearing known signatures of the Petitioner, which ranged in date from 1989 through 2021.  (9T162-15 to 163-18).  [...] prepared two signature comparison charts showing the enlarged signatures in question and known signatures of the Petitioner.  He was asked to determine if the signatures of the Petitioner on the antenuptial agreement were genuine.  [...] opined that it was “highly probable” that both signatures of the Petitioner on the antenuptial agreement are genuine signatures.  “Highly probable” is an expression of virtual certainty under the standards of [...]’s profession.  He noted that it could not be a definite conclusion of identity due to working with a copy as opposed to an original document.  (9T163-20 to 167-14).  The standard of “highly probable” was the second highest rating given by forensic experts, which rests above a “probable” standard, which nevertheless still represents a very strong conclusion.  [...] has testified that in other cases where he found a probable standard, and those opinions and conclusions were accepted by the court, meaning he was not precluded from testifying.  (9T168-15 to 171-3).  [...]’s finding of “highly probable” in the instant case represents a finding of virtual certainty, which goes beyond the legal definition of a reasonable degree of certainty.  (9T171-10 to 12).  [...] also determined that the Petitioner’s two signatures were not a fabrication from another source.  He found no evidence of simulation of the signatures, commonly known as forgery in the legal field.  [...] also found no evidence of a cut and paste or manipulation with reference to the Petitioner’s signatures.  (9T172-9 to 174-5).  [...]’s expert testimony was uncontroverted, as the Petitioner failed to provide any expert testimony rebutting his opinions.  In assessing the credibility of the [...], the Chancery Division held as follows:  This court finds John Paul [...]e uncontroverted and extremely credible.  (Pa 26).
[brief] “I do find that the agreement is valid and enforceable; that [...] is to pay $1500 per month going back to the breach date, which would – so the first missed payment was actually July 5, 2017.  And that those monies are owed….  I am going to award 1083 days of penalty at $100 day, which is $108,300.  So the total amount due for the missed payments is $157,800 through June 22nd, which is today…”  (4T 25:11-15; 26:5-8)  Defendant’s ongoing failure to bring the support payments current resulted in the continued imposition of the same contractual penalty.  [...] was bound by the Appellate Division decision and applied that decision to the facts before him.
[directive] okresu pozbawienia the court could,  Do you understand that in its discretion, impose a minimum time in confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentence imposed?  Czy przyznał(a) się Pan(i) do jakiegokolwiek zarzutu, odbycia obowiązkowego który wymaga 7.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]
[directive] If the infant appears to be no more than 30 days old, shows no signs of abuse or neglect, and is delivered voluntarily by a parent or a parent has voluntarily arranged for another person to leave the infant at a police station or equivalent and no intent to return for the infant is expressed, the case 4 falls within the “New Jersey Safe Haven Infant Protection Act” and the procedures set forth under § 1.3 below shall be followed.  1.3