ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 4.  ¿Entiende que al declararse culpable y admitir que se trata de un delito o delitos violentos, usted renuncia a su derecho a que un jurado determine, más allá de una duda razonable, que están presentes las circunstancias que hacen que el delito o delitos sean violentos?  Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that the crime(s) are a violent crime you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the circumstance(s) that make the crime(s) a violent crime(s) are present?
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DECIDED CORRECTLY THAT APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE COGNIZABLE CLAIMS UNDER THE NJCFLA OR THE CFA (Raised Below:Pa43-Pa51)  A.  There is No Private Right of Action Under the NJCFLA  1.  This Court’s Recent Decisions Confirm Conclusively that There is No Private Right of Action  As an apparent predicate for Appellant’s CFA claims and, later, her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, she spent nearly 14 pages arguing that an implied private right of action exists under the NJCFLA. (Pb6-Pb17, Pb27-Pb28).  As the Appellate Division held recently, however, there is no such private right of action under the NJCFLA:  “Defendant’s claim cannot prevail as she may not enforce the CFLA’s license requirement because the Legislature did not provide a private right of action under the CFLA. ”  Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, a/s/o Bluestem Brands Inc/Santander Consumer USA v. Glover, No. A-3545-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS, at *10 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 18, 2024), citing Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171, 180, (App. Div. Mar. 14, 2024).  Notably, the same law firm that represents Appellant advanced the same legal theory in both Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC and Francavilla, which the Appellate Division rejected both times (including, in Francavilla, during the month prior to Appellant filing her Brief here).  The Appellate Division held the same in two other recent cases involving Appellant’s counsel, *N.A.R., Inc. v. [...]*, No. A-0322-23, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1313 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 24, 2024) and *Asset Acceptance, LLC v. [...]*, No. A-2827-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 820 (Super. Ct. App. Div. May 8, 2024).  There, too, the Court held that there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA.  These decisions end the matter.
[brief] Polzo v. Cnty of Essex (Polzo II), 209 N.J. 51, 75 (2012) citing Muhammad v. NJ Transit, 176 N.J. 185, 195 (2003).  In matters such as this one, the Courts have routinely found that the actions of the municipality raise a material issue of fact as to whether its conduct was palpably unreasonable.  In Polzo v. County of Essex 209 N.J. 51,35 A.3d 653 (2012), the Court stated that the actions of defendant [...] were not palpably unreasonable because [...] was responsible for an extensive network of roads and “a public entity might reasonably give lesser priority to the shoulder of a roadway, which is not intended for ordinary travel. ”
[brief] “As held by the appellate panel in Scardigli v. Borough of Haddonfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 300 N.J. Super. 314 (App.Div. 1997):  “N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f) directs the planning board to ‘provide for the verbatim recording of the proceedings by either stenographer, mechanical or electronic means. ’  Without such a record, courts are unable to engage in judicial review and ordinarily should remand for further proceedings.  Carbone v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Weehawken, 175 N.J.Super. 584, 586 (Law Div.1980) (because the submitted meeting minutes were inadequate and no verbatim record was made, matter remanded to planning board for rehearing); Lawrence M. Krain Assoc. v. Mayor of Tp. of Maple Shade, 185 N.J. Super. 336, 341 (Law Div.1982) (without verbatim recording of board of adjustment meeting, court could not decide if denial of variance was arbitrary or capricious, and remanded for new hearing on that part of the application).
[brief] In doing so, the motion judge not only disregarded the proposition that a jury not a judge decide issues of fact but disregarded the admonition that the question of whether an action is reasonably likely to deter protected activity depends on the surrounding facts because the “significance of any given act will often depend on the particular circumstances.  Context matters. ”  *Burlington Northern*, 548 U.S. at 69.  The U.S. Supreme Court held in an intellectual property case that when a “reasonable person” standard applies, a jury should decide the issue.  *Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank*, 574 U.S. 418 (2014).
[directive] Have any promises other than those mentioned on this form, or any threats, been made in order to [Yes/<>11] [No/otJ...1..8.]  22. cause you to plead guilty?  1t!-~ o]  1-F,l<>Jl ~4,'- o].S>]<>Jl, ;;z1"8"}7}  %~: '(178"6}7]] tj-~ ~4,'-o]t..j- ~'.ll°i3'Y7J}?  ~-g-i9_ ~~¾  Do you understand that the judge is not bound by any promises or recommendations of the [Yes/<>11] [No/otJ...1..8.]
[brief] Pursuant to the Appellate Division, a place of public accommodation is not free to offer its services in a hostile fashion.  Holmes v Jersey City Police Department, 449 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 2017).  By refusing to provide plaintiff with a signed Order from which he could appeal his unlawful conviction that would forever cause a stain and blight upon his reputation, the defendants provided plaintiff with hostile services and denied him of public accommodation.  R. 3:21-5(b) (Pa41)  Contrary to the defendants, there was no signed order of conviction given to the plaintiff or his attorney when previously requested.  Pa470-Pa484).
[brief] Appellants’ Responses Are Unavailing.  Unable to meaningfully contest the State’s proofs showing it will likely succeed in demonstrating that the Amended Policy violates the LAD, Appellants  \(^4\)  Appellants’ website includes a page for accessing its Policies and Regulations through a service called “PUBLICACCESSOnline”.  [...], [...], available at: https://www.[...]/seportal/Public/pubElanOnline.aspx?id=b7fb9224d11a4a049241102af3e02dfe (last accessed Feb. 19, 2024).  A search of that service conducted on Feb. 19, 2024 revealed no district regulation 5756.  raise three separate arguments instead: that (i) the State has no settled right to relief; (ii) the Amended Policy finds support in federal and state recordkeeping laws; and (iii) the preliminary injunction interferes with parents’ constitutional rights.
[brief] The numbers were wrong.  It was bogus.  And, yeah, I stopped short of the standard for fraud, which is clear and convincing because a lot of this, again, was created by one person.  And then, you know, to argue that, well, you can show it by clear and convincing or you can’t; you know, prov[e] it at all, I think is somewhat disingenuous.  (27T88:1-8).  J.  Post-Trial Motions
[brief] Pa0014, ¶49.  Plaintiffs allege that the Legislature has placed a severe restriction upon an attorney’s license to practice law by prohibiting attorneys from devoting some undefined portion of their practice of law to debt adjustment services – services that constitute the practice of law and fall solely within the province and regulation of the Supreme Court.  Pa0013, ¶44.  In the Second Count  Plaintiffs allege that the Limited Attorney Exemption is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore violative of Plaintiffs’ due process rights.  Pa0016, ¶58.  Without definitions of “principally engaged” and “attorney-at-law of this State,” or any other guidance as how these terms are interpreted or applied, the prohibition fails to give fair notice and warning of, and forces Plaintiffs and all other lawyers to guess, what conduct is prohibited and subject to penalties, discipline, and even criminal prosecution and imprisonment.  Pa0016, ¶56.  Plaintiffs’ Third Count alleges that the Limited Attorney Exemption is unconstitutionally overbroad and violative of Plaintiffs’ due process rights because it regulates and infringes upon constitutionally-protected activity.  Pa0019, ¶64.  Plaintiffs allege that while the Act furthers the State’s interest to protect debtors from abusive, deceptive and fraudulent practices by exempting some attorneys of the State from its regulations, it fails to advance the State’s legitimate interest (and, in fact, has the effect of harming clients) because it not only prohibits certain attorneys from legitimately engaging in the practice of law but prohibits those attorneys who devote the most time and represent the most clients in this area of practice of law (such as bankruptcy attorneys), and thereby have the most experience, expertise and specialization in this area of practice of law, from assisting clients with debt adjustment.  Pa0018, ¶63.  Lastly, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have violated the Federal Civil Rights Act and New Jersey Civil Rights Act by depriving Plaintiffs and other attorneys of their due process rights summarized above.
[brief] [...] ACTING GLOUCESTER COUNTY PROSECUTOR By: [...], ESQUIRE SDAG/Acting Assistant Prosecutor Attorney ID.: 047572013 [...] [...] [...] [...] AMENDED BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division DOCKET NO: A- CRIMINAL ACTION On Motion For Leave To Appeal From An Interlocutory Order Of The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Granting, in part, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress STATE OF NEW JERSEY : Plaintiff-Appellant : Gloucester County v. : [...], : [...] [...]  Defendant-Respondent : Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Defendant is Confined Your Honors: TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Therefore, any boiler plate presumption of constitutionality of a statute must give way to its actual impact on the \textsuperscript{4}The State’s main effort to distinguish the situation of LSD students from those in the Abbott/SDA districts is by arguing that LSD students don’t suffer from “the same municipal overburden common to SDA districts” [SB at 31].  The State does not seem to recognize that LSD students suffer from a different, and quite likely much greater, form of “overburden. ”  As the ALJ found, and this court accepted, LSD students suffer from the unique fiscal burden of costs for tens of thousands of nonpublic school students that consume more than half of the entire public school district budget [Alcantara, 475 N.J.Super. at 62-63].  students of LSD.  We know that to be a denial of T&E and the State’s effort to attribute that solely to local failures falls far short of the mark.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a). of Facts, and led both the ALJ and the Commissioner to find there were no material issues of fact about the project.  (Aa122).  “When both parties to an action ‘move[] for summary judgment, one may fairly assume that the evidence was all there and the matter was ripe for adjudication. ’”  Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 450 (2007) (quoting Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 266 N.J. Super. 300, 323 (App. Div. 1991) (alteration in original)).  Since the record below is robust on this issue, there is no need for a remand.  Moreover, the issues raised by [...] for remand relate to the next step, which is the extent of public access needed on the site.
[brief] 3  All citations to the State’s Brief herein are citations to State’s brief in the trial court.  To be sure, the State may overcome the presumptions of fitness and affection if an appropriate factfinder makes specific findings that specific parents are either unfit or will not act in the child’s best interests.  But the Parental Secrecy Policy does not require such findings.  Instead, its secrecy requirement is predicated on the presumption that all parents are unfit and/or will not act in the best interests of the children simply because their children do not want them to know they are being socially transitioned at school.  ACa81.  This impermissibly reverses the presumptions of fitness and affection in violation of the parental right.  * * *
[brief] Appellee is, therefore, barred from arguing that the ordinance does not properly provide enough senior citizen housing elsewhere or in more appropriate locations.  To meet that goal, the 2019 Land Use Element added several new properties to be specifically designated for senior citizen housing, including the three uses sought by [...].  However, [...] ignored those designations and by its application sought to have the Board, and now the Court, rezone this Property.  In fact, the subject property was included in the review by the Master Plan Subcommittee and the Planning Board in leading up to this Master Plan amendment, but ultimately, two other properties were included and this Property was specifically excluded by the Planning Board.  Da78.
[brief] Chapter 230 “Land Use and Development Regulations” of the Code of the [...] is hereby amended to add a new Article XXXV “Senior Housing – 1 Overlay District” to read as follows:  Article XXXV.  Senior Housing – 1 Overlay District § 230-268.  Purpose.  The purpose of the Senior Housing – 1 Overlay District is to allow developers to have the option of redeveloping designated lots for adult community housing in multifamily-type structure(s), while also retaining the developers’ option to develop in accordance with the underlying R-27A zone district for the properties.
[directive] Section by required 3.3.2. subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory approval charging and the on limits or conditions such impose may Prosecutor County  The deems Prosecutor the as subsection this to pursuant issued directive any under granted authority complaint- for apply but not complaint-summons issue to granted authority (e.g., appropriate approval prosecutorial without charge to granted authority approval; prosecutorial without warrant Early  No to subject the not are that offenses example, for as, such of cases, types specified in only etc.).  violence; domestic involve do that not offenses or Graves Act, the or Act Release is authority any, if circumstances, in what whether and specify shall directive such  Any complaint- a of issuance approve to officer supervisory designated specially a to granted Directive, of 4 Section this under presumed is acomplaint-warrant for application when summons designated specially a to granted is authority any, if circumstances, what in whether and and complaint- a of issuance when acomplaint-warrant for application approve officer to supervisory to authority The 3.3.2. subsection See Directive. this of 4 Section under presumed is summons the if only officers supervisory specially-designated to granted be shall presumption a overcome of delegation such that resources, available on based determines, Prosecutor County overburdened being from Office Prosecutor's the prevent to necessary authority is prosecutorial such that ensuring for responsible remain shall Prosecutor the consultations, and charging by officers. supervisory specially-designated by properly exercised is authority delegated 21 Page in when and determine to Section this by authorized are Prosecutors County
[brief] Cases Cited:  In re: Reisdorf, 80 N.J. 319, 326 (1979)  ...........................................11  In re: Blomer, 37 N.J. Super. 85, 94 (App.Div.1955)  .............................12  In re: Trust of Brown, 213 N.J. Super. 489, 501 (Law.Div.1986)  ............13  Estate of Reisen, 313 N.J.Super. 623, 628-31 (Ch.Div.1998)  ...............13  Rendine v Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 337 (1995)  ......................................13  Mauro v Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp.,225 N.J. Super 196, 120 (App).  ..17  Wolfe v Malberg, 334 N.J. Super 630, 637 (App.Div.2000)  ....................17  Strahan v Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 418, 428 (Ch.Div.1993) ..................39  Marx v. Marx, 265 N.J. Super. 418,428 (Ch. Div. 1993).  .....................39  Flagg v Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 572 2002)(Citations Omitted)  .................................................................39  In re: Probate of Willard Codicil of Macool, 416 N.J. Super 298, 314, (App.Div.2010)  .................................................................40  Czoch v Freeman, 317 N.J. Super. 273, 285.  .....................................60  Woehr v Travelers Ins. Co, 134 N.J. Eq. 38, 40-41, 34A 2d 136(Ch.1943)  ..60  [...], [...] (Middlesex County unpublished but provided)  .................................................................60  Rules of Court Cited: Rule 4:42-9(3) .................................................................11  Rule 4:42-9(b) ...............................................................12  Rule 1:7-4.  .....................................................................15
[brief] (Pa900a).  [...] issued a written report in this matter in which she opined that [...]’s attack on [...] was “a sudden ‘out of the blue’ savage” to-kill style attack, as opposed to ‘everyday’ aggression. ” (Pa900a).  She wrote that these types of killer attacks are “typically sustained unless interrupted. ” (Pa900a).  [...] wrote in her report that: “Persons regularly involved with breeding stallions should be aware of every stallion’s potential to engage in the type of sustained attack exhibited by [...] on the day of the attack. ” (Pa900a).  [...], the [...] veterinarian involved with freezing stallion semen at [...], testified that there’s a basic level of aggression that’s natural in dealing with stallions, “especially when you’re using them for breeding. ” (Pa835a-Pa836a).  She testified: “When you’re dealing with breeding, you bring out a level of energy and aggression that [stallions] don’t necessarily get the rest of the time, and so that tends to make them a little bit more aggressive. ” (Pa836a).  She further testified that, in addition to being naturally more aggressive than other horses, stallions are even more aggressive during the breeding process.  (Pa836a).  [...] testified that breeding stallions creates a “conflict situation” which “predisposes [stallions] for more potential triggers for either just an instantaneous bite or kick or more serious aggression. ” (Pa942a).  [...] testified that, for stallions, the breeding environment “is just very different from just [] handling a horse on a farm outside the breeding situation. ” (Pa942a).  [...] testified that, at her breeding facility, they describe the moment when a stallion is being brought to the breeding shed as “go-time. ” (Pa957a).  Cell phones are put away, everyone is where they need to be and communicating with minimal chit-chat, “so that if something happens, you hear the important words. ” (Pa957a).  [...] testified that she teaches at her facility how, during the process of breeding a stallion, “to be prepared for what could happen at any time. ” (Pa957a).  [...], the co-owner of [...], where [...] was stabled and collected for several years, testified that there is “general knowledge amongst people who work with horses that stallions are more aggressive in their behavior than other kinds of horses.
[brief] THE WILFS CANNOT RELITIGATE THE TRIAL COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS ON LIABILITY, WHICH THE APPELLATE DIVISION AFFIRMED, AND THEIR EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT DURING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD WARRANTS PUNITIVE DAMAGES.  [...]’ challenge to the trial court’s punitive damages award shares one thing in common with their other unfounded arguments on this appeal: they distort the Appellate Division’s remand decision in hopes of convincing this Court that the trial court should have done something it was not instructed to do.
[brief] This Court should “revisit” and “reconsider” its prior holding in Konitch v. Hartung, 81 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 1963), certif. denied, 41 N.J. 389 (1964).  This argument by plaintiff is equally meritless.  As noted above in Point I, Konitch is just one of numerous cases that are on point with the subject matter and flatly reject plaintiff’s position.  DeCicco v. Anderson, 99 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1968) is another Appellate Division case involving two co-employees in a parking lot where plaintiff was injured as a pedestrian by the defendant who was driving a vehicle.  In addition to Konitch and DeCicco, the following cases all re-affirmed the co-employee workers’ compensation immunity: Barone v. Harra, 77 N.J. 276 (1978); Linden v. Solomacha, 232 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div. 1989); Ehrgott v. Jones, 208 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1986); Maggio v. Migliaccio, 266 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 1993); Grawehr v. Township of East Hanover, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1634 (App. Div. 2017).
[brief] Defendant additionally raises the following contentions in his pro se supplemental brief:  **POINT I**  CONTRARY TO THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT THAT “IT'S NOT A CONSPIRACY TO TRY TO GAIN WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS,” THIS CASE PRESENTS THAT DEFENDANT'S DUE RIGHTS PROCESS RIGHTS AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS [WERE]  VIOLATED ON THE BASIS OF BAD FAITH, [CONNIVANCE] ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT, BY PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, [WHOSE]  CHARGING PROCESS AND DECISIONS RETURNED  [AN]  INVALID INDICTMENT THAT WAS NOT RETURNED IN OPEN COURT BEFORE THE “ASSIGNMENT JUDGE,” R. 3:6-9(b), WAS NOT FILED AT THE TRIAL COURT, NOR ENDORSED AS A “TRUE BILL” BY THE FOREPERSON OF EITHER THE STATE OR [BURLINGTON]  COUNTY GRAND JURY, MEANING APPELLANT IS IN CUSTODY DUE TO THE PROSECUTOR[’]S VIOLATION [OF]  BOTH ARTICLE I, ¶ 8 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION AND AMENDMENT V OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.  AS A RESULT[,]  BURLINGTON COUNTY PROSECUTED THE CAUSE WITHOUT THE TRIAL COURT HAVING JURISDICTION ON THIS CASE.  THE PROSECUTOR'S [SUMMATION]  DIRECTS TO [CELENIA]  RIVERA WHO ON CROSS[-EXAMINATION]  RECANTED HER PRIOR TESTIMONY  BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE BLUE EYES BUT RATHER BROWN EYES, AS HE IS A “NATIVE AMERICAN[,]”  A CLEAR MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION CASE.  ALL OF THIS WAS SO EGREGIOUS THAT IT CLEARLY AND UNMISTAKENLY DEPRIVED ...  DEFENDANT  A FAIR TRIAL REQUIRING [HIS]  CONVICTION BE VACATED AND REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).
[brief] The fact that a governing body member campaigned in support of a project that comes to fruition and requires legislative action by the governing body is not barred by the LEGL or any other law.  Such would defy common sense, not to mention the candidate’s constitutional rights to advocate for the public good.  \(^4\)  Governing body members can recuse themselves without providing a reason and often do so on thorny issues to avoid accountability with the voters.  The fact that someone recuses themselves does not mean there is a conflict; it just means that the member does not wish to participate in the consideration of the issue.  Plaintiff also argues that *Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Bd. of Adj.*, 237 N.J. 333, 329-351 (2019) supports his position.  It does not, as that case involved a zoning board of adjustment member and the fact that the board was acting as a tribunal in its adjudication of the plaintiff’s development application and, hence, why the 200 foot disqualification rule created a conflict of interest.  In sum, the undisputed facts established that there was no disqualifying conflict of interest and, thus, summary judgment dismissing the challenge to the Bond Ordinance on such grounds was properly granted.