ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “The doctrine of merger is based on the concept that an accused [who] committed only one offense . . . cannot be punished as if for two. ”  State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (quoting State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975)) (alterations in original).  Therefore “[m]erger implicates a defendant’s substantive constitutional rights. ”  Ibid. (citing State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 116 (1987)).  Besides its effect on sentencing in many cases, merger “also has a measurable impact on the criminal stigma that attaches to a convicted defendant. ”  State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263, 271 (1984).
[brief] ’”  Wilson v. Brown, 404 N.J. Super. 557, 583 (App. Div. 2009), quoting McClain v. Coll. Hosp., 99 N.J. 346, 351 (1985).  He cannot and does not make a showing of need to outweigh the public’s interest in maintaining confidentiality when it comes to law enforcement investigations and particularly related to members of the Judiciary.  Only if the public record and public/private interests requirements are satisfied – which they are not here – does the burden shift to the [...] to demonstrate that its need for confidentiality outweighed [...]’s need for disclosure.
[brief] The statute authorizes the Board to entertain an application for "a certificate certifying that the use . . . existed before the adoption of the ordinance which rendered the use . . . nonconforming," ibid., and Appellant was manifestly not seeking a “certificate certifying” that a valid nonconforming use “existed. ”  Indeed, Appellant was seeking a determination from the Board that the Respondent’s use of Lot 5 for parking was “not in fact a valid, nonconforming use” (1T16-1T17).
[brief] (Ca222).  On September 24, 2021, the court appointed [...], Esq. as receiver.  (Ca22).  On September 24, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered an order in the matter of [...] v. [...], [...], and [...], under Docket No. [...], appointing [...], Esq. as receiver.  (Ca22).  The order of September 24, 2021 did not require the receiver to post a bond.  (Ca22).  [...] was appointed on September 24, 2021 as statutory receiver to take control over the business, liquor license, and personal assets of defendants [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX  Order transferring jurisdiction (June 23, 1994) ..............................................Pa1  [...]’s judgment of conviction......................................................................Pa3  Order denying first PCR (July 28, 2000) .........................................................Pa9  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ##  Cases  **Graham v. Florida**, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)  .................................................................16  **Miller v. Alabama**, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) ...  16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 42  **Rosenberg v. Tavorath**, 352 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2002)  ...............................30  **State v. Baker**, 153 N.J. 48 (1998)  ...........................................................................3  **State v. Baker**, 175 N.J. 433 (2003)  ...........................................................................3  **State v. Baker**, 214 N.J. 116 (2013)  ...........................................................................  4, 16  **State v. Baker**, No. A-2961-18 (App. Div. Feb. 4, 2022)................................. 4, 20, 29, 44  **State v. Baker**, No. A-3045-10 (App. Div. October 10, 2012) ......................... 3, 14, 16  **State v. Baker**, No. A-4406-00 (App.  Div. Oct. 23, 2002) .....................................3  **State v. Baker**, No. A-5326-94 (App. Div. Oct. 27, 1997) ....................................3  **State v. Bolvito**, 217 N.J. 221 (2014) ......................................................................21  **State v. Comer**, 249 N.J. 359 (2022) ................................................................. 4, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 40, 41
[brief] (PA070-071; PA073-077; PA079-080).  Prior to and on April 13, 2022, plaintiff [...]’s address/residency was in [...].  (PA070-071; PA041, T10:L2-6; PA051, T49:L11-15).  On April 13, 2022, appellant/plaintiff [...] was operating a 2002 Kia Sportage, which vehicle was involved in an accident with respondent/defendant [...].  (PA070-071).  [...] denied appellant/plaintiff [...]’s claims related to the April 13, 2022, accident due to “material misrepresentation. ”  (PA082-083).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] “No court has ever ordered a notification and recall campaign on the basis of state law. ”  545 F. Supp. at 1181.  The FDA has the sole “discretion” to require recall of a product that it approved.  Id. at 1181.  [Even if there were state law authority for a notification and recall campaign, such authority would be preempted by the FDCA for the same reasons that there is no implied right of action....  Any state law which would put these same powers in other hands must be deemed foreclosed....  Since the federal interest in this area is “dominant” and the regulatory scheme is “pervasive,” preemption must follow.
[brief] The court indicated that there was not a procedural or substantive basis for the relief being sought and reliance on *res ipsa*.  (3T13:4-15:2).  Appellant argues that it has proven negligence based on a state of emergency and the By-Laws it is "more than sufficient to demonstrate the likelihood of prevailing on the merits."  (App. Brief, p. 26).  However, this is not supported by any actual reports or citation.  Moreover, Appellant has failed to prove how there was an affirmative obligation on the part of the Respondent to perform any of these measures.  In addition, Appellant has failed to provide this Court or the court below with any proof that any of these measures would have prevented the damages being sought in the underlying Complaint.  In conclusion, Appellant’s brief contains multiple claims and arguments which are unsupported by citation.
[brief] (Db32.)  While at the same time advocating without equivocation that the Code applies to special masters, [...] encourage this Court to disregard the trial court’s application of the Code and instead adopt a novel, self-serving standard for disqualifications.  Under [...]’ proposed standard, an individual, without exception, would be “prevent[ed] . . . from acting as a Special Master when he or she is simultaneously handling a separate paid matter for one of the parties or their attorneys. ”
[brief] For the sake of simplicity, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] shall hereinafter refer to himself in the first person.  This simple small claims case involved a well-publicized annual chess tournament, where all of the players would pay an entry fee to compete against other similarly-matched players, so as to earn quite significant monetary prizes.  The primary basis for my bringing this case was that the defendants failed to disclose a significant limitation as to the prizes (i.e. only one prize per person).  The secondary basis is that they failed to follow their own published tournament rules (i.e. about the registration cut off time) for the particular event I had entered, resulting in a significant detriment to myself and all of the other participants who had already paid their entry fees before that published cut off time.  At trial, the court made four (4) significant errors in dismissing my claims.  The first error was the trial court’s finding that the Consumer Fraud Act was not applicable, because a tournament prize was not included within the definition of “merchandise” under the Consumer Fraud statute.  The second error was the trial court’s finding that because it was not intentionally concealed, the undisclosed clause was nonetheless still enforceable.  The third error was the trial court’s finding that a player’s paid entry into the tournament did not create a contract, thus was not controlled by common-law contract principles.  The fourth error was the trial court’s finding that the doctrine of “accord and satisfaction” would have nullified my claims, even if the court had been otherwise persuaded to rule in my favor.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] This case is not a close call.  The record is replete with evidence for a jury to conclude that [...] blamed Appellant - the victim - and transferred her, not in effort to take corrective action, but in an effort to silence, to punish, and to protect a contract with [...].  The transfer was against Appellant’s will.  It was immediately after (in fact on same the day) she complained of sexual harassment.  [...] admittedly never investigated Appellant’s concerns before, during, or after she complained.  Instead, Respondents accused Appellant of bringing the harassment upon herself.  The harassment never stopped.  There was no follow-up by [...] whatsoever despite multiple written follow-up complaints of retaliation and ongoing harassment, resulting in a constructive discharge.  On these facts and this record, it was an error for the Trial Court to deprive Appellant of her day in court.
[brief] Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.  Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious criticisms.  First, legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory.  Judicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow [...]’s memorable phrase, an exercise in “‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends. ’”  [Citation omitted.]  Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.
[directive] State v. Maure, 240 N.J. Super. at 281-283 & 286-289.  Moreover, our courts have stated that Breath Test Instrument Inspection Certificates (BTIIC’s), which are prepared pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:51-3. 4, are prepared accurately, carefully, competently and have a "strong and convincing indices of trustworthiness."  State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. at 13-14; State v. Cleverley, 348 N.J. Super. at 459; State v. McGeary, 129 N.J. Super. at 224-227; State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. at 30-31; State v. DeVito, 125 N.J. Super. at 479-480; State v. Teare, 133 N.J. Super. 338, 341 (App. Div. 1975), rev'g. 129 N.J. Super. 562 (Law Div. 1974), aff'd. 135 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 1975); State v. Ettore, 228 N.J. Super. at 31-32; State v. Ernst, 230 N.J. Super. at 243-244; State v. Lanahan, 110 N.J. Super. 578, 580-583 (Cty. Ct. 1970); State v. Hudes, 128 N.J. Super. at 591-595, 596-598.  In that same context, the BTIIC, and the Alcohol Influence Report both constitute records of a public official, performed in an official capacity.  Thus, those documents are subject to mandatory judicial notice under N.J.R.E. §201 as official public records prepared and maintained by a public official under N.J.R.E. §803(c)(8) & N.J.A.C. 13:51-4.3(b).  Therefore, they are admissible as records of a public official, pursuant to N.J.R.E. §803(c)(8).
[brief] 12  I.  The trial court correctly granted [...]’s motion to compel arbitration notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ claims of unconscionability (Pa003).  ..................................................................................  12  A.  [...]’s terms expressly delegate the question of unconscionability to the arbitrator, not the trial court.  ..........  13  B.  Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that [...]’s terms are unconscionable.  ..................................................  18  1.  [...]’s terms are not substantively unconscionable.  .................................................................................. 19  2.  [...]’s terms are not procedurally unconscionable.  ..................................................................................  20  a.  [...]’s purported lack of bargaining power does not make [...]’s terms procedurally unconscionable.  ..................  21  b.  [...]’s purported inability to understand English does not make [...]’s terms procedurally unconscionable.  ...........................................  24  II.  The trial court correctly found that [...] manifested her assent to [...]’s terms (Pa003)  ...........................................  28  TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
[brief] This resulted in [...] filing his August 23, 2017 motion to enforce litigant’s rights (A33; A36).  [...] reacted with her false, frivolous and untimely cross-motion to set aside.  (A77).  Turning to [...]’s factual renditions in making her R. 4:50 challenge at the Plenary Hearing, the trial court found each of them to be incredible:
[brief] As stated by former [...] in his dissenting opinion in Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 14 (1950)  “…the common law would be sapped of its life blood if stare decisis were to become a god instead of a guide…”, cited with approval in White v. North Bergen Tp., 77 N.J. 538, 550 (1978).  becomes a privately controlled agency.  The Humane Society case and other cases do not, within the context of the separation of powers and delegation of legislative authority, “…firmly establish that the Council is neither a private entity nor controlled by one.
[brief] DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS FAILED TO OFFER ANY GENERAL-CAUSATION OPINIONS AND THEIR SPECIFIC-CAUSATION OPINIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE “NET OPINIONS. ”  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (DA0785; DA0816; DA0846)]**  Plaintiff’s inability to prove defect is alone fatal to her case, but her problems do not stop there.  As noted above, Plaintiff must also provide “expert testimony to satisfy [her] burden with respect to both general causation and specific causation. ”  *In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA)*, 2003 WL 22417238, at *20.  “A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when... probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. ”  *Townsend*, 221 N.J. at 60-61 (emphasis added) (quoting *Davidson v. Slater*, 189 N.J. 166, 185 (2007)).  That is the case here.  Plaintiff has no evidence to prove general causation, without which Plaintiff cannot make a submissible case.
[brief] ” (Da110).  Applied to this case, the issue is whether the relationship between [...] and those who signed up for the [...] alerts would be damaged.  Here, there is no relationship to harm.  In the proceedings before the Trial Court, Defendants produced no evidence that any relationship between Defendants and any other person would be harmed.  Defendants never provided any evidence of harm.  During the proceedings below, Defendants provided no evidence that anyone was removing themselves from the [...] alerts or that there was any other harm to any relationship.
[brief] The Parties settled this matter and memorialized the terms in a June 23, 2023 Settlement Agreement.  Pa49.  The Settlement Agreement indicated that no admission of liability was being made by any party, and modified the Lease Agreement by ending the lease on October 31, 2023.  Ibid.  [...] was required to pay $46,058.39 each month for four months, on or before July 1, August 1, September 1, and October 1, 2023.  Ibid.  The Settlement Agreement included a Consent Judgment for possession of the premises and a Consent Judgment for $796,484.39 in the event [...] defaulted.  Ibid.
[brief] (Doc. 13-1 at 3-5).  She was then terminated upon her return to work, and this absence was cited as one reason for her termination.  (Doc. 13-1 at 5-6).  This story holds together and plausibly indicates Plaintiff's termination was, in part, retaliation for her absence mandated by Defendant's COVID-19 policy, which was implemented to comply with Defendant's duty under OSHA to provide a safe and healthy workplace, § 654(a)(1).  The Court's previous finding that these allegations are sufficiently similar to those alleged in Wheeler remain unchanged.
[brief] Accordingly, the Legislature has determined that the --- 3 See also *Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro*, 35 Cal. App. 4th 620 (1995) (affirming summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ entire claim based on after-acquired evidence where employer learned during discovery that the plaintiffs had been convicted of felony conspiracy, but falsely stated on employment applications that they had never been convicted; employer had a contract with a federal agency that prohibited it to employ individuals convicted of a felony); *Egbuna v. Time–Life Libraries, Inc.*, 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc); *Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, 186 F.3d 502, 504 (4th Cir. 1999) (both holding that an “undocumented alien” is barred from maintaining an action under Title VII for alleged discrimination due to being statutorily ineligible for employment in the United States).  relationship between residential facilities and their residents should be intensely regulated, pursuant to the strong state policy of protecting children and adults with developmental disabilities.  209 N.J. 269, 293-94 (recognizing that facilities “are prohibited from hiring individuals who have committed one in a list of enumerated crimes”).  Some of the individuals being served are non-verbal or unable to communicate.  Appx 521 at ¶5 (admitted by Plaintiff).  The relevant statutory regulation at issue in this case regulates the ability of [...]’s employees to come into direct contact with these extremely vulnerable individuals served.  See N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:44A-2.4(b) (“The purpose . . . is to establish minimum requirements for the provision of residential services to people with developmental disabilities. ”).  This regulation, therefore, puts protections into place to protect individuals being served.  Appx 521 at ¶6 (admitted by Plaintiff).  Plaintiff’s argument that the public policy behind the statutory bar in Cedeno (ensuring those convicted of bribery do not work for the government) is somehow more important than the one protecting vulnerable individuals who cannot speak up or protect themselves is patently wrong and must be rejected.
[brief] The Judgment is not void due to Respondent’s alleged CFLA affirmative defense because the claim is barred by the doctrines of *res judicata* and collateral estoppel.  Where a defendant argues, in a motion to vacate a default judgment, that the transfer of the debt is void, and that plaintiff failed to establish proof of assignment and violated federal laws, these arguments address the sufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint or defendant’s potential defenses to the claim and were required to have been raised in a timely answer to the complaint as opposed to as a defense first raised in a motion to vacate the default judgment.  See *Unifund CCR Partners v. Beras*, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 717, at *11 (App. Div March 23, 2011) (denying a motion to vacate a default judgment where defendant challenged the sufficiency of the judgment on the basis that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction and that plaintiff failed to establish proof of assignment and violated provisions of federal debt collection laws).  Here, Appellant’s arguments, including potential defenses to this Action regarding Respondent’s sufficiency of its standing must have been raised in a timely answer to the Complaint and not by way of the Motion to Vacate.  E.
[brief] It applies when a homicide, other than felony murder, which would otherwise be murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, other than felony murder, is “committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2).  The Legislature limited passion/provocation manslaughter to crimes that would otherwise constitute purposeful or knowing murder, as opposed to aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter.  *State v. Galicia*, 210 N.J. 364, 379 (2012).  There are four elements of passion/provocation manslaughter.  *State v. Canfield*, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 275 (App. Div. 2022), aff’d as modified, 252 N.J. 497 (2023).  First, there must be adequate provocation; second, the defendant must not have had time to “cool off” between the provocation and the killing; third, the defendant must have been impassioned by the provocation; and fourth, the defendant must not have cooled off before the killing.  *Ibid.*  The first two elements are objective, using a reasonable person perspective, and the last two elements are subjective.  *Ibid.*  When a trial court is deciding whether to charge the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter, it must determine if there is sufficient evidence to meet the first two elements of the offense.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  An appellate court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment under the same standard as the trial court.  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).  Summary judgment must be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  The court must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged dispute in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  “[T]he court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord [that party] the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom[.]”  Id. at 535.  A presumption of validity and constitutionality attends every legislative decision, including the adoption of a redevelopment plan.  Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken, 242 N.J. Super. 329, 332 (App. Div. 1990).  Therefore, a party challenging the validity of the adoption of a plan bears a heavy burden.  Vineland Constr. Co., Inc. v. Twp. of Pennsauken, 395 N.J. Super. 230, 256 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998)).  To prevail in setting aside the questioned plan, the legislative decisions must be shown to be arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, or unconstitutional.  Downtown Residents, 242 N.J. Super at 332.  It is not enough to show that the legislative determinations were debatable.  Id. at 333.  Here, the trial court correctly ruled in favor of the municipality’s actions.  II.
[brief] B)  The trial court did not weigh the reasonableness of the fees requested (other than the court’s extra-judicial impression that the total amount sought “seemed low”) – this fact is axiomatic from the transcript, as well as the fact that the total fee requested does not match the total stated in [...]’s own affidavit of service.  As argued above, the trial court was required to “analyze the Rendine factors in determining an award of reasonable counsel fees and then must state its reasons on the record for awarding a particular fee.