ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PLAINTIFFS CAN PRESENT SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE ON PROXIMATE CAUSE AND DAMAGES TO REACH A JURY THROUGH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND THE TESTIMONY OF [...] AND OTHER REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT PROFESSIONALS, AND THEREFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF MUST BE REVERSED.  (Pa10-Pa12)  If a jury were to find Defendant [...] negligent in failing to provide its surveyor with a current revised grading plan for plaintiff's property, then the jury should be permitted to also consider issues of proximate cause and damages.  Just as the court below incorrectly required plaintiff to designate an expert to prove liability, the court likewise incorrectly required plaintiff to designate a specifically labeled "expert" on proximate cause and damages.  The Court below confirmed that the proper measure of damages would be the amount of money required to put the injured party in the same position as if the damages had not occurred, specifically "to financially put the plaintiff in a position as if the grading discrepancy had not occurred."
[directive] Charging the Grand Jury  A uniform grand jury charge shall be used in all counties.  A print copy of the Grand Jury charge shall be provided to grand jurors by the supervising judge in accordance with R.3:6-3(b).  Note: A uniform grand jury charge was separately implemented by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006).  Are grand jurors provided with print copies of the charges as required?  ___ YES ___ NO  4  IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE -- GRAND JURY STANDARDS: Standard 5.
[brief] We have the frontage on Porter will have their main entrances so it feels like more of a neighborhood. ”  (1T 59:4-11).  [...] testified to the infringement on the setback to Porter Avenue “that infringement is just the open air balconies.  So, in essence, it’s not that overpowering building on the streets.  And, again, we’re trying to kind of create this front area that accepts the entry and accepts kind of, like, a pedestrian friendly option. ” (1T 60:2-9).
[brief] Div. 2001) | 13, 14 | | Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 394 N.J. Super. 278 (App.Div. 2007) | 9 | | K.D. v. Bozarth, 313 N.J. Super. 561, 713 A.2d 546 (App. Div. 1998) | 14 | | Lewis v. Lewis, 132 NJ 541 (1993) | 13 | | LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62 (2009) | 13 | | Printing Mart v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) | 10 | | Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) | 15 | | Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 NJ 325 (1985) | 7 | | Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of N.J., Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 570 (App.Div. 2016)| 12, 15 | | Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 190 N.J. 61, 918 A.2d 595 (2007)| 13 | | United Hearts, LLC v. Zahabian, 407 NJ Super. 379 (App. Div. 2009) | 13 | ####
[directive] 7.5  The leaders of Tactical Teams and Crisis Negotiation Teams are encouraged to formally organize statewide associations to enhance existing relationships and share best practices for the safe resolution of barricaded individual and hostage situations.  Once organized, these associations should include opportunities for mental health professionals to participate in this collaborative process.  As Tactical and Crisis Negotiation Teams gain experience working with mental health professionals, the associations and mental health professionals are further encouraged to submit suggestions to the Attorney General for revisions to this Policy in order to facilitate the safe resolution of barricaded individual and hostage incidents.
[brief] Although the decision is generally left in the sound discretion of the trial court (“UNLESS” there is demonstrated Abuse of Judicial Discretion as demonstrated in this appeal), it is germane to recognize that “[a]ll doubts…should be resolved in FAVOR of the PARTIES SEEKING RELIEF. ” as set forth in Mancini, Supra, 1332 N.J at 334, 625 A.2d 484 citing Arrow Mfg. Co. v. Levinson, 231 N.J. Super, 527, 534, 555 A2d 1165 (App. Div. 1989).  Although the court found in the Mancini instance “their” neglect was inexcusable it must be asserted “this” defendant has shown NEITHER the court (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41) nor the plaintiff (Pa1) were able to bring forth any FACTS or EVIDENCE to “disprove” that service of process was “NOT” EXECUTED for the MARCH 9, 1990 hearing, thus resulting in a void default judgment (Pa7) for the court’s lack of jurisdiction as service of process had not been validated (Pa1).
[brief] Precluding a relevance and responsiveness review will make it almost impossible for parties to agree on search terms—a crucial and necessary step in almost every civil case involving electronic discovery.  If a responding party knows that the court might order every single document that hits on a search term to be turned over, it will fight extremely hard to make the search terms as narrow as possible.  And, a requesting party will push for extremely broad search terms in the hopes of gaining access to a private look into its adversary’s business.  The fight over search terms will swallow judicial and party resources, leading to court intervention early on in almost every case.  Conversely, if the parties know that they will be able to conduct a review for relevance and responsiveness, the stakes of the search term fight will be much lower, and agreement therefore much more likely.  The trial court’s order does all this with no countervailing rationale for expanding the discovery process in this way.  There was no allegation or indication that either party had withheld relevant documents.  And the trial court offered no particularized rationale for why, in this case, it was throwing relevancy and responsiveness out the window.  At a time when the federal rules have been amended to focus the scope of discovery on information related to claims and defenses, to avoid “the problem of overdiscovery,” and to “encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 committee’s note to 2015 amendment, the trial court’s order moves in the opposite direction, vastly expanding the scope of discovery beyond what is allowed by the rules for no good reason.  The trial court’s order in this case has the potential to reverberate far beyond the dispute between these two parties.  It threatens to re-write the rules and upset the discovery process in almost every complex civil action.  This Court should reverse.
[brief] (Id. at 12-13; Pls.’ Supp’l Mem. at 1).  *4  Plaintiffs assert that their Depo Notice, including Exhibit A to the Depo Notice, “covers each of the above issues, as the notice covers [...]’s preservation practices, including any automatic deletion that typically occurs; efforts to preserve documents; document deletion practices; and repositories of responsive documents that existed for each custodian. ” (JS at 13 (citing [...] Decl. ¶¶ 2-4)).  They also argue that all of the above information is discoverable.
[brief] To further compound [...]’s gross, discretion abuse, he chose to ignore my substantiated evidence that [...] told me, while refusing to engage in work towards any Settlement, that if [...], [...], and I would reach agreement on a detailed 3-Way Settlement, which he believed we could never do, he would agree to work on finalizing that 3-Way Settlement for [...].  Judge then ignored my substantiated evidence that [...] & [...] repeatedly REFUSED to work towards final Settlement and hold off filing Verified Complaint and “formal” IA for Surrogate Audit, as we requested, when we presented them w/detailed Settlement we had agreed to.  (prior Brief, p. 9, 2nd par.; p. 35, 1st par.; p. 39, 3rd par.; p. 51, 1st par.; p. 58, par. 6).  “Simply stated, the trial court did [NOT properly apply] the law [and grossly abused] its discretion. ”  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE FEE AWARDS
[directive] Early Warning and Risk Management  3.4.1  Although the internal affairs process is frequently triggered by the filing of a civilian complaint, law enforcement agencies must also proactively work to detect troubling patterns in police conduct before that conduct escalates into more serious internal affairs issues.  3.4.2  To enhance its integrity, provide an optimal level of service to the community and reduce its exposure to civil liability, every law enforcement agency should establish procedures for dealing with problem employees.  Law enforcement agencies have a duty to monitor their employees’ behavior, and establish mechanisms that provide the internal affairs function and the law enforcement executive with the ability to track the complaint records of individual officers and identify those officers with a disproportionate number of complaints against them.  Law enforcement agencies must utilize the information developed by these mechanisms to prevent individual officers from engaging in conduct or behavior that violates the constitutional liberties every member of the community enjoys.  It also is expected that law enforcement agencies will utilize the information to prevent development of patterns, practices or trends of inappropriate behavior or conduct.  3.4.3
[brief] Da132-144.  The validity of the Arbitrator’s interpretation of the PTA is not “reasonably debatable. ”  Knecht, 2012 WL 1020005 at *2 (affirming the trial court’s determination that “the arbitrator's interpretation of the contractual language was not reasonably debatable” and that the “arbitrator exceeded the scope of his powers by disregarding the clear terms of the parties' contract”) [Da554].
[brief] In further support of the City’s position that OPRA’s privacy provision should apply to these e-mail addresses, in factual scenarios which are directly on point, the [...] ("[...]"), the governmental body tasked with adjudicating OPRA disputes, and the Appellate Division in unpublished decisions, have determined that private e-mail addresses are not subject to disclosure under OPRA.  The [...] has made this determination in the matters of *D’Andrea v. NJ Civil Service Commission*, [...] 2014-153 and *Beggiato v. Twp. of Hillsborough*, [...] 2017-144.  In the *D’Andrea* matter, the [...] determined that personal e-mail addresses of public officials were properly redacted based upon the personal privacy exception.  In *Beggiato*, the [...] found that email addresses for a Township email list were private and rightfully excluded under *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1*.  The Appellate Division has found that personal e-mail addresses should not be disclosed under OPRA’s privacy provision in the case of OPRA requests themselves.  *See Wolosky v. Somerset Cty.*, 2017 WL 1179852 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 30, 2017) (holding that the County was not required to disclose the email addresses of individuals who had previously submitted OPRA requests because individuals who submitted said requests "did not waive their right to nondisclosure of personal information in the requests" and that the email addresses of requestors did not go to a "core concern" of OPRA).  Most relevantly, the Appellate Division recently found that members of the public who submit their email addresses to receive electronic newsletters and notices from a municipality have an objectively reasonable expectation that their email addresses will not be disclosed to a non-government organization that intends to send unsolicited emails to them to further the organization's political and social objectives.  See *Rise Against Hate v. Cherry Hill Township*, A-1440-21, 2023 WL 2670720, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Mar. 29, 2023).  The *Rise Against Hate* matter is almost identical in fact to this matter, except that the municipalities in that case actually did maintain the e-mail addresses and therefore actually did have a responsive document or record.  Therefore, the facts in the instant matter are more persuasive because the City does not even maintain the requested information.  Therefore, the *Doe* balancing test weighs in favor of non-disclosure of citizens’ private e-mail addresses, and this position is supported by extremely relevant and persuasive authority.
[brief] [...] saw a passenger inside the vehicle, later identified as defendant’s wife.  (1T26-1, 42-3).  Defendant provided a driver’s license from the State of Montana.  He could not produce any proof of insurance.  He also could not produce the vehicle’s registration, although another police officer who arrived later obtained a temporary registration from defendant.  (1T27-5 to 7, 113-3 to 19; V:16:53:23 to 27).  When speaking with defendant, [...] saw that his pupils were “extremely constricted. ”  In the officer’s experience and training, which included training related to narcotics, constricted pupils was “usually indicative of someone being under the influence or in possession of narcotics. ” (1T27-19 to 25, 123-18 to 21).  The officer also observed that defendant appeared “extremely nervous,” meaning that he was “shaking” and “avoiding eye contact. ” (1T27-13 to 16).  [...] returned to his police vehicle and checked defendant’s driver’s license in his computer system.  The system reported that defendant had a warrant out of Montana “that was not extraditable. ”  According to [...], this meant that Montana would not come to New Jersey to pick up defendant.  Thus, he did not intend to arrest defendant based on the warrant.  He could not recall the nature of the offense underlying the warrant during his testimony.
[brief] In *El Shaer v. Planning Bd., Lawrence*, 249 N.J. Super. 323 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J.  546 (1991), the plaintiff proposed a ten-lot subdivision which complied with all of the bulk standards.  However, "plaintiff failed to present alternative plans which would have less of an environmental impact than the plan proposed, as required by the [subdivision] ordinance."  *Ibid.* at 327.  Additionally, four of the lots would front on a major highway, creating accessibility problems.  "[T]he requirement that a subdivision provide safe ingress and egress is logically implied from the statutory language."  *Ibid.* at 330.  "Finally, the LDO requires that the applicant present alternatives in terms of site design and project location that may result in less of a negative impact than the development proposed.  Plaintiff did not present such an alternative plan to the ten-lot configuration actually proposed."  *Ibid.* at 332.  The denial of plaintiff's subdivision was affirmed.  That plaintiff may have met the specific bulk requirements of the development ordinance does not mean that he was entitled to an approval of his subdivision plan.
[brief] ” (Da1461).  It further provides that the company shall always maintain sufficient cash to cover six months of projected operating expenses, and that the company shall only distribute profits which are “in excess of that amount. ” (Da1474).  The evidence established, and the trial court found, that [...] breached the [...] Stockholders Agreement by: (a) expending company funds without [...]’s authorization; and (b) distributing profits inequitably and inconsistently with his interest in the company, to the detriment of the company and [...].  (26T35:16 to 37:23; 50:10 to 51:21).  The trial court (correctly) went further on reconsideration.
[brief] (Pa 66, n.5)  See also 2T 47-9 to 10 (“The dispatcher call which the officer relied on, I don’t believe was enough to justify the stop. ”)  Despite the claims in the State’s brief, what happened here is simple: the trial court considered the contents of the 9-1-1 call presented by the officer and found it insufficiently corroborated to justify a stop because the corroborating testimony was put forth by a whole incredible witness.  The trial court’s credibility finding, which is at the core of this case, is entitled to great deference.  An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s judgment is restricted to the test of whether the findings made by the trial court could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 472 (1999).  A reviewing court should defer to a trial court’s credibility findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.  *Id.* at 474.  Overturning the trial courts’ assessment of credibility is an extraordinary step, since “trial court findings [concerning issues of fact] are ordinarily not disturbed unless ‘they are so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice,’ and are upheld whenever ‘they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.
[brief] See June 26, 2023 Orders as (Da104 – Da117).  At the time of the June 19, 2023 hearing the Hon. [...], J.S.C. indicated that the Order to Show Cause would not be assigned an additional return date until after such time as the discovery could be procured from [...]  The transcript for the June 19, 2023 hearing was unavailable as “not on the record”.  The Subpoena was served on [...] by personal service on July 21, 2023.  (Da259).
[brief] It is a fundamental maxim of appellate law that contradictory jury instructions cannot withstand appellate scrutiny because it is impossible to know which instruction the jury followed.  State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 433 (1991); State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 530 (1991); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 323 n.8, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1975 n.8 (1985).  There is no more obvious application of that principle than here.  These instructions were utterly contradictory: on one hand, the jury must convict if only the ordinary elements of aggravated manslaughter are proven; on the other, self-defense is a “complete” defense to aggravated manslaughter that the State must disprove.  That latter instruction did not purport to “correct” the erroneous ones; rather it just contradicted them.  Thus, in keeping with Moore, Oglesby, and Francis v. Franklin, reversal is required in such a situation when the error in question goes to such a fundamental matter.  See also State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015) (“An essential ingredient of a fair trial is that a jury receive adequate and understandable instructions”; reversing convictions for plain errors in robbery instruction), quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997); State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988) (manslaughter conviction reversed when explanation of “recklessness,” which was pivotal in that case, did not explain completely); *State v. Rhett*, 127 N.J. 3, 5-7 (1992) (proper instructions are essential to a defendant's right to a fair trial and critical errors in jury instructions warrant reversal even when not objected to at trial); *State v. Weeks*, 107 N.J. 396, 410 (1987) (“[i]ncorrect instructions of law are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless-error theory”).
[brief] [...] relies on the legal arguments from his initial brief and adds the following:  POINT I SUPPRESSION IS REQUIRED BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SEARCH AND THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THIRD-PARTY CONSENT.  In his initial brief, [...] argued that suppression is required because the State failed to prove that [...] voluntarily consented to a search of her bedroom.  (Db 9-22)  As laid out more thoroughly in that brief, the body-worn camera footage (BWC) and police reports revealed that [...] initially refused to cooperate with police and consented to a search of her room only after being handcuffed, placed in the back of a police car, questioned, surrounded by multiple officers, and threatened with “trouble” if she did not tell them the truth.  (Db 5-7)  The motion ¹  This brief uses the same abbreviations as [...]’s initial brief.  In addition, Db refers to [...]’s initial brief, Sb refers to the State’s brief, and Dsa refers to [...]’s supplemental appendix.  court’s decision ignores these facts, which bear significantly on the voluntariness of [...]’s consent.  (Da 25-33)  In its response brief, the State argues for the very first time on appeal that [...] lacks standing to challenge the search of [...]’s bedroom.  (Sb 18-21)  In addition, the State argues that even if [...]’s consent was involuntary, her daughter [...] provided valid consent for the search independent of her mother.  (Sb 23-26)  These arguments must be squarely rejected. \(^2\)  A.  The State’s Argument That [...] Does Not Have Standing Is Both Waived For Purposes Of Appeal And Lacks Merit Because [...] Has Automatic Standing Given His Possessory Interest In The Gun And The State’s Failure To Prove Abandonment.
[brief] Unsurprisingly, Defendants argue that their conduct was that of an upstanding party and that they did nothing in an attempt to stymie litigation of this matter.  However, this Court should consider the logic, reasoning and purpose behind Defendants’ decision not to file their Motion to Dismiss immediately when Plaintiff’s initial sixty (60) days to submit the affidavit of merit lapsed.  The reason that Defendants chose to not file their Motion to Dismiss after sixty (60) days and instead chose to file it after one-hundred and twenty (120) days is because they wanted an easy way to escape liability in this matter.  As a result, Defendants did nothing, sat quietly, relied on their single “demand for affidavit of merit” in their Answer, and waited for Plaintiff to not only default on the affidavit of merit requirement after sixty (60) days, but waited an additional sixty (60) days to ensure that Plaintiff would be barred from ever being able to file her affidavit of merit.
[brief] (App. Div. 2000), *certif. denied*, 165 N.J. 527 (2000) (employment agreement); *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A.*, 168 N.J. 124, 131-32 (2001) (same); *Itzhakov v. Segal*, No. A-2619-17T4, 2019 WL 4050104, at *3-8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 28, 2019) (Pa195-Pa203) (ordering discovery to “illuminate[] the meaning of [an] arbitration provision”); *Estate of Watson v. Piddington*, 2020 WL 2710168, at *1 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 26, 2020) (Pa191-Pa194) (one attorney drafted an LLC agreement for both LLC members).  See also *Grandvue Manor, LLC v. Cornerstone Contracting Corp.*, 471 N.J. Super. 135, 146 (App. Div. 2022) (declining to extend *Atalese* to a commercial contract because the parties “were sophisticated parties who elected arbitration clearly and unambiguously and that their statutory claims were arbitrable”); *Reinv. Fund, Inc. v. Rauh*, No. A-3184-21, 2022 WL 17587863, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 13, 2022) (Da148-Da151) (compelling arbitration “despite the lack of any specific mention of the parties’ statutory rights” due to “an arms-length agreement formulated by sophisticated parties that memorialized a commercial undertaking”); *Gastelu v. Martin*, No. L-4067-14, 2014 WL 10044913, at *6 & n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2015) (Da114-Da121) (holding that the waiver of rights “standard is not as stringent” for parties to a commercial contract); *Schmidt v. Laub as Trustee for Carol L. Glatstian Living Trust*, No. A-0620-19T1, 2020 WL 2130931, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 5, 2020) (Pa275-Pa280) (enforcing arbitration provision between “sophisticated businesspeople”); *In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig.*, 938 F.3d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding application of *Atalese* “only in the context of employment and consumer contracts” and that the “rule ‘d[oes] not extend . . . to commercial contracts’”) (citation omitted).
[brief] But second, even if the new rule is given pipeline retroactivity, reversal is not required under the particular circumstances of this case, as it did not affect the jury’s verdict.  There was no plain error in the trial court’s failure to anticipate the objective component of the recklessness inquiry, in terms of having the jury weigh things from the perspective of a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim, rather than an anonymous ordinary person.  Given the specific facts of this case, the testimony of the victim, and the arguments made at trial, there was no risk that this “minor” aspect of the charge possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.