ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Another completely separate ground for appeal is also related to [...]’s expert, but in a completely different way.  As explained above, the reason that Cohen’s expert did not testify as to the reasonableness of the billing was only because he was barred from doing so by an Order of [...].  So after [...] not testifying due to the Order, [...]’s attorney during summation stated the following, without being stopped by judge Grasso-Jones.  Shockingly, [...]’s attorney stated during summation that Cohen’s expert didn’t say that the bills were unreasonable.  He didn’t say the bills were excessive.  He didn’t say that the bills were not necessary.  He didn’t offer that opinion.  So he’s not on the same wave length as his own, as his own client, [...], who said they’re unreasonable and if that weren’t enough, [...]’s attorney actually repeated a short while later that Cohen’s expert didn’t say one time that the bills were excessive, unreasonable and not fair, not one time.  In a very similar case of an attorneys arguments during summation regarding the absence of barred expert testimony, the Supreme Court has stated, “Summation commentary, however, must be based in truth, and counsel may not "misstate the evidence nor distort the factual picture. ”  Bender v. Adelson, 901 A. 2d 907, 919 (N.J. 2006).  “When summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad latitude otherwise afforded to counsel, a trial court must grant a party's motion for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that "it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law."  R. 4:49-1(a). ”  Id.  “[W]e agree that counsel's comment asking the jury to draw an adverse inference from defendants' failure to call any independent cardiologists necessitates a new trial. ”  Id.  The Supreme Court also stated in that matter that the missing witness doctrine was not available in that case, because “[g]iven the trial court's order barring the [] expert[ testimony], [same was] not within defendants' power to produce. ”  Id, at 921.  Thus [...]’s error in permitting [...]’s expert while precluding Cohen’s expert, despite the fact that both had reviewed the same records, was compounded by the extremely prejudicial summation by [...]’s attorney.  G.
[brief] The issued Order provided for an accelerated briefing schedule to avoid undue prejudice of the stay of the underlying lower Court Order.  Despite contentions of Appellant, the issued Order did not provide for any stay or other restriction upon sale of the Property.  The Property remained under a pending Agreement of Sale, with the Buyer pushing for closure of said transaction.  Subsequent to commencement of the appeal and prior to issuance of the opinion of the Appellate Division, the Property was sold for $200,000.00 to a disinterested third party purchaser, with sufficient funds escrowed by the title company to satisfy the then existing [...].
[brief] MERELY DENY THE CONTENTS OF APPELLANTS’ BRIEF, PRESENTING NO FACTS, NO PROCEDURAL HISTORY, NOR ANY DISCUSSION OF THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT OR CASES APPLYING IT.  Respondents’ brief simply dismisses Appellant’s facts and arguments without any analysis.  They seek to distract the Court by pretending things just didn’t happen instead of addressing the issues on appeal.  Respondents do not set forth “a concise procedural history,” any reference to the appendices, nor any statement of facts, merely “den[ying Appellant’s facts] in their entirety. ”
[brief] ”  In the within matter, the Court did not obtain a sufficient factual basis to satisfy the requirements of the foregoing statute because the Court never elicited an acknowledgment from the Defendant herself with regard to the admissibility of the alleged B.A.C. result of .17%.  Attached to the within Letter Memorandum of Law in accordance with Rule 1:36-3 is the unpublished Appellate Division opinion in State v. [...], Docket No. [...], Decided September 10, 2020, which supports the legal argument set forth herein.
[brief] More compelling, however, is the fact that the dominion of the [...] is so confined.  The wildlife it regulations, as indicated, are limited specifically to those species which are commonly the subjects of hunting and fishing, and even then the regulatory power is restricted.  See, E.g., N.J.S.A. 23:4-49, defining game birds to include twenty-two species; N.J.S.A. 23:4-1, prohibiting hunting of most of these birds except in the open season fixed by federal regulations.  See also N.J.S.A. 23:4-18.  The hunting season and, where applicable, the bag limits for certain birds and small game, N.J.S.A. 23:4-1, N.J.S.A. 23:4-2, and N.J.S.A. 23:4-32, certain furbearing animals, N.J.S.A. 23:4-39, deer, N.J.S.A. 23:4-43, foxes N.J.S.A. 23:4-58.1, and certain fish, N.J.S.A. 23:5-1, are set forth by statute where no provision in these instances otherwise appears in the State Fish and Game Code.  While it enjoys, in the discharge of this function, a certain flexibility permitting enlargement or limitation of the statutory designations, nevertheless the Council at all times must condition such departures on the essential purpose its regulations are designed to serve – the maintenance of a plentiful supply of game and fish for recreational hunting and fishing.
[brief] Under The Wholesaler Agreement  [...] works with thirteen distributors that sell Sapporo beer in the New York City metropolitan area (known as “Metro-New York”) and the state of New Jersey.  (Da11-Da13 ¶¶ 7, 11.)  These distribution agreements are non- exclusive.  (Da13-Da14 ¶¶ 11, 16.)  Thus, distributors compete with each other on service, brand selection, and other commercial factors.\(^3\) (Id.)  The relationship between [...] and Appellants is governed by a Wholesaler Agreement.
[brief] ”  *City of Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980).  Accordingly, “[a]n agency’s determination on the merits ‘will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record. ’”  *Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys.*, 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (*quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys.*, 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)).  Thus, the judicial role in reviewing all administrative action on appeal generally is limited to three inquiries: “(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law”; (2) “whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action”; and (3) “whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124 (App. Div. 1983) ............................................11  State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 264 (2015) ...........................................................................16  State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999) .............................................................................16  Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2008) ..............................................49  US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 476 (2007) ..................................................12-13  Wilson v. Flowers, 58 N.J. 250, 260 (1971) .............................................................................21  Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 514 (2019) .................................12
[brief] 84a  Exhibit G to Certification, Transcript of Trial dated March 20, 2023, filed June 29, 2023 (omitted here – see 2T)  -- Exhibit H to Certification, Transcript of Trial dated March 21, 2023, filed June 29, 2023 (omitted here – see 3T)  -- Exhibit I to Certification, Transcript of Trial dated March 22, 2023, filed June 29, 2023 (omitted here – see 4T and 5T)  -- Exhibit J to Certification, Transcript of Trial dated March 27, 2023, filed June 29, 2023 (omitted here – see 7T)  -- Exhibit K to Certification, Transcript of Trial dated March 28, 2023, filed June 29, 2023 (omitted here – see 8T)  -- Exhibit L to Certification, marked up copy of Jury Verdict Sheet, filed June 29, 2023
[brief] When defendant told her wanted a prescription for Adderall because he liked the way it made him feel and he no longer wanted to purchase it on the street, [...] introduced defendant to her doctor, who had given her prescriptions for Adderall and Suboxone.  Nevertheless, defendant researched the doctor prior to seeing him in order to make sure he could be easily manipulated.  Along with taking Adderall, [...] also witnessed defendant’s daily use of marijuana (7T:68-25 to 75-7; 76-1 to 78-12).  Despite his drug use, defendant physically worked out daily – either at a Planet Fitness Gym, or outside at a park doing calisthenics or something similar.  (7T:100-12 to 24).  As his constant companion, [...] also witnessed defendant’s various rantings and conspiracy theories regarding law enforcement, government, history and “things of that nature. ”  To further his theories, defendant would often conduct Internet searches and do research on either his smart phone or by going to a local library to use the computer.  (7T:75-8 to 24).  Defendant believed that people were out to hurt or harm him, cause an upheaval in his life, or possibly try and kill him.  As a result, defendant believed he was the subject of “gang stalking. ”  So much so that while driving around in his Impala, defendant required [...] to take her phone apart so he could not be “tracked” and frequently made her change her telephone number.
[brief] One extremely important aspect of [...]’s statement is that she never contended that [...] admitted that he tried to kidnap [...], or that he was concerned regarding the kidnapping charges specifically.  [...] admittedly pulled out an imitation firearm during an altercation with [...] where she presented no reasonable threat, which could arguably still constitute possession of an imitation firearm for an unlawful purpose.  This is also not a case where there is a question regarding whether the conduct was accidental or purposeful, in which case there may be a stronger argument for admission of such consciousness of guilt evidence.  Even assuming arguendo that [...] did make these statements to Diana, which he adamantly denies, this evidence at best suggests consciousness of guilt with regard to some criminal activity, not necessarily the attempted kidnapping.
[brief] [...] has finally acknowledged in its opposition brief that the exclusion in the Policy focuses on the “intent to injure” and not the “intent to interfere. ”  As stated in [...]’s initial brief, the intent required in tortious interference claims is an “intent to interfere” and not an “intent to injure. ”  As a result, tortious interference claims do not fall within the Policy’s exclusion.  Faced with this dilemma, [...] has now pivoted and argues for the first time that under Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., “malice” is defined as inflicting the harm intentionally and without justification or excuse.
[brief] The very first proposed Rugbeer factor requires that an arbitration agreement be clear and unambiguous.  That an agreement to arbitrate clearly and unambiguously advise a party that they are waiving their right to trial in favor of arbitration (i.e. whether an agreement is “valid”) is already subject to judicial review and required for any arbitration contract.  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 443 (2014); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b).  Additionally, proposed Rugbeer factor 2: “the agreement does not adversely affect the public interest” is wholly duplicative of Rudbart factor 4 “the public interests measured by the contract. ”  Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 127 N.J. 344, 356 (1992).  Moreover, while [...] claims that arbitration in the context of medical malpractice is contrary to public interest, the reality is “public policy favors arbitration agreements, including in health care settings.  (Da067) citing Moore 416 N.J. Super. at 45 (App. Div. 2010)(emphasis added).  Finally, the Rugbeer test is inappropriate because it unnecessarily conflates the factors and weighing of equities found in an exculpatory agreement like those found in Gershon, Adm'x Ad Prosequendum for Est. of Pietroluongo v. Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2004) and Stelluti, with an agreement to arbitrate which merely specifies the forum in which a party’s claims may be addressed.
[directive] This feature is consistent with the notion of ensuring the sternest punishment for those offenders who, by virtue of their participation in organized criminal activities, pose the greatest danger to public safety.  The extent of the increase in the plea offer based upon the street gang involvement Special Application and Enhancement Feature shall be determined by the prosecutor (with appropriate supervisory approval) based on an assessment of the defendant’s role within the gang (rank and leadership status, and the nature of the tasks performed by the defendant) and the nature and impact of the gang’s overall activities.  Nothing in this Section shall preclude a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues in accordance with Section 12 or a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation in accordance with Section 13.  To help ensure the uniform implementation of this Special Application and Enhancement Feature, eligibility for this feature and the extent of the increase of the plea offer within the authorized range (i.e., one to nine months, or six to eighteen months in the case of a first-degree crime), must be approved by a supervisor designated by the county prosecutor or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.  The county prosecutor and Director are hereby authorized to designate one or more persons to review and approve the use of this Special Application and Enhancement Feature who should be selected based upon their knowledge about local street gang activities and the impact of such gang activities on public safety and quality of life within the applicable jurisdiction.  Page 87
[brief] Solondz v. Kornmehl, 3147 N.J. Super. 16, 21 (App. Div. 1993).  The “services” referred to in Section 6.1 are clearly the use of the Borough’s sewer lines.  Equally important, Section 6.1 provides the Borough is entitled to connection fees of “any user. ”  Section 6.1 does not provide that the Borough is only entitled to connection fees for connections in the Borough, and it also does not state that all other connection fees that are not “in the borough” belong to the Township.  Similarly, if the intent was for Section 6.5 to provide for the Township to receive out of town connection fees language to that effect should appear in Section 6.1, which again is the only section in the 1999 Agreement that provides for or specifically mentions connection fees.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The Chancery Division has refused to follow this Court’s remand directives after two prior appeals.  Had the trial court followed this Court’s directive after the first 2006 limited remand, the case would have concluded fifteen years ago with an accounting and valuation of [...]’s 25% partnership interest.  Instead, the new judge assigned to the case after the 2006 remand allowed the intervention of [...] as a new plaintiff, at the supposed end of the litigation, and endorsed an unprecedented, unauthorized expansion of the case with new claims by both Plaintiffs that were never raised in the original seventeen years of the litigation.  Seven more years of post-remand litigation preceded entry of a new final judgment in 2013.  After a second appeal was decided in 2018, two new trial judges again failed to adhere to this Court’s directives.  Four-and-a-half years after the second remand, the trial court re-issued most of its prior rulings that this Court vacated and directed be re-examined and modified.  The trial court’s latest judgment against the [...] must be reversed because it ignores the clear directives of this Court in the 2018 appeal, contravenes New Jersey law, and fails to tie findings of fact to the law or the claims at issue.  This case was originally filed more than three decades ago.
[brief] 42.  Prior to [...] becoming the Rabbi of Plaintiff in the early 1990s, there was a single morning prayer service that started around 7:00 a.m.  This service was conducted in the main sanctuary located closest to the entrance by the Sixth Street Lot.  Between 2008 and 2009, two additional services were added: a 7:50 a.m. service (conducted in the secondary sanctuary located closer to the Fifth Street Lot entrance) and an 8:15 a.m. service (conducted in the main sanctuary).  The 7:00 a.m. service is typically completed by 7:50 a.m.; the 7:50 a.m. service is typically completed by 8:45 a.m.; and the 8:15 a.m. service is typically completed before 9:15 a.m. (8T 104:14-109:7)  **Recordation of Easement**
[brief] The [...] email states the incredibly wrong conclusion "best we can determine, the Ordinance requiring Site Plans was adopted in December of 1984" (See Da262).  This document was part of the [...] improper submission (Exhibit WW on Index Da174) allowed by Order (Da214).  This false and absurd Board attorney assertion was passed on to the Court in the improper [...] submission allowed by the Court, and then erroneously adopted by the Court as "fact" (Da280).
[directive] Iniciais do Réu / Defendant’s Initials no Formulário Padrão de Declaração Judicial/Formulário Revisado Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese página 7 de 7  Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Portuguese page 7 of 7  Attachment 2  Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas  English, English-Spanish, English-Haitian, English- Polish, English-Korean, & English-Portuguese Versions
[brief] Rivkin, 143 N.J. at 366 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).  The fact that the defendants did NOT care one way or the other about the likely consequences of plaintiff missing her psychiatric medications for almost an entire week was egregious and SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE.  This an abuse that is “close to the rack and the screw to permit constitutional differentiation. ”  That same disrespect for plaintiff’s rights and their inability to see her humanity, allowed them to block her from contacting her attorney and ignore her requests to attend her court matters on 1/8/2020, 1/29/2020, 2/1/202, 2/11/2020, 2/12/2020, 2/19/2020.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 19:19-6 --- \(^2\)  This obviously does not include the forfeiture of an office upon the conviction of a felony or under any situation governed by the Municipal Vacancy Law, for example.  (emphasis added).  That language, adopted more than eighty years after *State v. Governor*, represents a deliberate legislative choice to permit the same board that discovers a tallying slip to return, reopen its worksheet, and produce an accurate statement.
[brief] At most, that decision is persuasive authority only.  After all, neither the U.S. Supreme Court “nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different than the one rendered by the highest court of the state. ”  *Johnson v. Fankell*, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997).  The New Jersey Judiciary is the final arbiter of the State Constitution.
[brief] ✷: Like when?  [2/14/22, 10:25:04 AM]  ✷: Now?  [2/14/22, 10:25:40 AM]  [...]: yes [2/14/22, 10:25:56 AM]  [...]: was the taxes paid or your final judgment is real [2/14/22, 10:33:29 AM]  ✷: I own it FJ is very real [2/14/22, 10:46:40 AM]  [...]: wow locky you [2/14/22, 10:46:45 AM]  [...]: can I buy it [2/14/22, 2:20:53 PM]
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE’S EXPERT, [...], WHO WAS NOT NAMED BY THE STATE UNTIL THE DAY PRIOR TO JURY SELECTION (58a; T1, 68-91).  On April 25, 2022, the day prior to the start of jury selection in this matter, the State notified counsel for Defendant that it intended to rely upon the expert testimony of Special Agent [...] and supplied Agent Hauger’s report for the very first time.  Agent Hauger’s opinion was related to geo-time tracking of [...]’ cell phone records on August 11, 2015.  The State had previously named a different expert in mid-2019, and the defense presented the expert report of [...] on March 4, 2020 in response thereto.  It wasn’t until over two (2) years later, on the literal eve of trial, that the State identified a brand-new expert on the issue of per call measurement data [“PCMD”] with regard to Defendant’s cell phone number.  Defendant objected to the introduction of the evidence, given the late submission, and his inability to adequately address the opinions articulated by Mr. Hauger’s report so close in time to the trial of the matter.  The trial court denied the defense application to bar the late expert report and ruled that, in lieu of producing a rebuttal expert report, Defendant could submit a proffer as to his own expert as to the expected testimony.  New Jersey Court Rule 3:13-3(I) governs the use of expert witness testimony in criminal matters and provides as follows: (I) names and addresses of each person whom the prosecutor expects to call to trial as an expert witness, the expert's qualifications, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, a copy of the report, if any, of such expert witness, or if no report is prepared, a statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
[brief] Count I of [...]’s Complaint sounds in implied contract.  Count II sounds in misrepresentation, which Plaintiff-Appellant alleges he relied upon to enter into what he considered to be an implied contract (his acceptance of admission into the Pharmacy School on March 1, 2012).  Count III alleges fraudulent inducement into what Plaintiff-Appellant says was an implied contract with [...].  Count IV contains no substantive legal theory for relief, but rather adds John Does who were never identified.  Consequently, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 governs this suit.7
[brief] ¶131, Pa29.  16.  [...] filed a brief for reconsideration which the judge invited.  It also explained that [...] had certain conflicts, such as two pending lawsuits against it in which [...] was counsel.  The brief also had a “bad search” argument, based on the unsigned permission as well as other exculpatory arguments.  ¶137, Pa30.  17.  The judge “bounced” the motion several days later, proving my point about disqualification due to retaliation.  This denied [...] reconsideration and denied [...] a chance for interlocutory appeal, if necessary.  18.  [...] complained to the assignment judge about the above lack of Due Process in an ADA Administrative Complaint asking His Honor to process the timely filed motion.  [...]’s never heard back.  ¶¶138-139, Pa30.  19.  The “missing” exculpatory registration, requested in criminal discovery, showed up in the mail – 14 months late.  ¶¶141-43; Pa31.  20.  During the hearing for the re-filed exculpatory motion, the prosecution withdrew its veto, 30 months into the case.  21.  Throughout, I sent the Prosecutor DoJ Bulletins, etc. that warned states about liability for the well-documented, massive discrimination against defendants with mental disabilities.  ¶¶173-74, Pa37-38.  22.  [...]’s legal papers are frequently “lost,” not time stamped correctly, bounced or simply not forwarded to the court for decision.  So the loss, the bounce and delay in hearing [...]’s motion are all part of pattern which has affected 100% of [...]’s [...] suits or motions in the last 12 years (about 11-12 cases).  ¶¶151-53, Pa32-33.  23.  [...] finished PTI “cleanly” in February 2018.  Pa140-141.  Procedural Background