ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *D’Agostino v. Maldonado*  216 N.J. 168 (2013).  The plaintiff suffered an ascertainable loss on the first two transactions because she incurred, and paid, fees and charges to [...].  Those fees are a cognizable damage.  She incurred an ascertainable loss because it was only the decree of the bankruptcy court that caused her to not be obligated any longer on the debt.  In the present matter, the defendant engaged in a transaction forbidden by New Jersey law, that constituted an unconscionable business practice, that practice caused the plaintiff to incur fees and charges to fund the unconscionable practice, which caused an ascertainable loss to the plaintiff.
[brief] Defendants also argue that this Court should not consider *Firoz*, or other unpublished decisions, under Rule 1:36-3.  Contrary to Defendants’ argument, though unpublished decisions are not binding, this Court may find such decisions persuasive.  *E.g.*  Sauter v. Colts Neck Volunteer Fire Co. No. 2, 451 N.J. Super. 581, 600 (App. Div. 2017) (unpublished opinions may be cited, and courts may find them persuasive); see also Pressler & Verniero, N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 1:36-3 (2017).  general rule holds true whether a litigant explicitly frames its motion as one for reconsideration, or merely seeks the same relief in a subsequent motion.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Pretrial discovery “is not limitless. ”  *HD Supply Waterworks Grp., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation*, 29 N.J. Tax 573, 583 (2017).  Relevancy is a fundamental prerequisite and has been codified in our Court Rules to eliminate overly burdensome and costly discovery exercises.  Imposing unlimited discovery burdens on parties would not only increase the already high cost of litigation, but it would also chill parties’ willingness to participate in the legal system.  Our Court Rules limit the production of discovery to relevant materials.  Amici curiae therefore urge this Court to vacate the ESI Order.
[brief] Id. (quoting Pullen v. Township of South Plainfield, 291 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App.Div.1996) (citing Ward v. Scott, 16 N.J. 16, 23 (1954); Bellington v. Township of East Windsor, 32 N.J. Super. 243, 249 (App.Div.1954), aff’d, 17 N.J. 558, 112 A.2d 268 (1955)).  Likewise, when reviewing the decision of a trial court that has reviewed municipal action, the appellate court is “bound by the same standards as was the trial court. ”  Fallone at 562.  B.
[brief] A.  THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED, AND PROPERLY REJECTED, PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM THAT SHE SUFFERED AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION (8a-9a, 16a-17a)  On appeal, Plaintiff avers that the trial court “erred in finding that Plaintiff had not adequately pled the second prong of a NJLAD claim. ”  Pb20.  Despite Plaintiff’s contention, the trial court indeed performed a nuanced analysis of Plaintiff’s allegations, applied well-settled legal principles, and aptly determined that Plaintiff’s allegations fell far short of satisfying the second element of a claim for retaliation under the NJLAD, namely, an adverse employment action.
[brief] *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required [...] to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.  [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and seven months past the statutory deadline, which is not a de minimis violation.
[brief] You testified in your deposition in this case -- A Yes. Q -- in June of 2021, so almost a year ago.  A  Yeah.  Q  That you withdrew the application that you made to [...] in 2014 because you were too busy, correct?  A  Well, that was one of the reasons, correct.  Q  But that’s what you told me.  That’s the only time I got to talk to you, correct?
[brief] In a lengthy, well-reasoned oral opinion, the trial court closely scrutinized this wholly unavailing position and found it lacking any legal merit.  The trial court further found the Tenant did not and could not allege any underhanded conduct by the landlord.  As well, because the landlord voluntarily dismissed its claim against the Tenant and Guarantor, they suffered no ascertainable loss under the CFA.  The Order below is well-supported by both law and fact and, thus, should be affirmed.  Appellants cannot identify any precedent warranting a reversal here.
[brief] ”  [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.3.3 on R. 4:46-2; see also Lenches-Marrero v. Law Firm of Averna & Gardner, 326 N.J. Super. 382, 387-88 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that the “motion court should have permitted plaintiff a brief adjournment of the motion for summary judgment” in order to depose relevant witness “in light of” later-learned discovery).
[brief] That such discrimination could continue in the meantime, and may not be fully remediable after the fact, undermines “any adjudication [[...]] may make in this matter in vindication of [students’] rights. ”  Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8 (adding “adequate enforcement” of the LAD ranks “high indeed in our public policy”).  The court’s order was further justified “to aid in the preservation of the subject matter of a proceeding pending before an administrative agency. ”  Ibid.; see also ibid. (emphasizing that courts “cannot adopt a grudging or narrow approach” in this circumstance, because otherwise, administrative adjudication of LAD rights could become “a vain and useless act”); Poff, 228 N.J. Super. at 379 (enjoining landlord from renting apartment while an administrative proceeding under LAD was pending concerning refusal to rent apartment to gay men).
[brief] 19 State v. Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. 286 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148 (2004) .................................................................................. 10 State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544 (2012) .................................................................. 11, 12 State v. Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108 (2007) ..................................................................  11 State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) .................................................................. 10 State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 (1998) ....................................................................  16, 18 State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219 (2007) .................................................................. 30, 31 State v. Francisco, 471 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div.), certif. denied, __ N.J. __ (2023)  .......  13 State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (2014) ..................................................................  10 State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010).................................................................  10 State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612 (2022)..................................................................
[directive] 지불해야 하는 것을  Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?  16.  경우, [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  [해당없음/NA]  귀하가 공직에 있거나  공무원인 유죄 인정으로 인하여 귀하의 아십니까?  직위 또는 직무를 박탈 당할 수 있음을  Do you understand that if you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty?
[brief] Second, the Plaintiff treacherously accuses the Defendant of several lack luster, racist behavioral claims, outlining frustrations in their de novo brief and ultimately blaming the Defendant solely of delaying the criminal matter in its entirety.  Accusations were simply opinionated, as well as, unsubstantiated against the Defendant [AP 62 and AP 75] when the Plaintiff had the Defendant’s substantiated evidence detailing her whereabouts when she submitted her motion to dismiss request that resulted in the downgrade charge currently on appeal.  The submissions to the Superior Court were incomplete, detailing one transcript, knowledge discovery transmission issues and the Defendant’s motion to dismiss {with her substantiated evidence} dismissed that resulted in the Defendant’s erroneous de novo conviction by the Honorable [...].
[brief] [...] (“[...]”) of the [...] (“[...]”) was investigating the sale of cocaine by an individual known as “[...]. ” (2T11-1 to 3).  As part of that inquiry, [...] made an undercover purchase of narcotics from a female later identified as [...], who was the paramour of [...].  (2T11-3 to 6).  [...] ultimately identified “[...]” as [...], the defendant here.  (2T11-7 to 9).  [...] executed an arrest of Mealing and defendant at which time defendant attempted to evade custody by driving over top police vehicles before being detained.  (2T11-18 to 24).  [...] executed search warrants on property related to defendant and recovered significant quantities of cash, narcotics, and a handgun.  (2T12-2 to 24).  Come 2014, little had changed.
[brief] 32 State v. Milton, 178 N.J. 421 (2004) ...........................................................................  18, 19, 20 State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998) cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S.Ct. 1380 (2001)  ......................................................................................... 32, 35 State v. Nataluk, 316 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1998).................................................  24 State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547 (1990)..............................................................................  49 State v. Polk, 164 N.J. Super. 457 (App.Div.1977).......................................................
[brief] 83 Id. 84 Id. 85 Id. 86 Id. 87 Pa848.  88 Pa851.  89 Pa852.  90 Id. 91 Id. 92 Pa861.  ARGUMENT POINT I THE MOTION  JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DECLINING TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO R.  4:40-2 BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THAT THE JURY’S VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER AS TO THE RESULT (Pa665-66).  The purpose of Rule 4:40-2 is to allow the court to correct "clear error or mistake" by the jury.  Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969).  In considering a motion for JNOV under Rule 4:40-2(b), the standard is:  "[I]f, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according [her] the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied .  . . ."  Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)).  Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s Motion for JNOV is time-barred is without merit.  While Plaintiff did not orally move for a directed verdict at the close of evidence, or for JNOV on July 28, 2023, immediately after the jury returned its verdict, the requirement that a motion be made at the close of evidence is inapplicable, since the basis for Plaintiff’s Motion in this case arose upon the return of the verdict, and not by reason of proofs which reasonably may have required a motion for judgment pursuant to R. 4:40-2.
[brief] BECAUSE THE NET RESULT IS THE SAME, NAMELY SUCH PROVISIONS  LEAVE DEFENDANTS UNDERINSURED AND PLAINTIFFS WITHOUT RECOURSE FOR RECOVERY.  .................................................................  1 POINT II.  NOT A SINGLE NEW JERSEY CASE CITED BY DEFENDANT HAS UPHeld THE UIM DEFINITIONAL EXCLUSION INVOKED HERE AS APPLIED TO AN EXCESS/UMBRELLA POLICY BY VIRTUE OF A “FOLLOW FORM” CLAUSE BECAUSE SUCH CONSTRAINED INSURANCE POLICY
[brief] Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 558-59 (1979)....  6  In re AMICO/Tunnel Carwash, 371 N.J.  Super. 199 (App. Div. 2004)........... 4 In re Authorization for Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 372 N.J. Super. 578 (App. Div. 2004)................................................................. 12 In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370 (2013) .................................................................................. 9 In re Proposed Xanadu Redev. Project, 402 N.J. Super. 607 (App. Div. 2008)......................................................................................... 9 In re Riverview Development, LLC, Waterfront Development Permit No. 0908-05-0004.3 WFD 060001, 411 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 2010)............... 4 In re Tideland's License 96-0114-T, 326 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 1999)..... 5 Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 476 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2023).................................................................5, 6, 7, 8, 9 Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40 (1976)
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS AS TO EFFECT IVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WERE NOT RAISED AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL  ..............................................................................  9 POINT II  DEFENDANT’S ADA CLAIMS AND DISCOVERY REQUESTS WERE NOT BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION, JUDGE, WERE NOT A PART OF THE RECORD, AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL.  (THIS ARGUMENT REFERS TO POINTS II AND III OF DEFENDANT’S BRIEF.)  .................................................................  16 POINT III  [...] PROPERLY HELD THAT THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT WAS ADMISSIBLE.  (THIS REFERS TO POINT IV OF DEFENDANT’S BRIEF.)  ...............  18 POINT IV  THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD TO PROVE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  (THIS ARGUMENT ENCOMPASSES POINTS IV AND V OF DEFENDANT’S BRIEF.)  .................................................................  20  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................
[brief] 69  Polarome Int’l, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 2008)  ............................................. passim Port Auth. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D.N.J. 2001), aff’d 311 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 2002)
[brief] Respondent urged the court to overturn the [...]’ rejection and simply assume the voter mistakenly bubbled the “write-in” option.  No legal authority supports such speculation.  N.J.S.A. 19:16-3(a) states that ballots are counted if “proper marks are made … and the total number voted for, for each office, does not exceed the number of candidates to be elected to each office…”  Here, more marks are made (three) than the total candidates to be elected (two).  N.J.S.A. 19:16-3(f) additionally provides that if a voter “marks more names than there are persons to be elected to an office …or his choice cannot be determined, his ballot shall not be counted for that office …”
[brief] The D’Avila Case Is Controlling In This Appeal.  [...]’s next argument demonstrates yet another clear misunderstanding of New Jersey law.  [...] expends three pages analyzing the facts of a case that is over thirty years old (Kane v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., 278 N.J. Super. 129, 146-147 (App. Div. 1994) (while it conspicuously expends a maximum of two-three paragraphs in support of its own arguments).  The holding in D’Avila is factually, legally, and temporally far more relevant to the facts in the instant matter.  Nonetheless, in [...]’s misguided attempt at distinguishing this Court’s holding in D’Avila from the matter at bar, [...] stresses the argument that the holding in Kane, not the holding in D’Avila, should apply to the instant matter.
[brief] There were no eyewitnesses to this interaction and the evidence collected did nothing to shed any light on the precise nature of the interaction between [...] and the woman, or the words exchanged during the course of their argument.  As such, this matter could be properly categorized as a “he said, she said” situation.  Trial in this matter should have involved the jury assessing the respective accounts of [...] and the young woman and making a calculated determination as to whose narrative they deemed to be more plausible.  However, this once simple fact-finding endeavor into what occurred on the evening of January 25, 2021, took a sharp turn approximately nine months later when [...]’s ex-girlfriend checked herself out of rehab and went straight to the police station to make various outlandish accusations against her former romantic partner.
[brief] Pa024.  Thereafter, on March 27, 2024, Appellants through [...] filed a motion seeking a stay of proceedings in the court below pending this appeal.  Pa025.  Respondent avers that the entirety of the brief in support of that motion was devoted to staying the proceedings and that it did not contain argument directed at modifying or staying the effect of the Order under review with respect to the requirement that the [...] have counsel separate from [...].
[directive] While ORVs are generally prohibited on public lands, multiple legal avenues exist for ORV users:  (1)  ORV users and recreational groups can seek special use permits from the State Park Service within the Department of Environmental Protection for ORV events.  See N.J.S.A. 39:3C- 22; N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.2; N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.4.  (2)  Snowmobiles are permitted in certain areas of public lands within New Jersey.  These areas include sections of High Point State Park, Wawayanda State Park, Ringwood State Park, Forest.5 Stokes State Forest, and Worthington State  (3)  ORV use on public lands may be permissible if it constitutes a reasonable accommodation because of a disability.  See New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to - 49; see also Lasky v. Moorestown Twp., 425 N.J. Super. 530, 537 (App. Div. 2012) (noting that the park owned and maintained by the Township was a “public accommodation” subject to the Law Against Discrimination’s prohibition on discrimination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-12).  The Department of Environmental Protection, State Park Service, and Division of Fish and Wildlife have made efforts to create greater accessibility on public lands for individuals with physical disabilities, such as the designation of adaptive bike trails, and visitors may contact these entities to learn more about reasonable accommodations.  Both ORV users and law enforcement personnel are advised to consult with the Department of Environmental Protection to determine the locations and times of permitted routes and events, which may change over time.  E.
[brief] [...] testified as to her certainty that the first time she entered the Decedent’s safety deposit box was the date she surrendered it, on June 21, 2021, a date that was confirmed by Respondent.  (11T50:4-6; 11T13:2-4; 11T13:24 to 15:4; P572(a)).  Yet, on June 18, 2021, three days before [...] first entered Decedent’s safety deposit box, Respondent had attached a copy of the 2014 Will to her answer and Crossclaim, averred in her Answer to Complaint in Paragraph 17, “the original will was subsequently located. ”  (P100a at 17; P104a to 109a).  The facts confirm that the original 2014 Will was not in Decedent’s safe deposit box when she died, but rather, was in Respondent’s possession after it was made, which Respondent concealed throughout this litigation and trial.  That is obviously because a beneficiary’s possession of a will that favors her is a factor that constitutes suspicious circumstances under the law.
[brief] \(^5\)  The same holds true for Plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Even if they drove to the mall to identify tenants, they would have had no way of knowing whether any tenant they observed that day was actually a tenant on the day of the accident.  That the Respondents may have been tenants for many years does not matter.  No person arriving a few weeks or months after the accident, layperson or lawyer, would have had any reason to know how long any particular tenant had been operating at the strip mall.  Instead, Plaintiffs did what responsible litigants do.  They sued the Landlord and then served discovery seeking the identity of the potential “John Doe” lessor defendants.
[brief] -------------------------------  [...], individually and as Guardian ad Litem for [...]; [...], individually and as Guardian ad Litem for [...]; [...], individually and as Guardian ad Litem for [...]; [...] individually; and [...], individually and as Guardian ad Litem for [...]  Petitioners, v. [...], COMMISSIONER OF THE [...]; the [...]; and the [...]  Respondents.  -------------------------------  APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF
[brief] Pa000108–Pa000110.  The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that he could not have “raise[d] these claims prior to the Settlement Agreement [in *Roma*],” holding the *Roma* class “clearly did raise the same issues back in 2012. ”  Pa000110.  The court held the *Gannon* claims are not “future claims,” but “the same claims regarding the interchange fees addressed in the *Roma* case, and are thus covered by the Settlement Agreement. ”  Pa000110.  On June 19, 2024, Plaintiff appealed.  Pa000001–Pa000002.
[brief] 1.  The Planning Board’s Determination was Entitled to Great Deference...27  2.  The Borough’s Decision to Adopt Ordinance 1667 Approving the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan Was Also Entitled to Great Deference ...29  3.  The Trial Court Properly Recognized the Presumption of Validity Accorded to the Actions Taken by the Planning Board and the Borough..............31  B.
[brief] McQuillin, supra, at § 12.143; and see Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal. 2d 833, 3 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566, 350 P.2d 529 (1960); Giuliano v. Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension F., 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 231 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1967); Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1968).  Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598.  In Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, the Court evaluated a “preponderance of the equities” and “all of the circumstances” to achieve a “just result. ”  Id. at 600.  This Court is not bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue.  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).  As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited."
[brief] See Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., Inc., 170 N.J. 602 (2002); Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 (1985).  Plaintiff does not argue factual grounds against application of Exclusion C.5 of the [...] and [...] policies to his claims.  Plaintiff never contended in the trial court that the employer conduct alleged in his Complaint is distinguishable from the language and applicability of Exclusion C.5 in the [...] and [...] policies.  Plaintiff also does not argue, as is typical in many insurance coverage actions, that an ambiguity in Exclusion C.5 requires that it be construed in Plaintiff’s favor to afford insurance coverage.  Nothing in Exclusion C. 5 is ambiguous.  Its language expressly applies to conduct of the employer or its agent that is substantially certain to result in injury.  Consequently, case law Plaintiff cites regarding interpretation of insurance policies and their exclusions has no relevance in this appeal.  In addition, as previously stated, Plaintiff does not argue that the trial court improperly reviewed the motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), or considered materials or information that was not appropriate.  Nor does Plaintiff argue that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of review to the insurers’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim against the insurers.  This appeal presents a single narrow challenge to the C.5 Exclusion of the [...] and [...] policies.