ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] HISTORY  Plaintiff is a public entity created under the Federal Housing Act of 1938 which oversees more than 12,000 public, affordable housing units throughout the [...], New Jersey.  (Pa42)  Defendant is a skilled trade organization affiliated with the [...] that represents carpenters across four counties in New Jersey, including Essex County where the [...] is located.  (Pa42)  Plaintiff and Defendant are parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) which sets forth the parties’ respective rights and duties, as well as grievance procedures for covered employees.  (Pa43)  In particular, Article III of the CBA provides, in pertinent part, the following:  ARTICLE III  EMPLOYER’S RIGHTS  A.  The Authority hereby retains until itself all powers, rights, authority, duties and responsibilities conferred upon and vested in it prior to the signing of this Agreement by the laws and Constitution of the State of New Jersey and of the United States, including:  1.  The executive management and administrative control of the Authority Government --- 1  The procedural history and statement of facts have been combined for the Court’s convenience because they are inextricably intertwined.  2  “Pa” refers to the appellate appendix of Plaintiff [...]. and its employees by utilizing personnel, methods and means of the most appropriate and efficient manner possible as may from time to time be determined by the Authority.  ***  3.  The right to make, maintain and amend such reasonable rules and regulations as it may from time to time deem appropriate for the purposes of maintaining order, safety and/or the effective operation of the Authority after advance notice thereof to the employees and to require compliance by the employees.  4.  To hire all employees, and subject to the provisions of law, to determine their qualifications and conditions of continued employment, or assignment, and to promote and transfer employees.  5.  To suspend, discharge or take any other appropriate disciplinary action against any employee for just cause according to law.  ***  7.  To make such changes as it deems desirable and necessary for the efficiency and effective operation of the Authority.  ***  B.  No rules, customs, or practices shall be permitted or observed which limit or restrict production, or limit or restrict the joint or individual working efforts of employees.  ***  D.  No rules, customs, or practices shall be permitted or observed which limit or restrict production, or limit or restrict the joint or individual working efforts of employees.  (Pa43-44)  (emphasis added)  A. [...]’ Injury History And Underlying Grievance.
[brief] Property – Environmental  Since 2011, the property has been under DEP oversight when a tenant, [...], had a hydraulic oil spill and remediation was required.  Neither individual Defendant in this lawsuit was involved in that process at the time.  8T6-18 to 7-1; Pa0296 to Pa0297.  It was at this time that [...] hired Environmental Consultant [...] to oversee the work done by [...], the environmental remediation company hired by the tenants.  8T6-19 to 7-7.  Upon completion of the remediation of the hydraulic oil spill and submission of a RAO specific to this spill cleanup, it was also reported to the NJDEP that the property, as a whole, was potentially contaminated with Lead and PCBs.  Pa0297.  In light of these additional environmental issues needing to be addressed [...] asked Joe Lockwood to stay on and work on the site investigation required by the NJDEP.  Pa0297; 8T8-2 to 9-1.  In 2012, [...] was brought in by Joe Lockwood to be the LSRP for the property site remediation.  6T7-20 to 8-4.  Defendants will be in direct regulatory oversight on May 7, 2024.  5T125-1 to 13; 4T-9 to 25.  The stringent oversight regulation requires financial security bonds, retention or employment of an LSRP, and an environmental plan for remediation.  4T214-1 to 217-21.  III.
[brief] 32 Riveria v. Columbus Cadet Corp., 59 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 1960) ....................... 20 Saks v. Ng, 383 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 2006) ....................... 31 Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128 ..........................................................
[brief] Thus, to the extent *Mejia* had any application to the matter, it was in as applied to [...]’s claimed right to dismissal of the Third-Party Complaint, which is a moot point given the jury’s allocation of no liability to [...].  allocating the 60 percent against [...] with the appropriate interest as I figured out up and -- THE COURT: Yes, absolutely.  [...]: Okay.  Okay.  And I’m -- THE COURT: [...], -- we’ll figure it out.  [(22T11, 22T25)]  The parties then submitted supplemental briefing and, on February 28, 2023, the trial court entered plaintiffs’ proposed judgment order holding [...] 100% responsible for the judgment, which, with interest, exceeded $1.9 million:
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW  The burden of proving a tenant’s default in a nonpayment of rent action always rests with the Plaintiff.  It is the Plaintiff who must submit evidence proving the tenant’s default in rent.  In the case at bar the court proceeded on an examination of payments focused solely on the Defendant.  The legal error complained about in this case is that in the absence of Plaintiff being able to show the tenant’s default, the court shifted the burden onto the tenant.
[brief] The effective date of the amendment authorizing [...] to pay its employees from the Board’s money is June 29, 2020.  As with all statutes, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) must be given prospective application, which negates all of [...]’s claims for payment on its April / May / June 2020 invoices.  The Legislature undisputedly did not express retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  Under the two-prong implied retroactive application test, the court cannot apply retroactive application of the statute because 1) the Legislature never intended to give the statute retroactive application; and 2) the retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.  [...]’s claims, which are based on the retroactive application of the statute, thus fails, thus requiring a denial of its motion for summary judgment.
[brief] *Ayers v. Jackson Township*, 106 N.J. 557, 585 (1987) (emphasis added).  Here, there exists no proximate cause between Appellants’ loss of their solar project, the land, and/or the Solar Rights and any actions of the CEP Respondents.  Appellants defaulted under their Lease and subsequently lost their interest in the Property when the landowner, [...], exercised its rights under the Lease to terminate.  Appellants have admitted losing their lease due to an inability to pay their rent arising from some dispute among their partners.  [...] then terminated Appellants’ application, which resulted in the loss of Appellants’ Solar Rights.
[brief] For interrogating police officers, "observations that [a] defendant appeared aggravated . . . and was 'clearly upset' . . . were . . . opinions based on first-hand perception of defendant's appearance, demeanor, and reactions, which fall within the lay opinion rule."  Tung, 460 N.J. Super. at 101.  However, an "[officer's] opinions as to defendant's truthfulness and guilt . . . [are] not admissible as either demeanor evidence or lay opinion."  Ibid.
[directive] Pursuant to Section II.C of AG Directive 2018-2, law enforcement agencies are required to conduct random drug testing at least twice in each calendar year and to test at least 10 percent of the total number of sworn officers within the agency each time.  However, the only laboratory currently approved to conduct such tests—the [...] ([...])—is facing a significant backlog after it was forced to suspend collection of urine specimens between March 23, 2020 and July 1, 2020.  To ensure the most efficient use of law enforcement resources and maintain the numerous benefits associated with the law enforcement mandatory random drug testing program, I have determined that it is necessary and appropriate to adjust the timeframe and reporting requirements of Directive 2018-2, while still requiring that every agency test at least 10 percent of its officers at least four times over the two-year period between January 1, 2020, and New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 December 31, 2021.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, I hereby direct all law enforcement agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following policies, procedures, standards, and practices.
[brief] Ibid.; see also State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 448, 452-453 (2017); State v. Balthrop, 92 N.J. 542, 546 (1983) (holding that the trial court must state on the record the basis for concluding that there was a “substantial danger of undue prejudice, or an absence thereof, that would accrue to the objecting party if the proffered evidence were introduced”).
[brief] [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  JUSTICE COMPLEX TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08625  [...] ATTORNEY NO. 031591987  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE  BUREAU P.O. BOX 086  TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08625 (609) 376-2400  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  December 12, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] 1  Purpose of Policy ...................................................................................................................................  1  2  Definitions ............................................................................................................................................. 2  3  Deciding Whether to Pursue .................................................................................................................  4  4  Role of the Pursuing Officer ..................................................................................................................  7  5  Vehicular Pursuit Restrictions ...............................................................................................................  8  6  Authorized Tire Deflation Devices ......................................................................................................  10  7  Role of the Supervisor .........................................................................................................................  12  8  Role of Police Communications ..........................................................................................................  13  9  Reinstating Pursuits ............................................................................................................................  13  10  Interjurisdictional Pursuits ..................................................................................................................  13  11  Vehicular Pursuit Reporting ................................................................................................................ 14  12  Vehicular Pursuit Review ....................................................................................................................  15  13  Training ...............................................................................................................................................  17
[brief] This is a case of first impression in New Jersey.  The [...] is the only policy making and regulatory body in the government of the State of New Jersey that is controlled by a single private organization.  The majority of its members (6 out of 11) must be sportsmen recommended by the [...] thereby giving this private organization an ostensible public status to regulate hunting, trapping and conservation of game animals in New Jersey in violation of Articles III and IV of the New Jersey State Constitution.  The statutes governing the composition of the Council and delegating regulatory authority to it also contravene the related private non-delegation doctrine.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (Pa 1-16).  The Order to Show Cause was supported by Certifications of [...], [...] and [...].  On September 23, 2020, the relief requested was denied.  (Pa 17-23).  On July 16, 2020, Defendants [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), and [...] filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.  (Pa 24-31).  On August 6, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to dismiss Count II of the Defendants’ Counterclaim.  The Court below denied the Motion on September 25, 2020.  (Pa 17-23)  Defendants [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses on August 14, 2020.  (Pa 17-23).  Defendants [...] and [...] were voluntarily dismissed with prejudice on September 22, 2021.  (Pa 17-23).  On April 28, 2022, [...], [...], [...], and [...] filed a Motion for summary judgment.  On August 3, 2022, the Court denied the Motion.  (Pa 17-23).  On August 9, 2022, the Court entered a Supplemental Order denying the Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment (Pa 17-23), and on August 26, 2022, the Court entered a revised opinion.  (Pa 17-23).  A bench trial was held on October 31, 2022, November 1, 2022 and November 2, 2022. \(^1\)  [...] and [...] did not appear and were dismissed from the case. \(^2\)  On August 3, 2023, the Court entered an Order for Judgment, finding no cause for either the Plaintiffs’ Complaint or the Defendants’ Counterclaim.  (Pa 32).  On August 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal.
[brief] In State v. Gerns, 145 N.J. 216, 231-32 (1996), the Supreme Court noted that defendant had presented “impressive” statistical data of disparity of sentencing in drug cases, and suggested that such disparity might offend either the State Constitution or the Code’s "overriding commitment to assuring uniformity in criminal sentencing."  In State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998), the Court held that county-by-county disparities in plea offers in "school zone" drug cases were unconstitutional and required the Attorney General to draw up new guidelines.  These broader concerns in drug cases, as well as disparities between co-defendants, derive from the long-standing principle that “grievous inequities in sentences destroy a prisoner’s sense of having been justly dealt with, as well as the public’s confidence in the even-handed justice of our system.
[brief] On May 11, 2023 counsel for [...] filed a motion to hold [...] in contempt for failure to comply with the terms of the April 19, 2023 Order.  Counsel for [...] filed opposition to the motion and filed a cross motion seeking to vacate the prior Order and quash the subpoena.  Oral argument was conducted before [...] on June 19, 2023, and was limited to the [...] and [...] motions.  Following oral argument, the [...] issued two (2) orders on June 26, 2023 with a written statement of reasons, vacating the prior Order enforcing litigant’s rights but denying [...]’s request to quash the subpoena.  (Da104-Da117).  [...] entered an order on June 27, 2023 denying [...]’s Order to Show Cause without explanation other than referencing the other orders issued.
[directive] See N.J. S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2).  In contrast, evidence of a defendant’s involvement in a criminal street gang or other form of organized crime might be relevant both to the risk that defendant might fail to appear (the criminal organization could facilitate flight) and the risk that defendant might commit new criminal activity (the organization might expect or even require the defendant to engage in ongoing criminal activity or violence).  See Section 7.5 (requiring a prosecutor seeking preventive detention to specify the type of risk justifying detention).
[brief] [...]’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED  BECAUSE THE STATE PRESENTED  A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE DESIGNED TO DENIGRATE  [...] AND ADVANCED NUMEROUS IMPROPER ARGUMENTS SIMILARLY DESIGNED TO PORTRAY HIM AS A DISTURBED LONER.  (6T78-24 TO 81-5; 7T73-12 TO 74-25, 172-4 TO 180-11)  Mr.  Mustafa undoubtedly had an extremely troubled personal life, plagued by significant mental health issues, substance abuse issues, extended periods of unemployment, homelessness, hospitalizations, and more.  At trial, the State improperly capitalized on these facts to grandiosely depict [...] as a disturbed, psychopathic personality.  This was done by extensively eliciting unflattering testimony about [...]’s life during his homelessness and through the admission into evidence of numerous possessions found in his car that were irrelevant to the underlying incident and only served to portray [...] in an unduly negative light.  Additionally, the State advanced arguments founded on denigrating [...] both for his Adderall use and his homelessness, arguments our courts have explicitly held are improper.  Because the trial court refused any remedy for the State’s improper admissions and arguments, and [...] was substantially prejudiced as a result, his convictions must be reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial.
[brief] On May 27, 2022, [...] found defendant guilty of DWI.  [...] found defendant not guilty of Reckless Driving and Careless Driving.  (4T13:1-13; 4T13:14-17).  Defendant was sentenced, as a first time DWI offender, to mandatory fines and penalties, including a $307 fine, $33 court costs, $50 Violent Crime Compensation Board (VCCB) assessment, $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund (SNSF) assessment, $225 DWI surcharge, and 12 hours at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC).  Defendant’s license was suspended for seven months and he was also sentenced to an ignition interlock suspension period.  (4T17:2-7; Aa1-Aa3).  Defendant appealed.
[directive] This is consistent with current statewide practice in pre-indictment disposition programs, where defendants in exchange for a reduced sentence routinely agree to accept responsibility for their offenses and thereby waive the right, for example, to file or pursue a motion to suppress physical evidence.  This graduated plea system acknowledges that the gravamen of plea bargaining is that a defendant, motivated by self-interest, will knowingly and voluntarily waive constitutionally-based rights (including the right to trial by jury, the right to require the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to confront State witnesses, and the right to call favorable witnesses) in exchange for the opportunity to receive a reduced sentence.  The State, in turn, will agree to the reduced sentence in exchange for the certainty of the early disposition and to conserve limited prosecutorial and judicial resources.
[directive] To: ASSIGNMENT  JUDGES # 05-14  DIRECTIVE CRIMINAL DIVISION  JUDGES GRAN~  [Supersedes Directive# 03-10]  A. FROM: [...] AMENDED FORM- NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS AND TIME TO FILE A  SUBJ: PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION  RELIEF AND COLLOQUY 25, 2014  AUGUST DATE: Directive #20-06 (November 15, 2006) promulgated the Appeals Rights Form for use in criminal cases and the standard Appeals Rights colloquy to be used by the judge during sentencing to ensure that a "defendant understands his or her appeal rights and has executed the appeal rights form knowingly and intelligently."
[brief] In New Jersey, it is well established that residential property owners have no common law duty to clear snow and ice from public sidewalks abutting their property.  Qian v. Toll Bros, Inc., 223 N.J. 124, 135 (2015) (quoting Skupienski v. Maly, 27 N.J. 240, 247 (1958); Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 201 (2011).  If a property owner removes snow from a public sidewalk, they will not be liable to a person injured on the sidewalk “unless through [the owner’s] negligence a new element of danger or hazard, other than one caused by natural forces, [was] added to the safe use of the sidewalk by a pedestrian.  *Luchejko* at 201 (quoting *Saco v. Hall*, 1 N.J. 377, 381 (1949)).  One of the Court’s reasonings is that imposing liability on residential owners for natural events like “refreeze” would discourage them clearing snow and ice in the first place.  Finding it to be solid public policy to encourage homeowners to remove snow and ice from sidewalks abutting their property, the Court has upheld these principles for decades.
[brief] The TCA defines the limited parameters within which a claimant may recover damages for a tortuous injury from a public entity.  The basic legislative premise of the TCA is to re-establish immunity for all public entities except under limited circumstances as enumerated by the TCA.  The mere happening of an accident is insufficient to impose liability upon a governmental entity.  Wilson v. Jacobs, 334 N.J. Super. 640 (App. Div. 2000).  Rather, to establish liability against a public entity under the TCA, a Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the public property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury; --- \(^2\) RESPONDENTS rely upon, and incorporate herewith the arguments of CO-RESPONDENT [...] as if set forth fully herein.  (2) the condition proximately caused the injury; (3) the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury that occurred; (4) either the condition was wrongfully created by an employee of the entity or the entity had actual or constructive notice long enough to have taken measures to protect against it; and (5) the action or inaction of the public entity in protecting against the condition was palpably unreasonable.
[brief] The Trust claims its interest is not general and that its “request for a hearing is grounded in a factual navigational harm that has uniquely impacted Appellant. ” (Ab12-13).  However, as the [...] found, the Jibsail Technical Modification Permit was located a sufficient distance from other structures and the marked navigational channel so as to not hinder navigation.  (Aa135).  [...] correctly determined that the Trust was unable to establish a statutory entitlement to a hearing.
[brief] (11T 111-10)  He told officers that in the morning he was picked up by his cousin, [...], who dropped him off at [...] and picked him back up later.  (11T 116-19 to 125-21)  [...] said that at some point, [...] picked up a person called “[...]” and dropped him off at a store near the scene of the shooting.  (11T 132-2 to 139-6)  At the time of his arrest, [...] was wearing Nikes.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : Plaintiff-Appellant, : v. : [...] : Defendant-Respondent.  On Appeal from a Final Order in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] In fact, Plaintiff profited by the subversion of the municipal zoning code by continuing to make money from the Property under the Lease, while at the same time failing to take prompt action to complete remediation.  Allowing a property owner to benefit from the subversion of the integrity of the zoning code only encourages more property owners to subvert zoning.  Like in Ketcherick, superimposed on N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) is a requirement that the use of the property must be a legal permitted use.  In other words, a property owner cannot defeat a redevelopment designation with an illegal non-conforming use.  Any other interpretation would lead to an absurd result and would be contrary to the public policy of the MLUL.  Because the Trial Court’s decision was contrary to public policy, it must be overturned.