ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] CRIMINAL APPREHENSION  Goal:  The police patrol dog will demonstrate the ability to apprehend a "suspect" and return to the handler on command.  2.4.1  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to physically apprehend (bite and hold) the "suspect" until the "suspect" is taken into custody (and a release command is issued) under the following circumstances: a.  No crowd.  b. Through a standing crowd.  c. Through a moving crowd.  2.4.2  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler or after a gunshot is fired, will demonstrate the ability to physically apprehend the "suspect" until the "suspect" is taken into custody (and a release command is issued).  2.4.3  The police patrol dog, after physically apprehending the "suspect," will demonstrate the ability to release the "suspect" on command from the police officer handler.  2.4.4  The police patrol dog will demonstrate the ability to terminate pursuit prior to physical apprehension when verbally recalled by the officer handler from a reasonable distance (minimum of 10 yards) under the following circumstances: a. No crowd.  b. Through a standing crowd.  c. Through a moving crowd.  2.4.5  The police patrol dog will demonstrate tolerance to gunfire while performing criminal apprehension exercises.  2.4.6  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to remain in a finish position when a "suspect" begins to flee (false start).  22 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements  2.5
[brief] 9 U.S.C. § 2 contains specific exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration clauses and states that arbitration is improper where “such grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any \(^3\)  The agreement between [...] and [...] states that it “shall be governed by, and enforceable under, the Federal Arbitration Act.  . . .”  *See [...] Card Agreement* p. 6 (Pa141). contract. ”  Like other contractual rights, the right to compel arbitration may be relinquished through waiver.
[brief] slip op. at 4 (citations omitted)  Like Alston, this matter deals with a series of 9-1-1 calls, placed from different locations and at different times, but very close in time to one another.  Ibid.  They all have a unifying theme.  The 9-1-1 calls gives insight on the foot chase, that led to the arrest of the defendant.  Defense counsel tried arguing this to the court when he stated, "I ask that this be recorded as a present sense impression, because the person, and an excited utterance because in my case defendant being arrested, they are reporting it to the police dispatch, so it's present sense impression.  They are reporting it to the police dispatch, so it's present sense impression.  They are reporting it as it's happening, and an excited utterance.  I'm sure, you know, catching a suspect in a homicide case causes excitement in a police officer, so I think the Court erroneously limited my cross-examination and precluded my client's right to confront witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment."  (12T:212-1 to 12).
[brief] (7T 70-1 to 127-21)  The video depicts a person — wearing light pants, a black shirt, a mask, and a hat — on a bicycle shooting into a car and later being picked up by a person driving a Chevrolet.  (11T 89-11 to 18; Da 21 – Slide 10)  There was no eyewitness to the shooting, but there was one witness who saw the bicyclist afterwards.  [...] testified that he saw a “person dressed all in black, black mask, everything riding a bike” holding something in his hand that morning.  (6T 36-7 to 9)  Franchi further testified that the man got off his bicycle, which he left on the side of the street, and got into a silver SUV with license plate [...].  (6T 38-13 to 41-2)  He told officers that the man looked tall and thin.  (6T 56-3 to 21)  The defense asserted at trial that [...] was not thin at the time of the shooting.  (14T 38-11 to 17)  The car was registered to [...].
[brief] In that case, the defendant issued a threat to a group of people.  The Appellate Division reversed because the facts of the case led to a risk of a non-unanimous verdict as the defendant made multiple distinct threats against multiple distinct individuals.  *Id.* at 557.  In *Tindell*, the indictment only named one victim in the defendant; however, the jury heard evidence of multiple threats to multiple people that could have led the jurors to come to differing conclusions as to who was threatened.  *Id.* at 553.  As in *State v. Macchia*, 253 N.J. 232 (2023), the State did not introduce evidence that “defendant committed different acts against different victims. ”  Like *Macchia*, the State presented one theory of the case: defendant entered the bank with a simulated weapon and demanded money from the tellers who were working in the bank at the time.  He did not commit separate acts of violence like the defendant in *Gentry*.
[brief] In Re Carter, 191 N.J. 474 at 482; see also Saccone v. Bd. Of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380(2014)(quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011))(an agency’s determination of the merits will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record).  To determine whether an agency decision “is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,” the appellate court must determine:  (1)
[brief] Following the trial courts decision, Defendant’s filed a motion to reconsider the denial of summary judgment.  (Pa 265-Pa  In their motion, Defendant alleged that reconsideration was appropriate because the court erred in not considering the city’s affirmative defense regarding its well-established anti-discrimination and harassment policies.  (Pa 273)  Plaintiff opposed the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration asserting that: (1) the motion was untimely filed, and (2) the Defendant did not meet the standard under R. 4:49-2 as the Defendant did not show an abuse of discretion or error in oversight in the denial of the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  (Pa 273)  After hearing oral argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration (T1), the trial judge granted the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and reversed their previous order that denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  (PA 271-Pa 282)  The Court maintained that there were material facts in dispute as to whether Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of the LAD due to his race.  (Pa 280-Pa 281)  However, the Court determined that the City did have an effective anti-discrimination policy and enforced the policies promptly.  (Pa 281-Pa 282)  The trial court erred in this decision as the policy was not effective in stopping the discrimination, nor was it enforced promptly as Defendant [...] was never admonished or reprimanded for his racially motivated conduct.  Further, the harasser Defendant [...] was the person in the Department assigned to train its members on the anti-discrimination policy.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Maryland.  All of the buildings were built since 2015, and are between 400,000 and 800,000 square feet.  Thirty-three of the 34 buildings have a “clear height” of 36 to 40 feet.\(^5\) Ja107; 5T 50:7-25; 51:1-11.  In the past 10 years, neither [...], [...], nor [...] have seen the construction of a warehouse with a building height of 30 feet or less.  (5T 10:1-25; 11:1-18; 44:17-25; 45:1-9; 49:15-25; 50:1; 71:21-25; 72:1-14).  [...], [...], and [...] all agreed that the increase in height can be attributed to the industry’s technological advancements, such as racking systems, pick mods, material handling, forklifts, and high-reach equipment.  These advancements allow for taller structures on smaller footprints.  (5T 11:20-25; 12:1-10; 52:13-25; 53:1-11; 71:21-25; 72:1-14).  As [...] put it, “[t]he whole industry is centered around higher buildings.  [Third-Party Logistic companies] are programmed to operate in higher buildings. ” (5T 47:8-16).  Therefore, [...], [...], and [...] all agreed that a building of this nature, built at 30 feet is “antiquated”, would be “functionally obsolete the day it was built,” and “simply doesn’t work for modern day \(^5\)  The one exception was a “spec to suit”, where the developer intends to construct a spec building, but later commits to a specific user, and customizes that building for that user’s specific needs.  That building had a “clear height” of 32 feet, and a building height of about 40 feet.  (5T 50:7-25; 51:1-11).  warehousing. ” (5T 11:20-25; 12:1-10; 51:20-25; 52:1-2; 71:21-25; 72:1-14).  Investors seek a 36 to 40 foot “clear height” for a 300,000 square foot building or larger, and lenders seek at least a 40 foot “clear height” for any building over 400,000 square feet.  (5T 47:8-16; 48:1-9).  As a result, any project with a 30 foot height restriction would not be financeable (even if the total square footage was broken up into three or four buildings), and would not be constructed.  (5T 54:17-25 through 56:1-5).  Unlike Grasso, where plaintiff argued that there was a “limited market” for the residential products permitted by ordinance, Grasso, 375 N.J. Super. at 52, the unrebutted evidence here is that there is no market for a 30 foot high warehouse.
[brief] 5  Documents illustrated in appendix are the documents Defendants indicate are missing, communication to the trial court and methods of submission to the Defendants and/or trial court are eclectic.  Submission methods varied based on Plaintiff’s mobility issues, technology challenges due to size of emailed documents via email and/or other technology issues with the NJ JEDS system.  Similarly, Plaintiff argues the final order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, is not pursuant to Rule 4:23-4
[brief] Incensed by a result different than their expected “no cause,” Defendants desperately endeavor to claw back this lawfully entered verdict.  Defendants accuse [...] of admitting the verdict to be “unexpected. ”  While it is true that [...] noted that the verdict - $3,500.00 for lost wages, and $927,000.00 for pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life – was “unexpected,” she also conclusively held that the award was not at all shocking to her conscience.  [...] found the verdict to be fair and reasonable given the evidence presented, and additional factors observed by the Court.  Most convincingly, [...] upheld this verdict not once, or twice, but on three separate occasions.
[brief] Table of Authorities - Statutes 1/2 New Jersey Statute 39:4-92.2 -  Procedure for motorist approaching certain stationary vehicle.  1.  a.  The operator of a motor vehicle approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle as defined in R.S.39:1-1 that is displaying a flashing, blinking or alternating red or blue light or, any configuration of lights containing one of these colors, shall approach the authorized emergency vehicle with due caution and shall, absent any other direction by a law enforcement officer, proceed as follows:  (1)  Make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle if possible in the existing safety and traffic conditions; or (2)  If a lane change pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section would be impossible, prohibited by law or unsafe, reduce the speed of the motor vehicle to a reasonable and proper speed for the existing road and traffic conditions, which speed shall be less than the posted speed limit, and be prepared to stop.  New Jersey Statute 39:4-88 -
[brief] ]  This representation was a significant exaggeration of the contents of the proffered email.  The email does not state the profile was deleted, only that [...] could not find the information on their servers.  And the email does not implicate any action on the part of the State to effectuate this.  In fact, the State had already confirmed on the record it did not delete or take any intentional or affirmative action to erase the profile. (1T13-16 to 18; 1T15-16 to 19).  Nonetheless, [...] determined defendant has established “either bad faith or connivance or an extremely egregious carelessness on the part of the detective[.]” (2T16-13 to 25).  The judge based this ruling solely on the State’s inadvertent failure to preserve the profile, stating, Unfortunately for the State here, the egregious carelessness of the detective in this case in failing to preserve the profile information . . . which contains the -- again, essentially the bait with which [...] was lured, including the age of the person purportedly that the profile belonged to as well as the full, un-pixelated, uncropped photographs of this individual on the [...] website.  All of that was preserved.  But the profile was not preserved.  There’s simply no explanation for that.
[brief] [...], however, curiously pulls the Parcel A (Da122) and Parcel B (Da118) descriptions from the [...] Report, but fails to distinguish, let alone discuss, Mr. [...]’s conclusion that [...] owns the Property at Lot 22 (a portion of which is identified as the yellow-shaded parcel in the [...] Report at Pa19):  “[b]ased upon the documents of record as of August 15, 2022, [[...]] is the record owner of Parcel A and [[...]] is the record owner of Parcel B. ”  Pa17.  [...] also opines that he believes the debris piles in question are located upon [...]’s record title lands.  Pa18 at ¶ 2.⁹ ⁹  It must also be noted that [...] refers to the [...] Report as a “Title Survey,” but Mr. [...] never performed a survey of the parcels – he performed a title report.  In fact, the [...] Report recommended the parties obtain a survey.
[brief] In fact, the expert had stated in his report “[t]he concrete floor along which [...] was allegedly caused to fall was slip-resistant under wet conditions in accordance with standard custom and practice. ”  (Pa43).  expert report?  [...]: Yes, Judge.  I - - my - THE COURT:  Then you were aware of their - - of their indication to you that they would go down this road to demonstrate that the - - that the floor - [...]:
[brief] [...]’s tax returns for 2017 and 2018 were not available, and had been on extension, until around the time of the pharmacy’s May 2019 sale to [...].  (3T43:13-19; 3T48:4-12; 3T50:2-4).  There is no evidence showing Plaintiff requesting copies of tax returns until 2018.  There are no text messages or emails from 2016 or 2017 that Plaintiff has with either Defendant or the pharmacy’s accountant, [...], asking for any [...] tax information.  (2T57:11-19).  The 2019 return would not be due for another eleven months and the 2018 return was only approximately a month and a half late (but the accountant had requested an extension).  (3T48:13-19).  Defendant did not have any company tax returns to share with Plaintiff until just before the same to [...] in May 2019, which she shared with him when they were completed.  (3T126:25-127:5).
[brief] The entire controversy doctrine proscribes dismissal of a successive suit unless both **inexcusable failure** to comply with the notice provision **and substantial prejudice** are established by the undisclosed party.  The party asserting the entire controversy doctrine as a defense, bears “the burden of establishing both **inexcusable conduct and substantial prejudice. **”  *Hobart Bros. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.*, 354 N.J. Super. 229, 242 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 170 (2002) (emphasis added).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................5  LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................16  POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PROHIBITED  DEFENDANT FROM ARGUING THIRD-PARTY GUILT ........................................................................................................................................16-22  POINT II  DETECTIVE KOHLER’S EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING THE LOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S CELL PHONE ON THE NIGHT AND EARLY MORNING HOURS OF THE VICTIM’S DEATH WAS NOT INADMISSIBLE LAY OPINION.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ..............23-34  POINT III  DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT WAS NOT VIOLATED WHEN DETECTIVE  SERGEANT LUYBER TESTIFIED THAT AN ANONYMOUS 9-1-1 CALLER LED POLICE TO SPEAK TO SASHA HEDGEPATH.  (RESPONDS TO DEFENDANT’S PRO SE POINT I).  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ........................................................................................................................................34-40  POINT IV  THERE WERE NO CUMULATIVE ERRORS WHICH WARRANT THE REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS.  (RESPONDS TO DEFENDANT’S POINT III)  .................................................................41-42  POINT V  THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MUST BE AMENDED TO MERGE COUNT THREE INTO COUNT TWO AND TO REFLECT 1,119 DAYS OF JAIL CREDITS.  (RESPONDS TO DEFENDANT’S POINT IV)  ...........................................................................................................42  POINT VI  THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A HEARING ON DEFENDANT’S ABILITY TO PAY RESTITUTION.  (RESPONDS TO DEFENDANT’S POINT V)  .........................................................................................43  CONCLUSION  ..........................................................................................................................43  #
[brief] As stated in the appellate brief, this Court has a unique opportunity to rectify this outrageous circumstance.  More specifically, since the lien holder still maintains title to the property, the Court reasonably can permit [...] the opportunity to redeem and pay the taxes and reimburse any reasonable expenses incurred by the lien holder.  In this circumstance, the lien holder is made whole and [...] gets his property back along with its substantial equity.  This result is exactly the purpose of a court of equity.  As such, the defendant-appellant, [...] T. Kemp respectfully requests that the Appellate Court deny the Plaintiffs cross motion, reverse the trial court order denying reconsideration, vacate foreclosure judgment and permit [...] to redeem his home.
[brief] I am compliant with all court orders including the trial court’s questionable decision directing a deposit of $125,000 as security but the defendant, having already walked away with impunity after violating multiple orders before the divorce trial (Pa1413-15), continues to remain delinquent on her obligation to execute IRS documents for the year 2022 that would enable me to claim the child tax credit as directed in the March 1, 2023 order.  Equally disconcerting is the motion judge looking the other way and failing to address the matter of defendant’s noncompliance in the January 12, January 26, and March 8, 2024 orders.  “The court's failure to consider defendant's clear violations of the order was without any explanation, and overlooked the purpose of Rule 1:10–3: ensuring compliance with court orders. ”  N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. State, 451 N.J. Super. 282, 300 (App. Div. 2017).  “Ultimately, the court is responsible for ensuring that its duly issued orders are honored. ”  State v. Garcia, 195 N.J. 192, 204 (2008).  I request this court to direct the motion judge to address the matter of defendant’s noncompliance in a time-bound manner without the plaintiff having to incur the cost of filing yet another motion.  Although the $50 motion filing fee is not a princely sum, as a matter of principle, litigants should not have to bear the cost of filing repeated motions if the judge fails to address all the issues raised in a motion or an OTSC.  POINT V TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON LEGALLY BASELESS GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE USPS TRACKING NUMBER OF SERVICE OF MOTION ON DEFENDANT.
[brief] During the course of trial, [...], counsel for plaintiff, argued to the trial court that the construction defect case files from the underlying case should be removed from the courtroom as being prejudicial.  (4T:29:14-17).  Defense counsel argued that these were the [...] files from the underlying Sollecito case\textsuperscript{11}, which contained the litigation documents received from the [...] firm, as well as the documents they created while they were handling the litigation\textsuperscript{12}.  (4T:30:1-6).  The documents were for the purposes of [...]’ proofs at trial.  (4T:30:13-14 and 18-19).  In addition, these documents were present in the courtroom since the beginning of trial.  [...] never sought leave of trial to review these boxes and never cross-examined [...] about the files or the invoice entries.  Accordingly, the Court properly overruled plaintiff’s objection.
[directive] Such authorization may be given for repeated or continuous deployment of an ALPR mounting the device on a particular police vehicle, or positioning the (e.g., ALPR at a specific stationary location), in which event the deployment authorization shall remain in force and effect unless and until rescinded or modified by the chief or designated supervisor, or the Attorney General or county prosecutor or designee.  4.4  Trained Operators and Analysts  A sworn officer or civilian employee of the department may operate an ALPR or access or use ALPR stored data only if the person has been designated as an authorized user by the chief of the department, or by the Attorney General or designee or a county prosecutor or designee, and has received training from the department on the proper use and operation of ALPRs, the requirements of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2010-5, and these Guidelines, and any policies and -5- procedures goveming the use of ALPRs and ALPR data issued by the department pursuant to Attorney General Directive 2010-5and Section 14 of these Guidelines.  5.
[brief] careful.  Flexmir, Inc. v. Lindeman & Company 8 N.J. 602 (1952).  "A jury verdict is entitled to considerable deference and 'should not be overthrown except upon the basis of a carefully reasoned and factually supported (and articulated) determination, after canvassing the record and weighing the evidence, that the continued viability of the judgment would constitute a manifest denial of justice.'"
[brief] It is not enough to suggest that there is no opposition, especially if the facts do not warrant the granting of relief in the first instance."  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 408 N.J. Super. 289, 302, 974 A.2d 1102 (App. Div. 2009).  Johnson v. McClellan, supra 498 N.J. Super at 591-592
[brief] Ultimately, the trial court has the discretion to determine the qualifications of prospective jurors and conduct a “probing inquiry” to determine the potential for prejudice in having that juror serve.  *State v. Scherzer*, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 487-88 (App. Div. 1997).  When a juror indicates that he may remain impartial when questioned, a reviewing court must accord that statement a “great deal of weight” and must defer to the trial court’s ability to assess the sincerity and credibility of the juror.
[brief] Again, had the Legislature intended to expand the Public Trust Doctrine by giving the Department authority that goes beyond the common law, the Public Access Law’s legislative history would reflect this objective; however, it is silent on the issue, which only further underscores the Legislature’s will to preserve the status quo as it existed at the time—not alter it.  Although not mentioned in the Public Access Law’s legislative findings, the Legislature was also motivated to enact the Public Access Law due to legal action in the New Jersey courts.