ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS TO DEFENDANTS KUCINSKI AND MARTIN BECAUSE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR THEIR OFFICIAL ACTIONS.  Qualified immunity is a doctrine that shields government officials from a suit for civil damages when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  Qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit,” the right to avoid the rigors and costs of trial.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted).  Whether an official is covered by qualified immunity is a matter of law to be decided by a court, “preferably on a properly supported motion for summary judgment or dismissal. ”  Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
[brief] 32 State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133 (1986) ...................................................  33 State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 2021) ............................  44 State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2017) ...........................  34 State v. Jiminez, 175 N.J.  475 (2003) .................................................... 11 State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409 (1977) ..................................................... 33, 37 State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 449 (2001) ................................................. 34 State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336 (App.Div.1974), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72 (1975) .................................................................................. 27, 28 State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354 (1987) ....................................................... 43 State v. Luna, 193 N.J. 202 (2007) ......................................................... 18, 19 State v. Macchia, 253 N.J. 232 (2023) .................................................... 40 State v. Maisonet, 245 N.J. 552 (2021) ................................................... 11, 12 State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 1998) ..................... 11 State v. McNeil, 405 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 2009) .............................. 15 State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005) ....................................................... 43 State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5 (1997) ....................................................... 11 State v. Pessolano, 343 N.J. Super. 464 (2001) ....................................... 15, 16 State v. Planes, 274 N.J. Super. 190 (Law Div. 1994) .............................. 29 State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 (2004) .................................................... 14 State v. Reddy, 137 N.J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 1975) ............................... 21 State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) ......................................................... 6, 27, 28 State v. Rinaldi, 58 N.J. Super. 209 (1960) ............................................. 12 State v. Rose, 458 N.J. Super. 610 (2019) ............................................... 14 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) ......................................................... 41, 42, 43, 47 State v. Roth, 289 N.J. Super. 152 (App. Div. 1996) ............................... 16 State v. Setzer, 268 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1993); certif. denied 135 N.J. 468 (1993) .................................................................
[brief] For the aforementioned reasons, the Appellant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reverse the various trial court Orders dismissing [...] and [...] with prejudice, as well as the Orders dismissing the Appellant’s Complaint with prejudice.  The Appellant has demonstrated substantial medical malpractice claims against the Respondents that must be adjudicated on the merits.  The existence of any procedural deficiencies must be set aside in the interest of justice and fairness.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...] [...], Esq. [...]
[brief] Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  The website further advised that failure to do so by that date would render the member ineligible to apply at a later date.  (Pa11).  On January 3, 2023, the Division received [...]’s Request for Amended Benefits Form.
[brief] In any event, even if the court had admitted the precluded evidence concerning [...]’s 2018 conviction, the effect on the jury’s verdict would have been nonexistent because the jury clearly disbelieved [...]’s testimony anyhow.  Defendants fail to appreciate that the jury did not find Defendant [...] credible when he testified that he entered the intersection only after the light turned green.  The jury clearly determined [...] had a red light when he entered the intersection.  Had they believed his testimony that he had a green light, then they would have apportioned 100% of the fault to [...].  However, this jury accepted the facts applied to the law that both defendants acted in a negligent manner and that the negligence of both defendant-drivers were proximate causes of the accident.  The jury disbelieved [...] and they could not have disbelieved him more had they heard about this drug conviction.
[brief] At the end of the meeting, the Parties agreed to exchange proposals for a successor contract by the end of January, 2022 (Ibid.).  On or about January 14, 2022, [...] filed the underlying Unfair Practice Charge against [...], which was docketed by the Commission as [...] (Pa222, ¶ 22).  On February 9, 2022, [...] filed the underlying Cross-Unfair Practice Charge against [...], which was docketed as [...] (Ibid.).  Proposals were exchanged by the Parties in or around January 26, 2022 (Id., ¶ 23).  The parties did not meet again to continue negotiations from the filing of unfair practice charges docketed as [...] and [...] until on or around March 1, 2023 (Id., ¶ 24).  The purpose of that meeting was to address the role of the [...] (Ibid.).  However, the parties did not come to a resolution on that issue (Ibid.).  On or about January 31, 2024, the parties again met to continue negotiations pursuant to PERC’s Order and Decision.  However, the parties never reached a formal agreement regarding the specific role of the [...], although [...] has complied with PERC’s directives and negotiated with [...], including its [...], while this appeal is pending.  Accordingly, the issue of the [...] remains (Ibid.).
[directive] Core Principle Two Force as a Last Resort and Duty to De-Escalate.  Force shall only be used as a last resort when necessary to accomplish lawful objectives that cannot reasonably be achieved through verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment or de-escalation techniques.  Force shall never be used as a retaliatory or punitive measure.  2.1  Authority to use force.  Officers are granted the unique authority to use force for lawful purposes, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) effectuating a lawful arrest or detention; (b) carrying out a lawful search; (c) overcoming resistance directed at the officer or others; (d) preventing physical harm to the officer or to another person (including intervening in a suicide or other attempt of self-inflicted injury); (e) protecting the officer or a third party from unlawful force; or (f) preventing property damage or loss.  2.2  Prohibitions on certain force.  Officers may not use or threaten to use force for any following reasons: (a) to punish a person or to retaliate against them for past conduct; (b) as a lesson to prevent a person from resisting or fleeing in the future; or (c) to resolve a situation more quickly, unless delay would risk the safety of the person involved, officers, or others, or would significantly interfere with other legitimate law enforcement objectives.
[brief] See *Bove v. AkPharma Inc.*, 460 N.J. Super. 123, 152 (App. Div.) (“[L]itigation may become frivolous, and therefore sanctionable, by continued litigation over a merit-less claim, even if the initial pleading was not frivolous or brought in bad faith. ”), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 7 (2019).  [...] alerted Plaintiffs that there was no completed transaction at the very outset of this case, as part of the Initial 1:4-8 Letter. (Pa442a).
[brief] *Id.* at 609.  This remains the law.  In *[...]*, the property lying between homeowners and the Atlantic Ocean was originally designated on a filed map as an open campground.  The developer retained ownership of the land designated for the campground.  When the developer later sought to develop the campground for individual bungalows and tried to change the original plat plan to reflect this new use, the plaintiff [...] successfully complained that he had relied on the filed map that showed the open land.  *Id.* at 609-10.  Reasoning the homeowner purchased his property near the ocean in reliance on the filed map, which showed open land between his property and the Atlantic Ocean, the Court wrote:  Whenever the owner of a tract of land lays it out into blocks and lots upon a map, and on that map designates certain portions of the land to be used as streets, parks, squares, or other modes of a general nature calculated to give additional value to the lots delineated thereon, and then conveys those lots by reference to the map, he becomes bound to the grantees not to use the portions so devoted to the common advantage otherwise than in the manner indicated.  . . .  From this doctrine it, of course, follows that such distinct and independent private rights in other lands of the grantor than those granted may be acquired, by implied covenant, as appurtenant to the premises granted, although they are not of such a nature as to give rise to public rights by dedication.  The object of the principle is, not to create public rights, but to secure to persons purchasing lots under such circumstances those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy portions of a tract laid out on the plan indicated.  [Id. at 608-09 (citations omitted). ]  Applying this to the facts in this case, the trial court correctly found the historical deed documents referencing the 1925 Plan established a clear right to an implied easement appurtenant.
[brief] (2T:10-10 to 11-1).  While in the area, [...]’s attention was drawn to a suspicious gray Jeep Grand Cherokee.  (2T:11-2 to 11-4).  [...] noticed that the Jeep failed to utilize its turn signal\(^2\), was equipped with heavily tinted front windows, had an inoperable rear brake light (“taillight”, “stop lamp”), and was circling the block.  (2T:11-5 to 14-6).  [...] and other officers at the scene proceeded to conduct a motor vehicle stop.
[brief] **PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ENTITLEMENT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; THEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION MUST BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.** (DA201 at ¶¶ 1-2; DA202 at ¶¶ 1-3).  The Chancery Division similarly erred in determining that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance under the Agreement because Plaintiff failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden.
[directive] The Division will cultivate a network of Develop a referral network for victim services.  partner organizations, including victim support organizations and non-profit organizations that support victims, and offer to connect victims to these partners to receive free counseling and other services.  The Division will educate staff and volunteers at these partner organizations about the professional disciplinary process so they are equipped to help victims understand that process and, in cases where the victim consents to a referral, refer cases of sexual misconduct by licensees to the Division for investigation.  IV.
[brief] “As we have previously recognized, the concern with respect to claims of third-party guilt is ‘the ease in which unsupported claims may infect the process. ’”  State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 66- 67 (2020) (quoting *State v. Loftin*, 146 N.J. 295, 345 (1996) (*Loftin I*)).  To avoid that issue, a defendant may not seek to introduce evidence in order “to prove some hostile event and leave its connection with the case to mere conjecture. ”  *Sturdivant*, 31 N.J. at 179; see also *Loftin I*, 146 N.J. at 346 (allowing defendant to introduce evidence that “a generic ‘someone else’ did the crime,” but could not identify a specific individual without any evidence).
[directive] 10.  CASES DETENTION Decision.  Detention  Pretrial for Needed Reports 10.1 within and courts prosecutors by made be must decisions detention pretrial  Recognizing that prosecutor is a when 2A:162-19(d), N.J.S.A. see acomplaint-warrant, of filing the after days detention a for preparing is or detention, pretrial seek whether to decide to information compiling law a request may prosecutor the detention, pretrial for motion a having filed after hearing give to arrest the to leading investigation the conducted or arrest the made that agency enforcement relevant information document would that reports any of preparation expedite and to priority highest shall agency enforcement law the request, such receiving Upon decision.
[brief] (36T 35:16 to 37:23; 50:10 to 51:21).  The 2007 [...] Stockholders Agreement between [...] and [...] provides that all decisions regarding operation of the business of the corporation and the expenditure of funds “shall be made by majority vote of the Stockholders. ” (Da2714).  It further provides that the company shall always maintain sufficient cash to cover six months of projected operating expenses, and that the company shall only distribute profits which are “in excess of that amount. ” (Da2727).  The evidence established, and the trial court found, that [...] breached the [...] Stockholders Agreement by: (a) expending company funds without [...]’s authorization; and (b) distributing profits inequitably and inconsistently with his interest in the company, to the detriment of the company and [...].
[brief] Borough of Fort Lee, 311 N.J. Super. at 292; Fanarjian, 237 N.J. Super. at 402; Harrison Riverside, 309 N.J. Super. at 472-475; McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 320 (1991).  (iii)  Landlord Did Not Fail to Mitigate Its Damages (Da1-3)  Even assuming arguendo that Landlord was required to mitigate the damages it did not seek and was not awarded, it had no duty to re-write the Lease and award Tenant the unearned 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance as an “offset”.
[brief] ### Cases  **Berkowitz v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co.**, 106 N.J. Eq. 238, 241 .................. 13, 15  **Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein**, 155 N.J. 599, 609 (1989)  ...........................................  14  **Brodzinsky v. Pulek**, 75 N.J.Super. 40, 48 (App.Div.1962)  Cert. den. 38 N.J. 304 (1962)  ..................................................................................  12  **Central State Bank v. Hudik-Ross Co., Inc.**, 164 N.J.Super. 317, 323-324 (App. Div. 1978)  ............................................................................................................  12  **Dugan Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.**, 398 N.J. Super. 229, 242-43 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 196 N.J. 346 (2008)  ..............................................................................  13  **Gruber v. Mayor and Tp. Committee of Raritan Tp.**, 73 N.J. Super. 120, 127- 128 (App. Div. 1962)  .................................................................................................  18  **Hupsch v. Resch**, 45 N.J.Eq. 657, affirmd 46 46 N.J.Eq. 609 (1889)  ...............  13  **Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale**, 86 N.J. 619, 624–25 (1981) .......... 14  **Kuller v. Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia**, 124 N.J. Eq. 473, 475 (1938)  ..................  13  **Rowley v. Flannelly**, 30 N.J.Eq. 612 ........................................................................  13  **Sardo v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland**, 100 N.J. Eq. 332 (1926)  .........  13  **St. Pius X House of Retreats, Salvatorian Fathers v. Diocese of Camden**, 88 N.J. 571, 577 (1982)  .............................................................................................  13  **Tilcon New York, Inc. v. Morris County Co-op. Pricing Council**, 2014 WL 839122 (App. Div. March 5, 2014) .....................................................................  14  **U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey**, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)  .........................  18  ### Statutes **N.J.S.A. 40:11A-1, et seq.** ......................................................................................  17  **N.J.S.A. 40:11A-20** ...............................................................................................  17  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] At the conclusion of the testimonial phase of the trial, the trial court conducted a charge conference with the parties during which it went over the form of the Charge it had prepared based upon the parties’ pretrial exchanges.  4T.118:24 to 137:16.  The proposed Charge included Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11G(i) on life expectancy.  It did not include 8.11G(ii) on the time unit rule which was not referenced in Plaintiff’s pretrial exchange.
[brief] (Da 033).  Compounding insult to injury, [...] did so by individuals who continued to assert they were directors of both [...] and [...].  (Da 050).  It was therefore reasonable for [...] to believe itself under attack by [...] and its former directors and seek assistance such as that provided by [...].  It is also eminently reasonable to believe [...], who has undertaken many charitable efforts to support the Muslim community, would step forward and do what was needed to assist [...] in protecting the mosque in which he prayed.
[brief] There are sufficient facts within the documentary evidence before the Department from which to support its decision.  (T3 586:17 to 587:8; 589:10 to 590:19).  And as long as “[the court] and the interested parties can and do understand fully the meaning of the decision and the reasons for it, no sufficient reason exists to remand for fuller and clearer findings and later reconsideration. ”  Application of Howard Sav. Inst. of Newark, 32 N.J. 29, 53 (1960) (declining to remand even though agency findings were “not nearly so clear, full and well organized” as could be expected).
[brief] Every single election-related case law, both for this statutory provision and others, is clear that the voter’s intent is paramount, and the purpose of these provisions is to avoid fraud and double-counting of votes.  Nothing, including in [...], suggests (much less requires) mindless adherence to the text of the statute just for the sake of it where the voter’s intent is reasonably clear.  To do so now would defeat the overarching intent of our election code going back for nearly 180 years.  Nobody disputes that no double votes were cast.  Nobody disputes that there were no warnings given to voters not to cast a write-in vote for someone already appearing on the ballot.  Nobody disputes that the voter, in this case, wrote in the names of the two candidates, in order, immediately next to their printed names.  As the trial court stated, upon consideration of both the certification process and the ballot itself, “the issue of fraud is not one of any concern for this Court. ” (2T82:17-18).  It further stated that, “There’s no question in the Court’s mind that the vote for [...] when it appears immediately next to Anthony [...]’s name is who would be the voter wish[ed] to cast their vote for. ” (2T81:18-21).  This Court should uphold this factual finding that was made upon due consideration of the evidence before the trial court and count the ballot in favor of Anthony [...].  To not do so would violate the voters’ constitutional right to vote and “the corollary right to have that vote counted at full value without dilution or discount. ”  Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. at 474 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964)).
[brief] (Aa5).  Subsequently, [...] received its Impact and Facilities Study from [...] in July 2024, which reflects a 24-month construction schedule and a commercial operation date of June 30, 2027 for its facility, well beyond the TI program’s expiration date.  The Facilities Study estimates the time required to obtain property rights and permits for construction of the required facilities.  https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-requests/serial-service-request-status, Accessed August 20, 2024.  take “considerable time” to build the project on dredge ponds and to combine the ponds, so it was “unclear that both excavations of the mine and construction of the solar array can be completed in the time permitted in the TI [p]rogram.
[brief] [...] further elaborates on his theory of negligence at his own deposition.  Here too, his opinions are based on the usual evidence categories, as the following demonstrate: with sufficient lighting from the streetlight, the driver’s reaction time would have been quicker (scientific knowledge); [...] relied on illuminance data collected by [...] during his site inspection (data); the most important factor that [...] considered was that overgrown trees obstructed the streetlight (video); point-by-point measurements would be ideal but would be of no consequence where there were 0.0 foot candles at the pole (scientific knowledge, experience, site data); IESNA does not take into consideration a driver’s headlights (scientific knowledge, experience); some municipalities rely on IESNA and DOT standards (experience, industry standards and practice); [...] has hesitation about stating the light was on at the time of the accident since it was off during the investigation (photograph, deposition testimony); the light beam trained at the pole in the Desch experiment caused the streetlight to turn off (photographs, scientific knowledge, experience); backlighting is to be avoided so that a positive contrast can be kept on pedestrians, and backlighting is a scientific approach (scientific knowledge, experience); although backlighting is based on a scientific approach, [...] relied on [...]’s findings in his field study (site data collected by [...]); [...] should have made recommendations to [...] about lighting at the intersection (experience, industry standard); [...] stated that even if the light was off, that would not necessarily affect backlighting (scientific knowledge, experience); and finally, in a situation in which in a municipality does not have internal guidelines and regulations for an engineering consultant to follow, then standards by IESNA or the New Jersey DOT would be heavily relied upon (industry standard, experience).  Because [...] and [...] have unassailable education, training and experiences in construction, premises liability, lighting and lighting design, and their opinions are based on the evidence categories provided in the bold parentheticals, their opinions are not net opinions by any stretch of the imagination and should not have been barred.
[brief] [...] is unable to prove [...] is responsible for any alleged missing items, as both [...] and [...] were in her home and removed items following the incident long before [...]’s arrival on the scene.  [...] has not and under the fact of this case cannot produce any credible evidence establishing that [...] is responsible for any alleged damage to her personal property, as her own testimony establishes that those items were already damaged by the water leak and the activities of [...].  In her motion for reconsideration before the Trial Court, [...] claimed that she provided an expert report in support of her alleged damages against [...].
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED  THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM STANDARD AND, AS SUCH, THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS MATTER FOR THE COMPLETION OF DISCOVERY AND TRIAL (1025a-1031a).................................20  II.  PLAINTIFFS SUFFICIENTLY PLED CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THESE CLAIMS WITHOUT ANALYSIS.  (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10).................................................................22