ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF DECISIONS, ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS  Trial Order, dated June 30, 2022 .........................................................Da361  Trial Court Order, dated March 15, 2024 ........................................Da49  Order Granting Motion for Leave to Appeal, dated April 29, 2024 ........................................................................................................................Da397  Trial Court Order Denying Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, dated April 26, 2024................................................................................Da398  Order Granting Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, dated June 14, 2024................................................................................................................Da400 ##  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Nowhere does [...] concretely describe the harm that would befall it should it wait another few months for the next phase of the builder’s remedy action to proceed, when it had waited – by its own admission – over a decade to redevelop the site.  Although before this court, [...] describes its harm as its “inability to serve the public interest by revitalizing the Property with commercial development that will improve the quality of life for its residents and spur new job growth and business opportunities,” (Db34), the trial court in no way determined at this stage of the proceedings that [...] could not revitalize the Property.
[brief] [...]’ CERT.  REPLY, DATED MAY 30, 2023, TO [...]’S MAY 25th  CROSS-MOTION TO RECONSIDER  OCT. 6, 2022  ORDER, PAR. 1D, TO:  1)  REJECT COURT AUTHORIZED, TRUST PAYMENT, & REQUIRE PAYBACK OF $4,120.48  FOR [...]’S FEES FOR WORK IN MID-2021, WHEN [...] WAS SOLE COUNSEL FOR TRUST & ITS TRUSTEES, PRIOR TO ANY DISPUTES BETWEEN [...] AND [...] FOR HIS RESIGNATION AS CO-TRUSTEE (4T, p. 46, line 15, to p. 47, line 13) (31a, last par., 1st 2 sentences for Ms. Ross’ Exceptions only) SECTION H APPEALING RULINGS FROM AUGUST 4, 2023 HEARING FOR: 1) [...]’S TWO WRONG, & UNREASONABLE RULINGS (“This case has to end” AND “if there is dissatisfaction with rulings of this Court, it should be appealed”) AS HIS “STANDARDS” TO REJECT CROSS-MOTIONS BY [...] & ME 2) REJECT SEPT. 6, 2023 ORDER, PAR. 3&4 THAT DID NOT GRANT OUR CROSS-MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER ORDER PROVISION DUE TO ITEM I & [...]’S OPINIONS ON RECONSIDERATION MOTIONS 3) REVISE MARCH 7, ‘23 ORDER, PAR. 1, TO NOT GRANT TRUST PAYMENT OF $93,277.54 FOR [...] LEGAL FEES, & REQUIRE PAYBACK 4) REVISE MARCH 7, 2023 ORDER, PAR. 2, TO REDUCE APPROVED TRUST PAYMENTS FOR [...] & [...]
[brief] *Ibid.*  On June 27, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the Court's June 8, 2021 Order.  (623a).  In support of this motion, Plaintiffs attached a certification from [...], an Atlantic City police officer, and as of June 27, 2021, the President of [...].  (625a).  Schwenger certified that on December 14, 2017 the union members voted via email on whether to ratify the settlement agreement of the First Police Matter.  (626a).  Further, she certified that only active employees (not retirees) were allowed to participate.  Ibid.  Schwenger further certified that all of the [...] had retired before the ratification vote.  Ibid.  On July 15, 2021, Defendants filed a cross-motion for reconsideration of the Court's June 8, 2021 Order partially granting their motion to dismiss.  (627a).  On October 25, 2021, the Trial Court granted Plaintiffs' motion and permitted Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...]'s claims to proceed to discovery.  (629a-630a).
[brief] ERRONEOUSLY RESTRICTED THE DEFENSE FROM ARGUING THIRD-PARTY GUILT.  (9T74-22 to 78-1)  During jury selection, the State made an oral motion in limine to bar “any argument with regard to a third-party guilt in this matter and objecting to any third-party guilt charge being provided. ” (9T64-16 to 22).  The parties agreed that the proposed third-party defense was based on a statement from [...] that [...], the father of [...]’s son, had previously shot at the victim and Hargrove.  (9T65-18 to 66-10; 9T68-17 to 69-5; 9T73-7 to 25).  But the State contended that because there was “no direct casual link” between the previous incident and the murder, the defense should be barred from presenting third-party guilt.  (9T65-13 to 67-4).  Adopting the State’s argument, the trial court ruled that the defense had not presented sufficient evidence of third-party guilt and barred defense counsel from mentioning third-party guilt in his opening statement.  (9T74-22 to 78-1).  The trial court’s ruling was erroneous because no direct causal link is required for a defendant to present third-party guilt.  A defendant is entitled to present any admissible evidence of third-party guilt that engenders a _____________________  6  The transcript erroneously spells the name as “[...]. ”  reasonable doubt that the defendant is the culprit.  And the allegation that Ballard had previously shot at the victim could lead the jury to conclude that Ballard had a motive to kill the victim, thus casting reasonable doubt that [...] was the perpetrator.  The trial court therefore abused its discretion, infringed [...]’s constitutional right to present a complete defense, and deprived him of due process and a fair trial.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................  4-12  POINT I RESPONDENT MISREADS  MCKENNEY’S CORE PRINCIPLES AND MISINTERPRETS  APPELLANTS’ MATERIAL DEVIATION  ARGUMENT (DA001-DA006; DA020-DA046; Pltf. T:133:12-25-134:1-25; 147:14-25;148:1-25; 151:22-25—152:1-7)  POINT II  APPELLANTS RELY ON THEIR BRIEF-IN-CHIEF IN RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE JURY’S VERDICT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (DA001-DA082; 4T:133:1-25—159:1-25; 4T:110-199; 7T:57:1-25—86:1-25)  POINT III  APPELLANTS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR ARGUMENT REGARDING RESPONDENT’S RETALIATION  CLAIM (DA001-DA082; 4T:133:1-25—159:1-25;4T:110-199; 7T:57:1-25—86:1-25)  POINT IV  THE JURY’S AWARDS OF COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE UNJUST PRODUCT OF RESPONDENT’S SURPRISE TESTIMONY (DA079-DA082; 2T-8T)
[brief] This is an appeal from several Orders issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey: (1) Orders dated April 27, 2023 granting the Motions to Dismiss filed by each of the Defendants-Respondents; (2) Order dated April 27, 2023 denying the Plaintiffs-Appellants Motion to Designate Trial Counsel; and (3) Order dated July 10, 2023 denying Plaintiffs-Appellants Motion for Reconsideration of the April 27, 2023 Orders.
[brief] With respect to Plaintiffs’ trespass claim, [...] answered in certified interrogatories that a representative of [...] engineering may have trespassed onto Plaintiffs’ property in connection with [...]’s preparation of its plans.  [...] did not deny that it may have trespassed.  This is also a critical fact which the trial court did not consider when considering Plaintiffs’ mind set in pursuing their claims against [...] and whether Plaintiffs’ claims were pursued in bad faith.
[directive] Non-Qualifying Participants  9-33  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  A participant who fails to achieve a passing score on a prescribed qualification course shall receive remedial instruction.  This instruction shall be provided after the supervising firearms instructor analyzes the problems which may have led to the failure.  The time allotted and method of remedial training to be conducted shall be determined by the supervising firearms instructor.  The supervising firearms instructor, in consultation with firearms instructors and the participant, will:  1.  Review factors which may have contributed to or caused a participant's failure to qualify, including a check of the participant's firearm.  2.  Document any subsequent attempts to qualify and the results of those attempts.  If after the remedial training and subsequent attempts to qualify the participant still does not fire a passing score, the supervising firearms instructor shall report this information to the chief or agency executive.  The chief or agency executive will then determine what action is appropriate and maintain whatever records are appropriate.  Section 10.
[brief] If the challenged right is not fundamental, the injunction need only bear a “rational relationship” to a “legitimate interest. ”  *Heffner v. Murphy*, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting the “strong presumption of constitutionality” and deferential nature of rational basis review); see *Heller v. Doe*, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (noting rational basis is “not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices”).  If the right is fundamental, the injunction must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.  See *Holland*, 895 F.3d at 292.  This injunction satisfies either test.
[brief] Photographs and observations made during this site visit were compared to photographs taken by [...] on scene on 10/6/21 (“[...]”), diagrams prepared by [...], high resolution aerial orthoimagery taken on 10/19/21 (13 days post-accident) and 6/22/21 (3.5 months pre-incident).  As part of this evaluation, [...] and [...]'s paths of travel and [...]'s sight lines were reconstructed using scaled measurements from the [...] team's composite diagrams.  (Da33-Da36, §3 Incident Analysis & Discussion).  [...]’s reconstruction estimated that [...]'s vehicle was traveling at 12 MPH prior to reaching the end of the east/west drive aisle.
[brief] Cardinale v. Bd. of Trustees, 458 N.J. Super. 260, 272–73, 204 A.3d 312, 320 (App. Div. 2019)  So, as was explained to the Trial Court below, the parties *sub judice* both believed the 30 day return to work provision at Par. 17 would be acceptable to the [...].  This was a practice in effect among local entities at the time of the drafting of the Separation Agreement (as noted herein in Point Five, Part B – discussing [...]).  The severance provisions at Par. 18 were put in place should the effort prove to be wrong.  The severance terms are included without limitation as to provisions or whether the subject terms “benefitted” either side, and interpretation of these terms or what should be stricken is directed by the plain language of the Separation Agreement and cannot interpreted against either party (Da 20, Par. 20).  Therefore, Appellant’s argument as to Cardinale isn’t applicable - the question before the Court was a question of contract interpretation - whether the terms declared to be illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective by the [...] should be stricken under the terms of the Separation Agreement.  B. [...] v. [...], [...], [...] (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. January 5, 2022)
[directive] 4.2.3  Investigations of officer misconduct may proceed in one of two ways.  An investigation may be conducted for the purpose of imposing a disciplinary sanction or initiating a criminal prosecution.  The distinction between the two is important because each type of investigation has differing legal requirements.  Consequently, it is important that the internal affairs investigator be familiar with proper investigative techniques and legal standards for each type of proceeding.  It is essential that experienced investigators be assigned to internal affairs investigations.
[directive] These Guidelines impose limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in these Guidelines shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  Severability.  The provisions of these Guidelines shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of either this is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.  C.
[brief] [...]'s declined to order the Board to provide the mandatory *Paff v Department of Labor*², record's search certification.  (3T:12/16/22 5:3-16)  In response to the Board's self serving allegation they could not locate the missing records (3T:12/16/22 5:25-6:16), [...] requested to take discovery of the Board in general and the record custodian in particular.  (3T:12/16/22 6:18-6:25)  Furthermore, the Board failed to inquire of the [...], who because they achieve the final administrative decisions is an untapped source for the Board could to recover the missing records.  (3T:12/16/22 7:13-25)  Furthermore, the Board did not even search the very students' records who were the subject of the settlements that the OPRA was based on.  This Court may remember in the prior appeal, the fact the Board had requested a --- ².  *Paff v. N.J. Dep't of Labor*, 392 N.J. Super. 334, 341 (App. Div. 2007) ("With respect to future requests, however, the agency to which the request is made shall be required to produce sworn statements by agency personnel setting forth in detail the following information: (1) the search undertaken to satisfy the request; (2) the documents found that are responsive to the request; (3) the determination of whether the document or any part thereof is confidential and the source of the confidential information; (4) a statement of the agency's document retention/destruction policy and the last date on which documents that may have been responsive to the request were destroyed.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff did not file arbitration removal motion.  R. 4:46-1 specifies that a motion for summary judgment shall be served and filed not later than 28 days before the return date and opposing affidavits and certifications shall be served and filed not later than 10 days before the return date.  Defendant filed opposition to the motion for summary judgment on November 3, 2022, which was one day before the return date (Da16).  A mandatory arbitration hearing was scheduled for November 16, 2022 (Da8).  Defendant did not serve and file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment 10 days before the return date because Defendant misunderstood the application of R. 4:21A-(c)(1) and (c)(2).  R. 4:21A-(c)(2) allows the removal of a case from arbitration 15 days after the notice of a hearing.  However, a formal motion must be made to the arbitration administrator.  On September 29, 2022, a mandatory arbitration was scheduled for November 16, 2022 (Da8).  Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 6, 2022 (Da9), which was after the order scheduling the arbitration.  Defendant expected Plaintiff to file a motion for removal from arbitration with the arbitration administrator.  No motion was filed and the arbitration administrator did not order a stay in the arbitration.  Thus, because Defendant expected that arbitration would be held before the Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, it did not file its opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment until November 3 (Da15).  “See Rubin v. Rubin ... 159 ... (recognizing that, although litigants are not entitled to greater rights than represented litigants, due process principles permit the imposition of a procedural bar only after consideration of the pro se litigant’s ‘reasonable expectations’ about what had occurred. ”)  [...] v. [...], 433 N.J. Super., 494, 500 (App. Div. 2013).  (Emphasis Added).  B.
[brief] The 1925 Plan  Plaintiffs also concede that the 1925 Plan, which they acknowledge is critical to any analysis of their property rights, does not contain anything to support the easement they seek.  (Da966)  Rather, plaintiff’s expert admits that their claim to an easement is, essentially, “we’re on or near the beach”:  Q.  Okay.  Like, for example, is it fair to derive from this that the [implied easement appurtenant] that the [...] are talking about is not specifically addressed in a conveyance?  A.  It’s not, but the genesis document is, is the map, and the map doesn’t specifically textually say that you have rights to the beach.  It does not say that there.  * * *  Q.  Okay.  Is there anything else on the map other than proximity that otherwise suggests an easement other than the proximity?  A.  No.  (Da902, Da911)  Because, as explained above, mere proximity to the beach is not enough under New Jersey law to establish an implied easement, the 1925 Plan does not support plaintiffs’ claim for an implied easement.  c.
[brief] (PA 114-II 8, 123-130).  A.  The Local Redevelopment and Housing Law  The municipal power to adopt and implement a plan of redevelopment is derived from the State and is governed by the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -73.  See *Vineland Constr. Co., Inc. v. Township of Pennsauken*, 395 N.J. Super. 230, 250-251 (App. Div. 2007), dismissed as moot, 195 N.J. 513 (2008).  As with other land use powers, the municipality must adhere to the requirements of the enabling statute in order for its exercise of those powers to be valid.  Failure of a municipality to observe the limitations of the grant and follow the standards and requirements which accompany the grant, require a court to invalidate the municipal action as arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable or otherwise *ultra vires*.  See *Weymouth Township*, supra, 80 N.J. at 21; *Kohl v. Mayor & Council of Fair Lawn*, supra, 50 N.J. at 275; *Rockhill v. Chesterfield Tp.*, 23 N.J. 117, 125 (1957); *Swan Lake Spa LLC v. Twp. of Montville*, 2019 N.J. Super. App. Div. Unpub. LEXIS 1712, *7-9; Cona v. Twp. of Washington*, 456 N.J. Super. 197, 202 (App. Div. 2018) and *East Mill Associates v. Township Counsel of East Brunswick*, 241 N.J. Super. 403 (1990) ("We agree with Plaintiff that the failure to comply with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62a invalidates the Ordinance").
[brief] When I balance that prejudice against these defendants and their interests and their right to have this case expeditious – expeditiously decided, to have this case expeditiously go to trial, which already has not been too expeditious, balanced against the interest of the plaintiff in this case, which would not be foreclosed from bringing these claims, they would just have to bring it in a different procedural posture, the Court is not persuaded that allowing an amendment to the complaint at – complaint at this late stage of the case when we have a trial date looming in March would not be in the interest of justice to the parties in this case at this point.  (885a – 886a; 1T, 81:18 – 82:5, emphasis added).  It is obvious that in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to amend in the 2015 Action, [...] never inculpated Plaintiffs or held that Plaintiffs should have attempted to file their Motion to Amend earlier in time, and certainly did not find that the new claims were barred by the dismissal of the previous claims.
[brief] In *Fasano v. Li*, No. 16 CIV. 8759 (KPF), 2023 WL 6292579, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023), the court held that an over six year delay, given the facts, did not constitute waiver.  [...] asks this Court to ignore *Fasano* because it was decided by a New York federal district court.
[brief] Next, the so-called “Rugbeer test” proposed by the [...] violates federal law because it singles out medical malpractice claims for harsher scrutiny than other types of contractual claims.  Here, the [...] would invalidate the arbitration agreement on the basis of alleged unequal bargaining power; but by that logic, an arbitration clause in every consumer contract would be unenforceable.  Finally, the [...] would hold an agreement to arbitrate to the same standard as a liability waiver— even though the former does not, and the latter does, divest a party of its legal claims altogether.  For the reasons that follow, this honorable court must reject – as it did fourteen years ago – the arguments raised by the [...].
[brief] (Aa1-12).  As an initial matter, the Commission found that [...]’s technical violations, i.e., not advising [...] of his right to appeal to the Commission or providing [...] with notice of its extension request, did not invalidate [...]’s determination as it did not affect the integrity of the investigation or conclusions.  (Aa10).  The Commission also highlighted that [...] availed himself of the appeals process, and therefore did not suffer any material harm from any alleged technical violation.  Ibid.  That said, the Commission did not sanction the lapses but rather, warned [...] that future violations could result in fines or other appropriate action under N.J.A.C. 4A:10-2.1(a).  Ibid.  The Commission also confirmed [...]’s jurisdiction to investigate [...]’s complaint.  *Ibid.*  It agreed with [...] that as a current [...] employee “who is on union leave performing union duties that involve doing business with the State,” [...] was subject to the State Policy under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1—which also governed his conduct at the [...] building and the union office, where business regarding the representation of State employees takes place.
[directive] Notably, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that while police are permitted to "run the plates" of any vehicle they encounter while on patrol, and need not have a particularized reason before checking a vehicle’s license plates against a government database, police in this State may not as a result of any such lookup be shown personal identifying information about a motorist unless there is a particularized basis for further police action.  See State v. Donis, 157 N.J. 44 (1998).  The Guidelines attached hereto are designed to protect the legitimate privacy interests of motorists by implementing the non-disclosure rule established in Donis and by adapting the Donis Court’s rationale to the context and capabilities of ALPR technology.  Recognizing that our experience with this new and evolving technology is limited, and that we still have much to learn about how best to incorporate these devices into our arsenal of investigative techniques, it is appropriate for me as the State’s chief law enforcement officer to issue uniform statewide guidelines to ensure that ALPRs are used only for law enforcement bonafide purposes, and that the data collected by these devices are used in accordance with substantive standards and procedural safeguards that appropriately balance the need for law enforcement agencies to prevent and respond to terrorism and other forms of crime against the legitimate privacy interests of persons operating motor vehicles on the roadways of this State.
[brief] \(^1\)  Furthermore, because plaintiff knew immediately upon falling that he had been injured, and because he had to have known that any injury was the fault of another, given his position that he fell on an improperly maintained parking lot, the discovery rule also did not apply here.  As such, there was nothing to toll the running of the statute of limitations and Plaintiff had two years from the date of the accident to file suit.  As he did not file suit against [...] within that time, he is barred by the statute of limitations.
[brief] (Aa116)  Additionally, the two percent levy cap for taxation would result in maximum allowable taxation of $168,661,461.  (Aa117)  The Arbitrator went on to discuss in detail the available funds to pay for raises.  (Aa117-118)  Ultimately, he concluded that he could not award even two percent because it was unaffordable.  (Aa120).  Rather than leave the reader to wonder why he reached such a conclusion, [...]’s Award and decision contains a detailed discussion of the City’s available funds and the basis for his decision.