ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That result would only encourage providers to conceal fraud long enough to get paid, which is clearly at odds with the legislative intent in AICRA and other statutes to root out insurance fraud.  2.  Defendants’ interpretation violates the canon that the Legislature is presumed to make significant changes only explicitly.  New Jersey courts presume that the Legislature makes significant changes in the law explicitly.  See, e.g., Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 216 (2014) (noting that adoption of plaintiff’s interpretation of statute “would dramatically expand the liability of private individuals beyond its current bounds and authorize actions against a private person for perceived constitutional violations,” “a radical change” that the Legislature would not make ambiguously); Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 457 N.J. Super. 565, 573 (App. Div.  2019) (“Absent greater evidence than its silence, we refuse to assume the Legislature intended to make such a significant and incongruous change” to an existing statutory scheme), aff’d, 241 N.J. 112 (2020).  In other words, the Legislature does not “hide elephants in mouseholes. ”  Perez, 218 N.J. at 216 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).  If Defendants were right that claims for compensatory damages arising from fraud must be arbitrated, it would be a sea change in the law of this State.  As explained, the IFPA and RICO are both aimed at preventing insurance fraud, including by authorizing private rights of action in court and broad judicial remedies including compensatory and treble damages.  See supra Point I.C.  The IFPA is particularly focused on fraud in automobile insurance as a major area of abuse.  Chi. Title Ins., 388 N.J. Super. at 558.  Those private causes of action and statutory remedies would effectively be abolished as to PIP-related fraud if an insurer were required to arbitrate such claims before [...], which, as explained, cannot award any monetary or equitable remedies to insurers, permits very limited party discovery and nonparty subpoenas, and severely restricts party and claim joinder.
[directive] The internal affairs function should prepare periodic reports for the law enforcement executive that summarize the nature and disposition of all misconduct complaints the agency received.  This report should be prepared at least quarterly, but may be prepared more often as directed by the executive.  The report should include the principal officer; the allegation; the complainant; the age, sex, race and other complainant characteristics that might signal systematic misconduct by any member of the agency; and the investigation’s status.  61  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  9.9.2  Concluded complaints should be recorded and the reasons for termination explained.  9.9.3  This report shall be considered a confidential, internal work product.  Dissemination of the report should be limited to command personnel, the County Prosecutor, the appropriate authority, or a civilian review board that meets the minimum requirements for access to internal affairs information, if mandated by the governing body.  9.10
[brief] However, since [...] did testify regarding the validity of the solid metal measuring gauge which he produced and it was apparently, ‘a simple device that is not really subject to change,’ even though the certificate of accuracy was not ‘sealed’ in compliance with the statute, the judge felt ‘safe’ in concluding that it complies with the required standard and admitted it under Evid.R. 63(15).  *Id.* at 60-61.  The reviewing court agreed with the trial court.
[directive] A judge of the Superior during the conduct of investigation pursuant to this chapter may an Court a. upon his own motion or upon application of the expert designated to conduct such investigation, exercise the subpoena powers of the Superior Court and enforce such subpoena in similar manner as in civil actions in Superior Court; the take or order the obtaining of evidence and the taking of testimony, by deposition or otherwise, in b. similar manner as in civil actions in the Superior Court.  Any person who shall willfully and corruptly testify falsely to any material matter upon oath administered by the judge or the expert designated to conduct the investigation shall be guilty of PeTbW.  Jan. L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff 1, 1962.
[brief] **The Deposition of [...].**  The deposition [...], [...]’s General Counsel and CFO, also took place on November 30, 2022.  During her deposition, [...] reported that [...] had been working with [...] for “several years. ”  (3T37:12-13)  Based upon prior experience, [...] testified that [...]’s business practices included the provision of “a statement of the account or something at the end of the month. ”  (3T107:19-24)  When presented with follow-up questions relating to the existence and location of such documentation, Joanne [...] responded, “I am sure it does somewhere.  I’d have to see if I can obtain it.  I don’t know. ”  (3T115:17-18)  Moments later, however, the following exchange ensued:  Q: So you sent several hundred thousand dollars to [...].  And as you sit here today, with all the certifications that have been filed and whatnot in this case, you have no idea what was purchased with these checks.  A: No.  It was pipe.  I know it was pipe.  **I don’t know specifically which – which pipe, if it was Schedule 40 or Schedule 10, but it was pipe.**  Q.  Okay.  Again, that’s an interesting concept.  But, again, do you have anything from [...], for example, saying that we provided only Schedule 40 pipe totaling $400,000.00 and here is a packing slip or a spreadsheet or anything to support what these checks were for.  A: No.  From [...], no I don’t have that.  (3T116:6-24)  (emphasis supplied)  Remarkably, [...] appears to have been oblivious of the fact that if [...]’s payment to [...] was for Schedule 10 pipe, it would be factually impossible for this same payment to be for “replacement material” within the purview of the Subject Contract.
[directive] At its January 10, 2006 Administrative Conference, the Supreme Court concurred with the Judicial Council’s recommendation that Directive #34A-65, Violation of Probation, issued by then Administrative Director [...] on July 11, 1966, be restated and reaffirmed.  Accordingly, this Directive restates the substance of that earlier directive, that is, that County Prosecutors, and not Probation Officers, are responsible for the prosecution of defendants charged with violating the terms of their probation.  This Directive, by thus restating the substance of Directive #34A-65, supersedes that earlier Directive.  During the course of the Probation Vicinage Visitation Program (as part of the implementation of the Outcome Based Standards for Probation Supervision (OBS)) it became apparent that, despite the provisions of Directive #34A-65, there has been considerable variation in vicinage practice with respect to the prosecution of violations of probation.  This variation was confirmed in the responses to an informal survey conducted by the AOC Probation Services Division.  Thus, in some counties the Prosecutor has been fully involved in violation of probation (VOP) proceedings, while in others Probation staff has handled all aspects of the VOP process.  The Conferences of Criminal Presiding Judges and Vicinage Chief Probation Officers reviewed the current practice and concluded that the policy contained in the 1966 Directive should be reaffirmed.  The Criminal Presiding Judges reasoned that because a VOP involves a defendant already sentenced by the court, it is akin to contempt for violating a court order.  The Prosecutor represents the state’s interest at contempt proceedings and the same should hold true for VOP proceedings.  The Presiding Judges were of the view that the Prosecutor has a fundamental role at VOP proceedings to represent the interests of the state and the victims.  They Directive #4-06 April 7, 2006  Page 2 also noted that the Probation Officer ought not to act as both witness and prosecutor at the VOP proceeding.  The Judicial Council reviewed the recommendations of both Conferences and concurred in the recommendation that the substance of Directive #34A-65 be reaffirmed.  And, as noted, the Supreme Court agreed.
[brief] [...]’s NJLAD Harassment Claim was also both Legally and Factually Deficient.  Although the trial court did not address [...]’s hostile work environment claim as to the State Respondents, it bears mentioning on appeal that [...] alleged no specific acts of sexual harassment against State Respondents and failed to establish that State Respondents should be held vicariously liable for any alleged acts of sexual harassment on the part of defendant [...].  Under the NJLAD, employer liability for alleged sexual harassment by an employee can be established under a theory of vicarious liability under Restatement § 219(2)(d).”  Aguas v. State, 220 N.J. 494, 512 (2015).  Thus, contrary to [...]’s argument, the State Respondents cannot be strictly liable for any sexual harassment she experienced in the workplace.  (Ab41).  Indeed, under prevailing case law, [...] could only proceed on a theory that State Respondents should be held directly liable if they were allegedly negligent or reckless in discharging their duty to protect [...] from sexual harassment - Restatement § 219(2)(b).
[brief] --- 4  Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, copies of all unpublished opinions cited within this brief are submitted as part of the State’s Appendix.  (school did not violate any fundamental parental rights when it “failed to provide information”), aff’d, 456 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006).  Multiple courts, including the District of New Jersey, have relied on this principle in rejecting the argument that parents have a fundamental right to information about a child’s LGBTQ+ status.
[brief] Only the financial consequences of defendant's civil reservation application are at play.  In our view, delaying the decision until sentencing affords the judge a better picture of defendant's then-present financial circumstances.  Because defendant was not yet — and may never be — sentenced on the present charges, the trial court should have delayed consideration of defendant's application until the completion of his PTI term.  Should defendant successfully complete PTI, the endangerment charge will be dismissed, thereby mooting defendant's application for a civil reservation.  On the other hand, if defendant is unsuccessfully terminated from the program, a judgment of conviction will be entered on the charge, and defendant may renew his application, with notice to the victim, prior to sentencing.  That process will enable the court to determine whether defendant can establish "good cause," including whether he faces the potential for devastating financial loss, where the civil reservation was not part of plea negotiations.  Conversely, in those cases where the civil reservation is part of the plea agreement and necessary "to remove an obstacle to a defendant's pleading guilty to a criminal charge," State v. Haulaway, Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 506, 508, 608 A.2d 964 (App. Div. 1992), the order should be stayed pending the conclusion of the defendant's PTI term.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2............................................................................................................. 38 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3.............................................................................................................  17 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4............................................................................................................. 29, 36, 37 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5............................................................................................................. 18 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3 ...................................................................................................... 18 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 .................................................................................................... 1, 10, 16 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-34......................................................................................................... 17 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-36......................................................................................................... 17 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-45......................................................................................................... 17 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-46......................................................................................................... 17 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-46.1 ........................................................................................................... 17 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-47 .................................................................................................................. 17 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48 .................................................................................................................. 178 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-49 .................................................................................................................... 26 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-50 .................................................................................................................... 17 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-61 .................................................................................................................... 43 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 ....................................................................................................................
[brief] (1T15-17)  A side by side review of the 2007 aerial photos of the Property and the 2020 aerial photos of the Property, marked as Objectors 1 during the Hearing, clearly shows that extensive grading has been performed since the [...] constructed the garage.  (Pa36)  Thus, [...]'s testimony at the Hearing was less than candid and the 2022 Zoning Application was deceptive as to the extent of grading done at the Property, as well as the use of the accessory structure.
[brief] See R. Doc. 103–1, p. 3; citing R. Doc. 31–1, pp. 26–27, ¶ 3.  [...] contends however that when the Deer Park team met [...], [...], [...]–[...]’s IT officer, [...]–[...]’s attorney, and [...]–an [...] representative, they were only provided access to the following computers and devices: (1) [...]’s C5120 Milano flip-phone; (2) [...]’s 24 HR Safety computer; (3) [...]’s iPhone 4s, for which [...] contends was discarded on November 10; (4) [...]’s iPad; and (5) [...]’s [...] computer.
[brief] A  No.  What I'm saying is if I had their surveyor notes and I had all the details of what they did, then I would be able to know how comprehensive it is.  But not all surveys are comprehensive.  Q  Right.  So you don't know if it was comprehensive or not.  A  I don't know, and that's the whole problem with this is we're suggesting that it's very comprehensive.  It may not be.  In some cases, I find it is not.  Q  Well, you don't know in this case that they didn't do something that they were supposed to.  A  No.  But what I'm saying this process, with the forms that you've given me, the word that comes to mind is doubt.  I have doubt, as an expert, of just what they did.  There's a lot of doubt, so I can't assume anything.  There's just a lot to the imagination.  Q  Okay.  So let's continue.  A  Okay.  Q
[directive] (10)  As soon as possible, photographs should be obtained of all decedents and people involved in the crash who exhibit an injury (for example, defendant, victims, etc.)  (a)  The photographs should be taken in a manner, which does not interfere with either medical treatment or extraction efforts.  c.  Post-Scene photographs may include the following.  (1)  Of vehicles, as required.  (a)  May include overhead and close up details of trace evidence, as determined by the Division of State Police investigator, after consultation with the County Prosecutor’s Office investigative staff.  (2)  Of the scene, in daylight, by the next day, with photographic placards, if possible.  (3)  Polaroid or digital photographs of vehicle in fatal and serious injury cases may be taken to be turned over to the County Medical Examiner’s Office prior to autopsy, in the event of subsequent death.  (4)  Autopsy photographs.  (5)  As soon as possible, photographs should be obtained of all decedents and people involved in the crash who exhibit an injury (for example, defendant, victims, etc.)  (a)  The photographs should be taken in a manner, which does not interfere with either medical treatment or extraction efforts.  d.  All original photographs should be maintained by the County Prosecutor’s Office fatal accident unit and/or designated investigator or detective.  - 7 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2  JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY REFORM THE TRUST (Da18)  The Defendants assert that in its June 10, 2022 Statement of Reasons, “[...] explained that the trial court reformed the Trust language based upon the doctrine of probable intent citing N.J.S.A. 3B:3-33.1(b).” (Db34).  This is a mischaracterization; the trial court did not “explain” why it “reformed” the Trust, and in fact the word “reform” does not even appear in that opinion.  Instead, the Court interpreted the Trust language, and as argued at Point IV, above, fashioned a remedy to enable the Decedent’s intent to be achieved, and as shown above, the Decedent’s intent was in fact achieved.  Reformation is “remaking or modifying an instrument, to correct mistakes, to fulfill an unexpressed intention, or to address circumstances that were unforeseen.  In re Trust of Nelson, 454 N.J. Super. 151, 160 (App. Div. 2018).  The trial court did not do anything of the kind.  In arguing variously that the trial court improperly interpreted or reformed the Trust, the Defendants urge an interpretation of the Trust that cannot possibly be supported.  They argue that Section 4.1A(a) and (b) should be read to vest the three beneficiaries with one-third of both properties, after which they could negotiate buyouts:  “[S]trict accordance with the Trust language requires that purchasing shares of the properties can only be accomplished after each beneficiary is deeded their one-third equal share. ” (Db29-30).  Such a reading would render both subsections of Section 4.1A superfluous.  If the Decedent’s intent was as the Defendants propose, there would have been no reason to even include subsections 4.1A(a) and (b) in the Trust.  The properties would have been divided equally between the three beneficiaries pursuant to Section 4.1A, after which they could have negotiated buyouts or, as the [...] admits might be the case, engaged in even more litigation.  (8T82:1-15).  It is a fundamental rule that legal documents should not be interpreted in a manner that would render a provision superfluous.  See, e.g., Caruso v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 136 N.J.L. 597, 598 (E. & A. 1948), observing that the interpretation of a contract should not leave a portion of it useless or inexplicable).  V.
[brief] The failure to give either of these instructions requires reversal of [...]’s convictions.  The failure to apprise the jury of every element of a crime is reversible error.  State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 290-92 (1989).  This is so because the absence of a jury instruction on an element means that there can be no proper jury finding of that element.  Id. at 291.  “[T]here is simply no substitute for a jury verdict” on every element of a crime.  Ibid.  The identity of the perpetrator is an element of the offense that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 326 (2005).
[directive] The County Victim-Witness Coordinator will contact the selected service resource prior to actual referral to introduce the client and situation at hand, facilitate effective service and overcome unnecessary delays.  A previously established rapport and protocol with selected service agencies should be established and follow-up contact concerning the victim's satisfaction and progress should be made.  F.  Compensation for injuries resulting from violent crime is available to qualified applicants from the [...].  Assistance will be made available to victims bv providing information on and referral to the [...].  This involves advising the victim about compensation, explaining eligibility, providing and assisting with the completion of claim forms, and providing assistance in gathering verification of losses and damages.  G.  County Victim-Witness Coordinators will advise victims of their right to seek restitution, where applicable, and advocate on behalf of victims in seeking these entitlements.  H.
[brief] Cumberland County Indictment [...] charged [...] with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and 3a(2) (count one); second-degree desecration of human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1a(2) (count two); fourth-degree tampering with physical evidences, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (count three); second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a(2) (count four); and second-degree false public alarm, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3a(1) (count five) based upon allegations that the defendant had purposely or knowingly caused the death of her son, [...], desecrated his remains in her attempt to cover up the murder, and caused a false public alarm in her attempts to hide the crime and deceive law enforcement.  (Da 1-3).  On various dates between January 10, 2020 and March 6, 2020, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., held a testimonial hearing on Griner’s motion to suppress her statement to police.  (1T-7T).  Judge Malestein granted the motion in a written order on June 3, 2020, holding that it could not be used in the State’s case-in-chief.  (Da 4).  Judge Malestein ruled, however, that the statement was voluntary and could be used to cross-examine Ms. Griner if she testified at trial.  (Da 4)  Prior to trial, Ms. Griner moved to preclude [...] from testifying as an expert in forensic anthropology and to limit the testimony of medical examiner [...] to prevent him from opining that the “manner of death” was homicide.  On July 12, 2021, Judge Malestein denied the motion to preclude Bird’s testimony.  (Da 5; 10T:34-14 to 42-23).  On September 28, 2022, after a Rule 104 hearing, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied the motion to limit Dr. Mazari’s testimony.  (Da 6-7; 15T:113-20 to 128-2).  Beginning on December 12, 2022, Judge Gangloff presided over a jury trial on all counts (18T:9-15 to 16-13).  On January 4, 2023, the jury found Ms. Griner guilty of all counts and made additional findings related to the murder count pursuant to 2C:11-3b(4)(k).  (Da 8-14).  On February 21, 2023, Judge Gangloff sentenced Ms. Griner to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole pursuant to 2C:11-3b(4)(k).  (46T:27-21 to 42-17; Da 15-18).  Ms. Griner was also sentenced to a seven year consecutive and a five year concurrent sentences for her conviction on the remaining counts.  Ms. Griner filed a notice of appeal on April 12, 2023.  (Da 19-23).