ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Rather, those cases were decided on the narrow issue of the ambiguity of the exclusion, without regard to whether such an exclusion would be void because it violates statutory intent.  The majority opinion of the Appellate Division that was affirmed in Delta Plastics, moreover, made clear that even if the C5 exclusion were unambiguous, as the insurance industry claims it has now drafted it to be, the reasonable expectations of the insured would not be met.  “Moreover, even if the language is deemed unambiguous, the reasonable expectations of the insured must be considered.  See, e.g., Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595 (2001); Salem Group [v. Oliver], 128 N.J. [1,] 4 [(1992)]; see also Schmidt, supra, 155 N.J. at 51; Beseler, supra, 380 N.J. Super. at 200.  The essence of the two-part policy, Part One covering workers' compensation defense and indemnification, and Part Two covering defense and indemnification in other employer liability situations, is seamless coverage.  Part Two coverage has been described as a "gap filler."  Schmidt, supra, 155 N.J. at 4950.  [...]'s interpretation of Part Two would widen rather than fill the gap. ”  Delta Plastics, supra, 380 N.J. Super. at 542 (bold added).  CONCLUSION
[directive] Thank you.  Combatting gun violence has been my top priority, and we, at the Department of Law and Public Safety, have used every resource available to us to confront this challenge.  Our transformational approach to public safety is working on January 4, 2024, along with [...], we announced that for the first time since the State began tracking shooting statistics in 2009, the number of people shot in New Jersey fell below 1,000.  Building on a 25% reduction in the number of shooting victims in 2022, the number of shooting victims in 2023 dropped an additional 13% with 924 people shot.  In 2024, the number of shooting victims was further reduced to 788 people  These recommendations apply only to tertiary prevention providers.
[brief] R. 4:49-2 provides in relevant part that a “motion [for reconsideration] shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court overlooked or as to which it erred....”  (Emphasis added.)  Moreover, the party seeking reconsideration must satisfy a high bar before the Court should even engage in the reconsideration process:  “...[A] litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process. ”  Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 289 (App. Div. 2009)(citation omitted); see, Morey v. Borough of Wildcrest, 18 N.J. Tax 335, 341 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 80 (2000).  The Trial Court also quoted (Pa75–76) the substantial law significantly limiting the circumstances under which reconsideration is permitted:  Reconsideration should be limited to those cases which either “'(1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ’”  *Castano v. Augustine*, 475 N.J. Super. 71, 78 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting *Cummings v. Bahr*, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (internal citation omitted).  The “magnitude of the error cited must be a ‘game-changer’” to warrant reconsideration.  *Ibid.* (quoting *Palombi v. Palombi*, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 289 (App. Div. 2010)).  “Reconsideration cannot be used to expand the record and reargue a motion.  Reconsideration is only to point out ‘the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred. ’”  *Capital Fin. Co. of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi*, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting R. 4:49-2).  Our law is clear that “the purpose of R. 4:49-2 is not to re-argue the motion that has already been heard for the purpose of taking the proverbial second bite of the apple. ”  *State v. Fitzsimmons*, 286 N.J. Super. 141, 147 (App. Div. 1995).  Indeed, our courts have cautioned that litigants are not permitted to file motions for reconsideration merely because they are dissatisfied with the court’s decision.  *Dennehy v. East Windsor Regional Bd. of Educ.*, 469 N.J. Super. 357, 362 (App. Div. 2021) (citing *Palombi*, supra, 414 N.J. Super. at 288).  ...But “[f]iling a motion for reconsideration does not provide the litigant with an opportunity to raise new legal issues that were not presented to the court in the underlying [trial]. ”  *Medina v. Pitta*, 442 N.J. Super. 1, 18 (App. Div. 2015) (citing *Cummings*, supra, 295 N.J. Super. at 384).  Plaintiff has not identified to this Court any specific way in which plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration met these high bars or in which the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying these motions.  See Section I.  Thus, this Court should affirm the denial of these motions.
[brief] [Pa562]  Upon learning of the overdraft, [...] was concerned that his sister-in-law, who worked for the Firm’s outside accountants, would scrutinize the relevant bank records and delve into the other checks written at the same time.  In particular, he was worried that she would ask questions about the $20,000 check, which was written for a personal matter he did not wish disclosed to her and did not want known by a family member.  [Pa562]  The matter came up during a discussion between [...] and a former employee of the Firm who offered to help “hide” the matter from [...]’s sister-in-law.  Since the money properly belonged to [...] and was not being used for an illegitimate purpose, he did not believe the suggestion would cause any harm.  [Pa562]  The former employee proceeded to alter the bank statements to disguise the $20,000 check.  The altered bank record was placed in a file to which [...]’s sister-in-law had access.  [Pa562-Pa563]
[directive] •  To conform to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.  •  To conduct semi-annual firearms qualification programs in conformance with the standards set forth in this manual.  •  To qualify, twice annually, on a Handgun Qualification Course (either HQC1 or HQC2) with a minimum score of 80% with the service handgun.  (See Appendices A or B for courses of fire).  •  To qualify, twice annually, on a Handgun Qualification Course (either HQC1 or HQC2) with a minimum score of 80% with any off- duty handgun which has been determined by the agency executive or supervisory firearms instructor to be substantially different in design, function or caliber from the service handgun.  (If an off-duty handgun does not differ substantially in design, function, or caliber 9-11 Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards from the service handgun, a separate qualification with this weapon is at the discretion of the agency executive).  •  To qualify, under night firing conditions, twice annually, on the Handgun Night Qualification Course (HNQC) with a score of 80% with the service handgun.  (See Appendix C for course of fire).  •  To qualify twice annually, under night firing conditions, on the Handgun Night Qualification Course (HNQC) with a minimum score of 80% with any off-duty handgun which has been determined by the agency executive or supervising firearms instructor to be substantially different in design, function or caliber from the service handgun.  (If an off-duty handgun does not differ substantially in design, function or caliber from the service handgun, a separate qualification with this weapon is at the discretion of the agency executive.)  •  To qualify those officers who are or might be assigned use of an agency issued shotgun twice annually on both the Shotgun Qualification Course (SQC) and the Shotgun Night Qualification Course (SNQC) with a score of 80% using the agency authorized shotgun.  •  To qualify those officers who are or might be assigned use of the agency issued shotgun utilizing slug ammunition twice annually, both in daylight and under subdued light conditions, on the Shotgun Slug Qualification Course (SSQC) with a minimum score of 80% using the agency authorized shotgun.  •  To provide remedial training for those personnel who do not meet the standards of qualification or take appropriate action until such time as the qualification standards are met.  •  To train, on a semi-annual basis, all personnel in the use of force, including an update in all state, county and agency policies, statutes, and court decisions dealing with the use of force.
[brief] Defendant's convictions and sentence should be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: s/[...]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID No. 031801995  Dated: January 16, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  DOCKET No.: [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  STATE OF NEW JERSEY :  On Appeal from A Conviction  The Plaintiff-Respondent : Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County v. : [...], : Defendant-Appellant : Indictment No. [...]
[brief] [...] Seeks to Confirm the Arbitration Award  After [...] filed this action to confirm the Award on January 23, 2024, [...] filed a motion to modify the Award on February 1, 2024, asserting the same arguments it would later assert in the Trial Court, and the same arguments it has re-asserted here in this Court.  Da160-63.  The Arbitrator denied [...]’s motion to modify any portion of the $4,310,849.48 principal award, but found, with regard to the award of interest only, that the interest needed to be recalculated pursuant to a new formula (with a different start date and with respect to select projects only).  Da235-36.  The Arbitrator otherwise expressly held that, “[i]n all other respects, the Award dated January 19, 2024 is reaffirmed and remains in full force and effect. ”  Da236.  The parties thereafter agreed to a “Corrected Final Award” to [...] in the net amount of $3,889,835.14, which the Arbitrator entered on April 12, 2024.  Da242.  --- 6
[brief] In January 2022, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claim alleging retaliatory discharge because she failed to invoke a clearly mandated public policy; the Court permitted her to seek leave to file an amended complaint if she was able to cure this deficiency.  (Doc. 12 at 10-14).  Plaintiff now seeks leave to file an amended complaint that, inter alia, claims her termination violated the general mandate that employers provide a work environment free from hazards that cause "or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to [their] employees" found in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).  (Doc. 13).  DISCUSSION
[directive] LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER  An individual who is sworn and empowered by the State of New Jersey to conduct investigations and make arrests for any offense enumerated in the New Jersey Criminal Code.  PENETRATION  Sexual penetration means vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse between persons or insertion of the hand, finger, or object into the anus or vagina, either by the actor or upon the actor’s instruction.  The depth of insertion shall not be relevant as to the question of commission of the crime.  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(c).
[brief] However, other courts have reached the common-sense conclusion that the usual rules of insurance contracts apply to CCIPs and OCIPs.  For example, in *Workers’ Comp. Fund v. [...] Corp.*, the Utah Supreme Court articulated no distinction when it held that an employee of a contractor enrolled in an OCIP was still entitled to proceeds of the OCIP’s workers’ compensation insurance benefits where no notice was given to the contractor of the policy’s cancellation.  See 210 P.3d 277, 287 (Utah 2009) (“[...] [OCIP insurer] is required by law to give notice to [...] [enrolled contractor] of any policy cancellation …  Since no notice was given to [...] by [...] of the insurance policy being cancelled, the policy is still valid. ”).  On a broader level, outside of CCIP and OCIP policies, other jurisdictions have emphasized the need for strict compliance with cancellation requirements in various insurance scenarios, even where the insured secured other coverage, in order protect the public and avoid confusion as to coverage and compliance.
[brief] For example, the BWC and police reports show that the police encountered [...] more than once, and [...] at first declined to tell them what happened.  (Da 16, 20, 23; BWC1 at 8:55 to 9:30)  The BWC also reveals that [...] initially refused to open the door to her apartment when the police first asked.  (BWC4-A at 27:00 to 27:14)  And the BWC shows that [...] ultimately consented only after being detained, handcuffed, placed in the back of a police car, surrounded by multiple officers, and threatened with “trouble” if she did not tell them the truth.
[brief] What was he apologizing for, if not Bella’s aggressive behavior and invasion of Koda’s territory?  [...] suggested the dogs get together to play and told [...] and [...] not to worry because Bella had small teeth.  But he missed the point: Bella’s aggression and antagonistic behavior created a festering animosity between the two dogs that built up over four and a half years until it tragically exploded.  As [...] said when he declined the play date, the damage had already been done.  D.  Temperament evidence urges the opposite result of State v Herold.
[brief] Lastly, Plaintiff’s argument that the City’s adoption of the Amended Redevelopment Plan constitutes impermissible spot zoning is without merit.  “‘Spot zoning’ is the use of the zoning power to benefit particular private interests rather than the collective interests of the community. ”  Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Township, Inc. v. Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6, 18 (1976).  The burden of proving that a zoning ordinance is illegal spot zoning lies with plaintiffs.
[brief] Here, the trial court correctly determined that this is a matter of important public interest because it was necessary to provide clarity to the public, [...], [...], [...], and [...] on the exactitudes of the Restructuring Act’s residency requirements.  (1T68-69).  The trial court also noted that [...] “is the most visible symbol of higher education in this state” and appointment to [...] “is an extremely important and prestigious appointment. ” (1T67).  Defendants do not deny the preeminence of [...] as the State University of New Jersey or the prestige associated with appointment to BOG.  (Db18).
[brief] ”  Id.  Similarly, *Woo-Padva 2* cites to subsection 18 in support of the notion that the NJCFLA can only be enforced by the [...].  See *Woo-Padva*, No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *9.  The citations to subsection 18 are illustrative in that it shows the courts’ reasoning was based entirely on the existence of enforcement remedies by the [...]; however, nothing in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 precludes a private right of action.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 merely provides for the Commissioner’s authority and available remedies under the NJCFLA.
[brief] A general release, not restricted by its terms to particular claims or demands, ordinarily covers all claims and demands due at the time of its execution and within the contemplation of the parties. ”  Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184, 203–04 (1963).  12  Appellant’s reliance on Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 23 (1994) is unavailing when considered in the context of clear and consistent subsequent authority on point.
[brief] THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY THE REQUESTOR IS NOT DISCLOSABLE UNDER THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO ACCESS PUBLIC DOCUMENTS (Da122)  The common law definition of a public record is more expansive than the definition contained in OPRA.  Bergen County Improvement Auth. v. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 370 N.J. Super. 504, 509–10, (App.Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 143 (2004).  To constitute a public record under the common law, the item must be “a written memorial ... made by a public officer, and ... the officer [must] be authorized by law to make it. ”  Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 222 (1978).  To access this broader class of documents, requestors must make a greater showing than required under OPRA: (1) “the person seeking access must ‘establish an interest in the subject matter of the material’ ”; and (2) “the citizen's right to access ‘must be balanced against the State's interest in preventing disclosure. ””  *Keddie v. Rutgers, State University*, 148 N.J. 36, 50 (1997).  Under OPRA, the requestor’s interest in a document is irrelevant, whereas in the common law right of access the interest of the requestor is considered and “balanced against the State's interest in preventing disclosure. ”  *Id.*  The common law right of access involves a two-step inquiry; first, a litigant must establish an interest in the public record.  *N. Jersey Newspapers Co. v.  Passaic County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders*, 127 N.J. 9, 13 (1992).  Second, a Plaintiff/Respondent's interest in disclosure of the relevant documents must outweigh the State's interest in non-disclosure.  *Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex*, 660 A.2d 1163, 1169 (N.J. 1995).  In making that determination, courts are to consider the following factors: (1) the extent to which disclosure will impede agency functions by discouraging citizens from providing information to the government; (2) the effect disclosure may have upon persons who have given such information, and whether they did so in reliance that their identities would not be disclosed; (3) the extent to which agency self-evaluation, program improvement, or other decision-making will be chilled by disclosure; (4) the degree to which the information sought includes factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of policymakers; (5) whether any findings of public misconduct have been insufficiently corrected by remedial measures instituted by the investigative agency; and (6) whether any agency disciplinary or investigatory proceedings have arisen that may circumscribe the individual's asserted need for the materials.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: THE DEFENDANT’S PETITION WAS UNTIMELY UNDER THE RULE AND DISMISSAL WAS THEREFORE REQUIRED.  The Court Rules governing timely petitions state:  Notwithstanding any other provision in this rule, no second or subsequent petition shall be filed more than one year after the latest of: (A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right has been newly recognized by either of those Courts and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases on collateral review; or (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or (C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent application for post-conviction relief where ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on the first or subsequent application for post-conviction relief is being alleged.
[brief] 394 N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 2007).  The Supreme Court found that, although the Municipality had conformed to the special adoption requirements, the Court has the further obligation to review the adequacy of the reasons expressed and whether that rezoning was arbitrary.  The Court concluded "the reasons expressed by the Governing Body for its decision to rezone this parcel fall short", and the new zone was neither supported by sound reasoning nor reasonable.  The change, made at the behest of nearby residents without consistency with the Master Plan, was arbitrary zoning action.  *Mahwah Realty Associates Inc. v. Township of Mahwah*, 420 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div. 2011) is also relevant.
[brief] Cases Bacon v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015) .........................................................  7  Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F.  Supp. 2d 823 (D.N.J. 2011) ......................................................... 14, 16 Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994) ......................................................................................  19 DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013) ..................................................... 14, 15, 16  Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1957) .......................................................  8  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91 (2018)  ....................................................................................  7 F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550 (1997)  ..................................................................................  8  Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1950) ..........................................................  10 Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557 (2011) .................................................................................. 13, 16 Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009) .....................................................
[brief] Ha105.  This report was mandated by the GWRA and states quite unequivocally that New Jersey needs even more aggressive decarbonization measures than those in the EMP if it is to meet the 80% reduction objective by 2050.  In its introduction, the report says:  New Jersey is especially vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change due to its coastal location and population density.  Minimizing these risks requires immediate, decisive, long-term commitments across all levels of government and sectors of the economy to facilitate the steep reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are necessary to protect New Jersey's economic, social, and environmental vitality.  Recognizing the need for coordinated action in the public and private sectors, the New Jersey Global Warming Response Act (L. 2007, c. 112;b L. 2018, c. 197) (GWRA) directed the [...] ([...]), in collaboration with other state agencies, to develop plans and make recommendations for reducing emissions of climate pollutants, represented throughout this report as carbon dioxide equivalent emissions or CO2e, to 80% below their 2006 levels by the year 2050 (known as the "80x50" goal).  [Ha113, emphasis added; footnote omitted.]
[brief] Absent the flagrantly illegal stop of the Mazda, the State would not have been able to detain its occupants.  No information would have been gleaned about its occupants, no normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued, and the evidence in the car would never have been found.  Even if the stop was lawful, the State has failed to prove that the evidence would have been discovered absent the unlawful credentials search.  Assuming the only illegality was the credentials search, the State cannot meet prongs (1) or (3) for the same reason: there is no basis to believe the officers would have sought a search warrant without seeing suspected heroin in the car and no basis to believe they would have gotten one.  The warrant application relied on the heroin found in the car.  (2T 60-20 to 73-25)  There was not any mention of marijuana.  The reason there was no mention of the odor of marijuana is because there was no such odor.  And despite the trial court’s attempt to massage that fact in its opinion, it made quite clear on the record that the odor was an impossible claim when examining the marijuana found in the car: