ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  10.  Other errors in the “accounting” became blatantly obvious, demonstrating Probation’s mis-management of the account record.  For example, Probation failed to track allocation of alimony versus child support payments.  The Audit of 9/18/2020 (DA304) improperly indicated an overpayment of alimony of $41,278.42 but an arrearage of $21,548.50 on child support – violating child support regulations requiring allocation of funds first toward child support.  Again, as [...], stated, “no one did the analysis. ” (2T11, 8-10).  Probation’s “accounting” of 3/17/2022 failed to address the improper re-institution of garnishment of SSA benefits or the use of a false NJ child support account.  11.  Despite these errors in Probation’s 3/17/2022 “accounting,” the Court determined the “accounting” complete (see Order of 4/4/2022, DA80).  The Order also terminated SSA garnishment as of 2/7/2022 (but Probation and the SSA continued improper garnishment – see paragraph no. 7 above), and alimony was to continue at $498/week (also violated by Probation – as noted above).  However, the Court failed to investigate the discrepancies between evident errors in the account record and the 3/17/2022 “accounting. ”
[brief] “[n]o New Jersey statute creates a limitation period specifically applicable to UM claims. ”  Id. at 404.  “When an insured purchases an original policy of insurance he may be expected to read it and the law may fairly impose upon him such restrictions, conditions and limitations as the average insured ascertain from such reading. ”  Morrison v American Intern. Ins. Co. of America, 381 N.J. Super at 542, quoting Skeete v Dorvius, 368 N.J. Super. 311 (App. Div. 2004), aff’d 184 N.J. 5 (2005).  The Morrison Court went on to state “we continue to adhere to the maxim that an insured is chargeable with knowledge of the contents of ‘an insurance policy in the absence of fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the carrier. ’”  Ibid. (internal citations omitted).  As stated above, not only did Appellant fail to raise an issue of reasonable expectations or ambiguity of the policy language at the trial court level; Amicus Counsel has not provided any evidence that a reasonable expectation of an insured is that he or she would not have to abide by the terms of the contract from which he or she seeks benefits, other than to argue that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 governs the time within which to file a claim for uninsured and/or underinsured motorist claims.
[brief] Exhibit L to Certification of [...] Handwritten Notes 6/3/21 regarding [...]’s Incident with police (Attached at Pa287)  Subpoena served on police Officers by [...]  *This should not be considered a duplicate because it has an additional recipient.  xxx on 11/12/2020 (Attached at Pa298) Letter to [...] 10/27/2020 regarding trial scheduled when discovery incomplete non receipt of audio/videos and motion to suppress not heard (Attached at Pa078)  Letter to Judge and Prosecutor 11/20/20  Requesting Discovery Production of Expert Report of Chemist and Credentials (Attached at Pa300)  Incident Data Type/Offense as of 3/6/2020 involving [...] (Attached at Pa302)  Complaint Summons dated 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa041)
[brief] Decision and Judgment  Dismissing Action With Prejudice......................Pa0098  Order Denying Intervenor’s Motion to Settle the Record..........................Pa0072 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bryant v. City of Atlantic City, 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998).................................................................6 Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken, 242 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1990)...............................................................5 Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 2001)...............................................................8, 9 Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of W. Orange, 68 N.J. 543 (1975)..............................................................................................5 Malanga v. Twp of W. Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023)............................................................................................10 Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass’n v. City Council of City of Jersey City (“PADNA”), 413 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2010)...............................................................8 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28(a).........................................................................................10 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1.............................................................................................6 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d).......................................................................................8
[brief] Pa66.  This “ripeness” conclusion was clearly incorrect.  As previously noted, [...]’s separate arbitration against the [...] (the Sonehan Arbitration) centered on a contract between only [...] and the Owner— not a contract with [...].  The conclusion that [...]’s “claim as a subcontractor” against [...] did not ripen until the culmination of that separate arbitration is plainly wrong (and entirely unexplained by the trial court’s decision). 8  G.  [...] Moved for Reconsideration of the Trial Court’s August 30 Orders Due to the Trial Court Overlooking Critical Evidence of the Hackensack Project at the First Arbitration (Pa960)
[brief] The officers asked Plaintiff for the keys to the Jeep so they could confirm the name of the owner, and ensure that it did not contain property from any motor vehicle burglaries.  Plaintiff refused to hand over the keys and became irate and uncooperative.  The officers attempted to place Plaintiff in handcuffs due to his abrupt change in demeanor and refusal to provide the keys.  Pa022-Pa023; Pa303-Pa304.  Plaintiff then began to suddenly pull away from the two officers, and attempted to run away and flee the scene.  Edison Supp. Appendix 001 ([...] at 4:00; [...] at 3:10).  The officers were able to maintain hold of Plaintiff’s arms to prevent him from escaping.  Plaintiff testified that he knew the officers were attempting to handcuff him, and he admitted that he resisted and “didn’t allow them to do so[.]”  Pa454 (T64:15-18).  The police officers took Plaintiff to the ground as they attempted to handcuff him, and Plaintiff’s knee and hands came into contact with the ground.
[brief] The Court explained that “it is not necessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of the court[:] ... the mere appearance of bias may require disqualification....  [T]he belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable. ”  Id. at 43 (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (citing R. 1:12–1(f)), cert. den., 522 U.S. 850 (1997).  The Court found it was a mistake to focus on the actual prejudice suffered by the litigant.
[brief] (6T18-2 to 24).  The court also recognized that defendant was subject to a significant term of incarceration derivative of a federal prosecution that began after the charges for which he was being sentenced.  (6T17-1 to 12).  This federal sentence involved a sixteen-year term of imprisonment.  (Ibid.)  Ultimately, the Court sentenced defendant to a fifteen-year term of incarceration with a seven and one-half year period of parole ineligibility, concurrent to the federal sentence.  (6T19-16 to 20-11).
[brief] [...], ESQUIRE  Attorneys for Defendant [...]  [...] [...] [...] – facsimile  [...], Plaintiff, vs. [...], [...] and/or [...], JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitiously named) and XYZ COMPANIES 1-10 (fictitiously named), Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM: LAW  DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW: HON.  [...], J.S.C.  Civil Action  AMENDED REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT  [...]  Date: October 23, 2024
[directive] While not specifically covered by this law, reasonable limitations should exist on video INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 40 surveillance.  The primary issue is one of privacy.  Video surveillance, especially covert surveillance, should not be used in areas where employees have a high expectation of privacy, such as locker rooms and bathrooms.  In public areas, video surveillance may be used.  In many law enforcement agencies, certain areas such as lobbies, cell blocks and sally ports have video surveillance for security reasons.  Video obtained from these sources is applicable to internal investigations.  Questions about the specific application of video surveillance, especially covert surveillance, should be addressed to the [...].
[brief] On October 26, 2022, the Respondent filed the Fee Application, requesting: attorneys’ fees of $108,590.50 and expenses totaling $4,906.54; income and corpus commissions totaling $2,039.53; and accountant fees of $17,649.57.  254a-301a.  On the same day, the Appellant moved for reconsideration of the Judgement, repeating the same facts and arguments in his exceptions.
[brief] While the Court in this case did consider that [...] had a history of employment, “[t]he sentencing transcript is devoid of any mention of defendant's financial resources and/or his likely future earnings. ”  *State v. McLaughlin*, 310 N.J. Super. 242, 264 (App. Div. 1998).  The Court did not inquire as to [...]’s salaries at any of his previous places of employment or his likely salary if he were able to secure a job in the future.  Like in *State v. Pessolano*, 343 N.J. Super. 464, 479 (App. Div. 2001), the Defendant in this case “was no longer employed,” which certainly impacted his ability to pay.  Thus, [...]’s position was far different than the defendant in *State v. Orji*, 277 N.J. Super. 582, 589 (App. Div. 1994), who “ha[d] a bachelor's degree in marketing[,] and [wa]s gainfully employed as the owner operator of a limousine taxi service. ”  Not only did the Court fail to ascertain or consider any information regarding a realistic salary that [...] might expect to earn if he were to obtain a new job, the Court would have also been required to consider that expected salary against [...]’s expenses so as to be able to appropriately set “the time period for making restitution. ”  *Ibid.*  Because the Court did not make any explicit findings regarding defendant’s likely salary or expenses, the Court also did not make any findings that the amount of restitution imposed was “consistent with the defendant's ability to pay. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2).  Accordingly, this Court should remand for a proper restitution hearing at which the sentencing Court will be required to make such explicit findings.
[brief] The trial court correctly dismissed the claim for punitive damages.  (36)  The trial court correctly held that “based upon the dismissal of all claims for compensatory damages against [...] and [...] Specialty Insurance, [[...] and [...]] cannot pursue any claim for punitive damages against these defendants. ”  [3T36-15]  [...] acted as any insurance carrier would by rescinding policies procured by material misrepresentations and filing a declaratory judgment action to confirm the policies could be rescinded.
[brief] [Pa563]  Both counts related entirely to the handling of the $30,000 in fees and other money belonging to the Firm in the aforementioned trust account.  [Pa331]  Neither count in the OAE Complaint involved the provision of legal services to any client.  [Pa331]  Following a hearing, on March 20, 2017, [...] was censured by the Disciplinary Review Board (the “Censure”, and collectively with the audit and OAE Complaint, the “OAE Proceeding”).  [Pa563, Pa341]  It is undisputed that as with the OAE Complaint, the Censure related entirely to the financial issues plead in the OAE Complaint and not any issues pertaining to the rendering of legal services to any client of the Firm.  [Pa341]  C.
[directive] This section outlines the follow-up investigation of a reported bias incident.  This outline is designed to provide a practical approach to the continuing investigation of suspected or confirmed bias incidents.  Bias incident follow-up investigations should be conducted by trained detectives or investigators; however, a number of officers who are not detectives or investigators may become involved in a typical investigation, particularly in smaller agencies.  Bias incident investigations shall be given the appropriate degree of priority treatment.  Follow-up investigations and community relations activities shall be timely and comprehensive.  The victim shall be kept informed of the progress of the investigation.  Referrals to the appropriate support services shall be made, as required.  Referrals shall also be made to the [...], if appropriate.  Page 7 of 16  The work of the investigator may involve working with people with diverse backgrounds.  The investigator must be able to show compassion and sensitivity toward the plight of the victim while gathering the evidence needed for prosecution.  Victims of bias incidents, like all victims of crime, experience emotional stress as a result of their victimization.  This stress may be heightened by a perceived level of threat or personal violation due to the special nature of the bias incident.  Investigators assigned to handle bias incident cases should have a background in working sensitive cases.  They should also have experience handling community relations.  In any case where language barriers are an issue, if possible, investigators fluent in the particular language should be assigned to assist in the investigation.  Additionally, investigators should be generally familiar with various forms of bias incidents and organized hate groups operating within the State of New Jersey.  The [...] and the [...] can provide information and assistance regarding organized hate groups operating within the State.  Investigator Responsibilities:
[brief] [Db10]  Contrary to that statement, the trial court found instead that the notice was mailed to [...] at the post office box address she provided to Plaintiff, but the “court is unable to determine [sic] the defendant refused the mail.  . . .  In this case, the court has reason to believe service of the Rule 1:20A-6 was not effected – at least not until the personal service in court was made on August 27, 2019. ”
[brief] THE NATURE OF THE NEGATIVE CRITERIA REVIEW (Ja48, l. 23- p. 52, l. 19; and passim)  In addition to demonstrating that the subject lot suffers a hardship, thereby satisfying the “positive” criteria of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), which the Plaintiff has shown, the application must also pass the ‘negative criteria’ examination, as outlined in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(a) and (b).  Specifically, it must be shown that granting the variance will not cause “a substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zoning plan and zoning ordinance”.  Menlo Park Plaza Associates v. Planning Bd. of the Twp. of Woodbridge, 316 N.J. Super. 451, 460 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 160 N.J. 88 (1999).  The five objecting neighbors and the Board members failed to provide any testimony, factual or otherwise, suggesting an impairment to the intent and purpose of the zoning plan and zoning ordinance.  They avoided any analysis of the zoning plan and zoning ordinance altogether.  The clear demonstration of no negative effect on the zoning plan is evident since this variance affects only one isolated property.
[brief] [...] at the Board hearing, and [...]’s brief, focus instead only on the inherently beneficial use and the positive criteria, while ignoring the second prong of the negative criteria it needed to satisfy for a use variance.  *Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Wall*, 127 N.J. 152, 165-66, (1992).  The Board strictly followed the requirements of the law, respected the statutorily required process of creating a zone plan and zoning ordinance, and found the application deficient.
[brief] ”  2018 Op. at *29.  It is important here to emphasize, however, that the Appellate Division did not determine that [...]’s fee decision and the Trial Court’s award to [...] based upon his counsel’s expenditure of time and effort in investigating and in then establishing the facts, circumstances and events that occurred prior to the RICO SOL Period, was erroneous; nor did this Court determine that those efforts by [...]’s counsel were not compensable.  Instead, this Court left that determination to the Chancery Court on remand.  In remanding the attorney’s fees issues, this Court did affirm key components of [...]’s NJRICO fee award, including [...]’s and [...]’s award to [...]’s counsel of a 25% fee enhancement.
[brief] In addition to the general categories of damages, [...] asserted claims specifically under the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA).  If the finder of fact were to determine that either or both defendants violated the CFA, then [...] would be permitted to receive an award of money for their loss proximately caused by the defendants, in which case the amount “shall” be threefold and the Court “shall also award reasonable attorney’s fees, filing fees, and reasonable costs of suit” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  See also Model Civil Jury Charge 4.43.  Here, the Trial Court already determined that the defendants conduct under the CFA was a jury question.  If there was a question as to whether what was promised was what was delivered - it necessarily follows that the question of damages and remedies should have also been left for trial.  In determining otherwise, the decision on summary judgment left [...] to proceed to trial with one arm tied around its back being unable to fully confront the counterclaim for nonpayment with the extensive representations they were presented with during the sales and planning process.
[brief] ”  Id. at 72–73.  The Court noted that, “[w]ithout a cooperative response from both municipalities, the property may not be susceptible to development.  This fact may bear on the determination of whether a special reason exists under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), militating in favor of a variance. ”  Id. at 73 (citations omitted).  While the Court acknowledged that the [...] was “mindful” of [...]’s zoning, it decided that it had “no way of knowing whether [Holmdel’s] attention to this aspect of the variance application was sufficient. ”  Id.  The Court held that the [...] must give “significant weight” to [...]’s zoning ordinance when reviewing the application:
[brief] Following [...]’s September 25, 2015 letter advising [...] that it was “CCIP approved,” [...] never received anything from [...] or [...], or anyone else, advising it that its coverage in the CCIP had been cancelled.  (Dta1293-1295, T201-15 to 203-6; Dta1080.)  [...] claimed it was “unaware” that [...] performed “other work. ”
[brief] He pressed for mitigating factors that compelled [...] to assess what happened in the case.  There was video evidence admitted at the protracted trial that captured defendant shooting both victims, contrary to his testimony at trial he only shot [...].  As the State argued, the jury interpreted the video evidence as fact finder to come to its verdicts of passion/provocation manslaughter and attempted passion/provocation manslaughter.  But even after the jury rejected his claim of self-defense and of only shooting [...], defendant continued to maintain he acted to protect himself and failed to acknowledge his responsibility for killing [...].  [...], who presided over the trial and had seen the evidence, was in the position to assess the evidence in addressing what sentence to impose.  He acknowledged the jury’s verdict of passion/provocation manslaughter.  The judge in this case did not make findings contrary to the jury’s verdict acquitting defendant of purposeful or knowing murder.  The judge had to explain his reasons for rejecting the mitigating factors urged by defendant, which focused on the victims facilitating their demise and whether defendant had acted under “strong provocation” and whether he had “substantial grounds tending to excuse his conduct.
[brief] M59.  The Trial Court also specifically cited the "disturbing evidence in the record" related to the comments and behavior of the Township's then-mayor, [...], in opposition to the Amended Application.  M38.  Among the actions of [...] prior to the Zoning Board hearing which drew criticism from the Trial Court was his outrageous issuance of an "inappropriate" press release arguing against Plaintiffs' then-pending application, which "appear[s] to have preordained the Amended Application's denial; and that, along the way, resulted in the subversion of due process and fundamental fairness to the Applicant.  If anything, at a bare minimum, those actions only served to further inform and underscore the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the Board’s denial decision.
[brief] ......................................16  **Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,** 142 N.J. 356 (1995)  ..............................................................................................18  **HD Supply Waterworks Grp., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation,** 29 N.J. Tax 573 (2017)  .........................................................................................23  **Hollingsworth v. Perry,** 558 U.S. 183, 130 S. Ct. 705, 175 L. Ed. 2d 657 (2010)  ......................................19  **Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J. v. State,** 425 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2012)  ......................................................................18  **In re Actavis,** 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 39254 (3d Cir. Dec, 6, 2019) ........................................ passim  **In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,** 418 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................19  In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 653 (D.N.J. 2004) .................................................................21 In re Pelvic Mesh/Gynecare Litigation, 426 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2012) ...............................................................5 In re Zostavax Litigation ESI Protocol, MCL No. 629, [...] (Mar. 22, 2019) ..............................................20 Lewis v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214628 (M.D. La. Dec. 2, 2023) .....................................11 Lipsky v. N.J. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2023) ............................................................14, 15, 17 Madlinger v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2726 (App. Div. Oct. 30, 2017) .........................10 Purdue Pharm. Products v. Actavis Elizabeth, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 111363 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2015) .......................................21 Royzenshteyn v. Pathak, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1562 (App. Div. Aug. 6, 2020) .........................10 Trenton Renewable Power, LLC v. Denali Water Sols., LLC, 470 N.J. Super. 218 (App. Div. 2022) .............................................................6, 18 UPMC v. Highmark, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196362 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2013) ..................................22, 23 Willmore v. Savvas Learning Co. LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166813 (D. Kan. Sep. 19, 2023) ...................................16 Other Authorities [...], “Discovering A Better Way: The Need For Effective Civil Litigation Reform,” 60 Duke L.J. 547 (2010) .........................................................7, 8 [...], [...] & [...], Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies (2010) ..........................8 [...], Give us a Break: The (IN)Equity of Courts Imposing Severe Sanctions for Spoliation without a Finding of Bad Faith, 60 Drake L. Rev. 887 (2012) ..................................................................................................................8