ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 52.  A New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") Air Permit is not required due to the insignificant source of emissions.  Also, a DEP Land Use Permit is not required due to the limited scope of the Facility and the absence of environmentally sensitive features at the Proposed Site.  53.  [...] will apply for a Monmouth County Road Opening Permit once the approval requested herein has been obtained from the Board.  VIII.
[brief] Appellant further argued that Respondent never advised her that she received the check from [...].  However, to address the issue if Appellant paid all her rent, the Court asked for any receipts or proof of payments (by Zelle) to in essence conduct an accounting of all payments that had been made.  (1T, P. 8, line 6- P. 10, line 25).  Over the issue regarding Appellant’s claim that the Respondent was being paid twice, the Judge compared payments that were made dating back to October 2020.  [...] paid $1500 to the Respondent and the Appellant tenant Zelled $1200.  The Respondent also stated that she never gave the Appellant a receipt because her payments were sporadic.  (1T, P. 10, line 20- P. 11, line 25).  After comparing Zelle payments that the Appellant made as opposed to payments Respondent received from the [...], the Court determined that over 4 years at $1500 a month the rent should have been $72,000.00.  The [...] paid $21,000.00.  The Court also determined that the Appellant paid the Landlord $13,200.00 in 2021 and $7,700.00 in rent for 2022.  The Appellant also admitted that she stopped paying rent to the Respondent landlord in July, 2023 believing that she should be credited for those payments.  (1T, P. 26, line-P. 28, line 14).  In the Court’s precise calculations there were payments made to the Respondent of $49,600.00 which left a rental arrear balance of $22,400.00.
[brief] ”  (PA000079 at ¶¶ 78-79)  However, Plaintiff fails to establish a mandate of public policy that is clearly identified and firmly grounded.  Instead, as with her CEPA claim, she cites regulations that have little relevance to the complaints she allegedly made, and which cannot reasonably be said to express a clear mandate of public policy.  Specifically, N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) does not evince a clear public policy that group homes have a set staffing ratio or that moving employees from one home to another is prohibited.  Nor does N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.7(a) establish a clear public policy that employees must have training in blood sugar testing or that training videos are an insufficient means by which to train employees.  In short, when read with the cases above in which a clear expression of public policy was found, it becomes abundantly apparent that Plaintiff has not identified a mandate of public policy that renders her termination unlawful.  [...] properly ruled that Appellant did not establish a clear mandate of public policy, finding that She relies on regulations that are limited to her alleged complaints and do not reasonably express a distinct mandate of public policy.  In particular, N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) does not clearly indicate a public policy mandating specific staffing ratios in group homes or prohibiting the relocation of employees between homes.  Likewise, N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.7(a) does not establish a clear public policy requiring employee training in tasks like blood sugar testing or condemning the use of training videos.  Therefore, Count Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint was appropriately dismissed by the Superior Court, and Appellees urge this Court to affirm the dismissal.
[brief] *Lang v. Zoning Board of Adjustment*, 160 N.J. at 60-61; *Burbridge v. Township of Mine Hill*, 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990).  It should be remembered that Judicial Review is intended to be a determination of the validity of the agency’s action, not substitution of the court’s judgment therefor.  *CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Plan Bd.*
[brief] Around noon on August 19, 2017, Homdel Police Officer [...] went to [...] in response to a report of burn damage.  (13T:36-5 to 38-9)  Weimer saw “burn damage to the rear of the building above the patio pavers” and saw what looked like “a burnt piece of plastic and a bottlecap” on the ground under the area burned.  (13T:39-15 to 24)  Weimer watched black and white footage from a surveillance camera owned by [...].  (13T:40-20 to 41-13)  According to Weimer, the footage showed that, on August 17 around 8:30 pm, “a gray or silver sedan” parked in the rear lot and a person walked toward the building.  The video showed the person then run from a “fireball” at the back of the building.  Weimer described the person as “[a]pproximately 6 foot tall male, white, bald, wearing jeans and a loose fitting white T-shirt.
[brief] [...] obtained financial data for [...]’s development project from the [...].  [...] noted that “[...] provided [[...]] a \(^4\) Plaintiffs abandoned and did not present any proofs or arguments as to a mixed use market rate development.  $3,612,994 long-term loan to the development, and also authorized a 9% Low Income Housing Tax Credit investment into the project. ”  Pa 274.  [...] also confirmed that the [...] tax credits ultimately awarded to [...] for this project provided $122 million dollars of public financing to the developer and postulates that [...] could have availed himself of the same benefit, although seemingly he possessed no funding and no known ability to obtain such funds privately.
[brief] (Da24-26; Da211-231).  The court below had already adjudicated numerous fee applications in this case from 2016 - 2022 in which it had on many occasions conducted an analysis and concluded that the rates charged by Plaintiff’s attorneys were reasonable and compatible with rates charged by comparable firms in our region.  (Da7-8).  Defendants even appealed prior fee orders for prior awards in which they had challenged counsel’s rates, but later abandoned such efforts.  See, e.g., [...] (appeal dismissed).
[brief] Such reliance clearly undermines the 2020 Decision and requires the reinstation of the original Board decision.  POINT V RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY SUFFICIENT BASIS TO GRANT RELIEF FROM THE PROVISION OF THE ROUTE 33 SIGNAL.  In their efforts to be relieved from providing the Route 33 Signal, the Respondents, Trial Court and Special Hearing Officer have cobbled together a self-serving irrelevant standard which ignores the well-established basis for granting relief from a condition of a land use approval.  Specifically, they focus on whether there is a need for the Route 33 Signal for public safety.  Such a standard clearly ignores the standard for relief from a condition, as well as the explicit language of the VC-2 Zone.  While it is well established that an applicant can seek relief from a condition of a prior land use approval; the relevant standard is whether the condition is unreasonable or unlawful.
[brief] | | Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 18 Va. Cir. 463 (1990)  .................................................................10–11  Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)  ........................................................................passim Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350 (2015)  ........................................................................15  Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) ........................................................................12 Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon, 202 N.J. 390 (2010) .......................................................................2, 11–12, 17 Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019) .......................................................................13 Kopin v. Orange Prods., Inc., 297 N.J. Super. 353 (App. Div. 1997) ..............................................2, 17 Lavin v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Hackensack, 90 N.J. 145 (1982) ........................................................................18, 21 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (as revised Jan. 27, 2016) .............................10 State v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507 (1983) ........................................................................19 Stone Wool 22, LLC v. Streater, No. A-2613-22, 2024 WL 3241363 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 1, 2024) ..............................................9 Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023) ....................................................................passim United States v. Lawton, 110 U.S. 146 (1884) .....................................................................14 United States v. Taylor, 104 U.S. 216 (1881) .....................................................................14 United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) ...........................................................................................................13 Constitution New Jersey Constitution .................................................................................................3, 5–6, 11 Statute New Jersey Tax Sale Law .....................................................................................................8 Other Authorities Br. Amici Curiae of [...], et al., Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22- 166/238523/20220922113207496_22- 166%20Amici%20Brief%20[...].pdf ..............................................................................15 Br. Amici Curiae of States of Utah, et al., Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22- 166/256332/20230306140902231_2023-03- 06%20UT%20Brief%20of%20Amici%20Curiae%20in%20Supp% 20of%20Pet%20Tyler%20v.%20Hennepin%2022- 166%20FINAL.pdf
[brief] (Pa11).  The website further advised that failure to do so by that date would render the member ineligible to apply at a later date.  (Pa11).  On July 6, 2023, the Board received [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form, completed on April 25, 2023, and a Request for Amended Benefits Form, completed on April 26, 2023, as well as a sworn affidavit from [...] dated April 25, 2023.
[brief] Plaintiffs are thus wrong in suggesting that the Senate confirms a majority of the BOG, infusing them with delegated legislative power.  The BOG has no such power.  \(^2\) “Db” refers to Defendants-Appellants’ opening brief filed October 10, 2024.  Methodist Episcopal Church of Jersey City, 89 N.J.L. 397, 398 (Sup. Ct. 1916).  There, the court permitted a writ of quo warranto to allow plaintiffs to challenge the legitimacy of a church’s board of trustees.  Missing from the court’s analysis was any discussion of the modern law regarding a church’s First Amendment right of autonomy to manage and organize as it deems appropriate.  In light of that omission, the decision’s analysis is questionable.
[brief] 1.  The Applicant’s Engineer [...] testified, and thereafter reiterated, that the grading plan was designed to maintain the required separation between the drainage system and the seasonal high-water table.  Moreover, it was a re-design of the grading of the entire site in order to meet the requirements of the State and Municipal stormwater management regulations which require addressing the quality, quantity and re-charge of stormwater.  [...] opined that the grading plan was designed for those proper purposes and was not designed in order to increase allowable building height.  2.  The Borough Planning consultant, licensed Planner [...] testified that she agreed with [...].  She opined that the Ordinance allows for variation in grades.  She testified that she agreed with [...] that the grading plan presented is meant to design the entire site to properly function as a whole and not designed to raise building heights.  She agreed that, based on the testimony of the Applicant’s Engineer and the Board Engineer, the design will properly control stormwater management and the required separations between the drainage system and the seasonal high-water table.  She opined that the Ordinance intends to permit the measurement for building height from the revised lot grade shown on an approved site plan and that the Applicant’s plan meets those requirements.  She rejected the assertion that this grading plan was designed to allow increased building height and noted that there were no articulated reasons to do so on this property.  (Pa 078-079; Resolution paragraphs 15 & 16)  The Planning Board submits that it properly found that the testimony of [...] and [...] was credible and supported [...]’s position that the revised lot grade was developed for the purposes set forth in [...]’s testimony and [...]’s testimony and not designed to allow increased building height.  Therefore, no height variance was required, and the Planning Board properly exercised its authority to approve the site plan pursuant to the provisions of the MLUL.
[brief] As noted in the previous points, this argument should be barred, as defendant did not raise it at the trial court level.  *Nieder v. Royal Indemn. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229 (1973).  New Jersey Court Rule 2:10-2 states:  Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court.  Assuming, arguendo, this Court reaches the merits of defendant’s argument, it must be reviewed for plain error.  While a defendant must receive a fair trial, he is not entitled to a perfect trial.  *State v. Loftin*, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div. 1996).  Not every suspected deviation from perfection on the part of the prosecutor warrants reversal of a conviction.  *State v. Williams*, 113 N.J. 393, 452 (1988); *State v. Hipplewith*, 33 N.J. 300, 314 (1960); *State v. Bucanis*, 26 N.J. 45, 46 (1958).
[brief] During the July 19, 2024 oral argument on this point, the trial court was concerned with Plaintiff’s argument concerning the confusing nature of the sections (7.2, 7.4 and 7.5) in Defendant’s arbitration provision (in the subject New Jersey, form, health club Membership Agreement) concerning “Disputes”.  (T30-24-25; T31-1-3)  Accordingly, and unlike cases that will be relied on by [...], the issues of “Dispute”, “public injunctive relief” and/or arbitrability are intertwined throughout multiple sections (7.2, 7.4, and 7.5), and over the course of multiple pages, of [...]’s arbitration provision as opposed to clearly set forth in just one section.(Ja36-Ja37)  This conflicts with the clarity for arbitration provisions required by this Court in *Rotondi*, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1662, *10-12 citing NAACP of Camden County East*
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[directive] Page 42  Attorney General [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  (1)  The defendant’s conduct did not involve distribution of a controlled substance to a law enforcement officer (i.e., an “undercover buy”), or distribution to an informant or cooperating witness acting under the direction or at the request of a law buy”)3; enforcement officer (i.e., a “controlled (2)  The defendant at the time of the present offense was not on bail or released on personal recognizance while pending disposition of another charge constituting an indictable crime or disorderly persons offense; (3)  The defendant at the time of the present offense was less than 26 years of age, or the current offense involved an aggregate amount of controlled substances less than one-quarter of the amount needed to establish a second-degree crime pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (e.g., less than one-eighth ounce (3.54 grams) of heroin, 3  This eligibility criterion may be based upon the defendant’s actual conduct and not just the specific offense or transaction to which the defendant will plead guilty.  See Section 3.1.  This criterion is premised on a recognition that an undercover “sting” operation is an essential investigative tool that can help to deter drug distribution activities.
[brief] “‘When interpreting different statutory provisions, we are obligated to make every effort to harmonize them, even if they are in apparent conflict. ’ ”  Saint Peter’s University Hosp. v. Lacy, 185 N.J. 1, 14 (2005) (quoting In re Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. 468, 485 (2000)).  Furthermore, “‘when legislative intents of two apparently conflicting statutes dealing with the same subject are at issue, courts are enjoined to reconcile conflicts and read the laws as consistent to give effect to both expressions of the Legislature’s purpose. ’ ”  Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 388 N.J. Super. 550, 557 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting N.J. State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 310 N.J. Super. 224, 234 (App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 158 N.J. 211 (1999)).
[brief] “Every judge is duty bound to abide by and enforce the standards in the Code of Judicial Conduct.  See R. 1:18”  In re DiLeo, 216 N.J. 449, 467 (2014).  “The Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by this Court in 1974, requires that "[a] judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court."  Canon 3A(5)”  Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 96 (1985).
[directive] If information in the arrest report or other police report reasonably suggests that the defendant is involved in street gang related activity, a standardized waiver offer may not be tendered without first consulting with a designated supervisor); and (9)  The defendant: (a) did not actually or jointly or constructively possess a firearm in the present case, (b) has no pending indictable charge involving a weapon, and has no pending indictable charge involving any crime that is subject to the provisions of the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2, and (c) has no pending charge for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b (eluding while operating a motor vehicle).
[brief] Docket No: [...]  Trial Court Judge/Agency Name: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Dear Judges, Pursuant to R. 2:6-2 (b), please accept this reply brief in support of my appeal in this matter.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT..............................................................................1  THE HISTORY OF [...]’S PRIOR COUNSEL’S COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR THE LAW IS WELL DOCUMENTED..................................................4  THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY THE SAYLOR OPINION  DEMONSTRATES THE MALICIOUS VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT........................................5  [...]’S CONDUCT WAS A KNOWING FRAUD UPON THE COURT ............9  THIS CASE WARRANTS APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE........................................................................................................14  CONCLUSION.............................................................................................15  ## TABLE OF JUDGMENT (S), ORDER (S), RULING (S), AND DECISION (S) ON APPEAL | Document Name | Date | Appendix Page Number or Transcript | |--------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------| | Order Denying Summary Judgement | 02/03/2023 | Pa4 | | Order Denying Order to Amend | 03/29/2023 | Pa5 | | Order Denying Order to Vacate | 05/25/2023 | Pa6 | | Order Denying Order for Reconsideration | 08/15/2023 | Pa7 |
[brief] Plaintiff’s mixed-use Application failed to meet this ordinance criteria because, among other reasons, the Property contains two entirely unrelated principal uses that have nothing to do with each other and therefore meet neither the letter nor the intent of the Westampton Zoning Ordinance.  I.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined that a Zoning Board Interpretation Was Necessary Given the Differing Interpretations Offered by the Plaintiff, Defendant, and Objector (5T 27-24 to 28-2)
[brief] **EXHIBIT A Amended Verified Complaint filed April 1, 2019 (Da123)  EXHIBIT B January 29, 2020 Transcript of Trial (Omitted)  **EXHIBIT C January 7, 1963 Agreement (D-4) (Da13) EXHIBIT D Stipulation of Facts filed August 2, 2021 regarding heating supply Da948 **EXHIBIT E November 2, 1972 [...] Application for Variance to [...] to construct an addition to an existing school with insufficient parking/insufficient sidelines and exceeding the maximum lot coverage on Lot 5, Block 69 - **Affidavit of Ownership (Da940) - **Notice of Hearing for variance (Da941) - **Affidavit (Da942) - **List of Property Owners Served (including [...]) (Da943) - **Resolution of Approval (Da944) EXHIBIT F Site Plan for Proposed Addition to Existing School Da949 EXHIBIT G July 28, 2021
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S JULY 30, 2020 ORDER IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY DEFERENCE [...] argues that “a trial court’s factual findings premised upon evidence admitted in a bench trial are generally entitled to deference and ‘are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ’” (Db, p. 30).  It further argues [...]’s July 30, 2020 Order, which concluded that it was not possible to apply the fact-based allocation preferred under controlling Massachusetts law, is entitled to deference by this Court.  The problem with this argument is that the trial court’s conclusion was not supported by “adequate, substantial, credible evidence.
[brief] THE DACCA ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.  Because Appellants could not show unconstitutional overbreadth of the DACCA, the court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and should uphold such challenge only if the enactment is “‘impermissibly vague in all its application,’” that is, there is no conduct that it proscribes with sufficient certainty. ”
[brief] Individually, Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10 and/or ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10, in their corporate capacity and as to the principles and owners individually (Names being fictitious and unknown but described as the corporate or individual owner(s), manager(s), lessor(s), supervisor(s), who had control of the premises located at [...], who contributed to the March 16, 2017 loss),  Defendants  On appeal from:  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION PASSAIC COUNTY  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT
[brief] The Jury’s Damages Findings Were Supported by the Weight of the Evidence (RAISED BELOW: Pa55-Pa61)  .............................................38  i.  The Compensatory/Economic Loss Damage Awards are Supported by the Weight of the Evidence (RAISED BELOW: Pa55-Pa57)  ..................................................................................................................38  ii.  The Punitive Damages Award is Not Against the Weight of the Evidence, Nor is it Excessive (RAISED BELOW: Pa57-Pa61)  ..................................................................................................................40  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................................46 | JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR RULING | Page # | |-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | Order of Judgment dated May 26, 2023 | DA-083 | | Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial | DA-088 | TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT’S SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX