ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Cf. N.J.S.A. 59:4-7 (weather immunity: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for any injury caused by the effect on the use of streets and highways of weather conditions”); N.J.S.A. 59:2-1b; Bachman Choc. Mfg. Co. v. Lehigh Whse. & Transp. Co., 1 N.J. 239 (1949) (storm of hurricane severity could trigger defense to negligence as an act of God).  The mere fact that a tree fell does not prove it was due to human intervention.  On the other hand, the undisputed record evidence establishes that this particular tree withstood years of punishment by extreme weather conditions without incident.  Even accepting Plaintiff’s --- 5
[brief] Contractual Interpretation is the process of giving meaning to the symbols of expression, taken and compared together in the setting of the circumstances.  A subsidiary provision is not so to be interpreted as to conflict with the obvious "dominant" or "principal" purpose of the contract.  Courts seek the intention of the parties; and to this end the writing is to have a reasonable interpretation.  Disproportionate emphasis upon a word or clause or a single provision does not serve the purpose of interpretation.  Words and phrases are not to be isolated but related to the context and the contractual scheme as a whole, and given the meaning that comports with the probable intent and purpose; and thus, the literal sense of terms may be qualified by the context.  The significance of a particular part of the writing is determined by a consideration of all its parts.  It is the revealed intention that is to be effectuated.
[brief] ”  Matter of Musick, 143 N.J. at 216 (1996).  A reviewing court may reverse the decision of an administrative agency where “it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ”  Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Reg'l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, Passaic Cty., 131 N.J. 626, 641 (1993).  In determining whether to grant a Motion to Dismiss, “the [School Ethics] Commission shall review the facts in the light most favorable to the complainant and determine whether the allegation(s), if true, could establish a violation of the Act. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3; See also Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969) (dismissal on motion inappropriate if case supported by a scintilla of evidence).  Appellants pled violations of two provisions of the School Ethics Act in their Complaint: N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) and (e).  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) states:  I will uphold and enforce all laws, rules and regulations of the State Board of Education, and court orders pertaining to schools.  Desired changes shall be brought about only through legal and ethical procedures.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) states:  I will recognize that authority rests with the board of education and will make no personal promises nor take any private action that may compromise the board.  On July 26, 2022, the [...] dismissed Count 5 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and dismissed Counts 2 and 3 as to both N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) and (e).
[directive] Property Submission: Refrigerated Material  3.3.1  If any material or substance (evidence) must be refrigerated, and the property officer is available, the officer shall deliver the property to the property officer.  3.3.2  If any material or substance (evidence) must be refrigerated, and the property officer is unavailable, the material or substance shall be placed into the refrigerator located in the Detective Bureau.  This will be done through one of the detectives on duty, or, if there is no detective on duty at the time, the on-call detective is to be contacted.  The property description report will be signed in the same manner as if it were to be stored in the holding locker.  No such material or substances are to be refrigerated at any other place unless it is absolutely necessary.  3.4
[brief] - (1T 99:21-102:13).  •  He testified [...] never did any business with [...], a company connected to the directional drill.  Plaintiffs' counsel took him meticulously through every line item of [...]'s accounts at [...], where he truthfully and in great detail testified, demonstrating outgoing wires as early as May, 23, 2016 to [...], later [...] payroll, [...], and [...].
[brief] *Cole* also requires the consideration of “whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy. ”  *Cole*  215 N.J at 281.  [...] speculated that [...] had a “delay strategy,” which the lower court embraced in its order without any analysis of the facts.  T1 72:6-8.  Yet, there are no facts to support a finding that the timing of [...]’s motion to compel arbitration is a “delay strategy. ”  Until this year the parties devoted their energies to the defense cost dispute – which was successfully resolved via the “binding mediation” (i.e. arbitration) before [...].  Further, there have been no substantive rulings on indemnity—favorable or unfavorable—and there is no basis for [...] to claim that [...] is seeking delay as part of its arbitration strategy.  To the contrary, the delays prior to [...]’s Motion to Compel Arbitration were the result of [...]’s litigation strategy – not [...]’s – and [...] acted promptly once the stay was lifted.  Due to the nature of [...]’s Indemnity Claim — which involves both the application of the pollution exclusion in the [...] Umbrella Policy and various complex coverage issues under the [...] Pollution Policy — now that the other parties have been removed from the case, [...] has invoked its right to arbitration in order to resolve this dispute fairly and efficiently.  It never intended to abandon its contractual right to arbitrate.  Da399-400, ¶¶ 4-6.  As [...] can obtain complete relief concerning the indemnity claim vis a vis [...]—and it has settled the [...] Indemnity Claim with its other insurers—arbitration will serve to resolve this dispute in an expeditious fashion that will conserve court and party resources.
[brief] After she was transferred within the Academy to the Training Support Unit, the unit head had one meeting with her and [...] (1T; 98:4).  She never saw the unit head again (1T; 98:8), but maybe for a couple of short sightings (1T; 98:10).  When she met with the unit head and [...], they were “very annoyed and pissed off that [...] was leaving the unit” (1T; 98:5).  The Lieutenant was “really pissed off at me” for coming into that position (1T; 98:17).  Plaintiff was in that job from March until the beginning of July 2017 (1T; 99:7).
[brief] As the Meier court explained, “[w]hatever may be the terms of a lease and the duties of lessor and lessee as to each other, the lessor cannot by virtue of the lease release himself from potential liability to third parties. ”  419 N.J. Super. at 450.  In granting [...]’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court erred in rigidly applying Reyes and § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).
[brief] This argument is meritless—and ignores precedent binding on Defendants.  Defendants’ definition of Legal Services states:  **LEGAL SERVICES** means those services performed on behalf of the **Named Insured** for others by an **Insured**, whether or not performed for a fee or other consideration, as a licensed lawyer in good standing … but only where such services were performed in the ordinary course of the **Insured's** activities as a lawyer.  [Pa171, § 3(P) (emphasis in original)]  Legal Services, thus, for purposes here, only involves services rendered by an attorney (an Insured) “for others” “in the ordinary course of the Insured’s activities as a lawyer.
[brief] *State v. O.D.A.-C.*, 250 N.J. 408, 421 (2022).  A defendant’s confession is involuntary if it was made because his “will was overborne. ”  *Ibid.* (citing *L.H.*, 239 N.J. at 42).  To evaluate voluntariness under the due process clause, courts likewise scrutinize the totality of the circumstances, looking to the same factors as those relevant to the waiver analysis.  *Ibid.* (citations omitted).  If police mislead a suspect to reasonably believe that a custodial interrogation will be about a far less serious charge, then the suspect’s waiver cannot be voluntary.  *Diaz*, 470 N.J. Super at 518-19; see *State v. Nyhammer*, 197 N.J. 383, 407 (2009) (stating that evidence a person was “threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver of his privilege will render the waiver involuntary”) (citations omitted).
[directive] 소지한 것에 대하여 유죄 시인을 또는 (1) You are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm with intent to use it against the person of another or to murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, robbery, burglary or escape; or (2) 2008년1월13일 합니다: 귀하는 이후에 발생한 다음 범죄들 중 하나에 대하여 유죄 시인을 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b에 소지, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d에 소지, 의한 산탄총의 의한 마손된 무기의 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a에 (총기)의 소지, 2C:39-4.la에 의한 불법적인 목적으로 무기 의한 N.J.S.A CDS 소지, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5a, b c에 범죄 또는 다른 범죄들을 저지르는 동안 총기의 또는 기관총, 권총, 소지, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7에 의한 라이플총 또는 산탄총의 불법적 의한 무기를 사람들, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9a., b, e g에 기관총, 소유하지 못하는 특정한 또는 또는 의한 산탄총, 제조, 운송, 마손.  단총열 마손된  총기 또는 공격 총기의 처분 및 또는 (2)  You are pleading guilty to one of the following offenses that occurred on or after January 13, 2008: possession of a shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b; possession of a defaced weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; possession of a weapon (firearm) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; possession of a firearm while in the course of committing a CDS offense or other offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; unlawful possession of a machine gun, handgun, rifle or shotgun, 2C:39-5a., b or c; certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7; or manufacture, N.J.S.A. transport, disposition and defacement of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, defaced firearms or assault firearms.
[brief] ”  While the case was reversed on MLUL grounds, the Appellate Division held that the public notice complied with *N.J.S.A.* 40:49-2(a).  The title of the Ordinance in this case was “AN ORDINANCE OF THE MAYOR AND TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE [...], COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER ADOPTING A REDEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR BLOCK 46, LOT 2; BLOCK 47, LOTS 1, 2, 3, 3.01, 4 IN THE [...], [...], STATE OF NEW JERSEY. ” (Pa90-Pa91).  Although there was not a separate statement of purpose, the title of Ordinance 13-2022 conveyed its purpose in a clear and concise manner: the adoption of a redevelopment plan for Block 46, Lot 2, and Block 47, Lots 1, 2, 3, 3.01, 4.
[brief] ”  In Am. Budget Corp. v. Furman, 67 N.J. Super. 134 (Ch. Div.), aff’d per curiam 36 N.J. 129 (1961), a company engaged in the business of debt adjusting challenged a former statute prohibiting the practice, with certain exceptions.  The former statute defined a “debt adjuster, “in part, as a person who: acts or offers to act for consideration as an intermediary between a debtor and his creditors for the purpose of settling, compounding, or in anywise, altering the terms of payment of any debts of the debtor…  N.J.S.A. 2A:99A-1(a).  The Court in Furman upheld the constitutionality of the statute, finding that “services encompassed by the statutory definition of debt adjuster are often an integral and essential part of an attorney's job when he represents a debt-ridden client. ”  Id. at 143.  The Court additionally observed that “[i]t is plain by now that in their activities debt adjusters may encroach upon the practice of law. ”  Id.  In Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 313, 316 (1964), the Supreme Court determined that “the rendering of advice and assistance in obtaining extensions of credit and compromises of indebtedness” constituted the practice of law.  The Supreme Court of the United States, in reviewing a similar Kansas statute, determined that the business of debt adjusting involves the practice of law.  See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 732.  In Ferguson, the Court elucidated that:  The business of debt adjusting gives rise to a relationship of trust in which the debt adjuster will, in a situation of insolvency, be marshaling assets in the manner of a proceeding in bankruptcy.  The debt adjuster’s client may need advice as to the legality of the various claims against him, remedies existing under state laws governing debtor-creditor relationships, or provisions of the Bankruptcy Act - advice which a nonlawyer cannot lawfully give him.  Id.  See also In re Pilini, 173 A.2d 828, 831 (Vt. 1961) (individual involved in "debt pooling" service and who attempted to handle litigation on behalf of debtor found to be engaged in the practice of law); Home Budget Service, Inc. v. Boston Bar Ass'n, 139 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 1957) (actions of corporations involved in the practice of "debt pooling" amount to the practice of law).  Here, the trial court concluded that the “DACCA does not prohibit an attorney’s right to practice law; rather, DACCA regulates a distinct business of debt adjustment that contemplates those lawyers licensed in New Jersey can provide debt adjustment services to New Jersey consumers as long as that debt adjustment activity is not their principal activity. ”  T17:L3-9.  To be covered by the Limited Attorney Exemption, “an attorney-at-law of this State” must not be “principally engaged as a debt adjuster”.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2)(a).  The trial court’s holdings cannot be reconciled with the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that debt adjustment services performed on behalf of a client constitute the practice of law.  To hold otherwise would contravene established precedent.  See, e.g., Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 732; see also Furman, 67 N.J. Super. at 143; Appell, 43 N.J. at 336; N.J. Comm. Unauth. Prac. Op. 36.  POINT II
[brief] [...] raised a significant dispute during the motion hearing, asserting that [...] believed he was signing the Agreement only on behalf of his son, not for himself. personally.  Although [...] contends that [...] signed on behalf of both himself and his son, their own counsel conceded during oral argument that they were unsure whether the protocol mandates a separate waiver for each participant or if a single waiver suffices for both the parent and minor.  See 1T21:8-14.
[brief] When evaluating whether summary judgment was proper a de novo standard of review is applied.  *Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City*, 209 N.J. 558, 564 (2012).  This is the same standard as is used for review of conclusions of law.  Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 385 (2010).  As such, “[i]n reviewing a trial court's evidential ruling, an appellate court is limited to examining the decision for abuse of discretion[,]”  Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008).  The Court must first decide if there is a genuine issue of material fact, and if none exists, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Brill v. The Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  In Brill, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a motion for summary judgment: requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the nonmoving party…  If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to constitute a ‘genuine’ issue of material fact for purposes of Rule 4:46-2.  The import of our holding is that when the evidence ‘is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,’ the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.
[brief] On October 16, 2020, the [...] submitted a letter to [...] reviewing the HAD application and the Project’s potential natural resource impacts.  (Aa328-330).  To ensure it “give[s] great consideration and weight” to the Council’s RMP, [...] consults with the [...] about Highlands applications such as [...]’s.  N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.1(i).  The [...] noted the Property is historically disturbed, characterized by invasive vegetation, isolated patches of forest, non-functional open water buffers and riparian areas, and disconnected and non-functional critical wildlife habitat.  (Aa330).  It explained that approximately 285 feet of existing gravel access road was within an open water buffer and riparian area and has been in its present condition since the 1960s when it served the Property’s former quarry.  (Aa329).  The Council also observed that the Property contained five areas of trees, only one of which qualifies as a forest, a regulated Highlands resource.  (Aa329).  In this forest, [...] proposes to remove twenty-three trees to install a security fence, which would impact .64% of mapped critical wildlife habitat on the Property.  (Aa330).  Based on these facts, the Council found that the Project avoided and minimized impacts to Highlands resources.  (Aa330).  The Council noted that the tree removal will have a “de minimis effect” on Highlands resources, observing that [...] proposed a planting plan to mitigate for the trees removed, and construction would be subject to seasonal timing restrictions to minimize impacts on critical wildlife.  (Aa330).  The Council also recognized [...]’s use of green infrastructure for stormwater management.  (Aa330).  In sum, the Council found that [...]’s Project is consistent with the goals of the Highlands Act and the Council would not object to [...]’s issuance of an Exemption #11 for the Project.
[brief] It rejected my evidence, that it overlooked in Feb. 17th rulings, requiring [...] to issue, as discharged Trustee at no cost to Trust, a Final Accounting (from Apr. 1, ’22), as per Oct. ‘22 Order, par. 2 citing 3B:14-7, that required discharged Trustee to issue, but that he refused.  10.  Court erred in Sept. 6, 2023 Order, par. 3&4, by rejecting Cross-Motions by [...] & me & my Reconsideration Motion that had evidence & arguments supporting Items 1-9.
[brief] (Da 10 at 2:21)  That officer recovered a fanny pack and found within it a weapon, four live rounds, fifteen glassine envelopes of heroin, nine small containers of cocaine, and forty-six dollars.  (1T 35-3 to 23)  After his arrest, [...] asked the officers, “somebody told on me?” (Da 10 at 3:00 to 3:05, 4:21)  ____________________ looking for someone “wearing black” and that he was told [...] was wearing a “black sweatshirt” or an “all-black outfit,” implying that he had some idea of who he was supposed to arrest.
[brief] T3, p. 73:12-20, T3:77:13-17.  These records place the [...], within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, at the East Orange Toll Plaza on date of service at 9:36 a.m. and on the Delaware Memorial Bridge at 11:28 a.m.  on the same date.  The Court allowed Google maps to be used for purposes of distance.  T3, p. 91:23-25.  Accordingly, [...] opined that it was very unlikely that the [...] were at [...] at the time of the service in that they could not have left after 9:25 a.m. (time of service) and made it to the toll plaza 9.1 miles away on local roads in 11 minutes.  T3, p.79:1-9.  [...]’ expert report was admitted into evidence without objection.  T3, p. 70:20-25.  His expert report was authored dated December 15, 2022.  225a.  [...] opined that [...] was not at the location of service on August 23, 2021 at 9:25 a.m. because she was traveling in the family vehicle at that time.  He based his opinion on the metadata of the photographs and the toll records from [...] which use GPS.  Plaintiffs did not call an expert and his testimony was uncontroverted.
[brief] On July 19, 2023, Appellant commenced this foreclosure action on real property located at [...] (the “Property”) against [...] and [...] (collectively, “Borrowers”).  (Pa216 at ¶3.)  Appellant was the holder of a note, dated April 30, 2008, bearing the signatures of Borrowers, memorializing an obligation to repay a loan in the principal amount of $201,832.00, together with interest thereon (the “Note”).  (Pa260 at ¶8, Ex. B.)  The Note was secured by a mortgage executed by Borrowers encumbering the Property (the “Mortgage”) (together with the Note, the “Loan”).  (Pa260 at ¶9, Ex. C.)  Appellant commenced this action based upon Borrowers’ default of their obligations under the operative loan agreements, as modified by a February 12, 2018 loan modification agreement with [...] (a prior servicer on the Loan) (the “Modification Agreement”).  (Pa434-35 at ¶¶25, 31-32.)
[brief] The Supreme Court explained as follows:  Although defendant’s unauthorized dissemination of the report also might implicate a deviation from prevailing professional standards of practice, proof of that deviation is not essential to the establishment of plaintiff’s right to recover based on breach of contract.  Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 341-42, 801 A.2d 1134, 1142 (2002)  Essentially, as the Supreme Court analogously explained in Couri, the crux of Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims is that [...], in concert with non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants, acted wrongfully by creating the fraudulent scheme that is the subject matter of this litigation.  This fraudulent scheme does not implicate a deviation from a professional standard of care, and proof of a deviation from a professional standard of care is not essential to prove Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims.  Indeed, Plaintiffs were permitted to pursue the Tort Claims against the non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants.  Therefore, just as in Couri, no AOM or expert testimony was required in this matter.
[directive] Police Superintendent of State by the programs equivalent of continuing education —the campus police officers and county, local, current and County local departments to the discretion of part is left —for the most professions in other Page 5 is training requirements.'  At present, there in-service only few statewide  There are a Prosecutors. training that provided in-service are specific courses of regarding the uniform statewide policy no graduating policy to ensure that after uniform statewide thus no local officers, and county and to them deal with the help participate in education programs to academy, officers police from a changes around them.
[brief] A.  Deference Is Appropriate Here Because The Trial Court’s Judgment Was Based Largely On Testimony of Witnesses Whose Credibility Was In Question [Issue Raised Below 5T13-9]  “Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility. ”  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998).  As the Cesare Court found, when the trial court’s decision is based on the testimony of witnesses whose credibility the court questions, as is the case here, deference is especially appropriate.  Ibid.; see 5T13-9 (“...the credibility of some of the witnesses is in real dispute...”).  Notwithstanding these credibility concerns, the trial court’s judgment dismissing all claims against third-party defendants because [...] failed to establish damages is nonetheless “supported by sufficient, credible evidence in the record” and should not be disturbed.  See Rova Farms Resort, 65 N.J. at 483-84; State v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 386 N.J. Super. 600, 616 (App. Div. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] ’”  State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).  This critical role of the appellate court is precisely why a sentencing court is required to provide “[a] careful statement of reasons. ”  State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 74 (2014).  When “the application of [an aggravating] factor . . . was not supported by competent and credible evidence in the record, [a] defendant must be resentenced. ”  *Id.* at 78 (emphasis added).  An appellate court must also reverse a sentence when a sentencing court rejected a mitigating factor what was “amply based in the record,” as such factors “must be found” by the sentencing court.  *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 504, (2005) (emphasis added).  In sum, this Court is tasked with reviewing the evidence presented to the sentencing court and the sentencing court’s corresponding reasons for finding or rejecting aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether the court’s conclusions were “fairly supported on the record before the trial court.