ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Count X alleges the co-defendant, [...] violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act in connection with the sale of Unit 74 – a housing unit located at [...].  Although the Unit is a housing unit – it is not a ‘condominium unit. ’  Instead, it is part of the Condominium’s ‘common elements. ’  As a common element, Unit 74 cannot be sold like other real property.  The Plaintiff claims the Developer misrepresented its ability to convey marketable title to Unit 74 given its status as a ‘common element. ’  Through its motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff sought judgment as to Count One.  Defendants opposed and cross-moved for summary judgment.  Although the trial court concluded that Unit 74 is part of the Condominium’s ‘common elements,’ it nevertheless determined the Developer held marketable title thereto because the transaction was authorized by Section 8(e) of the Condominium’s Master Deed.  See T1, p. 17, Ins. 7-15.  Based upon this finding, the Court determined there was no misrepresentation and dismissed Count One of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.  Id.  On this appeal, the Plaintiff contends the lower court incorrectly interpreted Section 8(e) of the Master Deed.  Alternatively, even if the lower court correctly interpreted Section 8(e) to authorize the sale of Unit 74, its conclusion that the Developer conveyed marketable title is incorrect because the transaction is prohibited by the New Jersey Condominium Act.
[directive] 7.2.1 Notwithstanding the foregoing general rule prohibiting the recording of an undercover officer or confidential informant, in the event of a planned arrest/search warrant execution where it is expected that an undercover officer or confidential informant would be present (e.g., a raid where the undercover operative will be arrested to preserve his or her cover), BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 18  the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, may provide specific instruction to any BWC-equipped officers participating in the operation on whether to activate their devices.  7.2.2  The BWC shall be activated/re-activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so if and when the risk of capturing the image of an undercover officer or confidential informant no longer exists.  7.3  Special Precautions When a BWC Recording May Reveal Tactical Operations Information.  In the event that a BWC worn during the execution of tactical operations (e.g., “Special Operations” or “SWAT” operations, execution of arrest and/or search warrant, etc.) records confidential tactical information the disclosure of which might jeopardize future operations or officer safety (e.g., verbal codes or hand signals used to communicate information or instructions, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms, techniques to convince persons to open doors, etc.), the recording shall be “tagged” in accordance with Section 9.3.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (exempting from disclosure under the Open Public Records Act “security measures and surveillance techniques which, if disclosed, would create a risk to the safety of persons”); N.J.A.C. 13:1E-3.2 (2) (exempting records that may reveal “surveillance, security, tactical, investigative, or operational techniques”); see also Section 9.5 (prosecutor’s authority to seek protective orders when complying with discovery obligations).
[brief] In order to establish liability under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, Plaintiffs must establish the following; (1) public property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury; (2) the dangerous condition caused Plaintiff’s accident; (3) the dangerous condition created a foreseeable risk of injury; (4) the either (a) a negligent act or omission of a public employee created the condition, or (b) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition with sufficient time to protect against the condition; and (5) the action or inaction with respect to protecting against the condition was palpably unreasonable.  Posey ex rel. v. Bordentown Sewage Auth., 171 N.J. 172, 188 (2002).  (1)  The Parkway was in a Dangerous Condition at the Time of the Injury  To impose liability upon a public entity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, a property must have been in a “dangerous condition at the time of injury. ”  To establish a dangerous condition of public property, a plaintiff must prove that “a condition of the property” created “a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. ”  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a).  Thus, a plaintiff must prove that: (a) there was a defect in the property; (b) the defect was so severe as to create a “substantial risk of injury”; and (c) the property was being used with due care at the time of the injury.  See Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35, 44-46 (1993); Garrison v Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 294 (1998).
[brief] October 22, 2021 Trial Court Order | PA49-66 | | March 3, 2023, Order Granting [...]’s Motion to Set Date Certain for Compliance with Appellate Division Order | RA0036-37 | | March 31, 2023, Order Denying Appellant’s Motion for Documents and Extending Deadline to Comply with Appellate Division Order | RA0045-46 | | May 12, 2023, Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice | PA114-115 | | December 12, 2023, Order Denying Appellant’s Motion for Leave to File Appeal | PA150 | | March 1, 2024, Order Granting Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice | PA1-2 | # TABLE OF CITATIONS | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc.,** | 5 | | 139 N.J. 499 (1995) | | | **Allegro v. Afton Village Corp.,** | 5 | | 9 N.J. 156 (1952) | | | **Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,** | 11 | | 149 N.J. 378 (1997) | | | **Comeford v. Flagship Furniture Clearance Center,** | 5 | | 487 A.2d 1257 (App. Div. 1983) | | | **In re Civ. Commitment of D.L.,** | 13 | | 797 A.2d 166, 171 (App. Div. 2002) | | | **Johnson v. Grayce Tighe, Inc.,** | 12 | | 365 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2003) | | | **Kasharian v. Wilentz,** | 8, 9 | | 93 N.J. Super. 479 (App. Div. 1967) | | | **Kohn’s Bakery, Inc.
[brief] Defendants then filed a Motion to Bar evidence --- 7  Contrary to Plaintiff’s self-serving assertions, Defendants’ counsel never indicated that [...] would not be made available for a deposition after the discovery end date.  To this effect, even though Defendants had filed a motion to quash the Subpoena, Plaintiff’s counsel insisted on appearing before a court reporter on the date the Subpoena noticed [...].  During this interaction on the record, Plaintiff’s counsel kept insisting that Defendants were not producing [...] for deposition, which Defendant’s counsel refuted repeatedly:  [...] - “So [...], are you saying that you’re not looking to have the deposition of the other two parties [i.e. [...] and [...]] either now?  [...] - “No, we are.  We’re giving you them. ”  [...] - “Yes?”  [...] - “Yes, I just need dates for them.  They’re busy. ”  Mr.  Bardis - “You know what, let’s just do that through the motion because obviously, I know they’re busy, but-  [...] - “What do you mean?”  [...] - “Busier than you and me?  Is it because they got money or is it something like that?”  [...] - “Yes.  I mean, they have busy lives and we’re going to produce them. ”  [...] - “You know what we’ll do, we’ll put this in the motion and you and I can just wash our hands of it and let them explain why they’re so busy”  [...] - “You can put whatever you want in opposition to my motion. ” produced after the discovery end date because Plaintiff used documents to support his Motion to Amend that were not previously produced within the discovery period.
[brief] See Opp. at 20.  It nevertheless bears underscoring that actual malice, by its very definition, may not be imputed between defendants.  As a consequence, Plaintiff’s claims against the [...] must be dismissed unless she has alleged “facts” in her Complaint “from which a factfinder could conclude” that each of the [...]—[...], [...], and [...]—knew their statements were false or “in fact entertained serious doubts as to their truth,” St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.  The Complaint falls utterly short of alleging such facts.
[brief] Commenting on the prior version of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 which required publication of the ordinance in full, the Appellate Division explained:  The obvious design of the legislation is to insure that the public will be apprised of the proposed ordinance (or amendment) prior to its final passage in order that objections may be fully and freely raised and, if persuasive, honored.  La Rue, 68 N.J. Super. at 451.  These published decisions make clear that notice has primary purpose to advise the general public of the “essence and scope” of the proposed legislation.  Even if these decisions specifically concern zoning ordinance amendments, no reason exists why the same logic wouldn’t apply to notices for all ordinances, including ordinances adopting redevelopment plans.
[directive] When a minor who is 16 years of age or older believes that he or she is in need of behavioral health care services for the treatment of mental illness or emotional disorders, the minor’s consent to temporary outpatient treatment, excluding the use or administration of medication, under the supervision of a physician licensed to practice medicine, an advanced practice nurse, or an individual licensed to provide professional counseling under Title 45 of the Revised Statutes, including, but not limited to, a psychiatrist, licensed practicing psychologist, certified social worker, licensed clinical social worker, licensed social worker, licensed marriage and family therapist, certified psychoanalyst, or licensed psychologist, or in an outpatient health care facility licensed pursuant to P.L.1971, c.136 (C.26:2H-1 et seq.), shall be valid and binding as if the minor had achieved the age of majority.  Any such consent shall not be subject to later disaffirmance by reason of minority.  Treatment for behavioral health care services for mental illness or emotional disorders that is consented to by a minor shall be considered confidential information between the physician, the individual licensed to provide professional counseling, the advanced practice nurse, or the health care facility, as appropriate, and the patient, and neither the minor nor the minor’s physician, professional counselor, nurse, or outpatient health care facility, as appropriate, shall be required to report such treatment when it is the result of voluntary consent.  The consent of no other person or persons, including but not limited to, a spouse, parent, custodian, or guardian, shall be necessary in order to authorize a minor to receive such hospital services, facility, or clinical care or services, medical or surgical care or services, or counseling services from a physician licensed to practice medicine, an individual licensed or certified to provide treatment for an alcohol use disorder, an advanced practice nurse, or an individual licensed to provide professional counseling under Title 45 of the Revised Statutes, as appropriate, except that behavioral health care services for the treatment of mental illness or emotional disorders shall be limited to temporary outpatient services only.
[brief] ” (3T18-4 to 3T19-9).  It is well-settled in New Jersey that an attorney fee award is to be determined based on the “lodestar”, which equals the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.  *Seigelstein*, 464 N.J. Super. at 404-405; *Walker v. Giuffre*, 209 N.J. 124, 130-131 (2012).  Generally, a reasonable hourly rate is to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, which will necessarily include assessing the experience and skill of the prevailing party’s attorneys and comparing their rates to the prevailing rates in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.  Seigelstein, 464 N.J. Super. at 406; Walker, 209 N.J. at 131.  When making this determination, the trial court must consider the following factors outlined in New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) 1.5(a): (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
[brief] ’ ”  Palmentieri, supra, 231 N.J. Super. at 43.  In DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159 (1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court said:  “The scope of employment standard, while imprecise, is designed to delineate generally which unauthorized acts of the servant can be charged to the master. ”  Id. at 169.  The Court defined acts within the scope of employment as those “which are so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment.
[brief] Defendant, [...], claims “It is clear from the face of the Genesis Deed that the [...] intended to vest a ‘property owners’ association’ with authority to implement and enforce any ‘rules or regulations it chooses. ’”  (Db17) power to alter or amend any deed restrictions.  In fact, neither party would have the ability to impose new restrictions as [...]\(^2\) admits same in a letter, dated July 17th, 1998, which states:  “I would like to point out that the Developer does not have the power to change the club’s by-laws nor deed restrictions”.  (Da622)  This is also consistent with law.  *Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC*, 506 P.3d 18 (Ariz. 2022) (Da 464)  (Discussed at length below)
[brief] Under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (“AICRA”), N.J.S.A.§39:6A-1.1 et. seq., every standard automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed in this State must provide PIP benefits for the payment of benefits to the named insured and members of the insured's family residing in the insured's household without regard to negligence, liability or fault.  See, N.J.S.A.§39:6A-4.
[brief] ”  State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 353 (2013) (internal quotations and citation omitted); State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 162 N.J. 1999 (1999); R. 3:22-10(c).  Indeed, a defendant must do more than make “bald assertions” that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  *Cummings*, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.  Moreover, “[d]etermining which witnesses to call to the stand is one of the most difficult strategic decisions that any trial attorney must confront.
[brief] 3  #  TABLE OF CITATIONS | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | *Bouie v. New Jersey Dep't of Cmty. Affs.*, | | | 407 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 2009) | 3 | | *Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.*, | | | 144 N.J. Super. 1 (Law Div. 1976) | 2 | | Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | N.J. Stat. § 2A:58C-2 | 3 | ARGUMENT
[brief] The Rivera factors weigh in favor of disclosure.  In Rivera, the Supreme Court recently held that “[t]he public interest in transparency may be heightened in certain situations depending on a number of considerations” and set forth a list of five factors courts must consider in evaluating the public interest in disclosure of agency records.  Rivera, 250 N.J. at 148.  The records here concern a prosecutor's office's failure to prosecute and cover-up of public corruption charges brought against a former Superior Court judge, who engaged in serious misconduct.  All five factors auger in favor of disclosure under the facts of this case.  The public has an interest in (a) ensuring that New Jersey's criminal laws are uniformly enforced; (b) determining whether judges and former prosecutors like [...] receive preferential treatment from the Attorney General, the DCJ, or county prosecutors; and (c) determining whether any political considerations played a role in the prosecution or lack thereof of [...].  (1) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct.  Serious misconduct gives rise to a greater interest in disclosure.  For example, misconduct that involves the use of excessive or deadly force, discrimination or bias, domestic or sexual violence, concealment or fabrication of evidence or reports, criminal behavior, or abuse of the public trust can all erode confidence in law enforcement and weigh in favor of public disclosure; Chief Hudson County Municipal Judge [...] found probable cause to issue a complaint-warrant against [...] for four separate criminal charges, including a 2nd-degree charge of official misconduct, which exposed [...] to 18 years in prison.  This was based on irrefutable evidence of [...]'s statements to the [...] falsely claiming that she was a judge on emergent duty, falsely claiming to have a court order, and misleading police into kidnapping a child in order to benefit her friend.  A Supreme Court panel found “beyond a reasonable doubt” that “[[...]] intentionally misused her office to advantage another, thereby violating the public trust and compromising the integrity and independence of the judiciary. ”  The panel held “[[...]]’s misrepresentations to [...] were numerous and, in at least one instance, admitted. ”  [...]’s “conduct on May 9, 2015, demonstrated dishonesty, perversion of her judicial authority and betrayal of the public trust” and her “intercession ... represented a patent abuse of her office. ”  In the face of this, the [...] failed to prosecute [...].
[brief] (2T 58-20 to 59-7)  (“[T]he [...] and the [...][]s . . . jumped to conclusions, which ties into why they didn’t investigate . . . [a]nd that’s because . . . [y]oung, black male equals guns.  [...] is a young, black male.  Therefore, Jaki, the gun is his. ”).  Defense counsel also highlighted inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony and suggested that the officers were not credible in smelling marijuana and just wanted an excuse to search the Suburban.  (2T 49-6 to 51-15; 4T 105-1 to 113-4, 117-2 to 120-18)  In support of the theory that law enforcement made assumptions about [...], defense counsel drew attention to conversations the officers had during the stop in which they expressed their belief that [...] was involved in a robbery.  (2T 50-10 to 19, 56-23 to 65-9; 4T 113-5 to 131-4)
[brief] At his deposition, Defendant [...] was unable to explain what the agreement meant.  Under the circumstances, Plaintiff/Respondent contends that [...] was unduly influenced to sign the arbitration form as she was justified in assuming that Defendant [...], as a medical doctor, had her best interest in mind.  Plaintiff/Respondent also submits that the arbitration form and its surrounding circumstances are so shocking to the conscience as to be rendered invalid.
[brief] Plaintiffs contend that the record evidence established that Defendant, in concert with her co-defendants, moved money from [...] and [...] without the Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent via conduit accounts, accrual accounts, step transactions, and other means, all of which created “mazes” and “webs” of accounts that made the funds difficult to trace (Pb68).  This is simply false.  There was no evidence introduced at trial demonstrating that Defendant engaged in any such conduct, nor do Plaintiffs cite to a single instance in the record where such evidence was presented.
[brief] *See Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C.*, 203 N.J. 496, 522 (2010) (“Because it is ‘remedial legislation,’ the CFA is ‘construe[d] liberally to accomplish its broad purpose of safeguarding the public. ’”) (internal citation omitted); *Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc.*, 162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999) (“Because it is a remedial statute, its provisions are construed liberally in favor of the consumer to accomplish its deterrent and protective purposes. ”).  In granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court in *Valentine*, [...], reasoned: *Gonzalez* involved a mortgage foreclosure and “post-judgment agreements” that had “recast the terms of the original loan" and had included, according to plaintiff, “illicit financing charges and miscalculations of monies due.
[brief] Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. (retired and temporarily assigned on recall)  Date of Submission: August 29, 2024  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...] [...] 309 Morris Avenue, Suite E Spring Lake, New Jersey  07762 [...] (T) [...] (F)  [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID #015051990  August 29, 2024  VIA Ecourts  [...] – Appellate Division Clerk Appellate Division Clerk’s Office  [...]  Attn: [...], Case Manager  Re: Maloney v. Borough of Carlstadt  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal from the Trial Court’s Ruling Granting
[brief] (DA003, ¶20).  Paragraph 21 of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges in pertinent part:  Examples of the ongoing and severe religious and disability discrimination and daily harassment suffered by Plaintiff from Defendant [...] include but are not limited to:…  (DA003, ¶21).  As demonstrated in Plaintiff’s Complaint, paragraphs 21(a) through (g) list factual allegations against Defendant [...], all of which pertain to alleged statements and acts that [...] made to Plaintiff because she was Jewish.  None of these factual allegations allege any act or statement of disability discrimination.  DA003, ¶¶ 21(a)-(g).  Notably, paragraphs 22, 23, and 24 plead “[e]xamples of the ongoing and severe religious discrimination and daily harassment,” but glaringly do not plead disability discrimination in any specific or general way against Defendants [...], [...], or [...].
[directive] (only complete if the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013)  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of child pornography pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4) or 2C:24-4b(5) or an N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. attempt to commit either of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of parole supervision of life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] However, the "fourth element of a plaintiff's *prima facie* case requires a showing that the challenged employment decision (*i.e.*, failure to hire, failure to promote, wrongful discharge) took place under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. ”  Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Pub. Sch., 323 N.J. Super. 490, 502 (App. Div. 1999) (citation omitted).  Circumstances that give rise to an inference of discriminatory motive include actions or remarks made by decisionmakers that evidence discriminatory animus, preferential treatment given to employees not in the same protected class, a pattern of recommending the plaintiff for positions for which she is not qualified and not for positions for which she is well-qualified, or from the timing or sequence of events leading to termination.  See Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1192 (2001).  If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, “a presumption arises that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff. ”  Zive, 182 N.J. at 450 (citing Grande v. St. Clare’s Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 17-18 (2017)).  The burden then flips to the employer to establish “the reasonableness of the otherwise discriminatory act or [to advance] a non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s discharge.