ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(f)]  In order to justify building a circular culvert, an applicant can submit information to demonstrate that spanning the channel “would not be practicable due to one or more of the following physical constraints: i. Unstable substrate, which would likely undermine any proposed footing within or adjacent to the channel; ii. Irregular channel configuration; iii. Anticipated adverse hydraulic impact to the channel; or iv. Anticipated adverse impacts to offsite flooding, the environment, or public safety. ”  [N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(g)(6) (emphasis added). ]  No information regarding any of these physical constraints was provided by the applicant.
[brief] In State v. Perlstein, 206 N.J.Super. 246, 502 A.2d 81 (App.Div.1985) the appellate court affirmed a charge for obstruction because there was an independent unlawful act where by plaintiff refused to display her driver’s license and insurance card.  The law requires the display of these items.  The narrative report in our case clearly states that the officer tried to handcuff plaintiff after he refused to hand over [...]’s keys to the police who had no warrant or consent at the time.
[brief] The trial court considered this exact argument, and properly found it insufficient: “after all three were confronted and interviewed about it, all three admitted that they shouldn’t have been getting this charge pay, that it wasn’t authorized. ” (See 1T 25:21-24; see also id. at 25:24-26:5 (“yet [Plaintiffs] kind of go about, around about saying, well [...] said it was okay or as long as she didn’t get caught or get in trouble for it.  But I think that those assertions at that point in time were just inconsistent with how it went down and how they went about trying to surreptitiously hide this additional pay. ”); Id. at 26:7-13 (“at some point in time they try to say hey well look, maybe she did approve it, or she didn’t really approve it, or she didn’t say no.  But clearly that’s not the case, because if it was approved, it would’ve been part of the regular pay that [...] would have approved during her regular approval of their pay process. ”)).  Second, [...] has not shown that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to Conicello’s alleged antagonism toward her.
[directive] Assault on Victim while she was pregnant (at Index Assault or prior assault)  SAMPLE QUESTION:  Did he/she ever assault you when you were pregnant?  ✔Include only assaults against the Victim.  Do not count assaults against anyone other than the Victim.  ✔Count the Index Assault or any prior assault on the Victim, committed by the Defendant, if the Victim was pregnant at the time.  ✔The incident must include physical contact, the use or attempted use of a weapon to contact the Victim’s body, or a threat of harm made while displaying a weapon.  If you do not have a detailed description of the incident, count a charge of assault or other violent offense if it is known that the Victim was the Index Assault Victim and was pregnant at the time.  ✘It is not required that the Defendant knew that the Victim was pregnant.  2  © 2017 [...]  ODARA Scoring Form 7.
[brief] III.  Presuming a written acknowledgement of the Plaintiff’s ROFR to be a material modification of the third party’s offer/contract, the Trial Court erred in finding that the ROFR was not waived by the Plaintiff on June 3rd, 2023.  (raised below, Da395).  Presuming that this Appellate Court agrees with the Trial Court that the addition of the ROFR provision to the offer/contract actually was in some way a “material” change to the offer/contract, the presentation of the revision by [...]’s attorney, [...] on May 4, 2023, which explicitly included the ROFR, marked the beginning of a new 30-day period during which the Plaintiff could exercise its ROFR.  Da70.  The Trial Court concluded that the second presentation of the contract to the Plaintiff on May 4th, 2023 did not count and that the clock on the Plaintiff’s time within which it may exercise its ROFR did not start ticking until May 8th, 2023 because the document which was presented on May 4th, 2023 was not presented by the seller, but was presented by the third party buyer ([...]’s attorney, [...], Esq.) to the Plaintiff.  Da395.  The Plaintiff’s general counsel even acknowledges receipt and begins “processing” the offer as of May 5th, 2023.  Da69.  The Trial Court’s assessment of the impact of the third-party buyer presenting the document was that it didn’t “ripen” into a “truly ‘bona fide’” offer until the seller ([...]) presented it to [[...]] on May 8th.  Da395.  Thus, it was not because the offer was signed by [...] and [...] that was the determining factor, but that [...] was the one “confirming its intention to sell the property...”  Da395.  The fact that the Plaintiff [...] had the contract, with the amendment that they demanded, in its possession since May 4th, 2023 was, according to the Trial Court, of no import.  The Trial Court bases its decision in this regard on no case, no law, no argument presented by the Plaintiff, but its own bald analysis.
[brief] VII.  The Trial Court Failed to Exercise Its Powers and Jurisdiction Under the Prerogative Writs Clause and Rule 4:69.  (Pa79, Pa80, Pa82, 1T, 2T, 3T)  Here, the trial court and defendants extinguished an aggrieved party’s constitutional “as of right” to judicially challenge municipal action.  The Prerogative Writs Clause (Article VI, Section 6, paragraph 4) applies “as of right” to all levels of government: State, County or Municipal.  A Rule 4:69 action in lieu of prerogative writ serves as an adequate constitutional means for aggrieved third party taxpayers to seek judicial review of and relief from alleged ultra vires actions.  See, Alexander’s v. Paramus Bor., 125 N.J. 100 (1991) (holding that the scope of statutory jurisdiction accorded to the Council on Affordable Housing did not extinguish an aggrieved party’s constitutional right to judicially challenge municipal action).
[brief] 20  New Jersey Rule 4:10-2 .........................................................................  14  New Jersey Rule 4:10-2(a) ..................................................................... passim New Jersey Rule 4:10-2(f) .......................................................................  16  New Jersey Rule 4:10-2(g) ..................................................................... passim New Jersey Rule of Evidence 401 ............................................................. passim  1 eDiscovery & Digital Evidence § 7:21 .................................................. 26 2006 Advisory Comm. Note to Rule 34 ....................................................  17  Committee Report, Report of the Discovery Subcommittee on Proposed Rule Changes Regarding Electronically Stored Information (Nov. 2005) ..........16, 17 Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 4:10-2(a) (2024)  .................................................................  11, 15, 33, 40  The Sedona Conference: Commentary on Achieving Quality in the E-Discovery Process, 15 Sedona Conf. J. 265 (2014)  ........................................  27
[brief] Most significantly, [...] will equip the Regulator Station with an aboveground natural-gas fueled heating unit designed to pre-heat the natural gas traveling through the regulators connecting the transmission system to the distribution system.  This heating unit is a critical component of the Regulator Station precisely because of the 600 psig pressure reduction that will take place from the transmission system to the distribution system.  Specifically, due to the thermodynamic principle known as the Joule-Thomson Effect, that significant pressure reduction will result in an approximately 40 degree Fahrenheit decrease in the temperature of the natural gas running through the regulators.  (For every 14.7 psig reduction, the temperature of natural gas drops one degree Fahrenheit.)  That is because once gas service is interrupted, [...] cannot simply flip a switch to instantly turn service back on after the regulator is thawed and repaired (a process that itself could take some time).  Rather, before service could be restored, [...] personnel would have to visit each of the affected premises to manually turn off the gas at each service line.  Once [...] accomplished that task, it could re-pressurize the gas mains, but would have to return again to each individual affected property in order to turn the gas back on manually and re-light the pilot for each appliance and furnace.  If [...] did otherwise—if it simply turned the gas back on en masse without visiting each property—each premises with unlit pilot lights would slowly fill up with gas, which could result in a dangerous, potentially, life-threatening condition.
[brief] The crucial thing to consider here is that the photographs were taken on July 14, 2021 and the incident took place on May 7, 2019.  The photographs could have been shown to be a fair and accurate representation of the scene on the later date, but the question remained whether they were also such a representation of the scene more than two years earlier.  In order to properly admit the photographs, as the trial court properly found, the defense needed to show that the scene had not changed in any crucial respect.
[brief] Parents and students spoke passionately at Board meetings, condemning and repudiating Respondent’s racist Facebook posts and pleading with the Board to act.  (Ca100-105) (Patch Article: “You deserve to be off that board,” “you have no place here,” “you women brought the ugly to us,” “‘insane’ that neither [...] nor [...] were taking any accountability,” “It’s disgusting, and it’s inhumane, and it’s sad.  It’s sad!”  “It’s ugly and it’s disgusting. ”).  Despite all this evidence that Respondent actually compromised the Board with her transparently racist post – by posting it after she was elected and by refusing to take it down after she was a sitting Board member – the Commission stated that it had no jurisdiction to hear that Count.  This decision lacks fair support in the record.
[brief] THE TRIAL ERRED IN DENYING JOHN WESTERHOLD’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND TO ADD A MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM  A.  The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that No Criminal Action Was Instituted  In arguing that no criminal action was instituted against [...], Defendants ignore the central arguments in Plaintiffs’ initial brief:  (1) New Jersey’s history of holding that a criminal action is instituted when a criminal complaint is filed (Pb47-Pb49); (2) that the lone case the trial court relied upon, Richmond v. Thompson, 901 P.2d 371 (Wisc. App. 1995), is wholly distinguishable (Pb50); and (3) that no New Jersey case has ever held that the “criminal action” element of a malicious prosecution cause of action requires judicial action beyond the filing of the criminal complaint itself.  (Pb49).  Instead, Defendants look outside New Jersey and contend the trial court properly relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts §654 comment c.  Defendants do so even though they do not dispute either (1) that no New Jersey case has ever followed that comment, or (2) that the comment is inconsistent with New Jersey precedent.  Defendants’ sole argument is that a single New Jersey case “recognized and followed the Restatement in their analysis for malicious prosecution. ”  (Drb15) (citing Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 11 N.J. Super. 471 (App. Div. 1951)).  But the reverse is actually true.  In Shoemaker, this Court examined the Restatement’s analysis of whether certain types of pre-trial dismissals constituted conclusive proof of the lack of probable cause needed for a malicious prosecution claim.  In so doing, this Court rejected the Restatement because it was inconsistent with New Jersey law.  Id. at 476-77.
[brief] The Court asks for explanation of the high-water line:  Q: Now, I know we have been talking about the mean high water line before.  That is significant because that is the boundary between what would be considered Tidelands and what would be considered uplands, correct?  A: The line between, yes, the Riparian lands and the uplands.  Q: Right.  So, whatever the mean high water line is on a particular date and time would be significant because that would show where the Riparian Rights or where the Riparian land begins and where the uplands begin, correct?  A: Correct.  Q: Now, in terms of the mean high water - The Court: Okay, explain that in greater detail, please…
[brief] In sum, nothing about [...]’s testimony was beyond the ken of the average juror, and as the Johnson Court noted, lay jurors are capable of understanding the information provided by the device and its usual margin of error.  Accordingly, defendant’s argument that [...] improperly testified as a lay witness regarding GPS location and Health  Activity data obtained from [...] and [...]’s phones is unpersuasive and must be denied by this court.  POINT II
[brief] Plaintiff Admitted To All Material Facts Related To Her Disqualification From Employment With [...].  Plaintiff admitted to every fact within [...]’s Statement of Material Facts related to the question of whether Plaintiff was statutorily barred from employment with [...].  (Appx 520-32 ¶¶1-39).  It is undisputed that New Jersey provides “an individual shall be disqualified from employment” with group homes, including those operated by Defendant, if that individual has been convicted of “[a] crime or offense involving the manufacture, transportation, sale, possession or habitual use of [drugs].”
[brief] Price v. Strategic Capital  The Price decision is about a density variance not a height variance, but as discussed in Plaintiffs’ Brief, the standards for the various lesser (d) variances have all converged around similar proofs.  Pb 9-12.  The Price court adopted the analysis of the plaintiff in that case who sought to set aside a density variance granted by the [...]:  The overall premise of Price's appeal is that the Board's action in this case did not just address a "particular case," but rather a common problem in the SSOD zone.  Consequently, he argues, the Board was essentially engaged in rezoning by variance, which the Board is not authorized to do.  See Victor Recchia Residential Constr., Inc. v. Zoning Bd., of Adjustment of Cedar Grove, 338 N.J.Super. 242, 253-54, 768 A.2d 803 (App.Div. 2001) ("In short, the Zoning Board may not rezone by variance.").
[brief] Indeed, the limited scope of this act is evident from its history and its language.  Prior to 1873, an act of the Legislature, duly authenticated as such and on file with the Secretary of State, was conclusive evidence of its enactment and contents.  Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.L. 29, 44 (Sup. Ct. 1866).  A citizen could not go behind such attestation to challenge the fact of enactment.  See ibid.  The Legislature relaxed this strict rule in 1873 with the passage of L. 1873, c. 27.  It permitted two or more citizens to challenge a law as not having been enacted in the manner provided by the Constitution.  In re McGlynn, 58 N.J. Super. 1, 26 (App. Div. 1959).  One so challenging the law does so by permission of the Legislature.  In re Low, 88 N.J.L. 28, 30 (Sup. Ct. 1915).  While the language of this section has been revised since 1873, the essential scope of the act has remained unchanged.
[brief] [...]  Dated: March 11, 2025  On the Brief: -[...] (045811988)  [...] -[...] (020612008)  [...] -[...] (247422018)  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  Claremont Construction Group, Inc.  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS | v | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | A. Background Preceding the Dispute (Pa75) | 4 | | B. Claremont Sues [...] for Nonpayment (Pa77) | 8 | | C.
[brief] The Court also adopted *R.* 4:29–1(b), which permits the trial court, on its own motion, to “order the joinder of any person subject to service of process whose existence was disclosed by the notice required by *R.* 4:5–1(b)(2) or by any other means who may be liable to any party on the basis of the same transactional facts. ”  The Court further revised R. 4:5–1(b)(2), which now provides:  Each party shall include with the first pleading a certification as to whether the matter in controversy is the subject of any other action pending in any court or of a pending arbitration proceeding, or whether any other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated; and, if so, the certification shall identify such actions and all parties thereto.  Further, each party shall disclose in the certification the names of any non-party who should be joined in the action pursuant to R. 4:28 or who is subject to joinder pursuant to R. 4:29–1(b) because of potential liability to any party on the basis of the same transactional facts.  Each party shall have a continuing obligation during the course of the litigation to file and serve on all other parties and with the court an amended certification if there is a change in the facts stated in the original certification.  The court may require notice of the action to be given to any non-party whose name is disclosed in accordance with this rule or may compel joinder pursuant to R. 4:29–1(b).  If a party fails to comply with its obligations under this rule, the court may impose an appropriate sanction including dismissal of a successive action against a party whose existence was not disclosed or the imposition on the non-complying party of litigation expenses that could have been avoided by compliance with this rule.  A successive action shall not, however, be dismissed for failure of compliance with this rule unless the failure of compliance was inexcusable and the right of the undisclosed party to defend the successive action has been substantially prejudiced by not having been identified in the prior action.  [R. 4:5–1(b)(2) (emphasis added).
[brief] 11 State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 1996) .......................................................  35 State v. Lykes, 192 N.J. 519 (2007).  .................................................................................. 12 State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998) .................................................................................. 11 State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65 (1989) ......................................................................................  37 State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133 (2023) .............................................................................. 29 State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220 (2015) ..................................................................................  28 State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473 (2006) ..............................................................................  29, 31 State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4 (1994) ......................................................................................  35 State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640 (1984).  ..................................................................................
[brief] 2  “Pa” refers to Appellant [...]’s Appendix; “Pb” refers to [...]’s brief filed on March 12, 2024.  structured, and that numerous Respondents had engaged in kickbacks, illegal self-referrals, and a pattern of fraud and racketeering in connection with the services for which they obtained payment.  (Pa43-61; Pa87-99).  [...]’s lawsuit centered around [...], a medical practice that is alleged to have been structured in violation of the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine (“CPMD”), a regulatory framework designed to prevent the commercial exploitation of medical practices and protect public health and safety by ensuring that such practices are owned and controlled by licensed physicians.  (Pa37-68).  See [...] Ins. Co. v. Northfield Med. Ctr., P.C., 228 N.J. 596, 600 (2017); N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.16(f).  [...]’s complaint alleged that [...]’s formation and operation contravened the CPMD by allowing non-plenary physicians to exert control over the practice.  (Pa43-61; Pa448).  Further, the complaint alleged that Respondents violated the statutes and regulations prohibiting medical providers from paying or receiving kickbacks and engaging in self-referrals.  (Pa87-99).  [...]’s complaint sought: disgorgement of the $1.7 million in PIP benefit payments; damages and other remedies under the IFPA for self-referrals and kickbacks; and damages and other remedies under the New Jersey anti-racketeering law (N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 to -6.2) (“RICO”) based on the violations of the CPMD and for self-referrals/kickbacks.  In October 2023, the trial court granted three motions by Respondents to compel arbitration of the allegations in [...]’s complaint.  (Pa1-22).  The court held that the language in AICRA required arbitration, at the election of any party, of “all ‘disputes’ around the recovery of PIP Benefits. ” (Pa6-7; Pa13-15; Pa20-22).  The trial court reasoned that AICRA’s arbitration provision “encompasses a broad array of legal disputes regarding PIP benefits, including mistaken claims for benefits, fraud-based claims, or any other claim including the ‘recovery’ of PIP Benefits. ” (Pa6; Pa13; Pa21).  The trial court dismissed [...]’s claims without prejudice, including against those defendants that did not move to compel arbitration.  (Pa334).  On November 13, 2023, under Rule 2:2-3(b)(8) (permitting appeals as of right from orders compelling arbitration), [...] appealed.  (Pa353).  [...] and the [...] submit this amicus curiae brief in connection with this appeal pursuant to Rule 1:13-9(e).
[brief] (Da17).  Although the court initially declined to remove [...] and [...], it authorized the retention of the [...] to investigate [...]’s sale prospects, and ordered [...] and [...] to cooperate with that effort.  (Da17).  Lengthy motion practice then ensued relating to [...]’s sale and [...] and [...]’s efforts to obstruct it.  (Da18-21).  Based on the outcome of the [...]’s investigation – which took longer than anticipated because [...] delayed providing responses to information requests – the court ordered the special fiscal agent to sell [...] in April 2018 and again ordered [...] and [...] to cooperate in the sale process.  (Da18).  Instead of cooperating, they continued to obstruct and delay providing information needed to bring [...] to market, and Plaintiff again filed a motion seeking their removal in May 2018.  (Da18).  The court granted the special fiscal agent the authority to remove [...] and [...] from management if they continued to be uncooperative.  (Da18).  The special fiscal agent removed [...] in July 2018 after he fled the country to avoid the court’s July 3, 2018 order and became a fugitive.  (Da18).  After [...] continued to be uncooperative, and after it was revealed, after the fact, that [...] had filed unauthorized amended tax returns on behalf of [...] (in an attempt to lower [...]’s tax burden, which triggered an IRS audit), the special fiscal agent removed [...] in November 2018.
[brief] The defendants in the present case did nothing to create the fund, a key part of the reasoning in *Ladenheim*, and the defendant in *Ladenheim* was not the personal injury claimant, rather it was the claimants then former attorney, who had made a promise to the plaintiff and not fulfilled that promise.  In Cronin v. McKim-Gray, 353 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2002), the plaintiffs alleged that they provided medical services to [...] after she was involved in an automobile accident.