ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.* at 272-273.  In that case, a plaintiff sued a mall owner and a janitorial service for injuries that he sustained in a slip-and-fall accident.  *Id.* at 264.  The plaintiff slipped on water that had accumulated on the floor because of a leaky roof.  *Ibid.*  The mall owner sued the janitorial service of contractual indemnification.  *Id.* at 265.  The trial court awarded contractual indemnity to the mall owner, and the Appellate Division affirmed.  *Ibid.*  The contract between the mall owner and the janitorial service contained three indemnification clauses.  *Id.* at 266-67.  The first required the janitorial service to indemnify the mall owner for losses that the mall owner might sustain “as the result of a failure of materials and workmanship to be as warranted. ”  *Id.* at 266.  The second required the janitorial service to indemnify the mall owner for claims of bodily injury “occurring in and about the Shopping Center as a result of the work performed and materials and equipment installed or furnished by” the janitorial service.  *Ibid.*  The third indemnity clause required the janitorial service to indemnify the mall owner for losses “caused by or arising from the negligence” of the janitorial service. ”  *Id.* at 267.  The Supreme Court ruled that the contract limited the janitorial service’s indemnification of the mall owner to only that portion of the loss caused by the janitorial service’s fault, and not for the entire loss.  *Id.* at 269-20.  In reaching that result, the Supreme Court noted the presumption against indemnification for one’s own negligence, *id.* at 269, and the requirement that a contract express the intent to indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence “in unequivocal terms. ”  *Id.* at 272.  The Court ruled that the contract at issue did “not express in unequivocal terms an intention to indemnify the indemnitee [the mall owner] against losses arising from its own negligence. ”  Id. at 273.  Instead, the language of the contract limited indemnification to only those losses resulting from the janitorial service’s negligence.  Ibid.  Because the jury found that the mall owner was partially at fault for the plaintiff’s accident, it could not recover costs of defense or indemnification for the janitorial service.  Id. 273, 275.  In Kieffer, 205 N.J. 213, the Supreme Court again considered whether an indemnity contract required indemnification for the indemnitee’s costs of defense.
[brief] Instead of doing that, however, the State has sought to plug [...]’s fiscal shortfalls by annual and ever- --- \(^7\)  The only significant amendment of SFRA was S-2 in 2018, which principally phased out Adjustment Aid to Abbott districts and reallocated the funds to other districts.  According to S-2’s critics, that amendment was inconsistent with SFRA’s and Abbott’s funding equalization focus.  increasing advance state aid loans pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-56\(^8\) and to blame the district and the broader [...] municipality for their alleged shortcomings.
[directive] See Section 3.13.  Mitigating Factor #4 only applies when the defendant is a “drug or alcohol dependent person” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2.  It is expected that the defendant’s counsel would bear responsibility for providing information to the prosecutor that establishes that the defendant is a drug or alcohol dependent person and that he or she has enrolled in and is participating in an approved drug-treatment program.  See Section 3.9.  For the purposes of these Guidelines, a drug-treatment program is “approved” only if the treatment regimen has been ordered or approved by a court or probation department, or is provided by a drug-treatment facility that is licensed by the State to provide inpatient or outpatient drug or alcohol treatment services.  Page 83  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  If the defendant is participating in an outpatient (non-residential) treatment program, the mitigating point value is -2.  If the defendant is enrolled in a residential (inpatient) treatment program, the point value for this mitigating factor is -3.  In order to qualify for any mitigating points pursuant to this factor, the defendant must continue to participate in the course of treatment up to the date of the sentencing proceeding.  If for any reason the defendant’s participation in the treatment program is discontinued, whether because the defendant withdrew from the program or because he or she was expelled from the program by the treatment provider, the defendant will be deemed to have forfeited the mitigating points and, in that event, the prosecutor may recalculate the appropriate plea offer, excluding consideration of this mitigating factor, where such recalculation would result in a different authorized plea offer than the one previously tendered.  See Section 3.7.  10.2.5
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22; N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), (e).  [...] even stated in her Initial Decision on the Motion for Summary decision that “[b]y her own admission, Respondent refused to wear a face mask at Board meetings and posted commentary to her Facebook page calling [...] a ‘tyrannical POS’ for extending the school mask mandate under EO 251.  The purpose of her posting was to urge others to take a stand against the mask mandate. ” (Ca022).  [...] then found that “respondent led by example by refusing to wear a face mask at the Board meetings in utter disregard of EO 251 and Board members’ obligation to abide by and enforce EO 251 within the school district. ” (Ca035).  It is obvious from this finding that the Commission’s dismissal of Count 5 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) and (e) was premature.
[brief] There, it was noted that a consistent statement offered under N.J.R.E. 607 or N.J.R.E. 803(a) (2) does not need to be made prior to the alleged motive to fabricate.  Ibid.  In that case, the “defendant argue[d] that implicit in N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2) is a temporal proximity requirement.  On this theory, unless the prior statement was made before the occurrence of the asserted improper influence or motive, it lacks relevance to refute the charge. ”  Id. at 386.  The Appellate Division looked to *State v. Chew*, where the Court declined to adopt such a rigid rule in the context of a murder trial.
[directive] [Nie/No]  1. osobą uzależnioną od narkotyków?  Do you understand that the court has determined or may determine that you are a drug dependent person?  Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że jeżeli Sąd stwierdzi, że jest Pan(i) osobą [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  2. uzależnioną od narkotyków i również stwierdzi, że spełnia Pan(i) kryteria 2C:35-14, może Pan(i) kwalifikować się do wyroku obowiązkowego okresu N.J.S.A. specjalnego nadzoru kuratora sądowego w celu udziału w programie leczenia nadzorowanym przez Sąd („Sąd przeciwnarkotykowy”)? Kryteria takie obejmują między innymi stwierdzenie, że: (1) jest Pan(i) osobą uzależnioną od narkotyków lub alkoholu i (2) był(a) Pan(i) osobą uzależnioną od narkotyków lub alkoholu w chwili popełnienia aktualnego wykroczenia, i (3) nie był(a) Pan(i) w posiadaniu broni palnej podczas aktualnego wykroczenia ani innych czynów, o które jest Pan(i) obecnie oskarżony(a), i (4) nie ma Pan(i) żadnych wcześniejszych dyskwalifikujących wyroków, i (5) istnieje leczenie odpowiednie dla Pana(i), i (6) społeczność nie zostanie narażona na niebezpieczeństwo w wyniku odbywania przez Pana(Panią) wyroku „Sądu przeciwnarkotykowego”.
[brief] 27  III.  THE BOARD ACTED RATIONALLY, PRUDENTLY, AND REASONABLY ........................................................................................................  33  A.  The Board properly excluded portions of the Condominium fee ........... 34  B.  The Board properly reduced [...]’s taxes ....................................  36  C.  The Board properly reduced [...]’s management fee ................... 41  D.  The Board properly determined the equity in the property..............43  E.
[brief] In opposition to this appeal the Defendants have misrepresented facts in the record, misstated the law and have raised an estoppel argument on appeal where no cross-appeal was filed, which the trial court did not address and where the proofs in the record are so woefully inadequate that neither this Court nor the trial court could do the careful weighing of the equities that would allow this Court to give to the Defendants the ability to continue an illegal restaurant use in a quiet residential neighborhood.  RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’-RESPONDENTS’ POINT I (Pa 37-47, 55-59, 66-75, 95-96, 145-148, 150-152, 154; T1 at 48:6-49:24, 53:11-17, 53:23-54:16, 56:6-57:20, 57:8-59:16, 60:6-9, 61:9-25, 62:1-64:3, 69:12-71:7, 99:25-101:13, 102:1-106:11, 105:5-7, 105:22-106:11, 187:19-189:8; T2 at 143:22-144:1; T3 at 20:24-21:14, 60:5-61:6; T4 at 30:7-10, 31:14-17)
[directive] NOTE:  If the defendant is a female and qualifies for sex offender treatment, she will not be confined at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center but a facility designated by the Commissioner of Corrections where she will receive similar sex offender treatment.  Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Polish strona 3 z 3 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Polish page 3 of 3 고지:
[brief] ”  On the contrary, every certification filed by Defendant specifically objects to the signature, including she objected to it before the court in Plaintiff’s presence “It's some document that's not even verified.  It just says UPS or USPS on it on the top.  And that's not my signature. ”  T 24:1-3.  Further, he misrepresents that was Defendant’s law office in New York City where he claims he mailed the complaint when in fact her physical law office was in Nassau County New York at the time.  Next, his conclusion that Defendant participated in the case is refuted by every filing where she certifies she appeared limited to objecting to jurisdiction.  She was forced to have attorneys and herself watch the docket at times because Plaintiff filed things without serving her and she had to get that vacated.  He cannot claim that her watching the docket to protect her rights from his wrongdoing is participation.  His next false claim that a substitution was filed is refuted as discussed above-namely, there was no substitution and that documents was filed the day the complaint was dismissed in 2019 because the court insisted she file it.  It is also false that she requested leave to proceed with arbitration.  That never happened, nor is there a basis to seek “leave” when the plain language of Rule 1:20A-6 makes clear that it is the client who has the right to initiate fee arbitration proceedings conducted under Rule 1:20A.  Stated differently, "[w]hether or not a fee dispute will be arbitrated" pursuant to Rule 1:20A "is a matter within the exclusive control of the client" - leave is not required.  As to his Point 5.
[brief] (9T12-17 to 13-12; 9T22-12 to 21).  And even if defendant had the authority under the ADA to enter into a franchise agreement without his co-investors in [...], he was not an owner of [...].  Rather, [...] was owned by his sister [...], and defendant merely had the authority to sign on her behalf.  (6T8-14 to 11-16).  ______________________ stray pen mark.  Because [...] was not a party to the ADA, [...] could not become a WOB franchisee in Hoboken.  Even defendant’s own evidence at the motion hearing undermined the validity of the [...] franchise agreements.
[brief] (Pa65 at ¶¶6-7.)  [...] did not have the text of A.6260 or actual notice that any reproductive health bill would be discussed in the Assembly Committee Meeting of January 6, 2022.  (Id.)  [...] signed up to testify solely based upon the rumor that she heard that an abortion bill would be discussed.  (Pa65 at ¶¶ 6-7.)  In fact, during the Assembly Appropriations Committee hearing, the Chair announced, “we had a number of people that had taken time to sign up in anticipation that this bill would happen. ”  (Pa155 at 4:5-9.)  However, our Constitution and statutes require more than just anticipation – the public must be given meaningful notice rather than just rumors among those “in the know.
[brief] (3T 46-21 to 23)  [...] testified further that another sample from the same jeans \(^2\)  [...] also said at another point that defendant said he was hit by “a fist. ”  (4T 12-1 to 2) allowed no conclusion as to [...], but was positive for defendant as a contributor to a mixed DNA profile.  (3T 46-21 to 23)  Three friends of defendant -- two ex-girlfriends and one male friend -- testified that defendant called and texted them in the early morning hours of March 9, 2013, begging for a ride.
[brief] As discussed in greater detail below – and largely glossed over by Appellants – the FAA governs because the Wholesaler Agreement is a contract involving interstate commerce that contains an arbitration provision and no exception to the FAA applies.  Indeed, Appellants concede (as they must) that they engage in interstate commerce as the Wholesaler Agreement “appointed Appellants as non-exclusive wholesalers of [...] products in the New York tri-state area and the entire state of New Jersey”.  (Pb 9-10; Pa74.)  Even if FAA does not apply – which it does – the trial court correctly held that Appellants were still required to submit their claims to arbitration under both New York and New Jersey state law.
[directive] This supplements Directive #9-05 and supersedes the Statewide Bail Schedules promulgated by the May 12, 2009 Supplement.  Note that this supplement does not in effect. affect the bail policies promulgated by Directive #9-05.  Those policies continue  G.A.G. Attachments cc: Chief Justice [...]  Civil Division Managers Supreme Court Criminal Division Managers Criminal Presiding Judges  Family Division Managers Superior Court Judges Finance Division Managers Municipal Court Presiding Judges  Municipal Division Managers Municipal Court Judges  Municipal Court Directors and Administrators  [...], Chief of Staff  [...], Special Assistant AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  [...], Criminal Practice Division  Clerks of Court  [...], Municipal Court Services  A Trial Court Administrators  [...], Municipal Court Services  037 • 08625-0037  [...] • P. 0.  Box Trenton, New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary  Statewide Bail Schedules Prepared by: The Conference of Criminal Presiding Judges  Subcommittee on Bail Practices Approved by the Judicial Council on November 10, 2004  Promulgated by Directive #09-05  Updated: May 26, 2006 – Supplement to Directive #09-05 Updated: October 10, 2007 – Supplement to Directive #09-05 Updated: May 12, 2009 – Supplement to Directive #09-05 Updated: December 2, 2013 – Supplement to Directive #09-05 Table of Contents Indexes ............................................................................. 2 Bail Schedule 1 Crimes - Statutes which require bail to be set by a Superior Court Judge Bail Schedule 2 Crimes - Statutes (crimes and lesser included offenses) where bail may be set by a Superior Court Judge or a Municipal Court Judge or, in a Municipal Court ................................................................................................ 3 Judge’s Absence, the Municipal Court Administrator or Deputy Administrator Bail Schedule 2 - Disorderly Persons Offenses and Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses - These offenses may appear as lesser included offenses in Bail Schedule 2 and/or in the separate ........................................................................................................................................ 9 Bail Schedule 2 Disorderly Persons Section herein ........................................................................................................................... 12 Rules and Statutes Regarding Bail for Indictable Offenses .................................................................. 13 Rules and Statutes Regarding Bail for Disorderly Persons / Petty Disorderly Persons Offenses Bail Schedules ......................................................................... 14 Bail Schedule 1 – Statutes (crimes) which require bail to be set by a Superior Court Judge Bail Schedule 2 – Statutes (crimes and lesser included offenses) where bail may be set by a Superior Court Judge or a Municipal Court Judge or, in a Municipal Court Judge’s Absence, the Municipal .................................................................................................................................................
[brief] On May 17, 2020 while waiting for a Greyhound bus to Houston, defendant approached [...] and introduced herself as [...] and asked for help fleeing her abusive husband.  (6T72-14 to 23).  (6T74-6 to 21).  Jessenia called [...], whom she lived with, to ask if defendant could stay at their home for a few days.  (6T74-10 to 14; 6T87-20 to 89-12).  On May 18, 2020, they met [...] at the Houston bus station.  (6T78-2 to 12; 6T89-23 to 18).
[brief] Trial court’s January 12, 2024 order reversed the provision in the June 6, 2023 order (Pa506) directing plaintiff to pay the outstanding equitable distribution obligation within 50 days by denying defendant’s request for transfer of equitable assets.  (Pa1150).  The January 12, 2024 order explained the trial court’s decision directing the deposit of the passports by noting that it was to “address defendant’s concerns”.  There was no further explanation.  Trial court’s January 12, 2024, January 26, 2024 and March 8, 2024 orders did not address the matter of defendant’s noncompliance with the child tax credit claim provision in the March 1, 2023 JOD order that plaintiff raised in his December 13, 2023 reply certification (Pa1111), January 16, 2024 OTSC (Pa1195) and January 31, 2024 motion for reconsideration (Pa1230-32).
[directive] Conversely, the Assistant Prosecutor or Designated Supervisory Officer (See Section IV.A above) may decide to upgrade the offense or add additional charges.  In these cases, the charging agency shall modify the Live Scan record within the Live Scan system to reflect the appropriate changes, retransmit the modified Live Scan record, and contact the CRICU of the New Jersey State Police to make certain that the CCH system accurately reflects the charges that were actually filed.  In cases where fingerprints were taken but the case was then referred for a stationhouse adjustment, the officer must contact CRICU to make sure the prints are removed from the CCH system.  25 F.
[brief] The Trial Court’s determination and Opinion is clearly legally and factually unwarranted and incorrect.  POINT TWO  THE 1972 SCHOOL SITE PLAN APPLICATION/APPROVAL AS A MATTER OF LAW TERMINATED ANY SONS OF ISRAEL CLAIMED PARKING PERMISSION/EASEMENT ON THE SCHOOL LOT 5.  The [...] claim the 1963 Agreement extended a permanent easement for Lot 8 staff/attendee vehicles to priority park on the School’s Lot 5 parking lot and courtyard, and the Trial Court so found.  The Synagogue has never received nor provided any zoning or Site Plan approval for such an off-site parking use/facility on Lot 5, either from 1963 or thereafter.  In 1972 the then School owner applied for Site Plan approval with parking and other variances to substantially expand the School.  The Board records confirm that neither party --- the [...] nor the School --- informed the Planning or Zoning Board or the public that the [...] claimed any easement or continued entitlement for an off-site parking use for Lot 8 staff/attendees on the School Lot 5.  Given that the expanded School was deficient in parking for its own school use, the off-site parking use on Lot 5 by a second property/use would certainly be critical for a proper evaluation of the School Application.  Not only did the [...] not assert any right or permission for Lot 8 off-site parking use of the School Lot 5, the [...] represented to the Board that any occasional overflow school parking could be accommodated on other nearby vacant parcels then owned by the [...] --- at the time in 1972 the [...] owned nearby vacant Lots 6 and 10.  This 1972 School Site Plan --- and the position presented by both the School and the Synagogue that there was no off-site Synagogue parking easement or use -- - certainly mandates the Plaintiff's claim is invalid.  Based on there being no claimed parking right, the Planning/Zoning Boards approved the School expansion.  That any Planning/Zoning Board would approve a School expansion with an unmarked, unlined off-site third-party parking area with no curb cut, requiring cars to mount the curb and park in all directions immediately at an entry to a grade school is absurd.  That certainly creates an estoppel and precludes any such claim having any validity now (see Point Three Db44).  There is absolutely no basis to disregard or not be bound by that 1972 Site Plan and the representations and positions put forward in the Application/approval and Site Plan.
[brief] The Board’s efforts to discount [...]’ testimony were, frankly, outrageous.  Paragraph 15 of the Resolution contains the Board’s only attempt to make credibility determinations, where the Board concluded that [...] was not credible because he allegedly “sometimes incorrectly referr[ed] to Montvale Township. ”  [Da128-129, ¶ 15].  There is not a single instance of this in the certified transcript, and perhaps reflects the Resolution’s scrivener’s difficulty understanding [...]’ South African accent over Zoom.  As for the Board’s commentary in the same paragraph about the senior overlay zone, there is no such zone in Montville’s LUDO, as the only overlay zones are identified in § 230-116(B).  [Pa322-323].  [...]’ testimony about where the LUDO permits assisted living as of right (i.e., in the OB and I Zones, which the Zoning Map confirms are located on the borders of the Township or along major highways) is entirely distinct from where “senior living” may be permitted or where such uses may exist.  [See Pa231].  And the term “senior living” is not found anywhere in the LUDO.  Notably, the LUDO defines “Assisted Living Facility”, “Adult Community Housing” and “Senior Citizen Housing” as separate uses to highlight they are different.  [Pa287, 289, 311].  Conflating them is entirely improper, particularly as an attempt to denigrate the credibility of [...]’s expert.  His testimony on the non-viability of a 2-story project was in reliance on [...]’s architectural expert, who was surely qualified to render that opinion, which the Board fails to even mention.  [2T 62-24 to 63-6].  In their totality, these credibility “findings” do little to mask the Board’s true intent – to denigrate the merits of the application, undercut the unrebutted [...] proofs, and deny it without justification.  A land use board is permitted to reject expert testimony, but must do so reasonably, rather than on bare and unsubstantiated allegations.  See, e.g., N.Y. SMSA v. Bd. of Adj., 370 N.J. Super. 319, 338 (App. Div. 2004).  Pretending the LUDO contains things it does not, and mishearing testimony is not reasonable.  The evidence in the record confirms significant public benefits and limited, if any, actual detriments.  To the extent there were actual detriments arising from the grant of a use variance, [...] addressed them during the hearings through plan revisions and stipulations/conditions.  The only rational conclusion that the Board could have reached was, as [...] testified, that the benefits of the project substantially outweighed any detrimental effect of the variance.  Its failure to do so was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
[brief] ”  N.J.R.E. 402.  However, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. ”  N.J.R.E. 403.  Evidence is deemed probative when “it has a tendency ‘to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove. ’”  State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119, 127 (2008) (quoting State v. Allison, 208 N.J. Super. 9, 17 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 370 (1985)).  In other words, the evidence must be probative of a fact that is “really in issue in the case.