ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This is consistent with the Court granting discovery in other contexts based on its inherent authority.  Marshall, 148 N.J. at 269 (citing State ex rel. W.C., 85 N.J. 218, 221 (1981) (compelling pretrial lineup); State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 569 (1965) (permitting defendant to view State’s psychiatric reports on him); State v. Moffa, 36 N.J. 219, 221-22 (1961) (permitting defendant to inspect witness’s grand jury testimony); State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 604-05 (1958) (compelling witness to submit to psychiatric examination by defense expert)). grounds of attack on the judgment, or to confirm mere speculation or hope a basis for collateral relief may exist” should be denied, but specifically tailored requests, when good cause is shown, should be granted.  *Id.* at 97, 103, 107.  Courts may “reason by analogy” to existing discovery rules in designing an appropriate PCR discovery order.  *State v. Marshall*, 148 N.J. 89, 150 (1997).  *Marshall* cited with approval other jurisdictions permitting post-conviction interrogatories, noting the court’s inherent authority includes the power to fashion discovery procedures as necessary.  *Id.* at 91 (*citing* *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) (interrogatories in habeas corpus proceedings); *People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald*, 526 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1988) (depositions in PCR).  A review of unpublished New Jersey cases indicates it is not unheard of to compel interrogatories in PCR discovery.  See *State v. Russell*, [...], 2019 WL 2114762 (App. Div. May 15, 2019) (Da580) (interrogatories to trial judge regarding potential conflict issue).  Ultimately, PCR proceedings must provide a meaningful opportunity to root out unfairness and injustice.
[brief] 45 State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285 (2006) .......................................................  48 State v. Dulaney, 997 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) ............................. 31 State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277 (2023) .........................................................  42 State v. Evans, 235 N.J. 125 (2018) .........................................................  42 State v. Frazier, 558 S.W.3d 145 (Tenn. 2018) ........................................  31 State v. Gadsden, 303 N.J. Super. 491 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 187 (1997) ................................................................. 23, 25, 26, 27 State v. Gioe, 401 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2008) ................................. 12, 23, 29, 30 State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30 (2018) ......................................................... passim State v. Hamlett, 449 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2017) ............................ passim State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39 (2011) .........................................................
[brief] POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT REAL ESTATE CONSULTANTS DID NOT HAVE A COMMON LAW DUTY TO HAVE MAINTAINED THE PARKING LOT WHERE PLAINTIFF FELL.  ITS CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED AND PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED.  At point II of their brief, plaintiffs repeatedly rely upon [...]’ and other tenant defendants’ alleged breach of their lease agreements in support of their argument that the tenants in the strip mall had a common law duty to plaintiffs to have cleared the parking lot of snow and ice.
[brief] See Avatar Capital Finance, LLC v. Nassau Marina Holdings, LLC, 2022 WL 1495919, at *4 (N.J. App.  Div. May 12, 2022)(quoting Realty Asset).  Thus, “[a]fter entry of [a foreclosure] judgment interest will run at the legal rate except as otherwise ordered by the court and except as may be otherwise provided by law. ”  Shadow Lawn Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Palmarozza, 190 N.J. Super. 314, 318 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting R. 4:42-11(a)).  See Avatar, 2022 WL 1495919, at *4 (quoting Shadow Lawn).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t has been established practice in New Jersey that after foreclosure, interest runs at the legal rate and not at the rate stated in the bond or mortgage. ”  *Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Hampton Gardens Ltd.*, 88 N.J. 16, 22 (1981) (emphasis added).  Thus, it was an error as a matter of law for [...] to determine that “lawful interest versus contract interest is a distinction that has really no effect at all.  Lawful interest includes contract interest. ”  It does not.  **C.
[brief] 1:00 PM  Assembly Chambers Committees at the Call of the Speaker  *Assembly Appropriations Meeting  11:00 AM  Chair: Asm. [...]  The public may not attend the Committee meeting in person but may view and participate in the meeting via the NJ Legislature home page at https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/.  The Committee will take oral testimony on bills, by telephone and video, limited to three minutes.  If you are interested in registering your position with the Committee, please fill out the Registration Form located on the NJ Legislature Home Page under the applicable Committee heading.  For those individuals who wish to testify, please check the box “Do you wish to testify?” on the Registration Form.  Instructions for testifying before the Committee will be forwarded to you after you submit your Registration Form.  The form must be submitted by 5:00 PM on Wednesday January 5, 2022.  The public may also submit written testimony electronically in lieu of oral testimony.  Written testimony will be included in the Committee record and distributed to all the Committee members.  Written testimony should be submitted to OLSAideAAP@njleg.org.  A1772 [[...]/[...]+2], Batterers’ Intervention Programs, domestic violence cases-establishes standards A2316 [[...]/[...]+8], Physical therapy-permits dry needling under certain circumstances A2396 [[...]/[...]+1], Juvenile legal representation-expands Office of Public Defender A4651 [[...]/[...]+1], Blue envelope-issue, hold documents requiring a person w/autism to operate a veh.
[brief] See also Pagano v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. Edison, 257 N.J. Super. 382, 392-393 (Law Div. 1992).  Where, as here, the record does not support the findings and conclusions that are set forth in the agency’s written decision, such decision is not entitled to deference, and should be reversed.  The [...] seeks to rewrite history by asserting that its denial of the Application was based upon “legitimate safety considerations” when the record does not support this argument.  (Rb1).  The [...] claims on appeal that a loading area, which the Appellant is not required to account for as part of its site plan was “unsafe” and “inefficient,” despite ample support in the record to the contrary.  (See, e.g., T2/63:22-64:4, 68:7-68:25, 69:14-70:2, 86:8-87:14, 160:18-161:7).  Even a witness testifying for a third party objector would not commit to giving an opinion that the proposed loading practices were unsafe: “[a]ll I’m saying is [the proposed loading zone is] inconvenient, it’s not easy to get in and out of there, or is it easy to unload, it’s just a difficult practice. ” (T2/135:1-13).  The Resolution also states, contrary to the record, that “the Applicant failed to demonstrate that the means of ingress and egress to the site conforms to the site plan standards and technical requirements of the Tourism District Land Development Rules and the Green Zone Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] See Weinberg v Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 250 (2002)  Conversely, the Attorney General of New Jersey can bring an action solely for injunctive relief and, therefore, does not have the ascertainable loss requirement.  Id.  As further set forth in Weinberg, 173 N.J. at 253 “Read sensibly, the statute allows a private cause of action to proceed for all available remedies, including an injunction, whenever a consumer can plead a claim of ascertainable loss that can survive a motion for summary judgment.  The legislative intent to permit a private cause of action under the Act would be frustrated if a private litigant, who succeeds in bringing such a claim to a jury, must gamble on whether he or she will prevail ultimately on proof of the loss in order to obtain attorneys' fees, when he or she otherwise proves unlawful conduct. ” (emphasis added).  Therefore with respect to injunctive relief, and contrary to that argued by [...] in its appellate brief, the only difference between a private attorney general (such as Plaintiff’s counsel) and the Attorney General of New Jersey is that the Attorney General of New Jersey does need to allege an ascertainable loss.  See [...] Brief, pp. 17-18  The CFA provides that both a private attorney general and the Attorney General of New Jersey can seek “injunctive relief”.  Further, the CFA does not differentiate between the type of injunctive relief either a private attorney general and the Attorney General of New Jersey may seek.  If the legislature intended to exclude “public injunctive relief” from private attorney’s general it would have done so.  Accordingly, this counters [...]’s argument that Plaintiff “…has no express authority to even assert such a claim under…the CFA…”.  See Defendant’s Brief, p. 11.  Here, [...] specifically excluded “public injunctive relief” from its definition of a “Dispute” (Section 7.4)(Ja37) in the New Jersey health club contract provided to Plaintiff and the putative class.
[brief] We, as members of an intermediate appellate court, are “bound to comply with the law established by the Supreme Court. ”  *State v. Steffanelli*, 133 N.J. Super. 512, 514 (App. Div. 1975).  We are not persuaded otherwise by defendant's reliance on the out-of-state opinion in *Commonwealth v. Crayton*, 21 N.E.3d 157 (Mass. 2014).
[brief] On June 12, 2008, the [...] filed a complaint for the condemnation of parts of the [...] property by eminent domain.  See [...] v. State, No. A-0959-17T2, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1888, *6 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Sep. 12, This was a good 10 months before the parties signed the PSA.  The condemnation proceeding arose in the context of a major construction project to eliminate the traffic circle at Routes 70 and 73.  (Da36).  As part of this project, [...] would take the lots which connected [...] Diner to Route 70 and Route 73, and [...] Diner would be left without viable public access for the duration of the project.  On September 19, 2008, over six months before the PSA was executed, the court entered an order permitting the [...] to exercise its power of eminent domain with respect to [...] Diner.  Da37.  [...] closed for business in November, 2008.  2T134.  By way of brief background, [...] Diner did not have frontage on either Route 70 or Route 73, despite its position at the circle where the two major roads intersected.  Since the early 1980s, [...], which owned [...] Diner, had enjoyed access to these routes through parcels which were leased or were the subject of access permits with the State and a private owner.  Da36.  As early as July 30, 2004, the [...] ([...]) issued Stavros Inc. a “Change of Access Letter,” which proposed eliminating the Route 70 access to [...] Diner.  --- 3  This is an unpublished opinion.  It is offered not as legal authority, but to establish the relevant facts of this case.  Da37.  On January 28, 2005, the State proposed eliminating the Route 73 access to the diner, and advised [...] of its right to a hearing.  There ensued meetings between [...] and the State, which were attended by Defendant personally on behalf of [...]  Da37.  On February 21, 2006, the [...] Commissioner issued a final access decision which left intact the State’s plan to revoke the diner’s access.  [...] did not appeal, accepting the [...] determination.  Da37.  In June of 2008, the State moved to proceed by eminent domain, and that application was granted in September, 2008, as the court appointed commissioners to set the amount of just compensation to be paid for the [...] property.  Da37.  Within the week or so prior to signing the PSA on April 10, 2009, Defendant received a letter from [...] canceling the lease of the state-owned lot which allowed [...] access to Route 70 (Da38); without doubt, the State’s condemnation was happening.
[brief] Thus, Plaintiff sought and obtained the Court’s permission to leave the witness stand and approach a video screen.  Plaintiff did not return to the stand thereafter and continued testifying while standing.  Without prompting from counsel, the Court subsequently observed that Plaintiff “walking all around the courtroom and the like” could distract the jury and instructed Plaintiff to “keep it a little tighter. ”  3T.50:22 to 51:26.  Finally, after Defendants’ motion for a new trial was denied, a motion for reconsideration was filed supported by the certification of Defendants’ insurance adjuster describing behavior not previously brought to the attention of counsel or the Court.
[brief] $90,000 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on October 7, 2015 to the [...]’ bank account #0319.  (36T 37:7-9).  - [...] was shown extracts of the [...] MR line of credit account from the company’s QuickBooks software and was able to tie the transfer of $90,000 from that account to an October 2015 bank statement, which showed the funds were transferred to an account ending in 0319, which Plaintiffs established belonged to the [...].  (23T 24:14-21).  **Misappropriation #7:**
[brief] (6T121:7 to 122:14.)  The [...] also identified deficiencies with respect to the classification exception areas (“CEAs”), for which [...] failed to submit the required applications at the time he submitted the RIR.  (4T115:2 to 116:10, 118:19 to 120:15; 6T24:13 to 25:14, 26:9 to 27:15, 122:9-14; Pa2288-91.)  Between August 2022 and April 2023, [...] exchanged numerous emails with the [...] and provided additional information and submittals regarding the CEAs.  (4T119:13 to 120:22; 6T24:13 to 25:14, 26:9 to 27:15; Pa2284-86; Pa2296-2305.)  The [...] approved the CEAs on June 29, 2023, with the caveat that such approval does not mean that further delineation will not be required.  (4T120:23 to 121:1; 6T27:4 to 28:4, 118:5-21.)  Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on April 28, 2022.
[brief] Directing your attention to page 12 of Exhibit P-8, your rebuttal testimony.  THE COURT: That was page 12, [...]?  MR. DICKSON: Yes, Your Honor.  THE COURT: Thank you.  [...]: Yes.  I have it.  BY MR. DICKSON:  Q.  At line 4 to line 7, this testimony contains a description of what I only consider to be a pretty serious consequence, equipment failures as well as high feed pressure into homes with potentially significant risk to lives and property.  Has this happened with the temporary regulator?  A.  No, it has not.  Q.  In the next paragraph, beginning at line 8 and concluding at line 13, you describe an icing condition severe enough to cause the downstream piping to freeze, causing infrastructure failure.  Such an incident occurred at one of the company's regulator stations in 1994.  Did I read that substantially correctly?  A.  Yes.  Q.  Has this happened since 1994, at any part of the company system?
[brief] As [...] noted in his Memorandum of Decision issued with his April 17, 2023, Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration and to Amend Order Granting Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, “[R]econsideration is especially appropriate in situations where an issue is not fully evaluated by the Court.  See Calcaterra v. Calcaterra, 206 N.J.Super. 398, 403-04 (App.Div. 1986). ” (Da1415).  [...]’s February 1, 2023, original attorneys’ fee award (1) eliminated over $82,000.00 in fees for attorneys [...], [...], and [...] (Da1394); (2) denied all costs (Da1394-95); (3) reduced the time of attorneys [...], [...], and [...] by 1,047.25 hours (Da1399); (4) further reduced the attorneys’ hours by 33% (Da1387-88); and (5) awarded an enhancement of 10%. (Da1402).
[brief] Again, in Casino Reinvestment Development (CRDA) v. Katz, 334 N.J. Super 473, 485 (Law Div. 2000), the case primarily relied upon by plaintiff, states:  “In assessing the earning power of a property, income is estimated using the income and expense history of the subject property, The Appraisal of Real Estate, (Appraisal Institute 11th ed. At 482. ”  Again, the point is that the New Jersey Courts continually rely upon and cite The Appraisal of Real Estate text.
[brief] As such, even had [...] done what Plaintiff asserts it should have done, it cannot be said as a matter of law that [...]’s conduct denied Plaintiff the benefit of its bargain.  See, e.g., *Ross v. Annunziata*, Nos. A-2806-10T, A-3520-10T1, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 453 *21-22 (App. Div. Feb. 29, 2012) (dismissing a breach of good faith claim where a purchase contract was terminated by the return of funds, and the defendant later purchased the subject property without the involvement of the plaintiff, and stating that “even if one assumes for argument's sake that defendants withheld information from [plaintiff] and otherwise failed to cooperate, [plaintiff] was unable to demonstrate that defendants’ actions materially contributed to his failure to satisfy the condition precedent. ”); Sackman Enters., Inc. v. 309 Asbury Corp., No. A-2723-04T2, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1126, at *17 (App. Div. June 2, 2006) (“Seller’s obligation to Buyer ceased when Buyer exercised its right to terminate the Contract of Sale under the due diligence clause.  Accordingly, Seller had no obligations to perform under the Contract of Sale, and no covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied.
[brief] 25  Franklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 2010 WL 2543579 (Mag. D. Colo. May 12, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 2543570 (D. Colo. June 22, 2010) ..................  27  GenBioPro, Inc. v. Sorsaia, 2023 WL 5490179 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 24, 2023)  .......................................  25  In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, 202 F. Supp.3d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ..........................
[brief] The New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A.  2A:24-8 and 9 sets forth the grounds upon which an arbitration award may be modified or vacated.  N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 states:  The court shall vacate the award in any of the following cases: a. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; b. Where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof; c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; d.  Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.  There are ample grounds to vacate an arbitration award.  The Act requires that an arbitration award be vacated by the Court where “the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means” or where “the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.  The scope of judicial review in the public sector is limited to determining whether there has been a mistake of law, a violation of public sector guidelines, and/or whether the interpretation of contract language by the arbitrator is “reasonably debatable. ”  *Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Associates, Inc.*, 135 N.J. 349, 358-365 (1994); *College of Morris Staff Association v. County College of Morris*, 100 N.J. 383, 389-391 (1985); *Faherty v. Faherty*, 97 N.J. 99, 109-111 (1984); *Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny*, 81 N.J. 208, 217 (1979).  Public employee arbitration awards are reviewed more extensively than their private counterparts.  *City Ass'n of Sup'rs and Adm'rs v. State Operated School Dist. of City of Newark*, 311 N.J. Super. 300, 309.  (Citation omitted).  Where an arbitrator is not arguably construing or applying the contract language and is acting outside the scope of his authority, the Court must overturn his decision.  *United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc.*, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).  “The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract. ”  *United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc.*, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).  For the reasons that follow, This Court must vacate the [...] because it was procured by undue means and the interpretation of the relevant contract language is not reasonably debatable (Point I, infra); furthermore, the Arbitrator has acted outside the scope of his authority and exceeded or so imperfectly executed his powers that a mutual, final, and definitive award upon the subject matter was not made (Point II, infra).
[brief] Montaquiza, 346 N.J. Super. at 318.  Res judicata is also inapplicable here because the relief sought by Respondent is nothing like the relief [...] sought (Da830; Da178; Da194).  On this point there can be no dispute.  [...] did not seek declaratory judgment over anything.  Instead, he sought a judicially created easement, either by necessity or by prescription (Da178; Da830).  Unlike [...], Respondent merely seeks the remedy of declaratory judgment based on the recorded land records following Appellants’ refusal to honor the [...]-to-[...] Deed (or [...]-to-[...] Deed) and because --- 4Respondent concedes that there exists commonality of parties and that there was a final judgment rendered by [...] previously, both of which satisfy the res judicata test.
[brief] [...] did not have proper notice of this Foreclosure action and were not personally served with the Complaint.  The Return of Service is facially defective and other facts exist to cast doubt upon its validity.  It is well settled that a judgment entered without notice or service is constitutionally infirm.  "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections."  Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).  Failure to give notice violates "the most rudimentary demands of due process of law."
[brief] The grant of Reconsideration is a form of extraordinary relief.  As this Court has explained:  “Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases [that] fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ”  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App.Div.1996) (quoting D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div.1990)); see also Fusco v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] During trial [...] tried to subvert his deposition testimony by claiming he had a second meeting with the [...] so he could go over all of the documents with [...].  [...] testified that the second meeting lasted maybe half an hour (4T:18316-19) and it consisted of discussion between [...] and [...] that she did not really participate in (4T185:16-23).  It is clear from the verdict that the jury rejected [...]’s testimony that he explained the English PSA to [...] in detail.
[brief] Substantial corroboration that [...] was presently engaged in criminal activity was therefore required.  [...]’s observations of [...] on August 23, 2018, did not provide that substantial corroboration.  According to the affidavit, [...] parked on the side of the road, and a man leaned into the car with his hands.  (Dca 7)  The interaction was brief, as [...] had departed by the time [...] circled the block.  (Dca 7)  While [...] wrote that, based on his training and experience, he believed a hand-to-hand transaction occurred, the facts are far too minimal to \(^9\)