ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A Grand Jury Standards Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006)  Page 11 of 18 presentment is a formal document presented by you to the public in which you report on findings and recommendations as to some aspect of public affairs or to some public evil or condition to which the attention of the community should be directed.  The Grand Jury is an independent investigative body that represents the public and may therefore inquire into matters affecting community morals, health, safety, and general welfare.  If the Grand Jury expresses an interest in returning a presentment, the Assignment Judge will be advised and you will receive further instructions.  Your deliberations will be presided over by your foreperson who will administer the oath to witnesses and sign all indictments and presentments.  Your deputy foreperson will act in the absence of your foreperson.  The Grand Jury consists of 23 members.
[brief] (Vol. 2 Pa. 184-287).  The service of 613 pages of documents three days before the discovery end date not only failed to meet the requirements of R. 4:17-7 because service of the documents was not 20 days prior to the discovery end date, but was extremely prejudicial since depositions of defendants’ representatives were scheduled for May 26, 2022.  Defense counsel asserts in his Statement of Procedural History that he agreed to produce [...] subsequent to the discovery end date and cites a transcript of a colloquy between counsel in which defense counsel agreed to produce [...] for a deposition after the discovery end date because [...] was “busy”. (Db 5, Footnote 2).  Defense counsel has not advised the court that he never withdrew his motion to bar discovery after the May 26, 2022, deadline and as a result of his motion and the denial of plaintiff’s motion to extend discovery [...] entered an Order barring the use of [...]’s deposition at trial because it occurred after the discovery end date.( Vol. 1 Pa. 133-134).  Defense counsel Statement of Procedural History omits any reference to his gamesmanship.
[brief] The Plaintiff --- having presented no substantive direct case --- over defendant's objection (13T50-19) was allowed to present as rebuttal witnesses Traffic Engineer [...], former Township Attorney [...], and former Township Engineer [...].  Traffic Engineer Rea testified that the absence of any legend or markings of vehicle parking in the School courtyard on the 1972 Site Plan did not necessarily mean that no parking could occur there.  He acknowledged no indicia that such parking was approved by the Planning or Zoning Board and that the Site Plan showed a concrete walkway in the courtyard.  (13T55-24 to 104-24)  Former officials Wouters and Staiger briefly testified about a 2013 Township Letter expressing their then opinion that the Synagogue chiseling out of a curb cut in 2013 in front of its Lot 8 was not illegal.  (13T111-6 to 125-4)  Continuing with improper "rebuttal" testimony, the [...] called [...] and [...], two long-time Lakewood residents.  Amanik was a school student from 1954 to 1961.  He had no knowledge of the 1963 Agreement.  He recalled parking his vehicle in the School courtyard on “infrequent” occasions in the 1970's, the 1990's.  Between 2000 and 2010 he occasionally observed vehicles parked there.  On the infrequent occasions he made these observations the School was likely not in session (13T144-13 to 151-22).  Pfeffer attended the School from 1990 to 2002.  His recollection was that in those years the Fifth Street Lot was not used for any parking (other than 1 school vehicle) and was a play/recreation area.  As to the School courtyard, he recalled seeing vehicles occasionally parked, although the students exited every day out the Sixth Street doorway and through that courtyard.  After 2002, he attended the Synagogue every Saturday and did not observe any vehicles parked in the School Courtyard.  (14T4-25 to 41-13)  That concluded the Plaintiff's entire case.
[brief] ”); Model Criminal Jury Charge, “Attempt”, at 1 n.3 (rev. June 16, 2009) (noting that jurors must be specifically instructed that the lesser mens reas of knowledge or recklessness that are sufficient for the substantive offense are insufficient for an attempt because “all attempts must be purposeful”).  Thus, “it would not be sufficient” for a conspiracy conviction “if the actor only believed that the result would be produced but did not consciously plan or desire to produce it. ”  Model Penal Code Commentaries, § 5.03 at 407-08.
[brief] There was no evidence presented that Plaintiffs were aware of SP 3 prior to the unauthorized activities complained of by Plaintiffs.  (Pa000380; Pa000294, page 105, line 14 to line 21; Pa000322, pg. 36, line 2 to 6; Pa000323, pg. 40, line 13 to line 24; Pa000325, pg. 49, line 14 to line 19).  [...] further testified that he was never made aware of the original site plans for the Project, which incorporated his Domino’s Property into the Project, and that he had **no** understanding that the Property was to be incorporated into the Project.  (Pa000326, pg. 52, line 15 to line 25; Pa000344, pg. 124, line 1 to line 20; Pa000775).  In addition, while the Plaintiffs acknowledged that they allowed access for the installation of the ASDS, Plaintiffs’ representative [...] previously certified and testified that he only permitted access and the installation of the system based upon the misleading description of the work to be performed as “minimal”.  He further certified that he would not have permitted access if the scope of the work had been accurately and fairly represented.  (Pa000619; Pa000777 at ¶ 19-20; Pa000333, page 80, line 2 to line 15; Pa000339, page 103, line 3 to line 14; Pa000371, page 232, line 4 to line 22; Pa000778-Pa000779 at ¶ 21-30).  Such alleged statements were material facts in dispute that should have precluded the entry of summary judgment.
[brief] *Id.* at 377.  There was no such record before the trial court here that could demonstrate a legitimate public purpose.  The record is devoid of any stated public use for Defendants’ Properties.  The Contract between the Township and Developer does not constrain the Developer’s use of the Properties.  (*See* Da30-44)  The Properties may be used for whatever purpose subject to obtaining appropriate land approvals.  Given the lack of a record before the trial court upon which to find a legitimate public purpose, Defendants are likely to succeed on the merits.
[brief] ” (1T52:15-53:9) (emphasis added).  The court’s decision inexplicably departs from established law that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the harm is imminent, concrete, and non-speculative to justify injunctive relief.  Subcarrier Commc’ns., 299 N.J. Super. at 638.  The court’s reasoning in finding irreparable harm rests purely on speculation and theoretical scenarios.  The court was not presented with any evidence (much less clear and convincing evidence) that Plaintiff needed financing from lenders for its proposed project or that financing would be jeopardized if an injunction were not granted.  Simply stated, there is no evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion.  Because the court’s finding is “‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice’” this Court owes no deference to it.  See Griepenburg, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484).
[brief] All of Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit.  Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant “breached” the settlement agreement by even raising the concept that fees are discretionary under the MMWA is wildly baseless.  Quite simply, as outlined above, fees are discretionary under the MMWA.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2).  More importantly, the settlement agreement required Plaintiff to file the motion for fees within 60 days of the execution of the release, a requirement Plaintiff undisputedly failed to meet.  Therefore, to the extent this Court considers whether a party is in “breach” of the settlement agreement, it should conclude that Plaintiff breached the agreement by failing to file the motion for attorney’s fees within the time allowed under the settlement agreement.
[directive] 16 h.  A crime involving the possession or use of a firearm; i.  Vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5; j. Aggravated assault that constitutes a second-degree crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b); k.  Disarming a law enforcement officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11; l. Kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1; m.  Aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a); n.  Second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; o. Extortion, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5; p.  Booby traps in manufacturing or distribution facilities, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(b); q.  Strict liability for drug induced deaths, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9; r.  Terrorism, N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2; s.  Producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents, or radiological devices, N.J.S.A. 2C: 38-3; t. Racketeering, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2; u.  Firearms trafficking, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(i); v. Causing or permitting a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act, N.J.S.A. 2C:24- 4(b)(3); or w.  An attempt or conspiracy to commit the crimes enumerated above.
[brief] (T22:23-24:8).  Indeed, [...] offered no evidence to rebut [...]’s position that the State’s past practice reflected the parties’ consistent interpretation of the language of the contract since the calculation was first delineated in 1987.  On the contrary, to accept [...]’s position that the parenthetical’s reference to the 2,080 divisor is plain language, this court would have to read those eleven words in isolation of the entire paragraph in which that parenthetical is located, and [...], [...]’s sole witness, could not provide any factual basis for that conclusion.  He was not present during the negotiations or drafting of the contract as he only joined [...] twenty-five years after the first instance the 2,080 divisor was included in the contract.
[brief] Mays v. Penza, 179 N.J.Super. 175, 180 (Law Div. 1980).  A party seeking such relief must satisfy a “particularly heavy burden. ”  Guaman v. Velez, 421 N.J.Super. 239, 247-248 (App.Div. 2011).  Injunctive relief should not be entered simply to maintain the status quo.  Courts have consistently held that restraining one’s conduct without a full hearing is extraordinary relief.  *Crowe v. De Gioia*, 90 N.J. 126, 132-134 (1982).  In order to grant the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief, it is imperative that the law concerning the underlying conduct must be well-settled by clear and convincing evidence.  In other words, the “well-settled legal right” must concern the substantive application of the law, not, as the Court found here, a procedural aspect of the litigation.  To the contrary here, the Court found that it is well-settled that the Attorney General can litigate to enforce the LAD.
[directive] New Jersey law enforcement agencies are required by this policy to disclose the entire internal affairs file of a candidate to prospective law enforcement employers.  See Section 9 (“Internal Affairs Records”).  Candidates with out-of-state law enforcement experience must sign waivers of confidentiality regarding their internal affairs files so that they may be reviewed by the prospective employer, where legally permissible.  These procedures may also be used for promotional testing, and assignment to especially sensitive responsibilities or those that pose the greatest opportunities for abuse or wrongdoing.  Each agency should establish policies and procedures for recruitment, oral and written examinations, selection and the promotional process.
[directive] If a firearm was possessed, answer questions 1 a, b and c.  If a firearm was not possessed, mark question 1a not applicable [NA] and answer questions 1b and c.  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w razie przyznania się do winy w odniesieniu do oskarżenia o którekolwiek 1. z następujących przestępstw: przywódca siatki handlu narkotykami (2C:35-3); prowadzenie placówki wytwarzającej niebezpieczną substancję kontrolowaną (2C:35-4); wytwarzanie niebezpiecznej substancji kontrolowanej (2C:35-5); rozprowadzanie, posiadanie lub wytwarzanie gamma-hydroksymasłowego (2C:35-5.2); soli kwasu rozprowadzanie, posiadanie lub wytwarzanie flunitrazepamu (2C:35-5.3); zatrudnianie osoby nieletniej do rozprowadzania narkotyków (2C:35-6); rozprowadzanie, wydawanie lub posiadanie z zamiarem rozprowadzania niebezpiecznej substancji kontrolowanej w odległości 1000 stóp od terenu szkoły (2C:35-7); rozprowadzanie, kontrolowanej w obrębie 500 stóp od wydawanie lub posiadanie niebezpiecznej substancji publicznego obiektu mieszkalnego, parku lub budynku publicznego (2C:35-7.1); albo rozprowadzanie, posiadanie lub wytwarzanie imitacji niebezpiecznej substancji kontrolowanej (2C:35-11)
[brief] Da53-56.  The trial court correctly concluded that the “limitations period for pay-when-able loans begins once the debtor is found able to repay the loan. ”  Da53; see Guerin, 38 N.J. Super. at 460 (on a pay-when-able loan, “the debt is not due until the defendant is capable of paying” and the “statute [of limitations] does not commence to run until at least that time”); see also Flynn, 2006 WL at *1 (“the statute of limitations on a ‘pay when able’ loan does not begin to run until the debtors are capable of paying the loan.  . . .”) (citing Guerin, supra).  3.  The Trial Court Properly Concluded That The Parties Entered Into A Pay-When-Able Loan on April 26, 2013.
[brief] (Da28-Da63).  And the Motion was only filed after it became apparent that other litigation decisions were not viable.  (2T41-11-25; 2T42-1-3; 2T46-4-25; 2T47, 2T48, 2T49).  Thus, where the motion is not filed within a reasonable time, the Court is not required to reach the merits of the motion to vacate under Rule 4:50-1(d), (e), and (f).  See Chartonavich, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537 at *5 (“[b]ecause we consider the reasonable time issue before we reach the merits of a motion to vacate under Rule 4:50-1(d), (e), and (f), we end our inquiry here. ”).  Identical to the facts, here, in Chartonavich, the appellant delayed in moving to vacate the default judgment six years after the judgment was entered and, as a result, this Court deferred to the Lower Court’s holding that the motion to vacate was not filed within a reasonable time.  Because it reached this conclusion, the Superior Court of New Jersey declined to reach the determination as to whether the debt was void under the NJCFLA.  So, too, should this Court hold.  No different here, the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in holding Appellant’s Motion was untimely and is barred by the doctrine of laches due to his failure to proceed with a motion to vacate his default until 2023 when he conceded to becoming aware of the Action in 2019.
[brief] The record, however, is devoid of any evidence of any documented complaints about any allegedly unsafe driving practices by [...].  Notably, [...] admitted in his deposition that the accident “was my error. ”  Pa238a.  Even with this admission, there is no dispute that [...] was an experienced driver, having logged approximately 15,000 hours driving sweepers as of July 11, 2014, and having worked “more than a few” jobs like the job where the incident occurred before that night.  Pa230a, Pa1469a.  There is no evidence that [...] was involved in any prior accidents while operating a sweeper.
[brief] On October 25, 2021, [...] (“Plaintiff”) filed a verified complaint against Shawn and [...] (“Defendants”).  (573a)  The complaint delineated several requests for relief, including: (1) the ejectment of Defendants from the Boonton Property; (2) damages for mesne profits; (3) a court order mandating that Defendants return any trust assets currently under their control; and (4) a judicial declaration confirming that Defendants are not entitled to purchase the Boonton Property.  On January 7, 2022, Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief was filed.  (583a)  [...] (“Co-Defendant”) was added as an interested party.  On January 10, 2022, a hearing was conducted by [...].  (1T)  On January 25, 2022, the Trial Court entered an Order (1) granting leave for Plaintiff’s amended complaint; (2) granting leave for Defendants’ counterclaim; (3) instructing the Trustee to order appraisals for the Boonton and Florida Properties based upon the Settlor’s date-of-death; and (4) instructing the parties, upon receipt of the appraisals, to attend a settlement conference with Deputy Surrogate [...].
[brief] Witness testimony squarely addressing the ultimate issue of a defendant’s guilt infringes upon the jury’s role and is unquestionably inadmissible under our well-established case law.  See State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393, 407 (2016) (citing State v. Reeds, 197 N.J. 280, 293 (2009)).  Here, [...] and [...] both answered the ultimate question at issue in the trial by testifying that [...] committed aggravated assault on a police officer.  This was plain error, denying [...] his right to a fair trial and requiring reversal of his convictions.  While a police officer witness may offer fact testimony, opinion testimony on an ultimate issue – such as the defendant’s guilt – is impermissible.  See State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 446-447 (2020) (holding admission of police officer’s testimony that defendant’s actions “appear to have been criminal” was error); see also State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 461 (2011) (reversing defendant’s convictions for C.D.S possession with intent to distribute where police officer gave inadmissible opinion testimony that he had observed drug transaction); Simms, 224 N.J. at 404 (holding admission of police officer’s statements to effect that C.D.S. transaction had occurred was error).
[brief] *See, e.g., Gibbins v. Kosuga*, 121 N.J. Super. 252 (Law Div. 1972); *Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Koslowsky*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100515, at *12 (D.N.J. July 31, 2015).  Relatedly, the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled when the defendant, “through either intentional or unintentional fraud or concealment . . . causes the plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his duty of inquiry into the facts.
[brief] *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 529 (citing *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)).  As the Appellate Division noted in *Swarts v. Sherwin-Williams Co.*, 244 N.J. Super. 170, 178 (App. Div. 1990):  Of particular import… is the word “genuine. ”  An opponent to a summary judgment motion cannot defeat the motion by raising a misguided subjective belief, without more, to create a genuine issue of material fact.  *Swarts*, 244 N.J. Super. at 178.  Plaintiff has offered no evidence to forestall summary judgment other than his own subjective and self-serving interpretation of events.  Plaintiff relies on his unsubstantiated “feeling” that he was locked out of the Absent Management system.  See Pb9 (“he had no notification and felt he was being intentionally eliminated .  . . .”)(emphasis added).  That “feeling” is contradicted by the evidence.  Despite having informed [...] of his EEOC submission on March 1st, Plaintiff received Absent Management updates on March 5th and March 8th.  See Pa13 at ¶¶22-23; Pa57 at ¶¶22-23.  Plaintiff conceded at his deposition that Chris [...] lacked the administrative privileges needed to remove Plaintiff from the Absent Management system.  Pa15 at ¶34; Pa57 at ¶34.  Plaintiff could not identify anyone who may have assisted [...] in removing Plaintiff from Absent Management.
[directive] INTRODUCTION  In April 1992, an Advisory Group was established by the Attorney General to establish a statewide standard for training K-9 teams, that is, police officer handler- police dog teams, utilized in New Jersey law enforcement.  This group, comprised of K-9 officers and representatives from various types of law enforcement agencies throughout New Jersey, was to examine relevant training issues and suggest recommendations for a uniform, statewide training standard.  K-9 teams are of significant value in law enforcement in detecting evidence, in tracking persons who are lost, in tracking suspects sought by police, and in protecting police officers and deterring criminal activity.  A statewide survey reveals that K-9 units or teams exist in all 21 counties.  There are K-9 units operating in state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies statewide.  K-9 units are also maintained by some correctional facilities and transit authorities.  The proper and effective use of K-9 teams in police work and law enforcement is grounded in a basic training program which encompasses the knowledge and skills necessary to utilize the police dog in the field.  In-service training is then needed to ensure that required basic skills are maintained.  For these reasons, minimum mandatory statewide training standards have been developed for implementation by law enforcement agency executives in those agencies that have K-9 units or teams.
[brief] A.  Special Rules Apply When Construing The Rutgers Act.  The residency requirements as they appear in the Rutgers Act are as follows:  The membership of the board of governors shall be classified as follows and consist of: a. the president of the corporation, serving as an ex officio non-voting member; and b. 15 voting members, i. seven of whom shall be appointed by the Governor of the State, with the advice and consent of the Senate, with one of these members being a resident of Camden County, and one of whom shall be appointed by the Governor upon the recommendation of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the General Assembly and who shall be a resident of Essex County, and ii. seven of whom shall be appointed by the board of trustees, from among their members, one of whom shall be a resident of Essex County and one of whom shall be a resident of Middlesex County, elected and serving under the provisions of subsection I.c. or I.d. of 18A:65-15.  [N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14 (emphasis added.)]  As applied to [...], the residency requirement clearly applied at the time of appointment.
[brief] This factual history was corroborated by [...], the representative of the landlord, [...], who testified as follows in his deposition (his references to Bogatz are to [...], inhouse counsel for [...]s):  Q.  So as of this date, the folks at [...]s are preparing that the rent payment will not be paid by [...]; is that right?  A. Yes.  Q.  And given your frequent contact with [...] and familiarity with the situation, had [...] made his rent payment, would [...] have proceeded with the lease and gone forward?  A. Yes.  Q.  And after the initial notice, which was previously marked and is dated September 5th, do you recall whether you heard from or had any conversations with [...] after the notice had been sent out?
[brief] Our courts recognize the tort of spoliation.  *Jerista v. Murray*, 185 N.J. 175, 201 (2005) *(See Rosenblit v. Zimmerman*, 166 N.J. 391, 400-01 (2001)).  While a duty to preserve evidence is not boundless, a duty arises when there is: (1) pending or probable litigation; (2) knowledge by the party of the existence or likelihood of litigation; (3) foreseeability of harm or prejudice to another party if the evidence were discarded; and (4) evidence relevant to the litigation.  *Hirsch v. General Motors Corp.*, 266 N.J. Super. 222, 250-51 (Law Div. 1993).  An analysis of these factors as applied to the facts of this case overwhelmingly shows that [...] had an affirmative duty and was under an obligation to preserve all surveillance footage, preceding and including the point of impact, that day.