ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Not Are Risks)  Manage Might That Services the by posed risks) the that determines prosecutor the where cases be may There or monitoring of form some only by managed adequately can be release upon defendant not is or otherwise program services pretrial the by provided is not that service intervention is that activity criminal defendant's a example, of way  By risk(s).  mitigate the to available funds acquire to committed burglaries residential or robberies (e.g., addiction her or his to related court- participating a in interrupted by be might dependency) drug defendant's the support to Court  Drug Jersey's New of success proven the by shown as program, treatment ordered of cycle vicious break the to incentives and opportunities treatment provides which Program, include might conditions release (pretrial 2A:162-17(b)(2)(i) N.J.S.A. See crime. and addiction dependency") alcohol or drug for . treatment . available "undergo defendant the that be not might treatment pretrial that recognized Legislature the that note to added (emphasis and interpretation statutory reasonable of matter a As 6.2.4. subsection also See available). detention pretrial from immune to be deemed be not should defendant a policy, public sound the manage to sufficient been have might theory in conditions release unavailable because trial. pending release defendant's by posed risks) identified of provisions other the with accordance in determines prosecutor if the cases, such In pretrial the at argue shall prosecutor detention, the pretrial seek to Directive this of Section 7 of combination or condition no purposes, legal and practical for that, hearing detention the required, when court in appearance defendant's the assure reasonably would conditions not will defendant that and community, or the person other any of safety of the protection shall prosecutor the words, other In process. justice criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct by posed risks) if the Reform Law Bail under the authorized detention is pretrial that argue of a unavailability practical the to due unabated and serious remain will release defendant's risk(s). the mitigated have might otherwise condition that release pretrial seek presumption to creating a as construed be shall subsection in this Nothing a address to on how prosecutors to guidance uniform provides subsection this Rather, detention. condition any if law of matter a ordered as be cannot detention pretrial that argument defense defendant's assure the reasonably would 2A:162-17(b) N.J.S.A. by authorized expressly or the person other any of safety of the protection the required, when court in appearance justice criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct not will defendant that and community, to (provisions Section 13 also See available.
[brief] Will not result in a significant adverse impact on the environment.  [2]  Has been conceived and designed in such a manner that it will not significantly impair natural processes.  [3]  Will not place a disproportionate or excessive demand upon the total resources available to the project site or to the impact area.  Here, the record before the Board demonstrates unequivocally that the submitted Subdivision Application conformed in all respects with the MLUL and [...] Ordinances.
[brief] 7, 9, 10, 17-19, 22, 23, 32 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 ......................................................... 2, 3, 26 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181 ......................................................... 24 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-210 ......................................................... 7, 25 New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, Title 34, Chapter 13A ....................................................... 16 OTHER AUTHORITIES Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5.1 on R. 2:6-2 (2022) .................................................. 1 “New Jersey Standards For Appellate Review” by [...], Director, Central Appellate Research Staff, Appellate Division, New Jersey Superior Court (August 2022 Revision), citing, Mandel, N.J. Appellate Practice §34:2-3 (2022) ........................................................................ 26, 28 APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW Standards for Appellate review are the guidelines used by Appellate Courts to answer this question: was the error that occurred in a trial court or administrative agency so serious that it requires reversal or other intervention by the Appellate Court?
[brief] Appellant argues that it was error for the Court below to enter a stipulation of dismissal that dismissed Respondent’s claims against [...] that he did not have advance notice would be entered.  In support of this argument, Appellant cites a case discussing the denial of a motion to vacate such a dismissal, Burns v. Hoboken Rent Leveling & Stabilization Bd., 429 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 2013).  While the Burns court found the error harmless and affirmed, the more important issue is that Burns analyzed the denial of a motion to vacate the dismissal, because Appellant never filed a motion to vacate the issue below.  Inasmuch as this issue does not “go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest,” this Court should disregard this point.  Monek v. Borough of South River, 354 N.J. Super. 442, 456, 808 (App. Div. 2002).  POINT VIII:
[brief] Similarly, the PCR judge incorrectly recalled that the evidence revealed the cabbie’s final destination with defendant as [...]’s residence, which he also erroneously observed was in [...].  (14T 50-15 to 51-6; 19T 17-2 to 11).  Moreover, the PCR judge erred by inferring from the evidence that defendant’s trial attorney “was unaware of the existence” of the two alibi witnesses before the jury’s guilty verdict.  (19T 18-6 to 9).  Although defense counsel’s memory regarding any specific decisions or discussions was sparse, he did not deny that defendant told him about the two witnesses.  (14T 20-16 to 22-1, 23-24 to 24-20, 25-8 to 26-11).  Indeed, defendant testified at the PCR hearing that he asked defense counsel to interview both [...] and [...].  (18T 17-4 to 9, 22-9 to 12).  Be that as it may, the PCR judge inappropriately discredited defendant’s testimony where he mistakenly found that defendant claimed defense counsel interviewed one of the alibi witnesses while neither the trial attorney nor the witness recalled any such pretrial meeting.  (19T 14-12 to 18).  Accordingly, this court does not owe the PCR judge’s credibility determinations any deference.
[brief] [...]’s testimony “roundly” rejecting the idea of purchasing with Defendants, does not meet the standard.  (25a)  Further, Plaintiff’s desire to reform the Trust language in favor of herself and Co-Defendant, does not meet the standard.  This mistake granted [...] the power to sell the Florida Property to herself and the Boonton Property to [...], at below-market prices, contrary to the terms and purposes of the Trust.
[brief] In a recent unrelated matter, [...] acted in the same manner as I did.  [...] was a pro se plaintiff in a Law Division case, [...], where he clearly lacked standing.  The defense attorney advised him of this and sent him a R. 1:4-8 letter, but he never withdraw his claims.  So then 28 days later the defense attorney filed a motion to dismiss and for sanctions, which he did not even oppose.
[brief] 1.  The trial court applied the wrong standard in denying [...]’s motion to withdraw.  The trial court conducted an analysis under *State v. Slater*, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), but the proper question was whether [...] should be permitted to withdraw pursuant to R. 3:9-3(f), which governs plea withdrawals following successful appeals of pretrial motions.  2.  The trial court erred in denying [...]’s motion.  Rule 3:9-3(f) permits withdrawal when a defendant successfully appeals from a pretrial ruling.  This rule applies where, as here, the defendant [...] simultaneously pleads to multiple indictments.  See *State v. Diloreto*, 362 N.J. Super 600, 616 n.6 (App. Div. 2003).  The rationale behind this rule is rooted in basic principles of contract law and fundamental fairness.  3.  Without the providence and protection of Court Rule. 3:9-3(f), that gives [...] the right to decide to withdraw his plea, [...] would have went to trial, and never took any plea deal.  On March 19th, 2024, Jamar [...] oral argument took place, on March 19th, 2024 [...] SOA oral argument was decided and denied (Da 74-84).  On March 28th, 2024 [...] defense filed a motion for reconsideration to the appellate court (Da 85-91).
[brief] (Da 31-42).  As part of a pretrial investigation, defendant desired his trial attorney to interview [...] and [...] and analyze the cellular telephone data provided by the State during discovery.  (18T 15-4 to 16-6, 17-4 to 9, 22-1 to 3, 22-9 to 12).  At defendant’s PCR evidentiary hearing, the trial attorney testified that he did not recall any specific communications with defendant, (14T 21-18 to 21, 23-24 to 24-20, 25-8 to 26-11), but remembered, albeit not in detail, the cellular telephone data produced, (14T 29-14 to 19, 31-11 to 16).  LEGAL ARGUMENT WHERE A PCR JUDGE'S CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS ARE SO WIDE OF THE MARK THAT A MISTAKE MUST HAVE BEEN MADE, THIS COURT OWES NO DEFERENCE TO THE JUDGE'S FACTUAL FINDINGS OR INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM.
[brief] ”  Simmons, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 306 at *21-22).  (Da18)  On remand, the case was again before [...] for resentencing.  (2T)  The court again ran the certain persons offense consecutive to the robbery, reasoning:  I ran the possession of a weapon concurrent to the first-degree robbery because the weapon was used in the robbery and it should run concurrent.  However, a certain person is a separate and distinct offense apart from possession of a weapon.  Its own distinctive element of having a previous conviction, a felony conviction, which would not allow a person to have a gun.  And that being a separate crime, pursuant to State versus Yarbough,\(^3\) separate crime, separate instances deserve consecutive sentences which is why I imposed it.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Hon. [...], ALJ, order granting [...]’s motion to participate, March 11, 2015.  ALJ Kennedy’s order denying Respondent’s motion to dismiss, July 24, 2015.  Hon. [...], ALJ, order denying Petitioners’ motion for summary decision, July 19, 2016.  ALJ Metzger’s order granting [...]’s motion to participate, October 4, 2016.  Hon. [...], ALJ, order denying Respondents’ motion to adjourn; denying [...]’s motion for summary judgment; and denying Respondents’ motion to bar Petitioners’ expert witnesses, January 22, 2018.  ALJ Scarola’s order granting Petitioners’ motion to reopen the record; denying the BOE’s second motion to intervene; ordering Petitioners to file an amended petition and ordering Respondents to file an answer, August 20, 2018.  ALJ Scarola’s order denying [...] third motion to intervene, October 9, 2018.  ALJ Scarola’s order denying Respondents’ second motion to dismiss, January 8, 2019.  ALJ Scarola’s order asking the parties to stipulate to matters in the public record, July 29, 2019.  Initial Decision, Administrative Law Judge, March 1, 2021  Final Decision, Commissioner of Education, July 16, 2021.  Appellate Decision reversing the Final Decision and remanding to the Commissioner of Education “with instructions for the agency to consider the substantive arguments pertaining to the SFRA,” March 6, 2023.  Final Decision on the remand, Commissioner of Education, April 1, 2024.  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] Maintain housing if treatment in  Address any recommended medical/dental needs, needed Engage with Cooperate supervision  Demonstrate addressing people, places, and things treatment  Begin attending recovery groups, recommended by Review plan case as if follow  Develop and a financial plan, appropriate, per plan case other  Every week office visits as Monthly home visits Random drug tests (minimum * week)  2x 3  Adaptive Habilitation Minimum 120 Days.
[brief] The unusual aspect of my case is that I was out of work on a medical leave (FMLA), starting on September 9, 2021, and could not access my work emails while on medical leave during the critical months before my February 1, 2022 retirement.  But for my being on a medical leave, I would have had access to my work emails and may have learned that I was two months short of the required 10 years of service credit needed for my full retirement benefits.  Such a lack of service credit would typically have been remedied by the purchase of service credit by the employee.  Unfortunately, I never returned to work from my medical leave before retiring and was not notified until after my retirement that, in light of my retirement, I could not purchase any service credits.  (I was paid for one day, called an “administrative day,” in February of 2022 at the suggestion of the [...] solely to avoid a gap in my health insurance.)  Obviously, had the [...] advised me before my retirement that I was two months short of the 10 years of service credit needed for full retirement benefits, I would have remedied the problem by purchasing the necessary service credit (two months).  I had no reason to question the December 28, 2021 letter from the [...] stating that I would have the requisite service credit when I retired on February 1, 2022.  There is no dispute that the sole reason for the recalculation of my service credit was due to an error by my former employer.  Pa72 (the erroneous “information [was] provided by your former employer. ”)  Now, I am faced with the reduction of my monthly pension benefit and the total elimination of my life insurance benefit ($9,952.12) through no fault of my own.  Since I relied to my detriment on the information provided to me by the [...] while I was on medical leave (without access to my work emails) during the chaos of the pandemic, I should be permitted to purchase the two months service credit (the estimated cost of purchasing the two months service credit is $614.72) to give me the requisite 10 years service credit needed for both my full pension and life insurance benefit.
[brief] Exhibit 4, Deposition of [...], dated April 7, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 5, [...], Site Specific Safety Program and Procedures Manual, filed May 31, 2018 (Volume 6 of 15 – Pa970 to Pa1165) (Volume 7 of 15 – Pa1166 to P1359a) Exhibit 6, Deposition of [...], dated March 30, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 7, Deposition of [...], dated March 24, 2017, filed May 31, 2018 (Volume 8 of 15 – Pa1360 to Pa1560) Exhibit 8, Photographs, dated July 11, 2014, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 9, Deposition of [...], dated March 9, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 10, Deposition of [...], dated March 9, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 11, Deposition of [...], dated March 1, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 12, Deposition of [...], dated March 7, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 13, Deposition of [...], dated October 3, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 14, Deposition of [...], dated March 24, 2017, filed May 31, 2018 (Volume 9 of 15 – Pa1561 to Pa1760) Exhibit 15, Deposition of [...], dated May 10, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 16, Deposition of [...], dated June 2, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 17, Deposition of [...], dated June 2, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 18, Meeting Minutes, dated July 29, 2014, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 19, Emails, dated August 17 and 25, 2015, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 19, Crisdel Internal Traffic Control Plan Worksheet, undated, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 20, Deposition of [...], dated April 25, 2017, filed May 31, 2018  Exhibit 21, OSHA letter with citations and penalties, dated January 12, 2015, filed May 31, 2018  Movant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, filed June 14, 2018
[brief] Petitioner provided no affidavits from any individual with personal knowledge of the relevant facts or any competent evidentiary materials.  Petitioner only provided his attorney's certification with conclusory uncorroborated allegations and argument about the relevant statute.  Petitioner did not even provide a statement of material facts, which is specifically required by R. 4:46-2(a).  Summary judgment requirements are not optional.  Petitioner's failure to provide the required statement alone warranted the denial of the motion.  Petitioner's "proofs" consisted of nothing more than his attorney's certification of conclusory allegations, a copy of Executive Order No. 103 signed by Governor [...], a one-page document labeled, "Essential Employees," which is guidance promulgated by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, an Advisory Memorandum, and a CISA Memorandum, touching on workers that are essential to critical infrastructure.
[brief] Hearing Testimony Concerning the [...] Report  During his opening statement at the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel referenced an April 22, 2015 Bridge Inspection Report as purportedly evidencing the defendants’ knowledge of a dangerous condition months before the date of plaintiff’s accident.  (3T22:17-23:5).  This report was then identified during [...]’s testimony as the 2015 Biennial Bridge Inspection Report prepared by the engineering firm [...] (“[...]”) for the [...].  (Pa1343 and Da2).  On direct examination, [...] testified that on page 16-7 of the report, [...] noted settlement in the southbound roadway at the north bridge approach and that the same condition is memorialized by Photo 14 on page 16-23 of the report.  (3T69:8-73:19, Pa1343, and Da2).  [...] then testified that on page 16-6 of the same report, [...] made a repair recommendation to address the described condition.  [...] testified that this repair recommendation supported his conclusion that a dangerous condition existed as of the date of the report.  (3T73:20-75:8); (Pa1343 and Da2).  [...] did not testify on direct examination as to [...]'s evaluation of the significance of the roadway condition identified within its report.  On cross-examination, [...] made multiple material concessions concerning the content of [...]’s report.  As an initial matter, [...] acknowledged that he had no basis to opine that [...] was provided with [...]'s 2015 bridge inspection report or had any knowledge of the report at any point prior to the date of plaintiff’s accident in September 2015.  (3T160:15-161:4).  [...] also acknowledged that within its report [...] assessed the subject roadway condition as "fair" rather than "poor" or dangerous or a condition in need of emergency repair.  (3T135:13-137:8; 177:22-178:24).  Further, [...] recognized that [...] recommended a maintenance repair, as opposed to an emergency repair, to address the subject roadway condition.  (3T139:2-5).  [...] further conceded that [...]’s description of the roadway condition as involving settlement of “up to 2 inches” allowed for the possibility that the actual settlement measured less than 2 inches.  (3T175:13-176:16).  Hearing Testimony Concerning the T&M Memo
[directive] See note 8.  The determination as to what constitutes a reasonable period of time to delay the charging decision while awaiting the results of the automated pretrial risk-assessment process following Live Scan fingerprinting shall be based on the administrative burdens placed on the department by the delay (e.g., the need to re-assign an officer from patrol/call-for-service duties to stay in the station to monitor the defendant held in custody, the need for the arresting officer to return to patrol duty, etc.).  Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize delay to the extent that the defendant is not presented to a judge or other judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest as required by Rule 3:4-1.
[brief] Nash v. Lerner, 157 N.J. 535 (1999) ...........................................  14  Nunez v. Gallo, 2018 WL 6836109 (App. Div. Dec. 31, 2018)  ............ 32, 34 Padilla v. Young II An, 257 N.J. 540 (2024) ........................................... 16, 17 Qian v. Toll Brothers. Inc., 223 N.J. 124 (2015) ......................................... 16, 27, 34 Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479 (2020) ............................................. 10  Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981) ............................................ 14, 15, 16, 18 Yanhko v. Fane, 70 N.J. 528 (1976) .............................................. 14 RULES R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E) ..................................................
[brief] DEMONSTRATES THAT FRAUD ACT CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE RESOLVED THROUGH NFADR .........  2  A. Rules of Statutory Interpretation..................  9  B.  The Trial Court's Ruling Misinterprets What Constitutes a “PIP Dispute”  Under The 1983 Amendment and the 1998 Amendment to the No-Fault Statute...............................  10  C.  Compelling Insurance Carriers and/or Defendants to Resolve Fraud Act Claims Through the NFADR Process Deprives all Parties of Their Right to a Jury Trial...........................................  18  D.  Insurance Carriers Cannot be Compelled to Resolve Fraud Act Claims via the NFADR Process Since They Cannot be Awarded Damages.......  19 E.  The Inability of Parties to Obtain Discovery in NFADR Proceedings  Demonstrates That Fraud Act Cases are Meant to be Resolved in the Superior Court.................................  24 F.  Resolving Fraud Act Claims via NFADR Violates the Goals of The Entire Controversy Doctrine..........  28  G.  Compelling Fraud Act Claims to be Resolved Through the NFADR Process deprives the Commissioner of Insurance of its Ability to Intervene in This Matter .......  31  Conclusion .................................................  32  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS ON APPEAL  October 27, 2023  Order granting the [...]’ Motion to Compel Arbitration……………………………………Pa0001 October 27, 2023  Order granting the [...]’ Motion to Dismiss…………………………………………………Pa0009  October 27, 2023  Order granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss………………………………………………………Pa0016  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Certification of [...] .................. ICAa 001
[brief] Most of cases listed, including Defazio v. Quality Auto Exchange Corp. and [...], Docket No. [...] were in Northern New Jersey vicinages and individual actions.  See [...] Certification, ¶¶35-38 (Pa49-50).  Furthermore, Plaintiff also submitted three certifications that Counsel’s hourly rate ($475.00/hr. at those times) was reasonable.  Id., ¶39-41, Exs F-H (Pa50, 132-150).
[brief] Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents: [...], improperly plead as [...], [...] Rail Operations, and [...]; [...], improperly plead as [...]; [...], improperly plead as [...], [...], and [...] Washington Division; and [...].  [...], Administratrix of the Estate of [...]; [...], Guardian Ad Litem for [...], an infant, Plaintiff, v. [...]; [...] Rail Operations, Inc.; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] Washington Division; [...]; [...], [...], Defendants.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY OF NEW JERSEY, LAW
[brief] [...] WAS PERFORMING INELIGIBLE DEMOLITION WORK ON THE DATE OF THE [...]IDENT  Plaintiffs argue that enrollment in the CCIP was mandatory for work by all subcontractors at the Project, and therefore [...] must have been enrolled in the CCIP.  (Pb6, 20 and 45.)  This is simply not true.  Rather, the CCIP does not permit certain contractors, including those performing demolition, like [...], from enrolling in it.  In fact, the CCIP Binder identifies several types of work at the Project that are not eligible for enrollment stating, in relevant part, that “…NO COVERAGE WILL BE PROVIDED TO … DEMOLITION… AT THE PROJECT SITE(S).
[brief] Later that day, Juror 12 notified the court that she knew witness [...]’s mother, but that she didn’t know that earlier because he had a different last name.  Notably, Cooper only testified to calling 9-1-1 and finding the body, which was uncontroversial information and had no reason to engender unnatural sympathy.  Once again, she affirmed that this relationship would not affect her impartiality.  (24T 111-14 to 112-24).  These exchanges clearly demonstrate that Juror 12’s did not have any relationships of significance with respect to the State, the witnesses, or the victim.