ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **ARGUMENT**  The following are point-by-point counter arguments to the arguments of the Response:  1.  **LEGAL CITATIONS OF THE RESPONSE ARE DEFICIENT. **  Via its *Standard of Review*, pp. 10-11, the Response presents elaborate citations, in arguing that the decisions below should be affirmed.  The said citations appear to be a copy and paste search results from “Lexis+AI” for “New Jersey standards of appellate review,” which fail to satisfy the bar to legally exonerate the *Harmful Errors* below.  To show this, the appellant incorporates by reference the statements made via his *Appellate Brief*, pp. 17-34, as if fully set forth within, which show the manifested (1) unjust results, *State v. Mohammed*, 226 N.J. 71, 87 (2016), and (2) undermined fairness, *State v. Weaver*, 219 N.J. 131, 15 (2014), below against the appellant.  II.
[brief] The report notes the critical role played by reducing natural gas consumption in the buildings sector:  Residential and commercial buildings account for the second largest share (26%) of the state's GHG emissions, accounting for 24.6 MMT CO2e in 2018.  In order to achieve the 80x50 goal, emissions from the residential and commercial building sectors must be reduced by 89% to 2.7 MMT CO2e by 2050.  Space and water heating account for the majority of emissions from these sectors, with 87% of residential buildings and 82% of commercial buildings relying predominantly on natural gas.  [Ha118, emphasis added.]
[brief] The Schmidt Court confirmed the long-held tenet that policies issued pursuant to compulsory insurance requirements could not undermine that goal.  "In short, the terms of a policy issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-78 cannot conflict with the statutory mandate that there be coverage provided for all occupational injuries."  Id. at 49 (emphasis added).  Any effort to exclude coverage for work-related injury claims resulting in bodily injury is a violation of N.J.S.A. 34:15-72.  Id. at 51-52.  In analogous circumstances, this Court in Bellafronte v. Gen. Motors Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 533 (1977), held that coverage arising from statute cannot be limited by an insurance contract.
[directive] Fecha/Date Acusado/Defendant Abogado Defensor/Defense Attorney Fiscal/Prosecutor Formulario promulgado por la directriz # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Spanish página 2 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Spanish page 2 of 2
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...]  A/K/A [...], Defendant-Appellant.  Criminal Action On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] 4.  The parties may communicate any questions/concerns about the sale to the Attorney…(Da30).  This Order did not supersede, alter, amend or in any way vacate any provisions of the Consent Order relating to the sale of the Subject Property.  (Da30, Da395).  Thus, paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21 which relate to the sale of the Subject Property are still binding on all parties to the Consent Judgment, including the requirement for unanimous consent on all major decisions relating to the Subject Property.
[brief] In particular, she asked [...] whether his identification of her client outside the presence of the jury was “because he's the only person sitting here. ”  [...] answered, “no. ”  We emphasize that at the point defense counsel asked [...] about his out-of-court identification of defendant, there had been no questions from the State pertaining to either an in-court identification before the jury or identification made by [...] a few minutes earlier during the Rule 104(a) hearing.
[brief] Aa274-76.  This finding was inconsistent with the purpose of the rule governing summary judgment.  The summary judgment rule set forth in Rule 4:46–2 “serve[s] two competing jurisprudential philosophies”: first, “the desire to afford every litigant who has a bona fide cause of action or defense the opportunity to fully expose his case,” and second, to guard “against groundless claims and frivolous defenses,” thus saving the resources of the parties and the court.
[brief] Although disqualification is a harsh discretionary remedy that is only to be used sparingly and calls for a *painstaking* analysis of the facts, the trial court failed to undertake such a painstaking analysis, entirely misapprehended (and misapplied) the controlling law, and failed to appreciate that the disqualification motion was a transparent litigation tactic, having been delayed without excuse for over a year and only filed at the eleventh hour when this matter was on for arbitration and trial in early 2025.  First, the trial court erred and should not have disqualified [...] since Respondents [...]  (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...],” and together with [...], “Respondents”) failed to demonstrate that the instant matter and prior matters involving [...]’s representation of Respondents were substantially related, a requirement for disqualification.  Second, the trial court erred since Respondents never specifically identified or pinpointed the confidential information that was purportedly disclosed to [...] in connection with the prior matters.  Instead, Respondents asserted that “[...] Financials” -- a term that is vague, amorphous, and undefined -- were disclosed, and that [...] has information about Respondents’ attitudes towards litigation.  Third, RPC 1.9(c) was not argued by Respondents and is not an independent basis for disqualification in any event.  Nevertheless, even though the trial court found that there was no violation of RPC 1.9, it nonetheless disqualified [...] under RPC 1.9(c) which merely restricts how information can be used but does not provide an independent basis for disqualification.  Fourth, the trial court erred in permitting Respondents to submit [...]’s Certification (the “Certification”) *in camera* and *ex parte*, after previously denying the request on the record at oral argument, thereby running afoul of the constitutional guarantees of due process.  As such, it was impossible for [...] to rebut the contentions contained therein.  Indeed, Respondents argue circuitously that this *in camera* review was necessary to prevent [...] from reviewing information that Respondents purport [...] already has.  Fifth, even assuming *arguendo* that Respondents sufficiently demonstrated (they have not) that confidential information was revealed to [...], the trial court still erred since Respondents failed to demonstrate that the alleged confidential information is prejudicial.  Finally, the trial court further erred since Respondents should not have been permitted to inexcusably delay the filing of the Disqualification Motion for over a year, after the parties had exchanged voluminous paper discovery, engaged in substantial motion practice and, most egregiously, *after* arbitration and trial were already scheduled.  Thus, for the reasons more fully set forth below, this Court should reverse the Court’s Order disqualifying [...].  Due process requires nothing less.
[brief] The Board operates a kindergarten to eighth grade school district.  On May 16, 2023, the Board adopted Policy 8463 entitled “Parental Notice of Material Circumstances” which provided for parental notification of facts and/or circumstances materially impacting students’ physical and/or mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being (the “Original Policy”) (Da1-2).  The next day, Plaintiffs filed: (1) a Complaint alleging that the Original Policy discriminated against students on the basis of gender identity, gender expression and affectional or sexual orientation in violation of the New Jersey Law against Discrimination (“LAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. (Da3-23); and (2) an Order to Show Cause (“OTSC”) application seeking temporary and preliminary restraints against the Original Policy pending disposition of Plaintiffs’ administrative complaint with the Division on Civil Rights (“DCR”) challenging the policy’s legality.
[brief] An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).  Additionally, this court gives “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”  State v. Malik, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2003).  In reading statutory language, courts will give words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary.  *In Re Young*, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010).  Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.  The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4)).]  Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.
[brief] 1:7-6.  If in any application authorized in this chapter, the court shall adjudge any law or joint resolution, or any part thereof, to be void, the clerk of the court shall thereupon make a true copy of the judgment, certify the same under his hand and seal of the court and deliver the copy to the Governor or person administering the government, who shall issue his proclamation under the great seal of the State, setting forth such judgment.
[brief] [...]’s longtime attorney, [...], prepared a caveat for [...] to file.  When [...] took the caveat to the [...], he was advised that [...] had just probated [...]’s Will earlier that morning.  [...] gave the Will to [...].  Shortly thereafter, [...] told [...] that he spoke with [...], and [...] told [...] he was representing both [...] and [...].  [...] suggested to [...] he retain separate counsel and advised him there could be a conflict of interest in the future.  However, no evidence was produced that [...] did, in fact, retain [...], fully justified in believing that the lawsuit [...] was filing was sufficient to represent his interests as well.  Moreover, the trial court gave undue weight to the parties’ actions after the statute of limitations expired.
[directive] Definitions:  Home detention with limited exceptions (HDLE):  Home detention with limited exceptions requires a defendant to remain confined to a designated residence 24 hours/7 days a week.  Defendants may leave the residence to (1) attend in-person court appearances, (2) attend in- person pretrial appointments with Pretrial Services or in-person Probation appointments, (3) attend in-person attorney appointments after providing 48-hour notice to PSP, or (4) for any preapproved by court order.  other reason  Additionally: •  Defendants ordered to HDLE will be subject to random remote home detention checks by PSP officers.  During these checks, defendants must confirm their location via an appropriate method.  For example, by, video reporting, or via another visual representation, such as a verifiable, contemporaneous photograph depicting the defendant in front of an identifiable landmark at their home.  •  Prior to ordering HDLE, the court shall enter into a colloquy on the record with the defendant to ascertain their ability to comply with this condition.  If the court determines the defendant will not be able to comply with this condition, the court shall not order HDLE.  Similarly, if a defendant is ordered to HDLE who does not participate in video reporting and cannot provide contemporaneous video or photographic evidence to show that they are home during a remote home detention check, the defendant’s matter must be referred to the court to modify this condition.  Upon referral, the court must determine whether the defendant is able to comply with HDLE, including that the defendant has the ability to verify that he or she is home during a random remote home detention check, and must remove or modify this condition if the court determines that the defendant is unable to comply.  •  Noncompliance with HD conditions in the release order or in notices provided to the defendant shall constitute a violation.  Special care must be taken when ordering HDLE.  Courts must consider that defendants who are permitted to leave their residence are not actively monitored while outside of their house.  Therefore, it may be more appropriate for a defendant to be ordered to Strict HD which is stricter than HDLE.
[brief] 2 N.J.S.A. § 13:20-1 to -35.  3 N.J.S.A. § 13:20-2.  4 N.J.S.A. § 13:20-28(a).  reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility, provided that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of this [A]ct.
[brief] On October 31, 2022, a Hudson County grand jury returned superseding [...] ("Indictment") charging [...] ("defendant") in twenty counts with: first-degree maintaining or operating a CDS production facility contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (Count 1); first-degree possession with intent to distribute 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 5b(1) (Count 2); first-degree possession with intent to distribute lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 5b(6) (Count 3); second-degree possession with intent to distribute cocaine contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 5b(2) (Count 4); third-degree possession with intent to distribute ketamine contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 5b(13) (Count 5); second-degree possession with intent to distribute alprazolam contrary to N.J.S.A 2C:35-10.5(a)(4) (Count 6); five counts of second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within five-hundred feet of a public housing facility contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (Counts 7 to 11); five counts of third-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS within one-thousand feet of a school zone contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (Counts 12 to 16); and, four counts of third-degree possession of CDS contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (Counts 17 to 20).
[brief] Pa17-18.  Plaintiff maintains that this Court should reverse the trial court’s ruling and revisit the Appellate Division case law relied upon by the trial court.  The Legislature could not have intended to fully immunize from any civil responsibility a defendant such as [...], who negligently struck and killed the Plaintiff while engaging in conduct that had no inherent connection to the scope of her employment with the hospital.  Indeed, Defendant [...] never even clocked in or worked at all on the day of the crash.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 immunizes a defendant from a civil action if he or she “was in the same employ as the person injured or killed [....]”  This Court has explained that the determinative factor that prevents suit against a co-employee is whether the defendant co-employee is in the course of employment when the injury occurs.  See Mule v. NJM, 356 N.J. Super. 289, 394 (App. Div. 2003).  In Mule, this Court stated that  The fact that a car accident occurs on an employer’s property between two co-employees, and that injury to the employee who is in the course of her employment at the time is compensable at the time is compensable under the Worker’s Compensation Act, does not automatically mean that the injured employee’s common law claim against the other is barred by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  The critical question is whether both employees were in the course of their employment at the time the accident occurred.  If not, the fact that both motorists were co-employees is without legal significance.  [Mule, 356 N.J. Super. at 394 (emphasis added). ]  Further, in Manole v. Carvellas, this Court found that “If [Defendant] was not yet within the scope of his employment when the vehicles collided, the fact that he was also a [co-employee] would be a mere coincidence without legal significance, and plaintiff would be as free to sue him in a third-party action as anyone else. ”  Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138, 143 (App. Div. 1988) (emphasis added).  Here, the trial court cited the case of Konitch v. Hartung, 81 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 1963), certif. denied, 41 N.J. 389 (1964), which held that when one employee, who arrived for work and was walking through an employer-provided parking lot, was struck by a vehicle driven by another employee who was also arriving to work, no civil suit could be filed against the co-employee.
[brief] Plaintiff’s reliance upon this Court’s decision in Tucci v. Tropicana Casino & Resort, Inc., 364 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 2003) is misplaced.  The facts in Tucci are clearly distinguishable, because in that case, the plaintiff’s expert report was served.  The issue in Tucci was whether the trial court had abused its discretion by barring the report because it was late.  Tucci v. Tropicana Casino & Resort, Inc., 364 N.J. Super. at 51.  In this case, by contrast, the plaintiff’s expert reports were never served.  Moreover, the expert whose report the plaintiff intended to serve, [...], is not even qualified to testify that hematologist [...] was negligent.  On appeal, plaintiff offers no evidence that she would have ever been able to prove her claims against [...].  She provides neither evidence of circumstances that prevented her attorney from obtaining a report from an expert hematologist, nor evidence of what steps had been taken to do so.  The various additional decisions cited by plaintiff in “Point D” of her brief are equally unavailing because they arise from cases in which claims were dismissed as a sanction in circumstances where a party had failed to comply with some discovery obligation, or in circumstances where a party had failed to appear for trial.  See, e.g., Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chem. & Pollution Scis., Inc., 105 N.J. 464 (1987) (defendant’s counterclaim dismissed for failure to make discovery as directed by court’s order); Irani v. K-Mart Corp., 281 N.J.
[brief] This is so because the employer’s statutory duty, under both Article 1 and Article 2, to provide for the complete payment of any obligation he may incur to an injured employee by virtue of the Workers’ Compensation Law.  Since this duty must be implemented, if not by self-insurance, then by insurance from a company authorized “to engage in workmen’s compensation or employer’s liability insurance in this state,” N.J.S.A. 34:15-78, we cannot conceive of a legislative intent not to include somewhere within such policy the claim of a minor who is injured while at work and opts to pursue his common law remedy for damages against the employer.
[brief] As was amply demonstrated to the Trial Court, [...]’s absence on the evening of August 22, 2022 was irrelevant because the Objectors did not finish cross-examining the Homeowners’ witnesses on August 22, 2022 and, as such, were not ready to recall [...] to testify at that time in any event.  (Pa584-585).  Furthermore, at the continued rehearing on September 12, 2022, the Objectors did, in fact, call [...] to testify and he was subject to cross-examination.
[brief] AURORA DID NOT ASSERT ANY CLAIM AGAINST PRIME  [...] never pled any cause of action against [...], let alone for judgment pursuant to the MCS-90 endorsement.  [...] attempts to “explain-away” this fatal omission by arguing that it had standing to sue [...] for a money judgment pursuant to the MCS-90 endorsement.  Standing to sue [...] is not the issue: the issue is that [...] does not (cannot) dispute that it never sued [...] for a money judgment; in fact, [...] never so much as answered [...]’s counterclaim for declaratory judgment!
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  T1  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] PUBLIC WORKS, CONGREGATION  TIFERETH ISRAEL, ABC COMPANIES 1-10 (names for fictitious entities), JOHN DOES 1-10 (names for fictitious individuals), ABC COMPANIES 11-20 (names for fictitious entities) and JOHN DOES 11-20 (names for fictitious individuals), Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON GRANT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY
[brief] THE COURT BELOW MISSTATED THE RULING OF AN EARLIER COURT REGARDING THE NEED FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY.  (Pa12)  In his January 23, 2023 “Statement of Reasons” supporting denial of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Summary Judgment (Pa18), and in his “Statement of Reasons” supporting his initial grant of summary judgment (Pa5), [...] relied on an earlier, September 29, 2020, ruling by [...] in this case (Pa1-2), which [...] asserted required Plaintiff to obtain an expert report finding [...] to be “at fault for the alleged grading error.
[brief] (Da839)  On December 21, 2017, [...] filed an Order to Show Cause to Enforce Litigant's Rights, (Da210 to 237) asserting non-compliance with the Final Order, primarily in allowing its students to walk in the school courtyard among Synagogue parked vehicles.  Opposition was filed by [...] (Da238 to 276).  A hearing was conducted on February 14, 2018 and the Trial Court entered an Order awarding sanctions and attorney’s fees to [...] on March 6, 2018 (Da2285) and March 26, 2018 (Da292), with a Statement of Reasons.
[directive] See AG Directive 2021-5, Section II.A (non-enforceability by third parties).  4.4  Notice When Using BWCs Inside a Private Residence.  Prior to entering a private residence, a law enforcement officer shall notify the occupant that the occupant is being recorded by the BWC and, if the occupant requests the officer to discontinue use of the officer’s BWC the officer shall immediately discontinue use of the BWC unless the officer is actively engaged in investigating the commission of a criminal offense, or is responding to an emergency, or reasonably believes that the officer will be required to use constructive authority or force.  A request to discontinue the use of a BWC made to a law enforcement officer pursuant to this Section and the response to the request shall be recorded by the recording system prior to discontinuing use of the recording system.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 7