ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Even if this court were to find that postcards were a required mode of notice under the Ricci Act, the Board substantially complied by mailing them within thirty-two (instead of thirty) days of the effective date of the statute.  To suggest that such a minimal delay in sending over 200,000 postcards somehow eliminates the statutory deadline for filing claims would be an absurd result, and one this court should not accept.  See Regis, 208 N.J. at 449 (“[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”) (citation omitted).
[brief] 18  Friendship Manor, Inc. v. Greiman, 244 N.J. Super. 104 (App. Div. 1990) ............................................. 26, 38 Fulton Bank of New Jersey v. Casa Eleganza, LLC., 473 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 2022) ............................................. 15, 45  Garden of Memories, Inc. v. Forest Lawn Mem'l Park Ass'n., 109 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div. 1970) ............................................. 24, 32, ........................................................................................................ 34, 38, ........................................................................................................ 40
[brief] The 1972 Approved Site Plan, with the concurrence of plaintiff, is conclusive evidence that the plaintiff never had any permanent parking easement, and that any claim to a parking license on the School site was certainly waived and terminated.  The approved Site Plan. (Da934) shows the Fifth Street lot adjacent to the School with the legend “Paved Recreation and Parking Area”, and is the area designated and approved for parking vehicles for the School use and/or guests.
[brief] 4.  Judge ruled that “I am denying any reconsideration of [Trust payments for] fees, or awarding any [from [...] March 23, 2023 application for [...]’s $33,716 legal fees.] –  [In Mar. 7, ‘23 Order]  I awarded over $90,000 [$93,277] for [...] legal fees, We ordered [$17,649 for [...] accounting] fees, we ordered [$2,039 for [...]’s] commissions”  “So I am going to deny Mr. [...]'s application [for $33,716 legal fees]”
[brief] (8T63-11 to 64-17).  However, the judge found that defendant had been apprised of his Miranda rights two days prior and never invoked his right to counsel; but regardless, throughout booking, defendant was not interrogated.  (8T74-2 to 75-1).  The judge noted that the detectives’ body language indicated that they tried to ignore defendant and did not attempt to question him.  (8T75-2 to 13).  The judge likewise credited [...]’s interruptions informing defendant that he would be able to give a statement after booking.  (8T75-14 to 76-3).  In sum, the court ruled that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statements at booking were “voluntary in every way that [they] possibly can be. ” (8T76-25 to 79-16).
[directive] As the Third Circuit observed, "Congress `lacks the power compel the to directly to States require or prohibit' which acts itself Congress may require or prohibit."  Id. at (quoting New York v. United 227 States.  505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).  That federal courts licensing of have found the regime the Sports Wagering Act to be PASPA preempted by does not invalidate the Sports Wagering repeal of prohibitions Act's against the operation of sports pools by casinos and racetracks.  Recognizing that the Sports Wagering Act the might be challenged under PASPA, Legislature included a "severability clause" in its statute:  or  If any provision of this act, P.L. 2011, c. 231(C.5:12A-1 et al), its person or circumstance is held invalid, the application to any of other provisions or applications this act shall not affect invalidity invalid provision or given effect without the which can be of aze severable. provisions act application, and to end the this this 5:12-2(g)•] J•S•A• fN directly not of statute that are the provisions the intended for therefore Legislature The clear, the sports and as Third Circuit made Here, as the force and effect. in continue invalidated to repealing States from prohibit PASPA does not Justice conceded, Department of the leagues and of prohibitions against Wagering Act's repeal The Sports wagering. on sports prohibitions state-law licensing or otherwise without given effect can be racetracks casinos and wagering in sports and, accordingly, decision, Third Circuit's prohibited the by wagering, sports bylaw as authorizing N.J.S.A. 1:1-10. be given effect. must provisions least, the at General that, Attorney of the the view reasons, it is foregoing the For operating for liability criminal racetracks from and exempting casinos Act Wagering Sports the of operate a sports may casino states that "a which 5:12A-2(a), N.J.S.A. pool—specifically, sports a those terms are how with accordance in pool," operate sports a racetrack may that "a and pool" prosecuting and enforcement all law and and effect, force 5:12A-1—remain in N.J.S.A. defined in by that shall abide New Jersey of State of the under the laws their duties out carrying agencies in exemption.
[brief] Defendant also relies on unpublished decisions.  Db14 (citing to Miller (Pa127) and Mhrez (Da60)).  Those decisions did not consider the Senate Report’s Section-By-Section Summary of § 1692c(b) and failed to observe the Report’s reference to friends, neighbors, relatives, and employers was not in the context of § 1692c(b).  The result from following the Federal Decisions is not absurd because the result does not frustrate any FDCPA purpose.
[brief] The silver Tuscon seen in the surveillance videos was later determined to be the same one found outside the hospital emergency room.  (11T 34-3 to 12; 11T 42-6 to 13)  Its driver-side window was broken, there were two bullet holes in the driver-side door, and a bullet was lodged in the interior frame of one of the windows.  (11T 14-11 to 15-2; 11T 16-13 to 19)  A hospital security guard showed the police a bullet fragment that had been found on the floor of the emergency room.  The police recovered it as evidence.  (11T 25-18 to 26-8)  The State did not call either of the two victims as a witness.
[brief] Defendants cannot deny they had a duty to attempt some independent investigate before blindly relying on [...] when making their baseless, false, and outrageous accusations against [...].  “Although failure to investigate fully will not by itself be sufficient to prove actual malice, a failure to pursue the most obvious available sources for corroboration may be clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. ”  *Costello v. Ocean Cnty. Observer*, 136 N.J. 594, 615 (1994) (emphasis added).  Here, it is clear that the most obvious available sources for corroboration—[...] herself, the Student herself, the Student’s family, or other persons who were in the room—were never pursued by the Defendants, providing further evidence of their actual malice.  Thus, when Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, briefing on the [...]’ Motions to Dismiss, and the Amplification Order are viewed through the lens of what *Neuwirth actually said* about actual malice, it is clear that this case is replete with factual allegations going to the actual malice of each of the Defendants.  Contrary to the [...]’ distortion of *Neuwirth*, there is more than one way to plead actual malice, and point-by-point allegations about what the [...] said or thought behind the scenes is not required at the pleading stage where a story is “wholly unbelievable” or the informant may be one of “dubious veracity. ”  *See* Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 66, 101, (Da 016, 023-24 & 035-36), Amplification Order at pp. 5-8 (Da 215-218).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Indeed, the *Declaratory Judgments Act* provides in relevant part that:  A person *interested* under a … municipal ordinance … may have determined any question of … validity arising under the … ordinance … and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.  (Emphasis added).  [N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53]  Further, the *MLUL* defines an “interested party” as a person “… whose right to use, acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action taken …”, and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72, confers upon “… all *interested* parties …” the right to appeal or otherwise challenge a local municipal land use determination.
[brief] As he walked towards the corner of MLK Drive and Stegman Street, [...] reported the alleged shooting to the appropriate precinct.  As he neared the store, [...] heard the sound of gunshots and saw simultaneous flashes from the store's window.  He confirmed via radio that shots were being fired and requested immediate backup.  When he was approximately fifteen feet away from the store, [...] saw defendants leaving the store and “brandishing weapons. ”  By the time [...] arrived, “the gunshots had stopped;” it was at this point that [...] saw a man he recognized as [...] “just laying there lifeless” in the doorway of the store.  What occurred next can best be characterized as the real-life equivalent of a fictional police drama.
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to one of the following first or second degree crimes, on or after June 29, 2001: or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime, that occurred murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, disarming a law enforcement officer, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, aggravated arson by placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, burglary, theft by extortion by obtaining property of another by threatening to inflict bodily injury on, or physically confine or booby traps in manufacturing or distributing of CDS facilities or strict liability for drug restrain anyone or commit another offense, occurred on or after June 18, 2002: induced deaths; or that terrorism, or producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological occurred on or after January 13, 2008: agents or nuclear or radiological devices; or that first degree racketeering; or that occurred on or after August 14, 2013: occurred on or after November 1, 2013: child pornography; or that firearms trafficking.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS OF TRANSCRIPT(S) | DATE OF PROCEEDING | REFERENCE | |--------------------|-----------| | October 13, 2023 | T | --- 1  The various transcripts included in the appendix are all exhibits to the Certification of [...].  They served as evidence submitted to the motion judge and are of the meetings before Defendant-Respondent [...] (the “[...]”).  These exhibits are not stenographic transcripts of the arguments or testimony that form the record below in the Superior Court and therefore are not to be excluded pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(1).  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Moreover, although the trial court found otherwise, additional factors compound with [...]’s misrepresentations to further compel finding an involuntary waiver and statement.  For example, the trial court failed to consider that [...] told [...] at the beginning of the interrogation that he had gotten high on “dope” and “coke” that day.  (1T 28-13 to 21)  Even if [...] was not so intoxicated such that he was incapable of communicating, State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51, 64 (App. Div. 1994), the impact of drugs on his mental state is still one of several circumstances weighing in favor of finding [...]’s waiver involuntary.  Additionally, [...] used particularly coercive tactics to compel [...] to further incriminate himself, including stating that [...] would think [...] to be “just a cold-blooded individual who just went into a business and beat the shit of somebody” if he failed to satisfactorily explain his presence in [...].  (7T 180-10 to 13)  This interrogation tactic comes straight from step seven\(^4\) of the “Reid technique”—an interrogation method that many scholars argue is so coercive that it may elicit false confessions.  See, e.g., Timothy E. Moore & C. Lindsay Fitzsimmons, Justice Imperiled: False Confessions and the Reid Technique, 57 Crim. L. Q. 509 (2011); Kiera Janzen, Coerced Fate: How Negotiation Models Lead to False Confessions, 109 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 71, 90-91 (2019) (“[T]he Reid Technique may lead to coerced and false confessions. ”); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook 36-37 (2003) (describing the Reid technique as “inherently coercive” and stating that there is “ample evidence” it can lead to false confessions).  Under the totality of circumstances, [...]’s statements must be suppressed.
[brief] Plaintiff’s sole response to this argument—and the rest of [...]’s arguments below—is that Section 1.29 released only related claims that had accrued by the date of final judgment, which had yet to be “asserted or alleged” by the [...] class members as of that date, but which could have been “asserted or alleged” sometime “in the future” absent the entry of final judgment and dismissal of the complaint.  Pb20–Pb21.
[brief] Da1-49.  The defendants included 27 primary, excess,\(^1\) and umbrella insurers. \(^2\)  [...] pled that each primary insurer had a duty to defend and was obligated to pay in full for the expenditures made by [...] to defend the [...] Action and respond to certain government orders whereby [...] incurred alleged costs associated with the cleanup.  Da94, ¶¶ 237-243.  While [...] also sought a declaration and breach of contract damages for the duty to indemnify, i.e. [...]’s Indemnity Claim, it did not, at the outset of the DJ Action, actively pursue the indemnity counts in the Second Amended Complaint since those were not ripe and were stayed throughout much of the DJ Action.  As the DJ Action progressed, [...] sought to delay the litigation of [...]’s Indemnity Claim and made it clear that it filed suit to obtain a --- \(^1\) [...] has not pursued its claims against the excess insurers, which are not exposed by the totality of [...]’s alleged damages, because of where the excess policies attach.  \(^2\)  [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] (“[...]”); [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...] Da50-51.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b), in order to find that a “complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense” is frivolous, the judge must find on the basis of the “pleadings, discovery, or the evidence presented” that action was “commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury” or that the “nonprevailing party knew, or should have known, that the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b).  “A claim will be deemed frivolous or groundless when no rational argument can be advanced in its support, when it is not supported by any credible evidence, when a reasonable person could not have expected its success, or when it is completely untenable. ”  *Belfer v. Merling*, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144 (App. Div. 1999), citing *Fagas v. Scott*, 251 N.J. Super. 169, 189 (Law Div. 1991).
[brief] (Pa191-199; Pa200-209; Pa210-219; Pa220-230; Pa231-244).  Public opposition to the proposed development emerged in the course of the virtual public hearings that challenged the nature of the proposed development even though the Property has been zoned as Industrial for several decades.  (3T)  Importantly, [...]’s I-Zone District has always allowed warehouse/distribution uses on the Property, and the proposed development is in substantial compliance with applicable bulk and area standards.
[brief] Even if Plaintiffs chose to rebut the point, a case they cited in their trial court brief but now omit, Haack v. Ranieri, 83 N.J. Super. 526 (Law Div. 1964), conclusively supports Defendants’ position.  In that case, an unsuccessful candidate for a municipal council position sought to oust the winner of the election, alleging he had failed to satisfy the voter registration/residency requirement.  Id. at 529.  The plaintiff waited nearly six months before filing suit, which the court found was “long after the 45 days allowed” under the predecessor to Rule 4:69-6(a).  Id. at 539.  An elective office was at stake in Haack (as compared to a volunteer BOG position in this case).  Presumably, the public interest is at its highest when an elective office is at issue.  Nonetheless, the court in Haack found that nothing justified an extension of the filing deadline.  As the court explained, the plaintiff “has slept on her rights in a situation where the compelling need for a policy of repose is obvious. ”  Id. at 540.  The same is true here.  In support of their continuing violations argument, Plaintiffs cite Borough of Princeton v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135 (2000), but that case does not help their cause.  There, the Supreme Court extended the forty-five-day limitations period contained in Rule 4:69-6(a) in a case involving waste disposal contracts.  The Court held that such contracts were subject to the local bidding law and, because the contracts had not been bid, “the reduction in competition resulting from the extended term . . . constitutes a continuing impairment both of the solid waste management industry’s right under the [bidding law] to the regular re-bidding of public contracts, and of the public’s right to the protections afforded by an open market. ”  Id. at 153.  The case at bar is very different.  Here, there are no public contracts at issue (BOG members are unpaid), and there is no manipulation of any market that could harm consumers.  If anything, it is the misapplication of the quo warranto statute that has harmed the Rutgers community and impaired the work of the BOG by causing the sudden ouster of one of its longstanding members.  Simply put, the Borough of Princeton case is inapposite and thus holds no sway in the analysis.  II.
[brief] Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1975); Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 587-89 (1927); accord, e.g., French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430, 436-39 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rosales-Rodriguez, 289 F. 3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002); Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1997); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 828 A.2d 1009, 1014-16 (Pa. 2003).  Similarly, New Jersey law prohibits a judge from making ex parte communications to a deliberating jury.
[brief] Defendant [...] now appeals and, through his assigned counsel, raises the following arguments:  POINT I  THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE REPEATED PLAYING OF THE COMPOSITE POLICE SURVEILLANCE TAPE DURING TRIAL  PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE PREJUDICIAL IMPACT THAT PERMITTING THE VICTIM'S SISTERS TO REMAIN IN THE COURTROOM HAD ON THE JURY.  POINT III  THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED BECAUSE OF A VIOLATION OF THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER.  POINT IV  THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED WHEN THE PROSECUTOR ELICITED TESTIMONY FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD INFER THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS A “BAD PERSON. ”  (Not Raised Below)  POINT V  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES OF MANSLAUGHTER AND AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER ON COUNT TWO.  (Not Raised Below)  POINT VI  THE AGGREGATE BASE CUSTODIAL SENTENCE OF LIFE PLUS 25 YEARS WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
[brief] \(^{83}\)  Contract principles more readily respond to claims for economic --- \(^{80}\)  See, e.g., *Lee v. Carter-Reed Co.*, 203 N.J. 496 (2010).  \(^{81}\)  *Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P.*, 149 N.J. 620, 624 (1997).  \(^{82}\)  *Highlands Ins. Co. v. Hobbs Grp., LLC*, 373 F.3d 347, 356 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing *Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc.*, 170 N.J. 297, 315 (2002)).  \(^{83}\)  *See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 98 N.J. 555, 579 (1985).
[brief] The record before this Court is quite clear: [...] was within the course of his employment with [...] when the Accident occurred.  That fact is not disputed by anyone.  The miscommunication between [...] and [...] about which cut-through to utilize does not amount to “different theories of liability. ”  Liability for the happening of the Accident that is attributed to [...] will also be attributed to [...], vicariously.  Likewise, if [...] is not found liable, then [...] will not be held liable.  Thus, both [...]’ and [...]’s defense strategies in this litigation are very much aligned - that is - to minimize the apportionment of liability attributed to [...], which, in turn, would minimize [...]’s vicarious liability as his employer.
[brief] Around midnight on May 7, 2011, a 7-Eleven was robbed.  At approximately 12:15 a.m., Sergeant [...] of the [...] received a transmission about the armed robbery, which “had just occurred. ”  Horan testified that the dispatch described the suspects “as two Black males, one with a handgun. ”  Horan activated the lights and sirens on his marked patrol car and drove towards the 7-Eleven.  Approximately three-quarters of a mile from the 7-Eleven, Horan saw a car approaching in the oncoming traffic lane.  Using the spotlight mounted to his police vehicle to illuminate the inside of the car, he observed that the occupants were a man and a woman and let them pass.  Sergeant Horan testified that as he continued on, a second set of headlights approached.  He illuminated the inside of the vehicle and observed three Black males; “[t]he description of the suspects was two Black males so at that point I decided to issue a motor vehicle stop on the second vehicle. ”  Horan later explained that he was also struck by the lack of reaction to the spotlight by the occupants of the car, and that he “took into consideration the short distance from the scene, as well as the short amount of time from the call” as he made the stop.  Upon stopping the vehicle, Sergeant Horan radioed headquarters with the license plate number and a description of the car, and two more officers arrived.  Before he approached the vehicle, Horan learned from one of the other officers that the robbery suspects had been wearing dark or black clothing or jackets.  As he approached, Horan observed “some dark jackets” on the unoccupied rear passenger seat and on the floor of the vehicle.  Horan spoke with the driver, who was later identified as [...].  [...] was sitting in the passenger seat and [...] was in the rear passenger-side seat.  The dispatcher advised Horan that the vehicle had been reported stolen.  All three occupants were placed under arrest.  More officers arrived on the scene, and while several officers secured the arrestees, others assisted Horan in searching for a weapon.  First, Horan retrieved the clothing he had observed from the backseat of the vehicle.  Then, he and the other officers searched other parts of the vehicle, locating additional clothing in the trunk and a black semi-automatic handgun under the hood.  Searches of the men themselves yielded just under $600 cash.  Approximately $600 was reported stolen from the 7-Eleven.  The vehicle was then impounded, and police transported the three men to the police station.  [...] pled guilty to two weapons offenses and agreed to testify against [...] and [...], who jointly moved to suppress the physical evidence seized from the stop.  The trial court granted the motion in part as to the items seized from the trunk and the hood.  But the court found that the initial stop was supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion, that the retrieval of clothing from the interior of the vehicle was permitted under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, and that the money was lawfully seized incident to defendants’ arrest.