ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Once a party applied to set aside a report from the Boundary Commissioners under N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3, a trial court has all of the authority it would normally have to adjudicate a dispute.  The Report of the Boundary Commissioners should have been set aside due to the fact that it involves property rights of parties not before the trial court.  The Final Order of the trial court is inconsistent with the position of the trial court on the scope of its authority.  This case should be remanded for further proceedings to either resolve the dispute between the parties or join other affected parties who could fully participate in a renewed process from the outset.  Alternatively, the Boundary Commissioners’ Report could be rejected with the [...] and [...] being left to whatever further remedies may be available to them.  These positions are taken without prejudice to the [...]’ position at trial that the trial court had the authority to adopt the Ludwig Line proposed by the [...] which would not affect any other lots.  The [...] maintain that the only real solution in this case is to either adopt the Ludwig Line, or to reject the Report of the Boundary Commissioners on the basis that its *ultra vires* nature affects parties not properly before the trial court.
[brief] Da139.  Additionally, [...], who reported to the scene of the accident, confirmed that if the traffic lights for northbound/southbound traffic on State Highway 54 were yellow, then the traffic light for westbound traffic on Jackson Road had to have been red at the time [...] entered the intersection.  3T:108-10 to 14.  There is an overwhelming amount of evidence that Defendant [...] ran the red light.  Plaintiff testified that she was “very close” to the intersection when she observed the traffic light controlling traffic on Route 54 turn from green to yellow.  3T:169-20 to 22.  She was so close that she had determined that she was going to drive through the intersection with the yellow light and did not slow down or attempt to stop.  3T:187-20 to 188-4.  Plaintiff also testified that she was traveling approximately 55 miles per hour as she approached the intersection.  Ibid.  [...] testified that he was traveling about 60 miles per hour when he observed the light controlling traffic on Route 54 turn from green to yellow.  3T:147-8 to 10.  It is undisputed that the impact between [...]’s vehicle and Plaintiff’s vehicle occurred north of the intersection.  3T:186-2 to 4; Da158; Da159.  This means that [...] had to be even closer to the intersection than Plaintiff when the light turned yellow.  [...] testified that his statement that he was 200 feet from the intersection when the light changed was only an estimate.  3T:147-1 to 7.  However, he also testified that when the light changed to yellow, he determined that he was too close to safely stop and decided to proceed through the intersection with the yellow light.  3T:159-25 to 160-6.  He also testified that he did not speed up as he approached the intersection.  3T:150-15 to 21.  Both Plaintiff’s vehicle and [...]’s vehicle were traveling at similar speeds and the impact occurred on the north side of the intersection.  That means [...] almost completely cleared the intersection traveling south to north.  Under these facts it is simply illogical to conclude that [...] was negligent, but Plaintiff was not.  The jury’s verdict assigning [...] 40% of the fault for this accident is miscarriage of justice and should be vacated.
[brief] Here, the fact that the [...] have been in litigation over these and related issues for nearly twenty years speaks to the severity and substantial distress caused to them.  The [...] have suffered the severe distress caused by the wrongful and persistent default/foreclosure path assigned to their loan - without any effort by the plaintiff to correct the wrongful assignment and related notations of default that never occurred.  The investor billables for the foreclosure related fees, approximately $250,000, still have not been addressed by plaintiff or the court below and continues to cause severe emotional distress in particular to [...].  It is unknown as to where the [...] refinance money was applied other than to [...] (sub-servicer to [...]).  No medical or expert proof is required to establish a prima facie case of emotional distress damages worthy of trial.  The [...] are senior citizens with substantial equity in the home they have owned for so many years.  They have suffered emotional distress from the malicious acts and process that plaintiff has caused and repeatedly refused to remedy, Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2001).  No reasonable person could state that malicious continuation of process, and failure to rectify the wrongful default/foreclosure assignment, is not cause for serious emotional distress to such senior citizens.
[brief] Defendant here did not dispute the contents of the surveillance video – that it depicted a burglary of [...]; he disputed that it was him on that video, proffering only an alibi in defense.  The State countered this defense with the presentation of various [...] employees – defendant’s bosses (one of whom was a life-long friend) and coworker – and eyewitness [...], all of whom identified the defendant as the burglar depicted in the surveillance videos.  The jury too had access to these videos (and still photos from these videos) to themselves judge the similarities between the burglar and the man before them, with his distinctive red hair, beard and chest tattoo.  All of the State’s identification witnesses were subject to cross-examination with regard to their motivations.  Thus, the jury had multiple avenues before them to judge for themselves both the identity of the perpetrator and the credibility of these witness identifications.  Moreover, much of what defendant finds objectionable about the sergeant’s testimony is testimony that had already been provided by other witnesses.  [...] himself testified about the messiness of the tool room, claiming that you could not even find the light switch in that room.  [...] himself testified that the tavern’s surveillance cameras were not hidden, with some being completely visible to the public.  [...] testified that he did not retrieve the key for the tavern from the defendant after his termination.  Mr. [...] testified to having seen the defendant specifically in the tavern at the time of the burglary, notably finding defendant’s after-hours presence at the tavern not noteworthy because he believed defendant was still an employee.  [...] testified to recognizing the backpack that was worn by the burglar as a backpack similar to one he had seen the defendant always in possession of.  Numerous witnesses testified to the damage to the basement office and the money boxes inside based not on the videos, but on their personal observation of the office immediately after the burglary.  [...]’s testimony did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  Defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.
[brief] Likewise, [...] was subpoenaed by the trial court to appear on behalf of the defense; however, [...] refused to come from state prison to testify.  (15T:20-16 to 22-3).  The State called detective [...] as a rebuttal witness.  Detective Raynor testified that once [...] was identified as a potential witness in October of 2021, he was tasked with interviewing [...] again.  Detective Raynor testified that [...] did not want to provide a statement to police.  (15T:135-25 to 137-10).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE STATE’S SUMMATION DID NOT INFRINGE ON DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO HAVE THE JURY FAIRLY EVALUATE THE MERITS OF HIS DEFENSE.
[brief] [...] worsened his invalid denials of my Motions, & made them ripe for Appeal, by stating reconsideration “would be granted if “the decision rests on palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or the court didn’t consider or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence”. ” (3T, p. 6 line 4, to p. 7, line 7).  It is exactly what my Motions & this Appeal address I substantiated that my Reconsideration Motion had additional evidence & arguments, which I address in this Appeal, that “could not have been provided on first application” from my Aug. 8, 2022 filing since I substantiated that [...] refused to allow me to present this new evidence (when he also rejected my Sept. 12, 2022, requested Sur-Reply) at the Sept. 22, 2022 Hearing by restricting my presentation to only 8-minutes, even after I stated it would then be impossible to also present new arguments with new evidence that would be in response to new info in [...]’s Aug. 12, 2022 Certification.  SUMMARY - CONTRADICTIONS & ERRORS IN COURT’S ORDERS
[brief] Our Supreme Court has held that where “a reasonable person in [an individual’s] position, based on the nature of the police encounter, would not have believed that he was free to leave,” the individual is in custody and the police are obliged to advise him of his *Miranda* rights prior to any questioning.  *O’Neal*, 190 N.J. at 616, 622 (explaining that the custody standard is an objective one and is based on the totality of the circumstances).  The Supreme Court of the United States and Appellate Division have held that a defendant detained pursuant to a motor vehicle stop is not in custody for the purposes of *Miranda* where he has no reason to believe that “he [will] be detained beyond the time required to complete the motor vehicle stop. ”  *State v. Hickman*, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 630-32 (App. Div. 2000); see also *Berkemer v. McCarty*, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984) (holding that a person stopped pursuant to a motor vehicle stop is not automatically entitled to the protections guaranteed by *Miranda*).
[brief] As was stated by the Supreme Court:  "If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits."  Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27, 108 S. Ct. 538, 544, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555, 565 (1988).  Accordingly, "[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'"
[brief] Defendant’s lead argument is that the Trial Court erred in holding that the eminent domain proceedings here constituted a “sale” under the parties’ PSA, because “Defendant was not the actual owner of the parcels of land originally taken under eminent domain. ”  Db9.  It appears Defendant is arguing that the governmental taking is unlike a sale, because the property taken was never owned by [...], and thus [...] did not transfer away title, even involuntarily.  Defendant offers no citations for the facts which underpin this argument, but a review of the Appellate Division’s opinion in [...] v. State offers a firm rebuttal to Defendant’s premise.
[brief] Id. at 410.  The information provided illustrates the fact that Appellant was treated less favorably than the Caucasian Vice Principals.  Appellant testified that she would learn of assignments required by [...] at a later time than the Caucasian Vice Principals learned of the assignments and had less time to complete the time sensitive assignments.  Appellant has satisfied the factors to prove Discrimination Based on Race because Appellant was in a protected category based on race, she performed her job satisfactorily, she was subjected to adverse conditions in the workplace and the Caucasian Vice Principals [...] and [...] were treated more favorably than she was.
[brief] The sole authority relied upon is Ryder v. Ocean Cnty. Mall, 340 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2001).  That case involved the Mode of Operation Doctrine.  The Appellant slipped in the common area of the [...] on an orange drink (an “Orange Julius”).  The drink had been purchased in the food court.  After purchasing food and drink in the food court, customers were free to walk with their food and drink through the common areas of the mall, which resulted in frequent spills of food and drink.  There was a planter area in the location of the accident, where customers would sit to eat and drink.  The Court concluded that the Mode of Operation Doctrine applied to the mall as the mall was the equivalent of a self-serve cafeteria.  Id. at 509.
[brief] **[...]’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A PWCRA-REGISTERED ARCHAEOLOGIST IS A STATUTORY VIOLATION REQUIRING AUTOMATIC REJECTION OF [...]’S BID**  There is no dispute that the failure to include an item in a bid that is statutorily mandated is a non-waivable defect requiring automatic rejection of the bid.  See *P&A Constr., Inc. v. Twp. of Woodbridge*, 365 N.J. Super. 164, 177 (App. Div. 2004).  There is similarly no dispute that [...] failed to identify a PWCRA-registered archaeological subcontractor in its bid.  Because [...] was required to identify a PWCRA-registered archaeological subcontractor in its bid (see Point II supra), [...]’s bid must be rejected and the trial court’s Denial Order must be overturned.
[brief] ”  (7T 180-1 to 2)  From there, citing the surveillance footage of [...], [...] proceeded to accuse [...] of lying or dishonesty another thirteen times:  • “So, explain it to me, [...].  Because you already came at me with one lie. ”  (7T 180-16 to 17)  • “I’m not going to listen to lies. ”  (7T 180-20)  • “You’re lying about things.  . .”  (7T 181-19)  •  “You’re lying about things that could be explained.  And you’re going to go to prison.”  (7T 181-21 to 23)  •  “I don’t want you to swear on everything you love, because you’re lying. ”  (7T 183-13 to 15)  •  “Then why did you come up with two different stories before telling me the truth?  Why did you lie to me twice? ”  (7T 183-22 to 24)  •  “That’s a lie. ”  (7T 184-7)  •  “See here’s the thing.  The problem is when this goes to court and they see that you’re lying . . .”  (7T 184-17 to 19)  •  “[Y]ou’re saying that you didn’t enter the building [which] is false. ”  (7T 185-7 to 9)  •  “Well you lied to me twice already. ”  (7T 186-4 to 5)  •  “[...], -- you’re still lying to me now. ”  (7T 186-5 to 6)  •  “I’m not going to listen to you because I don’t want to hear lies. ”  (7T 190-6 to 7)  •  “So if you want to tell me the truth -- so when this goes to court and it looks like you’re sorry, and it looks like that you actually didn’t do this, then I’ll listen to you.  If you don’t and you want stick to this story then I’ll just hit play while we’re in court and then you can explain to everybody why you lied. ”  (7T 190-11 to 18)  And, adding further commentary on [...]’s guilt, [...] surmised that [...] was “going to go to prison for a very long time,” and that if [...] did not explain why he was in the building, [...] would have to believe that [...] was “a cold-blooded individual who just went into a business and beat the shit out of somebody. ”  (7T 180-11 to 13, 182-1 to 2)  Just like the detectives in C.W.H. and Tung, [...]’s extensive commentary on [...]’s veracity and character impermissibly invaded the jury’s ken.
[brief] *In re Stream Encroachment Permit No. 0200-04-0002.1 FHA*, 402 N.J. Super. 587, 602 (App. Div. 2008).  Had [...] notified [...] during the public comment period of its concern that [...] sought a culvert rather than a bridge, [...] or [...] would have further explained why a bridge is not feasible and would cause more harm to this channel than a culvert.  [...]’s concerns also ignore both the record and the FHACA regulatory structure.  [...]’s application notes that the tributary bed is less than five feet in width, that [...] designed the culvert based on the width and character of the tributary, and that the Duck Pond Run unnamed tributaries “do not appear to provide suitable habitat for fisheries. ” (Aa143; Aa155).  [...] does not refute the channel’s width or the other environmental resources surrounding the channel.  (Ab29-30).  [...] thus had sufficient information to determine that a culvert was proper for this road crossing, N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1(c)(2), and that placement of the culvert bottom two feet below the channel was not feasible, N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(h).
[brief] **  [...] stated:  [T]he expert opinions of both [...] and [...] are based on the erroneous premise that the Z-1 zoning established by the Redevelopment Plan applied to the Subject Property on the date of value.  Both [...] and [...] disregarded the I-1 zoning because they believed the Subject Property had been merely rezoned rather than made a part of a “traditional” redevelopment plan.  This treatment ignores the settled rule of law factoring out the project influences on value from the determination of just compensation.  Pa207-208 [emphasis added].  Here, the R-2 zoning must be applied when estimating the Property’s fair market value as of the Date of Valuation of June 3, 2019.  [...]’s position is also supported by the unpublished ruling of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. in the matter *[...] v. Kerrigan*, [...] (Law Div. 2008) (Pa210) where Judge Baber confirms the Scope of the Project Rule prevents a property acquired via condemnation to be valued pursuant to the zoning in place under the applicable redevelopment plan.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AS OF THE DATE THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED.  (25T77:7-78:23)  (Point IX of Plaintiffs’ Brief)  Rule 4:42-11(b) states that, in tort actions, “the court shall . . . include in the judgment simple interest . . . from the date of the institution of the action or from a date 6 months after the date the cause of action arises, whichever is later[.]”  Yet, plaintiffs contend the trial court abused its discretion by following this rule.  This argument lacks any merit.  Plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have awarded pre-judgment interest dating back to the date “for each transaction where the trial court determined the defendants had misappropriated funds. ”  Pb88.  This is an extraordinary request since the trial court included transactions that occurred seven and even twelve years before the complaint was filed.  In essence, plaintiffs ask this court to reward their dilatoriness, a wholly inequitable result.  Plaintiffs also contend they should receive “the full amount of prejudgment interest” because their claim was for a liquidated sum.  This argument is equally unavailing.  Plaintiffs claimed they did not receive their fair share in certain transactions.  This does not meet the definition of liquidated damages.  Liquidated damages is defined as "the sum a party to a contract agrees to pay if he breaks some promise, and which, having been arrived at by a good faith effort to estimate in advance the actual damage that will probably ensue from the breach, is legally recoverable as agreed damages if the breach occurs. ”  Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 453-54 (2013) (quoting Westmount Country Club v. Kameny, 82 N.J. Super. 200, 205 (App. Div. 1964)); see also, Holtham v. Lucas, 460 N.J. Super. 308, 317 (App. Div. 2019).  None of the contracts here contained such provisions.  Plaintiffs’ arguments thus fail to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in adhering to R. 4:42-11(b).  CONCLUSION
[directive] ☐If more than five rows are required, please check the box and attach a separate sheet of paper with the additional information.  and the sealing of all records concerning the subsequent criminal proceedings regarding such charge(s), or disposition(s), if applicable, and place such information in the control of a person within the office designated to retain control over sealed records.  Form Promulgated by Directive #08-21 (4/7/2021), CN 12763 (Municipal Sealing Order)
[brief] Notably, under New Jersey law, deeds are “construed to include all the [grantor's] estate, right, title, interest, use, possession, property, claim and demand” unless the grantor expressly limits the conveyance.  N.J.S.A. 46:3-13.  In other words, the presumption is that the grantor is conveying all of its rights in the real property unless it expressly limits the conveyance.  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 46:3-16 provides that:  Every deed conveying land shall, unless an exception shall be made therein, be construed to include all and singular the buildings, improvements, ways, woods, waters, watercourses, rights, liberties, privileges, hereditaments and appurtenances to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining; and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof, and of every part and parcel thereof.  Thus, property rights that are appurtenant to the dominant estate automatically pass with the conveyance of the dominant estate even if they are not expressly mentioned within the deed of conveyance unless an exception is made to their passing.
[brief] (1T 130-13 to 14)  After the [...] directed [...] to step out of the car, he told him that his pupils were “like pinholes,” to which [...] responded that he had not had his insulin and needed to eat something.\(^5\) (1T 125-13 to 126-24)  Even though the officer testified that he believed [...] might be under the influence, he did not ask [...] whether he was under the influence or administer any field sobriety tests.  (1T 121-9 to 18)  [...] conceded that did not have the training to determine whether [...] was under the influence and clarified that he never said that he thought that [...] was incapable of driving.  (1T 122-1 to 17)  He also admitted that pupil size “does not indicate of [sic] criminal activity” and that he was “not saying those two are connected. ”  (1T 124-9 to 10)  When asked why he was suspicious of [...], [...] testified that although he “didn’t witness anything criminal[,] it doesn’t mean that it didn’t happen” because “[i]t’s always possible somebody could be involved in criminal activity. ” (1T 124-2 to 8)  After questioning [...] about the Montana warrant and whether there were any drugs in the car, [...] asked [...] for consent to search the \(^5\)
[brief] Nevertheless, a hearing on this issue is, as the parties and the trial judge agreed, unnecessary.  The trial judge’s decision should be reviewed under the plain error standard, where any alleged error must have been “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2; see also State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) (holding where party “does not object or otherwise preserve an issue for appeal at the trial court level, [courts] review the issue for plain error”).
[brief] The workers’ compensation system is a historic “trade-off” whereby employees relinquish their right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for prompt and automatic entitlement to benefits for work-related injuries.  Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., 170 N.J. 602, 604 (2002); Millison v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 174 (1985).  “The workers’ compensation system represents the bargain that was struck between employers and employees concerning workplace injuries, whereby employers shoulder the expense of workers’ injuries arising out of the performance of work duties.