ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Rather, the court should enforce the agreement as written.  Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 590–91 (App. Div. 2016).  In situations where a child seeks neither a relationship, nor guidance from a parent, and instead looks to a parent only as a source of funds, that parent is relieved of the obligation to fund the child's college education.  See Moss v. Nedas, 289 N.J. Super. 352, 356 (App. Div. 1996) (noting a parent cannot be viewed as a “wallet” and deprived of involvement in the college decision making process).  A relationship between a non-custodial parent and a child is not required for the custodial parent or the child to ask the non-custodial parent for financial assistance to defray college expenses.
[brief] On June 9, 2017, [...] presented a plan to [...], an independent regional grid planner and system operator that serves, in part, to regulate [...]’s operations.  DA at 266a.  [...] was seeking to provide a third source of power to its Springfield Road and Stanley Terrace substations in [...], for purposes of “adding reliability to [the] network” through redundancy.  DA at 299a.  This provision of another power source is considered a “baseline” project because failure to complete it will allegedly result in a violation of [...]’s internal minimum criteria requirements needed for service to customers.  DA at 316a – 317a.  [...]’s proposed solution was to construct a new, higher voltage 69kV line connecting its Front Street substation with Springfield Road and Stanley Terrace.  DA at 266a et seq.  Ultimately, the construction of a line from those two substations was approved by PJM on October 18, 2017, and labeled as “[...]. ”
[brief] See, e.g., 2T14:23–2T15:3; 2T15:4–16; 2T16:5–6.  Unfortunately, counsel’s argument that no such allegation was made in the Verified Complaint fell on deaf ears.  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint asserted that: 1.  Plaintiff stored valuable items at his Aunt’s residence; 2.  After Defendant’s appointment, Defendant controlled the contents of the residence; 3.  Defendant informed Plaintiff that “all items unquestionably belonging to [...] were sold or distributed in February 2022”; 4.  Plaintiff was allowed to retrieve his possessions that were previously stored in his Aunt’s residence, but certain items were missing; 5.  Plaintiff requested an accounting of the items sold by Defendant and those items he still retains; 6.  Defendant refused to provide such information; and 7.  Plaintiff’s personal items may have been sold along with the Estate and Trust’s other assets.  (Pa2–3.)  Nowhere in the Verified Complaint is it alleged that Defendant absconded with Plaintiff’s property.  The only claim set forth in the Verified Complaint is one to compel an accounting of the Estate and Trust.  It is clear that the trial court misapplied the controlling statutes and Court Rule, as well as made factual determinations that were wholly unsupported by the record evidence, in rendering its decision dismissing the Verified Complaint.
[brief] There is also no dispute that there was no comparable evidence.  “A picture is worth a thousand words. ”  The defense, and ultimately, the petit jury (if this matter were to proceed to trial) should have had the benefit of the entire picture that [...] displayed on his “Adam4Adam” profile (not a pixelated, cropped version).  However, because of his deliberate, bad faith actions, the profile picture utilized by [...] no longer exists.  Likewise, the defense, and ultimately, the petit jury, should have had the benefit of the information that [...] displayed on his “Adam4Adam” profile, including, most importantly, information about his age.  Again, however, because of [...]’s deliberate, bad faith actions, the profile information no longer exists.  Without this discovery, [...] was deprived of the “best evidence” available to accurately determine the facts necessary for a petit jury to decide the case.  Again, there was no comparable evidence. \(^2\) --- \(^2\)  The State flippantly argues that Defendant “has the ability to recreate the profile during his trial. ”  See Pb22.  This argument is absurd.  There are absolutely no means through which Defendant can recreate the fake “Adam4Adam” profile utilized by [...].  Not only was this information critically important to defend against the allegations brought by the State, but it was also relevant to the defense’s anticipated reliance on the statutory and due process defenses of entrapment.  Again, the Trial Court agreed:  And this Court agrees with the defense in this case that the Adam4Adam profile information is crucial to the defense in this case.
[brief] Numerous times during his deposition, when Defendant [...] was asked to explain how the arbitration panel would be selected, he could not explain but only referred to the form: “whatever it says in the form” (Pa35).  When asked whether he knew the form has the patient waive their constitutional right to a jury trial, he repeated: “Whatever is in the form” (Pa39).  At her initial visit on October 14, 2021, after signing, [...] did not leave Defendants’ office with a copy of the arbitration form, as it would have been shredded (Pa39).  It is undisputed that, for fourteen days of the thirty-day assent period, she would not have been able to review the document.  Further, there is no documented evidence that she received it on her second visit on October 28, 2021 when staff members provided her with a copy of the Tumescent Liposuction Patient Information Booklet, though Defendant [...] testifies that it would have been (Pa24-25, Pa29, Pa40-41).  Defendant [...] claims that Defendant’s staff would have provided the arbitration form with the Booklet (Pa29-31, Pa40-41).  Throughout his deposition, Defendant [...] was unable to explain what the arbitration agreement meant other than to read directly from it (Pa27, Pa39, etc.).
[brief] In essence, [...] treated non-management employees as second-class citizens when it came to their safety in the parking lot.  A reasonable juror could conclude that [...]’s utter failure to ensure that there were pedestrian safeguards in the distant area of the parking lot where [...] was required to park created a substantial certainty that an employee, such as [...], would be injured; in other words, it was an accident waiting to happen.  The trial court erroneously failed to recognize that the question of whether a defendant employer has created a “substantial certainty” of injury to its employees is an inherently fact-sensitive determination to be made based on the totality of the circumstances.  The trial court appears to have granted summary judgment here because this case arose in a context (a dangerous parking area with no pedestrian protections) that has never been specifically addressed as the basis for a “substantial certainty” claim in prior case law.  However, the fact that a novel issue was presented by this case did not justify the trial court’s decision to usurp the role of the jury and erroneously grant summary judgment to [...].  A.
[brief] defense statements and the court’s mistaken belief that the floor was indeed slip-proof, (see Footnotes 1-3, supra), the defense witness confirmed on cross-examination  [...]: . . .  Mr. - - [...], I believe you testified that the floor is slip resistant.  Is that right?  A  That is correct, yes.  Q  Is it - - is it slip-proof?  A  Define slip-proof.  Nothing is slip-proof.  Q  Nothing is slip-proof.  A  Correct (3T83-12 to 16).  * * * * *
[directive] Vesting of Title in Forfeited Property.  Title to property forfeited under this chapter shall vest in the entity funding the prosecuting agency involved at the time the item was utilized illegally, or, in the case of proceeds, when received.  If another entity's law enforcement agency has participated in the surveillance, investigation, arrest or prosecution resulting in the forfeiture, then the prosecutor or the Attorney General, whichever is prosecuting the case, shall vest title to forfeited property, including motor vehicles, by dividing the forfeited property with the other entity in proportion to the other entity's contribution to the surveillance, in investigation, arrest or prosecution resulting the forfeiture, as determined in the discretion of the If prosecutor or the Attorney General. the property, including motor vehicles, cannot be divided as required by this section, then the prosecutor or the Attorney General, whichever is prosecuting the case, shall sell the property, including motor vehicles, and the proceeds of the sale shall be divided with the other entity in proportion to the other entity's contribution to the surveillance, investigation, arrest or prosecution resulting in the forfeiture, as determined in the discretion of the prosecutor or the Attorney General.  L. L. L. 1978, c. 95, 2C:64-7, eff. Sept. 1,1979.
[brief] JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS AS TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM UNDER THE NEW JERSEY CONSCIENTIOUS EMPLOYEE PROTECTION ACT AS NO RATIONAL TRIER OF THE FACTS COULD OR WOULD CONCLUDE PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN ANY PROTECTED CONDUCT UNDER THE ACT (PA23 TO PA27)  .........................................................  8  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Held that There Was No Evidence that Plaintiff Reasonably Believed that Defendants’ Conduct on or before July 5, 2016 Was Violative of Any Law, Rule or Regulation, or Clear Mandate of Public Policy.  (Pa23 to Pa25)  ...  9  B.  Plaintiff Cannot Establish That He Engaged in Protected Whistleblowing Activity.  (Pa24 to Pa25).  .........................................................  12  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................  15
[directive] 31, October on operational become shall Section This for Consultation/Char~in~A~proval Require to Authority  Prosecutor's County 3.5 Offenses.  Additional Prosecutor County of authority a the limit to construed be shall Directive in this Nothing and/or contact jurisdiction  Prosecutor's the within operating officers and agencies that require to approval such where offenses for prosecutors assistant designated from approval charging obtain involving those than other offenses persons disorderly (e.g., Directive this by required is not apply).
[brief] In other words, to declare an enactment invalid on its face, it must be such that under no circumstances is it possible to apply the legislation in a valid manner.  Once it is capable of being applied validly in some circumstances, any challenge is no longer one to the enactment “on its face” and becomes a challenge “as applied. ”  In the present matter, [...] failed to establish that under no circumstances could the Ordinance ever be validly applied to any person.  Rather, [...] was forced to assert that the Ordinance’s provisions could not be applied to *it* with respect to *the particular route* it wanted to take for the 69kV line.  Thus, as set forth in *N.J. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Farmer*, *supra*, [...] needed to assert and prove, and the court needed to find, that this particular route for the line was undisputedly essential to the provision of adequate service in order to have the Ordinance declared invalid on its face.  The undisputed fact that there were alternative routes precluded any such determination.  By asserting that the Ordinance was invalid because it might interfere with [...]’s first choice for a route, [...]’s challenge to the Ordinance became one challenging its validity “as applied. ”  As such, [...] was first required to apply for a permit; and any challenge in court before a permit was denied was premature.
[brief] While a subsequent Order dated May 31, 2024 was entered to facilitate the release of funds on deposit by the Superior Court, said order cannot be considered the Final Order in this matter, as it relates to the timeliness of this appeal.  (Da 218-219).  The true Orders that Appellant is really appealing in this matter are the Orders dated April 1, 2024 and April 29, 2024 – which denied awarding of compounding interest and denied attorney’s fees, whether based on funds in court or frivolous litigation.
[brief] Ab28.  She relies on a prior Commission decision for the proposition that an appointing authority “need[s] to indicate [its alternate arguments] at the time it submitted its background report when it returned the certification to [the Commission].”  Ab28 (quoting *In re Abaza, [...]*, [...], Civil Serv. Comm’n, Reconsideration, Final Decision (June 28, 2019), Ra74-82 (emphasis and alteration in original).  The Abaza decision does not support her contention and it is meritless.  In Abaza, the appointing authority removed county corrections officers from an eligible list “due to unsatisfactory driving records”.  Ra74 (emphasis added).  After the Commission determined that there was an insufficient basis for list removal due to those driving records, the appointing authority then sought reconsideration alleging that the subject employee actually “falsified his application” and should be removed on that entirely different basis.  Ibid.  The Commission denied the request for reconsideration because the appointing authority “could not bring up new grounds for removal that were not initially presented at the time it submitted its background report to this agency. ”  Ra77.  Unlike Abaza, the [...] did not present new grounds for removing [...] at any point.  As the Commission correctly explained, “the record indicates that the appointing authority presented [...]’s complete disciplinary history as a basis for it bypassing her name” and that “the appointing authority did indicate that if it did not bypass her, it would have removed her, which should have put [...] on notice that the appointing authority was seeking her removal if it was determined that she could not be bypassed under the Rule of Three. ”  AA13-14.  The [...] was not provided a second bite at the apple, because [...]’s unsatisfactory disciplinary history has been the grounds for its conclusion that she was not suitable for promotion to the high rank of Lieutenant and its determination not to promote her from the very beginning.  The Commission’s decision must be affirmed.
[directive] N.J.S.A. in defined as violence domestic involving offense persons a to subject offense while the committed defendant if 2C:25-19a8 the to pursuant order restraining issued permanent temporary or 1991." of Act Violence Domestic of "Prevention the of provisions for above the plea guilty enter a defendant a that requirement 2C:43-12g(3).  The N.J.S.A. such considering a when Further, prosecutor. the by waived cannot be offenses mentioned presumptions any consider prosecutor must PTI, admission the into for application defendant's be should defendant whether determining in seventeen factors all weigh and admission against 1 in Sections above outlined procedures follow the must Prosecutors PTI. for recommended supra. through 4, terms all and on record the place must prosecutor the all pleas, of entry guilty with the  As under PTI the into admitted be will who defendants for those agreement plea of conditions the Rule with in accordance taken are pleas ensure that prosecutor should The law.
[brief] Plaintiff’s contract with [...] was not renewed because her job performance did not meet [...]’s standards, as follows:  1.  Plaintiff’s annual evaluation summary for 2016-2017 showed Plaintiff was merely “Developing” in nearly all areas evaluated (with “Proficient,” “Accomplished” and “Distinguished” being better scores she did not receive), except for only two discrete areas in which she was marked “Proficient. ” (Da137-152).  2.  All of Plaintiff’s evaluations documented the fact that throughout her three years of employment with [...], she was not performing up to expectations because she never received a single mark for “Distinguished” in any category, she received marks for merely “Developing” in nearly every single category and was at best “Proficient” in some, but never all categories.  (Pl. Tr. 192:8-20; Da153-212, 214-251, 253-270; Pa314-325).
[brief] On June 18, 2015, the [...] issued a Clean Energy Order under the applicable three (3) docket numbers regarding the program to implement SRECs at the [...], and duly issued the following findings and conclusions, in relevant part, which effectively granted a certification upon the satisfaction of stated-conditions:  The Board FINDS that [...] has not required additional remediation or conditions for construction of the proposed solar facility on area AOC K.  The Board DIRECTS Staff to issue full certification to the project upon the applicant's demonstration that the project, as-built, does not go beyond the limits of AOC K, and that the project does not and will not disrupt or change, without prior written permission from the [...], any engineering or institutional control that is part of a remedial action for the site, and does not otherwise interfere with any remediation at the site.  The applicant shall file as-built documentation and allow for an on-site inspection.  After the applicant has received full certification and satisfied all SRP requirements, the Board DIRECTS Staff to issue a New Jersey Certification Number to the project for purposes of SREC creation, provided that all requirements of N.J.A.C. 14:8-2.4 are met.  [Emphasis added.]  The Board WAIVES the provisions of the SREC Registration Program in the Renewable Portfolio Standard rules requiring submittal of an initial registration package within ten days of installation contract execution at ADDRESSEE ONLY — CONFIDENTIAL & PRIVILEGED N.J.A.C. 14:8-2.4© and the registration length of one year at N.J.A.C. 14:8-2.4 (f) for the Hughesville Mill project.
[directive] Cash 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% should COURT and 3:26-2 summons $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 bail $500  Range  MUNICIPAL RULE setting to to to to to $100  Bail $500 $100 $100 $500 or crime.  TO warrant when offenses  PURSUANT  THE substantive considered OFFENSES  Disorderly Disorderly a IN Degree Disorderly Disorderly whether Persons Persons Persons Persons Degree included OR, ADMINISTRATOR, 4th Petty Petty JUDGE actual be PERSONS regarding lesser to appropriate.  a people obscene the a the of factors COURT obey persons then health conveyance, unless as as where factors 2
[brief] The issue is how well and under what circumstances examiners applying a given metrological method can reliably detect relevant differences in features to reliably identify whether they share a common source. ”).  Moreover, the ACE-V method is inherently subjective.  There is no objective determination for how many or what kinds of similarities are sufficient to declare a “match” between two prints.  NRC Report at 140 (“[F]riction ridge analysis relies on subjective judgments by the examiner. ”); PCAST Report at 101 (“[L]atent print analysis . . . depends on subjective judgment.
[brief] The trial court’s responsibility to review punitive damage awards for reasonableness is heightened when such damages are awarded against a public entity because public funds will be affected in payment of any such award.  Accordingly, in such cases, the trial judge “must scrutinize with great care the amount of the award to determine whether it is proportionate to the harm suffered by the plaintiff. ”  *Pritchett v. State*, 248 N.J. 85, 108-113 (2021).  Because excessive punitive damages may result in a denial of substantive due process, New Jersey Courts will apply test of *BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore*, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), which considers the egregiousness of the conduct, the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered and the punitive damages award and the difference between that award and other penalties imposed in comparable cases of misconduct.
[brief] During his sworn deposition testimony [...] confirmed he performed no calculations to support the conclusions contained in the Watermen Report:  Q: Did you perform any calculations when arriving at your conclusion that the sea wall constructed has increased the vulnerability of the subject property to wave-induced storm damage?  A: No.  Q: Did you rely upon any approaches for estimating over-topping discharge rates when reaching your conclusion?  A: No.  Da460 at 5:6-14 [emphasis added].  [...] testified that while he was aware of the Owen Method (and other methods) for computing over-topping discharge, [...] testified that it was “unnecessary” for him to utilize the Owen Method to reach “the conclusion I made.
[brief] Regarding the areawide plan or Areawide WQM Plan, these are developed at the county level, and “identify and address selected water quality and wastewater management issues for a particular jurisdictional area, including strategies to address both point and nonpoint source pollution.  The Areawide WQM Plan is the basis by which the Department and the designated planning agencies (DPAs) conduct selected water quality management planning activities for a particular area of the State. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:15-2.3.  In contrast, a “[w]astewater management plan’ or ‘WMP’ means a written and graphic description of wastewater service areas, and wastewater treatment needs. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.5.  WMPs “are [only] components of the areawide plan. ”  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.24(b), 420 N.J. Super. 552, 560 (App. Div. 2011).  The WQPA and WQMP Rules require consistency with the Areawide plans, including TMDLs and identification of potentially impacted nearby waters.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10; N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a).  The Areawide WQM Plan at issue in this matter does not appear in this administrative record, nor does it otherwise appear to be available to the public anywhere else, which is a fatal flaw in this administrative record.
[brief] When applying for his Progressive policy of insurance, [...] requested multiple price quotes from [...].  First, [...] requested insurance quotes utilizing first New Jersey address and then later for a North Carolina address.  If claimant was residing in North Carolina at the time, he filled out this insurance application, there would have been no need for him to request an insurance price quotation with the New Jersey address.  When applying for the insurance policy on January 30, 2022, he used a New Jersey IP address.  When he filled out the application, he indicated that he resided at [...], even though he was living in New Jersey at the time.  After the motor vehicle accident on May 25, 2022, Progressive took [...]'s recorded statement, where he stated that he had been living at [...] for “close to a year ago”.  He testified that he moved out from Charlotte, North Carolina “almost a year ago” and that he lived in North Carolina “almost a year ago”.  He testified that the move to New Jersey was a permanent move.  2.
[brief] New Jersey Bar No. 369652021  [...] [...] [...] [...]  On the Brief Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | INTRODUCTION | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 1 | | I. Retroactivity | 1 | | A. This case is a pipeline case | 1 | | B.