ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Contrary to the Appellant's assertion, the Township's decision to acquire the property in question was based on a demonstrable and pressing need for open space to prevent overdevelopment, preserve the environment, and provide recreational areas for the public.  It is abundantly clear that the record provides the Township believed it more appropriate and better planning for proposed religious dormitories to be constructed by a third party be relocated to property that the Township currently owns, which borders the common boundary line with [...].  The students who would be residing in the dormitory would undoubtedly be traveling to religious schools in [...].  By providing for the land exchange and thereby conveying that property to the developer, traffic issues, traffic expenses, as well as other related issues could be easily avoided.  At the same time, the Township agreed to accept and acquire property owned by the developer, which is located more in the center of town, where most of the population is living.  That property will be preserved for recreational and open space purposes.  Clearly, the public purpose is served by this Agreement and is easily understood by the public and This Honorable Court.  [...]'s Master Plan, along with other planning documents, consistently identifies the preservation of open space as a key objective.  The acquisition of the property owned by the Appellant aligns with these strategic priorities, providing clear evidence of the Township's long-term commitment to open space preservation.  The Master Plan highlights the need to protect natural resources, provide outdoor recreational activities, and manage growth in a sustainable manner, all of which are served by the proposed property acquisition.  The property in question has been identified as a critical area for conservation due to its ecological significance and potential for recreational use.  By acquiring this land, [...] aims to prevent overdevelopment, which poses risks to local ecosystems, contributes to urban sprawl, and diminishes the quality of life for residents.  The preservation of the parcel as open space is a proactive measure to ensure sustainable development patterns and protect the community's environmental health and recreational needs for generations to come.  The evidence supporting the public purpose behind the acquisition of the property is multi-faceted, drawing from environmental science, community engagement, strategic planning, and sustainability principles.  This comprehensive body of evidence not only justifies the Township's actions but also exemplifies the meticulous care and due diligence exercised to ensure that the public interest is served in the most effective and meaningful way.  The [...] has determined that the condemnation in question is necessary to preserve open space within the Township.  Given the broad definition of “public use,” it is not essential that the entire community or even any considerable portion of the community directly enjoy or participate in the condemned property for the taking to constitute a “public use. ”
[brief] Pa30.  Included with the Petition were other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.  Pa30.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa30.  Pa70-106.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.  Pa30.  Pa107-254.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa255-265.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.
[brief] Despite this reality, Plaintiff argues that their future redevelopment plans are irrelevant to Defendants’ obligations.  Pb37.  Plaintiff asserts that its own expert’s testimony should have been considered over Defendants’ expert, however it is the trial court’s prerogative to believe the testimony of one expert over another.  *City of Long Branch v. Liu*, 203 N.J. 464, 491-92 (2010); *Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc.*, 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85-86 (App. Div. 1961) (recognizing the trier of fact's ability to accept, in full or in part, the testimony of one expert over another)  While it is a rational and fair reading of the PSA that Defendants were required to cooperate with Plaintiff, it is improbable that Defendants would agree to assume the responsibility for the RAO in light of the extended negotiations, one third reduction in price, and surrender of prior insurance policies to Plaintiff.
[brief] See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979) (“A meaningful opportunity to defend, if not the right to a trial itself, presumes as well that a total want of evidence to support a charge will conclude the case in favor of the accused. ”).  In this case, a judgment of acquittal should have been entered on the first-degree robbery charge because the State failed to show that while committing a theft, [...] -- who did not possess a deadly weapon -- led the victim to actually and reasonably believe that he possessed such a weapon.
[brief] This argument is directly rebutted by the fact that the literal text of the new NJDEP standards, rules and regulations also do not state that all enforcement is EXCLUSIVELY vested in the DEP.  Nowhere do the NJDEP standards, rules and regulations expressly or implicitly abolish the long existing private right of action clearly established in the Public Trust Common Law.  Both adopt and incorporate the existing common law and go further, specifically enumerating other actions not clearly within the existing common law that constitute violation of the Public Trust Doctrines, such as eliminating existing public parking and existing public access points, issues that were somewhat debatable prior to July 1, 2019.  As plead in the Complaint, clearly plaintiffs are harmed and had standing to challenge this illegal government action.
[brief] ..................................................................................................................................................  49  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED Order granting summary judgment to Defendants [...] and [...], filed March 31, 2022 ................................................................. Pa1 Order denying summary judgment to Plaintiffs [...], [...], and [...], filed March 31, 2022 ................................................................. Pa3 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## FEDERAL CASES **Domm v. Jersey Printing Co.,** 871 F.Supp. 732 (D.N.J. 1994) .............................................................................. 47 **Premier Health Assocs., LLC v. Medical Tech. Solutions,** 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144274 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2018) ........................................ 43 **Ryan v. Liberty Mut. Ins.,** 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88907 (D.N.J. July 8, 2015) ............................................. 44 **Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co.,** 482 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2007) .................................................................................. 43 ## STATE CASES **Auto Lenders v. Gentilini Ford,** 181 N.J. 245 (2004) ............................................................................................... 17
[brief] *State v. Witt*, 223 N.J. 409, 418-19 (2015).  If he fails to do so at the appropriate time, then courts may decline to consider newly-minted arguments raised after a court has already decided a motion to suppress.  *Ibid.* (refusing to entertain a belatedly raised issue on appeal when “the State was deprived of the opportunity to establish a record that might have resolved the issue”); see also *State v. Gora*, 148 N.J. Super. 582, 592 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that a defendant was “duty-bound to present all his proofs concerning the alleged unlawfulness of [an act] at the hearing on the suppression motion”).
[directive] FEEDBACK FORM  See next page.  A- 38  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  Date:________________________________  FEEDBACK FORM  Your opinion is very important to us because it lets us know if your needs were met and how our services might be improved.  This information is confidential.  Please return this completed survey by using the reply envelope attached.  Thank you for sharing your thoughts.  It is our goal to provide the best services we can at such a difficult time.
[brief] ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE STORAGE UNIT MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE.  (2T 33-4 to 45-5; Da 24)  The trial court’s decision denying [...]’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his storage unit must be reversed because none of the key components of the warrant affidavit, either separately or together, establish probable cause.  Where the police seek to rely on a tip from a criminal informant in a warrant affidavit, the tip must be corroborated by an independent police investigation.  State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 389-90 (2004).  Corroboration is especially important in a case like this, where the informant has no proven track record of reliability.  State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541, 558 (2005).  While the investigation in this case confirmed some non-criminal details of the tip, such as the fact that [...] rented the storage unit identified by the informant and accessed it regularly, it fell short of corroborating the tip’s essential feature: that [...] was engaged in any criminal activity.  First, [...] wrote in the affidavit that he believed he witnessed [...] engage in a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction on August 23, 2018, but all [...] saw was [...] park on the side of the road and a man lean into the car with his hands.  (Dca 7-8)  These facts are far too minimal to suggest that a drug exchange occurred.  Second, although the affidavit discusses the narcotics found in [...]’s car during the traffic stop, that evidence was unlawfully obtained and cannot be used against [...].  See Point I.C, supra.  Even if that evidence could be considered, it is insufficiently connected to the informant’s tip regarding [...] and thus adds little to the probable cause analysis.  Lastly, while the affidavit states that a police dog alerted to the scent of narcotics at [...]’s storage unit, the affidavit fails to indicate that the dog was trained in narcotics detection.  Without any such indication, the purported positive alert means nothing.  In short, police did not have probable cause to believe that the storage unit contained illegal contraband.  The trial court’s decision denying the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the storage unit must be reversed.
[brief] On November 10, 2016, and October 14, 2016 defendant, [...] appeared before Honorable [...], J.S.C. on the State’s motion to admit certain evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b).  [...] granted the motion, ruling that: evidence from the unrelated robbery [...] would be admissible in the murder trial of [...]; Billmeier also ruled the two incidents charged in [...] could be tried together.
[brief] As of September 2015, plaintiffs became the owner of all of the solar-developmental rights that defendant [...] had compiled including the three items listed above.  The transaction was reflected in an Assignment document and a Bill of Sale.  Pa65.  On June 17, 2015, [...] obtained the right to earn Solar Energy Renewable Credits ("SREC") from the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities ("BPU") pursuant to the New Jersey Solar Act, N.J.S.A. 48:3-87 Subsection (t), which is specific to brownfields.  The SREC's are a separate and distinct asset that belongs to [...] and therefore plaintiffs.  Pa167.
[brief] Likewise, no one testified that [...] “deviated from the normal standards of conduct. ”  To reiterate, [...] testified that “[he] was not aware of Central Command ever telling an officer to get out of the television room. ” (Pa114a).  It was only “[a]fter this issue with Gales, their supervisor told officers to be at their desks and not to hang out in the television room.  Gales hanging out in the television room on August 16 was not by itself a department violation. ”  *(Id.)*  (emphasis added.)  3.  **N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12)**  Presumably, *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12)* (“other sufficient causes”), is the catchall administrative code that encompasses all of the violations not otherwise specifically delineated by other codes.  *In the Matter of Gary* MacDonald, [...], 2014 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 236, OAL DKT. NO. CSR 9803-13 (May 19, 2014).  In this case, this administrative code provision was meant to capture the various alleged violations of the HRB not otherwise mirrored by the various N.J.A.C. provisions.  For example, [...] was charged with HRB 84-17\(^{13}\), Section B4 “sleeping while on duty (essential),” HRB 84-17, Section C8 “falsification: Intentional misstatement of material fact in connection with work, employment application, attendance, or in any record, report, investigation, or other proceeding,” HRB 84-17, Section D2 “negligently contributing to an elopement or escape,” HRB 84-17, Section D7 “Violation of administrative procedures and/or regulations involving safety and security,” and HRB 84-17, Section E1 “violation of a rule, regulation, policy, procedure, order, or administrative decision”.
[brief] (Da64-Da71, ¶ 16; Pa35-Pa44).  Respondent also filed an Affidavit by [...], an employee of [...], records custodian for Respondent and master custodian agent for Respondent showing Appellant’s address is the NJ Address, Appellant failed to notify Respondent of a change of address, and that Appellant had received constant notice regarding the Judgment in the Action.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 17; Pa53-Pa62).  On July 3, 2023, Appellant filed a reply in further support of his First Motion to Vacate.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 18).  On July 6, 2023, the Lower Court held oral argument on Appellant’s First Motion to Vacate.
[brief] In her appellate brief, plaintiff-appellant offers this Court a second argument as an alternative to her first.  Specifically, plaintiff-appellant argues that even if the Court were to conclude that the [...]’ property was residential and not commercial, the [...]’ motion for summary judgment should still have been denied by the Motion Court because the [...] allegedly either created a new dangerous condition or exacerbated an existing dangerous condition that caused plaintiff-appellant to fall.  Plaintiff-appellant supports this argument by contending that her fall was not caused by “natural forces,” but rather a dangerous unnatural condition that the [...] created.
[directive] It is ORDERED that effective immediately the Order dated July 22, 1999, as amended by orders dated March 29, 2000 and August 15, 2000, designating the authorized Wiretap Judges in connection with the operation of the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 et seq., is hereby further amended so as to provide that in the absence or unavailability of the designated judge who authorized a particular interception, orders to seal tapes, wires, and all other recordings may be entered by (1) any other designated Wiretap Judge, or (2) the designated Communications Data Warrant Judge in the county or vicinage in which the investigation occurred, or (3) the Assignment Judge or the Acting Assignment Judge for the county or vicinage in which the judge who authorized the interception sits.
[brief] (Da 155-174)  Appellant moved for fees & costs.  The motion also sought to correct the prior order on the grounds that the awarded simple interest was not calculated on the correct full amount of the judgment.  (Da 175-188)  The motion was opposed.  (Da 189-193)  In an order, accompanied by a Statement of Reasons, the motion was denied.  (Da 194-202)  Appellant moved for reconsideration.  (Da 203-208)  The motion was granted by order entered 4-29-24, as to correcting the simple interest calculation & awarding costs, but denied as to fees.  (Da 209-217)  The court’s own prepared order of 4-29-24 was not accepted by the Superior Court Trust Unit for purposes of withdrawing & paying the funds as ordered.  An amended order was pre-approved by the Trust Unit.  On 5-31-24 the final order, as to all parties & issues, was entered by the court.  (Da 218-219)  This appeal timely followed.
[brief] These circumstances and what conclusions could be drawn from them were well within the jury’s understanding.  They did not require – nor were they based upon – [...]’s medical judgment or expertise.  The jury was “as competent as” [...] to analyze these facts and reach a conclusion as to the ultimate issue in the case.  Jamerson, 153 N.J. at 340-41.  The jury should have been empowered to determine the significance of the manner in which the body was disposed by “sorting through all of the evidence and using their common sense to make simple logical deductions. ”  Cain, 224 N.J. at 427.  Instead, the erroneous admission of [...]’s manner of death opinion improperly usurped the jury’s function.
[brief] In the Dwyer Action, plaintiff alleged in part that stormwater runoff from the driveway on [...] damaged his property and that the [...] trespassed onto his property.  A.  Plaintiff sued the [...] for property damage allegedly caused by water runoff and trespass.  In the Dwyer Action, plaintiff alleges that the [...] repaved their driveway and regraded their property so that their yard sloped to plaintiff’s property.  Pa8, ¶¶ 5, 7.  He contended that the [...]’ actions “created a nuisance by directing rainwater onto plaintiff’s property. ”  Pa9, ¶ 17.  He also claimed that the [...] “unlawfully entered Plaintiff’s property to dispose of tree limbs on Plaintiff’s property,” which allegedly caused property damage.  Pa11, ¶¶ 27-28.
[brief] ”  See White v. Mattera, 175 N.J. 158, 164 (2003) (internal citations omitted); see also Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 137 (1968) (“Our courts have identified the accrual of the cause of action as the date on which ‘the right to institute and maintain a suit’ first arose. ” (internal citations omitted)).  Here, the date on which [...]’s “right to institute and maintain a suit” for malicious prosecution first arose, was March 6, 2018, the date of the Court’s reversal of the judgment affirming his VOP conviction.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 14:8-10.1 to 10.6.  Consistent with the March 2020 Order, the rules defined eligible projects as those which had registered in the pre-existing SREC program; conditionally certified solar projects on a brownfield, an area of historic fill or a properly closed sanitary landfill facility pursuant to N.J.S.A.  48:3-87(t) (“Subsection (t)’’); conditionally certified solar projects for rooftop or ground mounted solar pursuant N.J.S.A. 48:3-87(r) (“Subsection (r)’’); and net-metered projects\(^4\).  N.J.A.C. 14:8-10.4 to -10.5; (Aa2).  The Board’s TI rules set forth project eligibility criteria and incentive factors in eight discrete solar project categories.  N.J.A.C. 14:8-10.5(b)(1).  Grid supply floating solar projects are not eligible under the TI program.  (Aa5).  The TI program closed to new registrations on August 27, 2021, and the Board launched the SuSI program a day later, via order on August 28, 2021.
[brief] BECAUSE THERE WAS NO MOTION TO BAR PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT, HIS TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED.  | 4 | | **POINT III:**  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT OPINION WAS A NET OPINION.  | 5 | | **POINT IV:**  DEFENDANTS’ CLAIM THAT THEY DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.  | 7 | | CONCLUSION | 8
[brief] In that case, [...] had withdrawn from arbitration and, after suffering an unexpectedly large award against it, went to Court to try to vacate.  [...] raised every post-award ground it could under 9 U.S.C. sec. 10, the last of which was that the other party’s claim was in the millions of dollars so [...] could have asked for 3 arbitrators.  Id. at 531.  However, [...] did not ask for 3 arbitrators and get rejected, as [...] did here.  It instead withdrew from the arbitration and let it proceed without its participation, not understanding what was at stake.  Id. at 525.  In rejecting that final issue, the Court generally referenced Dockser for the proposition that, a court “generally” lacks jurisdiction to determine the number of arbitrators.  Id. at 532.  It is doubtful that the Court in [...] Del even knew that Dockser was a pre-award case.  Nevertheless, when a full analysis is done Dockser did not stand for what the [...] Court only generally stated.  Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London v. Westchester Firs Ins. Co., 489 F. 3d 580 (3d Cir. 2007), like Dockser, was plainly a pre-award case and therefore not applicable here on its face to the post-award judicial analysis that was required.
[brief] D.  The Court Will Extend the Discovery Period by Six Months.  Finally, the Court will extend the discovery period in this matter by six months.  As noted at the hearing, the complexity of this case and the numerous, multifaceted discovery disputes that have plagued the parties and the Court mean that it is not realistic to assume that discovery can be rapidly concluded.  While the Court, in its previous orders, had held out hope that no further extensions to discovery would be necessary, that was, in hindsight, an assertion of undue optimism.  As the parties have been unable to agree on an appropriate extension of time, the Court will order a six month extension.  This length of extension is especially appropriate given that additional documents must be produced by the [...], the appointment of a special master and privilege review will take time, and the parties still have additional depositions to conduct.  III.