ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This is an action for legal malpractice against Defendant [...] for his negligence in drafting a provision of [...]’s will and for the negligent advice he gave [...] with regards to a mortgage.  Prior to the filing of this action the Chancery Division, Probate Part in the Probate Action had ruled the specific provision in [...]’s will was ambiguous and the Court construed Francesco’s probable intent so as to benefit his former daughter-in-law at the expense of his beloved son, Plaintiff-Appellant [...].  This action was instituted by complaint filed on April 26, 2023(Pa000001).  The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of filing an Answer(Pa000009).  The Motion to Dismiss was supported by the Certification of [...], Esq.(Pa000011) which authenticated exhibits.  No evidence was submitted from Defendant-Respondent [...] or any other person pursuant to R.1:6-6 factually supporting any allegation that Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claims against [...] in the Probate action was inexcusable or that the Defendant had suffered substantial prejudice as a result of the failure to assert the legal malpractice claims in that action.  Plaintiff filed Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and a Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 27, 2023 (Pa000097).  Plaintiff filed a Statement of Material Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Pa000099).  Plaintiff also submitted the Certification of [...] (Pa000107) with exhibits.  After hearing oral argument, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated May 17, 2023 (Pa000337) and denied Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.  Plaintiff-Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal and Plaintiff-Appellant has filed a request for oral argument with this brief.  Plaintiff if not appealing the denial of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  **FACTS**
[brief] I mean it’s my, as a man I’m giving you my word.  Okay?”  (Da 25; see 1T72-10 to 15 ([...] testifying that “[[...]] was concerned about causing any hardship to his wife.  And we had told him that if you tell us where the items are, you know, we’re going to go in there, we’re going to be respectful, we’re not going to try to make a big scene of this, and you know, we, we did. ”)  [...] then read out loud the entire Consent to Search Form.
[brief] On May 6, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to stay the sheriffs sale and the dismiss the foreclosure complaint.  This motion was denied on May 12, 2023.  (Pa 33-35)  On September 19, 2023 the Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause to stay the Sheriff’s Sale until certain documents were provided by Plaintiff and until certain other issues were resolved (Da 020-140).  The court denied the relief sought in the Order to Show Cause in its entirety by Order of September 25, 2023.  (Pa 30-32)  This appeal followed when Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on November 9, 2023 and an Amended Notice of Appeal regarding the denied Order to Show Cause on December 8, 2023 (Da 001-003).
[brief] (Pb72)  Plaintiffs again misconstrue the law and Cohen’s holding.  The Court in Cohen said that book value was only one possible methodology for a court to use in whatever case factually came before it: "Fair value" has been defined as requiring consideration of proof of value "by any techniques or methods which are generally acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court."  Dermody v. Sticco, 191 N.J.Super. 192, 196, 465 A.2d 948 (Ch.Div.1983) (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.1983)).  Both net book value and fair market value, as generally accepted techniques of valuation, can constitute fair value.  [Id. at 156-157 (emph. added)].  Because in Cohen that particular company’s operating agreement did expressly provide for book value as the fair and agreed valuation methodology, the Court simply commented that ‘book value’ was a “generally accepted” method for a court to choose in particular circumstances.  Id. at 157.  Thus, the Court in Cohen did not hold that “tax book value” is always “fair value”, as Plaintiffs misstate here.  It was fair value there because the parties had expressly agreed in their partnership documents that it was, and because book value is a recognized methodology.  This case is the opposite of Cohen.
[brief] **DISMISSAL IS NOT UNFAIR PREJUDICIAL.**  Finally, Plaintiff asserts that dismissal was unfairly prejudicial, asserting that she “diligently pursued discovery,” that there was only a “slight oversight” in failing to timely move to extend discovery, and that all that occurred here were “slight procedural errors. ”  (Pb31-32)  However, in reality, Plaintiff committed an abject failure to provide discovery or to otherwise move to extend discovery.  As [...] noted when denying the motion to vacate, any prejudice which Plaintiff suffers is not unfair prejudice:  While it is true that dismissal of plaintiff's case is detrimental, it is not unfairly prejudicial for all the reasons previously stated both by [...] and by [...].  Plaintiff is arguing for an indulgence to her benefit and the detriment of defendants.  The court rules are designed to promote the interests of justice for all the parties, not only plaintiff.  In this case, the prior rulings reflect that.  [Pa167]  This Court should agree and affirm the decisions in this case.  E.
[brief] See also *State v. Reininger*, 430 N.J. Super. 517, 537 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that the roadside questioning of defendant did not establish custody despite a pat down of defendant’s person and his repeated admissions that his vehicle contained firearms); *Hickman*, 335 N.J. Super. at 629 (holding that questioning of detained passenger regarding whether he possessed contraband did not require *Miranda* warnings and defendant’s contrary claims were “clearly without merit”); *State v. Weber*, 220 N.J. Super. 420, 424 (App. Div. 1987).  --- 7  Our Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and affirmed, although it did not reach the merits of the *Miranda* claim in its decision because defendant did not have standing to claim that the police violated the Fifth Amendment rights of the driver.  *Baum*, 199 N.J. at 412. (holding that police may inquire about his consumption of alcohol during roadside field sobriety tests without giving Miranda warnings).
[brief] (T20:12-13; T24:15-16).  The trial court stated from the bench that I can’t let a jury hear that” because of the word “gloss. ”  (T20:22-21:3).  Counsel argued that [...] should be allowed to testify from his personal knowledge about his opinion that after the painting with the high gloss patio paint the steps became “sleeker” and “rougher in the rain to navigate or when they’re wet,” but the trial court stated that without expert evidence it was “speculation, I can’t have the jury hear that. ”  (T9:1-8; T12:24-13:1; T20:25-21:16-20, T25:6-7).  Counsel for [...] also argued that summary judgment could not be had upon a “Battle of the Experts” and that “[[...]] talks about other issues, the handrails are not close enough, the steps are not constructed properly, all of these things combined with the paint and the storm, that could have caused it or contributed to it, and that’s the exception to Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, 246 N.J. 546 (2021), cause or contribute.
[brief] individuals based on improper voir dire questioning “unacceptably skew[s]” juries.  Mason v. United States, 170 A.3d 182, 190 (D.C. App. 2017) (holding that improper disqualification of juror who believed criminal justice system was systematically unfair to Black people compelled reversal).  Just like the Third Circuit explained in Salamone, even though a defendant has no right to a jury that includes a certain number of individuals with expunged convictions, “he is entitled to a jury from which none of those, or any other group, has been summarily excluded without regard to their ability to serve as jurors in the particular case.
[directive] https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide.htm#use A.G.'s Supplemental Policy on Less-Lethal Ammunition, dated • March 19, 2008 Use of Less-Lethal Impact Projectiles Pending Approval of • Ammunition Specifications and Training Course Memo, dated April 24, 2008  AG's Approved List of Less Lethal Ammunition, December 2010 • ***New Jersey Police Vehicular Pursuit Policy
[directive] Direct Indictments.  Prosecutor Request forNeed to Prepare a Complaint-Warrant or Complaint 4.9.1  Summons.  A grand jury will on occasion return an indictment against a defendant who was not arrested for the offense and therefore has not already been charged by complaint-warrant or complaint-summons.  These cases are referred to as “direct” indictments.  Rule 3:25-4, as recently amended, provides that persons charged by “complaint-warrant on indictment” (i.e., a complaint-warrant issued following a direct indictment) are “eligible defendants” for purposes of the Bail Reform Law as if they initially had been charged by complaint-warrant.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15.  This means that they are subject to pretrial detention or release on conditions that will be monitored by the pretrial services program.  Rule 3:7-8 provides that when a direct indictment is returned, the criminal division manager, as designee of the deputy clerk of the Superior Court, must issue either a complaint- summons or a complaint-warrant in accordance with Rule 3:3-1.  Despite the Rule, the criminal division manager will not prepare a complaint in direct indictment cases.  If a prosecutor wishes to label a defendant an “eligible defendant,” and thereby seek release conditions or pretrial detention when a direct indictment is returned, law enforcement (not the criminal division manager) must prepare a complaint-warrant (CDR-2) in the eCDR system and have a judicial officer review the application.  So too, when wishing to proceed with charges on a complaint- summons (CDR-1) when a direct indictment is returned, the charging document must be prepared in the eCDR system.  The charges in the complaint-warrant or complaint-summons should mirror the charges in the indictment.  The complaint-warrant or complaint-summons is necessary to link a defendant’s fingerprints taken with Live Scan after his or her apprehension or voluntary surrender.  Although Rule 3:7-8 does not specify the role that the prosecutor plays in the complaint-warrant versus complaint-summons determination, it is appropriate that, except in cases where a complaint-warrant is required pursuant to Rule 3:3-1(e), see subsection 4.4.1, or is presumed to be issued pursuant to Rule 3:3-1(f), see subsection 4.5.4, a complaint-summons should be issued following the return of a direct indictment unless the prosecutor establishes the basis for issuance of a complaint-warrant.
[directive] To this end, this Directive establishes the “Statewide HWC Program,” and provides a framework for partnerships between law enforcement and schools to provide children exposed to ACEs with a safe and supportive academic environment.  The program’s goal is to give a school notice when a student has been identified at the scene of a recent traumatic event so the school may handle that child with care.  This notice allows educators to assess whether certain actions are appropriate, such as postponing tests, re-teaching lessons, forgoing disciplinary action for an incomplete homework assignment, or referring the child to the school counselor.  This simple notice can pay dividends towards a child’s well-being and future academic success.
[brief] PA – 5.  Defendant’s failure to submit the necessary response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts is fatal to this appeal as it was with the Motion.  Plaintiff respectfully submits [...] properly admitted those material facts supported by the record that Defendant failed to properly dispute.  R. 4:46-2(b); Judson, 17 N.J. at 75; Masso, 207 N.J. at 556; Claypotch, 460 N.J. Super. at 488.  And, consequently, this Court, in reviewing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment de novo, but with the record at the time of the motion, should affirm the Order for that same reason.  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp., 224 N.J. at 199; Noren, 449 N.J. Super. at 196.
[brief] (Pb 21-26).  He states that any success in recovery on his lawsuit would not have constituted marital property, and as a result, takes issue with the Chancery Division’s comment that any such recovery would have occurred after his marriage to the Decedent.  (Pb 21-22).  The Respondent’s response to this argument is two-fold.  **First**, the Respondent’s intent in introducing the evidence of the nine lawsuits was to show the Petitioner’s history of extreme *litigiousness*.  (2T110-9 to 15).  Such evidence supports the fact that the Decedent was concerned that the Petitioner was a very litigious person, and told her attorney, [...], that the Petitioner would sue to try to prevent the probate of the Will.  (3T220-8 to 25; 3T225-11 to 226-2).  This prophecy turned out to be accurate.  Second, while any direct inheritance from his father’s estate may not have constituted a marital asset -- depending on how that money was utilized and invested -- it is clear that any recovery by the Petitioner in his malpractice suit against his attorneys or in his suits against the [...] and the [...] would have constituted marital assets, on the basis that it occurred during the course of the marriage.  Such a fact supports the Respondent’s position that the Petitioner indeed drafted the Anti-Nuptial Agreement executed by he and the Decedent.  Petitioner’s remaining argument, which focus on irrelevant and unpersuasive details of the various lawsuits, does not merit discussion.  9.
[brief] “The exceptions to the warrant requirement take into account that in certain circumstances, ‘a search without a warrant is both reasonable and necessary. ’”  *State v. Craft*, 425 *N.J. Super.* 546 (2012).  “For example, our case law permits a warrantless search when incident to a lawful arrest, when consent is given, when government officials act in a community-caretaking function, and when exigent circumstances compel action.
[directive] 1st Order 2nd Order V 3rd Order I Address Zip Number CAPS ID County Number(s)  PROMIS Ind/Ace/Complaint Number(s), Charges and Statutes Related Disorderly Persons and Motor Vehicle Charges of  In accordance with the provisions ofN.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 and-13 3:28-1 and upon the recommendation R. & et seq., of the Criminal Division Manager or designee and with the consent the Prosecutor and defendant to the attached listed of ORDERED terms and conditions the supervisory treatment, it is that all further proceedings be and are postponed of for a period months, beginning Date Judge Date Prosecutor Date Criminal Division Manager or Designee/Vicinage  Chief Probation Officer or Designee of  I consent to the conditions set forth the standard and special conditions.  I agree to a postponement further in proceedings for a period not to exceed three years.  During this period, I waive right to a speedy trial on this or any my related charges, including disorderly persons offenses and motor vehicle charges.  In addition, I agree to waive any double jeopardy claim as to any remanded disorderly persons offenses and/or motor vehicle violations.  Date Defendant Date Attorney  Revised Fonn Promulgated Directive #09-19 (06/04/2019), I 0299 by CN ATTACHMENT
[brief] On the other hand, [...] contended that due to the location of its driveways, not the Property’s, and the use of the public street by ambulances, they believed they would “run into a conflict with [the proposed] facility. ”\(^7\) (T1/133:3-7).  [...] further expressed concern that the retail customers might use one of the four (4) parking spaces available near the hospital entrance.  (T1/137:2-4).  He also referred to bus traffic, stating, “there’s a lot of traffic on Atlantic Avenue, you know. ” (T1/138:5-6).  [...] acknowledged that he would have the same concerns for any retail or restaurant use (e.g., Starbucks, 7-11) at the Property.  (T1/142:12-143:5).  [...] also presented expert witnesses with conflicting opinions.  [...] admitted that the Applicant’s proposed plan for loading may --- \(^7\)  Notably, [...] also confirmed that [...] never appeared at any public hearings or noted its objection to the Property being included within the Green Zone Redevelopment Area, which expressly permits retail cannabis facilities.
[directive] In determining which party is the primary aggressor where both parties exhibit signs of injury, the supervisor should consider such factors as:  a.  Any history of domestic violence or violent acts by either person.  b.  Whether the injury was caused by a person acting in self-defense.  c.  Relative size and strength of the persons involved.  d.  The comparative severity of the injuries suffered or inflicted.  e.  Each person's fear of physical injury resulting from the other person's threatened use or history of use of force.  8.
[brief] [...] cannot reap the benefit of protection from Builders’ Remedy lawsuits if it continues to obstruct the very affordable-housing development it relied upon in Court for such immunity.  As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, constitutional constraints supersede the municipality’s claim to local control over zoning, and Courts have routinely ensured constitutional compliance by preempting the role of the local zoning authorities and issuing whatever local variances or approvals are needed to complete the project, conditioned only upon “site suitability.
[brief] We have carefully reviewed the record and the arguments presented by counsel and conclude that the remaining issues presented by defendant are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.  R. 2:11–3(e)(2).  Reversed and remanded for a new trial.  All Citations Not Reported in A.3d, 2011 WL 2333357 2011 WL 1631124  Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.  UNPUBLISHED OPINION.  CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.  Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.  STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. [...], Defendant–Appellant.  Argued March 29, 2011.  Decided May 2, 2011.  On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, [...].
[brief] ESTATE OF [...], by [...], Administrator, Plaintiffs, -v- [...], M.D., [...], C.R.NA., [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10 (representing presently unknown health care providers or health care providers with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected, including but not limited to, doctors, surgeons, emergency medicine doctors, anesthesiologists, hospitalists, physician assistants, nurses, nurse practitioners, nurse anesthetists, technicians, and others); and ABC CORPS 1-10 (representing presently unknown facilities or entities who rendered care to the plaintiff who have deviated from the standard of care or facilities or entities with regard to which negligence is not presently suspected), Defendants.
[brief] Because the Objectors conceded that they failed to timely file their action in lieu of prerogative writs, the Objectors moved to enlarge the period of time in which to file their complaint in lieu of prerogative writs pursuant to R. 4:69-6 (c).  Rule 4:69-6 (c) gives the court discretion to enlarge the time period in Rule 4:69-6 (b) only where “it is manifest that the interest of justice so require. ”
[brief] As for the most particularly significant factor, the purpose and flagrancy of the police conduct, it weighs heavily in favor of the State here.  The Special Enforcement Team that stopped defendant’s car was a specialized police unit tasked with safely investigating ongoing drug-related crimes at a location known for frequent drug activity.  In no way was this specialized drug-enforcement unit stopping cars with the hope of ensnaring suspended drivers on pretextual justifications.  Checking stopped driver’s licenses is a well-recognized routine safety measure.  No evidence exists in the record, nor can it be in any way inferred, that the police unit’s real, primary, or even alternative purpose for conducting the investigative stop of defendant’s car was to embark on a proverbial “fishing expedition” to enforce the driving-while-suspended statute.  See id. at 418 (agreeing with case that found random stopping of cars with the hope of finding drivers with outstanding warrants was unlikely to satisfy factor (3) of Brown).  Here, the evidence shows nothing more than police enforcing the drug laws, and while in the process of trying to do so safely, also happened to learn defendant was a suspended driver and then dutifully charged him with driving while suspended, in addition to possessing the drugs found as a result of the investigation.  There was thus nothing about the police conduct or motivations here suggesting any disregard for defendant’s rights, let alone a flagrant disregard.  This factor therefore weighs heavily in favor of attenuation and against suppression.
[brief] The trial court, in its opinion, made no reference to Defendant’s comprehensive analysis.  It was as if the trial court had relied upon Plaintiff’s scant submission, that was supposed to be of benefit to the court, and completely ignored Defendant’s detailed submission.  In view of (1) the enormous amount of time that was expended by the Administrator and the parties at Plaintiff’s behest in an eight-year search for assets of the Estate that did not exist, and (2) Plaintiff’s failure to file a court-ordered submission that addressed the concerns of the Appellate Division and failure to file a court-ordered response to Defendant’s submission, (3) the fact that Plaintiff’s actions throughout this entire case—including his brazen violation of confidentiality orders and his actions that extended this litigation for years—show that Plaintiff did not meet the equitable considerations that must be present for attorney fee shifting under to R. 4:42-9(a)(2), and (4) the fact that Plaintiff did not follow court directions and orders on the remand, the trial court should have dismissed Plaintiff’s fee application with prejudice.
[brief] Ibid.  In other words, voters at that time had a choice between a “regular” ballot with the list of the nominated candidates and an “irregular” ballot upon which they could write in whomever they wanted.  Since they could only vote for president using one of these two ballots (and that ballot was placed in a separate receptacle), there was no risk of double voting, in contrast to other offices.  In 1940, the Legislature began mandating modern election machines in counties of the first class.