ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 224 F. Supp. 2d 852 (D.N.J. 2002).  [...] filed suit alleging violations of NJLAD, Title VII and §1981.  Id. at 852.  In [...], the first document demonstrating that [...] was aware of [...]’ complaints was a memorandum dated October of 1996.  Id. at 872.  [...] was later terminated in January of 1998.  Id.  Based upon the timeline, the Court determined “that the protected activity [...] engaged in during 1996 is temporally remote from his termination over a year later. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  “Accordingly, [...] ‘can prevail only if a reasonable jury could find that [[...]] engaged in a pattern of antagonism’ in the period between his…complaints [to [...]] and his firing. ”  Id (citation omitted).  In support of [...]’ argument that [...] demonstrated a “pattern of antagonism”, he argued that [...] “set him up” for failure by making him perform punitive work.  For example, [...] was made to create functional specifications for software projects that already had been completed, and would be made to work all night to finish assignments, and then was told the work was no longer needed.  *Id.* at 872.  The Court held that even these actions, which are grave on their face, if true, were *insufficient* to establish a pattern of antagonistic behavior.  *Id.*  If having to work all night on a useless effort is insufficient, how can the failure to answer an email, or to say hello, be anything but trivial?  Here, the alleged actions identified by Plaintiff occurred *years* after Plaintiff filed her first lawsuit.  As such, like in *[...]*, these alleged adverse actions are too temporally remote.  To establish a causal connection, Plaintiff would have to demonstrate a pattern of antagonism.  Here, many of the alleged actions also have nothing to do with Plaintiff, but rather involve transfers and the denial of transfers of other teachers within the school.  The failure of [...] to respond to one email years after the filing of the lawsuit, coupled with the other allegations, is simply insufficient to establish a “pattern of antagonism” in a setting where “temporal proximity” is missing.  Therefore, the Trial Court below appropriately determined that Plaintiff failed to show even a “remote relationship” between the alleged acts and the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Therefore, dismissal of Plaintiff’s NJLAD claims against Defendants [...] and [...] must be affirmed.
[directive] Page 4 b.  The Bureau shall conduct all internal affairs Internal Affairs Investigations. investigations involving law enforcement personnel employed by the Department.  The Bureau shall also conduct other sensitive investigations as assigned by the Attorney General, including internal affairs investigations relating to the conduct of County Prosecutors.  The Bureau may also conduct internal affairs investigations referred to the Department.  The handling of such matters will be governed by the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Procedures.  Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive Policy & See 2019-5 (the “Internal Affairs Directive”).  Office of Policing Policy.  4.  There is established an Office of Policing Policy (OPP), which shall oversee the development of statewide and Department-wide policies designed to strengthen confidence in the criminal justice system.
[brief] As explained in [...]’s opening Brief, *[...]* involved vacatur of an eight-year-old judgment in the face of calculated and inexcusable --- \(^2\) “[E]very iteration of the [NJ]CFLA since the NJSLL had the goals of prohibiting deceptive lending practices, limiting usurious interest rates, limiting what property could be used as secured collateral, limiting what entities could offer consumer credit or possess consumer accounts, and ensuring that only qualified, licensed entities were able to enter the consumer lending marketplace. ”  Chatonavich’s opening Br. 15. neglect by defendant [...].  *[...]*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109.  The court in *[...]* vacated the default judgment because it found that plaintiff [...]’s collection of a time-barred debt in violation of the FDCPA outweighed the interest in finality of judgment.
[brief] 13  ARGUMENT AND LEGAL SUPPORT  26  1.  THE INITIAL TRIAL COURT, THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF COMMON LAW  FRAUD BY PLAINTIFF, I.E.  THE INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION OF PLAINTIFF AS IT RELATES TO THE IMPOSITION OF TWO  (2)  PENALTIES ON DEFENDANT  THIS ISSUE WAS NOT DISCUSSED/RAISED BELOW  2.  THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE AS IT APPLIES TO THE INITIAL TRIAL COURT DECISION AND THE APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE INITIAL COURT  IMPOSITION OF THE FIRST PENALTY OF $108,300.00  THIS ISSUE WAS NOT DISCUSSED/RAISED BELOW  3.  THE LAW OF THE CASE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE SECOND PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT BELOW IN THE AMOUNT OF $118,000.00  THIS ISSUE WAS NOT DISCUSSED/RAISED BELOW  4.
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[brief] 43  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order denying Plaintiff’s Application For Prerogative Writ  Filed September 22, 2023 ................................................................. Pa1  [...] Resolution  No. [...] dated December 19, 2022.................................................................Pa107  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alpine Tower Co. v. Mayor and Counsel of Borough of Alpine, | 23 | | 231 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 1989) | | | Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., | 22 | | 160 N.J. 352 (1999) | | | Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill, | 26 | | 117 N.J. 376 (1990) | | | Cell South of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Windsor Twp., | 22, 24, 31 | | 172 N.J. 75 (2002) | | | Coventry Square, Inc. v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, | 36 | | 138 N.J. 285 (N.J. 1994) | | | Elco v. R.C. Maxwell Co., | 27 | | 292 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, | 22 | | 191 N.J. 344 (2007) | | | Grasso v. Spring Lake Heights Bd. of Adj., | 35, 36 | | 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Grubbs v. Slowthower, | 35, 36 | | 389 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007) | | | Hodges v. Sasil Corp., | 22 | | 189 N.J. 210 (2007) | | | Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, | 35 | | 45 N.J. 268 (1965) | | | Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, | 22, 24 | | 160 N.J. 41 (1999) | | | Medici v. BRP Co., | 14, 15 | | 107 N.J. 1 (1987).
[brief] Those defenses to State accountability have been offered and rejected repeatedly throughout the history of New Jersey’s school funding litigation.  As we will demonstrate in this brief, they may be even less plausible in this case given both the huge and unprecedented amounts of advance state aid loans necessary to fill [...]’s gaping budget holes and the continuous presence in the district of multiple State monitors for the past ten years.  There is a clear nexus between the proven denial of T&E to [...] public school students and the flawed application of SFRA to the district.  SFRA is supposed to ensure that, considering their particular circumstances, districts have sufficient assured funding to be able to provide T&E to their students.  The Final Decision accepts that proposition when it quotes from SFRA’s legislative findings that SFRA “should provide State aid for every school district based on the characteristics of the student population and up-to-date measures of the individual district’s ability to pay.
[brief] A close examination of the record below reveals that the Board’s Resolution of Denial was contrary to the statutory criteria and contrary to the factual record and opinion testimony presented to the Board in support of the requested variances by Respondents’ witnesses, including professional planner ([...], P.P.) and architect ([...]).  *Id.*  In the Court’s view, [...] provided overwhelming and uncontested evidence demonstrating its satisfaction of the special reasons standard applicable to requests for variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), the positive criteria standards applicable to requests for variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c), and the negative criteria standards applicable to requests for variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:67-19 .................................................................................................................. 19 N.J.S.A. 40:67-1 ..........................................................................................................................  19,20 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53(j) ..............................................................................................................  21,26,27,34  N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.2 .....................................................................................................................  24 N.J.S.A. 27:7-94 ..........................................................................................................................  34  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.2 ..............................................................................................................  44 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.5 ..............................................................................................................  44  N.J.A.C. 5:21-4.2 .......................................................................................................................  42,43  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] [...]’s primary causes of action were for a declaratory judgment (Count I) and for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II).  In a declaratory judgment action, “the person seeking the declaratory relief must prove his case, as must any plaintiff, and the burden of proof lies with him. ”  Concord Ins. Co. v. Miles, 118 N.J. Super. 551, 555 (App. Div. 1972). ¹
[brief] (1T39:21-40:1; Da150-178).  Plaintiff did not attempt to expand the duty which Plaintiff believes is identified in 5.20(F)(5) but instead shared the relationships, expectations, and understandings between the parties, so a jury could carefully consider who, if anyone, to apportion liability to.  [...], at his deposition, noted [...] had to follow the agreement, despite at the time believing the contract created limitations on [...] which would limit its ability to complete work at [...].  (1T40:8-16; Pa5-9).  Plaintiff argued that the factfinders should hear this testimony as it went directly as to whether [...] even thought he was able to keep the property reasonably safe for invitees like Plaintiff.  (Id.)  The trial court denied Defendants motion to bar reference to the snow removal contracts because it believed it was important for the factfinder to know the scope of what was expected of each defendant in order to consider apportionment, if any, of liability for the subject property.
[directive] If the complaint is sustained and it is determined that formal charges should be made, the law enforcement executive will direct either internal affairs or the appropriate commanding officer to prepare, sign and serve charges upon the subject officer or employee.  The individual assigned shall prepare the formal notice of charges and hearing on the charging form.  This form will also be served upon the officer charged in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147.  An example of a charging form is in Appendix F (Note: Civil Service jurisdictions must use forms authorized by the Civil Service Commission).  6.3.12
[brief] Furthermore, the proposed plan amendment advances the following objectives of the 2010 Master Plan:  - Maintain existing residential neighborhoods as attractive, high quality areas and ensure that renovations and new construction are compatible with existing neighborhood character.  - Maintain a balanced stock of quality housing that provides housing options for all generations, incomes, and lifestyles.  [*Ibid.*].  III.  **[...] Is Designated as Redeveloper**
[brief] ”  Further, the Law Division observed “[t]he landlord was not forthcoming with the leases” and that this required motion practice and repeated efforts to get the leases. ”  In a case concerning review of a lower court’s order under Rule 4:26-4, this Court wrote:  The question as to whether a statute of limitations applies in a given case is ordinarily a legal matter and “traditionally within the province of the court. ” Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274 (1973).  To the extent we have to reach the estoppel issue depending on the outcome of the first issue, we accord substantial deference to the trial court's equitable authority.  Here, the Law Division determined that the equities favored Plaintiffs before evaluating the legal issue of the Statute of Limitations to amendment made under Rule 4:26-4.  As the Cross Appellants fail to address the issue under the appropriate standard, this Court should affirm without consideration of Respondents’ position.
[brief] As to the sixth factor, the degree of need, Plaintiffs’ brief alleges that the [...] did not provide a “counterbalance” to the trial court’s finding that the “civic purpose” was a sufficient need.  Pb15.  However, the [...]’s brief did clearly address the fact that just because Plaintiffs allege a “civic purpose” does not mean that they need to obtain individuals’ personal information from the [...] by way of an OPRA request.  Db18.  As discussed in the [...]’s moving brief, there is no shortage of ways for Plaintiffs to obtain contact information from citizens who voluntarily wish to sign up to receive information from them.  Plaintiffs also always have the opportunity to attend public meetings to put their positions on local issues on the record.  Plaintiffs certainly have not shown a “need” for the e-mail addresses and the trial court erred in finding that a civic purpose equates to a need.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 to 12:5-11; Spalt v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envt’l Prot., 237 N.J. Super. 206, 212 (App. Div. 1989).  The CZM Rules also do not give third parties rights to an adjudicatory hearing to challenge a permitting decision.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.3; N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.1(e).
[brief] | | | Brown v. City of Jersey City, | 36 | | 2021 WL 2326382 (App. Div. June 8, 2021) | | | Caprio v. Nutley Park ShopRite Inc, | 36 | | 2022 WL 4361326, (App. Div. September 21, 2021) | | | Coyne v. Dep't of Transp., | 15 | | 182 N.J. 481 (2005) | | | Delgado v. Yourman-Helbig, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub., | 37 | | LEXIS 1266 (App. Div. 2022) | | | Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., | 32 | | 219 N.J. 395 (2014) | | | Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., | 13 | | 202 N.J. 369 (2010) | | | Finderne Heights Condominium Ass'n v. Rabinowitz, | 35 | | 390 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 2007) | | | Garrison v. Township of Middletown, | 15, 17 | | 154 N.J. 282 (1998) | | | Grzanka v. Pfeifer, | 33 | | 301 N.J. Super 563 (App. Div. 1997) certif. den’d 154 N.J. 607 (1998)| | Gaskill v. Active Environmental Technologies, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2003)................................................................. 29 Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6 (2008)................................................................................................. 13 Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533 (App. Div. 1996)................................................................. 33 Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., 339 N.J. Super. 97 (App. Div. 2001)................................................................. 33 Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485 (1985)............................................................................................. 16 Maslo v. City of Jersey, 346 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2002)................................................................. 29 Nextel of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adj., 361 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 2003)................................................................. 32 Penny v. Bor. of Wildwood Crest, 28 Fed. Appx 137 (3d Cir. 2002)........................................................................... 30 Polyard v. Terry, 160 N.J. Super. 497 (App. Div. 1978)................................................................. 16, 17, 38 Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008)............................................................................................. 16, 31, 38 Polzo v. County of Essex, 209 N.J. 51 (2012)............................................................................................... 16, 29 Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp., 207 N.J. 344 (2011)............................................................................................... 14, 32 Riley v. Keenan, 406 N.J. Super. 281 (App. Div.) cert. den'd 200 N.J. 207 (2009)......................... 14 Spina Asphalt Paving v. Fairview, 304 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 1997) .................................................................
[brief] (Pb18-19)  This argument fails for three reasons.  First, when a suspect asks a question concerning his rights, and the detective’s response effectively says that she cannot answer his question about his rights, a suspect will reasonably assume that all subsequent statements by the detective are not an answer to his question.  So whatever [...] might have understood the final Miranda warning to mean, he necessarily could not have understood it to answer his question about whether the police would provide him with an attorney.  Second, this final warning did not actually inform him of what would happen (a) if he were requesting an attorney at that time or (b) if he could afford an attorney but simply did not know any attorneys in the United States.  [...] never informed [...] that if he were requesting an attorney, the interview would end until [...] actually obtained an attorney.  Third, the reading of the final Miranda warning, especially after several confusing statements that told [...] that this final warning was not an answer to his question, did not obviate [...]’s obligation to ask a clarifying question after [...]’s ambiguous request for an attorney.  In response to [...]’s question about whether the police would provide him with an attorney, [...] was obligated “to clarify whether defendant was invoking [his] right to consult with an attorney. ”  Dorff, 468 N.J. Super. at 652.  [...] never asked [...] whether he was requesting an attorney.  For that reason, the motion court properly found that [...]’s potential confusion regarding his rights was not clarified by [...] before substantive questioning occurred.  (Pa24)  Because [...]’s question was an ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel, and because [...]’s response failed to clarify whether he was asserting his right to counsel but rather “operate[d] to, delay, confuse, or burden the suspect in his assertion of his rights. ”  *Alston*, 204 N.J. at 623, the motion court properly suppressed [...]’s statement.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153a.  The Department’s analysis of these factors in its justification for imposing Pre-Construction Condition #1 was so cursory and superficial that the Department effectively failed to satisfy its analytical obligations under Section 4 of the Public Access Law.  Department staff prepared an Environmental Report to accompany the issuance of the Permit.\textsuperscript{14} Aa0007-10.  The Report’s discussion of public access begins with an acknowledgement that the Department's Coastal Zone Management Rules,\textsuperscript{15} and the Department’s Public Access Rule in particular (N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)), do not require public access when the only activity being undertaken is the construction of a shore protection structure (such as a bulkhead) or accessory development at an existing residential property.  The provision in question reads in full as follows:  At an \textit{existing} residential development, where the proposed activities consist solely of accessory development or \textit{structural shore protection}, no public access is required if there is no existing public access on site.  Any existing public access shall be maintained.  If it is necessary to permanently impact the \textit{existing} public access in order to perform the activities, equivalent access shall be provided on site.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(i), emphasis added.  [...]’s Coastal Engineering Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.11, expressly the term \textsuperscript{14}  The Report is dated November 10, 2020 but includes a notation that the public access discussion was updated on February 23, 2021.  This was more than three months after the Permit was issued.  The reason for this has not been explained.  \textsuperscript{15}  The Coastal Zone Management Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:7-1 et seq., include the substantive standards used by the Department to review permit applications under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act, the Coastal Wetlands Act of 1970, the Waterfront Development Law and various funding programs.  “structural shore protection” to include bulkheads.  Consequently, by virtue of [...] seeking approval for nothing more than the repair and replacement of its bulkheads and the legalization of small accessory structures, the Coastal Engineering Rule clearly prohibits the Department from requiring public access on [...]'s property as a condition of the permit.
[brief] Pb33-34; 3T121:12-25.  In fact, after [...]’s direct examination went from 3T12 to 40, plaintiff’s cross-examination went from 3T41 to 82, followed by cross-examination by [...]’ counsel (who was clearly fully aligned with plaintiff), which included much questioning that had nothing to do with [...].  Then after re-direct that went from 3T103 to 122, plaintiff was allowed re-cross from 3T114 to 124.  Even after the point about which plaintiff complains where the Trial Court tried to limit plaintiff’s questioning, plaintiff was still permitted to ask a number of questions.  3T121:12-124:22.  Curiously, plaintiff also attacks the Trial Court for asking plaintiff if she was dropping her claim against [...] after plaintiff had stated that [...] was defunct and without assets, even though the Court simply accepted plaintiff’s response that she was not dropping that claim.
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