ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) or leader of a child N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1, or an attempt to commit either pornography network pursuant to N.J.S.A. of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] (3T7).  [...] only did evaluations for the Pension Board and insurance companies.  (3T9).  [...] conceded that a pre-existing injury was not an automatic disqualifier from being eligible for an ADR.  (3T23).  [...] only saw [...] once.  (3T23-24).  [...] reviewed no films of [...]; only the reports of the radiologists.  (3T24).  No medical treatment notes for [...]’s neck or back covering the timeframe of January 1, 2006, through October 16, 2015, were ever provided to [...] for review.  (3T31).  [...] claimed to have never heard the term Fitness for Duty Evaluation.  (3T31-32).  [...] reviewed no records where [...] was sent to a doctor because his superiors felt he could not physically do his job.  (3T32).  The Purported Workers’ Compensation Injury of 2009
[brief] On July 2019, 2020, a Mercer County Grand Jury returned Indictment Number [...], charging defendant [...] with first-degree murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (Count I); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39-4a, (Count II); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1), (Count III); and second-degree certain person not to possess a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b (Count IV).  Defendant subsequently filed a notice of motion to suppress his statement.
[brief] A.  [...] Failed To Demonstrate A Statutory Right Or A Particularized Property Interest Of Constitutional Significance To Entitle It To An Adjudicatory Hearing.  As noted above, the court’s review of agency decisions is limited.  Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 445 N.J. Super. 522, 535 (App. Div. 2016) (citing In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).  It is a “firmly settled” rule that a “trial-type adjudicatory hearing is not allowed . . . except to an appellant who can show a statutory right or a constitutionally protected property interest. ”  In re Riverview Dev., 411 N.J. Super. 409, 434 (App.  Div. 2010).  In fact, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) prohibits state agencies from promulgating “any rule or regulation that would allow a third party to appeal a permit decision” unless “specifically authorized to do so by federal law or State statute. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1 and -3.3(a).  Here, DEP correctly assessed that CAFRA, which governs the Permit, does not and cannot provide [...] a statutory right to an adjudicatory hearing.  N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 to -45.  (Aa73).  Moreover, consistent with the APA mandate, the CZM rules do not entitle a third party to an adjudicatory hearing to challenge a permitting decision.
[brief] Movant’s Statement of Material Facts, filed May 24, 2019 Certification of [...], filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit A, Second Amended Complaint, dated January 26, 2016, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 64a)  Exhibit B, Memorandum Opinion dated August 4, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2522a) -- Exhibit C, Estate of Alexander v. Northeast Sweepers, A-1123-17 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2018) (unpublished), filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2303a) -- Exhibit D, [...] Request for Expressions of Interest, dated December 16, 2013, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1787a) -- Exhibit E, Agreement between [...] and [...], dated April 26, 2014, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2280a) -- Exhibit F, Agreement between [...] Engineers, Architects and Land Surveyors, P.C., and [...], dated May 6, 2014, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1778a) -- Exhibit G, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], dated April 12, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1912a) -- Exhibit H, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated May 10, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2610a) -- Exhibit I, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], dated May 10, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1577a) -- Exhibit J, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated June 12, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2185a) -- Exhibit K, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated September 10, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2068a) -- Exhibit L, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], dated July 11, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 1947a) -- Exhibit M, Report of [...], P.E., dated December 22, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2425a) -- Exhibit N, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 26, 2019, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2504a) -- Exhibit O, Report of [...], P.E., dated December 11, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2391a) -- Exhibit P, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 10, 2019, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 2485a) -- Exhibit Q, Excerpts from the Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 9, 2019 2677a Plaintiff’s Response to [...]’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed June 27, 2019 2680a Plaintiff’s Response to [...]’s Statement of Material Facts, filed June 27, 2019 2692a Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, filed June 27, 2019
[brief] Given [...]’s rank, pursuant to the IAPP and Directive 2022-14, the investigation of the IA complaint was referred to the [...].  (Pa4 Complaint ¶ 7; Pa 51-51, IAPP 5.1.8).  On or about January 18, 2023, a Summary and Conclusions report was issued concerning the allegations in the IA complaint, which sustained the allegations of the IA complaint against [...].  (Pa4, Complaint ¶ 8).  Based on the [...] findings, at least one of the sustained charges required [...] to post details of the report and its findings, identifying [...] by name, on the internet as part of its compliance obligations under the IAPP and Directive 22-14.  (Pa4 Complaint ¶ 9; Pa 75-77, IAPP 9.11.2(k)).  The findings of the IA investigation were shared by the Chief of the Department with [...], who was given the option to retire, rather than go through a disciplinary hearing and contest the charges.  (Pa4 Complaint ¶ 10).  As a result of those discussions, there was an agreement between the [...] and [...] that resulted in [...] retiring effective April 1, 2023.  (Pa5-5 Complaint ¶¶ 11, 12).  After his retirement, [...], through his attorney, attempted to obtain “a copy of the formal procedures by which he [could] challenge the findings of the Summary and Conclusions report.  . .” (Pa5 Complaint ¶ 14).  By letter dated July 10, 2023, Assistant Prosecutor [...], Director of the Professional Responsibility and Bias Crime Unit at the [...], wrote to [...]’s counsel.  In that letter, [...] advised [...]’s counsel that there was no such procedure.  That, having failed to challenge the findings through the administrative process prior to retirement, he was prohibited from doing it post-retirement.  (Pa5-6 Complaint ¶¶ 15-16; Pa75-77, IAPP 9.11.2).  Presumably in response to [...]’s letter, [...] filed the underlying lawsuit seeking to compel the [...] to provide legal advice and/or create a remedy to address his failure to follow those that were available to him prior to his decision to retire, a remedy which would contravene the very purpose of the [...]’s IAPP and Directive 2022-14.
[brief] Rather, [...]’s testimony regarding the C.I. was based entirely on either hearsay – what [...] told [...] regarding the C.I.’s past performance – or hearsay within hearsay – what [...] told [...] the C.I. told him.  While N.J.R.E. 101(a)(3)(E) permits the court to rely on hearsay at a suppression hearing, the court may do so only when the hearsay is “trustworthy. ”  See also *State v. Novembrino*, 105 N.J. 95, 111 (1987)(noting that an informant’s tip, despite being hearsay, may be considered by the motion court “so long as a substantial basis for crediting [it] is presented”).  Here, [...] challenged the trustworthiness of [...]’s claim that [...] advised the C.I.D. units that the male in the Kia was “wearing a fanny pack with a .44 magnum inside of it,” because that detail was not included in the offense report that [...] wrote on the day of the incident.  Rather, according to [...]’s report, the only information that the C.I.D. units received about the male in the Kia was that “he was in possession of a firearm. ”
[brief] Plaintiff Violates Court Orders ..................................................12  D. Defendant’s Cooperation with the Administrator .......................14  E. The Litigation and Judgment in the Korean Action ....................15  F.  The Administrator’s Conclusions in the New Jersey Ancillary Proceeding .................................................................17  G.  Plaintiff’s Disregard of Court Orders and Plaintiff’s Constant Demands on the Administrator to Continue Searching the Books and Records of [...] Did Not Benefit the Estate and Was Detrimental to the Estate .........................................................18  H.  The Administrator’s Description of Plaintiff’s Actions During His Investigation ..............................................................21  I.  The Trial Court’s Rulings on the Remand Of the Legal Fee Award .............................................................................23  J.  The Trial Court Did Not Follow the Appellate Division’s Instructions ...........................................................................26  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................28
[directive] IMO Norton & Kress, 128 N.J. 520, 538 (1992).  Even in those cases where the defense asserts a claim based upon a report from an “expert witness,” a Municipal Prosecutor need not automatically concede that the report, or any purported testimony from an “expert witness” is, or will be, dispositive in the resolution of the case.  In cases where a breath test reading has been obtained, our Supreme Court has strongly counseled against the use of expert witnesses, particularly where the evidence does not remotely suggest there is even a reason to suspect that the breath tests administered to the defendant were not correct.  State v. Downie, 117 N.J. 450, 468 (1990), cert. den. 498 U.S. 819, 111 S.Ct. 63, 112 L.Ed.2d 38 (1990); State v, Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 517-518 (1987), app. dism. 484 U.S. 1038 (1987); State v. Hammond, 118 N.J. 306, 317 (1990); State v. Lentini, 240 N.J. Super. 330, 334- 336 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Maure, 240 N.J. Super. 269, 283 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd o.b. 123 N.J. 457 (1991).
[brief] 433 N.J. Super. 238, 241 (App. Div. 2013).  A lawsuit was brought against the property owner.  Id. at 243.  The plaintiff pointed to an expert who attributed fault to the owner’s trash removal procedures, but summary judgment was nonetheless granted because the cleaning procedures of the proprietor were not shown by competent evidence to be unreasonable.  *Id.* at 243-44; See also *Gaffney v. America on Wheels*, 16 N.J. Super. 484, 488-490 (App. Div. 1951) (granting a directed verdict in favor of a defendant because there was no indication that the alleged slippery floor was the fault of defendant or violated normal and generally accepted standards).
[brief] | | | THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT | | | PLAINTIFF, [...] WAS A “PARTICIPANT” AS | | | DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT | 26 | | CONCLUSION | 29 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Angrisani v. Financial Technology Ventures, L.P.,** | | | 402 N.J. Super. 138 (App. Div. 2008) | 18 | | **AT & T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,** | | | 563 U.S. 333 (2011) | 12, 14 | | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.,** | | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | passim | | **Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp.,** | | | 220 N.J. 544 (2015) | 13 | | **Bruni v. Didion,** | | | 160 Cal. App. 4th 1272 (2008) | 19 | | **Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,** | | | 546 U.S. 440 (2006) | 26 | | **Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostics Sys., Inc.,** | | | 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) | 19 | | **Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,** | | | 470 U.S. 213 (1985) | 17, 19 | | **Epix Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc.,** | | | 410 N.J. Super. 453 (App. Div. 2009) | 18 | | **Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc.,** | | | 244 N.J. 119 (2020) | 13 | | **Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A.,** | | | 168 N.J. 124 (2006) | 11, 22 | | **Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co.,** | | | 526 F.2d 777 (3d Cir.1975) | 16, 17 | | **Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.,** | | | 238 N.J. 191 (2019), reconsideration denied, 238 N.J. 508 (2019) | 20, 26 | | **Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC,** | | | 215 N.J. 174 (2013) | 10, 18, 19 | Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323 (2006)
[brief] ”); Da 59-60, Lease at § 22.01 (“The mention in this Lease of any specific right or remedy shall not preclude Landlord from exercising any other right nor from having any other remedy nor from maintaining any action to which it may be otherwise entitled either at law or in equity. ”)).  Finally, Tenant’s loquacious argument that “Landlord’s interpretation of § 4.02 is internally inconsistent to the point of being incomprehensible” because it remitted the 2022 and 2023 Tenant Allowance payments after Tenant deposited the Rent Arrears with the Clerk demonstrates that Tenant simply does not understand New Jersey landlord-tenant law.
[brief] Here, while [...] benefitted from the zoning changes to the maximum density and height requirements, those changes were made in accordance with the City’s statutory power to further the redevelopment of a blighted area.  The changes were adopted to promote development on a vacant parcel in a redevelopment area as part of a comprehensive plan to advance the general welfare of the community.  To find that such actions equate to “spot zoning” would effectively eliminate a municipality’s statutory power to rezone areas in need of redevelopment granted under the LRHL.
[directive] A fugitive defendant will be deemed to have waived any expectation or right to receive a pre-indictment plea offer or its functional equivalent and, in such cases, the return of an indictment will automatically result in escalation to the applicable initial post-indictment plea offer.  The county prosecutor shall notify the Attorney General in writing where the county does not have a pre-indictment case disposition program and where the prosecutor will rely instead on the provisions of this Section to issue on a routine basis the functional equivalent of pre-indictment plea offers.
[brief] [...] should have been awarded its judgment.  But, as both above cases are Appellate Division decisions, the law on assignments of prejudgment personal injury claims remained unchanged.  The law in New Jersey bars such transactions.  The highest court of New Jersey, prior to the 1947 Constitution, held in the case of Weller et al. v. Jersey City, H. & P. St. R. Co., 68 N.J.Eq. 659, 61 A. 459 (E. & A.1905) that a prejudgment assignment of an interest in a personal injury claim is invalid under New Jersey Law.
[brief] They are: Is [...] a proper non-conforming use? Was that use improperly expanded?  [...], the managing member of [...] (“[...]”) and [...], the respective owner of the subject property and the operator of [...], relied upon the representations of Oceanport officials that the pizzeria was a non-conforming use before [...] purchased the property and leased it to an operator for [...] in 2017 and [...] opened [...] in 2020.  Appellants would put the onus upon [...] and [...] to have second guessed the Oceanport officials and have performed an independent historical investigation of the accuracy of their advice before purchasing and operating.  If that requirement is held to apply to [...] and [...], that onerous requirement would necessarily apply to every applicant for land use permits anywhere in the State.  In asserting that the use was abandoned through its conversion into a television store in 1969, Appellants focus on a pamphlet which makes that very vague assertion.  They, however, gloss over the statement by the Attorney to the [...], who said on the record in 1984 that “this store has sold food for the past 52 years. ”  [...] properly rejected the pamphlet to be significant evidence.  (T.4 at 26:2-20).  With regard to the claimed expansion of use, Appellants cite several cases regarding improper expansion, but cite none in which there is just a change in the menu to keep up with the times.
[brief] In considering an appeal of an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court utilizes the same standard as the trial court on the same motion record.  *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021); see also *Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc.*, 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021).  When “the competent evidential materials submitted by the parties,” viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows no genuine issues of material fact, then “the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. ”  *Grande v. Saint Clare’s Health Sys.*, 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting *Bhagat v. Bhagat*, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).  On appeal, as is the case below, the Court must give the non-moving party “the benefit of the most favorable evidence and most favorable inferences drawn from that evidence. ”  *Est. of Narleski v. Gomes*, 244 N.J. 199, 205 (2020) (quoting *Gormley v. Wood-El*, 218 N.J. 72, 86 (2014)).  Appellate review affords no special deference to the motion judge’s legal analysis.  *RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018).  A.  The Trial Court Erred by Requiring a Transaction Between [...] and the [...]
[directive] 2.0.1  Achieving the desired level of discipline within the law enforcement agency is among the most important responsibilities of the law enforcement executive.  Yet, this is one of the most frequently neglected processes within many law enforcement agencies.  While the word “discipline” was originally defined as instruction, teaching or training, its meaning has shifted toward a concept of control through punishment.  This emphasis on control has resulted in discipline being viewed as a negative threat rather than a mechanism for remediation and improvement.  Too frequently rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures are used as an end in themselves, and their purpose in reaching agency goals is forgotten.  Focusing on the negative aspects of discipline diminishes officer morale and productivity.  2.0.2
[brief] This failure was particularly prejudicial to [...] because it was, in the court’s own telling, central to its decision to re-impose a life sentence:  “You cannot commit an act like this and not go under a life sentence…the youthfulness doesn’t rise to a level that would not make this an offense punishable by life.  It just doesn’t. ”  (5T92-3 to 10)  The court concluded, in other words, that the heinous nature of the crime outweighed the mitigating qualities of [...]’s youth.  The court had erred, however, in analyzing all five aspects of [...]’s youth.  The Court’s reasoning – and the life sentence predicated upon that reasoning – were thus erroneous.  A remand for resentencing is required.
[brief] This lawsuit is a challenge by a utility to a municipal ordinance regulating the usage of the municipality’s right-of-way with respect to what may be placed therein.  The [...]’s (“Town” or “[...]”) ordinance is the same as ones adopted by many municipalities in New Jersey.  It does not prohibit utilities from placing facilities in the right-of-way; rather, it only regulates the manner in which utilities may use the municipality’s right-of-way, requires the utility to submit an application for approval of the proposed use, and permits the municipality to grant certain exemptions from the ordinance’s requirements.  Here, [...] wanted to construct a 69 kilovolt line (the “69kV Project) to link its Front Street substation in Scotch Plains to its Springfield Road substation in Union through high-powered 69kV electric lines.  Although there were at least five feasible routes by which [...] could accomplish this connection, it wanted to route the line through [...].  [...] specifically designed the 69kV Project in a manner that violated [...]’s ordinance.  Rather than apply to [...] for approval of the route and the design that did not conform to the ordinance, [...] chose to institute a suit challenging various provisions of the ordinance.  Since no proper application for the 69kV Project was made to [...] or denied, the challenge by [...] was necessarily a challenge to the ordinance on its face and not a challenge to the ordinance “as applied. ”
[brief] Please, what is she talking about?  (6T-43)  [...] responded: I don't know.  (6T-43)  The Court: You don't know?  You don't know what [...] is?  And it's—she says it's your partner.  Something to do with your partner [...].  You think it's Mr. [...]?  (6T-43)  The Court stated: Stop.  Who puts $879,000 in an account with a company that you have no idea who even owns it and it's located in Wyoming?  (6T-44)  [...]: I didn't say no.  I guess, it's me and the lawyer company.  I guess we own it together—whatever, we own it together.  I just—(6T-44)  The Court: Who and who owns it together?  Who?  (6T-45)  [...]: Okay.  [...]—  The Court: [...]'s not going to bail you out on this one, because, you know what—(6T-45)  [...]: I'm not—(indiscernible-overlapping speech)—I didn't say it was him.  The Court—his license is on the line.  He's not going to say a word.  [...]: I didn't say it was him.  I'm not saying him.  No, no.  So [...] Groff from the company, we did this together so that the money only went to the children.  I got nothing.  (6T-45).  After [...] testified that she and [...] Groff owned the TMFT account together, [...] came back on the line.
[brief] Pursuant to the “American Rule,” a party is not entitled to collect counsel fees from the opposing party absent a contractual right (which plaintiff does not have in this case as argued with regard to Section 9 of the Mortgage Agreement above), a statute authorizing an award of fees (there is none in this case), or a finding of frivolous litigation (which was not found in this case).  In re Niles, 176 N.J. 282, 293 (2003).  In sum, the Law Division’s June 22, 2023 judgment is invalid because it grants to plaintiff a money judgment against the [...] that Section 9 of the mortgage agreement does not provide plaintiff with a right to obtain, and because this lawsuit that plaintiff brought arising from a mistaken discharge of the mortgage is not comparable to any of the proceedings that Section 9 sets forth as illustrative of the type of proceedings triggering the lender’s right to attorney’s fees.
[brief] A.  Facts  Presented at the Plea Hearing.  Defendant admitted that, on February 10, 2023, in the city of Elizabeth, he possessed a .38 special revolver, knowing that it was a firearm and that he did not have a permit and that he had been previously convicted of possessing a firearm without a permit; he knew that, as a result, he was legally determined to be a certain person not to possess weapons.