ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Both sides agree that the applicable statute of limitations is twenty (20) years.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-7.  The Court should find that for statute of limitations purposes, the clock already started to tick the moment [...] forged his brother [...]’s name on the problematic deed on December 10, 1998, which enabled [...] to later transfer the title to someone else.  As discussed supra, there is no basis to say that [...] forged [...]’s signature was any innocent error, whether or not his lawyer told him to engage in such a fraud.  As a well-educated, and experienced, property owner, [...] knew that he was forging his brother’s signature, and he knew that he was forging his brother’s signature in connection with the title transfer documents that he hired his real estate lawyer [...] to prepare.  Therefore, he knew that by virtue of his fraud, he had created a deed naming [...] as the new owner, which enabled [...] to transfer the title to someone else.  Unfortunately, the trial judge merely found that the deed at issue was voidable because the identity information stated in the body of the deed was incorrect.  [...] filed the underlying lawsuit because he purportedly found out that [...] transferred the title to [...] in 2019, pursuant to the December 10, 1998 deed that was fraudulently created by [...] himself.  Respectfully, for the purposes of a statute of limitation analysis, the issue is, whether [...] knew, or should have known, that on December 10, 1998, he had already fraudulently created a problematic deed permitting [...] to transfer the title to someone else.  Obviously, the answer is: Yes!  Therefore, the underlying lawsuit, which was filed on August 16, 2020, was untimely because [...]’s claims have been barred by the 20-year statute of limitations.
[brief] ‘The test is whether the particular delegation is reasonable under the circumstances considering the purpose and aim of the statute. ’  *Male v. Renda Contracting*, 64 *N.J.* 199, 201, 314 A.2d 361 362, Cert. den., 419 U.S. 839, 95 S.Ct. 69, 42 L.Ed.2d 66 (1974).  …  Our review of the limitations on the [...]’s authority, which limitations serve to promote other interests, convinces us that there does not reside in that body the potential for such aggrandizement of the Council members’ interests as would be repugnant to due process.  *Humane Society* at 579.  Based upon the above precedent, the claims advanced by the Appellants have already been rejected by the Supreme Court.
[directive] 9-31 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  Before any automatic or semi-automatic weapon is used, the supervising automatic/semi-automatic firearms instructor (or designee) shall inspect and approve the weapon.  Police Carbines.  Training and qualification shall be conducted with a police carbine approved by the agency.  Before any police carbine is used, the supervising firearms instructor (or designee) shall inspect and approve the weapon.  Scoped Rile.  Training and qualification shall be conducted with a scoped rifle approved by the agency.  Before any scoped rifle is used, the supervising firearms instructor (or designee) shall inspect and approve the weapon.
[brief] On July 5, 2016, following the Township’s July 4th celebration and fireworks display, the police were called to disperse a crowd which had become unruly/disruptive.  (Pa81 at T20-24 to 21-7).  During this incident/event, Plaintiff made radio transmissions in conjunction with his duties as a police officer.  (Pa107 at T18-11 to 18-20).  In these radio transmissions, Plaintiff claims to have said, “maintain the border” and “asked for mutual aid”.  (Pa107 to Pa108 at T18-23 to 19-3).  Plaintiff further “advised dispatch a direction that the group of juveniles were [sic] heading. ” (Id.).  The [...] investigated the conduct of a number of Maplewood police officers involved in dispersing the crowd on July 5, 2016, including Plaintiff and the Chief of Police.
[brief] One of the most noticeable features of autism spectrum disorder is the persistent difficulty he had with communication and this limited amount of social interaction.  He has had that his entire life.  It arose very early in development as it does in an autism spectrum discovery.  and one component of it, the speech disorder was treated with some success over the course of many years.  But it still remains difficult for him to engage in conversation.  He has taught himself to make eye contact which does not come naturally to him.  [14T:73-20 to 74-5].  [...] also testified that people with Autism Spectrum Disorder can display inappropriate affect or display of emotion that doesn’t fit the situation.
[brief] DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW:  HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. APPELLATE BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT  290  OCEAN, LLC  [...] - 027332006  [...]  A Professional Corporation [...]  Red Bank, N.J.  07701-6777 [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, 290 Ocean, LLC  MATTHEW N. FIOROVANTI, ESQ.  [...], ESQ.  Of Counsel  MATTHEW N. FIOROVANTI, ESQ.
[directive] ~789.]  -i'j"8"}7} o]~ ;..]1t)_o] o}1d_ 1~, o] %~ ~:i!)-.£.  o]~oJJ.Ai 4t1J-~ ~Jl=E~/EE-:= "i=-5:. ~1~~ 7-J¥~ 3;!¾ o]~ Ef.t" ;,;U ~~o] ~qt" o}1Jy77}?  -"j=-5:.  ~~  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney [Yes/"11] [No/0H..8..] c. about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?
[brief] PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT FAVOR THE RIGHT TO RESCIND AN EXPRESS WAIVER AND DOES NOT FAVOR ARBITRATION OVER A JURY TRIAL  Defendants illogically argue that a public policy favoring arbitration somehow supports the right of a party to rescind an express waiver of arbitration.  (Db24).  Defendants’ reliance on Garfinkle v. Morristown Obst. & Gynec. Assoc., P. A., 168 N.J. 124 (2001) is of no help to them.  There, some two decades ago, the Court refused to enforce an arbitration clause as to both the LAD and common law claims where the arbitration provision did not clearly and unmistakably indicate that the employee was giving up their statutory and constitutional rights to have their claims heard in court before a jury.  Id., at 136-137.  That holding has no bearing upon the issue of rescinding an express waiver of arbitration.  As to Defendants’ so-called federal public policy favoring arbitration, the United States Supreme Court has now clarified that the said policy “is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts. ”  Morgan, 596 U.S. at 417 (cites omitted).  Thus, an arbitration clause is no less susceptible to waiver under state contract law than any other contractual provision.  In 2021, the FAA was amended to expressly exclude gender or sexual discrimination and retaliation claims from arbitration in Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (H.R. 4445); Pa38 (official statements).  Thus, federal law now is clear that forced arbitration is “disfavored. ”  New Jersey law also provides that any agreement, such as an arbitration agreement, which hampers a victim’s rights under the LAD is against the public policy of this State.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7.  Defendants further argue that since there is no writing or subsequent Order memorializing the express waiver that they should be able to rescind it.  There is no requirement that an express waiver be in writing or be in a Court Order to be binding.  But here, there is a writing – a certified Court transcript.  Again, the Court below did not abuse its discretion in denying recession of an on-the-record waiver nor did the Court err by any other standard.
[brief] [...] is the owner and resident of a condominium unit at [...].  (Pa327 Dep. Tr. p. 9; Pa328, Dep. Tr. p. 10).  He has lived there since he bought the condo in 2005.  (Pa328, Dep. Tr. p. 10).  [...] has been managing the building at 357 8th Street for the past three of four years (Pa584-585), pursuant to a management agreement between it and [...] (Pa590; Pa635-642).
[brief] There is no precise measure and inflexible rule for the assignment of just compensation.  The Constitution does not contain any fixed standards of fairness by which it must be measured.  Courts have been careful not to reduce the concept to a formula.  The effort has been to find working rules and practical standards that will accomplish substantial justice such as, but not limited to, market value.  [58 N.J. at 384-385]  In City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, 326 N.J. Super. 1,19 (App Div.) certif. denied, 162 N.J. 485 (1999), the Court recognized that damages may not be evident until sometime after the taking.
[brief] The court further finds that his contract having expired by its own terms on December 31, 2023, [...] is no longer employed by the Borough, with the caveat that he shall be fully compensated for all services rendered to the Borough through the date of this Order.  The issues relating to the resolution and conflicts of the defendants pertinent to the injunction are moot.  (Da 2).  In its April 1 Order, the Law Division also ruled that the Defendants had a conflict of interest at the time of the January 2024 vote, stating:  The court finds the defendants' votes on the resolution were contrary to the Local Government Ethics Law.  The court finds the vote therefore was ineffectual and void regarding the subjects of the resolution which pertain to [...].  (Da 2).  On April 10, 2024, despite the conflict of interest ruling by the Law Division, the Defendants voted at a Council meeting to pay [...] only 20% of his outstanding fees for services rendered to the Borough.
[brief] Though she was “aware that the Student—who was seven years old—regularly wore a form-fitting hijab,” [...] pleads in her Complaint that she: asked the Student to brush back her hood….  When the Student did not respond to [...]’s request, [...], justifiably believing the Student’s hijab was underneath brushed the hood back a few inches with her hand….  While lightly brushing back the hood itself, and without making contact with the Student physically, [...] noticed the Student’s hair and that the Student was not wearing her regular form-fitting hijab underneath.  [...] immediately and gently brushed the hood back to cover all the Student’s hair and, out of respect for the religious practices of Islam and for the Student’s observation of same, apologized to the Student.  Da_010-11.
[brief] *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999); *Close v. Kordulak Bros.*, 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965).  "If the factual findings are supported by competent evidence, they will be upheld.  It is not ordinarily our function to weigh the evidence, to determine the credibility of the witness, to draw inferences and conclusions from the evidence, and to resolve conflicts therein."  *In re Grossman*, 127 N.J.Super. at 2.  In the present matter, [...] properly and correctly noted that Appellant disputed the testimony of the witnesses by offering her take of the events of September 12, 2022.  (Pa214).  [...] made credibility determinations, as was his obligation, as to the witnesses' testimony.
[brief] The Borough Effectuated a Policy Designed to Operate in Secret  The defective public notices transmitted by the Borough detailed above were part of a longstanding practice, as evidenced by notices obtained through Open Public Record Act requests, and included in the record below.  (Pa. 285 and Pa. 397.)  Of the 28 meeting notices in the record, nine were copies of notices actually published and the remainder were of the e-mail transmittals.  All failed to comply with the Open Public Meetings Act or N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.  (Id.)
[directive] I understand that if the prosecutor's consent to consider my application is required, my application will not be of considered by the Criminal Division until: (1) a statement compelling reasons is received by the Criminal Division; and (2) the prosecutor's consent is received writing.  in if I understand that compelling reasons are required to overcome a presumption against admission, failure to provide of compelling reasons to the Criminal Division may result rejection my application.  in if or I understand that I want to challenge the prosecutor's decision not to consider my application, a recommendation or against enrollment by either the prosecutor the criminal division manager or designee, that I must file a motion within of of of or 10 days receipt the rejection to the Presiding Judge the Criminal Division, judge to whom my case has been assigned.  of Print Name
[brief] These include the submission of a Planning Board report with recommendations within specified timelines and requirements for governing body review.  Id.  The procedures specified by the LRHL do not require a governing body to obtain the written consent of redevelopers prior to enacting any amendments.  In the absence of any statutory based source of authority to demand the City obtain Plaintiff’s consent, Plaintiff has no recourse to rely upon the language of the Redevelopment Plan instead.  The Redevelopment Plan states that its modification “must be consented to in writing by designated developers. ” (Pa514 to Pa523).  No gymnastics are required to interpret this language in relation to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff was no longer a designated developer when the City amended the Redevelopment Plan on December 9, 2020.
[directive] Significantly, the CJRA includes several time limits designed to move cases with detained defendants to trial more quickly.  First, defendants must be released if they have not been indicted within 90 days of being detained.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 90-day clock does not count “excludable time for reasonable delays 22(a)(1)(a).  The . . . set forth in subsection b” of the statute.  Ibid.  Subsection b, in turn, lists thirteen categories of excludable time.  The trial judge may extend the 90-day clock by up to 45 days if, on motion of the prosecutor, the court finds that (1) the defendant presents a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” to public safety and no conditions of release “could reasonably address” the risk, and (2) the failure to indict “was not due to unreasonable delay by the prosecutor. ”  Ibid.; R. 3:25-4(b)(2).  Second, defendants must be released if their trial has not “commence[d]” within 180 days of the return or unsealing of the indictment.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 22(a)(2)(a).  Under the Act, a trial “commence[s] when the court determines that the parties are present and directs them to proceed to voir dire or to opening argument, hearing of any motions that had been reserved for the time of trial. ” or the Id. at -22(a)(2)(b)(i).  The 180-day clock contains provisions that mirror both exceptions to the 90-day clock.  Id. at -22(a)(2)(a).  Finally, the CJRA contains a two-year cap.  Defendants shall be released from jail, after a hearing to consider conditions of release, if “the prosecutor is not ready proceed” two years after the court ordered the defendant detained. to Ibid. (emphasis added).
[brief] Pursuant to the Disqualification Rule in the *Code of Conduct for Judges of Compensation*, “Judges shall hear and decide all assigned matters unless disqualification is required by this rule or other law. ”  *N.J.A.C.* 12:235-10, Rule 3.16.  Section (B) of this Rule provides that judges shall disqualify themselves in proceedings “in which their impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. ”  Examples in this section refer to personal bias, prejudice or knowledge or if they have a financial interest in an enterprise related to the litigation.
[brief] No analysis, such as found required in Willoughby, Riza and Mahwah Realty, to warrant deference was done.  The "inconsistencies" between the 1988 Master Plan and its Land Use Element and the Redevelopment Plan are clear and substantial.  The Borough is free to adopt a Development Plan that is not consistent with the 1988 Land Use Plan and Master Plan; however, the error here is the failure of the Municipality and the Trial Court to recognize that lack of consistency and to follow the special requirements under N.J.S.A. 40A:12-7.
[brief] The Arbitrator’s decision is thus “binding and not reviewable for any error of law. ”  Id.  [...], in his concurrence in Perini, which the Court adopted in Tretina, set forth the standard as follows:  Basically, arbitration awards may be vacated only for fraud, corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrators.  [They] can be corrected or modified only for very specifically defined mistakes as set forth in [N.J.S.A. 2A:24-9].  If the arbitrators decide a matter not even submitted to them, that matter can be excluded from the award.  For those who think the parties are entitled to a greater share of justice, and that such justice exists only in the care of the court, I would hold that the parties are free to expand the scope of judicial review by providing for such expansion in their contract; that they may, for example, specifically provide that the arbitrators shall render their decision only in conformance with New Jersey law, and that such awards may be reversed either for mere errors of New Jersey law, substantial errors, or gross errors of New Jersey law and define therein what they mean by that.  I doubt if many will.  And if they do, they should abandon arbitration and go directly to the law courts.  [129 N.J. 479, 548-49 (1992). ]  The *Perini* concurrence established that an “error of law” need “be so egregious that one need only look at the cover page, at the award, to know that a horrible mistake had been made” such that “one could say that there was fraud or corruption or some similar wrongdoing that requires vacating the arbitrators’ award.
[brief] The Noise Ordinance directly conflicts with the State’s exemptions to the regulation of the unamplified human voice.  If it is deemed to be a nuisance ordinance, it directly conflicts with the State’s delegation of authority over noise nuisances to the Local Health Boards.  The existing law in either field, whether “noise” or “noise nuisances”, is pervasive and established, and leaves no room for attempted municipal regulation, especially which does not comply with the State’s clear procedural requirements and grants of authority.  B.  In enacting the Noise Ordinance, Defendants failed to comply with either the Noise Control Act or the noise nuisance provisions of Title 26.
[brief] The following facts are derived from [...]’s testimony at the suppression hearing.  (1T4-6 to 95-17)  At 2 p.m. on August 7, 2020—two days after [...] issued the Toms River search warrant—[...] officers established surveillance on [...]’s Lakewood home.  [...] testified that police sought to “maintain surveillance in the hopes that he traveled in the Toms River area. ”  (1T8-6 to 18)  If [...] crossed into Toms River, [...] explained, “at that point, we [i.e., the [...] officers] would conduct a motor vehicle stop of his vehicle and execute [the] court-authorized search warrant that I had obtained prior. ”  (Ibid.)  After [...] left his Lakewood home in the Jaguar, [...] officers observed him drive throughout Lakewood for up to an hour, as he stopped at three locations during which he met with unknown individuals.  (1T17-2 to 20-18)  [...] suspected that [...] was engaged in drug transactions out of the car, but officers did not stop him at any of these locations.  (Ibid.)  [...] testified that, even after seeing these Lakewood stops, the officers “hoped to stop [[...]] in Toms River”—not in Lakewood—to effectuate the search warrant.  (1T21-12)  In his investigation report, [...] confirmed that “[i]f and when [...] travelled into the Toms River area he would then be stopped by a [...] marked unit. ”  (Da 56)  Although [...] officers observed [...] driving near Lakewood’s border with Toms River, he never actually entered Toms River.  Worried that he may drive deeper into Lakewood—and even further from their jurisdiction in Toms River—[...] instructed two marked [...] vehicles to park at a Wawa along Route 70 in Lakewood to pull over [...] and execute the search warrant.  (1T21-6 to 12, 25-13 to 30-10; Da 57)  As shown on dashcam footage (Da 15 at 3:10:53 to 3:13:00), after [...] drove past the Wawa in the Jaguar, the marked police cars turned on their lights and began to follow him.  [...] stopped the car in the parking lot of a Lakewood car dealership.  (1T37-23 to 37 to 44-23)  [...] testified that, throughout their surveillance, [...] did not drive into Toms River and “was in Lakewood the entire time. ”  (1T79-15 to 20)  Uniformed and plainclothes officers immediately removed [...] from the car and placed him under arrest for prior pending charges.  (Da 15 at 3:13:00 to 3:14:30; 1T45-15 to 50-11)  Officers then executed the search warrant on the car, finding a handgun, 234 wax folds of heroin, and a small amount of cocaine.  Police also located two bullets in [...]’s jacket pocket and $1,608 in his pants pocket.  (Id.; Da 51)  C. Toms River Police Eventually Obtain [...]’s Consent to Search His Lakewood Home
[brief] Further, the claim of collateral estoppel improperly ignores the fact that Probation did indeed violate court orders and collateral estoppel cannot be applied to situations generated by failure to comply with court orders or the law even a court later mistakenly accepts the condition due to oversight.  Thus, Appellant has to question, how can Law of the Case doctrine or "collateral estoppel" be applied to Probation's blatant violation of the court's Orders (see discussion above, Point III, paragraph 3, for a list of court Orders inadequately enforced)?  These Orders are in fact the Law of the Case and their enforcement has been improperly ignored.  In this manner, the Court erred by misapplying the doctrine of Law of the Case and "collateral estoppel."  4.
[directive] alcohol to ability the (which affect may drug amind-altering of influence the under while persons by of threat the deterrent of effect general the undermine thus and consequences future project an habit, offender's support drug to the money raise to committed are or punishment), criminal subsection See criminal activity.  also future of indicator reliable a be can addiction untreated believing is that defendant for basis a objective an prosecutor has a when  Accordingly, 7.6.4. prosecutor notify court shall the 2C:35-14, the N.J.S.A. in defined as dependent alcohol or drug to ordered be of the condition defendant release, a as that, request and belief, this for of basis the a by prescription substance a without other controlled or drug narcotic any of use from refrain dependency or drug alcohol for treatment available undergo practitioner, to and medical licensed to required 2C:35-14.1 (defendant N.J.S.A. also See 2A:162-17(b)(2).
[brief] 34  Issue IV: Plaintiff’s Complaint Against [...] Should Have Been Dismissed On The Grounds That Plaintiff Failed To File The Complaint Within The Two-Year Statute Of Limitations Period.  (Presented at Pa522-529; 1T5:1-48:22; Pa888-928; 3T4:2-66:6 )  .........................................................................................................................  34 F. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................  42
[brief] Notably, when looking at the question of bad faith, by the August 7th date, [...] had still not submitted its promised proposed form of resolution.  What followed over the course of the next three plus months were a series of largely uninterrupted\(^{10}\) phone and email primarily from the Board’s attorney to the [...]’s attorneys attempting to finalize the Amendment to the Settlement Agreement and the Resolution of approval, see Statement of Facts, Pb24 to 27.