ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Borough of Seaside Heights Land Use Ordinance Codified § 246-22 .............................................................................  4  Borough of Seaside Heights Land Use Ordinance Codified § 246-36(B)(2)(b)[1] ..........................................................  29 N.J. Ct. Rule 4:69-1 ..............................................................  18 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 ...............................................................  3, 31 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 ...............................................................  29, 47 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 ............................................................  19, 40, 42, 46 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12 ............................................................  4, 40  ## LIST OF PARTIES | Party Name | Appellate Designation | Trial Court Party Role | Trial Court Party Status | |----------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | Participated Below | Appellate Division  Docket Number: [...]
[brief] Ibid.  The State explained this on the record during the defense’s objection, (28T:169-16 to 173-6), and then again later when defendant wanted to overturn the jury verdict, (36T:37-8 to 22).  It should be noted, as well, that there was no objection to defendant eliciting the recantation, or that [...] at one point claimed his testimony was fabricated.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES CITED ................................................................................................  Page Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2008) .........................................................  24 Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1999) .............................  33  Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270 (1982)....................................................................................... 36,37 Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 210 L. Ed. 2d 369 (2021)... 24,25,26,27,28,29 DeBrango v. Summit Bancorp, 3 28 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 2000) ......................................................... 34 Deutch & Shur, P.C. v. Roth, 284 N.J. Super. 133 (Law. Div. 1995) ....................................................... 33 Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr., 160 N.J. 454 (1999) .............................................................................. 38 Fagas v. Scott, 251 N.J. Super. 169 (Law Div. 1991) ..................................................... 33 Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 2009) ..................................................... 34 First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2007) .................................................... 34 Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div.1996) ....................................................... 37 Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516 (2019) .............................................................................. 23 Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 (2001) .............................................................................. 38 Iannone v. McHale, 245 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 1990) ..................................................... 34 In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1 (2020) ............................................................................... 23 Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 1960) .................................................... 24 Keeper v. Janelli, 317 N.J. Super. 309 (Law. Div. 1999) .......................................................................... 38 Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256 (App. Div. 1997) .................................................. 36 Klimko v. Rose, 84 N.J. 496 (1980) ........................................................................................................... 38 Levinson v. D'Alfonso & Stein, 320 N.J. Super. 312 (App Div. 1999) .................................................................................. 38 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982)
[brief] The claim that Appellant was not performing her job is erroneous.  As noted, [...] testified that Appellant obtained effective scores on her Observations and that the Summative Reports were effective at year end for the first two school years.  (Pa348, [...] Dep 10/28/22, T30:6-8, 18-22, T31:11-12; Pa298, Pa314 Observations and Pa326, Pa327, Summative Reports for 2017 and 2018; Pa211, [...] Dep. T201:8-11, T209:8-14, T209:25, T210:3-6)
[brief] The prosecutor concluded his summation as follows:  [I]n order to find [defendant] innocent[,] you have to completely discount the testimony of ... [...]'s girlfriend ... [...].  You have to completely discount the testimony of [[...]]'s friend [...].  You have to completely discount that for some reason ... [defendant's] long-time friend [([...])] who knows his nickname, who knows his mom and ... lie[d] to the police and ... lie[d] again on the stand.  You have to [for] some reason believe and discount the testimony of [defendant's] lover on the day of May 23, 2019[,] that she would for some reason lie to the police and then come to court and lie today on the stand.  In order for you to find [defendant] innocent[,] you have to discount all that testimony.
[brief] As aptly summed-up by the Trial Court:  There is not a doubt in my mind, and I certainly do hope that I put a preamble to the hypothetical, theoretical fee findings in this case, that those were theories that were offered by the defendants to cut short or to truncate the plaintiff’s allegation that management fees were taken without authorization[ and a]bsolutely improperly, with no agreement.  …  And just in case … the management fee theory didn’t work, the theoretical fee and the hypothetical fee theories were used.  (236T19:22-19)  ***  [T]he defendants were … attempting to support their taking of management fees from the partnership by proffering the theory that they were entitled to theoretical and hypothetical management fees.  And there was further evidence that was presented with regard to the true up.  And all of this was to undermine the plaintiff’s [NJRICO] allegation of theft by deception with regard to the management fees that were taken.  (236T19:2-11).  D.
[directive] These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), (4) or (5)(a), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), luring or enticing a child pursuant to 2C:13-6, criminal sexual contact pursuant to 2C:14-3b if the victim is a minor; kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1, criminal restraint pursuant to 2C:13-2 or false imprisonment pursuant to 2C:13-3 if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent, promoting child prostitution pursuant to Please note for Question 4b(2) that while endangering the welfare of a child 2C:34-1b(3), (4), or any attempt to commit any such offense.  pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii), can be subject to parole supervision for life upon a motion of the prosecutor, this offense was not included in the February 1, 2018 amendments to the offenses subject to Megan’s Law under 2C:7-2b(2).
[brief] Defendants pay lip service to these basic principles but do not follow them.  The plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11 provides that a financial agreement “shall include findings” by the municipality setting forth “appropriate” tax exemption provisions and an “appropriate” annual service charge [PILOT] schedule.  The statute asks the municipality to make “determinations” as to (a) “the relative benefits” of the project “when compared to the costs, if any, associated with the tax exemption” and (b) “the importance of the tax exemption to be granted in obtaining the development of the project and in influencing the locational decisions of probable occupants of the project or units of the project. ”
[brief] THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A DISPUTE IS SUBJECT TO AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS TO BE RESOLVED BY A COURT, NOT AN ARBITRATOR, PER N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b).  [...] argues that the question of whether the disputes at issue are subject to the med-pay intercompany arbitration agreement is a “condition precedent” and therefore, within the scope of authority granted to the arbitrator per N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6.  This argument fails based on the statutory authority cited along with the common sense factual considerations.  The underlying premise of the [...]’s arguments to vacate the nine (9) med-pay arbitration awards is that they each represented a dispute that was not within the terms of the med-pay intercompany arbitration agreement.  Specifically, the agreement includes exclusions:  Article  Second  Exclusions  No company shall be required, without its written consent, to arbitrate any claim or suit if: (a) it is not a signatory company nor has given written consent; or (b) it creates any cause of action or liabilities that do not currently exist in law or equity; or (c) its policy is written on a retrospective or experience-rated basis; or (d) any payment which such signatory company may be required to make under this Agreement is or may be in excess of its policy limits.  However, an Applicant may agree to accept an award not to exceed policy limits and waive their right to pursue the balance directly against the Respondent’s insured; or (e) it has asserted a denial of coverage; or (f) any claim for the enforcement of which a lawsuit was instituted prior to, and is pending at, the time this Agreement is signed; or (g) under the insurance policy, settlement can be made only with the insured’s consent; or (h) medical payment subrogation claims are prohibited by statute or judicial decision.  (Emphasis added).  There is no question that the agreement excludes any dispute arising out of jurisdictions where med-pay subrogation is prohibited based on statute or judicial decision.  [...] raised this exclusion as an affirmative defense as required by the Arbitration Forums rules.  Each arbitrator rejected this affirmative defense, generally finding that [...] was a signatory to the agreement and not considering the specific legal authorities cited by [...].  Whether med-pay subrogation is prohibited in New Jersey is not a condition precedent.  Rather, it is a question of whether a dispute (or in this case, nine disputes) fall within the scope of the med-pay intercompany arbitration agreement.  In this regard, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6 provides that the resolution of such a question is for the court and not for the arbitrator.
[brief] In *New Jersey Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot. V. Duran*, 251 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 1991), the document at issue was a certificate regarding the accuracy of a lobster gauge utilized by State and federal agents to bring criminal charges against defendant for the sale of “illegal short lobsters. ”  The State official testified to its use and accuracy.  By statute, the gauge had to be measured, and a certificate of correctness issued.  The certificate of correctness was allowed under the precursor to *N.J.R.E.* 803(c)(8).
[brief] ...........................................................................................................................30, 31 Alcantara v. Allen-McMillan, 475 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div. 2023) ........................................... passim DePascale v. State, 211 N.J. 40 (2012) ........................................................................ 32  Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254 (1998) .......................................................................  30  In re State Bd. of Educ.’s Denial of Petition to Adopt Regulations Implementing N.J. High Sch. Voter Registration Law, 422 N.J. Super. 521 (App. Div. 2011) ..............................................  34 Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (2006) .......................................................................  30 Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449 (1976) .......................................................................  32  Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 133 N.J. 482 (1993), cert. denied sub nom, 510 U.S. 1110 (1994)  ......  30 Twp. Pharmacy v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 432 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 2013)  ............................................. 33-34  STATUTES L. 2007, c. 62 §§ 1-2 ....................................................................  4 L. 2007, c. 260 ............................................................................. 3, 31 L. 2010, c. 44, § 4 .......................................................................  4 L. 2010, c. 44, § 5 .......................................................................  4 L. 2016, c. 22 ............................................................................. 25 L. 2018, c. 67 .............................................................................  6  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This court has ruled that the [...] ([...]) is not providing its students with a constitutionally-mandated thorough and efficient education (T&E).
[brief] (Cra62-63; Cra250-251).  Within each of its 2020 actuarial memoranda, [...] highlighted in a chart its newly adopted actuarial assumptions: | Year | Updated in Assumptions Due To | |------|-------------------------------| | 2014 | Lower Claim Termination Rates (CTR) in later durations  Higher Benefit Utilization Rate (BUR) in later durations | | 2015 | Lower Voluntary Lapse  Lower Active Life Mortality | | 2016 | Lower CTR BUR methodology change | | 2017 | Incidence differential for Lifetime and Non-Lifetime benefit period | | 2018 | Lower CTR | | 2019 | New Choice 2 & 2.1 incidence assumption with improved fit by age and duration | (Cra62 and Cra250).  The magnitude of [...]’s proposed premium rate increases was unprecedented.
[brief] 18.  After having made six (6) years of uninterrupted payments, Defendant utilized a self-help remedy and stopped making payments of the $1,500.00 for 46 months.  This totals $69,000.00, which is less than what was owed by [...].  From that point forward Defendant has made every payment of $1,500.00 per month (No trial transcript reference since the payments resumed after the trial concluded.  19.
[brief] Appellant’s theory fails because this interpretation it is at odds with other provisions in the FDCPA, and a Court must consider the statute as a whole in determining Congress’s intent.  *Robinson*, 519 U.S. at 341.  *See also Nicholas v. Mynster*, 213 N.J. at 480 (plain reading of statute not applied when “overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. ”); *Matter of C.P.M.*, 461 N.J. Super. at 582.
[brief] (Pa556; Pa106-107).  [...] measures the baseline for the height of a structure utilizing the average pre-construction grade at the four (4) corners of the home.  (Pa468; Pa105).  The fact that the rear of the home is set on piles contributes to the height variance by altering the average pre-construction grade.  (Pa468; Pa104).  There is no practical way to expand the home horizontally without disturbing steep slopes.  (Pa557; Pa106).  There is no practical way to expand the home horizontally without disturbing mature trees (which themselves aid slope stability).  (Pa557; Pa106).  The steep slopes on the wooded lot accommodate a taller structure within the established footprint of the home.  (Pa556; Pa111).  The existing home is already constructed on a street not improved to municipal standards and would remain so constructed if the remaining variances were not granted.  (Pa558; Pa104).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C. dated January 6, 2023  Granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment ..............................................................................  Pa20  Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C. dated January 6, 2023  Granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment  .................................................................  Pa21  Order of Hon. [...], J.C.S. dated February 10, 2023  Denying Plaintiff [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the January 6, 2023  Orders Granting Defendants [...]’s and [...]’s Motions for Summary Judgment  ...............................................................  Pa23  Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. Granting Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants [...] and [...] ..................................................  T34:24 to T44:18  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Da317)  In response, the [...] agreed that the large complex procedures “are in place for this matter”.  (Da316)  The case manager further stated that, “if you are no longer agreeable to one arbitrator to hear this matter, please confirm and the [...] will proceed in accordance with the Rules. ”  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, in its June 17, 2016, response to [...]’s request to apply the LCC Rules, the [...] agreed to do so unless he agreed to proceed with one arbitrator but told [...] that [...] would still be one of the arbitrators.
[brief] Plaintiffs dismiss Berg by arguing that it “does not substitute general laws of statutory construction to determine what a statute means; it only applies to determine the existence of a contract and its scope. ” (Pb26.)  They are incorrect.  When Berg applies—as here, in a case involving a legislative contract—it does, indeed, remove the analysis from the framework of “an ordinary statutory interpretation case.  . . .”  225 N.J. at 272.  That means any ambiguity in the statutory language “spells failure,” id. at 273, for the purported claim.  Thus, for Plaintiffs to prevail on the more burdensome Middlesex residency requirement that they are advocating, that obligation must be “unmistakable” and “clear. ”  225 N.J. at 263-264, 277.  The trial court erred by not applying Berg (the court did not even mention Berg).  Both sides below accused the other of adding words to the [...] Act that do not exist.  The trial court focused only on words it believed [...] was trying to add—i.e., that the residency requirement applies only “at the time of appointment”—words that the court said it would not imply.  (1T76.)  But that was the wrong perspective.  Instead, under a proper Berg analysis, the trial court should have concluded that the parties’ competing arguments underscored that the scope of the residency requirement is unclear; hence, the more burdensome obligation being advocated by Plaintiffs must fail.
[brief] Outside of the action now on appeal, [...] commenced arbitration proceedings against [...]’s companies on October 30, 2018.  (See Plaintiffs’ R. 4:5-1 Certification at Da717).  The proceedings ultimately led to the entry of judgments against several of [...]’s companies in favor of [...].  (See Da40 for listing of judgments; See also arbitration awards at Da157-67 and Da225-38).  Several months passed during which parties on both sides grew increasingly eager to move forward, but the trial court was largely unresponsive, presumably due to [...]’s pending retirement from the bench and [...]’s arrival in Chancery.
[brief] In cases decided after Balsamides and Lawton, this Court has ruled marketability and minority discounts should not normally be used to offset fair value.  In Casey v. Brennan, 344 N.J. Super. 83, 112, (App. Div. 2001), adopted what the Delaware Supreme Court had said:  In refusing to apply marketability discounts or minority discounts, the Delaware Supreme Court has noted that the "objective of [the statutory] appraisal is 'to value the corporation itself, as distinguished from a specific fraction of its shares as they may exist in the hands of a Particular shareholder.'"  Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del.1989).  We agree.  Thus, we conclude that the judge correctly declined to apply marketability discounts or minority discounts to the value of the shares.  In addition, we perceive no reason to distinguish, for these purposes between marketability and minority discounts and, thus, also conclude that minority discounts likewise are not to be applied in a valuation proceeding.  [Ibid., (emph. added)].
[brief] By way of his refusing to allow that to go without the appropriate police response, Plaintiff, in seeking to enforce the law, engaged in activity protected under CEPA.  In *Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc.*, 222 N.J. 362, 388 (2015), our Supreme Court rejected a defendant-employer’s contention that the protections afforded by CEPA do not apply to certain employees based upon their job functions and duties.
[brief] The only point this brief will add in that regard is that Respondent’s brief essentially argues that the religious discrimination allegations in her pleading are interwoven with her disability discrimination claim—a fact which overlooks a critical distinction.  Respondent argues out of both sides of the issue: in one breath, the religious discrimination and disability discrimination claims are discrete and in the same breath they are interdependent—that is, the alleged religious discrimination caused her anxiety.  This sophistry does not stand against the weight of the evidence presented at trial.  Either the claims of religious discrimination and disability discrimination go hand-in-hand, or they are separate.  Respondent may argue that both can be true—the claims are interwoven and separately pleaded.  Even if this cognitive dissonance is accepted by the court, the evidence presented at trial does not support the jury’s verdict in either scenario.  The jury’s verdict found that Respondent did not suffer religious discrimination, which leaves only viewing the claims as separately pleaded, not interwoven.  If the claims are viewed as separately pleaded, then the jury’s verdict collapses under the weight of the evidence, especially in light of Respondent’s surprise testimony regarding disability discrimination and retaliation.  Accordingly, the ground is ripe for mistrial based on the occurrence of surprise testimony in this case.
[brief] (20T  During [...]'s brief testimony he was evasive and largely unresponsive.  He claimed that he obtained the email with the change form by calling a customer service representative, but he didn't want to give the name of the representative.  He eventually stated:  I don't know the rabbit hole this is going down, and if now, you're going to then try to reach out to this poor service person that's just doing her job, but her name is [...], K-O-R-N-E-G-Y, who is just a policy service person working for the [...] in Charlotte, North Carolina, who forwarded to me those documents, which I then forwarded to you.