ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ’”  Defendants’ raised multiple grounds for reconsideration based on serious errors and irregularities in [...]’s conduct, commentary, and ruling.  These grounds were clearly stated in defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and at oral argument on the motion.  In the Preliminary Statement to their Motion for Reconsideration, defendants’ explain that they sought reconsideration for three primary reasons: 1. the January 23 Orders “denied [defendants] the benefit of a reasoned legal analysis premised on findings from the record” (Da129-130); 2. the January 23 Orders “turned a blind eye to the rules of comity and the ‘special equities’” stating “the Missouri Action is ‘of no moment to this court’” in direct contravention “to the analytical paradigm established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Sensient Colors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 373, 388-393 (2008)” (Da130); and 3. the January 23 Orders “violate[d] fundamental tenets of due process to the extent [[...]’s rulings] allow[ed] this case to proceed against two entities who [plaintiff] concede[d] do not themselves have sufficient contacts with New Jersey to support general or specific personal jurisdiction.
[brief] You know, the whole tenor of this from day one, and I remember it clearly, was that this is somehow a completely frivolous action, it is [seller’s] remorse.  It was just [...] waking up one day years later deciding that he just wants more.  And I reject that completely.  I know it started with certain accounting irregularities, and then this tax notice.  And maybe if [[...]] would have paid, . . . at that point [Mehta] might have been satisfied.  But that is just another indication that [the defendants] are going to fight . . . tooth and nail, like somehow the plaintiff is delusional.  Well, I didn’t find that he was delusional.  I found him credible.  I found [...] credible.  I found transactions which were diversions or misappropriations.  (37T 74:21 to 75:13, emphasis added).
[brief] We need not comment here on whether these problems are sufficiently prevalent to render legislative history inherently unreliable in all circumstances, a point on which Members of this Court have disagreed.  *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.*, 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005).  Defendant argues the construction adopted in the published Federal Decisions leads to an absurd result if it prohibits the use of letter vendors.  Defendant relies on its unfounded contention that the *Senate Report* limits the meaning of “any person” as used in § 1692c(b) to a consumer’s friends, neighbors, relatives, and employers.  Db2, Db13-Db14.  It does not.  The *Senate Report* does not refer to friends, neighbors, relatives, and employers in the context of § 1692c(b).  Instead, those people are mentioned in two prefatory sections titled “Need for this Legislation” and “Prohibited Practices. ”  *Senate Report* at *2, *4.  Those introductory sections do purport to explain the scope of § 1692c(b).  Defendant ignores where the *Senate Report* specifically addressed § 1692c(b).  In its entirety, the Report’s Section-By-Section Summary of § 1692c(b) states:  There is a general prohibition on contacting *any third parties* (other than to obtain location information) except for: the consumer’s attorney; a credit reporting agency; the creditor, the creditor’s or debt collector’s attorney; or any other person to the extent necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy.  [Emphasis added.]  Thus, the Senate Report does not limit the meaning of “any person” in § 1692c(b).
[brief] [...]’s arguments emphasize the offensive nature of the video, degrade [...]’s character, and claim that the removal is justified by how it reflects negatively on the town to be connected to [...].  None of these points are relevant to the legal issues presented to this Court.  After inflaming the reader with these arguments, [...] attempts to draw a legal connection between “offensive” conduct and what constitutes “misconduct in office. ”  [...] erroneously conflates “misconduct in office” with general “misconduct” or “conduct unbecoming a public employee. ”  Under a plain reading of N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c), “misconduct in office” must have a direct connection to the actual performance of the duties of the office.  The statute’s language clearly requires this nexus.  By its direct words, the statute addresses “misconduct in office” - misdeeds in the performance of the public role – not an officeholder’s “misconduct” in their private behavior.
[brief] A.M.S. v. M.L.S., [...], 2021 WL 3197768, at *7 (App. Div. July 29, 2021).  In her Reply Brief, Defendant does not refute Plaintiff's argument on cross-appeal that the trial judge here also "truncated" his analysis of R. 5:3-5 and failed to analyze all the applicable R. 5:3-5 factors.  That is reversible error.  Nor does Defendant comment on the fact that Plaintiff achieved overwhelming enforcement of several provisions of the Property Settlement Agreement, which required fee shifting.  But the trial court ignored that term of the agreement (Ca14 ¶27) and undermined the parties' intent.  That is reversible error.  Defendant also does not contest that her Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests For Admissions were in evidence.  (Pa72).  Defendant denied the following key facts and required Plaintiff to incur significant fees proving them at the Plenary Hearing:  - Defendant repeatedly denied that she executed or reviewed the Matrimonial Settlement Agreement, the Mid-Marriage Agreement, and the Powers of Attorney.  (See generally Pa72).  - She also failed to admit that she received the $200,000 check as part of her equitable distribution.  Id.  The trial court committed reversible error by not considering that evidence to apply the fee shifting requirement of R. 4:23-3.  It was clear that the Plaintiff’s requests were not objectionable, they were of substantial importance, and Defendant did not have reasonable grounds for not making the admissions.  See generally Pa72; see also R. 4:23-3.  On the issue of sanctions, Defendant fails to dispute Plaintiff’s claim that there was no “practicability” for compliance with the safe harbor letter.  Nor does she refute Plaintiff’s claim that regardless of the safe harbor letter, there is an inherent power of the trial court to sanction.  The trial court committed reversible error by not commenting on the practicability of compliance with the safe harbor letter requirement, and by not utilizing its inherent power to sanction.  Nonetheless, it was clear the sanctions request was a minor part of Plaintiff’s fee application; the major part of Plaintiff’s fee application was against the Defendant.
[brief] Pa1152, Da51.  All of the evidence establishes that it is an inescapable conclusion that [...] used the right of way and crossing in a manner in which it was not intended to be used.  The undisputed facts material to this issue establish the following.  About 7 seconds before the collision, [...] sounded the horn as the front of the train was just finishing crossing over Grand Street, which is one block prior to the crossing.
[brief] H.  The Trial Court’s Telephonic  May 13, 2024  Ruling  During a break in the May 13, 2024 deposition, [...] heard telephonic arguments regarding the propriety of defense counsel’s instruction that [...] not answer questions regarding the statements made at the time of his guilty plea.  See 1T6:22-7:10.  After hearing the parties’ positions, [...] ruled that [...] “has to answer the questions” regarding the statements he made at the time of his guilty plea because “there’s no privilege associated with this at this point in time in the proceedings” and “[t]here’s not a civil reservation in place at this point in time. ”  1T13:12-15; 1T20:21-22.  [...] noted that “[i]t’s not like you’re asking for something that’s covered by the attorney/client privilege where once it’s out you can’t shove it back into the bottle. ”  1T13:15-17.  [...] ruled that the ultimate admissibility of [...]’s prior statements was a separate issue, but “everyone knows what he said at the allocution in his plea, and he absolutely can be asked questions about it” at his discovery deposition.  1T13:18-24.  [...] further found that the defense’s reliance on the case of State v. Lavrik and the possibility of a future civil reservation being granted were all issues going to the ultimate admissibility of [...]’s prior statements at the time of trial and were therefore not dispositive of whether he could be asked about them in a discovery deposition.  1T14:7-24.  Following [...]’s ruling, [...]’s counsel unilaterally terminated the deposition for the stated reason of moving for leave to appeal.
[brief] Among its protections, the LAD prohibits discrimination on the basis of “gender identity or expression, [or] affectional or sexual orientation” in “any place of public accommodation,” N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1), including “any kindergarten, primary and secondary school, … [or] high school,” N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l).  In other words, a school that adopts a policy discriminating against students based on their sexual orientation or gender identity has violated the LAD’s bedrock protections.  This dispute arose when the [...] and [...] (Appellants or the District) violated the LAD by adopting a blanket policy that required school personnel to affirmatively inform the parents of LGBTQ+ students about their child’s sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression.
[brief] 41  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Preclude [...]’s In-Court Identification of Defendant .... (4T 14-7 to 17-15; 8T 10 17 to 11-12; Da23)  Failure To Preclude [...] From Offering Inadmissible Lay Opinion Testimony On What The Surveillance Video Showed ........................................... (9T 26-1 to 48-25)  Jury Instructions on Identification, Which Omitted The “Feedback” Instruction Contained In The Model Charge ...........................................(11T 115-20 to 21)  Order Imposing $12,443.56 In Restitution And $1,500 Total In Probation Supervision Fees Without Consideration Of Defendant’s Financial Means................................. (Da31-32; 13T 26-10 to 13)  Judgment of Conviction ...........................................................................................................(Da31-33)
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT........................................................................5  I.  [...] HAS NO DAMAGES..............................................................5  II.  [...] HAS NO VIABLE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST [...].................................................................5  III.  THE EXPERT OPINIONS OF [...] ARE IRRELEVANT.................................................................6  A.  [...]’s opinions that Alliant did not perform its duty to inform [...] that [...] was unenrolled from the CCIP, or to ensure that [...] notify [...] that the [...] general liability (GL) policy had been canceled, are irrelevant.................................7  B.  [...]’s opinion that the [...] GL policy remained in effect because Alliant did not perform its duty to ensure compliance with the cancellation provision of the certificate of insurance (COI) is irrelevant.................................................................9  CONCLUSION..................................................................................10  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The frivolous litigation claim was based on three documents pertaining to the vacation of Church Lane, the approval of revised plans by the Bridgeton City Planner, [...], and an email from the city engineer approving those changed plans.  (Pa000459-Pa000460 at ¶ 20-21; Pa000121).  The documents were created in 2021.  (Pa000121).  Moreover, in [...]’s response to interrogatories, [...] acknowledged that a representative of [...] may have trespassed on Plaintiffs’ Property in connection with the preparation of site plans (Pa000108).  None of the factual averments or documents referenced in the frivolous litigation letter refuted, in any way, an allegation of trespass, nor did they explain the reason why SP 3 showed proposed project improvements on Plaintiffs’ Property when Plaintiffs had not authorized any activities or construction on their Property.  In relevant part, [...]’s SP 3 depicts the installation of Project parking lot spaces and a dumpster location on the Plaintiffs’ Property.
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[brief] Harris, 457 N.J. Super. at 50 (quoting Adim, 410 N.J. Super. at 423-24; State v. Johnson, 436 N.J. Super. 406, 422 (App. Div. “[W]hat constitutes a reasonable length of time” requires the trial court to “weigh all the relevant circumstances, including ‘such factors as the length and complexity of [the] trial and the quality and duration of the jury’s deliberations. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Figueroa, 190 N.J. at 235); Adim, 410 N.J. Super. at 424.  Because “[t]he decision by a judge to send a jury back for further deliberations after it has announced a deadlock is discretionary,” this Court will reverse such a decision “only if the judge has abused [her] discretion. ”  Harris, 457 N.J. Super. at 48; Figueroa, 190 N.J. at 235.  In Harris, 457 N.J. Super. at 49-51, this Court found no abuse of discretion — “[a]lthough” noting this was “a close question” — in the trial judge’s direction that the jury continue to deliberate after the submission of three deadlock notes where the six-week trial was relatively complex and the five days of deliberation only amounted to 10 to 12 hours of actual deliberation due to extensive readbacks/playbacks.
[brief] Both the Board and [...] have offered return on equity approaches that would be compliant with the TPA’s protections, and which the *amici* support.  Although the Board’s approach would still incorporate an estimation of the value of [...]’s dwelling unit, the value would be discounted significantly due to its rent-controlled status, and [...] would be entitled to a lower return and resulting rent.  This rent would ultimately be affordable to [...], and therefore the Board’s approach would ultimately still follow the legislative intent of the TPA that condominium conversions cannot destroy affordable housing.
[brief] [T]he Court Rules "shall be construed to secure a just determination, simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."  R. 1:1-2(a).  For that reason, "[u]nless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice."  Ibid.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The matter was significantly complicated by the actions of the landlord in pushing the rent leveling board to go outside of its ordinance and link the rent to the unit’s market value as a condominium.  Forgotten in the details of hypothetical appraisals, equalized tax assessments, and a fruitless search for comparables, was the big picture, which is that this landlord invested in an apartment building and transformed that investment into condominiums, making a profit and fair return on its investment.  It was always the case, even back in 1993 when [...] bought the building, that [...]’s ability to convert its apartment building to a condominium building required compliance with the TPA and local rent control.  In short, this was a regulated area, [...] was subject to the regulations, and [...] proceeded with its investment and condominium conversion under those regulations because it was profitable to do so.
[brief] I am awarding punitive damages because what was done in this case … was done not with a reckless, but a willful disregard of the rights of the partners, [...] and [...].  And it was clearly not negligent.  It was not even grossly negligent.  It was grossly willful.  And it was done repeatedly.  And the outcome was foreordained when the act itself, or the acts themselves were committed.  223T62:5-62:14, 223T77:17-78:1.  [...] specifically found that [...]’ intentional and malicious conduct continued unabated during the years 2003 through and including 2011, justifying an award of punitive damages.  (225T43:19-45:2)  Further addressing the statutory factors for punitive damages, [...] found [...] were aware that their actions would result in serious harm, particularly to [...], who they knew to be financially vulnerable compared to them:
[brief] When [...] was presented with his court-filed certification from the same matter which stated he had received the summons and complaint on January 18, 2014, he changed his testimony and said that the case was not disclosed because it was a “special circumstance. ” (5T85:15-86:18; Pa1204-Pa1206).  Subsequently, [...] testified that he did not disclose the outcome of the case because “it was appealed. ” (5T87:3-15).  However, even though [...] testified he “would report it whatever the decision is” whether favorable or unfavorable, he was allegedly unaware that his appeal had already been denied.  (5T98:4-100:15; Pa1282).  [...] then admitted that he never informed investors that the matter was pending as an appeal.  (5T100:12-15).
[brief] Indeed, the Trial Court later mused that, if it were in Plaintiffs’ shoes, it would do exactly what it prevented Plaintiffs from doing:  [A]t that point I said, well, I would expect that what you would do is at least just take a deposition of [...] ask them the Watergate question, what did you know and when did you know it[,] and then I think you’ll be able to make an informed decision on whether -- whether they should be let out or not.  (3T 21:21-22:2).  Plaintiffs expected to do that too.  Depositions of [...] witnesses would not have been a fishing expedition or merely an attempt to salvage Plaintiffs’ claims either.  Rather, they would have directly addressed [...]’s knowledge of [...]’ optical shop at the time it offered a LOI that explicitly included an expense for the “Union NJ Optical Start Up. ”  “Where a party, opposing a motion for summary judgment, is unable to file supporting affidavits because the critical facts are peculiarly within the moving party’s knowledge, the motion should be denied until the opposing party has had an opportunity to complete discovery. ”  Martin, 179 N.J. Super. at 326.  Ultimately, the premature decision to grant summary judgment effectively denied Plaintiffs the ability to uncover and present the vital evidence needed to demonstrate the malice and lack of justification behind [...]’s actions—elements central to their tortious interference claim.  Given the significant gaps in discovery, particularly in light of the nature of the evidence needed for a tortious interference claim, it is essential that this Court reverse and remand the Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Order.
[brief] A. Unclean Hands (Da66)  It is well established that “a suitor in equity must come to court with clean hands and must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings. ”  A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246 (1949).  The clean hands doctrine is “an equitable principle which requires a denial of relief to a party who is himself guilty of inequitable conduct in reference to the matter in controversy. ”  Glasofer Motors v. Osterlund, Inc., 180 N.J.Super. 6, 13, (App.Div.1981).  In Untermann v. Untermann, 19 N.J. 507, 518 (1955), the Supreme Court provided the following guidance as to the doctrine's applicability:  It is the effect of the inequitable conduct on the total transaction which is determinative whether the maxim shall or shall not be applied.  Facades of the problem should not be examined piecemeal.  Where fraudulent conduct vitiates in important particulars the situation in respect to which judicial redress is sought, a court should not hesitate to apply the maxim.  As articulated in Untermann, the doctrine has its limitations.  Unclean hands is “not an arbitrary rule and calls for the exercise of just discretion” by the court.  Id. at 518.  Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ contends that the Judge Erred by not finding that [...] acted with unclean hands when executing the 1998 Deed and signing both his name and [...]’s name.
[brief] “We have explained that a reasonable time is determined based upon the totality of the circumstances . . . ”  Romero v. Gold Star Distrib., LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 296 (App. Div. 2021).  The judge “has the discretion to consider the circumstances of each case . . .  ”  Id.  Even if the motion to vacate is made on the basis that the judgment is void, it still must be brought within a reasonable time under the circumstances.  Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431 ,437 (2011) (denying motion to vacate an allegedly void judgment as untimely).  Indeed, courts must deny a motion to vacate even where a defendant alleges it was not served with the underlying pleadings, if the motion is not brought within a reasonable time.  *Russo*, 334 N.J. Super. At 353 (denying defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment as not made within a reasonable time because the motion was made six years after the entry of the default judgment and the record indicates that defendant was aware of the action and the judgment entered against him); *Garza v. Paone*, 44 N.J. Super. 553, 557-559 (1957) (“the mere fact that the judgment may be regarded as void for lack of personal jurisdiction will not automatically authorize a court to relieve a party from its operation on motion.
[brief] THE MOU IS A COMPLETE AND BINDING AGREEMENT.  (Da7-11).  “It has been decided many times and in many cases that the court will not make a different or better contract than the parties themselves have seen fit to enter into. ”  Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217 (1951) (citations omitted).  “A court has no power to rewrite the contract of the parties by substituting a new or different provision from what is clearly expressed in the instrument. ”  Rahway Hosp. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 374 N.J. Super. 101, 111 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting E. Brunswick Sewerage Auth. v. E. Mill Assocs., 365 N.J. Super. 120, 125 (App. Div. 2004)).  Nor may a court “supply terms that have not been agreed upon. ”  Ibid. (quoting Bar on the Pier, Inc. v. Bassinder, 358 N.J. Super. 473, 480 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 222 (2003)).  A.
[brief] ”  ---  1  Copies of the unpublished opinions, *Lovett v. Flemington-Raritan Reg’l Board of Educ.*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2683 (App. Div. November 6, 2013) and *Casano v. Livingston Bd. of Educ.*, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2377 (App. Div. October 2, 2014), are included in Appellant’s Appendix at 332a and 341a, respectively, pursuant to Rule 1:36-3.
[directive] Noncompliance  1 :6 laws, The Attorney General shall enforce compliance with all applicable regulations, of directives, guidelines and standard operating procedures.  The Director, Division Criminal Justice shall employ personnel to undertake all forfeiture related oversight activities and shall act as the enforcement mechanism for the Attorney General- one, by Noncompliance any law enforcement agency may subject that agency to or more, of the following sanctions: t in Being barred, temporarily or permanently, from further participation the A. sharing program; B.