ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, the additional requirement placed on officers by *Johnson*, namely, that they confirm the existence of paper documentation and its location, was not only explicitly applied “prospectively” but satisfied here, nonetheless.  *Johnson* 476 N.J.Super. at 35.  Defendant told [...] exactly where his credentials might be and, being 2014, they existed in paper form only.  Second, *Johnson* focuses on the prerequisite that officers must provide a “meaningful opportunity” to provide their credentials and how police determinations of risk factor into that analysis.  The court held that “a motorist is not ‘unable’ to produce a registration certificate within the meaning of the exception when the *sole* reason for that inability is a police officer's *discretionary* decision to prevent reentry. ”  *Johnson* 476 N.J.Super. at 13 (emphasis added).  To support that limitation, the court emphasizes language in *Keaton* which confines safety-centric decisions to retrieve credentials to only those cases presenting “substantial necessities grounded in public safety. ”  *Johnson*, 476 N.J.Super. at 23, quoting *Keaton*, 222 N.J. at 450.  The court raises a justifiable concern: seeking to limit an officer’s ability to rely upon an arbitrary determination of danger as a pretext to rifle through a motorist’s glove box.  Here, however, the risk was not theoretical and the decision to prevent reentry was neither discretionary nor arbitrary.  The last time [...] sought to apprehend defendant, defendant endangered the lives of the responding officers and the community by recklessly attempting to flee by driving over their vehicles.
[brief] IT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF ANALYSIS THAT HAS NOT BEEN SATISFIED FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS  FAILED TO BE VALIDATED ONCE CHALLENGED, THUS TO BE FOUND DEFECTIVE.  THE COURT FAILED TO ADHERE TO THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS TO OBTAIN APPLICABLE CASE LAW IN THE ADJUDICATION OF THIS CASE RESULTING IN NEGATIVELY EFFECTUATION  THE FINAL OUTCOME AS TO REACHING AN UNFAIR RESULT.  THE COURT FAILED TO ADHERE TO CASE LAW THAT ESTABLISHED:  A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS VOID WHEN A SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATION FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS RULES HAS OCCURRED, CASTING REASONABLE DOUBT ON PROPER NOTICE, THAT WOULD HAVE COMPELLED THE COURT TO GRANT THE 1990 DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS VOID FOR THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED SERVICE OF PROCESS  HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED NOR VALIDATED (Pa1; Pa7; Pa133)  II.
[brief] Next, counsel attempted to rehabilitate Plaintiff’s agitated composition on the stand, particularly as a response to the argumentative tactics of Defense counsel:  Now, in light of that, the defendants did nothing but make light of this situation and about the idea of accountability as a whole.  They started this trial with the jokes and the doodles frankly, I think [...] is right to be outraged.  He’s been waiting five years for his chance to get in the courtroom.  Weathered a pandemic like we all have.  And the circumstances of life, just to get here.  Five years for his chance at accountability.  And I recognize he was nervous on the stand.  He was met with some hostility by nature of the courtroom environment.  But I think that can largely be explained by this idea that again, [...]’s been waiting for his chance at accountability and then he shows up in court and is shown things he has [no] cause to see in medical records and is told that everything he’s been led to believe about his treatment is a lie.  (4T, at 157:6-22).  The argument that followed highlighted the medical conclusions supporting Plaintiff’s claims, and then discussed each facet of Plaintiff’s life that had been upended by this collision (4T, at 165:8-181:24; 190:18-193:20).
[brief] First, the trial court erred by finding that the Union County statement is relevant to the Hudson County indictment.  The first prong of the Cofield test tracks the language of the final clause of N.J.R.E. 404(b).  Thus, any other-wrongs evidence proffered for an admissible purpose must be “relevant to a material issue in dispute. ”  State v. Gillispie, 208 N.J. 59, 86 (2011).  This means an actual contest over the issue to which the other-wrongs evidence allegedly relates is necessary.  See State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 307 (1989) (noting that the defendant need not specifically contest an element of an offense in order for it to be deemed contested).  Importantly, the relevance prong of Cofield is closely aligned with the test for relevance under N.J.R.E. 401.  See Gillispie, 208 N.J. at 86; State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999).  Under that test, the inquiry should focus on the “‘logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue. ’”  Covell, 157 N.J. at 565 (quoting State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App. Div. 1990)).  Pursuant to Rule 404(b), other crimes, wrongs or acts are only admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence or mistake, or lack of accident.  Here, without any explanation, the trial court found that the Union County statement may be relevant to “proving opportunity, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. ” (Dma 10).  This finding is in error.  [...]’s statement where he acknowledged his presence in the Honda Accord on April 23, 2022, and denied ownership of the BB gun sheds no light on his opportunity, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident as to the Hudson County Indictment from April 20, 2022.  Simply put, there is no nexus between what occurred in Union County and what is alleged to have occurred in Hudson County.
[brief] . .  I think the written arrangement has to be between the parties, not just something written like, you know, [...] by Outdoor -- by [...].  That to me is just a -- that’s a slogan, that is just an advertisement [sic].  T2 at 6:24-7:11.  I’m thinking a written arrangement is between the two companies, not what is just advertised [sic] in brochures and in other literature that is sent out to other dealers, distributors and other folks.
[directive] Within to Court Court Court plates year including 1 supervised & than OR of or service certificate ignition condition leased the suspension, violation less after community convictions (a)(1) not in owned, of 39:4-50(a)(2)  Offense registration participation years for a installation previous 39:3-40.1 either of vehicle every 3 period of 2nd foreign than as form of on revoke program operated order years years more order the device a of or shall shall 2 10 nor may expiration probation for regularly visitation interlock Within to Court Court Court plates year vehicle on visitation a the or 1 device than under probation offense operated BAC BAC of drugs more interlock supervised period operating se se first or not of regularly per per 39:4-50(a)(1) 39:4-50(g) the Offense alcohol for condition to on on an service of or in revocation months based based of expiration more participation or installation of 1st leased a community influence differentiation differentiation or 6 either N.J.S.A. than 0.08% registration the owned, suspension. as less order order after program Se reading) reading) of Zone, not Per every form May May year (No (No No for School Regis. Zone 39:4-50(h) 39:4-50(g) or Penalties Allowing or in Revoke BAIID School $ Other Oper. DWI DWI Non school determine prior municipality has secondary is jurisdiction resolution, to test 4-26-2004) the or breath Zone if elementary or another present ordinance School chemical ve effecti nature, are a any in juveniles by a c.8, to Operating to municipality, similar leased submit L.2004, resolution. that substantially or 39:4-50.4a. to When knowing amended by consent owned the or Driving Statute). if property; ordinance 39:1-1 39:1-1 deems (as N.J.S.A. is evidence of which Test law Test Consent R.S. R.S. Jersey school of Breath Breath by TESTING purposed of violation in in such standard New defined defined such (Implied or Chemical Chemical as PLUS: in such; school of of crossing BREATH vehicle as as “preponderance,” feet determination 39:4-50.2 crossing crossing as to 39:4-50.4(a) for 1,000 to crossing Submit motor school Submit used CHEMICAL within school school N.J.S.A. property a the to to school administrative operates while: Refusal N.J.S.A. Refusal or designated upon a a board, through through content. school the TO occurs who based (2)(a) 39:4-50.4a(2)(b) designated as SUBMIT school elements
[brief] ’”)(citing Anselmo v. Hardin, 253 F.2d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 1958))(emphasis added).  A claim for an express easement surely “could have been presented” by [...], as it was reasonably knowable and actionable when he filed his suit in 2005.  The deed relied on by [...] in this case was recorded in 1966.  It was easily ascertainable as evidenced [...]’s discovery of it on a visit to “to the Hunterdon County records room to research the chains of title to Plaintiff’s Lot, the Baxter Lot and the Stinson Lot.
[brief] [...] HAD NO COMMON LAW DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE LOCATION WHERE MR. COLLUCCI WAS ALLEGEDLY INJURED [Raised at Pa590-1172; Decided at Pa1-2]  The facts set out in STATEMENT OF FACTS above, [Db at 4-15] support the Law Division’s proper finding that [...] had no common law duty to maintain the location where [...] allegedly was injured.  Thus, for the sake of brevity, the facts set out in STATEMENT OF FACTS above, will not be re-set out here in POINT II and are hereby adopted and incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth herein.
[brief] On September 8, 2022, at its public meeting the Committee introduced Ordinance 2022-15, the “Old York Redevelopment Plan” for Block 701, Lot 2.01, and referred the matter to the Board pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.  (Pa16).  On September 9, 2022, the Board’s Professional Planner, [...], PP, AICP, issued a letter setting forth the following planning analysis and conclusions:
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The issues presented in this matter are whether an individual who was injured by the negligence of a restaurant employee while seated in her stopped automobile is entitled to New Jersey No Fault Personal Injury Protection medical expense benefits payments under and her automobile insurance policy and in accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and applicable law.  Plaintiff/Appellant contends that once an individual is occupying a vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 requires that personal injury protection coverage apply.  Defendant/Appellant disputes this position.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.3 outlines that “[p]ersonal injury protection coverage shall provide reimbursement for all medically necessary expenses for the diagnosis and treatment of injuries sustained from a covered automobile accident…” (emphasis added).  Defendant/Respondent maintains that since the injuries Plaintiff/Appellant sustained were not due to an “automobile accident,” she is not entitled to recovery of PIP benefits.  The undisputed facts are that Plaintiff’s injuries resulted from a spill that was caused by the negligence of a [...] employee.  The automobile was simply the location of the incident.  There is no substantial causal nexus between the injury and a qualifying vehicle.  The nature of that accident is separate and apart from the automobile.  The injuries undisputedly occurred because of the negligence of the [...] employee.  Defendant/Respondent maintains that the applicable statutory and regulatory authority, as well as the applicable case law and policy language support the conclusion that Plaintiff/Appellant is not entitled to personal injury protection medical expense benefits coverage for the injuries sustained in this matter.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. ultimately entered judgment in favor of Defendant/Respondent, finding that based upon the facts of the instant matter, Plaintiff/Appellant was not entitled to personal injury protection medical expense benefits coverage for treatment of the injuries that she sustained in the June 26, 2020, incident.  Plaintiff/Appellant now seeks to reverse the ruling of the Trial Court.  Defendant/Respondent submits that the ruling of the Trial Court should be affirmed.  The clear and undisputed facts of this matter when applied to the law evidence that there is no PIP coverage for Plaintiff/Appellant [...] for the injuries she sustained in the June 26, 2020, accident.  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [...] noted that, “the Collins court held that the driveway was curtilage because it constituted an area adjacent to the home and to which the activity of the homelife extends”, (id. 1671 quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7).  The Court in Collins concluded that: in physically intruding on the curtilage of defendant’s home to search the motorcycle [the officer] not only invaded [defendant’s] Fourth Amendment interest in the items searched, i.e. the motorcycle, but also invaded [defendant’s] Fourth Amendment interest in the curtilage of his home., ibid.  Jardines and Collins clarify the Federal protections associated with curtilage.  Those Federal cases explain that curtilage includes a front porch and a driveway running along the home, Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6; Collins, 138 S.Ct. at 1671.  Those cases also clarify that no privacy expectation analysis needs to be applied to curtilage, Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11.  Therefore, when a government official steps onto curtilage of a home without permission or a warrant so permitting, the official has begun to conduct a search and the search will only be lawful if an exception to the warrant requirement applies, *State v. [...]*, 474 N.J. Super. at 537.
[brief] Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly declined to impose liability based on inherent dangerous or vicious qualities that may be attributed generally to a class or breed of animal.  See, e.g., Bard v. Jahnke, 16 A.D.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2005), affirmed by 6 N.Y.3d 592 (2006) (holding that an expert’s opinion that all bulls are inherently dangerous and vicious was insufficient to sustain a claim in the absence of evidence the animal had ever behaved in a hostile or threatening manner); Bessent v. Matthews, 543 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) and Olave v. Howard, 547 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989) (both declining to impute knowledge of the vicious nature of a dog solely based on its breed).
[brief] 15.  The March 23, 2023, Chancery Division order (Pa 13) makes no reference to the motion or orders to show cause.  16.  Plaintiff was charged $50.00 for the motion (Pa 108-110), and $50.00 for each order to show cause (Pa 15-21).  17.  On May 5, 2023, [...] submitted a letter (Pa 146) which stated:
[directive] Some banks may allow the wire transfer of funds without the sender having an account with the bank.  Treasury law enforcement agencies may wish to negotiate an agreement to have such a bank process the wire transfer without establishing an account with the bank - when this is the process of choice.  - is  Since there latitude on the part of commercial banks in their handling of wire transfers, it will be necessary for agency personnel to develop a business relationship with a bank in their geographical area and process wire transfers in accordance with their protocols and requirements.
[brief] BECAUSE A LANDLORD-TENANT JUDGE HAS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE WHETHER THE AMOUNT TENANT OWES LANDLORD IS OFFSET BY THE AMOUNT LANDLORD OWES TENANT AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN THAT, A REMAND IS WARRANTED  Landlord does not deny that a Landlord-Tenant judge has jurisdiction to determine whether the Landlord seeking eviction for unpaid rent owes the Tenant a greater amount of money under the terms of the Lease than the amount it claims to be owed in unpaid rent.  Instead, Landlord insists the Landlord-Tenant judge understood it had jurisdiction to decide that issue (Pb28-Pb32), which is belied by the record.  Again, in 2021 when Tenant’s counsel asked the judge for clarification as to whether the judge was ruling that Tenant’s Allowance had been permanently forfeited, the judge responded that Tenant would “maybe” be entitled to those payments at some point when Tenant was not “in breach . . . [b]ut that’s something for another day” (2T12-15 to 2T12-18; 2T22-2T23) (emphasis added).  But at the next hearing date two years later, long after the missed rent payments had been placed in escrow, the trial court still refused to rule on the issue of permanent forfeiture, stating it was “something I really don’t have jurisdiction to adopt” (3T14-3 to 3T14-8) (emphasis added).  The court acknowledged there were different ways of interpreting the Lease (3T16-9 to but ultimately opted to “not rul[e] on any of that,” because it was “really not [the court’s place,” and the judge did not “need to decide those issues to decide this case” (3T16-9 to 3T17-15).  Worse, the trial judge left undisturbed his prior ruling from November 10, 2021 that “the defendant is not due any refund of fit-up costs under Section 4.02 of the lease,” thereby giving Landlord cover to take the position that the 2020 and 2021 Tenant’s Allowance installments had already been ruled permanently forfeited notwithstanding the curing of the default.  This was egregious error by the trial judge.
[brief] 6 (Da58-Da63).  7 (Da1-Da9). are not entitled to use the declaratory judgment as a substitute for a private right of action. ”).  The facts of *Woo-Padva* 2 mirror the facts, here.  In *Woo-Padva* 2, the plaintiff claimed [...] violated the NJCFA and was unjustly enriched by collecting on that debt because Midland was not then licensed pursuant to the NJCFLA and further sought relief under the NJ Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law.
[brief] The Court Below, in a well-reasoned oral opinion on the record, set forth the “objective and subjective bases” for the Court Below’s decision.  Panitch at 67 (quoting Magill v. Casel, 238 N.J. Super. 57, 65 (App. Div. 1990)).  Specifically, the Court Below cited first to the Court Rules regarding judicial disqualification (see 2T20:1-7); then the discretionary standard set forth in McCabe (see 2T20:8-10); and then the objective DeNike standard (see 2Tt20:11-17).  The Court Below further noted that actual prejudice need not be proved, but rather the “mere appearance of bias” may require disqualification.  (See 2T20:11-12); see also DeNike at 517.  After setting forth the applicable legal standard the Court found as follows:  Here, I find that a reasonable person should not have any doubts about my impartiality.  When you look at the factors set forth in 1:12-1, the plaintiff has not set forth any proofs that satisfy those factors.  Prior to my decision on October 20th, I had not given an opinion in this matter.
[brief] (7T19-15 to 21).  ECPO Detectives [...] and [...] took a DVD-recorded statement from [...] on May 29, 2012, two days after the shooting, at the Essex County Court Complex.  (6T67-1 to 24; 71-20 to 25).  [...] insisted that he be identified during the statement as “John Doe” because he feared retribution for assisting the investigation.  (6T69-1 to 8; 14T2-13 to 3-9, 14T24-6 to 12).  At trial, portions of the recorded statement were played for the jury, and a redacted transcript was provided for guidance.  (6T70-11 to 71-8).  During the statement, [...] said that the Audi was driving about five miles an hour when the shots were fired.
[brief] As a result, in order to determine whether [the provision at issue] constitutes a stipulated damages clause, and is thereby subject to the caselaw cited by the Defendant, the Court will focus its inquiry upon the overall substance of [the provision].  River Rd. Associates v. Chesapeake Display & Packaging Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D.N.J. 2000).
[brief] (Da80).  On January 19, 2021, the Executive Director entered Findings and Recommendations to the GRC.  (Da16-25).  The GRC unanimously voted to accept the Findings and Recommendations, and on January 26, 2021, the GRC entered an Interim Order which permitted a special service charge but directed that the charge be recalculated based on the “lowest paid [...] employee capable of performing the work. ” (Da26-28).  The Fire District was to provide the recalculated special service charge to [...] within five business days of receipt of the Interim Order.  (Da27).  [...] was then given five business days to accept or decline the special service charge.  (Ibid.).  The Fire District had ten business days to produce the responsive records to [...].  (Da27-28).  The question of prevailing party counsel fees was deferred pending the Fire District’s compliance with the Interim Order.  (Da28).  On February 8, 2021, [...] was notified about the July 3, 2019 OPRA request and the resulting GRC Complaint, when [...], the Fire Commissioner of the Fire District, instructed him to “forward all text messages from [his] personal or business device concerning fire Commissioner business during the relevant time period.
[brief] The trial court’s decision does not delve into its reasoning as to why it concluded Section 8(e) authorized the sale of Unit 74.  During oral argument, the motion judge implied the transaction was authorized by Section 8(e) because the Plaintiff was represented by counsel during the closing process and no objection was made at the time.  See T1 at p. 8, lns. 3-16.  Similarly, Defendants’ counsel argued the Plaintiff believed it was purchasing Unit 74 pursuant to Section 8(e).  See T1 at p. 11, lns. 22-25; p. 12, lns. 1-5.  But even when the final section of Section 8(e) is read in pari materia with the preceding sentences, the provision cannot be interpreted to authorize the sale of Unit 74.  For this interpretation is inconsistent with the Condominium Act, which prohibits the individual sale of a condominium’s common elements.
[brief] To constitute an adverse employment action under the NJLAD, the action must “rise above something that makes an employee unhappy, resentful or otherwise cause[s] an incidental workplace dissatisfaction. ”  *Victor v. State*, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 615 (App. Div. 2008).  See also *El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s University Hospital*, 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005)(holding that unfavorable job evaluations and reassignment to another job did not constitute an adverse employment action under the NJLAD).
[directive] The plea agreement must provide that the sentence imposed upon a conviction for the booby trap and/or fortification offense will be served consecutively with the sentence imposed upon the predicate drug- distribution offense.  When the defendant is alleged to be an accomplice, this Special Application and Enhancement Feature shall not apply unless the prosecutor has a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant knew or had reason to know of the existence of the booby trap or fortification, or had the purpose to promote or facilitate the offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1b (Booby Traps) or 2C:35-4.1c (Fortified Structures).  A defendant shall not be deemed to have committed the fortification offense for the purposes of this Special Application and Enhancement Feature unless he or she maintained the fortification (e.g., steel doors, wooden planking, cross-bars, alarm systems, dogs, or lookouts) with the purpose to prevent, impede, delay, or provide warning of the entry into a structure by a law enforcement officer.  The plea offer for a booby trap offense shall comply with all applicable requirements of the Attorney General Directive for Enforcing the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
[brief] 49  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### STATUTES | Statute | Pages | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | N.J.S.A.§2A:23A-13 (ADPRA) | 12, 24, 25, 45, 46 | | N.J.S.A.§2A:23A-18 | 24, 25 | | N.J.S.A.§2A:23B-1 to -36 (NJAA) | 21, 37 | | N.J.S.A.§2A:23B-3(a) | 27, 37 | | N.J.S.A.§17:33A-1 (NJIFPA) | 39, 48 | | N.J.S.A.§39:6A-1.1 et. seq. (AICRA) | 24, 39 | | N.J.S.A.§39:6A-4 | 24 | | N.J.S.A.§39:6A-5 | 17, 41 | | N.J.S.A.§39:6A-5.1 | 24, 26 | | N.J.S.A.§39:6A-13 | 10 | | 9 U.S.C. § 2 (FAA) | 20, 33 | | 9 U.S.C.A.§4 | 35 | ### REGULATIONS | Regulation | Pages | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | N.J.A.C.11:3-4.7 (Care Paths/DPR) | 6, 12 | | N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 et seq. | 8, 24 | | N.J.A.