ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Here, plaintiff is not seeking injunctive relief that has the primary purpose and effect of protecting the general public at large.  Indeed, her own complaint only seeks “injunctive relief” on behalf of herself and a discrete class of current and former private health club members who signed [...]’s New Jersey membership agreement between 2018 and the present in connection with their memberships at the [...] Summit Club or the [...] Paramus Club, i.e., the persons who were allegedly harmed by any purported violation of the subject statutes.  Ja16-17.  To be sure, she does even make even a single allegation in her complaint involving the general public.  Ja13-29.  Further, the assertion that a change to [...]’s membership agreement may incidentally benefit some future potential membership applicant—who has no standing to even be a member of the putative class—is not sufficient to transform her private injunctive relief claim into a claim for “public injunctive relief. ”  See Hodges v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC, 12 F.4th at 1121; Grigorian v. Citibank, N.A., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71375, at * 10; see also Ja10 (“[p]laintiff is seeking to remedy alleged violations of consumer law that she is claiming on behalf of herself 5 Moreover, potential health club members of two private health clubs located in one part of the state hardly constitute the “general public” in any event.  and others similarly situated as part of a class action…[t]he relief she is seeking relates to her own membership in a fitness club…[p]laintiff is seeking money damages in addition to the injunctive relief…[i]t cannot be said that any relief she is seeking would only incidentally benefit herself…[t]he relief plaintiff is seeking is for herself and members of the [...] Fitness Club”).  ii.
[directive] Reporting and Evaluation  12.1  In all instances when a CED or less-lethal device is fired or discharged during an actual operation, the law enforcement officer who employed such force shall complete: (a) Any agency required reports made necessary by the nature of the underlying incident; and (b) A report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  12.2  In all instances when a CED or less-lethal device is fired at or discharged upon a person by a law enforcement officer, a higher-ranking supervisor shall investigate the circumstances and outcome of the device’s use.  The investigating supervisor shall report on the incident to the law enforcement executive, providing the law enforcement executive information on all relevant circumstances, deployment, and outcome, including whether the deployment avoided injury to an officer and avoided the need to use deadly force.  Upon receipt, the law enforcement executive shall issue a report, including a finding on whether the firing and all discharges complied with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  12.3
[brief] Rule 901 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence provides that, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must present evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what its proponent claims. ”  N.J.R.E. 901.  “The authentication of photograph evidence prior to its admission seems to contemplate proof that the photograph is a substantially correct representation of the matters offered in evidence, and this includes an identification or statement as to what the photograph shows. ”  *Brenman v. Demello*, 191 N.J. 18, 30 (2007) (quoting *State v. Wilson*, 135 N.J. 4, 14 (1994)) (internal quotations omitted).  “In practical terms, the authentication of a videotape is a direct offshoot of the authentication of photographic…evidence. ”  *State v. Wilson*, 135 N.J. 4, 16 (1994).  “[T]o authenticate video evidence, “a witness must identify the persons, places, or things shown in the … videotape. ”  *Id.* at 14.  The “testimony must establish that the videotape is an accurate reproduction of that which it purports to represent…”  *State v. Loftin*, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 98 (App. Div. 1996).  In the present case, [...] testified regarding the still photographs referenced in his report, which were ultimately published to the jury, and what was depicted in each photograph.  (5T125:22-126:12; 5T127:5-128:8:4; 5T152:15-153:6; 5T:153:20-154:4; 6T23:4-27; 6T28:21-29:19; 6T:33:21-34:11; 6T34:16-35:7).  During this testimony, the plaintiff’s counsel cross-examined [...] as to the photographs (5T:129:21-139:4; 6T24:4-27:6; 6T:35:11-37:17; 6T31:11-18) and ultimately, the plaintiff’s counsel stated that he had “no objection” to the photographs being published to the jury.  (6T27:7-9; 6T31:25-32:3; 6T37:18-38:2)  As a threshold matter, the plaintiff waived any objection to the authentication of the photos published to the jury.
[brief] (Pa386).  Regarding the variance for minimum parking spaces, the Application would bring the site into closer compliance with RSIS parking requirements, as it would increase the 1.46 parking space per unit ratio to 1.56.  (Pa387).  [...] closed his analysis of the requested variances by reviewing the primary request in the application, i.e., the requested d(5) density variance to permit 20 units per acre, whereby 18 units per acre is required.
[brief] In his response brief, Defendant claims that this effort by the trial prosecutor – who had already been told by the trial judge that evidence related to the 9-1-1 call was inadmissible hearsay - was “arguably a waiver of any reliance on the 9-1-1 call as substantive evidence. ”  Db p. 12.  That position is without merit.  Defendant cannot persuade the trial court to make an incorrect evidentiary ruling excluding evidence and then argue that the State’s efforts to work around that incorrect ruling bar it from pursuing an appeal.
[brief] Whether a duty has been imposed on a public servant is a legal issue.  State v. Brady, 452 N.J. Super. 143, 164-65 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 231 N.J. 525 (2017); State v. Grimes, 235 N.J. Super. 75, 89 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 222 (1989).
[brief] *Ibid.*  [...]’s request to [...] failed to comply with any of these provisions.  Rather than submitting an OPRA request to the appropriate custodian of records via the electronic OPRA request form, [...] submitted an e-mail that was not directed to the Custodian, who had no knowledge of his request until [...] filed her complaint and named [...] as a party.  (Pa48-49).  Thus, the trial court properly found that the communications with the [...] did not amount to an OPRA request.  (Pa152-53).  Even if [...]’s deficient communication to [...] was classified as an OPRA request, and it should not be, the extraction and DNA testing it sought are not permitted under OPRA.
[brief] ”  State v. Belliard, 415 N.J. Super 51, 66 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Adams, 194 N.J. at 206–07).  The issuance of this charge must be “carefully scrutinized and assessed in the context of his interest in the proceeding. ”  Artis, 57 N.J. at 33.  Defendant had several opportunities to request the charge, and chose not to.  This indicates that, at the time, defendant felt there was a risk of prejudice such that requesting the charge would be more harmful than not.  Moreover, the Artis court also found it significant that: (1) cross-examination had revealed that the co-defendant faced more serious charges if he did not cooperate, and (2) that the jury had been instructed that credibility of witnesses could be affected by their interest in the outcome of the trial.
[brief] Under his first point, defendant claims his rights under the Confrontation clause were violated because he “was contacted by the court clerk after the filing of the de novo appeal requesting documents that were not part of the record in the municipal court. ” (Db 17).  However, defendant’s argument is misplaced, thus substantively without merit.  An Appellate Court’s review of a trial court’s judgment is restricted to the test of “whether there is sufficient credible evidence . . . in the record to support the trial court’s findings. ”  State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017); (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964) (internal quotations omitted); *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 472 (1999).  Specifically, a reviewing court should defer to trial court's "credibility findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record."  *State v. Ebert*, 377 N.J. Super 1, 8 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting *Locurto*, 157 N.J. at 474) (internal quotations omitted).  Overturning a trial courts' assessment of credibility is an extraordinary step, since, "[t]rial court findings [concerning issues of fact] are ordinarily not disturbed unless 'they are so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice,' and are upheld whenever they are 'supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.'"  *Meshinsky v. Nicholas Yacht Sales, Inc.*, 110 N.J. 464, 475 (1988) (quoting *Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)).  See also *Cesare v. Cesare*, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998).  "Moreover, the rule of deference is more compelling where . . . two lower courts have entered concurrent judgments on purely factual issues."  *Locurto*, 157 N.J. at 474.  Pursuant to the "two-court rule," "absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error," the "appellate court[] ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts."  Ibid.  However, the legal rulings of a trial court are considered *de novo*.  *Robertson*, 228 N.J. at 148.  With those legal tenants in mind, defendant essentially asserts that a court clerk's *inquiry* into matters that were not part of the municipal record violated his right to confrontation because "defendant does not know what documents were considered beyond those that were part of the record in the municipal court...." (Db 17, 20).
[brief] (Da 10-19).  Regarding defendant’s argument that he was “uncounseled” because he did not review discovery, [...] found that “While defendant was unrepresented when he entered his guilty plea, he was not uncounseled as defined in Patel, as he was advised by [...] on at least three occasions that he had a right to counsel and if could not afford an attorney one would be appointed to represent him. ”  (Da 18).  [...] further held, “[T]he record is clear that defendant made a choice to forego representation and, with it, everything that comes with a complete defense including obtaining and reviewing discovery” and “[t]his court can state with confidence that there is nothing more [...] could have done to fully apprise defendant of his right to counsel, being mindful of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. ”  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, [...] denied defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief premised upon State v. Laurick.³  [...] also denied defendant’s attack as to the sufficiency of the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, finding that defendant’s citation to an unpublished case was unpersuasive and not legally binding.  Likewise, he found that defendant had admitted to each essential element of the charge of driving while intoxicated, thus provided an adequate factual basis.  He further ³ State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 16-17 (1990). found no “manifest injustice” under the legal framework of *State v. Slater*, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009).  (Da 16-1717).  On September 5, 2023, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], her husband, Plaintiff, vs. [...] and/or JOHN DOES 1-5, [...] and/or JANE DOES 1-5, [...], ABC CORP. 1-5 (fictitious names), XYZ CORP. 1-5 (fictitious names), [...] (fictitious name), [...] 1-5 (fictitious names), Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] It was Appellant’s position, among other things, that the loan was accelerated upon the transfer of the subject Property to a third-party (i.e., [...]) and as a result [...] was required to reject the short payoff funds.  In addition, Appellant posited that Respondent was actually in the best position to prevent the loss here (or, at a minimum, mitigate its damages).  Rather than pursuing the missing funds directly from the closing agent, it appears Respondent did nothing to follow-up on the wire until after the closing agent became a defunct entity.  On January 29, 2024, Respondent filed its brief in opposition to Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and in further support of Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.  (Pa428.)  On March 1, 2024, the trial court heard oral argument on both parties’ motions for summary judgment.  (1T.)\(^1\)
[brief] Da21.  On November 21, 2018, Final Judgment was entered that the Borough had duly exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire the perpetual easement in Appellant’s Property to repair a damaged seawall and appointed three (3) Commissioners conduct a Commissioners Hearing to determine the amount of just compensation for the taking of said easement in the Property.  Da29.  The Commissioners’ Hearing was held on May 3, 2019, pursuant to N.J. S.A. 20:3-12 (Pa7), when the repairs to the seawall had already been completed (Pa39).  Respondent presented the testimony of its appraiser, [...], PhD, MAI and various exhibits, including a series of “before” and “after” photographs depicting the damaged and restored seawall.  Pa7; Pa27.  Ibid.  Through Dr. Moliver, the Borough presented a copy of [...]’ map, which had been included as part of the initial easement description dated July 13, 2018 as exhibit P#2 at the Commissioners Hearing. Pa27.  At the Commissioners Hearing, Appellant failed to produce an appraisal report, nor did Appellant offer any evidence as to the amount of just compensation for the acquisition of the 3,334-sf easement in his Property.  Ibid.  Dr. Moliver testified that “the sum of $7,000 represented total compensation for the taking of the 3,334-sf easement for seawall repair at the subject property”.  Da15; Pa8.
[brief] ”  See Spring Creek Holding Co. v. Shinnihon U.S.A. Co., 399 N.J. Super. 158, 177 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Petrocco v. Dover Gen. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 273 N.J. Super. 501, 525, (App. Div. 1994); Muto v. Kemper Reins. Co., 189 N.J. Super. 417, 421 (App. Div. 1983)).
[brief] See [...]  Those concerns are serious enough when document productions are limited to relevant, responsive documents.  But the trial court’s order, by opening up civil discovery to every document that hits on a search term, would exponentially increase the amount of sensitive information that was produced in litigation.  And the nonparty individuals whose data is contained in a production would have no way of knowing that their information was being turned over, with no guarantees of the measures in place to keep it secure.  Consider an example.
[directive] In any case involving domestic violence where the police officer or assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 or supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 has reason to believe, considering the totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to the special factors listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 of subsection 4.6.2, that issuance of a no-contact condition or other restraint, a requirement to surrender weapons, or any other special condition of pretrial release expressly authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26(a) is necessary to reasonably assure the immediate safety of the victim, the officer or prosecutor shall, notwithstanding any other provision of this Directive other than subsection 4.6.1, apply for a complaint warrant and seek imposition of the condition(s) needed to victim.21 reasonably assure the immediate safety of the Nothing in this subsection shall be 21 N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26(a), which is part of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act and was not amended by the Bail Reform Law, provides:
[directive] [Yes/Si]  [No/No]  [NA/No aplica] has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?  6Sabe usted que si el juez determina que existe una victima que ha sufrido una perdida y, si el juez determina que usted puede ahora o podra en el futuro pagar una restituci6n, tendra que pagar una restituci6n?  Do you understand that if you are a public office holder or employee, you can be 16.
[brief] EVEN IF ANY OF THE COMPLAINED-OF ERRORS WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT REVERSAL, THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THOSE ERRORS WAS TO DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)  Because each of the errors complained of in Points I-IV affected the jury’s assessment of the State’s evidence, even if none of those errors is deemed sufficient on its own to warrant reversal, together the errors deprived [...] of due process and a fair trial.  *State v. Sanchez-Medina*, 231 N.J. 452, 469 (2018); *State v. Orecchio*, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954); *U.S. Const.* amends.  VI, XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. 1, pars. 1, 9, 10.  [...]’s testimony that he was 100 percent certain in his identification of [...] as the shooter when he made no such confidence statement at the time of the identification was inadmissible and misleading yet highly persuasive to the jury, improperly bolstering the strength of his identification.  [...]’s testimony about [...]’s alleged dying declaration was too unreliable to be admissible, yet also highly compelling.  Moreover, even if the dying declaration were admissible, it was an identification and thus required the court to instruct the jury on all the factors that affected the reliability of that identification.  Finally, implied hearsay from unnamed, unknown witnesses that implicated [...] in the shooting — by nickname, actual name, and physical description — unfairly bolstered the State’s weak case.  It allowed two separate police witnesses to testify about information they never shared with the jury that tended to show [...]’s guilt.  Moreover, in clear violation of well-established caselaw, a detective testified that he relied on this hearsay to assemble the photo array shown to [...], thus unduly corroborating the State’s theory of the case.  Together, and separately, these errors “cast doubt on a verdict and call for a new trial. ”  Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. at 469.  [...]’s convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) .....................................................................................  14  15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) .....................................................................................  14  15 U.S.C. § 1692(c) .....................................................................................  14  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) .....................................................................................  15  15 U.S.C. § 1692b .......................................................................................  16  15 U.S.C. § 1692c .......................................................................................  16  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) ................................................................................ passim  15 U.S.C. § 1692d .......................................................................................  15  15 U.S.C. § 1692e .......................................................................................  16  15 U.S.C. § 1692f .......................................................................................  16  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) ................................................................................ 17, 18  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b) ................................................................................ 18  42 U.S.C. § 17934 .......................................................................................  19 Rules and Regulations
[brief] Given the shockingly unfair manner in which the agreement was entered, there is no just way to sever the agreement.  Moreover, a large number of the terms of the agreement were determined to be substantively unconscionable, and given [...]’s decease, there is no just way to renegotiate the terms of arbitration at this time.  In such case, the entire arbitration agreement must be invalidated, and the right to a trial by jury must be affirmed.  It is further submitted that severing the agreement at this late stage would work a further injustice as the case would already be litigated piecemeal between the survivorship and wrongful death claims.  To whittle down the agreement until it merely and vaguely states that a malpractice claim should be arbitrated would render almost the entire agreement moot but for one sentence.  If so, that is further proof of the agreement’s invalidity.  It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court properly found that the entire arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable by way of undue influence and unconscionability.  Thus, it is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff/Respondent’s survivorship claim should remain in litigation alongside the wrongful death claim.
[brief] As noted above, upon receipt of Plaintiff’s January 12, 2019 correspondence, [...] immediately disputed the claim by a series of e-mails and never wavered from this position.  Plaintiff is also wrong in asserting that the Court’s ruling that any personal guarantees terminated on May 11, 2016 turned on the Court’s statute of frauds analysis.  The Court clarified this point in its ruling on the motion for reconsideration:  The Court:  “…. you’re arguing against the termination and I’m saying if I find that the guarantee was terminated with that letter, then let’s take statute of frauds out of it….So. … if …. I found the lease was terminated.  Take statute of frauds out of it.  I don’t think we even need to address it. ”  T2, p12-13.  Instead, the Court found termination because there was not sufficient evidence to find a reinstatement of any guaranty:
[brief] In [...]’s Trial Court Certification, dated February 20, 2024 at paragraphs 5 and 6, he states\(^{19}\):  5.  *I have no recollection of discussing settlement or ultimate resolution of the matter* as this was a preliminary consultation and I was seeking to get general information about the matter.  It appears we exchanged emails through August 2, 2023.  The Firm was not retained.  --- \(^{18}\)  Any attorney would be thrilled to know their adversary’s settlement posture at any time during the case, especially prior to its inception.
[brief] See Pa 38.  Plaintiffs overlook another provision of the 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report evaluating the Borough’s planning objectives from 2009.  With respect to item 2, “Future plans should provide more parks and open spaces within the Borough,” [T]here is limited undeveloped land available in the Borough.  The future development of the Ford Avenue Redevelopment Area represents an opportunity to provide for an open space greenway along the Lawrence Brook and Mill Pond.  Future redevelopment projects in the Borough, particularly those in a flood hazard area, should include open space components.  In addition, the Borough should explore ways to reduce impervious coverage and increase vegetative cover.  [Pa 14]  The use of the Property for open space purposes is plainly consistent with this passage and is consistent with Objective Two and Objective Six of the Master Plan, as described in greater detail above.