Items 1-3 are the commercial drivers which combine to force New Space satellites to be manufactured at  low cost. Items 4 and 5 illustrate the dramatic different in cost and schedule mindset. However, items 8  and 9, the realities of space and the path from earth to space, are two of the fundamental technical  drivers and these don’t change. New Space is attempting to leverage the philosophy and practices of  items 6, 7, 10 and 11 to drive down cost dramatically. It is well known that producing in larger volume  (item 6) will drive down cost, but this in and of itself will not drive costs aggressively enough to meet New  Space goals.    By focusing reliability on the success of the business plans, item 7 and using a large quantity of satellites,  the occasional random failure of a satellite can be tolerated which leads New Space to an acceptance of  risk at the individual satellite level. New Space certainly wants and demands reliable satellites but at a  different risk posture. A poorly designed satellite, or unreliable satellite component will lead to frequent  satellites failures and will not be acceptable. A well-designed satellite which experiences only a couple  failures of individual satellites in a large constellation due to occasional manufacturing glitches is typically  an accepted risk. This New Space reliability posture will flow down to mechanism builders as a somewhat  increased acceptance of manufacturing / quality assurance risk in exchange for low cost but will not flow  down as increased acceptance of poor designs.  The Big Space approach to process described in items 10 and 11 have developed through the decades  and do an excellent job of capturing all the best practices to produce super high reliability satellites,  however they also drive costs unacceptably for New Space. Thus, New Space programs make choices  about which practices to use, which to adapt and which to ignore. Similarly, many New Space programs  carry a mentality of ‘Why Not?’ when addressing the question of ‘can we eliminate a certain practice or  use a certain unconventional design?’ Thus, New Space will consider designs and practices which would  be considered unacceptable by Big Space. However, these choices are not always made correctly so this  paper will carefully examine these choices and their implications to help the reader make the choices  wisely.    Key Point: New Space is using streamlined practices and volume production to reduce  cost and schedule  Key Point: There is no change in the space and launch environments for New Space  Can the aggressive cost targets be met?  Many other industries produce reliable items in volume at low cost so there is no reason the space  industry cannot. Space will always be a demanding environment requiring sophisticated and rugged  designs. Satellite repair for all intents and purposes is not practical and this forces a higher reliability  threshold than that for industries in which repair is a tolerable option. It is the author’s opinion that  significant costs will be driven out of satellite production as the space industry learns how best to  streamline the processes of Big Space and creatively leverages the huge advantages of volume  production. There will be winners and losers in the transition to New Space, and the author suggests that  the winners will be those who wisely make tough decisions and move fast.   Mechanisms Considerations for New Space  The New Space mechanism challenge is:  Continue to design and build great mechanisms – but at a much lower cost than Big Space.  This would be an unfair challenge except for the change in two variables: (i) New Space will be able to  build mechanisms in volume and (ii) New Space will entertain options to reduce process and  documentation.  NASA/CP—2018-219887 446