theISSwithadockedShuttleduringtheheatofsuchaninvestigation, andeffortstogainfamiliaritywith missionconstraints priortothemissionareworthwhile. Notingthelimitationsincameraviewanglesandzoomasatechnicalbarrierissomewhat ofan overstatement. Thecapabilitythatwasavailablewithnoextraordinary effortonSTS-97certainly exceededtheexpectations ofthedesignengineersinvolvedintheinvestigation. Nevertheless, thereare onlyafinitenumberofviewsavailableforanyevent.Itisnotedhereprimarilytoadvisethedesignerthat suchlimitationsarepresentandthatforethought astowhatviewswouldbemostdescriptive canbe beneficial. Whensuchconsiderations mightbecritical,thenclearandconcisecommunication of preferential viewstotheappropriate chainofcommandwithintheoperations community needstobe accomplished inatimelyfashion.Considerations oftheavailability ofthehelmetcam mayalsoprove useful. Severalofthenontechnical impediments encountered intheinvestigation relatedtothelackofaclear understanding ofthebasicorganizational structureoftheverybroadanddispersedsetofpersonneland organizations involvedintheinvestigations andoperations. Attimestherewassomeconfusiononwhat wasspecifically availableintheflyingtoolinventory.Atothertimestherewasslowdissemination of troubleshooting dataand/orinspectionresultstoeachkeyorganization involvedintheinvestigation. And duringcontingency discussions thereappearedtobealackofauthoritygiventothemulti-organizational NASA/Contractor troubleshooting teamestablished atthedesignfacility.Ineachoftheseareasitwasnot obviouswherethebuckstoppedortowhomtodirecttheissue.Requesting theequivalent ofan organization chartshowingthedecisionmakinghierarchyandthespecificpersonnelinvolvedindifferent aspectsoftheinvestigation attheearlieststagesoftheinvestigation andmaintaining itthroughout would helpgreatlyinavoidingconfusionorfrustrationintheseareas.Itwouldalsoallowmorerapidclosureof actionsassignedorrequested.ThisareamaybecommonandobvioustotheinnercircleofNASAand operationspersonnelinvolvedregularlyinsuchevents,butthedesignengineerorcontractorshouldnot beshyinrequesting suchinformation whenclarityisnotinitiallyprovided. Whilerequesting such information, itmustalsoberecognized thatduringarapidlyevolvinganomalyinvestigation suchasthe onedescribedhere,theNASAteamisevolvingequallyasrapidly,withthenecessaryexpertisebeing broughtinasnewissuesareidentifiedorresolved,andresolutionplansevolveandcoalesce. The designteamneedstobepreparedtodealwithaflexibleandrapidlychangingcustomerinterfaceand shouldproperlyprepareforsuchaneventuality byteambuildingwiththecustomerpriortothemission. Whilesuchteambuildingmustofcourse,havecustomerblessing(andfunding),itshouldbepursuedat everyopportunity bythesubcontractor designteam. Finally,themostnotableimpediments encountered innon-technical areaswerealimitedandpoorly defineddownwardcommunication pathtothedesignteam,andanevenmorelimitedandpoorlydefined upwardcommunication pathtotheoperationsteamduringcriticalevents.Examplesofthelackofclarity indownwardcommunications includethepreviouslymentioned issuesrelatingtothelackofdefinition providedfortheavailabilityofrealtimevideoandotherorbitalconstraints andthelackofunderstanding providedtothedesignteamofthedecisionmakinghierarchy.Thedeployment ofthesecondsolararray wingduringrealtimevideoblackoutandportionsoftheeclipseagainstthespecificrecommendations of thedesignteamwithoutnoticewasafurtherexampleoflimiteddownwardcommunication aswasthe difficultyencountered inobtainingcertaindelayeddownlinkedinspectiondataandspecificplanned operationtimes.Goingtheotherdirection,oneexampleofill-definedupwardcommunication channels wouldbethefinalmomentsofthesecondwingdeployment wherethemechanisms wereswitchedinto thelowtensionmodetooearlyallowingthetensionbartobepulledofftheContainment Boxbypanel adhesionsimilartothefirstwingdeployment. Atthispointtherewasnodefinedprocesstoprovideinput tothedecisionmakersandnorequestfortechnicalinputbythemthroughtheestablished teleconlink.A secondnotableexamplecomesfromthecloseinspectionofthemechanisms fordamagewiththeEVA helmetcam. Duringthisevent,whererealtimevideowasavailable,aconclusive viewofsomesmall stowagemechanisms ofinterestmightnothavebeenobtainedexceptfortheuseofacellphonecarried bytheastronautworkingwiththesolararraydesignteamandthepersonalaccesshehadtokey individuals. Thelackofclarityinthesecommunication channelsprovidedthegreatestopportunity for potentiallyavoidablemistakesorwastedtime.Here,again,thefranticpaceoftheactivitiesandthe familiarityoftheprocessestothoseinvolvedregularlyinthemmighteasilyallowthedefinitionofthe NASA/CP--2002-211506 180