Romania December 1989 was thus both revolution and coup, but its primary definitive characteristic was that of revolution, as outlined by 'Florentin' and Marius Mioc above. To this must be added what is little talked about or acknowledged as such today: the counter-revolution of December 1989. Prior to 22 December 1989, the primary target of this repression was society, peaceful demonstrators - although the Army itself was both perpetrator of this repression but also the target of Securitate forces attempting to ensure their loyalty to the regime and their direct participation and culpabilization in the repression of demonstrators. After 22 December 1989, the primary target of this violence was the Army and civilians who had picked up weapons, rather than citizens at large. It is probably justified to say that in terms of tactics, after 22 December 1989, the actions of Ceausist forces were counter-coup in nature, contingencies prepared in the event of an Army defection and the possibility of foreign intervention in support of such a defection. However, precisely because of what occurred prior to 22 December 1989, the brutal, bloody repression of peaceful demonstrators, and because the success of the coup was necessary for the success of the revolution already underway, it is probably accurate to say that the Ceausescu regime's actions as a whole constituted a counter -revolution. If indeed the plotters had not been able to effectively seize power after the Ceausescus fled on 22 December 1989 and Ceausescu or his direct acolytes had been able to recapture power, we would be talking of the success not of a counter-coup, but of the counter-revolution. A key component of the counter-revolution of December 1989 concerns the, as they were christened at the time, so- called 'terrorists,' those who were believed then to be fighting in defense of the Ceausescu couple. It is indeed true as Siani-Davies has written that the Revolution is about so much more than 25 'the Front' and 'the terrorists.' True enough, but the outstanding and most vexing question about December 1989 - one that resulted in 942 killed and 2,251 injured after 22 December 1989 - is nevertheless the question of 'the terrorists.' Finding out if they existed, who they were, and who they were defending remains the key unclarified question of December 1989 two decades later: that much is inescapable.

## ' ' LOST '… DURING INVESTIGATION: WHEN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE IS NOT EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE.

From early in 1990, those who participated in or were directly affected by the December 1989 events have attested to efforts to cover-up what happened. Significantly, and enhancing the credibility of these accusations, those who claim such things come from diverse backgrounds, different cities, and from across the post-Ceausescu political spectrum. Further enhancing their credibility, in many cases, they do not attempt to place these incidents into larger narratives about what happened in December 1989, but merely note it as a fact in relating their own personal experiences. Let's take the case of Simion Cherla, a participant in the December 1989 events in Timisoara. Here is how Radu Ciobotea recounted Cherla's story in May 1991:

Simion Cherlea also arrives, agitated. He received a death threat, wrapped in a newspaper. Next to it, in his mailbox, a bullet cartridge was also found. To suggest to him that that is how he would end up if…