hole on the wall, he will pass through to the other side’ is false. In each case, the antecedent is true in the (partial) state of affairs I am imagining. However, in the first counterpossible, the consequent is true, while in the second, the consequent false. Now, there are some counterpossibles in which the contradiction within the antecedent is too glaring for us to move to a partial state of affairs in which the antecedent is true. Consider Quine’s example of a round square copula on Berkeley College. In order to move to a partial state of affairs in which this antecedent is true, I would have to screen out part of the antecedent itself (either ‘round’ or ‘square,’ on the one hand, and ‘copula’ or ‘being on,’ since copulas are not located, on the other). Thus, I must move to a (partial) state of affairs in which the antecedent is N, screened out, rather than true. Thus, when dealing with a counterpossible in which the contradiction is expressed in the antecedent itself, we use the second row of the above truth- table. Thus, these counterpossibles will never be false. They can only be true or N, screened out.14 pretense.15 It seems that a three-valued logic nicely models the above account of The propositions that we treat as N (screened-out) are those propositions that we totally ignore. In actual cases of pretend play, we ignore certain proposition so naturally that it does not seem worth mentioning which propositions we screen out. For example, children screen out the proposition ‘something cannot simultaneously be composed entirely of yellow plastic and steel’ when wielding a whiffle-ball-bat as a sword. Notice that it is not that the child treats the above proposition as false, rather, the child ignores it altogether. Or consider the following from Gould (1972): a 3-year-old boy on a jungle gym said, “ ‘I'm a pussycat. Meow, meow.’ He then came down from the jungle gym and lay on the ground, saying, ‘I'm dead. I'm a dead pussycat . . . I got shooted’ ” (Gould 1972: 212, quoted in Nichols and Stich 2003: 20). The boy treats some false propositions as true (e.g. ‘dead things cannot talk,’ ‘cats cannot talk’). However, he also screens out some propositions. We begin to see them as we try to work through how it would be that this dead cat is talking. Dead things are not breathing, yet vocal speech requires air in the lungs. Now, it could be that the boy is treating the proposition ‘vocal speech requires air in the lungs’ as false, but not necessarily so. Plausibly, he is simply not considering the proposition at all, which is to say that it is screened out. Let’s return to the counterpossibles at issue when we attempt to address the axiological question of God’s existence:

- 1. If God were to exist, the world would be better.
- 2. If God were to exist, the world would be worse.
- 3. If God were not to exist, the world would be better.
- 4. If God were not to exist, the world would be worse.

When subjects assess 1-4, they must screen out those beliefs that generate contradictions when combined in inference formation with one of the antecedents of 1-4. That is, we assign those propositions that generate contradictions the truth-value ‘N.’ Crucially, we must not screen