suggest that humans should engage in counterpossible reasoning by ‘accepting’ or ‘supposing’ that the antecedent of the counterpossible conditional is true and ‘screening out’ those beliefs that would result in contradiction when combined in inferencing with the acceptance or supposition. I suggest that the axiological investigation use a three-valued logical system. The cognitive account of pretence I use offers a way to make sense of the third truth-value. When engaging in counterpossible reasoning, some propositions are ‘true,’ others ‘false,’ and still others ‘ignored.’ An implication of my approach to the axiological question is that some propositions should not be permitted in the dialectic between the pro and anti-theists.

### 2. Previous work on counterpossibles and the axiological question

Presumably responding to the axiological question requires comparing the overall value of states of affairs in which God exists (Godly states of affairs) and states of affairs in which God does not exist (Godless states of affairs). Doing so requires assessing the truth-value of the following four claims:

- 1. If God were to exist, the world would be better.
- 2. If God were to exist, the world would be worse.
- 3. If God were not to exist, the world would be better.
- 4. If God were not to exist, the world would be worse.

Kraay and Dragos (2013) outline four positions one could take regarding the axiological question: pro-theism (1 or 4 are true, 2 or 3 are false), anti-theism (2 or 3 are true, 1 or 4 are 1-4).3 false), indifferentism (1-4 are false), and agnosticism (unsure of the truth-value of However, for anyone who thinks that God’s existence is a matter of necessity (i.e. God either exists necessarily or necessarily does not exist), either 1 and 2 are counterpossibles, or else 3 and 4 are. Thus, there is a fifth possible response to the axiological question: nothing at all can be said about the value of God’s existence or non-existence. I call this position ‘quietism.’ Quietism should not be confused with agnosticism on the axiological question. The quietist claims that the axiological question cannot be answered for metaphysical, rather than epistemic, reasons. According to the quietist, asking what value God would bestow on the world would be like asking what value a round square copula on Berkeley College would bestow upon the world. At best, the question is not substantive, at worst it is meaningless. The first task in answering the axiological question is to respond to the quietist’s objection. One proposed solution is to distinguish 1-4 epistemically. Kahane (2012) initially considers this option, explaining that when we consider God’s necessary existence and necessary non-existence, at least one of these

“does not describe a genuine possibility. They describe what are at most epistemic possibilities— ways in which things might turn out to be (even to necessarily be), for all we know. These epistemic possibilities will still be open to agnostics, or even to uncertain believers. But they will be closed to those who know that some position describes an impossibility—the possibility that 4 God exists is closed to atheists who are certain that the concept of God is incoherent.” (p. 35)