These optimistic scenarios had in common the hope that the nascent Sino-Russian partnership would be fatally weakened, tipping the scales in favor of the United States in the coming battle with China for global supremacy. (…)

How was this plan conceived and decided upon? In truth, the general objectives had been defined since the Obama administration. The President himself gave his approval to the Maidan coup (2014), which was overseen directly by then-Vice President Joe Biden, who acted as a pilot for Ukraine between March 2014 and January 2016. Then, the American administration took strong measures to block the implementation of the Minsk II agreements, reprimanding Merkel and Macron for agreeing to be the subscribers. This is why Berlin and Paris have never made the slightest gesture to persuade kyiv to respect its obligations.

The operation to provoke a crisis in the Donbass was engineered by influential figures – notably Anthony Blinken, the Secretary of State, and Jake Sullivan, the head of the National Security Council – and in neo-conservative circles during the Trump presidency (…).

The strategy was to increase the pressure on Moscow in order to nip in the bud Russia's aspiration to once again become a major player capable of depriving the United States of its privileges as world hegemon and sole ruler of Europe. It was led by the fiery Victoria Nuland and her fellow neo-cons present in the National Security Council (NSC), the CIA, the Pentagon, Congress and the media. As Anthony Blinken and Jake Sullivan were themselves partisans of this strategy of confrontation, the outcome of the debate was decided in advance.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, the plan was ready and only awaited the decision of the White House. Advocates of a new Cold War throughout the administration were able to impose their views on a government in which there were no dissenting voices and led by a passive and malleable president was certain. Thus, the anti-Russian plan in Ukraine took shape with the reinforcement of Ukrainian military forces along the line of contact in the Donbass and bellicose talk about the need to impose heavier economic sanctions on Moscow in the event of a conflict, coming from both Washington and Brussels.

Kremlin leaders seem to have been fully aware of what was going on. The American objective of returning Russia to its subordinate place was taken for granted by the Kremlin. But there was some uncertainty as to what initiatives to expect on the ground: a major assault by kyiv forces in the Donbass or smaller provocative acts to provoke a Russian reaction that could serve as a pretext for the imposition of sanctions – including the closure of Nord Stream II?

########## It is likely that senior officials in Washington had not themselves made a choice as to the tactical modalities of their action. (…)

But in the end, the decision to launch the operation against Russia was taken. Undeniable proof of this are the very precise announcements by President Biden, Anthony Blinken and CIA director William Burns as to the date of the Russian “offensive”. They could be so affirmative because they knew perfectly well the date set for the start of the Ukrainian military operation against Donbass – and knew that Moscow would immediately govern militarily. These assertions were not based on privileged information obtained thanks to interceptions of Russian communications or the presence of a mole in the Kremlin… Washington does not have such access to Moscow's decision-making centers, as evidenced by the fact that the States United States were surprised by all the other important Russian initiatives, including the military intervention in Syria in 2015.

The countdown was triggered by a 30-fold increase in Ukrainian bombings in the Donbass – including against residential areas – between February 16 and 23, 2022, as reported by OSCE monitors. The exact form and extent of the Kremlin's reaction was unpredictable, but that in itself was not a problem