sort, and use a different name for the other, that is fine with me. The terminology does not matter. 7 I have drawn the distinction among reasons for action, but it extends to reasons for attitudes, including feelings. Moreover, I motivated the distinction by thinking about non-aesthetic examples, but it extends to the aesthetic realm. In the remainder, I explore these extensions.

- 3. The argument from taste

Reflection on taste might support the claim that aesthetic considerations only provide justifying, as opposed to demanding, reasons for feeling. It is a platitude that different people have different tastes. Moreover, two people (or the same person at different times) can respond in different ways to the same object in a way that is faultless. For example, the curve of a bay window might charm one person 8 and leave another indifferent. Arguably, that there is room for such divergence is a central feature of our thought and talk about the aesthetic domain. Compare: 'Nothing is more characteristic of the aesthetic than being bored or repelled by what enthrals someone else' ( Moran 2012: 303). This might suggest that it is aesthetically permissible for two people to have opposing attitudes toward the same object. For present purposes, a weaker claim suffices. It is aesthetically permissible for one person to be bored (or enthralled) by something and for another not to be bored (or enthralled) by it. More generally, it is aesthetically permissible for one person to have an affective attitude toward an object and for another to lack it. A straightforward explanation for this is that the reasons aesthetic features provide for having a certain feeling are justifying, not demanding. Since justifying reasons can only make it the case that a person may feel a certain way, not that they ought to do so, it follows that it is only ever the case that a person is permitted to respond to those aesthetic features, not that they are obliged to do so. So, if one person feels a certain way about something in light of its aesthetic features and another person does not, it need not follow that either person is feeling something they ought not to feel, or failing to feel something they ought to feel. A person's taste, then, manifests in the justifying aesthetic reasons to which they respond with feeling. This line of thought is suggestive but not decisive. A reply is to grant that, for those without the relevant taste, the reason for feeling an aesthetic feature provides is at most justifying, but to insist that, for those with the relevant taste, the reason is demanding. One way to gloss this is by appeal to the distinction between reasons and conditions (see Bader 2016, Dancy 2004). To illustrate, the fact that Miyuki can go to the cinema is not a reason for her to go, but it enables the fact that she promised to do so to be a reason for going. In a similar fashion, one might view taste as an enabling condition: it enables a consideration that would not otherwise be a demanding reason for feeling to be one. On this view, if a person has the relevant taste, it might be the case that they ought to respond affectively to aesthetic properties, not simply that they may do so. In