aesthetic obligations not to have certain emotional responses. While this allows for innumerable aesthetic obligations of a negative kind, this too is not an implausible result. It is possible for finite creatures such as ourselves to satisfy each such obligation, and the obligation that results from their agglomeration, simply by not having the relevant feelings. The argument above relies on the principle that ought implies can . One might object that this is controversial. That is true. Nothing in philosophy is uncontroversial. But it is a 16 widely held principle and even its critics acknowledge its intuitive plausibility. So, while it is beyond the scope of this paper to defend the principle, I think it is legitimate to appeal to it in this context. In any event, there are independent grounds for doubting that a person ought to have each and every matching attitude, hence, that aesthetic reasons for feelings are demanding. First, consider the link between what a person ought to do and criticism. If a person ought to φ and does not φ, they are criticisable, unless they have an excuse. But a 17 person is not open to criticism or in need of an excuse for lacking one or all of the matching attitudes (as distinct from having an un matching attitude). So, it is not the case that they ought to have one or all of the matching attitudes. Second, consider retrospective attitudes of assessment. If Miyuki ought to have gone to the cinema but did not, she might say or think to herself, 'I should have kept my promise!' If a person realises that they did not have a matching attitude to some of the aesthetic features of the façade of the house, or for that matter to all of them, they would not say or think to themselves , 'I should have done so !' Finally, consider the link between what a person ought to do and advice (cp. Thomson 2000). Suppose that Carlos does not know that his friend Juan will be at the party, but Maria does know this. She might tell Carlos , 'You should go to the party!' In contrast, a third-party with full(er) information about the aesthetic features of the façade of a house would not advise someone, with respect to each of the matching attitudes, to have it, let alone to have all of them. In conclusion, the view that aesthetic reasons for feelings are demanding makes the aesthetic domain too demanding.

- 5. Resisting the argument from excess

There are two ways to resist the argument for the view that no aesthetic reasons for affects are demanding. The first is to maintain that all such reasons are demanding, but deny that this results in an explosion of obligations. The second is to deny that all aesthetic reasons to feel are demanding, but insist that some are. I cannot discuss here every possible way of developing these defensive strategies, but I will consider some of the most obvious and, I think, most promising ways of doing so, and suggest that they fail.

- 5.1Cost-cutting

A person who wants to defend the view that aesthetic reasons for feeling are demanding might allow for an explosion of such reasons but deny that there follows an explosion of aesthetic obligations. To do so, they might challenge the claim that, if there is an aesthetic reason for a matching attitude, there is no reason as weighty against that