but rather as inviting or requiring something from us, a response that maybe owed to it. (2012: 313, see also Kubala 2018)

Part of the idea here is that an aesthetic feature provides a demanding reason for a person to feel when experienced. The present proposal is that an aesthetic feature provides a demanding reason for a person to feel only when experienced. Given the richness of perceptual experience, this constraint will not block the argument from excess. In a very different context, Heck writes about the fecundity of what is given in perceptual experience:

Consider your current perceptual state - and now imagine what a complete description of the way the world appears to you at this moment might be like. Surely a thousand words would hardly begin to do the job. […] Before menow, for example, are arranged various objects with various shapes and colors, of which, it might seem, I have no concept. My desk exhibits a whole host of shades of brown, for which I have no names. The speakers to the sides of my computer are not quite flat; I could not begin to describe their shape in anything like adequate terms. The leaves on the trees outside my window are fluttering back and forth, randomly, as it seems to me, as the wind passes over them. - Yet my experience of these things represents them far more precisely than that, far more distinctively, it would seem, than any other characterization I could hope to formulate, for myself or for others, in terms of the concepts I presently possess. (2000: 489-490)

The issue at hand is not whether a given experience reveals more features, indeed, more aesthetically relevant features, than a person can conceptualise, but whether it reveals more features than a person can match in their attitudes. Plausibly, it does. A defender of the view that aesthetic reasons for feeling are demanding might suggest a stricter epistemic constraint on what it is to be a reason than those considered above. But then their view becomes even more controversial. The burden is on them to provide independent motivation for the constraint.

- 5.3Paying attention

I turn now to the second way of resisting the argument from excess. One might grant that the argument shows that not all aesthetic reasons for affective attitudes are demanding, but it is consistent with this that some such reasons are demanding. The proponent of this view owes an account of what distinguishes demanding reasons to feel from merely justifying reasons. That difference does not lie in the content of the reasons. After all, each is, or is provided by, an aesthetic feature. And it is obscure why being dazzling to such-and-such degree would demand being dazzled to that degree, say, while being charming to such-and-such degree would only justify being charmed to that degree. In view of this, I suggest that, on the most plausible version of this view, the difference between the demanding and justifying aesthetic reasons to feel lies, not in their content, but in the presence or absence of further conditions that enable or disable their demandingness. On this view, being dazzling to such-and-such degree might demand being dazzled to that degree in some circumstances, and merely justify it in others. The obvious candidate for the relevant condition, one with sufficient generality, is attention . With respect to the beautiful - although the point generalises to the balanced, the graceful, the vibrant, and so on - Moran suggests that 'anyone attending to it properly ought to respond with pleasure and admiration' (2012: 305). To put this in the