in place. There are no rights prior to the principles of justice. But we could object that justice is a matter of respecting the rights people already have , their 'natural rights' . Robert Nozick ( Anarchy, State and Utopia , Ch. 7) argues for a theory like this. It is concerned primarily with the distribution of property (not political justice or opportunities), and argues that justice involves three ideas:

- 1. Justice in acquisition: how you first acquire property rights over something that has not previously been owned;
- 2. Justice in transfer: how you acquire property rights over something that has been transferred (e.g. by gift or exchange) to you by someone else;
- 3. Rectification of injustice: how to restore something to its rightful owner, in case of injustice in either acquisition or transfer.

Nozick's theory of justice claims that whether a distribution is just or not depends entirely on how it came about . By contrast, justice according to Rawls' Difference Principle depends entirely on the 'pattern' of distribution at that moment. Rawls understands social justice in terms of states of affairs, but Nozick argues that it should be understood in terms of actions.

An advantage of Nozick's theory is that if a certain distribution of goods (D1) is just (according to whichever theory you like), then if people voluntarily move to a different distribution (D2), observing justice in transfer, D2 will also be just. Whether D2 is patterned according to the Difference Principle is irrelevant . Suppose a famous footballer whom people love to watch, e.g. Lionel Messi, asks to be paid €0.25 of each ticket sold for home games. The club agrees and fans are happy to pay the extra €0.25 each. If 400,000 people go to his games in a season, he will be € 100,000 richer. According to Nozick, this is not unjust, because everyone gave the extra money voluntarily . Yet the new distribution will be deemed unjus t by Rawls' theory if this inequality is not to the advantage of the poorest people in society (including those who don't care about football) .

Justice, Nozick argues, is about respecting people's (natural) rights, in particular, their rights to property and their rights to self-ownership. We must allow people the freedom to decide what they want to do with what they own. Each person is separate, an individual, and we must respect their autonomy. People are 'ends -in- themselves' (Kant), and we cannot use them in ways they do not agree to, even if that would lead to some supposed 'greater good' (e.g. other people getting what they need). This has a radical conclusion: to take property away from people in order to redistribute it according to some pattern, e.g. the Difference Principle, violates their rights . But this is exactly what taxation (for the purpose of redistribution) does. To tax Messi's extra earnings and return the money to poorer people in society violates his right to the money.

Nozick thinks property rights are important because they derive from 'self - ownership'. A person has a right to what they produce, because they own their own labour, which they invest in creating the product. 'Justice in acquisition' places constraints on exactly when and how this occurs, but this is the basic idea. And once something is (justly) owned, then justice is all about justice in transfer.