2018, Moran 2012). Remarks such as, ' You have to look at the magnolia by the back door while it's still in bloom!' or, ' You must take note of their new haircut! ' are commonplace. If a person aesthetically ought to attend, they are open to criticism if they fail to do so. The point is well taken. But it does not support the view under consideration, namely, that attention (as such) conditions aesthetic reasons for feeling, specifically, by turning them from justifying to demanding. Still, perhaps the point leads to a different proposal, namely, that reasons for attention condition aesthetic reasons for affects. When there is a demanding aesthetic reason for a person to attend to something, then the reasons to feel which its aesthetic features provide are demanding, hence, they ought to have those feelings. Attending is a (mental or non-mental) action. For example, attending to the magnolia might involve looking at its petals, following their outlines, comparing their colours to those of their neighbours, and so on. So, aesthetic reasons to attend are aesthetic reasons to act. I do not deny that there are such reasons - indeed, I will argue that there are shortly. What I do deny is that aesthetic reasons to attend condition aesthetic reasons to feel in the way suggested. Suppose that Vanya ought to look at the magnolia but does not. She is criticisable for this failure. But she is not in addition criticisable for, say, not relishing the sumptuousness of its petals. Indeed, given that she did not attend to the magnolia, such criticism seems inappropriate. So, it is not the case that Vanya ought to have affective attitudes that match the magnolia's aesthetic features. So, even though there is a demanding reason for her to attend, there is none for her to feel. At this point, the opponent of the argument from excess might protest. What if Vanya attends to the magnolia, but fails to relish its sumptuous petals? In that case, she is criticisable. Since she conformed to the reasons that demand attention, she must be criticisable for not conforming to the reasons that demand feeling. However, it is not the case that Vanya conformed to the reasons that demand attention. Those reasons, I take it, are not merely reasons to attend, but reasons to do so in a way that results, at the very least, in relishing the magnolia's sumptuous petals. M ore generally, demanding aesthetic reasons to attend are aesthetic reasons for actions that result in matching attitudes. So, there is no need to postulate demanding reasons for feeling to explain why a person who attends to an object without forming the relevant feelings is open to criticism.

- 5.4A final objection

I have considered some ways of resisting the argument for the view that aesthetic reasons to feel are only ever justifying. No doubt there are more ways of doing so, but I take myself to have done enough to show that that argument deserves serious consideration. By way of a segue, I turn to an objection which targets the conclusion directly, rather than the route to it. One might object to the claim that there are no aesthetic obligations to have affective attitudes by pointing out that, in some contexts, it does seem acceptable to say such things as, 'You should admire the way they've arranged the furniture in this room ! ' No doubt it is okay to talk this way. But one might view this as loose talk. Compare: 'You should grow your hair!' This is not literally true. Hair growth is not reason -responsive. What this remark is intended to convey is something like: you should not cut your hair or, more generally, you should take actions to ensure your hair grows or refrain from