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influence. Both traditional and far right media are broadcasted though over-the-air signals increasing their influence and stance of non-involvement and opposition, respectively. The private sector (business guilds) holds hidden power as these are the actors lobbying politicians to pass or block a reform. This is seen in the financial support given to political campaigns of ‘status quo’ candidates (El Comercio, 2019) that make up the current opposition block. The organization of the private sector takes centre stage for understanding support and levels of influence. Some Communities of Practice (CoP), such Artisanal Fishing and Tourism, are in favour of the agreement given they have been disproportionally affected by the recent oil spill – raising demands for regulation and compensation (CooperAcción, 2022). However, these CoP’s are also part of bigger ‘private enterprise’ coalitions such as the CONFIEP. Self-defining as ‘the CoP of CoPs’ this organization, along with other coalitions, has previously voiced its opposition to the agreement (CONFIEP, 2020; RCR, 2020) using arguments that were then repeated by congresspeople in the first attempt at ratification (Romo and Sierra, 2020). The opposing views within such coalitions allows for an entry point in overcoming previous blockage. Within the private sector, there is also significant influence of foreign investors. Predominant entities like the OECD and the IDB have issued public statements calling countries in the region to ratify the agreement (OECD, 2020). Earlier this year the OECD opened accession discussions with Peru, the first steps towards a potential membership (OECD, 2022). The clear stance of this organization towards the agreement is to be carefully considered by institutions that seek this membership. On the other hand, the IDB has developed an Environmental and Social Policy framework that sets parameters to be met for its new projects, in direct alignment with the 3 Escazu objectives (IDB, 2020). Representatives of the World Bank and European investment Bank have also highlighted the importance of ratification in guaranteeing investment stability (CEPAL, 2022). Other relevant actors are religious referents, the president of the Peruvian Episcopal Conference issued a letter to congress asking for agreement ratification, quoting here statements by the Pope regarding environmental protection (Tufani, 2020). The importance given to religion in the country means this institution potentially affect both regulation (hidden power) and public perceptions by dictating what citizens should care about (invisible power). The known religious ideology behind some political parties can therefore give the church power over them as it also increases civil society’s support. Autonomous entities such as the Judiciary and Public defender’s office have no direct influence but their support for The Agreement can help in legitimize pro-ratification arguments. Regarding other countries, the recent signing of the Agreement by the Chilean government can have a positive influence in local perception of it. This action can be taken to show our congress how other world leaders – among which are those of the richest countries in the region – support this international collaboration. The case of Chile is particularly useful since former president Piñera refused to sign the Agreement with similar arguments as those used in Peru (Cueto, 2020), the recent signing is to be used to disprove said arguments in our context. Furthermore, the event was well received internationally, fact that could appeal to the egos of current legislators as it would be them making Peru part of a movement now being led by Mexico, Argentina and Chile (Alonso, 2022). Finally, Civil Society actors have limited lobbying (hidden) power and one could argue they are under the invisible power of an unresponsible state, making them naturalise crisis and indifferent to the failings of government. However, recent protests and their outcomes show there are organisations fighting this.

#### Strategy:

Considering the three-step process required to pass the bill and the recognised actors at play, this strategy seeks to turn the vote of FAC members through a combination of insider and outsider strategies. Public portals have allowed for mapping of interests of each commission member based on trajectory prior to politics, bills they have authored, and meetings held. Omitting the commission members affiliated with PL due to their known support, the remaining FAC members and their interests are presented in Table 1, with yellow used to identify swing voters. The simple majority required, and with the 5 PL votes guaranteed, allows to target our effort to the 6 highlighted commission members. This is done to have some leeway as 4 additional votes would