the penalty approach which utilises a ‘loss’ frame may be more likely to influence the keepers who were considered to have poorer disease management practices, for example. In the case of the cost-sharing compensation system, consistent with the economic literature outlined by Barnes and others (2015), the source of compensation was felt to have a limited influence on disease control behaviour. However, a system of levy payments may increase levels of knowledge relating to exotic disease risk and control. It is important to note that a compensation policy not supported by industry may lead to perverse behavioural responses. This was a consistent theme throughout the data, and it was felt to be particularly important for animal keepers to feel satisfied that the government is visibly ‘playing their part’ in preventing the spread of exotic disease, such as through effective border control (as previously suggested by Gunn and others 2008, Garforth and others 2013).

## Conclusion

A major conclusion of this study is that animal keepers do not consciously consider their exotic disease management behaviour to be influenced by compensation. This may be due to a lack of awareness of the compensation system for exotic livestock diseases, and thus other factors were considered more prominent in guiding their disease management decisions, such as animal welfare concerns, responsibility, reputation and perceived risk. These other factors should be considered during an outbreak or in designing responses to exotic livestock diseases and animal keepers must be made aware of the system of compensation that would affect them in order to achieve any potential desired behavioural response. One way that awareness of exotic disease and associated compensation available to the livestock sector could be increased is through a levy-based cost- sharing compensation system. For the system to be considered fair by animal keepers, it would need to allow for individual animal keeper payments to be differentiated at the farm level and be based on risk, to encourage animal keepers to reduce risk levels in order to pay lower premiums. The findings suggest that reductions in compensation payments may potentially lead to adverse impacts, such as hiding of disease and a lack of or delayed reporting. Linking compensation to the speed of disease reporting may have some positive impacts on exotic disease management practices, but based on the contrasting views of veterinarians (who favoured a penalty approach) and animal keepers (who favoured a bonus approach), it is likely some form of a tailored approach, with different interventions may influence different groups of animal keepers more effectively.

## Acknowledgments

The paper draws on findings from a study funded by Defra entitled Exotic Disease Compensation Review: Behaviours Project – Part 2 (Primary Research) SE4309. The authors thank two anonymous reviewers and the editor for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.

## References

ANGUS, A., BOOTH, C., ARMSTRONG, G. & POLLARD, S. J. T. (2013) Better evidence for regulatory reform: rapid evidence appraisals. Report to Defra, ERG117 BARNES, A. P., MOXEY, A. P., VOSOUGH AHMADI, B. & BORTHWICK, F. A. (2015) The effect of animal health compensation on ‘positive’ behaviours towards exotic disease reporting and implementing biosecurity: a review, a synthesis and a research agenda. Preventative Veterinary Medicine 122, 42– 52 doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2015.09.003