Déclaration de M. Alain Richard, ministre de la défense, sur la construction d'une véritable défense européenne et sur les relations entre l'Union européenne, l'OTAN et les Etats-Unis, Georgetown le 23 février 2000.
Date: 2000-02-23
Orateur: Alain Richard
Fonction: FRANCE. Ministre de la défense

Thank you, Professor Barnes, for your kind words of introduction. I greatly appreciate this opportunity for a broad exchange of views with a distinguished audience particularly knowledgeable in the field of international relations. I am deeply honored to address you in an auditorium that has hosted a number of eminent speakers. I also know that it is here at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service that the foreign service officers of your country receive part of their training and become diplomats for their country. As diplomats serving a country that has considerable influence and responsibilities, many of you will be the focus of great expectations. Your talent for dialogue will be in strong demand. I wish you great success. Today's topic, European defense and the transatlantic link, is a broad one. Before I lead you into it, I would like to try to answer a question I have been asked repeatedly since my arrival in Washington: "What is it all about? What is this thing you Europeans are talking about? Tell me in one sentence". It is very simple: We want the Europeans to be able to put out fires in their own backyards, with the Americans where you want to join, without you where you don't. With this, you know it all. Where do we start? The cold war is over, it has started fading in our minds. We are beginning to gain a better perspective of the challenges our privileged Northern democracies face in today's imperfectly globalized world society. It is a very complex society indeed where multiple factors of tension are at work within and between States. During the past decade we have experienced more and more frequently how imperfect the tools for the peaceful resolution of conflicts are. We have witnessed the transformation of these tensions into actual crises that threaten our security interests and require military intervention. The Gulf war and the prolonged Balkan conflict have taught us that these crises are of a mixed nature, involving ethnic, economic and political factors. We have not found simple solutions to master them and they tend to drag on for much longer than we would wish. They also tend to be fairly unpredictable and intractable once they get started. Their resolution requires a combination of civilian and military actions, and the mobilization of substantial resources, that can only be found in the framework of coalitions acting within UN Security Council mandates. In the course of the 90's France was involved in more than thirty crisis situations requiring the involvement of military forces, most of them side by side with US forces. This is an impressive record from which we should draw a shared pride. The United States and the European nations have borne the brunt of the burden in handling these crises. They have done so to a large extent with the military resources that they had acquired for cold war purposes. We have thus relied on the political and military capital we had accumulated in the past. The time has now come to take a fresh look at how we intend to handle future crises and which tools we shall need to do so. The European Union has focused up to now mostly on its economic and commercial dimensions. The implementation of its political dimension has proven to be slow and difficult. The need to give substance to the Common Foreign and Security Policy is now felt more acutely by our leadership and public opinions. The EU's great potential today is that it can rely on economic, humanitarian and diplomatic tools. The recent experiences have also made it clear that there would be no credible European crisis management capability unless it were backed by a significant military force, allowing Europe to contribute to any operation or lead it. I believe this feeling is shared by our public opinions. They responded with great maturity to the difficulties and uncertainties of the Kosovo operation. They now expect us to be able to act when needed. This has long been advocated and supported by many in the United States. President Kennedy called for it in a 4th of July address: "It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us against fragmentation of the Alliance. Only such a Europe will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean, in facing the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can we have a full give and take between equals, an equal sharing of responsibilities and an equal level of sacrifice". Let me pay tribute to this vision and stress that putting it into practice will, indeed, require major efforts from both Europeans and Americans. In this regard, the experience we have been going through in Kosovo has been a decisive one. The Europeans became acutely aware that they were not capable of collectively handling the military dimension of collective action without a massive US contribution, even if the political aspects of the crisis were managed jointly with their US ally. The US itself had to draw substantially on its global capabilities to field the appropriate level of forces required to put decisive pressure on Slobodan Milosevic. It is interesting to note that the efforts by the Europeans to organize themselves to deal with crises affecting their security were simultaneous with the Kosovo crisis and seem to have received substantial impetus from it. Unfortunately, we are still deeply involved in this crisis. I am particularly encouraged to see that all Alliance members have demonstrated active solidarity in handling the difficult phase we are now going through in Mitrovica. Just as early Bosnia was an example of Europe getting involved on the ground (in the context of UNPROFOR), and the US taking its time to frame its policy, Kosovo was a wake-up call in the other direction. In this respect, I believe that, after Cologne, the Helsinki summit meeting of the EU members last December was a turning point. The Fifteen determined that they had the political will to handle the crises that affected their security and that they intended to do so in close coordination with the Atlantic Alliance. Decisions among the Fifteen are taken according to the procedures defined by the treaties, i.e. by members alone. That does not exclude consultations upstream with all the partners ready to contribute to the actions to be decided. The Fifteen determined that they would enhance the political and military instruments available to them in order to be able to reach decisions, in a similar fashion to the North Atlantic Council. The existing Political Committee will be given a permanent standing with resident ambassadors. It will be able to rely on the military advice of a Military Committee, where representatives of the fifteen member states will be at hand, like in the NATO military committee. Of the fifteen EU Member States, eleven plan to have the same military representatives sitting in both military committees. This will ensure full transparency among them. A European joint military staff will help the Military Committee to commission and elaborate strategic options and evaluate them at any given time, on the request of the Political and Security Committee. A similar framework has existed for some time within the Western European Union without raising questions or concerns. No cumbersome new bureaucracy will be created, the number of staffers envisaged being the same as those that now work within the WEU and will be disbanded. It is far smaller than that of the staff in corresponding NATO institutions. All three of these bodies are going to be set up in an interim mode next week on the 1st of March and will start working closely with Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO and now the EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. I know that Americans want to understand how this is meant to work concretely and interact with NATO. Let me therefore try to describe for you the way a crisis could be managed and the various options on which we would have to decide "en bonne intelligence" as my Foreign Ministry colleague says. If we look back at ten years of crises in the periphery of Europe, we are reminded that, before a tense situation erupts into an open crisis, there is intense consultation among Western countries. The Kosovo crisis was ten years in the making and the object of innumerable meetings and discussions within NATO, the EU and other groups. EU meetings adopted common positions that were fully concurrent with those adopted among NATO members. All the tools available to diplomats were tried before it became apparent that the threat of the use of force was required to stop Milosevic from brutalizing his own citizens. This was done as early as June of 1998 by NATO members acting jointly. Subsequently the diplomatic and military moves were closely coordinated, and it was the cohesion of all Western countries expressing itself throughout the crisis in NATO, the EU and other bodies that made our collective success possible. This complex and lengthy process through which democracies seek the best approach in a continuous dialogue among themselves should remain the norm. The EU and its member States, using their new tools for advice on both the civilian and military aspects of possible approaches, will examine what options are open to them. They will be in constant touch with their NATO allies, including at the highest level, who will be doing the same thing while testing with them all peaceful means to defuse the crisis. Several options are possible should it appear that the use of force becomes necessary. The first option is that the 19 members of the Alliance conduct a military operation and launch it using the full potential of the NATO machinery and of its members. This was the case in Bosnia and in Kosovo. France has shown that it was ready and capable of participating in such an option and had no problem working fully within a NATO command structure. Approximately 7,000 French soldiers are deployed today under NATO command. In the Kosovo air campaign we were the second largest contributor and today we bear the difficult responsibility of handling the most difficult region in Kosovo for KFOR. Upon recommendation of the SACEUR, the North Atlantic Council has accepted that the Eurocorps would provide the core of the next headquarters for KFOR, thereby demonstrating the dual nature of existing European military capabilities. In the second option, the EU would take overall responsibility for a crisis management operation. It would do so taking advantage of the dispositions worked out in the June 1996 Berlin NATO Ministerial meeting. It would make use of NATO headquarters such as CJPS (Common Joint Planning Staff) and SHAPE for the planning of its operation, of the chain of command organized under Deputy SACEUR for the command of the operation, and of the operational headquarters and troops earmarked for NATO for its implementation. Non-EU allies would, of course, be welcome to participate in such an operation should this path be chosen. Particulars of this option have been worked out over the years between NATO and the WEU and should in time be applicable to the EU in some way or another. The third option is one that has rarely been used so far. It is the one that clearly raises most questions in this city. Should the NATO Allies decide not to commit themselves as such and the EU members decide to do so, there is a possibility that the EU might have to rely on strictly European capabilities to run an operation. The participation of non-EU NATO Allies would also be welcome. For the moment, the Petersberg tasks on the high end of the spectrum (similar for example to Operation Allied Force) would require some capabilities that the Europeans do not yet have, but that they have nevertheless decided to acquire. In the short term this option will therefore be available only for more limited military operations. We believe this is a workable option that requires serious efforts on the part of the Europeans. It is an indispensable one if we want all our nations to have a real choice when they decide in the future. As to the decision on which of the three options would be carried out, the concern that there might be a competition between NATO and the EU is groundless. Such a decision could not be taken with pre-emption of either of them, nor can anyone imagine that Europeans will be ready to carry out an operation against American interests. Indeed, American preferences and conceptions will be fully taken into account in this process. In real life, and this cannot be stressed enough, we all very well know that this process would take place through direct consultation and dialogue between capitals, and not through a purely institutional decision-making process. This is how we have dealt with crises erupting in the Balkans for example over the last ten years. On this issue, I trust that the cartesianism of our American friends will be influenced to some extent by French pragmatism... In all three options, whether the intervention is made with the use of NATO assets or not, the forces that will be used will be the same. They will be the national and multinational forces that exist in Europe, some earmarked for NATO use, some not. They will also be those that the US can commit to such an operation. Nobody envisages setting up new forces for this purpose, we only intend to enhance the existing ones to make use of them in a different way. As you can see, we are not talking of two organizations competing with each other and vying for primacy. We are talking about a transatlantic community of democratic nations working together to find the best possible way to grapple with a complex and unpredictable world. Can one seriously imagine that the Europeans acting within the EU would consider getting involved in a politico-military operation while keeping the US in the dark or ignoring its advice and not seeking its support and participation? Speaking for France, I can tell you this has not been our practice, however sharp our discussions with the US may sometimes sound. I see no reason why we should change our policy. This is what is meant by the Helsinki Summit report when it states that: "the objective of the Union to have an autonomous capacity to take decisions, and where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crisis". Now I can hear some voices in this city saying of this coming of age of the European Security and Defense Initiative: "Maybe it is a good idea but they will not be capable of making it work in practice". I object to this on the following grounds: - First the Europeans have shown in the Kosovo crisis that they were capable of taking difficult political decisions on the basis of their principles and interests. And that they could do so fast. They will increasingly need to acquire a culture of decision and accept taking risks more on their own, in close consultation with the US. But these are proud nations that have shown what they were capable of and interaction with NATO will certainly stimulate them in this regard. - Second, the Helsinki declaration starts with a detailed description of the targets the EU countries set for themselves in terms of military capabilities. These are quantitative so called "head-line goals" and qualitative targets regarding collective capabilities in areas that closely coincide with those identified in NATO by the Defense Capabilities Initiative. This emphasis is crucial. It indicates that the Europeans are serious about overcoming their deficiencies, and recognize that there can be no serious political message without effective clout to support it. - Third, you must bear in mind that this process will require time and dedication. The present unsatisfactory state of defense budgets within NATO partially reflects a state of complacency deriving from US protection. My European defense minister colleagues keep telling me that they expect to get a better reaction from their parliaments if they can present their budget requests as a contribution to the construction of Europe. Just as enhanced European capabilities should imply increased European responsibilities, so will, I believe, increased responsibilities translate into a greater sense of entitlement by EU citizens and, thereby a greater willingness to spend money for defense. Give us a few years to take advantage of the better economic circumstances that are emerging in Europe and we will prove the skeptics wrong. Let me tell you about some of the projects we have in mind in reinforcing the European military capabilities that could operate under the responsibility of NATO or of the EU. We have pragmatically set in Helsinki as a global objective to be able, before 2003, to deploy and sustain, over at least one year, a corps-size rapid reaction ground force (up to fifteen brigades, hence between fifty thousand and sixty thousand soldiers). This force must be able to take care of its own needs. Hence it will have to be provided with capacities of command, control, intelligence, and logistics. It will have the support of naval and air elements. We are now working among the Fifteen on how to implement this objective in terms of national contributions before the end of the Portuguese presidency of the European Union, next summer. I intend to propose to my defense minister colleagues of the Fifteen that we organize during the following French presidency a force generation conference in order to express in a concrete way our national contributions to the headline goal. This global objective will require that we commit ourselves concurrently to the realization of our goals for collective capacities in the field of command, control, intelligence and strategic lift. In order to strengthen our capacity for informed decision making, we could agree among willing European nations to undertake, in close co-ordination with the EU, the collective mobilization of surveillance and early warning assets (i.e. full overhead reconnaissance, comprising space assets, planes and unmanned aerial vehicles). Exploitation of these assets would remain on a national basis, with a disposition for pooling our evaluations under the direction of the Political and Security Committee. To reinforce our European capabilities for strategic planning as well as command and control, France and the United Kingdom have made public their willingness to authorize the use of their joint structures by the EU. They have also announced the possibility of welcoming other European elements into these structures. This step aims to put multinationalized command capabilities at the service of the EU. In the same way, it is the responsibility of those of us who are engaged in European multinational forces, to carry on the transformation and strengthening of command capabilities at the tactical level. The members of the Eurocorps have committed themselves to transforming it into a rapid reaction force. We must also progress, among concerned Member States, toward the creation of an airlift command as suggested at the last Franco-German Summit. Along with the Dutch, we also intend to propose to our partners the creation of a European cell for maritime strategic transport. This will allow is ultimately to co-ordinate common use of the overall available military assets and the potential use of civilian assets. Lastly, let me stress the importance of keeping a competitive high tech arms industry in Europe. A massive restructuring has taken place in our aerospace and military electronics sectors, largely on the basis of initiatives from the companies themselves. I believe this is positive and gives governments a good chance to get the European taxpayer full value for his money, if we can keep effective competition alive. However this renovated sector reminds us it will reach its full potential only if European governments start to procure their equipment in a harmonized, systematic and forward looking way. We Europeans should clearly pay far more attention to technology research and development if we want to avoid transforming the gap in spending on technology which does exist between the US and Europe into a gap in capabilities. In this regard, I believe the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative exercise is a valuable one because it forces all allies to think hard about their priorities. It also forces them to think about the interoperability between allied forces which has to be strengthened in spite of different technological choices. We would also expect the US to do its share to make transatlantic cooperation possible in the military industrial field by easing the strict barriers that exist in the field of export licensing and protection of technologies. The Pentagon has been showing the way. I wish it well with other Washington players. These are our ambitions. They will be undertaken with the corresponding seriousness, They will also fully benefit NATO both in meeting its Article 5 duties, for which it retains the central role in European security, and in addressing its other tasks in regional crisis management. Our defense and security project answers long-time American demands within NATO that Europeans develop their national forces further for better interoperability, efficiency, sustainability and self-sufficiency. NATO itself will have to change and grow in order to play its role in this new partnership. The adjustment process already underway to implement the results of the Washington Summit will have to move ahead. Channels of exchange and consultation between NATO and the EU will need to be set up. It has taken ten years since Maastricht to progress towards a common European currency. We will need a comparable time-frame to achieve the autonomous capacity for intervention that we set as a goal in Helsinki. We shall not be overambitious however by setting an unrealistic short term goal, of being able to manage crises on the scale of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo within the next few years. The French government intends to submit to Parliament in the spring of 2001 a programming law for military spending over a six-year period that will make clear our full commitment to reaching the collective targets on capabilities that were defined in Helsinki. Credibility can only be built over the long run, and EU members will launch the important changes that are required in order to maximize the effectiveness of their available resources and mobilize supplementary ones as soon as possible. By building new capabilities in this decade, the Europeans will be laying the foundations for a solid alliance of partners in this century. To conclude, I would like to insist on four points: - After European Economic and Monetary Union, the European defense project is the European construction's next major endeavor. The EU members have recognized that they needed to have the relevant military means necessary to back up their Common Foreign and Security Policy. - These military efforts must be clearly identified and the new capabilities crafted in our armed forces. Hence the objective we set in Helsinki of a projection-capable force and collective capabilities as soon as 2003. It is not about creating a European army: it is about benefiting from increased means of crisis management entrusted to either NATO or the EU according to the circumstances. - This project serves to reinforce and revitalize the Atlantic Alliance: Improvement of our national capacities will be of significant benefit to the Alliance as well as to the Union. The capacity to commit our forces will increase the Alliance's and the US' spectrum of options and its standing with public opinion. Taking up greater responsibilities as Europeans will enable us to act as collective partners in an Alliance of democratic countries. This I believe is the greatest guarantee that the U.S. itself will remain engaged in common projects with its European allies in the future. - Lastly, I would stress that there is no turning back. If the European project launched at Helsinki fails it will be Europe's capability to act to ensure its own security and to act along with the U.S. as an ally that will be at stake. Our European failure would be our common Atlantic failure. Our European success will be a common Atlantic success, because it will allow us to address, together, the challenges that face us in an increasingly unstable world. There is no other economic and political partner in the world with which you share so many interests and values. The same is true for us. Neither side can - nor should - take the other for granted. I am convinced that in a few years' time, one of my successors will come back here to tell your successors that the job has been done and that the Europeans and Americans are still side by side handling new challenges. Thank you very much. (Source http://www.defense.gouv.fr, le 2 mars 2000)