based on the following chapters, write some discussion questions to ask in class at the professor. Write the questions with clear references from the text:

THE EVOLUTION OF 
JAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS 
Core Moves for Japans Initiatives in Asian 
Regionalism beyond Southeast Asia 
........................................................................................................ 
TAKASHI TERADA 
JAPAN has been a prominent player in the politics and economics in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the last four decades.' Japan, as well as Australia, 
became the ASEAN's first dialogue partner in '977, and it took credit for initiating the 
establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, a main dialogue 
framework for regional security. Japan also organized a summit meeting with ASEAN 
in 2003 where ASEAN leaders gathered in their official capacity at a venue outside the 
Southeast Asian region for the first time, while choosing Singapore, a founding ASEAN 
member, as its first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partner in 2001. Japan's commitment 
to forging good relations with ASEAN has been consistent and comprehensive, 
illustrating Japan's unchanged keen interest in this regional institution. Yet there do exist 
some regional institutions or initiatives beyond ASEAN, including the ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT, or ASEAN+3), the East Asian Summit (EAS), the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the 
Free and Open lndo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. Remarkably, Japan has also consistently 
played a key role in the formation and development of these wider regional institutions. 
ASEAN has traditionally been unable to take a political initiative toward wider regional 
institutions as a unified player, as seen in the fact that it has never proposed any FTA to 
external regional states. How has Japan managed to promote these mega-regional 
frameworks despite ASEAN's traditional and conventional heSitancy toward a wider 
regional institution? 
This chapter identifies and examines key patterns in Japan's commitment to Asian 
regionalism developed outside the Southeast Asian region by strengthening and 
carefully treating relations with ASEAN to establish a view that Japan's engagement in 
868 
TAKASHI TERADA 
Table 43.1 Evolution of the Japan-ASEAN Relations 
Regional Major Events 
Regional 
Institutions 
Phase I 
(mid-1970s) 
Phase 11 
(mid-1980s) 
Phase III 
(late 19905) 
Phase IV 
(mid-2000s) 
Phase V 
(mid-2010s) 
Phase VI 
(late 201 Os) 
End of Vietnam War 
Plaza Accord 
AFC 
China's charm Offensive 
diplomacy 
US Asia Pivot 
US·China Rule·making 
competition 
ASEAN 
promoting relations with ASEAN-partly through assisting the development and sta· 
bility of ASEAN members-was considered an essential step forASEAN's 
participation in the new and wider regional institutions Japan hasmltlated. Japans com· 
mitment to both ASEAN and wider Asian regionalism can be dlVlded mto SIX phases, 
with respective regional institutions/initiatives, all of which have been produced mainly 
as a result of Japan's responses to the overarching structural changes m East ASia (see 
Table 43,1). 
Based on the analytical presumptions promoted by neoclassical realism, this chapter 
pursues Japanese policy responses to the changing international structures through 
examining, especially, Japanese prime ministers' perceptions, ideas, and roles to Identify 
Japan's distinctive moves on ASEAN and wider regional institutions, Sheddmg lIght on 
a new facet of the evolution ofJapan· ASEAN relations in the context of the development 
of various regional institutions in Asia that Japan views as pivotal in the 
tion in Asia, this chapter illustrates Japan's continued efforts to reduce ASEAN s tradl' 
tional anxiety that its institutional Significance would be diminished if a larger regIOnal 
arrangement developed. 
PHASE 1: END OF THE VIETNAM WAR AND 
FUKUDA DOCTRINE 
It was not until the Kakuei Tanaka administration (1972-1974) that Japan recognized the 
Significance of ASEAN, but, ironically, Tanaka encountered massive riots in Thailand 
and Indonesia when he visited five ASEAN countries as pnme mmlster m January 1974· 
THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS 
Japan's Regional Strategy 
Fukuda Doctrine (MOFA) 
APEC 
APT 
EAS 
TPP 
FOIP 
Economic Cooperation Dialogue 
(MITI) 
Monetary Cooperation (MOF) 
Competition with China 
Encirclement of China 
Promotion of shared values 
and rules 
Anti-Japanese feeling had been exacerbated by Japan's growing economic presence in 
Southeast Asia, and by malpractice by Japanese business people. This, however, marked 
an important turning point in Japan's attitude toward ASEAN; as the then Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, Susumu Nikaido, commented, these encounters were not necessarily harmful 
to Japan in the long run, because they provided an opportunity for Japan to rethink its 
diplomatiC approaches to Southeast Asia and assisted mutual understanding (cited in 
Terada 2001, 202). Symbolically, this view became shared by key political figures, 
including Takeo Fukuda, who came into power in December 1976, and placed a much 
higher priority on foreign policy toward ASEAN. 
Fukudo's contribution to the improvement in Japan-ASEAN relations was made 
through the so-called Fukuda Doctrine, announced on August 18, 19770 in Manila, and 
assessed as "a major turning point in postwar Japan-ASEAN relations in that it prOvided 
what Japan regarded as a statement of its political interests in the Southeast Asian 
region" (Morrison 1988, 422). The second point of the doctrine-that Japan, as a true 
friend of the countries of Southeast Asia, would do its best to build a relationship of 
mutual confidence and trust based on a "heart-to-heart" understanding, not only in 
political and economic areas, but also in social and cultural areas-was especially 
significant. This was based on Fukudo's own idea that the Japan-ASEAN relationship, at 
the time confined to money and goods, should be converted to one based on "heart-to· 
heart" contact. This abstract notion of "heart-to-heart" relations was Fukudo's attempt 
to modify Japan's negative image as selfishly pursuing economic benefits, as an 
"economic animal;' and to create a friendly relationship with ASEAN countries on the 
basis of mutual understanding and confidence (Nishiyama 19770 5). Fukuda believed the 
emergence of the anti-Japanese protest movement unleashed during Tanako's 1974 visit 
could have been avoided ifJapan had attempted to cultivate mutual trust with Southeast 
Asia (Atarashi 1984, 112). According to his memoirs, Fukuda (1995) had learnt a lesson 
about how to approach ASEAN from his predecessors' failures. Fukuda became a major 
Japanese political figure who took initiatives in fostering grass-roots level exchanges 
between Japan and Southeast Asia, and he made the decision to contribute five billion 
yen to the ASEAN Cultural Fund. Fukudo's personal affinity with Southeast Asia was 
embodied in the Fukuda Doctrine. 
President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, immediately after hearing Fukudo's 
Doctrine speech, showed his respect for Fukudo's foreign policy by stating, "We have 
been waiting a long time for this kind of attitude to appear in Japan. Now, without any 
hesitation, I can say that ASEAN really has found a true friend in Prime Minister 
Fukuda" (cited in Shibusawa 1984, 105-106). Japanese prime ministers had never before 
received such tribute from Southeast Asia for their foreign policy. ASEAN's changed 
attitude to Japan was also caused by the structural changes in the region, and led to 
Fukuda's invitation to the ASEAN Summit Meeting and the announcement of the 
Fukuda Doctrine. The US military withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia at the end 
of the Vietnam War, the 1975 fall of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia, and that of 
the Thieu government in South Vietnam had heightened a sense of instability and 
insecurity among Southeast Asians. Insurgency also remained a Significant threat in all 
TAKASHI TERADA 
ASEAN countries. Members were consolidating ASEAN by encouraging economic 
development. They decided that "swift economic development [was] the only way to 
combat domestic insurgencies and perceived threats from Indochina" (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, September 2, 1977), and realized that Japan was the only nation that 
could make progress toward stability in the region. ASEAN countries began to see it "as 
a potentially greater source of political support" (Morrison 1988, 421). Senior ASEAN 
officials and ministers, including President Marcos, visited Japan at various stages before 
Fukuda's visit and expressed their desire for Japan's economic cooperation. ASEAN 
countries well understood the nature oOapan's contribution: "political support" through 
economic cooperation, unlike the military support offered by the US. Japan provided a 
loan of approximately US$1 billion to ASEAN countries for their five major industrial 
projects and multiplied its official development assistance (ODA) in the following three 
years, targeting ASEAN countries as the major recipients. 
Symbolically, the Fukuda Doctrine constituted a favorable environment for Fukuda's 
successors to launch a fresh approach to Asian regionalism. It turned out to be necessary 
that ASEAN countries would recognize Japan as a benevolent contributor to the region, 
one that did not seek reward and that conducted diplomacy on the basis of equality. 
Fukuda's pro-ASEAN diplomacy did not represent a bid for Japan's economic benefit, 
but was sincere in assisting ASEAN countries and treating them as equal partners. 
Japan's diplomatic efforts as well as its growing economic power brought about more 
favorable conditions for Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Fukuda's successor, to launch 
the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, eventually realized as the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1980. 
PHASE 11: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
AND APEC 
East Asian economies achieved rapid economic growth in the 1980s. For instance, from 
1981 to 1987, real export growth in Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, categorized as newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs) was 10.1 percent, 16-4 percent, and 13.9 percent, 
respectively (Park 1989, 126). Some ASEAN nations followed; Thailand recorded real 
economic growth of8.4 percent in 1987 and 11.0 percent in 1988, while Malaysia recorded 
7.5 percent in 1988 (MITI 1990, 45). East Asia's economic development in the 1980s was 
largely the result of export -oriented development strategies, facilitated by changes in the 
industrial structure of Japan, and it was caused mainly by the appreciation of the yen 
after the Plaza Agreement in September 1985. The appreciation of the yen was so steep 
(from 260 yen per dollar in 1985 to 140 yen by late 1989) that Japanese exporters had 
difficulty exporting labor-intensive products made in Japan. As a result, exporters 
procured more of their parts and materials from overseas suppliers, and began to 
THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS 
establish production facilities outside Japan. This contributed to the rise of Japanese 
direct investment in ASEAN, giving a strong boost to local industries that supplied mate
rials and parts. This resulted in a flow of products from such facilities into Japanese mar
kets, and Asian nations established closer economic relations with Japan through trade 
and direct investment. Japan increased its imports from NIEs and ASEAN-they rose 
from less than 14.2 percent in 1985 to almost 20 percent three years later (Terada 1999, 7). 
These changes in the structure of the regional economy provided the impetus in Japan 
for the exploration of new possibilities of economic regionalism. In other words, the 
continuing growth of ASEAN economies, which led to confidence about their 
economies and greater interdependence in the region, was a major factor that promoted 
a common regional interest, namely the establishment of APEC in 1989, as the first 
intergovernmental regional institution. Given their recent emergence from the status of 
colonies occupied by powerful imperial countries, ASEAN countries had been cautious 
about involvement in intergovernmental regional institutions that might have intruded 
on their sovereignty and included some of the former imperial powers, especially Japan, 
which had resorted to war to create a regional sphere of influence for itself. The non
aligned policy of Malaysia and Indonesia also contributed to ASEAN's negative attitude 
to intergovernmental regional economic cooperation. Japan was aware of these factors, 
and the Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI) dispatched the delegation 
to ASEAN capitals to sound out reactions for its proposal and Australian Prime Minister 
Hawke's ideas on regional economic cooperation. Importantly, the MITI mission 
functioned as a sounding board for every nation in ASEAN. During the visit, each of the 
countries had communicated its views. In turn, they were keen to know the views of 
other countries. It was MITI's task during the visit to inform the visiting country of other 
ASEAN countries' views on the idea of an intergovernmental institution. MITI's 
diplomacy was useful in creating a receptive atmosphere in the region for the idea of a 
ministerial meeting and, importantly, it set the "groundwork" for Australia's proposal 
and its subsequent diplomacy for the establishment of APEC. 
ASEAN's growing acknowledgement of the merit of economic cooperation, especially 
after they gradually increased the confidence about their economies, was another factor 
for APEC's successful launch. ASEAN's external economic relations were predominant 
with other Asia-Pacific economies. The ASEAN economies became highly interdependent 
with their main economic partners in the Pacific, especially with Japan. Interdependence 
was not necessarily nonproblematic; the region was perceived to hold some kind of a 
consultative forum in order to manage this interdependence. From ASEAN's perspective, 
economic relations and economic cooperation became matters of a priority. ASEAN's 
acceptance was, according to Jusef Wanandi (1989, 12), "a significant change from 
ASEAN's previous posture which has been one of the main obstacles in pursing previ
ous initiatives" and this change was attributable to a "gradual process of socialisation" to 
the idea of regional economic cooperation within each ASEAN nation. Japan through 
MITI eventually took an advantage of the situation to establish the first intergovern
mental economic institution in Asia and the Pacific. 
872 
TAKASHI TERADA 
PHASE Ill: AFC AND APT 
A crisis tends to create a major incentive for promoting international collaboration and 
cooperation to tackle the crisis-led problems, especially after older beliefs, regimes, and 
systems are judged inappropriate. japan demonstrated regional leadership during the 
1997 AFC at a time when the United States was described as indifferent and absent in 
alleviating the financial strains of the ASEAN nations. japan quickly mobilized its assets 
to assist the countries through the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-Ied package by 
injecting US$4 billion into Thailand, US$5 billon into Indonesia, and US$1O billion into 
South Korea, making it the largest financial contributor to the total IMF rescue package. 
It also provided short-term support for the currencies facing the most attacks, and long
term support for areas of restructuring and development of financial practices in order 
to prevent a future calamity. Because japan's actions regarding the AFC were "central, 
credible, and decisive;' japan cemented its image in Southeast Asia as a major leader for 
the East Asian region (Grimes 2003, 366). 
Yet when it came to a concrete regional institution designed to tackle financial 
problems, the United States acted to eradicate it. The Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was 
proposed in September 1997 by japan's vice minister of finance, Eisuke Sakakibara, as an 
Asian financing facility with an initial capitalization of $100 billion. The United States 
and the IMF were staunchly opposed to it, as it was perceived to erode the significance of 
the US-dominated IMF, indicating that the United States was highly sensitive to any 
subregional grouping that would exclude it. Sensitive to the view of the United States 
and the IMF, japan and other Asian countries, despite initial enthusiasm, began to heed 
the warnings from US and IMF officials. Asian leaders began to "make speeches lauding 
the importance of the IMF. It quickly became clear that there was little appetite in Asia 
for a confrontation with the United States and the IMF amidst plummeting currencies 
and stock markets" (Altbach 1997, 10), as was evidenced by Singapore, which later 
turned down the AMF plan as "not practical" (Straits Times, March 3, 2000). One reason 
it was difficult to garner support from the region is that these countries wanted the 
United States to remain committed to the region in terms of economic links and security 
concerns. Yet the AMF was to be pOSitively assessed later, as Tommy Koh, Singapore's 
former ambassador to the US and UN noted. According to Koh, "many Asian 
intellectuals appreciated the japanese proposal because they felt that it was very forward 
looking .... We have so many foreign exchange reserves. If only we were more united 
and we had a common vision and a common institution like the Europeans, we would 
be able to help each other" (cited in Terada 2003, 275). Thus, when japan attempted to 
launch the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), a network of bilateral currency swap 
agreements designed to prevent another financial crisis, based on APT, in 2000, it did 
not face any serious opposition from ASEAN. 
The multilateralization of financial cooperation in Asia was chiefly encouraged by the 
eroding international influence of the Western powers, as was made clear through the 
THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS 
Global Financial Crisis, triggered by bad mortgage-related securities and other devalued 
assets held by US financial institutions in 2008, and the subsequent European debt 
crisis. ASEAN members, most of which accumulated foreign reserves in US dollars as a 
lesson learned from their horrific experiences during the 1997 AFC, the first case which 
provided the chief motivation toward greater financial cooperation, have taken 
collective action to save troubled nations in the region. Utilizing APT to better address 
the needs of the regional financial cooperation, APT countries gradually strengthened 
the move toward the multilateralization of the CMI arrangement, putting pressures for 
reforms on US-backed rules of global governance. Importantly, this process included 
the decision to establish the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) in 
May 2011 in Singapore to provide stable financial surveillance and monitoring systems. 
This was made possible after ASEAN accepted the fundamental beliefs attached to 
japan's abortive AMF proposal. 
PHASE IV: CHINA'S CHARM 
OFFENSIVE AND EAS 
It was the AFC that also brought China and ASEAN closer; as one official close to the 
Chinese foreign minister commented, "it was around that time that China 'began 
advocating all countries involved should put aside disputes and develop the region'" 
(Asian Times, February 10, 2004). These strengthened relations with ASEAN acted as a 
foundation for China's East Asian engagement, and the closer China-ASEAN relations 
also invited japan to be more engaged in ASEAN, especially in the proliferation of 
ASEAN Plus One free trade agreements (FTAs) (Terada 2010). This process became 
a powerful force for the development of East Asian cooperation, including the institu
tionalization of ASEAN+6 framework, embodied in the EAS, and it was developed as a 
resultofJapan's reaction to China's courtship toward ASEAN diplomacy, with its "charm 
offensive" diplomacy (Kurlantzick 2007), as seen in its engagement in the signing of the 
ASEAN+l FTA and ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) ahead of any 
other regional country. In fact, the influence of China's charm and amicable diplomacy 
in ASEAN made a conspicuous difference compared to japan's regional diplomacy, 
which primarily evolved around the alliance with the United States, especially when 
Koizumi and Abe were prime ministers in 2001-2007. China's chief motive behind such 
an active ASEAN diplomacy lay in its effort to remove the threat perception toward its 
regionally expanding military and economic influence-a desecuritization of its rise 
(Goh 2007). According to Khoo (2011), the extremely high level of precaution against 
China's military rise exists as a fait accompli in East Asia as a whole, and he concludes 
that the regional countries' anxieties about how China would use its growing military 
capabilities encouraged their support for a continued US presence in the region. 
874 
TAKASHI TERADA 
The inaugural EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur in December zoos, with all thirteen 
APT members plus India, Australia, and New Zealand. A key momentum for the EAS 
came from Japan's hosting of a commemorative summit with the ten ASEAN leaders 
in December Z003, which proceeded even though some ASEAN members, such as 
Thailand, doubted the need for a commemorative summit when the same heads of 
government had gathered for the APT Leaders' Meeting in Bali a few months earlier, 
and there seemed no immediate reason for these ten national leaders to travel to Tokyo 
to meet again. The Japanese commemorative summit was symbolically Significant 
primarily because it was the first time that ASEAN leaders had gathered in their official 
capacity at a venue outside the Southeast Asian region. This summit provided strategic 
leverage for japan and a precedent for China and South Korea to organize similar special 
summits with ASEAN outside ASEAN's home turf. 
While it was japan that effectively scooped the strategic victory of hosting the first 
meeting with all ASEAN leaders outside the region, it was China that first officially 
announced its interest in hosting the first East Asian summit to be held outside 
Southeast Asia. Indeed, the site for the summit was hotly contested strategic turf. 
Malaysian prime minister Abdullah Badawi advocated for the EAS on his visits to China 
and Japan in May zo04. After Badawi's visit, China supported Malaysia's bid to host the 
inaugural EAS in Kuala Lumpur in ZOOS, an apparently qUid pro quo arrangement that 
secured Malaysia's support for China's bid to host the second summit. japan tended to 
regard Chinese engagement with ASEAN as a means for China to develop an economic 
alliance and pave the way to its leadership in the region. But this is a region where Japan 
had developed extensive economic relations over the previous thirty years in investment, 
aid, trade, human resource development, and technology transfer. japanese leaders 
increaSingly worried about a situation where China's economic rise and more active 
diplomacy in Southeast Asia might enable China to snatch from japan the leading 
position in regional economy and business, and consequently in politico-strategic 
undertakings. For instance, Toshiya Tsugami, then a senior trade official, mentioned 
that "the prospect of an ASEAN-China FTA stunned and shocked japan;' and that japan 
feared China would manipulate the FTA to "kick out japan from the East Asian 
economic and political circles" (Business Times, Aprilz, Z003). This view helped sustain 
Japan's keen interest in East Asian regionalism, particularly through ASEAN. 
Keen to check China's growing influence in East Asia and aware of the United States' 
perception of China's rise as detrimental to US interests in East Asia, they were working 
to have Australia included in the East Asian framework. japan's support for Australia's, 
as well as India's, inclusion in East Asian regionalism was to enhance the role of its 
partnerships with Australia and the US as its valued allies, with a view to countering 
China's ambition to dominate the region. Yet this move inspired China to seek exclusion 
of such extra-territorial "China balancing" members, and hence insist later that the 
ASAEN +3, rather than an EAS, should be used as a forum for discussing community
building in East Asia, with membership of the community limited to APT nations. 
China's approach contrasted clearly with that of japan, which advocated "open 
regionalism;' including Australia, India, and New Zealand, to reduce China's influence. 
THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS 
In the event, Japan's open regionalism prevailed for the inaugural EAS, partly thanks to 
India's strong claim on the use ofEAS rather than APT as a vehicle for the community
building in East Asia. Symbolically, this view was also supported by Indonesia, which 
worried about the negative consequence of the growing regional power of China on 
ASEAN's influence, and favored involving such "balancing" countries like India and 
Australia (Terada Z01O, 76-77). 
The competition between Japan and China to gain strategic ground by influencing 
key decisions on the EAS provided ASEAN with justification for taking the initiative to 
organize the EAS, on the grounds that the intenSifying rivalry between the two Northeast 
Asian big powers would harm the sound development of regional cooperation. As a 
consequence, ASEAN was able to set three conditions for participation in the first 
EAS: that the participant country should (,) be a member of the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) or be willing to become a member, (z) be a complete ASEAN 
Dialogue Partner, and (3) have substantive relations with ASEAN. Accordingly, 
Australia was compelled to sign the TAC despite its earlier rejection, given its keenness 
to join the EAS, and Russia was not offered official membership because it was seen to 
not yet meet the third condition. Overall, Japan-China competition accelerated the 
momentum toward establishment of the EAS, particularly by enabling and encouraging 
ASEAN to declare the ASEAN centrality in a wider East Asian regional framework. In 
sum, Japan has at various turns become a reactive player to China's strategic moves, 
which caused structural changes in East Asia, but japan's effort to preclude China's 
regional predominance partly through the formation of EAS served to sustain regional 
cooperation, since ASEAN was eventually more integrated toward a single player and 
Australia's and India's regional engagement was encouraged. 
PHASE V: THE UNITED STATES' ASIAN PIVOT 
STRATEGY AND TPP 
........................................................................................ 
The United States had never been interested in participating in any East Asian (as 
opposed to Asia-Pacific) regional institution until Barack Obama assumed office in 
january Z009 and subsequently declared himself'America's first Pacific president." One 
of the first steps the Obama administration took in regard to regional engagement was 
to sign ASEAN's TAC in July zo09, fulfilling the only precondition for official EAS 
participation that had not previously been met by the United States. American interest 
in the EAS was then underscored by President Obama in a speech he delivered in Tokyo 
in November zo09, in which he stated that US regional engagement with EAS would be 
implemented "more formally as it plays a role in addreSSing the challenges of our time:' 
Soon after, Obama met with Southeast Asian leaders at the inaugural US-ASEAN 
Summit, held during the 2009 Singapore APEC meeting. This involved the first 
encounter between a Myanmar leader and a US preSident in more than four decades. 
TAKASHI TERADA 
Myanmar had previously been an obstacle to the United States signing the TAC, which 
includes the principle of noninterference in the affairs of other signatories. A linchpin of 
ASEAN's political values, this principle appeared to previous administrations to restrict 
the scope of American regional policy, including the possible imposition of political 
pressure on Myanmar to promote human rights and democracy. In the end, the United 
States realized that signing TAC would not cause serious problems for its diplomacy, as 
many signatories-including such US allies as Australia and japan-have demonstrated 
(Terada 2005). Thus, Obama's decision to sign TAC and join EAS did not rule out the 
option to pressure Myanmar directly, but instead promoted high-level dialogue with 
Myanmar, symbolizing Obama's Asia Pivot strategy. 
The US became more serious about encircling China, including its engagement in 
EAS, after the survey ship USNS Impeccable was surrounded by Chinese vessels and 
required to leave the area during its routine operations in international waters in the 
South China Sea in March 2009, forcing the US to reali2e China's assertive attitude in 
the Asian ocean. Bader (2012) confessed that it was in 2010 that the US acknowledged 
China's behavior on the South China Sea as unprecedentedly different. A regional 
institution that the US chose as a way of coalition-building for American maritime 
interest was the EAS. One of the most essential consequences of US participation in 
the EAS was a transformation of institutional characteristics of the EAS from being 
process-oriented to a more result-oriented institution. Prior to Hilary Clinton's par
ticipation as secretary of state in the 2010 EAS, ASEAN had never successfully acted as 
an effective shield to protect the interests of its members in territorial disputes. 
However, the United States, playing a key role in placing the disputes on the ARF 
agenda in the same year, confronted China over the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea. Of significance was the United States' claim that both parties should pro
vide "legal evidence" to support their territorial claims. This legal-based approach to 
the territorial disputes, initially promoted by the Philippines, was something China 
had previously not paid serious attention to. At the 2011 EAS, where President Obama 
participated for the first time, furthermore, all the participating countries, except 
Myanmar and Cambodia, touched on the South China Sea disputes, implying an 
encirclement against China through dialogue was formed. The "Declaration of the 
East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations" stipulates 
the respect for international law that the US claimed. As a result, China was forced to 
consider making a legally binding "Code of Conduct in the South China Sea:' as 
demanded by ASEAN, in lieu of the nonbinding "Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea" signed in 2002. 
Yet, as ASEAN is not a concerning party itself, the transformation ofEAS did not fully 
support the US intention. For example, the "Six-Point Principles on the South China 
Sea:' agreed to in july 2012 among ASEAN members, did not lead to the resolution of the 
dispute, nor did it influence China's persistent claim of a bilateral negotiation approach. 
More significantly, the split of ASEAN solidarity was jeopardi2ed after Laos and 
Cambodia-the two ASEAN members receiving massive economic assistance from 
China-supported China's position against the inclusion of the third-party voice in this 
THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS 
877 
dispute. For instance, Cambodia, the 2012 ASEAN chair, ran the proceedings in a 
direction in accordance with the wishes of China with regard to the problems in the 
South China Sea. This provoked a reaction from the Philippines and Vietnam, which 
were opposed to China's assertions in this sea. Also, at the ASia-Europe Meeting held in 
October in 2012 in Laos, Chinese premier Wen jiabao sat beside the Laotian prime 
minister, the chairperson of the meeting. This was an anomalous case in terms of the 
ceremonial custom that ASEAN has nurtured, indicating an exceptionally friendly 
relationship both nations have established, especially through China's tactical use of its 
economic power for Laotian development. 
Following America's commitment and ASEAN's fragile position concerning the 
South China Sea, japan showed its engagement in the South China Sea issues as a state 
which also struggled with China on the maritime disputes in the East China Sea, 
including the Senkaku Islands, to work together to imposing restrictions on China's 
claims, which rely on a vague legal basis and assertiveness. japan's keener interest in the 
South China Sea was revealed when japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed to 
establish the East Asia Maritime Forum to discuss maritime security among experts, 
while the then deputy foreign minister, Tsuruoka Koji, conveyed his anxiety over China's 
aggressive maritime behavior by stating that" 'might is right' should not be justified" 
(Nikkei, October 6, 2012). China criticized these japanese approaches, especially its 
proposal for the establishment of a new maritime forum as "its own advance southward:' 
and cautioned that "japan would find it annoying if China got involved in a row between 
japan and South Korea over the issue of the Takeshima Islets and backed Seoul at 
an international meeting .. .. Parties not in the dispute should remain quiet" (Asahi 
Shimbun, November 6, 2011). ASEAN eventually became reluctant to support japan's 
proposal, which would replace the existing ASEAN Maritime Forum, due to its fear of 
losing its voice in this area, disproving japan's attempt to build a coalition with some 
ASEAN states within a multilateral forum against China over maritime disputes. 
including its own Senkaku Islets issue. Abe's 2013 proposal to create a permanent 
committee to enhance the EAS functions was not materialized, partly due to China's 
successful tactics of making some ASEAN members, like Laos and Cambodia, more 
susceptible to China's interest through offering them massive economic assistance. 
japan's and the United States' direct concern stemming from China's aggressive 
economic and strategic moves in the region led to the TPP. Abo's special interest in the 
TPP was encapsulated in a statement in March 2013, in which he stressed that the 
potential benefit of participating in the TPP was not limited to the economy. While 
underscoring the significance of creating an economic 20ne with new economic rules by 
forging a partnership with its key ally, the United States, Abe highlighted the universal 
values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule oflaw as a political foundation 
for the economic rule-making approach (Abe 2013). Abo's statement implies that TPP 
members will take collective action not just economically but also politically against 
countries that do not share those values, especially China-an approach that may 
subsequently evolve into political and security cooperation based on that shared stance. 
This view represented a consistent approach in his highly ideologically colored foreign 
880 
TAKASHITERADA 
consultations in june 2018 they additionally shared "support for a free, open, and 
inclusive Indo-Pacific region;' advocated ''ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region, 
and reaffirmed that ASEAN -led mechanisms ... play an indispensable role in the region" 
(MOFA 2018). Indian prime minister Narendra Modi's speech on the Indo-Pacific 
at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue marked a watershed moment. Modi highlighted 
"inclusiveness, openness, and ASEAN centrality and unity" as the heart of the Indo
Pacific, adding that "India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club 
of limited members" (MEA 2018). This stance was followed by then-US defense secre
tary james Mattis's statement that with "deepening alliances and partnerships as a prior
ity, ASEAN's centrality remains vital, and cooperation with China is welcome wherever 
possible;' and that "we do not ask any country to choose between the United States 
and China" (000 2018). While the US hardened its stance on China, with the Trwnp 
administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2017 and National Defense Strategy 
(NOS) in 2018, and by repeatedly referring to China's revisionist activities, Mattis's 
remarks became a countervailing account, reframing the FOIP as more than a "China 
only" matter, since a "containment of China" strategy was not likely to gather support 
from ASEAN members (Tan 2020). 
Given that these softer views on FOIP were expressed by Indian and US leaders, then
japanese foreign minister Taro Kono followed suit, saying that ASEAN was equally at 
the heart ofjapan's FOIP vision (Strait Times, july 27,2018). japan finally chose to soften 
the image and stance of the FOIP in October 2018, in preparation for Abe's first visit to 
Beijing for the bilateral summit, by appending "vision" to the Indo-Pacific in lieu of 
"strategy;' the term Prime Minister Abe had initially used to promote the global values 
when announcing this approach in 2016. japan also accepted ASEAN's concern that 
the term "strategy" was meant to contain China in the belief that China's expanding 
maritime ambitions and influence on infrastructure development should be curbed by 
some sort of containment strategy (Nikkei Asia Review, November '3, 2018). Even 
though the policy ingredients that FOIP was supposed to promote remained unclear 
initially, key agendas such as freedom of navigation and overflight, connectivity through 
quality infrastructure development, and the rule of laws enhanced by maritime law 
enforcement capacity-building came to be included as a result of collaboration with 
ASEAN members. In return, ASEAN learned to hail japan's focus on implementing 
"high-quality infrastructure" as the core component ofits FOIP strategy, which was also 
launched as a competing concept toward China's BRI (Strait Times, November 15,2018). 
While the other ASEAN members had not been unenthusiastic about the Indo
Pacific construct, Indonesia took an initiative in defining the role of ASEAN in the FOIP 
discourse (Anwar 2020). Indonesian foreign minister Marsudi initiated a "high-level 
dialogue on Indo-Pacific cooperation" in jakarta in March 2019 by inviting foreign 
ministers and senior officials from the eighteen members of EAS and by laying out the 
Indonesian proposal on the Indo-Pacific concept, which was formalized in the ASEAN 
Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. This document includes four key components: (1) a 
perspective on the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, not as contiguous territorial 
spaces but as a closely integrated and interconnected region, in which ASEAN plays 
THE EVOLUTION OF jAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS 
881 
a central and strategic role; (2) the identification of this Indo-Pacific region as a relation
ship of dialogue and cooperation rather than rivalry; (3) development and prosperity 
for all; and (4) a recognition of the importance of the maritime domain and perspective 
in the evolving regional architecture (ASEAN 2019). At the 14th EAS in Bangkok in 
November 2019, Abe welcomed the announcement of ASEAN's version of FOIP, seek
ing to cooperate with ASEAN toward materializing their version by achieving synergies 
with his FOIP concept in areas such as strengthening maritime security based on the 
rule of law, enhancing connectivity through quality infrastructure, and sustainably 
using marine resources, for instance by combatting illegal fishing (MOFA 2019b). 
japanese foreign minister Motegi continued this trend by stressing the importance of 
connecting both concepts more strongly, announcing japan's readiness to inject US$3 
billion in 2020-2022, including US$1.2 billion in overseas loans and investments for 
ASEAN (MOFA 2019a). This aid initiative aims to meet the Significant demand for 
infrastructure development in the ASEAN region, while at the same time redreSSing 
economic inequality and realizing stable development. In this way, japan has not only 
tactically incorporated ASEAN into the FOIP vision by seeking synergy with ASEAN's 
version of FOIP, but it has also managed to use its capital investment into the region to 
reduce the competitive aspect with China's BRI. Given that, according to a survey 
conducted by the ISEAS (2020), 63.6 percent of ASEAN recipients have no or little 
confidence in the BRI, there remained ample space for japan to be acknowledged by 
ASEAN as a stable aid provider with qualitative rather than quantitative competence, 
thanks to its steadfast tendency to comply with international development rules. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a fresh interpretation of japan's patterned approach to ASEAN 
over the past forty years, examining it in the context of japan's interest in leading wider 
concepts of regional institutions in Asia. It analyzes japan's policy direction and diplo
matic efforts to maintain good relations with ASEAN as a key precondition for its 
commitment to establishing six different regional initiatives or institutions beyond 
Southeast Asia. Following a neoclassical realism claim, this chapter illustrates interna
tional/regional structural changes consistently serving as a source of a key motive 
behind japan's interest in wider regional initiatives: the end of the Vietnam War for 
ASEAN, the Plaza Accord and regional economic interdependence for APEC, the 
AFC for APT, China's charm offensive for EAS, China's hegemonic rise for TPP, and 
japan-China competition over economic rules for FOIP. japan acknowledged the unity 
and integration of ASEAN as a prerequisite for these wider regional institutions, making 
it a significant task to ease ASEAN's concern about its possible marginalization within 
Asia a politics and economics. 
Another key analytical component of neoclassical realism is the domestic political 
relevance, and this chapter's analytical focus on prime ministers' statements and roles 
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helps to identify their foreign policy predispositions,. showing Takeo Fukuda, junichiro 
Koizumi, and Shinz6 Abe as commonly pursing their specIal Interest m strengthemng 
relations with ASEAN. The chapter examines the policy approaches to ASEAN taken by 
other prime ministers, such as Ryutaro Hashimoto, Keizo Obuchi, and Yasuo Fukuda 
eTakeds son), since they placed a higher priority on China in their foreIgn polIcy and 
had little interest in Asian regionalism. Symbolically, Fukuda, KOIzuml, and Abe 
belonged to the same political faction within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and 
commonly highlighted the importance of shared values such as democracy m their 
foreign policy. In other words, some ofjapan's initiatives in wider regional arrangements, 
such as EAS by Koizumi and the TPP and later FOIP by Abe, can be viewed as partly 
promoting democracy in Asia, and they regarded ASEAN as a useful 
in this 
aim. Yet japan's dilemma lies in some ASEAN members remammg 
as Cambodia with its controversial electoral system restricting opposItIOn partIes 
activities, and they become susceptible to China's courtship with massive development 
aid. It can be conduded that japan's commitInent to wider regional institutions has been 
partly designed to assist ASEAN's possible acceptance of shared values such as 
democracy and market-economy system. japan's ASEAN engagement endures as far as 
the struggle for Asian democracy exists.