based on the following chapter, write some discussion questions to ask in class. Refer to the test when writing questions:

JAPAN-RUSSIA 
RELATIONS 
ALEXANDER BUKH 
ONE of the most influential works on the history ofJapan-USSR/Russia relations refers 
to the two countries as "distant neighbors" (Kimura 2000). Kimura's book was published 
two decades ago, but the term he uses to describe the state of bilateral relations during 
the late Soviet and the early post-Cold War period is applicable not only to most of the 
twentieth century, but also to the current state of relations between Japan and Russia. 
Geographically, Russia is Japan's closest neighbor. Even if one ignores the disputed 
islands, the closest of which is located only two miles from Cape Nosappu, the distance 
between Sakhalin's Cape Crillon and Hokkaido's Cape Soya is a mere twenty-eight 
miles. Thus, even the possibility of connecting the two islands by a rail bridge has being 
discussed by policymakers on several occasions (Sharkov 2018). 
This geographical proximity, however, is not reflected in the political, economic, and 
other sets of relations between the two neighbors. Despite the end of the Cold War and 
the various important transformations in both the global and the regional structures of 
power, Japan and Russia have yet to conclude a peace treaty that would end the abnor
mal state of relations that has existed between them since the end of World War 
n. Economically, the trade volume between Japan and Russia has experienced an 
impressive growth in the twenty-first century and reached the all-time high OfUS$34.8 
billion in 2013. Even during this period however, Russia was ranked at only 14th place 
among Japan's trading partners, below such geographically remote or significantly 
smaller countries such as Australia, Taiwan, and Germany (Okada 2014, 137). Similar 
trends can be observed in the movement of people between the two countries. While the 
number of visitors in both directions shows an impressive increase when compared to 
the '990S, the number of Russian visitors to Japan in the year 2018, for example, stood at 
roughly 95,000, significantly less than from all other Japan's neighbors, most of ASEAN 
countries, and geographically distant countries such as France, Canada, and Australia 
ONTO 2019a). The number of Japanese tourists recorded in Russia also continued to 
grow. In 2017 it increased by 20 percent from the previous year and stood at 102,000, but 
920 
ALEXANDER BUKH 
this number is comparable to the number of Japanese tourists to many other Eastern 
European countries ONTO 2019b) and does not reflect the geographical proximity 
between japan and Russia. 
Each of these trends has its unique factors and causes, and the bilateral relations can 
be examined from various angles while applying a wide range of theoretical and meth
odological approaches. This chapter, however, will focus mostly on the territorial dis
pute over the "Northern Territories" (known as Southern Kuriles in Russia)-the four 
islands occupied by the Soviet Union in the waning days of the Asia-Pacific War, today 
administered by Russia and claimed by japan. The focus on the territorial dispute is not 
simply due to the lack of space. Nor do I intend to imply that tile territorial dispute alone 
accounts for the relative "distance" between the two countries in other sets of bilateral 
relations. The main reason for devoting most of this chapter to the Northern Territories 
is the central theme of this volume, which is "evaluating japan's democracy:' 
A political system's responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens is one of the 
central themes in both the theory and the practice of democracy (Hobolt and 
Klemmemsen 2005). In tile scholarship on the role of public opinion in japan's foreign 
policy, the "elitist" model that views the public opinion as being molded by the policy
makers rather than influencing it, has prevailed (Midford 2011, 12). Interaction between 
public opinion and elites in foreign policymaking, however, is a rather complex process 
that defies generalization and cannot be reduced to either the 
model or the 
"top-down" one (Risse-Kappen 1991). Thus, rather than testing one theory or another, in 
this chapter I focus on japan's policy related to the Northern Territories dispute as a case 
study aimed at exploring inductively the relationship between public preferences and 
policy choices. 
With this in mind, this chapter will proceed as follows: The remaining part of this sec
tion will provide a brief overview of the history of the territorial dispute and related 
negotiations between japan and the USSR/Russia. The following section will explore the 
dynamiCS in the Japanese public opinion related to the dispute, the factors that shaped it, 
and its relationship with state policy, both domestic and toward tile USSR/Russia. The 
third section will examine the role of tile dispute in other areas of bilateral relations. In 
the concluding section, I summarize the arguments made in this chapter and offer some 
observations regarding the factors tIlat explain the relationship between public opinion 
and policymaking in the case of the Northern Territories dispute. 
During the roughly nine decades that passed between Commodore Perry's "opening" 
of japan and Emperor Hirohito's August 15, 1945, speech that announced Imperial 
japan's surrender, japan and Russia/USSR fought one major war (1904-1905) dubbed by 
some as "World War Zerd' (Wolff and Steinberg 2005) and engaged in a series of mili
tary clashes (1938-1939) during the Second Sino-Japanese War. japan and Russia were 
also in a short-lived alliance during World War I (Berton 2011), interrupted by the 
Bolshevik Revolution and followed by japan's intervention in the Russian Civil War, 
as the "Siberian Intervention" (1918-1922). japan and Russia also concluded 
three treaties (1855, 1875, and 1905) that first delimitated and then shifted the border 
between the two countries. None of these treaties placed the currently disputed territory 
JAPAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
921 
under Russia's jurisdiction. It is important to remember, however, that prior to 1868 the 
disputed islands did not constitute part of historical japan either. For centuries, they 
were part oflands inhibited by the Ainu, along with what today is known as Hokkaido 
and Sakhalin. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the islands, along with 
Hokkaido, were incorporated into japan proper as part of modernizing japan's north
ward expansion, and over the following decades were subjected to centrally organized 
colonization and "pioneering:' The process of colonization and its disastrous effects on 
the indigenous population has been outlined in detail is excellent works by scholars 
such as Emori Susumu (1987) Richard Siddle (1996) and Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1998 
and 2000). By 1945, however, the population of tile disputed islands consisted mainly of 
Japanese who migrated there from other parts of japan and stood at roughly 17,000 
(Kuroiwa 2006), almost identical to today's Russian population there. 
The Soviet Union joined the war in the Pacific on August 9, 1945, when it unilaterally 
abolished the USSR-japan Neutrality Pact and declared war on japan. From mid-August 
through early September, Soviet troops occupied the southern part of Sakhalin/ 
Karafuto, tile Kurile Islands/Chishima, including its southernmost islands of Kunashiri 
and Etorofu, and tile islands ofShikotan and Habomai (actually a group of small islets 
but considered as one island for the purpose of simplicity), located close to Hokkaido. 
Many Japanese residents escaped to japan proper during or in the immediate aftermath 
of tile Soviet occupation. The remaining population was expelled, and by February 1946, 
the occupied territories had been incorporated into the Sakhalin Oblast region. 
As already noted, none of the territory that came under Soviet control was seized by 
japan during the Asia-Pacific War. However, at the February 1945 Yalta Summit of 
joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, it was agreed that the 
Soviet Union would get the rights to Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles (without speci
fying the exact scope of the Kurile chain) in exchange for the Red Army participation in 
the war against japan. Six years later, on September 8, 1951, japan signed the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty (the Peace Treaty with japan). The Soviet Union was not a party 
to this treaty, but nevertlleless, according to Article 2C of the Treaty, japan renounced all 
rights and claims to Southern Sakhalin and tile Kurile Islands. Similarly to the Yalta 
agreement, however, the treaty did not specify the geographical scope of the Kurile 
Islands. Hara (2006) convincingly traces this ambiguity in the treaty that was supposed 
to delimitate postwar japan's borders to the Cold War policy of the United States, the 
main occupying power in japan and the chief architect ofthe settlement. 
The territorial dispute crystalized and took on its present shape during the 1955-1956 
japan-USSR normalization talks. After San Francisco, the government ofJapan gener
ally saw all of the Kuriles as being lost, and when the normalization talks started in June 
1955, it was hoping for the return of only the Habomai and Shikotan, which were histori
cally considered part ofHokkaido. However, during the talks, japan's position suddenly 
changed to a demand to include also tile Southern Kurile Islands of Kunashiri and 
Etorofu. Secret instructions to the negotiators explicitly stated the return of the two 
islands as a precondition to a peace settlement but implied flexibility on the return of 
other territories seized by the Soviet Union, including tile two larger islands ofKunashiri 
922 ALEXANDER BUKH 
and Etorofu (Tanaka '990, 165-68). The domestic political process that led to the sudden 
change in Japan's position, and the emergence of the "four islands" demand during the 
negotiations, is thoroughly examined in Hellmann's (1969) classic work. Hellmann and 
others (e.g., Hara 1998; Hasegawa 1998) trace the emergence of the demand for the four 
islands to the intra-conservative rivalry and the anti-Soviet sentiments of the right
leaning faction of the conservatives, who were not enthusiastic about the reestablish
ment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The demand for four islands was 
rejected by the Soviet side and the negotiations resulted in the Joint Declaration of 1956, 
which formally ended the state of war between USSR and Japan, re-established diplo
matic relations, and included a promise to transfer the two small islands to Japan after 
the conclusion of a formal peace treaty, but did not demarcate the border between the 
two countries. 
In the aftermath of the '955-'956 negotiations, the central government paid little 
attention to the territorial dispute. From the late 1960s, however, it embarked on an 
extensive domestic campaign aimed at firmly entrenching the idea of the "Northern 
Territories" in the public discourse (Iwashita 2005). At the same time, the demand for 
the return of the four islands became the focus ofJapan's USSR-related policy. 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union did not result in a drastic 
change in Japan's policy related to the Northern Territories. The domestic campaign per
sisted, and Japan continued to demand the return of all the four islands. Contrastingly, 
Russia's position underwent an important transformation. From the 1960s onward, the 
Soviet Union denied the existence of a territorial dispute between the two countries. 
This position was reversed during the April 1991 visit to Tokyo ofthe USSR's first and last 
president, Mikhail Gorbachev, when he accepted the four islands as objects of future 
negotiations. A more radical change followed the next year, this time coming from 
newly independent Russia. A secret proposal brought by Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
envisaged the conclusion of a peace treaty, accompanied by the transfer of the two 
islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan in accordance with the 1956 Declaration. It 
also included plans for continued negotiations regarding the status of the remaining two 
islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu (Hasegawa 1995). However, despite this groundbreak
ing shift in Russia's position, the Japanese side failed to respond to this initiative and 
momentum for the resolution of the dispute was lost as bilateral relations started to cool 
in the latter half of 1992. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990S and early 2000S, the two 
sides conducted numerous negotiaiions aimed at resolving the territorial dispute. In 
1997 the strong personal bond that gradually developed between Prime Minister 
Hashimoto of Japan and President Yeltsin of Russia facilitated the drafting of an opti
mistic declaration that stated both parties' intention to solve the territorial dispute and 
conclude a bilateral peace treaty by the year 2000. During the Kawana summit the fol
lowing year, Hashimoto presented Yeltsin with a detailed proposal that suggested 
approaching the territorial problem and the conclusion of a peace treaty not as a dispute 
but rather as a border delineation issue and envisaged a separate bilateral agreement to 
determine the actual timing and the modalities of the transfer of the islands (Sat6 and 
Komaki 2003, 172-197). This proposal was rejected by Russia, however, and the idea of 
JAPAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS 923 
resolving the dispute by 2000 vanished into oblivion. From early2000s onward, follOwing 
a series of scandals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that paralyzed Japan's 
Russia policy, the negotiations on the status of the islands and toward the conclusion of a 
peace treaty entered a "dormant season:' Japan's position relapsed to that of the Cold 
War era-the simple demand for the return of the four islands (Iwashita 2005, 10-14). 
Japan's stance on the territorial dispute started to change only in the second half of 
2010S, under Shinz6 Abe's second premiership. Abe brought a drastic change to Japan's 
Russia-related policy by sidelining MOFA and concentrating the polic)imaking process 
in the Prime Minister's Office (Iwashita 2019). From the early days of his term in office, 
Abe prioritized the resolution of the Northern Territories dispute and put a consider
able effort into establishing good personal relations with Russia's President Putin. As of 
June 2019, the two leaders met twenty-six times, an unprecedentedly high number. In 
2016, two months before the Nagato summit, the Japanese media reported that the gov
ernment was considering a settlement of the territorial dispute involving a transfer of 
the two small islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan, and a joint administration of 
the other two (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2016). The Nagato summit, however, did not result 
in any concrete agreements, and the leaders did not even issue a joint statement. The 
negotiations continued, though, and in November 2018 Abe and Putin agreed to facili
tate the conclusion of a peace treaty based on the 1956 Japan-USSR Joint Statement. This 
announcement resulted in widespread speculations in the media that Prime Minister 
Abe was now seeking the return of the two small islands and a face-saving arrangement 
regarding the remaining two islands (Sat6 2018). Nevertheless, as of August 2019, the 
two leaders had still not come up with a concrete plan for resolving the dispute and sign
ing a peace treaty. While the details of the negotiations have not been made public, it 
seems that this time the impasse is due to Putin's reluctance to transfer even the two 
islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan (Yoshida 2019). President Putin's reluctance 
to take such steps can be attributed to a variety of factors, including the concern about 
US bases moving closer to Russia's shores, and the fear that any kind of a territorial com
promise may undermine his carefully cultivated image of the collector of Russian lands, 
leading to a further decline in domestic support ratings. Regardless of the factors that 
obstruct the progress of negotiations, it seems that Abe's drive to resolve the territorial 
dispute has resulted in a fiasco (Iwashita 2019). 
PUBLIC PREFERENCES AND JAPAN'S 
"NORTHERN TERRITORIES" POLICY 
Before proceeding further to examine the relationship between public preferences and 
policy, it is important to note that "public" is not a unitary actor and comprises various 
groups with different degree ofinterest in politics in general, and in the issue in question 
more speCifically. Following Risse-Kappen (1991), I distinguish here between three 
924 
ALEXANDER BUKH 
groups: mass public opinion; the attentive public with a general interest in the dispute; 
and the issue public, comprising those groups and individual citizens who are directly 
affected by the territorial dispute. 
During the first two postwar decades, both the mass public opinion and the attentive 
public in Japan have shown little interestin the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. 
For example, in 1954, the journal Soren Kenkyit (Soviet Studies) conducted a poll among 
scholars, analysts, Diet members, and bureaucrats titled "What Should Be Japan's 
Demands from the Kremlin?" Less than 20 percent of the respondents included the 
return of the disputed territory in their list of demands, with the scope of the territory 
varying from one resporident to another (Soren Kenkyit 1954, 2-16). This shows that the 
understanding of the territorial issue and the actual scope of the territory to be 
demanded back was rather vague even among those Japanese with expertise and a par
ticular interest in bilateral reiations. In terms of the mass public opinion, even on the eve 
of the first round of bilateral negotiations in 1955, over 50 percent of the respondents in a 
related opinion poll stated that Japan should have no special demands vis-it-vis the 
Soviet Union when negotiating the terms of a peace treaty. Few months later, in 
November 1955, 40 percent of the respondents had no opinion when confronted with 
the question as to whether Japan should demand the return of all the four islands or 
compromise on only two (Asahi Shimbun polls cited in Mendel [1961]1971, 203-209). 
This general lack of interest persisted well into the 1960s. For example, in a public opin
ion poll on current affairs conducted by the central government in 1969, only 4.7 percent 
of those polled mentioned the territorial dispute among the issues in which they were 
interested (Cabinet Office 1969). Even on Hokkaido, the general public showed little 
interest in the islands. Results of a poll conducted there in 1966 show that 55 percent of 
the polled did not have any knowledge regarding the historical justifications for Japan's 
possession of the Northern Territories. Among the variety of current international 
issues, only 9 percent stated that they were interested in the Northern Territories, as 
opposed to 44 percent that expressed their interest in the Vietnam War. Moreover, when 
asked about the issue they were more interested in-the reversion of Okinawa or the 
Northern Territories-more respondents chose the former over the latter (Hopp6ry6do 
Fukki KiseiD6mei 1966, 2-12). 
This lack of interest in the territory seized by the Soviet Union among both the gen
eral and the attentive publics is not surprising and can be attributed to the relatively 
small size ofthe territory, its limited· resources, and the overall dire economic conditions 
in postwar Japan that forced the people to focus on issues with direct relevance to their 
livelihoods. There was one exception to this apathy, however; namely, the reversion 
movement that formed on Hokkaido in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet occupa
tion, which epitomized the issue public directly affected by the territorial dispute. 
The reversion movement consisted mostly of those individuals and groups with 
vested interests in the occupied islands, such as the former residents of the islands and· 
the residents of the Nemuro area in Eastern Hokkaido, which, prior to the Soviet 
occupation, had deep economic connections with the islands. Groups that formed the 
early reversion movement were scattered across Hokkaido and varied greatly in size, 
JAPAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
'I 
925 
membership, and the scope of their demands. For the purposes of this chapter, two 
are particularly worthy of mentioning. One is the Nemuro-based Commission for 
Entreating the Return of Islands Attached to Hokkaido (hereafter the Commission), 
which became the most noted organization in the reversion movement. The Commission, 
founded in December1945 by Nemuro's mayor, Ishisuke And6, was one of the first orga
nizations in the movement, and no doubt one of the most vocal ones. Moreover, the 
Commission had a relatively large membership. While many other groups had only a 
handful of members, in 1951 the occupation authorities estimated the Commission's 
total membership at nine hundred (SCAP 1951). 
The demands of the Commission, comprising Nemuro residents and former residents 
of the islands, were driven by the economic interests of its members. Its first petition, 
submitted to the Occupation Authorities and various Japanese ministries in August 
1946, requested the placement of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai under the 
"protective occupation" of the United States (Nemuro City 1997,2-5). For Nemuro, the 
two South Kurile Islands along with Shikotan and Habomai played a vital role in its 
fisheries-centered economy (Kuroiwa 2006,248). Hence, the scope of the territory that 
became the object of the Commission's activism was limited to these four islands. 
Subsequent petitions and resolutions adopted at citizens' rallies organized by the 
Commission, and addressed both to the Occupation Authorities and the Japanese gov
ernment, continued to demand the return of the four islands to Japan. While the 
Commission used a variety of arguments to justify its demands, ranging from historical 
excursions to nationalist and occasionally internationalist frames, the main factor that 
instigated it actions was economic. The main parts of the petitions, as well as the debates 
within the Commission, show that the return of the islands was seen as a matter of vital 
economic importance for the Nemuro region (e.g., Nemuro City 1997, 64-65). 
Another organization named Nemuro Area Peace Preservation and Revival Alliance 
(hereafter the Alliance) was formed in 1953 as a challenger to the Commission's claims of 
representing the interests of Nemuro residents. The Alliance was led by Mamoru 
Togashi, who, like And6, was a Nemuro local and held various administrative positions 
in the local fishermen's cooperative. However, he was more of a union activist rather 
than a member of the prewar elite. Togashi was identified with the Left, and in 1955 he 
was elected to the Nemuro City Assembly on a "reformist" platform. Unlike the 
Commission, the focal point for the Alliance was not the occupied territory per se, but 
rather the economic revival of the border zone around Nemuro. Togashi and the 
Alliance saw trade relations with China and a fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union 
as key to resolving the Nemuro economic predicament. Accordingly, the activities of the 
Alliance focused mostly on lobbying Diet members from Hokkaido to support normal
ization negotiations with the two countries and the conclusion of a provisional agree
ment with the Soviet Union that would enable local fishermen to fish in the waters 
surrounding the islands (Honda 2011, 79-80). In 1954 the Alliance had 2,200 members 
(Matsuura at NDL Fisheries' Committee, House of Councillors, April 1, 1954) and was 
almost four times bigger than the Commission. Rallies organized by the Alliance in 
Nemuro were attended by Diet members and high-ranking officials from the Japan-USSR 
926 ALEXANDER BUKH 
Friendship Association and drew up to a thousand participants (Nemuro Shim bun 1955). 
The declarations adopted at these rallies demanded that the central government establish 
diplomatic relations with the USSR and China, and, while working on a peaceful resolution 
of the territorial dispute, conclude an interim fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union 
(Hokkaido Prefecture 1955,64-65). 
Both the Commission and the Alliance stopped their activism in 1955 on the eve of 
bilateral negotiations (for a detailed discussion, see Bukh 2020). Nevertheless, the com
promising position advocated by the Alliance gained dominance in Nemuro (Nemuro 
City Assembly 1956) and was also voiced by various media outlets and local politicians 
on Hokkaido (Sekai 1956,207; Kuwabara 1962). 
To summarize, during the first two postwar decades, both the mass and the attentive 
public opinion paid little attention to the territorial dispute with the USSR. In contrast, 
the issue public concentrated in Nemuro was divided in its position between the harsh 
stance advocated by the Commission and the more compromising one that emphasized 
the importance of a fisheries agreement advocated by the Alliance. Now, let us turn to 
examine Tokyo's policy related to the territorial dispute. Arguably, the demands voiced 
by the issue public had little if any effect on it. During the occupation period, japan's offi
cial position regarding the Soviet-occupied territories was shaped mostly by its relations 
with the United States. In his speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference, Prime 
Minister Yoshida did state that japan came into possession of the Kuriles and Southern 
Sakhalin through peaceful means, and that its ownership over the South Kurile Islands 
ofEtorofu and Kunashiri had not been questioned by Russia since 1855. He also stated 
that Habomai and Shikotan were part of Hokkaido. There is no evidence, however, to 
suggest that this statement was in one way or another influenced by the reversion move
ment and was not a result of previous discussions at MOFA. 
The "four islands" demand on which japan's position changed during the 1955 negoti
ations corresponded to the scope of territory that was the object of the Commission's 
activism. For that reason, today Ando is referred to as the "father" of the reversion 
movement and is often mentioned in governmental and other publications related to 
the Northern Territories. The overlap in territorial demands, however, is more of a con
tingency than evidence of the Commission's influence. As already noted in the 
Introduction, the change in the scope of the territory was an attempt to torpedo the 
negotiations by the prudent faction inside the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
and their supporters in MOFA (Hellmann 1969; Hasegawa 1998). 
We should note, however, that the government did not simply ignore the plight of 
Nemuro fishermen who lost access to fishing grounds around the disputed islands and 
suffered from detentions and boat seizures by Soviet border guards (Matsuyama 1962). 
From the early 1950sonward, the government passed several laws aimed at providing 
financial assistance to detained fishermen and their families. In 1961 the government 
established a semi-governmental agency called the Northern Areas Association to 
administer the distribution of low-interest loans to owners of the "former fishing 
rights" -pre-1945 exclusive fishing rights in waters adjacent to the disputed islands. The 
government also encouraged the fishermen to purchase "seizure" insurance and started 
JAPAN -RUSSIA RELATIONS 927 
to provide "condolence money" payments, along with Hokkaido Prefecture, to the 
families of detained fishermen (Hokkaido Prefecture 1968, 1-8). 
In 1963 the government concluded the Kaigara Island Kelp Agreement, which finally 
enabled the collection of kelp on Kaigara, one of the SOviet-occupied Habomai islets, in 
exchange for a certain fee. The agreement was concluded after years of active lobbying 
by the chairman of the japan Fisheries Association, Tatsunosuke Takasaki, and against 
initial strong resistance from MOFA. The agreement was designed as a nongovernmen
tal arrangement between the japan Fisheries Association and the Soviet Council of 
National Economy in order to avoid undermining japan's territorial claims, as feared by 
MOFA. The conclusion of the agreement had a significant positive impact on the lives of 
Nemuro's residents, bringing an average gross annual income of 130 million yen from 
kelp alone in the mid-1970S (Ita 1974, 108; Honda 2006, 67-72). Incidentally, a similar 
agreement on fisheries, initially envisioned and advocated by the Alliance in the early 
1950s, was concluded only decades later, in 1998. It is a complex legal arrangement 
designed to enable japanese fishing activities near the disputed islands in return for a 
fee, while not undermining japan's territorial claims. As with the kelp agreement, its 
conclusion was made possible mainly due to efforts of one powerful individual. This 
time it was Muneo Suzuki, a member of the Diet from Eastern Hokkaido and at that 
time one of the LDP heavyweights, who managed to override the generally negative 
stance of MO FA and push through with such an arrangement (Honda 2006, 121-29). 
To summarize, during the first two postwar decades, while adopting certain measures 
aimed at alleviating the plight of those directly affected by the dispute, the government 
paid little attention to the issue public represented by the reversion movement and its 
demands. From late 1960s, however, Tokyo's Northern Territories-related policy experi
enced a dramatic change. In 1969 the government established the Association for 
Countermeasures Related to the Northern Territories (hereafter the Association), a new 
quasi-governmental agency in charge of the domestic activities related to the Northern 
Territories that absorbed the Northern Areas Association. The Association continued to 
distribute low-interest loans but also embarked on an extensive public educational cam
paign related to the dispute. In 1972 the Headquarters for Countermeasures Related to 
Northern Territories was established within the Cabinet Office. The creation of these 
two organizations symbolized the formal institutionalization of the idea of the 
"Northern Territories" on the governmental level as an instance of injustice inflicted 
upon the nation (Iwashita 2005, 204). The government further enhanced its Northern 
Territories-related domestic policy in the late 1970S, when the so-called thaw in rela
tions between the USSR and the Western bloc ended and the Cold War entered its sec
ond and final stage. In 1978, for the first time, MOFA published its Our Northern 
Territories booklet, which provided detailed explanations of the illegality of the Soviet 
occupation ofJapan's "inherent territory" and the latter's rights to the four islands. In the 
late 1970S to earlyI980s, the government also built several Northern Territories-related 
facilities, including the hundred-million-yen observatory-cum-museum on Hokkaido's 
Cape Nosappu, and in 1981 the Diet enacted a national Northern Territories Day. In 1980 
the government also initiated an extensive program of economic assistance to those 
11 
928 ALEXANDER BUKH 
affected by the dispute, when Prime Minister Zenko Snzuki declared that assistance to 
the Nemuro area was a "critical issue" for the government (Shibukawa 2004, 5). Two 
years later, the government passed the Law on Special Measures to Promote the Solution 
of the Northern Territories Problem. This law stipulated measures for supporting 
former residents and their descendants. Under this law, the government established a 
fund of one billion yen, which was to be used to assist areas adjacent to the disputed ter
ritories, including Nemuro and other nearby towns, in developing infrastructure, agri
culture, fisheries, and medical care (E-Gov 2016). 
While some of the measures in this extensive campaign can be attributed to the eco
nomic plight of Nemuro residents, its main rationale was based on domestic political 
calculations. An American diplomat reported that, based on private conversations with 
officials from MOFA and other governmental bodies, the actual reason for the creation 
of the Association was to be found in domestic politics and the japan-US negotiations 
regarding the reversion of Okinawa. Specifically, through activities of the Association, 
the ruling LDP was hoping to sway public support away from the Socialist Party, which 
opposed the reversion of Okinawa with American bases (David L. Osborn, cited in 
Ikeda 2003, 42-43). The government-led campaign to "enlighten' the public quicklydif
fused throughout the country, and numerous members of the attentive public took an 
active part in it. Countless books, pamphlets, and articles by government-affiliated 
organizations and sympathetic scholars were published, drawing public attention to the 
historical injustice inflicted on japan by the Soviet Union (e.g., Yoshida 1978; 
Kimura 1981). Newspapers, magazines, and even department stores quickly became 
mouthpieces of the reversion cause, featuring and depicting the miseries of the former 
residents (Stephan 1974). The economic rationale of the original reversion movement, 
however, disappeared from the narrative, and nationwide awareness of the loss of 
"inherent territory" became an end in itself(for a detailed discussion, see Bukl12012). 
It is hard to evaluate the change in the mass public preferences such a massive cam
paign has brought. Public opinion polls conducted by the government show that aware
ness of the dispute has risen significantly. At the same time, the structure ofthe questions 
in these polls did not allow the respondents to express their views regarding the impor
tance of the return of all of the four islands or other, more compromising scenarios (see, 
for example, Cabinet Office 1969). Nevertheless, it can be plaUSibly argued that the idea 
of"inherentterritory" and the injustice inflicted upon the nation as a result of its loss got 
firmly entrenched in japan's public discourse on the country's relations with the Soviet 
Union. In contrast, the issue public, comprising those directly affected by the dispute, 
adopted a pragmatic approach that received little attention from the policymakers. For 
example, a poll conducted on Hokkaido in 1974-1975 among former residents of the dis
puted islands showed that less than half of the original residents and their direct descen
dants were interested in relocating back to the islands, if they were returned to japan. 
Furthermore, among those who stated that they would return, it was not the longing for 
a lost homeland but more pragmatic reasons, such as property rights and the possibility 
to engage in fishing, that prevailed in the explanations for their choice (Gyosei Shiryo 
ChOsakai 1977, 16). The pragmatic approach to the territorial dispute continued to enjoy 
JAPAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS 929 
conSiderably broad support in Nemuro in the post-Cold War years as well, especially 
among those directly affected by the dispute and the younger generation (Iwashita 2006). 
The end of the Cold War, the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, and the important political 
transformations, both domestic and in the Asia-Pacific region, brought no significant 
changes to japans stance on the territorial dispute. Besides occasional calls from 
Nemuro to revise japan's policy (Fujiwara 2006), certain members of the attentive pub
lic also questioned the utility of the "four islands" demand for japans national interests 
(e.g., Wada 1999; Iwashita 2005). Such arguments however were quickly dismissed by 
hard-line conservatives as undermining japans "basic principles" (e.g. Tamba 2007, 
240) and disappeared quickly from the domestic discourse. Initially a product of domes
tic and international politics of the Cold War, the idea of the Northern Territories 
became an end in itself for japanese conservative policymakers, firmly rooted in the dis
course on "inherent territory" and injustice the nation has suffered as a result ofits loss. 
In contrast, mass public support for the rigid position taken by the government has 
been steadily declining. Already in 1992, a public opinion poll showed that less than half 
of the respondents supported the "four islands at once" demand, with only 30 percent 
support among respondents in their thirties. Furthermore, the compromising "joint 
administration of the islands" and the conservative "return of the four islands" options 
as the desired solution to the dispute received an equal number (30 percent) of votes 
from younger respondents in their twenties (Mainichi Shimbun 1992). In a public opin
ion poll conducted by the left-leaning Asahi Shimbun (1998), the majority of the respon
dents (35 percent) favored the "first two islands" solution over the "four islands at once" 
approach (28 percent). Furthermore, a majority (56 percent) chose "economic coopera
tion' as the most important issue in bilateral relations, while only 33 percent prioritized 
the territorial issue. A similar poll conducted two years later by the more center-Ieaning 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2000) confirmed this trend, as 34 percent of the polled favored 
the "two islands" solution over the insistence on the "four islands" (32.1 percent). 
Importantly, 26 percent of the polled, when replying to the same question, suggested 
that the territorial dispute should not be made a priority in bilateral relations. Even a 
poll on bilateral relations conducted by the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun in early 
September 2006, at the height of bilateral tensions and extensive media coverage sur
rounding the Russian coast guard killing of a japanese "poacher" in the waters near the 
disputed islands three weeks earlier, did not show overwhelming public support for the 
"four islands at once" solution (Yomiuri Shimbun 2006). While this stance managed to 
get the majority of responses (39.5 percent), other, less rigid options combined 
accounted for 45.2 percent of the total votes. 
Despite this change in mass public preferences, it was only under Prime Minister 
Abe's second premiership that japans policy on "Northern Territories" underwent fun
damental revision. Ifwe are to believe the various reports in the media, it changed to the 
demand for the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan and some face-saving privileges 
on the other two islands. This change initiated by Abe, however, was not a response to 
public preferences. Rather, analysists attribute it to a number of unrelated factors, such 
as Abe's personal background and his failures in other foreign policy initiatives. In terms 
930 
ALEXANDER BUKH 
of the former, it should be remembered that Abe's direct relatives include such prominent 
politicians as Nobusuke Kishi and <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED_PERSON>. Both served as prime ministers and 
both are key figures in Japan's postwar foreign policy. Kishi revised the US-Japan 
Security Treaty in 1960, and Sato successfully negotiated the agreement on the return of 
Okinawa in 1969. Furthermore, Abo's father, Shintaro Abe, served as Japan's foreign 
minister (1982-1986) and saw the resolution of the Northern Territories dispute as one 
of his main goals in this post. As such, Abe has a strong personal motivation to create a 
legacy as the prime minister who brought an end to the decades-old territorial dispute 
and concluded a peace treaty with Russia. In terms of other foreign policy initiatives, 
Abe's attempts to resolve the abductions issue with North Korea, one of the key promises 
of his 2012 elections campaign, bore no fruit. His attempts to improve relations with 
South Korea also resulted in a failure, with colonial history-related issues such as the 
"comfort women" and forced labor bringing bilateral relations to its lowest point in 
decades. As such, for Abe, success in the Northern Territories dispute could have been a 
desired foreign policy victory that overshadowed his other failures. Here, we should also 
mention the China factor, as some policymakers in Japan believe that improved rela
tions with Russia will create a certain deterrence for China's ambitions in the region (see 
Iwashita 2019 for a detailed discussion). To summarize, the drastic changes in Japan's 
Northern Territories-related policy introduced by Prime Minister Abe had little to do 
with the shift in public preferences, but were mostly shaped by his personal ambitions 
and developments in Japan's relations with other countries. 
NORTHERN TERRITORIES, ECONOMY, 
AND SECURITY 
It is safe to say that despite its centrality in the domestic debates on Japan's relations with 
Russia, the territorial dispute has played a minimal role in the trade between the two 
countries. Even during the Cold War years, despite the official policy of indivisibility of 
polities and economy, the territorial dispute exerted little influence on trade between 
Japan and the USSR (Carlile 1994). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japanese bUsi
ness engagement has been growing rapidly, reflecting the positive transformations in 
Russia's investment environment. While Japanese businesses have been active in Russia 
since the early 1990S, bilateral trade started to pick up only in 2003, spurred by the eco
nomic recovery in both countries and Russia's introduction of numerous legal reforms 
in customs duty and tax administration, as well as measures to protect foreign invest
ment (Ivanov 2005, 10). In 2004, Japanese cumulative investment in Russia was esti
mated at US$1.9 billion and direct investment stood at US$1.35 billion, making Japan the 
sixth largest investor in Russia (Bury 2004, 12). Bilateral trade continued to grow 
steadily, and in 2013 it reached US$34.8 billion, growing ten-fold as compared to 1992 
(Okada 2014). Since 2005 the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) has conducted a 
JAPAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
I • 
931 
poll among Japanese business leaders regarding doing business in Russia. Complexity of 
procedures, administration, and lack of proper legal infrastructure usually top the list of 
the main factors that complicate doing business in Russia. By contrast, the territorial 
dispute is completely absent from this list (e.g., Keidanren 2018). Thus, it can be plausi
bly argued that the growth in trade between the two countries, but also its relatively low 
volume, should be attributed to economic factors, unrelated to the Northern Territories. 
Similar factors probably account for the flow of people in both directions, though there 
are no opinion polls that can support or refute this assumption. 
The extensive economic cooperation plan announced by Prime Minister Abe in 2016 
as part of his strategy to resolve the territorial dispute can indeed facilitate the growth of 
economic relations between the two countries and create a direct linkage between the 
territorial dispute and economic interactions. At this point it is too early to evaluate the 
plan's results and its broader effects. As of August 2019, both the number of projects 
implemented as part of this plan and their scale are rather limited (Embassy oOapan in 
Russia 2019). It remains to be seen whether the structure of bilateral trade will move 
away from the existing predominance of car exports from Japan to Russia and natural 
resources in the other direction (Hattori 2018). 
In the realm of security; the threat perception of Russia in Japan's defense community 
started to change in the second half of the 1990S. The emergence of new threats such as 
North Korea and China led to an important shift in Japan's defense priorities and the 
security discourse on Russia (for a detailed discussion, see Bukh 2008). Japan's National 
Security Strategy of 2013, the more recently published Defence Charter (Ministry of 
Defence 2018), and the beefing up ofits military in the southwestislands, as well as other 
measures and documents clearly indicate that, at least in the short- to mid-term, Japan's 
security community sees China and possibly North Korea as Japan's main security 
threats. Indeed, the relatively limited nature of security cooperation between the two 
countries can be partially attributed to the predominance of the territorial issue in any 
security-related negotiations. Regardless of the progress in the territorial dispute, how
ever, close security ties between Japan and Russia are rather improbable as long as the 
security treaty with the United States remains the main pillar of Japan's foreign policy, 
and Russia and China remain in a "soft" alliance aimed at curtailing US power and 
influence. 
CONCLUSION 
The main argument of this chapter is that both the creation of the idea of the "Northern 
Territories" during the Cold War years and its partial demolition by Prime Minister Abe 
were products of political calculations rather than reflection on either the general or the 
issue publics' preferences. This should not be seen, however, as a simple endorsement of 
the "elitist" model in Japan's foreign policymaking. It should be remembered that, from 
the mid-1950s, the government did adopt certain policies aimed at alleviating the 
I 
932 ALEXANDER BUKH 
economic plight of Nemuro residents directly affected by the dispute. These measures 
can be seen as a policy response to the demands of the issue public. Furthermore, the 
government has adopted certain ideas and strategies voiced and used by the reversion 
movement when designing its domestic educational campaign. Admittedly, all the 
above were domestic policies. These policies however, facilitated the homogenization of 
the "Northern Territories" narrative, and contributed to sustaining its centrality in the 
domestic debate. Throughout the post-Cold War years, this narrative was often seen by 
decision-makers as a reflection of public opinion, and thus constrained their choices in 
negotiations with Russia (for details, see Sato and Komaki 2003). Nevertheless, it is safe 
to say that the elites played a leading role in shaping Japan's Northern Territories-related 
policy and the impact of public preferences was indirect at best. 
These patterns can be attributed to a number of factors. To start with, as other studies 
have shown, foreign policy-related issues play only a minor role in shaping voter's 
behaviorin Japan (e.g., Ishibashi 2007). This relative freedom from fear of electoral pun
ishment enables the elites to pay less attention to public opinion in foreign policy
related decision-making. Other factors are more case specific. One such factor is the 
predominance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping Russia-related policy until 
the recent emergence of the Prime Minister's Office as the center of decision-making. 
Unlike politicians, the dependence of MOFXs bureaucrats on public opinion is mini
mal, and its policymaking process has been dominated by incrementalism (Hara 2008), 
which makes the emergence of drastic changes in already established policy rather 
unlikely. It should also be remembered that the scale of the issue public, or the popula
tion directly affected by the territorial dispute, has been relatively small, with a limited 
potential to influence policy. Moreover, as noted in the previous section, the impact of 
the territorial dispute on other areas of bilateral relations has been minimal. This lack of 
material consequences has further contributed to the perpetuation of the Northern 
Territories as a symbol of injustice inflicted upon the nation. Abe's attempt to achieve a 
breakthrough in relations with Russia has led to the demise of the idea of indivisibility of 
the Northern Territories and related mythology; without, however, bringing a resolution 
to the territorial dispute. It is hard to imagine that in the foreseeable future any Japanese 
leader will give up completely on the mission for the return of at least part of the 
Northern Territories. Thus, unless Russia's stance softens and shifts toward a compro
mising solution, the dispute will probably continue to haunt bilateral relations, without, 
however, significantly affecting other areas ofinteraction between the two countries.