Come up with a 200 word introduction for this essay: 

‘The policy of appeasement was an entirely sensible response to the security challenges facing British leaders in the second half of the 1930s.’ 

 
One of the main reasons why the British government pursued a policy of appeasement in the 1930s was the widespread aversion to starting another war in Europe. This is because of the devastating experience of the First World War, which bankrupted the UK in economy and manpower. The Great War had cost Britain over 700,000 lives, millions of wounded, and billions of pounds in debt (SOURCE: Economic impact of WWI on Britain). It had also shattered the illusion of British invincibility and exposed the weaknesses of the British Empire. The war had damaged or even entirely discredited the concept of “Pax Britannica”, and a widespread sense of war-weariness, pacifism, and disillusionment could be felt in Britain  (SOURCE: a historical book or article on the impact of the First World War on Britain). 

Many British leaders, especially those who had served or witnessed the horrors of the First World War, such as Winston Churchill, were reluctant to repeat the same mistakes and sacrifice another generation of young men for a questionable political cause. The Great War had directly gone against the century-old policy of “splendid isolation”, and arguably had not returned an acceptable investment. Many Britons believed that widespread European war was futile, immoral, and avoidable, and that diplomacy, negotiation, and compromise were the best ways to preserve peace and security (SOURCE: 30s British history). They also feared that another war would bring even more casualties, destruction, and suffering, as the advances in technology and weaponry had made war more deadly and unpredictable. Air power had been proven not only to be horrifically effective on the battlefield, but also capable of destroying towns and cities. For the first time on a grand scale, civilians on the island were directly threatened by opposing militaries. Serious speculation about single bombs capable of destroying cities was already discussed (SOURCE: interwar speculation about nukes). This created a culture of great apprehension about another European war. The British government hoped that by appeasing the nationalist and militaristic dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini, they could satisfy their demands and prevent them from resorting to aggression. They also hoped that by giving them time and space, they could moderate their behaviour and persuade them to cooperate with the international community. This is why two successive prime ministers in the 1930s, Baldwin and Chamberlain, resorted to appeasement (SOURCE: a biography or memoir of a British leader who supported appeasement, such as Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, or Stanley Baldwin).  

However, not everyone in Britain agreed with appeasement against fascism. Some British leaders, such as Eden and Churchill, were sceptical of the policy of appeasement and warned of the dangers of trusting dictators. They argued that Hitler and Mussolini were not rational or reasonable, but ruthless and ambitious, and that their demands were unstable, unlimited and illegitimate. Eden said that “Hitler could only be stopped [with physical retaliation]” (Eden, 1960, p.157). They also urged that Britain should cooperate with other democratic countries, especially France and the United States, and support the victims of fascist aggression, such as Spain, Ethiopia and Czechoslovakia. This was in sometimes private, sometimes public opposition to the British government. For example, Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare’s appeasing apathy towards Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia was privately opposed by Eden (Eden, 1960.) This shows that appeasement was by no means a completely agreed upon default within the British political world, and was definitely not deemed “sensible” by many contemporary prominent politicians (SOURCE: a biography or memoir of a British leader who opposed appeasement, such as Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, or Duff Cooper). 

Another reason why British leaders were hesitant to confront Germany was their perception of the relative strength of the British and German militaries. Britain had a small, professional army that was mainly focused on defending Britain’s colonial territories, rather than fighting a continental war. Britain also had a limited budget for defence spending, as it was still recovering from the Great Depression. Britain’s army  lacked modern tanks, planes, and artillery (SOURCE: 30s RAF production challenges). Britain also faced the challenge of maintaining a naval supremacy over Germany, which had a powerful navy and a growing submarine fleet. Even though Britain’s surface fleet could easily challenge the Kriegsmarine, the U-boats proved to almost cripple the entire British war effort in the Second World War.  

In contrast to Britain’s small, professional force, Germany had a large, conscripted army that was rapidly expanding and modernising under Hitler’s regime, in spite of the Versailles treaty’s army size regulations. Germany had invested heavily and secretly in re-armament. One of the foundations of Nazism was a deeply held grudge against the Western powers over the defeat of 1918. This was used heavily in Nazi propaganda to increase the support for war amongst the German population (SOURCE: Nazi propaganda about 1918). Germany had also improved its military doctrine, tactics, and coordination, and had gained valuable experience and confidence from its involvement in the Spanish Civil War. Germany had also formed alliances with Italy and Japan, which increased its strategic and diplomatic leverage. (SOURCE: a historical book or article on the state of the German army and navy in the 1930s). British figures such as Churchill believed that “war will be avoided, in present circumstances, only by the accumulation of deterrents against the aggressor.” (Langworth, 2008, p. 55). This meant he believed the only way to resist Germany was by accumulating a greater military capability.  

Britain also had doubts about the reliability and capability of France. France had the largest army in Europe, but was plagued by political instability, social unrest and military stagnation. France struggled with just as much, and arguably more, war exhaustion as Britain, but also suffered with a much less organised and professional military (SOURCE: Poor state of French military). Due to France’s failing manpower, it was feared that German manpower would be around double the amount of soldiers that France could muster in an eventual war (SOURCE: French manpower 2-1 ratio 1930s). The French government was paranoid that Britain would abandon her to Germany soon into the war. Conversely, Britain feared that France would drag her back into another endless European war it could not escape from. Because of this, it was in the best interests of both nations to prevent war with Germany (SOURCE: Appeasement history). 

However, Britain’s assessment of the military balance was not entirely accurate, as Germany also had its own weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Germany’s re-armament was not as complete or successful as it appeared. For several years after Hitler took power in 1933, he was keenly aware that Germany was far weaker militarily than the Western Allies. He would comment, 'the forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking in my life. If the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance' (Hitler – Shore, 2002). This raises the question of whether appeasement really was “sensible” for the first few years of Hitler’s regime. Germany’s navy was also not strong enough to challenge Britain’s naval dominance, and its air force was not prepared for a long and costly aerial war. Germany also faced the risk of a two-front war, as it had to contend with the Soviet Union, which had a massive army and vast resources. (SOURCE: a historical book or article on the weaknesses and challenges of the German military in the 1930s) 
 
It can be argued that Baldwin and Chamberlain were not naive or cowardly, as has long been culturally taught, but instead cunning and strategic in their policy of appeasement towards Germany. Baldwin and Chamberlain were aware of the threat posed by Hitler, but it could be said that they deliberately delayed and avoided war in order to buy time and rebuild the British military. After the re-occupation of the Rhineland and the Anschluss, appeasement shifted from entirely attempting to prevent a war into attempting to delay an inevitable one. Britain initiated an urgent Spitfire/Hurricane development program in response to German bellicosity. In 1938 the first 50 Hurricanes had become operational (McKinstry, 2018). (SOURCE: a historical book or article that supports the revisionist view of appeasement, such as The Guilty Men by Michael Foot, or Appeasing Hitler by Tim Bouverie) 

On the contrary, there is evidence that Baldwin and Chamberlain genuinely believed in appeasement, and that they sincerely expected that it would work and prevent war. They repeatedly expressed their faith and trust in Hitler’s word and promises. According to Reynolds (2009), Hitler fully convinced Chamberlain that he could be trusted and that he would not mistreat Czechoslovakia. When taking into consideration Britain’s hamstrung military and colonial obligations, such a focus on appeasing diplomacy must be looked at without hindsight and in the context of an attempt to prevent a second great war (SOURCE: a historical book or article that criticises the revisionist view of appeasement, such as The Origins of the Second World War by A.J.P. Taylor, or Munich: The 1938 Appeasement Crisis by David Faber). 

However, one could also say that Baldwin and Chamberlain were actually completely misinformed. They underestimated the nature and extent of the German threat until it was too late, and they overestimated the effectiveness of their counter-policies. They failed to realise that appeasement was not a solution, but a problem, and that war was not a choice, but a necessity. Michael Foot and others created a then-anonymous document called “Guilty Men” in 1940 which accused the British government of incompetence and cowardice. It became very popular, which shows that appeasement quickly became much maligned as soon as the war began (SOURCE: a historical book or article that provides a balanced and comprehensive analysis of appeasement, such as The Road to War by Richard Overy and Andrew Wheatcroft, or Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline by Paul Kennedy).  
 

Britain’s traditional position geopolitically in Europe was one of isolation and conservative involvement in the mainland. Britain had always been a maritime and imperial power, rather than a continental and European power. Its chief priority for much of its history was to prevent any one power from achieving hegemony in Europe. This is what encouraged “splendid isolation” in the 19th century. It could be said that Britain’s foray into Europe in the First World War was a very divisive decision that convinced many that splendid isolation was indeed Britain’s best policy. Therefore, it is understandable that the generation of British political leaders following the Great War would be keen to avoid a general European war (SOURCE: a historical book or article on the British empire and foreign policy, such as The Rise and Fall of the British Empire by Lawrence James, or Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power by John Charmley). 
The First World War had also undermined the stability and order of the international system. The creation of the League of Nations was certainly an incentive to avoid war, by encouraging discourse and diplomacy in its stead.  

 

Through this lens, appeasement made sense for Britain, as it seemed to be a logical manifestation of the pacifist trend seen in world politics during the interwar period. Appeasement was seen by the British government of the 1930s as a legitimate way to steer Germany back into the diplomatic status quo of the international community. However, this can also be seen as incompetence, as Germany’s militaristic fascism and Hitler’s specific ideologies focused on European domination ensured that peace was never truly an option.  

There are an almost equal amount of arguments for and against the assertion that appeasement was a valid and sensible policy for the UK in the 1930s. While it is clear that appeasers made up the most prominent figures of Chamberlain and Baldwin’s governments, notable figures such as Eden and Churchill indicate that it was always a divisive issue, even within the Conservative Party.  
It is evident that Chamberlain simultaneously believed that appeasing Germany could genuinely save Europe from a second war, and that Britain should still prepare for a negative eventuality. Britain began preparing for war in the mid-1930s, which gave the second half of appeasement a military practicality that can be said to have legitimate value – this shows that Britain’s leaders during appeasement used a measured and balanced response to Hitler’s aggressions, a stance which history has shown to have been ineffective compared to Churchill’s staunch action.