based on the chapter below, write some discussion questions to ask the professor in class. The questions have to address the text directly

THE JAPAN-SOUTH 
KOREA RIFT 
"Inside" and "Outside" Pressures on Relations 
ALEXANDRA SAKAKI 
JAPAN'S relations with South Korea have been uneasy throughout the postwar era . 
Disputes over history, especially over japan's colonial rule of Korea from 1910 to '945, 
have recurrently surfaced, hampering bilateral cooperation. The postwar relationship 
has been characterized by cyclical ups and downs, as phases of reconciliation are fol
lowed by disagreement and antagonism. The volatility of relations presents an interest
ing puzzle, since the two countries share many similarities and interests that would seem 
to make them ideal partners. Both are allies of the United States, facing an uncertain 
regional environment. During the Cold War, both were confronted by the Communist 
threat from North Korea, China, and Russia, and in the post -Cold War era, new regional 
challenges have emerged with North Korea's missile and nuclear ambitions, China's 
assertiveness, and declining US power. South Koreas emergence since the 1990S as a 
full-fledged democracy and high-income economy seemed to provide a solid founda
tion for cooperation with japan, based on political and socioeconomic commonalities. 
Economic interdependence and growing ties on the societallevel also seemed to rein
force ties. 
For the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the overall trajectory indeed pointed 
toward growing cooperation and reconciliation between Tokyo and Seoul, despite tem
porary setbacks from history disputes. The positive momentum culminated in 1998 in 
a joint declaration of the two countries' leaders, Prime Minister Keiz6 Obuchi and 
President <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED_PERSON>,' in which they pledged to build a new forward-looking part
nership and develop relations based on mutual understanding and trust (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 1998). Underlining the cooperative mood, the two countries co-hosted 
the Soccer World Cup in 2002. Tokyo and Seoul also began to tighten security policy 
r 
848 
ALEXANDRA SAKAKI 
THE JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RIFT 
coordination on North Korea together with the US in the late 1990S. Around the turn of 
the century, many analysts were thus cautiously optimistic about relations, particularly 
in the trilateral context with the US.2 
However, relations have since taken a steep dive. Historical disagreements began to 
reemerge in the first decade of the century. After 2011, relations went into a downward 
spiral, unprecedented in the history of normalized relations since 1965. Disputes erupted 
about the compensation of former Korean forced laborers and so-called comfort 
women-women forced into prostitution in Japanese military camps during the colo
nial era. As the clash intensified, political leaders in both capitals publicly questioned 
whether the other side still shared similar core values and strategic goals. The escalating 
row signified the most serious strains in the relationship since normalization. Korean 
scholar Nam Ki-jeong described relations "on the verge of... a total breakdown" in 
mid-2019 (quoted in Sullivan 2019). Similarly, a senior Japanese government official saw 
relations in the process of "unravelling" (interview with official of the Japanese govern
ment, April 2019). Japanese and Korean analysts widely agreed that the clash went 
beyond past bilateral fluctuations, apparently signifying a deeper change in the relation
ship (interview with Katsumi Sawada, April 2019 ). 
This chapter analyzes the causes of the downturn, focusing on the period since 2011, 
proceeding in three steps. First, the chapter discusses existing explanations for the vola
tility of ties. Second, it then turns to the bilateral spat since 2011, providing an overview 
of events and highlighting the erosion of trust. Third, while acknowledging the signifi
cance of existing explanations of friction, the chapter points to two broad sources of ten
sion that must be considered to understand the recent downturn. It contends that 
pressure on the relationship has built both from the inside (from the domestic-societal 
contexts), and from the outside (from international changes), causing a negative spiral 
in bilateral dynamics. Changes in both spheres have generated mutual suspicion. The 
chapter builds on recent studies that have pointed to the effects of domestic politics as 
well as international level developments on bilateral relations. 
Japan-South Korea ties receive limited scholarly attention, despite their crucial role in the 
East Asian regional order. As advanced economies and stable democracies, Tokyo's and 
Seoul's bilateral engagement and their respective foreign policies shape regional dynamics 
across a wide range ofissues. Furthermore, Japan and Korea are Washington's most impor
tant allies in Asia, hosting approximately 49,000 and 28,000 US troops, respectively. 
Washington's ability to project power and regional leadership is thus affected not only by 
Tokyo and Seoul's respective alliance politics, but also by their mutual relationship. 
VOLATILITY IN RELATIONS: 
EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 
A number of studies have investigated the persistence of bilateral frictions. History 
weighs heavily on ties, and thus many scholars focus on historical disagreements as the 
root cause of tensions. For example, they point to disputes about apologies and 
compensation, controversies over the commemoration of war dead at Japan's Yasukuni 
Shrine, or the territorial row over the islet of Takes him a (Dokdo in Korean) in the Sea of 
Japan, controlled by South Korea yet claimed by Japan.' 
Related to historical disagreements, a prominent body of literature focuses on 
national identities as a source of frictions. Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder argue that 
the two countries have opposing conceptions of national identity, in turn affecting and 
bounding their foreign policy choices (Glosserman and Snyder 2015b). For Koreans, 
Japan is the most important negative "other" that shapes their conception of who they 
are. Simultaneously, "Korea challenges key strands of Japanese national identity: a 
peace-loving state that has itselfbeen victimized by war and has used its success to help 
other nations" (Glosserman and Snyder 2015a). Increased interaction between the two 
sides has accentuated these clashing elements of identity. Gilbert Rozman (2013) simi
larly focuses on what he calls "national identity gaps" between the two states. For him, a 
national identity gap can emerge between two states, when at least one of them "consid
ers the other salient to its national identity" (Rozman 2012, 133). Moon Chung-in and Li 
Chun-fu analyze clashing national identities and nationalist dynamics. They find that 
appeals to nationalist sentiments in Japan-including claims to the disputed Takeshimal 
Dokdo islands and visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine-trigger fierce reactions, 
as Koreans see such actions as an "assault on their territorial integrity and their collec
tive memory of the historical past" (Moon Chung-in and Li Chun-fu 2010). Shogo 
Suzuki (2019) furthermore argues that for Japanese right-wing revisionists, South Korea 
has emerged as a powerful threat to Japan's "ontological security:' or stable sense of self 
over time. In propagating nationalist rhetoric, they delegitimize and discredit Korean 
viewpoints. 
Other studies have sought to develop comprehensive explanations of bilateral dynamics, 
investigating instances of friction and cooperation. For example, Song Young-sun 
(2000) argued that while historical disagreements serve as a constraining factor, 
perceptions of threat have impelled cooperation. In this view, Japan-Korea cooperation 
is a function of the changing level of external threat, as both seek deterrence. Building 
on such a balance of threat logic, Victor Cha developed an influential model of quasi
allies, two states that remain non-allied but share a third power as a common ally. He 
concludes that the determining factor for Japan-South Korea relations is not the threat 
itself, but rather the countries' perceptions of the US ability and willingness to counter 
the threat. When US commitment appears weak, Tokyo and Seoul are forced to cooper
ate to counter threats. When US commitment appears strong, the two have the luxury of 
allowing historical disputes to upset relations (Cha 2000). 
Cha's quasi-alliance theory offered a convincing explanation for Cold War era 
dynamics, the focus of his study. However, the theory seems less suited to explain 
post-Cold War dynamics and particularly the deterioration since 2011. During this 
time, North Korea conducted nuclear and missile tests that are threatening to both 
Japan and South Korea. At the same time, doubts over US commitment to its allies 
have also grown in recent years. Despite that, Seoul-Tokyo ties continued their 
downward trend. 
850 
ALEXANDRA SAKAKI 
THE JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RIFT 
THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL AFTER 2011 
Before turning to the sources of frictions, this section provides an overview of events in 
the recent bilateral spat. The rapid deterioration of relations began with a ruling by 
Korean Constitutional Court in August 2011, which found that the government had 
violated the constitutional rights of former comfort women by neglecting to pursue the 
diplomatic resolution of their claims for compensation. The ruling put Seoul under 
pressure to take a more hardline stance vis-a-vis Tokyo. Another setback came in June 
2012, when the Lee Myung-bak administration suddenly canceled the scheduled sign
ing of a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan, a 
legal framework for exchanging classified security information about North Korea. The 
Lee government faced domestic criticism for its alleged secrecy and apparent willing
ness to cooperate militarilywith the former occupying power (Sheen and Kim 2012). To 
Tokyo's dismay, Lee became the South's first president to visit the disputed Takeshima/ 
Dokdo islets in August 2012. 
Relations failed to improve after leadership changes in both countries (Le., the election 
ofShinz6 Abe as Japan's prime minister in December 2012 and Park Geun-hye's inaugu
ration as Korean preSident in February 2013). Abe-known for his controversial remarks 
on history-was received with suspicion in Korea. Park in turn refused to meet with 
Abe, calling on "Japan's leaders to take a correct view of history" (McGill 2014). Abe's 
December 2013 visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine served as confirmation to 
Koreans about his rightist-nationalist leanjngs. 
Following intervention by Washington, which was concerned about the impasse 
between its two principal Asian allies, Japan and South Korea held their first bilateral 
summit in three and half years in November 2015. A month later, both countries' foreign 
ministers announced a delicate compromise on the comfort women issue: the Japanese 
minister apologized in Abe's name to the women for their suffering, promising a 
Japanese contribution of a billion yen into a South Korean foundation for victims; Seoul 
in turn promised to work toward a solution regarding a commemorative statue for the 
comfort women in front of Japan's embassy, which a civic group had erected in 
December 2011. In Tokyo's view, this statue violates the dignity ofits consular post. Both 
sides furthermore declared that the agreement "finally and irreversibly" put an end to 
the dispute (Panda 2017). However, the agreement was controversial in Korea from the 
start. A January 2016 poll showed that only 26 percent of Korean respondents supported 
the accord, while 56 percent opposed it (Moon Chung-in and Hur Won-Young 2017, 49). 
Relations briefly seemed to return to a more positive trajectory in 2016, amid 
increased trilateral security cooperation with the US and the conclusion in November of 
the previously failed GSOMIA for sharing military information. However, troubles 
reemerged after Park's removal from office over a corruption and cronyism scandal in 
December 2016. Park's successor, Moon Jae-in, who had campaigned for more transpar
ency in policymaking, decided to review the comfort women accord. Moon found that 
the accord lacked procedural and democratic legitimacy, and therefore it "cannot solve 
the comfort women issue" (Lee and Shin 2017). While Moon decided to formally respect 
the agreement (for example, by avoiding criticizing Tokyo over the issue in multilateral 
forums), he subsequently dissolved the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, set up 
to manage the Japanese funds paid under the agreement and viewed in Tokyo as the cen
tral pillar for implementation of the accord. This amounted to a de facto abrogation of 
the 2015 agreement for Tokyo. 
Bilateral tensions escalated in October and November 2018, when the Korean 
Supreme Court ruled that former forced laborers as the plaintiffs were entitled to per
sonal compensation payments from the Japanese firms Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal 
and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Choe 2018). The court argued that the 1965 Japan
Korea normalization treaty and the accompanying agreement on compensation had 
only regulated state claims, but not individual ones that had occurred in the context of 
Japan's illegal occupation (Sakaki 2019). Tokyo rejected this interpretation, arguing that 
the 1965 agreement explicitly stated that the "problem concerning property, rights and 
interests of the two contracting parties and their nationals ... is settled completely and 
finally:" The issue of forced laborers had been discussed in the talks, and until the court 
rulings, Seoul had shared the line that the claims had been settled. Tokyo called on 
Korea to stick to that position, emphasizing that bilateral treaties take precedence over 
domestic judicial decisions. However, Seoul stressed that it could not ignore the princi
ple of the division of power by acting against the judicial decision (interview with Yang 
Keeho, May 2019). It also argued that the rulings do not fundamentally challenge the 
applicability of the 1965 treaty, but only affect its scope (Cheongwadae (Blue House) 
Korea 2019). 
Adding fuel to fire, a bitter dispute erupted over a December 2018 maritime incident 
within Japan's exclusive economic zone. According to Tokyo, a South Korean warship 
undertaking a rescue operation for a North Korean vessel pointed its fire-control radar 
at a Japanese patrol aircraft observing the maneuver. Tokyo accused the South's ship of 
"extremely hazardous" behavior (Ministry of Defense 2019). Seoul asserted instead 
that the Japanese plane had approached its vessel on a dangerous, low-altitude course. 
Consultations failed to resolve differences, with both sides accusing the other oflying. 
Irrespective of the question of blame, which cannot be clarified on the basis of public 
sources, the incident underlined the extent of mutual mistrust. Observers on both 
sides speculated about the intentions behind the other side's apparent provocation 
(Sakaki 2019). 
The forced labor dispute further escalated in 2019 and 2020. Seoul rejected Tokyo's 
repeated calls for establishing a third-party arbitration panel to settle the issue, empha
sizing non-interference in the judicial decision (Kim Yoo-jin 2019). Tokyo refused to 
discuss Seoul's proposal for establishing a foundation for victims with voluntary contri
butions from Japanese and Korean companies (Song Sang-ho 2019). In July and August 
2019, Tokyo tightened its export controls vis-a-vis Korea, citing national security con
cerns-although most observers saw this as a retaliatory move over Seoul's inaction on 
the forced labor ruling (Arrington 2019). Tokyo imposed restrictions on exports to 
Korea of three chemicals used in the production of semiconductors and display screens, 
whose global supply is dominated by Japan. It also dropped South Korea from the "white 
r 
852 
ALEXANDRA SAKAKI 
THE JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RIFT 
list" of countries, implying that a wider range of materials and technologies required 
case-by-case export approval. Tokyo argued that it had evidence of Korean mismanage
ment of sensitive supplied items used in arms production, while also pointing out the 
two sides' failure to convene export controls talks since 2016 (Sakaki 2019). 
In Korea, Japan's moves were seen as "unusually strong" retaliatory measures and 
deliberate attempts to "weaken the best-performing South Korean companies" (Park 2019). 
Seoul protested, announcing that it would remove Japan from its list of preferred trading 
partners. Furthermore, Seoul dedared that it would terminate the GSOMIA intelligence
sharing pact with Tokyo, citing a "grave change" in the environment for bilateral coopera
tion caused by Japan's tightened export controls (Johnson and Murakami 2019). However, 
following strong pressure from senior US officials, the termination decision was provi
sionally suspended on November 22, 2019, just hours before the scheduled termination of 
GSOMIA. While Japan and Korea announced a resumption of talks on trade controls in 
late 2019, negotiations failed to make progress and the two sides continued to feud. Seoul 
argued that GSOMIA continuation was contingent on Tokyo reinstating Korea's prefer
ential trade status, while Tokyo denied such a linkage (Japan Times, November 25, 2019). 
As Tokyo refused to retract its technology-related trade controls, Seoul in June 2020 
reopened a complaint about the controls filed with the World Trade Organization that it 
had temporarily halted in November 2019 (Kim Tong-hyung 2020). 
By the summer of 2020, bilateral tensions about the forced labor issue further esca
lated, casting a dark shadow over the future of relations. On August 5, 2020, a South 
Korean court began procedures to liquidate assets seized from Nippon Steel Corp., 
which had refused to comply with a Supreme Court decision on compensating former 
workers. Barring a successful appeal by tlie company, the court will issue a sales order, 
leading to an auctioning of assets-a process that could take several months. However, 
Tokyo immediately warned that it views the court procedure as a "dear violation of 
international law" and is considering its response "with all options in mind;' according 
to then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga (Japan NewslYomiuri Shimbun 2020). 
Suga appears set on continuing this policy line as prime minister. According to media 
reports, Japan is contemplating retaliatory countermeasures such as recalling its ambas
sador to South Korea, tightening visa requirements, or imposing tariffs (Nikkei Asian 
Review, August 5, 2020). Seoul, which has stuck to its position of abiding by the judicial 
process, is said to be conSidering tit-for-tat responses, while also reconsidering a termi
nation of the GSOMIA agreement (Kang Seung-woo 2020). Such moves on both sides 
will likely lead to another downward spiral in bilateral ties, accompanied by deepening 
mistrust and growing estrangement. 
et al. 2019, 102). Japanese frustration about Korea has risen immensely among political 
elites and the public (Sakurai, Kuroda, and Nishioka 2019, 37). Second, both countries' 
policies have increaSingly been driven by emotional nationalism and popular senti
ments rather than cool-headed decision-making. Third, historical disputes have spilled 
over into the spheres of economics and security, which traditionally have been relatively 
insulated from frictions (Sakurai, Kuroda, and Nishioka 2019, 35). 
The following sections show that the relationship has increasingly come under pres
sure from two spheres. First, pressure has built from the "inside" -the domestic societal 
contexts-pushing the respective political leaders, who are mindful of public support 
and electoral effects, toward more nationalist and hardline positions vis-It-vis the other 
country. This has in turn reduced the room for political compromise between Seoul and 
Tokyo. Observers on both sides increasingly cast relations in terms of a 2ero-sum logic, 
whereby a "win" for one side implies a "loss" for the other. Second, pressure has built 
from the "outside" -the international and regional changes and perceptions thereof in 
each country. Amid the dedine of US power, Tokyo and Seoul hold differing views on 
how to respond to the challenges posed by North Korea and China, leading to bilateral 
friction. Japan and Korea have also been driven apart by changing patterns of economic 
interdependence, with Korea now highly dependent on China. This chapter seeks to 
delineate these "inside" and "outside" pressures on bilateral ties, while acknowledging the 
continuing relevance of national identity dashes and historical disputes as underlying 
sources of tension. 
DRIVERS OF THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL 
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 
The downturn in Japan-Korea ties is different from past cydical setbacks on several 
counts. First, the dispute's dynamics diverge from past patterns in that it is Tokyo that is 
angered by Korean political developments-not the other way around as before (Kuroda 
"INSIDE" PRESSURES: DOMESTIC 
CONSTRAINTS ON POLITICAL LEADERS 
During the Cold War, Korea's Japan policy was formulated by a small group of conserva
tive authoritarian leaders, who suppressed any dissenting voices (Park 2018,218). These 
elites saw little choice but to cooperate with Japan, given the common struggle against 
Communism as well as Korea's dependence on Japanese support for economic develop
ment (Sawada 2019). However, South Korea's transition to democracy in the late 1980s 
triggered a process of domestic reflection on the time of authoritarian rule and postwar 
policies vis-a-vis the former colonial oppressor. Victims oOapan's rule, induding former 
comfort women and forced laborers, stepped forward to seek redress. The debates 
exposed the domestic dissatisfaction with the compromises made in the 1965 normal
ization treaty, in which then-president Park Chung-hee prioritized economic develop
ment while discounting victims' interests. 
Domestic pressure on Seoul to address these perceived inadequacies has grown since 
the 1990S. In fact, the Korean search for "historical justice" has in some ways culminated 
in recent years. First and foremost, victims oOapan's colonial rule have long struggled to 
affect policies, including through lawsuits filed in Japan, the US, and Korea, but the 
recent verdicts from Korea's highest courts constitute their first substantial legal victories. 
854 
ALEXANDRA SAKAKI 
'The 2011 Constitutional Court verdict regarding comfort women and the 2018 Supreme 
Court rulings on forced labor directly challenge the Korean government's previous 
policies, putting Seoul under tremendous pressure. 'These judgments in turn can also be 
seen as an outcome of Korea's democratization process, with the judiciary-long ridi
culed as a servant of power-clearly asserting its independence through the rulings 
(interview with Masao Okonogi, April 2019 ). 
Secondly, South Korean politics is increasingly influenced by the so-called 386 gener
ation,' comprising those who were born in the 1960s and participated in the student 
democracy movement in the 1980s. 'These political leaders have a particularly critical 
take on past authoritarian policies. Reassessing the events of that time, including the 
1965 normalization treaty, is one of their central concerns. 'The alternation in govern
ment to the so-called progressive camp, under President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), 
President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) and finally President Moon (in office since 
2017), has also stimulated such a critical review of the authoritarian era (interview with 
Song Whasup, April 2019; interview with Yang Keeho, May 2019). Both Moon and Roh 
pledged to pursue "historical justice" during their respective terms. 'They called for 
investigating and punishing Korean collaborators ofJapanese imperialism (the so-called 
pro-Japanese, or "Chinilpa") (Kuroda et al. 2019, 103). In the eyes of many progressives, 
these collaborators and their descendants remained in their privileged positions after 
1945, thereby perpetuating injustice (Lim 2019). 'The progressives' political agenda has 
repercussions on relations with Japan, even though Moon maintains that his drive to 
"wip [e lout the vestiges of pro-Japanese collaborators" is not intended to "create issues 
for diplomatic conflicts with a neighboring country" (Moon Jae-in 2019). At a mini
mum, the crackdown on former collaborat6rs has severed the traditional Korean "pipes" 
with Japan, consisting of conservative elites-often from families of some influence dur
ing the Japanese occupation-who served as links between both countries (Rozman 
and Lee, 2006, 769-70). On a more general level, it has created a hesitancy among 
Koreans who might have more openly advocated for the relationship (Smith 2019). 
'These political trends have in turn impacted the judicial sphere to some extent. In 
2005 the Roh administration declassified thousands of documents on the negotiations 
of the 1965 treaty and established an expert panel to ascertain the validity of)apan's claim 
that all wartime disputes have been settled. 'The committee found that the treaty did not 
cover three groups of Koreans, namely comfort women, atomic bomb victims, and dis
placed laborers on Sakhalin Island (Katata 2019, 85). 'This finding prompted former 
comfort women to file a petition against the Korean government regarding its inaction 
in seeking a settlement of compensation claims (Shim 2011), ultimately leading to the 
August 2011 constitutional court ruling. 
Finally, President Moon's Japan policy has been influenced not only by his agenda of 
pursuing historical justice, but also by the aftermath of the scandal over the previous 
governm,nt. Park, impeached in December 2016 amid serious corruption allegations, 
was publicly criticized for her lack of transparency in governing, sparking mass protests. 
In his electoral platform, Moon Jae-in thus promised transparency in government. In 
the pursuit of "politics driven by the people, not a government for vested interests and 
THE JAPAN -SOUTH KOREA RIFT 
855 
elites;' the Moon government is thus highly sensitive to public opinion (Government of 
the Republic of Korea 2017, 5). One knowledgeable Korean observer even maintained 
that Moon is "afraid" of the public (interview with anonymous Korean journalist of a 
major daily, May 2019). 
In light of public dissatisfaction with the December 2015 comfort women deal, Moon 
decided to investigate the negotiation process and dissolve the Reconciliation and 
Healing Foundation. Furthermore, investigations into the previous government's 
scandal also revealed that Park had conspired with Chief Justice Yang Seung-tae to 
delay the ruling in the forced labor lawsuits (jang 2019). By pointing to the independence 
of the courts and refusing to prevent the confiscation of Japanese assets following 
the 2018 rulings, Moon sought to set himself apart from the policies of the disgraced 
previous president. 
While Moon is particularly attentive to the public mood, the two previous conserva
tive governments were also under domestic pressure in their Japan poliCies, particularly 
after the 2011 court ruling. President Lee was clearly reacting to massive criticism from 
the opposition and public when he canceled the GSOMIA:s signing in 2012. President 
Park was also under political scrutiny, because she is the daughter of the former military 
dictator Park Chung-hee, who oversaw the signing of the 1965 treaty. Her personal 
background explains her long resistance to meeting Abe. 
In Korea's societal struggle for historical justice, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) supporting victims of Japanese imperialism have also exerted strong political 
influence (Mut6 2017). In particular, the so-called Korean Council (in full, the Korean 
Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by 
Japan"), founded in 1990 to represent the interests of former "comfort women;' is 
regarded as a veto player on the issue.' Emboldened by the August 2011 ruling, it has 
erected numerous commemorative statues for these women around the world, includ
ing in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul in 2011 and in front of the Japanese consu
late in Busan in 2016. Since 2017, other NGOs have created similar monuments for the 
forced laborers. 'These activities have further complicated Seoul's relations with Tokyo, 
which views the statues in front of its embassy and consulate as a violation of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, requiring host countries to protect the dignity of 
diplomatic representations. 
While Korean politics has shifted toward a growing desire to reflect on the past and 
achieve "historical justice;' Japanese elites tend to exhibit nationalist attitudes more 
strongly than their predecessors and focus more on the future. As in Korea, Japan has 
seen a generational changeover in the political elites. Politicians born after the Second 
World War now define the agenda in Japan. 'Their attitude to the past is shaped much less 
by actual experience of the war and the immediate postwar era or by personal feelings of 
guilt. 'They expect Seoul to pursue a pragmatic line looking to the future rather than 
the past. 
Moreover, reconciliation efforts with Korea in the 1990S caused a backlash among 
rightist-nationalists in Japan, who subscribe to an impenitent stance on the past 
(Park 2018; Soeya 2019). 'These conservative opinion leaders and political elites began to 
856 
ALEXANDRA SAKAKI 
promote a revisionist narrative of the nation's history more vigorously, denying past 
aggression or explaining it away as defensive, while also criticizing the "masochistic" 
view of history encapsulated in reconciliation initiatives. Such right-wing narratives 
and efforts to whitewash Japan's history have in turn fueled South Korean distrust of 
Japan. In other words, gestures of reconciliation formulated with good intentions have 
ironically often had a damaging effect on Japan-Korea ties, because they triggered a 
nationalist backlash (Lind 2008). 
The Japanese public has, for its part, also become more susceptible to popular nation
alism (Smith 2015). Anti-Korean opinions, once marginal, today find significant public 
resonance-going as far as to call for a "severance of relations" (dank6) (Kuroda et al. 
2019; Sakurai, Kuroda, and Nishioka 2019). Many Japanese now share the view that 
Korea is a "bottomless pit" for reconciliation gestures that will never be accepted as 
sufficient. They feel vindicated by Moon's de facto suspension of the 2015 comfort 
women agreement. Whereas Koreans have long seen themselves as the victims of 
Japanese aggression and imperialism, many Japanese now perceive themselves as 
victims of a "history stalker" (Fukagawa 2019). 
"OUTSIDE" PRESSURES: DIFFERING 
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL SHIFTS 
The Japan-South Korea relationship has also encountered new strains stemming from 
the "outside:' or changes in the international environment. First, Tokyo and Seoul have 
somewhat divergent views on key foreign policy challenges and how to respond in the 
context ofthe relative decline in US power. Second, South Korea's economic dependence 
on Japan has decreased Significantly over the post-Cold War era, as the country devel
oped economic ties to China and other countries. The bonds that used to bind Seoul and 
Tokyo are no longer as solid as they used to be. 
Divergent Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities 
During the Cold War, Tokyo and Seoul were motivated to cooperate by their shared 
threat perception toward the Communist bloc (Park 2018,218). When war broke out on 
the peninsula in 1950, the United States relied heavily on its bases in Japan to provide 
supplies and logistical services to its troops fighting in Korea. Japan, in turn, provided 
rear-area support, such as the servicing of US military equipment. Based on this experi
ence, political leaders and security planners in both Tokyo and Seoul perceived a strong 
security link between their countries. 
Since the democratic transition and the 1998 inauguration of the first progressive-led 
government under President Kim Dae-jung, South Korea has seen the emergence of a 
THE JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RIFT 
857 
more controversial and polarized debate on how to handle the North Korean threat. 
Kim launched his "Sunshine Policy" toward the North, seeking to "induce incremental 
and voluntary changes in North Korea for peace, opening, and reforms through a 
patient pursuit of reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation" (Moon Chung-in 2012, 
21) Progressive leaders like Kim believe that pressure and sanctions on the regime only 
prompt a response in kind. Conservatives, by contrast, oppose the engagement approach 
as overly naive, advocating deterrence measures. The two political camps are further 
divided by their views about the value of the US alliance, with progressives tending to 
see Washington as an obstacle in pursuing peninsular self-determination. Such a critical 
view of the alliance is reinforced by doubts about US commitment and perceptions of 
excessive cost-sharing demands by the Trump administration. 
Meanwhile, Japan's political elites have grown overwhelmingly skeptical of engaging 
Pyongyang, seeing the North as repeatedly reneging on international agreements. Many 
Japanese are thus concerned that Moon's engagement policy will only invite North 
Korean deception and cheating (Kimiya 2019). Prime Minister Abe insists on a policy of 
strict sanctions against the North. Tokyo fears that Seoul could make concessions to 
Pyongyang that subvert Japanese security interests. Conversely, the Moon government 
regards Tokyo's hard line toward Pyongyang as a hindrance to its rapprochement policy, 
criticizing it as status quo thinking regarding the peninsula (interview with Cho Eunil, 
April 2019; interview with Yoon Young-Kwan, May 2019). The two countries' white 
papers underscore the diverging approaches. While the Japanese white paper of August 
2018 describes North Korea as an "unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat" (Lee 
and Oba 2019), Seoul's own paper ofJanuary 2019 dropped the regime's designation as 
an "enemy" (Onchi 2019). The difference in views has bred mutual mistrust and resent
ment in Tokyo and Seoul. 
Contrasting perspectives on China have also caused strains between the two countries. 
The gap was particularly wide during the Park administration, and while it has narrowed 
since, divergences could resurface as irritants in the future. When Park began her presi
dency in 2013, Japanese policymakers were highly concerned about China's assertiveness, 
particularly its maritime activities in the East and South China Sea. Japanese feelings toward 
China deteriorated rapidly after a Chinese fishing vessel collided with a Japanese Coast 
Guard ship around the islands in September 2010. The territorial dispute with Beijing 
further escalated in 2012 and 2013, prompting concerns about a possible military clash. 
Intent on pressuring Pyongyang, Park sought to improve relations with Beijing to 
drive a wedge between North Korea and its Chinese patron and ally. Her policy of 
upgrading relations with Beijing through summitry while taking an uncompromising 
stance toward Tokyo was widely interpreted as China-tilting in Japan. Such perceptions 
were fortified by Park's decision to join the September 2015 military parade in Beijing 
celebrating the 70th anniversary of China's victory over Japan in the Second World 
War-making her the only leader of a US-allied country to attend (Sakaki and 
Nishino 2018, 748). To many Japanese, Seoul was siding with China in a joint "history 
offensive" (Nam 2017). Tokyo's leaders feared an increasing Korean acceptance of a new 
Chinese-led regional order supplanting the existing US-led order. 
858 ALEXANDRA SAKAKI 
Seoul views China mainly through the prism of its North Korea policy, in addition to 
seeing it as an important economic partner, as discussed below. China is considered an 
important stakeholder on the peninsula, whose endorsement is indispensable for real
izing the goal of Korean unification. China is not only the North's formal ally but also a 
signatory to the armistice of 1953. Moreover, an estimated 90 percent of North Korean 
trade is with China, providing Beijing with leverage. Seoul is thus cautious not to 
antagonize Beijing by appearing to pursue a strategy of balancing (interview with Lee 
Sook-Jong, March 2017). Some South Korean observers fear that deepening security 
cooperation with the US and Japan could prompt closer alignment between China, 
North Korea, and Russia, thus reinstating Cold War divisions and perpetuating the 
peninsula's status quo (interview with Kim Ki-Jung, May 2019). 
Nevertheless, South Koreans are not fully comfortable with Chinese assertiveness 
and have grown more cautious in recent years. Seoul's June 2016 decision to install an 
American anti-missile system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
became a turning point in the Korean debate. Beijing protested the decision, exerting 
immense economic and political pressure, including the suspension of group travel by 
Chinese tourists. Seoul was shocked by Beijing's heavy-handed tactics, seemingly dis
counting Korean defense and security interests. President Moon mended ties with 
Beijing over the dispute in October 2017, pledging not to deploy additional THAAD 
batteries.'Nevertheless, Korea's view of China has changed dramatically as a result of the 
episode (interview with Song Whasup, April 2019). In the words of one government 
official, Koreans saw "the true color of China" (interview with official of the Korean 
government, March 2017). 
Japanese observers continue to see China as a major challenge to the US-led liberal 
order in the region, but fears of a military clash have weakened somewhat, as Tokyo and 
Beijing have improved their channels of communication since around 2017. Therefore, 
the Japanese-Korean gap in threat perceptions regarding China seems to have nar
rowed. Still, whereas Japan continues to focus on the systemic challenges posed by 
China, South Korea remains more focused on inter-Korean dynamics in its outlook 
toward Beijing. Therefore, differing foreign policy priorities to China could rekindle 
frictions between Tokyo and Seoul in the future. 
Shifting Economic Ties: Japan's Decreasing Importance 
During the Cold War and into the '990S, South Korea was highly dependent on the 
Japanese economy. When relations were normalized in 1965, Korea lagged far behind in 
economic development, with GDP per capita around US$lOo-about a tenth of/apan's 
(Kim Gyu-Pan 2017, 24). That year, Japan's share of Korea's total trade was around 34 per
cent, second only to the US share of 39 percent (Kim Gyu-Pan 2017, 25). Ever since nor
malization, Korea has benefitted from Japanese economic aid and investments as well as 
technological know-how. 
THE JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RIFT 859 
However, Japans relative importance to the Korean economy declined drastically, as 
South Korea emerged as a globalized economy with high technological standards and 
diversified trade relations. By 2018, Korea was the world's twelfth-largest economy. 
Simultaneously, regional economic relations have been affected by China's economic 
rise, resulting in a growing share of Korean trade with China. By contrast, Japans share 
of Korean trade has been in steady decline, even though the bilateral trade volume in 
absolute terms has increased since 1990 (Sakaki and Wacker 2017, 17-18). In the twenty
five years between 1993 and 2018, Japans share of South Korean total trade fell from 18.3 
to 7.5 percent (IMF 2019). In the same period, China's share increased from 5.3 to 23.6 
percent. In fact, China's share has been larger than that of Japan and the United States 
combined since 2009. Moreover, Japan was surpassed by China as the biggest source 
of South Korean imports in 2007 (Mukoyama 2012, 6). China has emerged as a major 
destination of Korean investments. Almost one-quarter of South Korea's foreign 
direct investment goes to China, against just around 2 percent to Japan (Sakaki and 
Wacker 2017, 22). 
Many policymakers in Japan fear that Korea's economic dependence on China has led 
to growing political dependence, which may result in Seoul's acceptance of a Beijing-led 
regional order. Such concerns were reinforced by Seoul's decision in 2015 to join the 
Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, an institution widely seen as created 
to rival the US-and Japan-led Asian Development Bank (Sakaki and Nishino 2018, 751). 
While South Korea is now highly dependent on China's economy, there are still areas 
where the country remains reliant on Japan. In particular, Korea depends on Japan for a 
number of strategic parts and materials in the production of semiconductors and smart
phone displays. Approximately 32.0 percent of semiconductor and chip-making equip
ment was imported from Japan in 2018, making it the most important country of origin 
(Obe and Kim 2019). Japan's tightening of export controls in the summer of 2019 thus 
caused alarm in Korea about a possible disruption of supply chains. The effect of Seoul's 
countermeasure-a 237.2 billion won supplemental budget (around US$199 million) to 
promote domestic production of semiconductor parts and materials in order to lessen 
the country's dependence on Japan-remains to be seen (Takayasu 2019). 
CONCLUSION 
Compared to past historical disputes in Japan-Korea ties, tensions since 2011 have run 
deeper, and mutual mistrust has hit unseen heights. Frustration, anger, and feelings of 
betrayal regarding Korea have grown dramatically in Japan-among both political elites 
and the public. Leaders in the two capitals publicly question whether the other side 
shares similar strategic goals and values. Reflecting doubts about commonly held values, 
Tokyo changed its description of South Korea in its diplomatic bluebook in 2015, 
eliminating a reference to the "share [d 1 fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, 
860 
ALEXANDRA SAKAKI 
and respect for basic human rights" (Sakaki and Nishino 2018, 749). Likewise, Seoul 
dropped the phrase referring to the shared "basic values of liberal democracy and 
market economy" with Japan in its 2018 white paper (Onchi 2019). Evidently, the two 
key democracies in East Asia view each other with deep suspicion. 
Historical disputes and competitive elements of national identity between the two 
countries remain key factors for understanding bilateral frictions. Yet the rapid deterio
ration of relations since 2011 seems to signify a deeper change in the relationship, as the 
traditional bonds that underpinned cooperation have eroded. As argued above, the rela
tionship has come under pressure from the "inside" (Le., the domestic-societal contexts 
of both countries), and from the "outside" (Le., international changes), as well as the 
interaction between both spheres. Domestically, the two countries' societies have
affected by generational changes-moved along clashing paths, with Koreans striving 
for more reflection on the past while Japanese seek a more forward-looking perspective. 
In terms of international changes, the end of the Cold War, the relative decline of the 
United States, and the rise of China have elicited different strategic responses from 
Tokyo and Seoul, breeding mistrust. Moreover, amid shifting economic ties in the 
region, Japan's relative importance to Korea has fallen, while China has become the most 
important economic partner. 
South Korea's democratization has undoubtedly had positive effects on Japan-Korea 
ties-for example, facilitating joint initiatives and cooperation on the multilateral stage 
as well as allowing more societal exchanges-but it has ironically also been a source of 
friction. The pluralization of Korea's domestic discourse-in itself a sign of a vibrant 
democracy-has led to critical reflections on past foreign policies, accompanied by 
civil society activities, as well as the emergence of a strongly polarized political system. 
From Japan's perspective, South Korean politicS has consequently lost its reliability 
and stability. 
On both sides, policymaking is increasingly driven by emotional nationalism and 
public sentiments. Mindful of electoral consequences, political leaders in Tokyo and 
Seoul increasingly cling to nationalist positions. Meanwhile, public debates and media 
reports on both sides lack the effort to engage with the other side's viewpoints. Many 
articles resort to stereotypes, with a Japanese article, for example, flatly asserting that 
Koreans tend to think emotionally rather than rationally (Katata 2019, 82). In both 
countries, the scope for public debate on the relationship has thus narrowed. As a par
ticularly controversial case in Japan, the mayor of Nag ay a, Takashi Kawamura, ordered 
a publicly funded art exhibition to be closed in August 2019, arguing that the featured 
comfort woman statue could give the wrong impression that Japan accepts Seoul's claim 
that the women were forcibly recruited (Mainichi Shimbun 2019). The temporary exhi
bition was reopened for a short period in October 2019, but the prefectural and central 
governments withdrew their financial support. Arguably, the shutdown of the event
ironically entitled ''After 'Freedom of Expression' "-was an act of censorship, thus not 
boding well for Japanese democracy. 
The rift between East Asia's two most important democracies could easily affect the 
regional balance of power, weakening America's position as an ally of both Japan and 
THE JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RIFT 
861 
Korea. It will require significant political courage, wisdom, and finesse on the part of 
both Seoul and Tokyo to return relations to a more positive trajectory.