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211 B.R. 899 (1997) In re Scott A. HARTMAN and Tamara L. Hartman, Debtors. Bankruptcy No. 96-83249. United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. Illinois. August 20, 1997. Gary T. Rafool, Peoria, IL, Chapter 7 Trustee. James S. Brannon, Peoria, IL, for debtors. OPINION WILLIAM V. ALTENBERGER, Chief Judge. Before the Court is the Chapter 7 Trustee's objection to the Debtors' claim of homestead exemption. *900 Prior to her marriage to Scott Hartman, Tamara Hartman purchased a home which she mortgaged. When she married Scott Hartman, he signed the mortgage note. From the time of their marriage, payments on the mortgage note were made from a joint checking account. For a time before and after their child was born, the sole source of the mortgage payments was the earnings of Scott Hartman. The terms of the mortgage note required that the mortgage debt be rewritten in November, 1997, and the Debtors planned to put title to the house in both their names at that time. On October 24, 1996, the Debtors filed a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy. Title to the home remained solely in Tamara Hartman's name. The Debtors each claimed a $7,500.00 homestead exemption. The Trustee objected to the homestead exemption claimed by Scott Hartman, asserting that only Tamara Hartman was entitled to claim a homestead exemption of $7,500.00. A hearing was held and the parties stipulated to the facts and submitted briefs. Both sides have cited Illinois bankruptcy court decisions in support of their positions. At issue in this case is the interpretation of the Illinois statute governing homestead exemptions, which provides, in relevant part: Every individual is entitled to an estate of homestead to the extent in value of $7,500 of his or her interest in a farm or lot of land and buildings thereon, a condominium, or personal property, owned or rightly possessed by lease or otherwise and occupied by him or her as a residence. . . . 735 ILCS 5/12-901. The statute has two requirements. Taken in reverse order, the first is that the property must be occupied by the party claiming the exemption. In the case before this Court, Mr. Hartman was doing so. The second is that the party claiming the exemption must either "own" or "rightly possess by lease or otherwise" the property. In the case before this Court, as Mr. Hartman has no title to the property he cannot be said to be an owner, nor was a lease involved. The issue is whether he otherwise rightly possessed the property, within the meaning of the statute, which would entitle him to claim an exemption. The Debtors rely principally upon Matter of Reuter, 56 B.R. 39 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1985). In that case, the bankruptcy court held that the spouse of a titled owner of the marital residence was also entitled to claim a homestead exemption. Reaching this conclusion, the bankruptcy court stated: Illinois courts have consistently interpreted the phrase, "owned or rightly possessed by lease or otherwise", to mean that the debtor had to