I need you to help me read through this. . I need you to attach notes to it to help me understand it and make my reading process easier. So, spit the entire passage back out, but with notes. Also keep in mind, there are some misplaced characters or words because i copy and pasted directly from a pdf, which may or may not include pages, page titles, page numbers, etc. Here is the passage:

You are more than entitled not to know what the word ‘per-
formative’ means. It is a new word and an ugly word, and
perhaps it does not mean anything very much. But at any rate
there is one thing in its favour, it is not a profound word. |
remember once when I had been talking on-this subject that
somebody afterwards said: “You know, I haven’t the least idea
what he means, unless it could be that he simply means what
he says’. Well, that is what I should like to mean. -

Let us consider first how this affair arises. We have not got
to go very far back in the history of philosophy to find philo-
sophers assuming more or less as a matter of course that the
sole business, the sole interesting business, of any utterance—
that is, of anything we say-~is to be true or at least false. Of
course they had always known that there are other kinds of
things which we say—things like imperatives, the expressions

of wishes, and exclamations—some of which had even been

classified by grammarians, though it wasn’t perhaps too easy

to tell always which was which. But still philosophers have.

assumed that the only things that they are interested in are
utterances which report facts or which describe situations truly
or falsely. In recent times this kind of approach has been

~ questioned—in two stages, I think. First of all people began to

say: “Well, if these things are true or false it ought to be possible
to decide which they are, and if we can’t decide which they
are they aren’t any good but are, in short, nonsense’. And this
new approach did a great deal of good; a great many things
2340 PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

which probably are nonsense were found to be such. It is not
the case, I think, that all kinds of nonsense have been ade-
quately classified yet, and perhaps some things have been dis-
missed as nonsense which really are not; but still this movement,
the verification movement, was, in its way, excellent.
However, we then come to the second stage. After all, we
set some limits to the amount of nonsense that we talk, or at
least the amount of nonsense that we are prepared to admit
we talk; and so people began to ask whether after all some
of those things which, treated as statements, were in danger
of being dismissed as nonsense did after all really set out.
to be statements at all. Mightn’t they perhaps be intended
not to report facts but to influence people in this way or that,
“or to let off steam in this way or that? Or perhaps at any rate
some elements in these utterances performed such functions,
or, for example, drew attention in some way (without actually
reporting it) to some important feature of the circumstances
in which the utterance was being made. On these lines people
have now adopted a new slogan, the slogan of the ‘different uses
of language’. The old approach, the old statemental approach,
is sometimes called even a fallacy, the descriptive fallacy.
Certainly there are a great many uses of language. It’s rather
a pity that people are apt to invoke a new use of language
whenever they feel so inclined, to help them. out of this, that,
or the other well-known philosophical tangle; we need more
ofa framework in which to discuss these uses of language; and
also I think we should not despair too easily and talk, as people
are apt to do, about the infinite uses of language. Philosophers
will do this when they have listed as many, let us say, as seven-
teen; but even if there were something like ten thousand uses
of language, surely we could list them all in time. This, after
all, is no larger than the number of species of beetle that ento-
mologists have taken the pains to list, But whatever the defects
of either of these movements—the ‘verification’ movement or
the ‘use of language’ movement—at any rate they have effected,
nobody could deny, a great revolution in philosophy and,

PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES 235

many would say, the most salutary in its history. (Not, if you
come to think of it, a very immodest claim.)

Now it is one such sort of use of language that I want to
examine here. I want to discuss a kind of utterance which looks
like a statement and grammatically, I suppose, would be classed
as a statement, which is not nonsensical,-and yet is not true or
false. These are not going to be utterances which contain curious
verbs like ‘could’ or ‘might’, or curious words like ‘good’,
which many philosophers regard nowadays simply as danger
signals. They will be perfectly straightforward utterances, with
ordinary verbs in the first person singular present indicative
active, and. yet we shall see at once that they couldn’t possibly
be true or false. Furthermore, if a person makes an utterance
of this sort we should say that he is doing something rather than
merely saying something. This may sound a little odd, but the
examples I shall give will in fact not be odd at all, and may
even seem decidedly dull. Here are three or four. Suppose, for:
example, that in the course of a marriage ceremony I say, as
people will, ‘I do’—(sc. take this woman to be my lawful
wedded -wife). Or again, suppose that I tread on your toe and
say ‘I apologize’. Or again, suppose that I have the bottle of
champagne in my hand and say ‘I name this ship the Queen
Elizabeth’. Or suppose I say ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain
tomorrow’. In all these cases it would be absurd to regard the
thing that I say as a report of the performance of the action
which is undoubtedly done—the action of betting, or christen-
ing, or apologizing. We should say rather that, in saying what
I do, I actually perform that action. When I say ‘I name this
ship the Queen Elizabeth’ I do not describe the christening
ceremony, I actually perform the christening; and when I say
‘I do’ (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife),
I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it.

Now these kinds of utterance are the ones that we call per-
formative utterances, This is rather an ugly word, and a new
word, but there seems to be no word already in existence to

- do the job. The nearest approach that I can think of is the word
236 PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

‘operative’, as used by lawyers. Lawyers when talking about
legal instruments will distinguish between the preamble, which
recites the circumstances in which a transaction is effected, and
on the other hand the operative part—the part of it which
actually performs the legal act which it is the purpose of the
instrument to perform. So the word ‘operative’ is very near to
what we want. ‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’
would be an operative clause and is a performative utterance.
However, the word ‘operative’ has other uses, and it seems
preferable to have a word specially designed for the use we want.
Now at this point one might protest, perhaps even with
some alarm, that I seem to be suggesting that marrying is
simply saying a few words, that just saying a few words is
marrying. Well, that certainly is not the case. The words have
to be said in the appropriate circumstances, and this is a matter
that will come up again later. But the one thing we must not
suppose is that what is needed in addition to the saying of the
words in such cases is the performance of some internal spiritual
act, of which the words then are to be the report. It’s very easy
to slip into this view at least in difficult, portentous cases,
though perhaps not so easy in simple cases like apologizing. In
the case of promising—for example, ‘I promise to be there
tomorrow’—it’s very easy to think that the utterance is simply
the outward and visible (that is, verbal) sign of the performance
of some inward spiritual act of promising, and this view has
certainly been expressed in many classic places. There is the
case of Euripides’ Hippolytus, who said ‘My tongue swore to,
but my heart did not’—perhaps it should be ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’
rather than ‘heart’, but at any rate some kind of backstage
artiste. Now it is clear from this sort of example that, if we slip
into thinking that such utterances are reports, true or false, of
the performance of inward and spiritual acts, we open a loop-
hole to perjurers and welshers and bigamists and so on, so that
there are disadvantages in being excessively solemn in this way.
It is better, perhaps, to stick to the old saying that our word is
our bond.

PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES 237

However, although these utterances do not themselves
report facts and are not themselves true or false, saying these
things does very often imply that certain things are true and
not false, in some sense at least of that rather woolly word
‘imply’. For example, when I say ‘I do take this woman to be
my lawful wedded wife’, or some other formula in the marriage
ceremony, I do imply that I'm not already married, with wife
living, sane, undivorced, and the rest of it. But still it is very
important to realize that to imply that something or other is
true, is not at all the same as saying something which is true
itself.

These performative utterances are not true or false, then.
But they do suffer from certain disabilities of their own. They
can fail to come off in special ways, and that is what I want to

consider next. The various ways in which a performative

utterance may be unsatisfactory we call, for the sake of a name,
the infelicities; and an infelicity arises—that is to say, the utter~
ance is unhappy—if certain rules, transparently simple rules,
ate broken. [ will mention some of these rules and then give
examples of some infringements.

First of all, it is obvious that the conventional procedure
which by our utterance we are purporting to use must actually
exist. In the examples given here this procedure will be a verbal
one, a verbal procedure for marrying or giving or whatever
it may be; but it should be borne in mind that there are many
non-verbal procedures by which we can perform exactly the
same acts as we perform by these verbal means. It’s worth
remembering too that a great many of the things we do are
at least in part of this conventional kind. Philosophers at least
are too apt to assume that an action is always in the last resort
the making of a physical movement, whereas it’s usually, at
least in part, a matter of convention.

The first cule is, then, that the convention invoked must
exist and be accepted. And the second rule, also a very obvious
one, is that the circumstances in which we purport to invoke

‘this procedure must be appropriate for its invocation. If this is

238 ; PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

not observed, then the act that we purport to perform would
not come off—it will be, one might say, a misfire. This will
also be the case if, for example, we do not carry through the
procedure—whatever it may be—correctly and completely,
without a flaw and without a hitch. Ifany of these rules are not
observed, we say that the act which we purported to perform
is void, without effect. If, for example, the purported act was
an act of marrying, then we should say that we ‘went through
a form’ of marriage, but we did not actually succeed in marrying.

Here are some examples of this kind of misfire. Suppose that,
living in a country like our own, we wish to divorce our wife.
We may try standing her in front of us squarely in the room

and saying, in a voice loud enough for all to hear, *t divorce.

- you’. Now this procedure is not accepted. We shall not thereby
have succeeded in divorcing our wife, at least in this country
and others like it, This is a case where the convention, .we
should say, does not exist or is not accepted. Again, suppose
that, picking sides at a children’s party, I say ‘T pick George’.
But George turns red in the face and says “Not playing’. In that
case I plainly, for some reason or another, have not picked
George—whether because there is no convention that you can
pick people who aren’t playing, or because George in the
circumstances is an inappropriate object for the procedure of
picking. Or consider the case in which I say ‘T appoint you
Consul’, and it turns out that you have been appointed already
—or perhaps it may even transpire that you are a horse; here
again we have the infelicity of inappropriate circumstances,
inappropriate objects, or what not. Examples of flaws and
hitches are perhaps scarcely necessary—one party in the
marriage ceremony says ‘I will’, the other says ‘I won't’; I say
‘I bet sixpence’, but nobody says ‘Done’, nobody takes up the
offer. In all these and other such cases, the act which we pur-
port to perform, or set out to perform, is not achieved.

But there is another and a rather different way in which this
kind of utterance may go wrong. A good many of these
verbal procedures are designed for use by people who hold

PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES 239

certain beliefs or have certain feelings or intentions. And if you
use one of these formulae when you do not have the requisite
thoughts or feelings or intentions then there is an abuse of the
procedure, there is insincerity. Take, for example, the expres-
sion, ‘I congratulate you’. This is designed for use by people
who are glad that the person addressed has achieved a certain
feat, believe that he was personally responsible for the success,
and so on. If I say ‘I congratulate you’ when I’m not pleased
or when I don’t believe that the credit was yours, then there is
insincerity. Likewise if I say I promise to do something, with-
out having the least intention of doing it or without believing
it feasible. In these cases there is something wrong certainly,

. but it is not like a misfire. We should not say that I didn’t in

fact promise, but rather that I did promise but promised in-
sincerely; I did congratulate you but the congratulations were
hollow. And there may be an infelicity of a somewhat similar
kind when the performative utterance commits the speaker to
future conduct of a certain description and then in the future
he does not in fact behave in the expected way. This is very
obvious, of course, if I promise to do something and then
break my promise, but there are many kinds of commitment
of a rather less tangible form than that in the case of promising.
For instance, I may say ‘I welcome you’, bidding you welcome
to my home or wherever it may be, but then I proceed to treat
you as though you were exceedingly unwelcome. In this case
the procedure of saying ‘I welcome you’ has been abused in a
way tather different from that of simple insincerity.

Now we might ask whether this list of infelicities is com-
plete, whether the kinds of infelicity are mutually exclusive,
and so forth. Well, it is not complete, and they are not mutually
exclusive; they never are. Suppose that you are just about to
name the ship, you have been appointed to name it, and you
are just about to bang the bottle against the stem; but at that
very moment some low type comes up, snatches the bottle out
of your hand, breaks it on the stem, shouts out ‘I name this ship
the .Generalissimo Stalin’, and then for good measure kicks
240 PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

away the chocks. Well, we agree of course on several things.
We agree that the ship certainly isn’tnow named the Generalis-
simo Stalin, and we agree that it’s an infernal shame and so on
and so forth. But we may not agree as to how we should classify
the particular infelicity in this case. We might say that here is
a case of a perfectly legitimate and agreed procedure which,
however, has been invoked in the wrong circumstances,
namely by the wrong person, this low type instead of the
person appointed to do it, But on the other hand we might
look at it differently and say that this is a case where the pro-
cedure has not as a whole been gone through correctly, because
part of the procedure for naming a ship is that you should
first of all get yourself appointed as the person to do the
naming and that’s what this fellow did not do. Thus the way
we should classify infelicities in different cases will be perhaps
zather a difficult matter, and may even in the last resort be a bit
arbitrary. But of course lawyers, who have to deal very much
with this kind of thing, have invented all kinds of technical
terms and have made numerous rules about different kinds of
cases, which enable them to classify fairly rapidly what in
particular is wrong in any given case.

As for whether this list is complete, it certainly is not. One
farther way in which things may go wrong is, for example,
through what in general may be called misunderstanding.
You may not hear what I say, or you may understand me to
refer to something different from what I intended to refer to,
and so on. And apart from further additions which we might
make to the list, there is the general over-riding consideration
that, as we are performing an act when we issue these per-

formative utterances, we may of course be doing so under

duress or in some other circumstances which make us not
entirely responsible for doing what we are doing. That would
certainly be an unhappiness of a kind—any kind of non-
responsibility might be called an unhappiness; but of course
it is a quite different kind of thing from what we have been
talking about. And I might mention that, quite differently

PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES 241

again, we could be issuing any of these utterances, as we can
issue an utterance of .any kind whatsoever, in the course, for
example, of acting a play or making a joke or writing a poem—
in which case of course it would not be seriously meant and we
shall not be able to say that we seriously performed the act
concerned. If the poet says “Go and catch a falling star’ or
whatever it may be, he doesn’t seriously issue an order Con-
siderations of this kind apply to any utterance at all, not merely
to performatives.

That, then, is perhaps enough to be going on with. We have
discussed the performative utterance and its infelicities. That
equips us, we may suppose, with two shining new tools to
crack the crib of reality maybe. It also equips us—it always
does—with two shining new skids under our metaphysical feet.
The question is how we use them,

II

So far we have been going firmly ahead, feeling the firm
ground of prejudice glide away beneath our feet which is
always rather exhilarating, but what next? You will be waiting
for the bit when we bog down, the bit where we take it all
back, and sure enough that’s going to come but it will take
time. First of all let us ask a rather simple question. How can
we be sure, how can we tell, whether any utterance is to be
classed as a performative or not? Surely, we feel, we ought to
be able to do that. And we should obviously very much like
to be able to say that there is a grammatical criterion for this,
some grammatical means of deciding whether an utterance is
performative, All the examples I have given hitherto do in
fact have the same grammatical form; they all of them begin
with the verb in the first person singular present indicative
active—not just any kind of verb of course, but still they all
are in fact of that form. Furthermore, with these verbs that I
have used there is a typical asymmetry between the use of this
person and tense of the verb and the use of the same verb in

242 PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

other persons and other tenses, and this asymmetry is rather an
important clue.
For example, when we say ‘T promise that Leey the case is
very different from when we say ‘He promises that _- +) OF in
the past tense ‘I promised that. . ”. For when we say I promise
that...’ we do perform an act of promising—we give a
promise. What we do not do is to report on somebody's per-
forming an act of promising—in particular, we do not report
on somebody’s use of the expression ‘I promise’. We actually
do use it and do the promising. But if T say ‘He promises , or
in the past tense ‘I promised’, I precisely do report on an act of
promising, that is to say an act of using this formula I promise
—J report on a present act of promising by him, or on a past
act of my own. There is thus a clear difference between our
first person singular present indicative active, and other
persons and tenses. This is brought out by the typical incident
of little Willie whose uncle says he'll give him halfa-crown
if he promises never to smoke till he’s 5 $ Little Willie's
anxious parent will say ‘Of course he promises, don t you,
Willie?’ giving him a nudge, and little Willie just docsn t
vouchsafe. The point here is that he must do the promising
himself by saying ‘I promise’, and his parent is going too fast
in saying he promises.
That, then, is a bit of a test for whether an utterance is per~
formative or not, but it would not do to suppose that every
performative utterance has to take this standard form. There
is at least one other standard form, every bit as common as this
one, where the verb is in the passive woice and in the.second or
third person, not in the first. The sort of case I mean is that of
a notice inscribed ‘Passengers are warned to cross the line by
the bridge only’, or of a document reading ‘You are hereby
authorized’ to do so-and-so. These are undoubtedly per-
formative, and in fact a signature is often required in order to
show who it is that is doing the act of warning, or authorizing,
or whatever it may be. Very typical of this kind of performa-
tive—especially liable to occur in written documents of course

PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES 243

~—is that the little word ‘hereby’ either actually occurs or might
naturally be inserted.

Unfortunately, however, we still can’t possibly suggest
that every utterance which is to be classed as a performative
has to take one or another of these two, as we might call them,
standard forms. After all it would be a very typical performative
utterance to say ‘I order you to shut the door’. This satisfies all
the criteria. It is performing the act of ordering you to shut the
door, and it is not true or false. But in the appropriate circum-
stances surely we could perform exactly the same act by simply
saying “Shut the door’, in the imperative. Or again, suppose
that somebody sticks up a notice “This bull is dangerous’, or
simply ‘Dangerous bull’, or simply ‘Bull’. Does this necessarily
differ from sticking up a notice, appropriately signed, saying
“You are hereby warned that this bull is dangerous’? It seems
that the simple notice ‘Bul? can do just the same job as the
more elaborate formula. Of course the difference is that if we
just stick up ‘Bull’ it would not be quite clear that it is a warn-
ing; it might be there just for interest or information, like
‘Wallaby’ on the cage at the zoo, or ‘Ancient Monument’.
No doubt we should know from the nature of the case that it
was a warning, but it would not be explicit.

Well, in view of this break-down of grammatical criteria,
what we should like to suppose—and there is a good deal in
this—is that any utterance which is performative could be
reduced or expanded or analysed into one of these two standard
forms beginning ‘I...’ so and so or beginning ‘You (or he)
hereby...’ so and so. If there was any justification for this hope,
as to some extent there is, then we might hope to make a list
of all the verbs which can appear in these standard forms, and
then we might classify the kinds of acts that can be performed
by performative utterances, We might do this with the aid of
a dictionary, using such a test as that already mentioned—
whether thete is the characteristic asymmetry between the first
person sirigular present indicative active and the other persons
and tenses—in order to decide whether a verb is to go into our
. 244 PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

list or not. Now if we make such a list of verbs we do in fact
find that they fall into certain fairly well-marked classes. There
is the class of cases where we deliver verdicts and make esti-
mates and appraisals of various kinds. There is the class where
we give undertakings, commit ourselves in various ways by
saying something. There is the class where by saying something
we exercise various rights and powers, such as appointing and
voting and so on. And there are one or two other fairly well-
marked classes.

Suppose this task accomplished. Then we could call these
verbs in our list explicit performative verbs, and any utterance
that was reduced to one or the other of our standard forms we
could call an explicit performative utterance. ‘I order you to
shut the door’ would be an explicit performative utterance,
whereas ‘Shut the door’ would not—that is simply a ‘primary’
performative utterance or whatever we like to call it. In using
the imperative we may be ordering you to shut the door, but
it just isn’t made clear whether we are ordering you or
entreating you or imploring you or beseeching you or inciting

you or tempting you, or one or another of many other subtly:

different acts which, in an unsophisticated primitive language,
are very likely not yet discriminated. But we need not over-
estimate the unsophistication of primitive languages. There

are a great many devices that can be used for making clear, _

even at the primitive level, what act it is we are performing
when we say something—the tone of voice, cadence, gesture—
and above all we can rely upon the nature of the circumstances,
the context in. which the utterance is issued. This very often
makes it quite unmistakable whether it is an order that is being
given or whether, say, I am simply urging you or entreating
you. We may, for instance, say something like this: “Coming
from him I was bound to take it as an order’. Still, in spite of
all these devices, there is an unfortunate amount of ambiguity
and lack of discrimination in default of our explicit performa-
tive verbs. If I say something like ‘I shall be there’, it may not
be certain whether it is a promise, or an expression of intention,

PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES 245

or perhaps even a forecast of my future behaviour, of what is
going to happen to me; and it may matter a good deal, at least
in developed societies, precisely which of these things it is. And
that is why the explicit performative verb is evolved—to make
clear exactly which it is, how far it commits me and. in what
way, and so forth.

This is just one way in which language develops in tune with
the society of which it is the language. The social habits of the
society may considerably affect the question of which per-
formative verbs are evolved and which, sometimes for rather
irrelevant reasons, are not. For example, if I say “You are a
poltroon’, it might be that I am censuring you or it might be
that I am insulting you. Now since apparently society approves
of censuring or reprimanding, we have here evolved a formula
‘T reprimand you’, or ‘I censure you’, which enables us expedi-
tiously to get this desirable business over. But on the other
hand, since apparently we don’t approve of insulting, we have
not evolved a simple formula ‘T insult you’, which might have
done just as well,

By means of these explicit performative verbs and some
other devices, then, we make explicit what precise act it is that
we are performing when we issue our utterance. But here |
would like to put in a word of warning. We must distinguish
between the function of making explicit what act it is we are
performing, and the quite different matter of stating what act
it is we are performing. In issuing an explicit performative
utterance we are not stating what act it is, we are showing or
making explicit what act it is. We can draw a helpful parallel
here with another case in which the act, the conventional act
that we perform, is not a speech-act but a physical performance.
Suppose I appear before you one day and bow deeply from the
waist. Well, this is ambiguous. I may be simply observing the
local flora, tying my shoe-lace, something of that kind; on
the other hand, conceivably I might be doing obeisance to you.
Well, to clear up this ambiguity we have some device such as.

raising the hat, saying ‘Salaam’, or something of that kind, to

824846 I
246 PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

make it quite plain that the act being performed is the con-
ventional one of doing obeisance rather than some other act.
Now nobody would want to say that lifting your hat was
stating that you were performing an act of obeisance; it
certainly is not, but it does make it quite plain that you are.
And so in the same way to say ‘I warn you that...” or ‘I order
you to...’ or ‘I promise that . . .’ is not to state that you are
doing something, but makes it plain that you are—it does
constitute your verbal performance, a performance of a parti-
cular kind.
So far we have been going along as though there was a quite
clear difference between our performative utterances and what
we have contrasted them with, statements or reports or de-
scriptions. But now we begin to find that this distinction is not
as clear as it might be. It’s now that we begin to sink in a little.
In the first place, of course, we may feel doubts as to how
widely our performatives extend. If we think up some odd
kinds of expression we use in odd cases, we might very well
wonder whether or not they satisfy our rather vague criteria
for being performative utterances. Suppose, for example,
somebody says ‘Hurrah’. Well, not true or false; he is perform-
ing the act of cheering. Does that make it a performative
utterance in our sense or not? Or suppose he says ‘Damn’; he
is performing the act of swearing, and it is not true or false.
Does that make it performative? We feel that in a way it does
and yet it’s rather different. Again, consider cases of ‘suiting
the action to the words’; these too may make us wonder
whether perhaps the utterance should be classed as performa~
tive. Or sometimes, if somebody says ‘I am sorry’, we wonder
whether this is just the same as ‘I apologize’—in which case of
course we have said it’s a performative utterance—or whether
perhaps it’s to be taken as a description, true or false, of the
state of his feelings. If he had said ‘I feel perfectly awful about
it’, then we should think it must be meant to be a description
of the state of his feelings. Ifhe had said ‘T apologize’, we should
feel this was clearly a performative utterance, going through

PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES 2497

the ritual of apologizing, But if he says ‘I am sorry’ there is an
unfortunate hovering between the two. This phenomenon is
quite common. We often find cases in which there is an
obvious pure performative utterance and obvious other utter-
ances commected with it which are not performative but de-
scriptive, but on the other hand a good many in between
where we're not quite sure which they are. On some occasions
of course they are obviously used the one way, on some occa-
sions the other way, but on some occasions they seem positively
to revel in ambiguity.

Again, consider the case of the umpire when he says ‘Out’
or ‘Over’, or the jury’s utterance when they say that they find
the prisoner guilty. Of course, we say, these are cases of giving
verdicts, performing the act of appraising and so forth, but still
in a way they have some connexion with the facts. They seem
to have something like the duty to be true or false, and seem

not to be so very remote from statements. If the umpire says

‘Over’, this surely has at least something to do with six balls
in fact having been delivered rather than seven, and so on. In
fact in general we may remind ourselves that ‘I state that...’
does not look so very different from ‘I warn you that...’ or
‘I promise to .. .”. It makes clear surely that the act that we
are performing is an act of stating, and so functions just like ‘I
warn’ or ‘I order’. So isn’t ‘I state that . . .” a performative
utterance? But then one may feel that utterances beginning
‘I state that .. .’ do have to be true or false, that they are state-
ments.

Considerations of this sort, then, may well make us feel
pretty unhappy. If we look back for a moment at our contrast
between statements and performative utterances, we realize
that we were taking statements very much on trust from, as we
said, the traditional treatment. Statements, we had it, were to
be true or false; performative utterances on the other hand
were to be felicitous or infelicitous. They were the doing of
something, whereas for all we said making statements was not
doing something. Now this contrast surely, if we look back

248 PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

at it, is unsatisfactory. Of course statements are liable to be
assessed. in this matter of their correspondence or failure to
correspond with the facts, that is, being true or false. But they
are also liable to infelicity every bit as much as are performative
utterances, In fact some troubles that have arisen in the study
of statements recently can be shown to be simply troubles of
infelicity. For example, it has been pointed out that there is
something very odd about saying something like this: “The cat
is on the mat but I don’t believe it is’. Now this is an owt-
rageous thing to say, but it is not self-contradictory. There is
no reason why the cat shouldn’t be on the mat without my
believing that it is. So how are we to classify what’s wrong
with this peculiar statement ¢ If we remember now the doctrine
of infelicity we shall see that the person who makes this remark
about the cat is in much the same position as somebody who
says something like this: ‘I promise that I shall be there, but 1
haven’t the least intention of being there’. Once again you can
of course perfectly well promise to be there without having
the least intention of being there, but there is something out-
rageous about saying it, about actually avowing the insincerity
of the promise you give. In the same way there is insincerity
in the case of the person who says ‘The cat is on the mat but
1 don’t believe it is’, and he is actually avowing that insincerity
—which makes a peculiar kind of nonsense.

A second case that has come to light is the one about John’s

childten—-the case where somebody is supposed to say ‘All

John’s children are bald but John hasn’t got any children’. Or
perhaps somebody says ‘All John’s children are bald’, when as
a matter of fact—he doesn’t say so—John has no children.
Now those who study statements have worried about this;
ought they to say that the statement ‘All John’s children are
bald’ is meaningless in this case? Well, if it is, it is not a bit like
a great many other more standard kinds of meaninglessness;
and we see, if we look back at our list of infelicities, that what
is going wrong here is much the same as what goes wrong in,
say, the case of a contract for the sale of a piece of land when

PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES 249

the piece of land referred to does not exist. Now what we say
in the case of this sale of land, which of course would be effected
by a performative utterance, is that the sale is void—void for
lack of reference or ambiguity of reference; and so we can see
that the statement about all John’s children is likewise void for
lack of reference. And if the man actually says that John has
no children in the same breath as saying they’re all bald, he is
making the same kind of outrageous utterance as the man who
says ‘The cat is on the mat and I don’t believe it is’, or the man
who says ‘I promise to but I don’t intend to’.

In this way, then, ills that have been found to afflict state-
ments can be precisely paralleled with ills that are characteristic
of performative utterances. And after all when we state some-
thing or describe something or report something, we do per-
form an act which is every bit as much an act as an act of
ordering or warning. There seems no good reason why stating
should be given a specially unique position. Of course philo-
sophers have been wont to talk as though you or I or anybody
could just go round stating anything about anything and that
would be perfectly in order, only there’s just a little question:
is it true or false? But besides the little question, is it true or
false, there is surely the question: is it in order? Can you go
round just making statements about anything? Suppose for
example you say to me ‘I’m feeling pretty mouldy this morn-
ing’. Well, I say to you “You're not’; and you say “What the
devil do you mean, I’m not? I say ‘Oh nothing—I’m just
stating you're not, is it true or false?’ And you say “Wait a bit
about whether it’s true or false, the question is what did you
mean by making statements about somebody else’s feelings?
I told you I’m fecling pretty mouldy. You're just not in a
position to say, to state that I’m not’. This brings out that you
can’t just make statements about other people’s feclings
(though you can make guesses if you like); and there are very
many things which, having no knowledge of, not being in a
position to pronounce about, you just can’t state. What we
need to do for the case cf stating, and by the same token
250 PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

describing and reporting, is to take them a bit off their pedestal,
to realize that they are speech-acts no less than all these other
speech-acts that we have been mentioning and talking about
as performative.
Then let us look for a moment at our original contrast
between the performative and the statement from the other
side. In handling performatives we have been putting it all the
time as though the only thing that a performative utterance
had to do was to be felicitous, to come off, not to be a misfire,
not to be an abuse. Yes, but that’s not the end of the matter.
At least in the case of many utterances which, on what we have
said, we should have to class as performative—cases where we
say ‘I warn you to...’, Tadvise you to...’ and so on—there
will be other questions besides simply: was it in order, was it
all right, as a piece of advice or a warning, did it come off?
After that surely there willbe the question: was it good or
sound advice? Was it a justified warning? Or in the case, let us
say, of a verdict or an estimate: was it a good estimate, or
a sound verdict? And these are questions that can only be
decided by considering how the content of the verdict or
estimate is related in some way to fact, or to evidence available
about the facts. This is to say that we do require to assess at
least a great many performative utterances in a general dimen-
sion of correspondence with fact. It may still be said, of course,
that this does not make them very like statements because still
they are not true or false, and that’s a little black and white
speciality that distinguishes statements as a class apart. But
actually—though it would take too long to go on about this—
the more you think about truth and falsity the more you find
that very few statements that we ever utter are just true or just
false. Usually there is the question are they fair or are they not
fair, are they adequate or not adequate, are they exaggerated
or not exaggerated? Are they too rough, or are they perfectly
recise, accurate, and so on? “True” and ‘false’ are just general
labels for a whole dimension of different appraisals which have
something or other to do with the relation between what we

PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES 251

say and the facts. If, then, we loosen up our ideas of truth and

» falsity we shall see that statements, when assessed in relation to

the facts, are not so very different after all from pieces of
advice, warnings, verdicts, and so on.

We see then that stating something is performing an act just
as much as is giving an order or giving a warning; and we see
on the other hand, that, when we give an order or a warning or
a piece of advice, there is a question about how this is related
to fact which is not perhaps so very different from the kind of
question that arises when we discuss how a statement is related
to fact. Well, this seems to mean that in its original form our
distinction between the performative and the statement is
considerably weakened, and indeed breaks down. I will just
make a suggestion as to how to handle this matter. We need
to go very much farther back, to consider all the ways and
senses in which saying anything at all is doing this or that—
because of course it is always doing a good many different
things. And one thing that emerges when we do do this is that
besides the question that has been very much studied in the
past as to. what a certain utterance means, thete is a further
question distinct from this as to ‘what was the force, as we may
call it, of the utterance. We may be quite clear what ‘Shut the
door’ means, but not yet at all clear on the further point as to
whether as uttered at a certain time it was an order, an entreaty
or whatnot. What we need besides the old doctrine about
meanings is a new doctrine about all the possible forces of
utterances, towards the discovery of which our proposed list
of explicit performative verbs would be a very great help; and
then, going on from there, an investigation of the various
terms of appraisal that we use in discussing speech-acts of this
that, or the other precise kind—orders, warnings, and the like.

The notions that we have considered then, are the performa~
tive, the infelicity, the explicit performative, and lastly, rather
hurriedly, the notion of the forces of utterances. [ dare say that
all this seems a little unremunerative, a little complicated.
Well, | suppose in some ways it is unremunerative, and I

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252 PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

suppose it ought to be remunerative. At least, though, I think
that if we pay attention to these matters we can clear up some
mistakes in philosophy; and after all’ philosophy is used as a
scapegoat, it parades mistakes which are really the mistakes of
everybody. We might even clear up some mistakes in grammar,
which perhaps is a little more respectable,

And is it complicated? Well, it is complicated a bit; but life
and truth and things do tend to be complicated. It’s not things,
it’s philosophers that are simple. You will have heard it said,
I expect, that over-simplification is the occupational disease of
philosophers, and in a way one might agree with that. But for
a sneaking suspicion that it’s their occupation.