请将“2.3.2.4	Government
However, the more Foucault turns to the regulation of the population, the more he has to shift the subject of his work. Already at the end of his third lecture on governmentality a ‘far-reaching turning point’ occurs when, ‘in a sort of dramatic theoretical turn’, a shift towards governmentality takes place.497With this term a new area of research opens up; the genealogy of the modern state, ‘the entry of the question of the state into the field of analysis of micro-powers’.498 Foucault arrives by way of biopolitics at security mechanisms and with them at the population. He now sums up himself: ‘While I have been speaking about 
population a word has constantly recurred ... and this is the word “government” ’.4" At the start of the fourth lecture he then says that he only wanted ‘to make a bit of an inventory of this problem of government’.500 In fact, however, he does nothing else from this point on. A ‘bit of an inventory’ turns into a reconstruction of political economy from the perspective of government.
Since engaging with the population, he appears to increasingly hold the view that there are predominately two ‘economies of power’: on the one hand the long since known sovereignty, which however he now defines as the exercise of power over the fine grain of individual behaviours^1 that is, sovereignty now refers to legal and disciplinary power; and on the other hand the ‘government of populations’.502 Thus Foucault’s shift already shows here, when he separates the two elements of brainpower and introduces two economies of power: one is sovereignty, which is directed towards individuals, and the other government, which targets the population. The terms ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’ hardly appear any longer, and biopolitics is even limited to a local technology which inscribes itself in medical institutions.503 Instead he speaks of ‘government’ and ‘governmentality’.
A law cannot be imposed from above upon the population through ‘legalistic voluntarism’, but the population has to be managed according to its own quasi-natural laws by acting upon it through analysis and calculation.504 From now on the question is thus no longer the safety of a territory, but the security of the population. It is not acted upon through laws and minute drills, but one allows circulations to take place and controls them,505 that is, the economy is introduced into the political administration - this is the main activity that matters in governing. Economy in the original sense - the wise government of the house for the common welfare of the whole. What matters is therefore that the inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, are subject to attentive surveillance and control^6 It is not a state or a territory that is governed, but people, individuals and groups.'’’117 Population is above all else the ultimate end of government.508 
But why is it especially population that plays such a decisive role in Foucault’s argument since he began to deal with biopolitics? The threshold of modernity, he claims, is crossed at the moment when we are no longer dealing only with a territory that is ruled externally, but have discovered the population that lives in it as the basis of the state’s wealth and power.509 Here it is crucial that it is not treated as a group of juridical subjects, but according to its ‘nature’. For this empirical surveys have to be undertaken to know the object of regulation in every detail. Here Foucault not only means procreation and mortality, but also economy and ‘opinions’. Therefore biopolitics is no longer the appropriate term. The term ‘public’, which was such a crucial notion in the eighteenth century, ‘is the population seen under the aspect of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements; it is what one gets a hold on through education, campaigns, and convictions’.5io
The perspective Foucault adopts here is in turn an implicit but harsh critique of liberalism. It is population - not the people. It is a question of regulating a productive multitude and not of legal subjects who rule themselves through democratic law. Once one leaves the juridical theory of power behind, one sees how in the niches of law the population has long since become an object of regulation, how it is being ruled, instead of being the one to rule. Nonetheless even the emergence of the concept of democratic self-legislation is an effect of constituting the population and the idea of self-government, which is expressed in juridical categories.
Now, Foucault holds the view that those practices for the leadership of people did not appear in one day, but developed over centuries, and finally transformed in the eighteenth century with the establishment of modern states into a specifically political form of power. Ever since the third century the prelude to this governing power was the Christian pastorate. Through its institutions it gradually ‘gave rise to an art of conducting, directing, leading, guiding, taking in hand, and manipulating [human beings], an art of monitoring them and urging them on step by step, an art with the function of taking charge of [human beings] collectively and individually throughout their life and at every moment of their existence’^11
In pastoral power the ruler is imagined as a shepherd in relation to individuals. The salvation of the flock is its essential objective. The pastor guides the whole flock and does everything for the totality of his flock, and also for each 
sheep of the flock.512 The history of the pastorate has to be understood as the starting point of a particular type of power over people, as a ‘matrix of procedures for the government of [human beings]’.513 The Christian community, which constitutes itself as the institution of the church and claims to govern human beings in their daily life on the grounds of leading them to eternal life, developed and refined its technology in the course of fifteen centuries.
The struggles of the entire Western world from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century were fundamentally struggles around this pastoral power. At stake was who would actually have the right to govern human beings in their daily life. In the Reformation, for example, which was a great pastoral rather than doctrinal battle, what was at issue was actually the way in which pastoral power was exercised^4 Here Foucault’s materialism is again on show, as he situates materiality in practices, instead of writing a history of doctrinal ideas. Very much as Max Weber investigates in his Protestant Ethic the influence of religious ‘ideas’ on the conduct of life,515 Foucault analyses how the Christian direction of conscience, the manner of salvation and the institution of pure obedience led to a particular worldly practice which constituted daily life.516 Pastoral power was thus, exactly like the idea of ‘predestination’, which Weber had investigated, an earthly power, even it if was oriented towards the eternal life«7
From the end of the seventeenth century on the government begins to take responsibility for people’s conduct^8 Two intersecting processes were central in this transition: on the one hand the dismantling of feudal structures and the centralisation in the state, on the other hand the Reformation and Counter Reformation, which led to conflict about how one is spiritually directed here on earth for one’s salvation, that is, to religious fragmentation^9 Government secularises the previously religiously defined goals of happiness, salvation and prosperity and articulates them anew in the framework of the political question of the state.520
Foucault distinguishes three historical types of government: raison d’état, liberal and neoliberal government, although one can only speak of govern-
ment in the proper sense in the period following the liberal art of government, because it is only here that the population itself becomes central.521 The liberal government manages instead of regulating, in that it does not prevent, but attempts to organise ‘natural’ phenomena in such way that they do not deviate from the desired trajectory.
At this point Foucault gets back to the security mechanisms as they are necessitated by this form of government. For now it is only possible to govern well under the condition that certain forms of freedom are truly respected (the freedom of the market, of speech, etc.).’22 However, this does not mean that this leads to a more tolerant or lenient government, for at the same time security mechanisms organise the conditions under which one can be free. Freedom is accordingly not an ideology, but a technique of government.523 At the centre of liberal practice is also a problematic relationship between ‘freedom’ and that which creates and also threatens to limit and destroy it.524
The security mechanisms reformulate Foucault’s idea that formal bourgeois freedom is bought by way of a corseting of bodies through disciplines, in such a way that now the security strategies are the ‘other side of the coin’ of liberalism. The interplay of freedom and security is at the centre of the new governmental reason.525 At the very same moment that freedom is produced, limitations, con-trols, forms of coercion, and threats are established (such as the protectionism of tariffs). The disciplinary techniques also develop at the same time as the era of freedoms, and the Panopticon is practically the form of liberal government as a whole. Of course, a liberal government has to provide a space for natural mechanisms and must in no way exert an influence on them in any other way - ‘at least in the first instance’ - than through supervision. Only if it establishes that something irregular is taking place does it have to inter- vene.526”翻译为中文