请将“2.	The disappearance of the schema of reference and of the submission of action to principle goes hand-in-hand with the “subversion of teleocratic representations.” This is a complex process: it implies the discovery that the history of imperative principles has come to an end, but it also means that the very moment when the opposition to principle is possible, the turn toward the closure of metaphysics has been realized. This opposition, moreover, is causally related to a radical change in the way we think the political realm: “With the turning, a certain way of understanding the political realm becomes impossible, and a new one inevitable”(p. 38).
This modification in political thinking can only be understood by an alternative way of thinking presence, presence becomes historical as opposed to mechanical or constant, which is to say that presence is now thought as event: “If presence is manifest as event, it is hostile to the domination of ends” (p. 255). By the same stroke the liberation of action is gauged; not only does it escape from any reference, but it no longer obeys any of the finalities attributed to it. Action rediscovers its real nature as an end in itself and thereby refuses an abusively transposed schema of finality that has more to do with fabrication than with action proper. Heidegger’s “anarchic” displacement did not negate finality, but limited it to its specific domain, that of fabrication: “Action, too, must free itself from the domination of finality, which is a category specific to production”(p. 256). By virtue of being rethought as event, action is withdrawn from the forms of domination embodied by the One, and finds again its own element: what Arendt calls the ontological condition of plurality.
3.	This modification in political thought means that as soon as the reference to an arche - to a First - decays, the political realm can no longer be thought in the framework of foundationalism. According to Schürmann’s analysis, there here arises a conception of the political realm that is at once more modest and more independent: far from founding, or implementing a first principle that has the value of foundation, the political realm is limited to situating.
“The political realm is the site where things, action, and speech may be adequate to each other” (p. 40), in other words it is the arena where these elements can come together. Just as for Heidegger the site is “the place where a phenomenon unfolds its essence” (p. 41), the political site is the place that manifests the force of cohesion of the principle in a given period. By manifestation is meant two things: a coming to presence or a disclosure, but also an exposure, since the political realm renders public and exposes this very principle. The turn - “the break in the modalities of presence” - undoubtedly modifies the political realm again: rather than revealing an epochal principle, the political is the site of the event or of presence as history. Significantly, this new conception implies carrying the ontologies of the political body over to the topology of the political site in order to delegitimize them. Whereas the ontologies of the political tradition subordinate practice to an ideality and function as discourses justifying subjection to the State, the new topological conception, inasmuch as it is a deconstruction of the metaphysics of the political body, returns action to itself and thus clears the way for a free adventure.
4.	The attempt to elaborate an alternative political philosophy starts with the deconstruction of foundations and the refusal of the metaphysical project, that is, the emancipation of political thinking from any reference to an ideal and normative instance. This implies another way of thinking the origin such that inaugural moments no longer dominate and command action but to the contrary set it free from epochal principles.
I began by warning that it would be illegitimate to present savage democracy simply as the political translation of the principle of anarchy. It would be contradictory, indeed, to attribute a function to a principle that has as its dominant trait the absence of any application, the absence of an archie function. Action in this constellation ceases to be a derivation of theory and reveals itself as anarchic. And one cannot take the question from the other end. For how can one reduce savage democracy to the realization of a principle, even if it is a principle of anarchy? Instead of wrongly enclosing anew savage democracy in a schema of reference, it is more appropriate to apprehend a double paradox, one that in each case is both dazzling and instructive. For is not the “savage essence” of democracy no less surprising than a principle that is a “principle of anarchy”? Just as anarchy destroys the idea of principle, the savage unsettles the idea of essence, the definition of quiddity. But it is the link in the paradox that catches our attention and that pushes us to consider a new question: In what way does savage democracy, understood as the manifestation of an experience of liberty, present a structure that answers or corresponds to the inner organization of the principle of anarchy?
Without here confronting the hypothesis of the end of metaphysics, specific affinities between savage democracy and the principle of anarchy may be discerned. With the help of this comparative framework, and in light of the above mentioned characteristics, I will outline various forms of action that respond to what, confronted with the historical constellation of modernity, Merleau-Ponty called “a certain modern obscurity.”13
-	To the decline of the metaphysical project of derivation, savage democracy responds by an indetermination with regard to the foundations of Power, Law, Knowledge, and the basis of their inner connection in the social realm as a whole.
-	To the fall of the teleocratic domination that liberates action from its finalist schema, savage democracy responds by the dissolution of the references of certitude and by an indetermination opposed to all forms of ultimate finality, whatever they may be. Faced with an enigmatic present and embarked on a journey for which “the way cannot be known in advance,” savage democracy grounds itself in a permanent questioning of the social and political realms of existence.14
-To the disappearance of the ontologies of the political order that functioned as discourses of legitimization and subjection, savage democracy responds by the disembodiment of the social realm and a concomitant disembodiment of power - that is, the form of power that Lefort relates, at least in Europe, to the historical experience of regicide.
-	Finally, in relation to Schürmann’s suggestion of a political philosophy inspired by the deconstruction of foundations, one finds a revealing “hesitation” in Lefort’s writings, or rather a coexistence between the call to “restore political philosophy” and the emphasis on thinking the political realm as such. By this I mean a way of thinking that understands from the outset that the rediscovery of the properly political is an endless adventure, since it can no longer function in the context of traditional narratives. Political thought thus breaks with the conceptual framework of classical political philosophy and renders obsolete the foundational categories that have been the ground for legitimizing political orders in the past. This relation to the origin is all the more problematic given that the question is not for democracy to constitute itself according to the authority of an inaugural moment but to welcome the emergence of the originary division of the social realm and to encourage in this way a renewed experience of liberty. It is here that the break with the foundation stone of traditional ontology - Aristotle’s - becomes most obvious. In Le Travail de l’Œuvre, Lefort credits Machiavelli with having outlined a new ontology. For Lefort, the author of The Prince is unsatisfied with judging tyranny unjust in relation to the model of the just State by applying the Aristotelian categories of essence and accident. Instead, Machiavellli welcomes the diversity of situations. Society is seen as in principle open to the event by virtue of the originary division that inhabits it. As a result of this “break” - at once unavoidable and irreparable - the conception of being as constant and stable presence is undone. The very idea of degradation vanishes in favor of a new conception of being characterized by the upsurge of the unprecedented: “But being can only be apprehended in relation to what happens, in the articulation of appearances, in the movement that forbids them finality, in the incessant recasting of what is established.”15
It is in the context of this new ontology discovered in Machiavelli that savage democracy may be understood. The permanent contestation that characterizes it in the fields of law and politics is but the effect of this experience of being, of this conception of being as that which happens, as event. In other words, permanent contestation, if one consents to think its true dimension, is not an empirical trait of a democratic regime but is the perennial unveiling of the experience of being in time, at the center of which there is a human struggle that takes on “historical creation as a whole,” or the complex and endless play of exchange and human struggle.16”翻译为中文