1. 
(HC)

The question is based on the accompanying documents. You are advised to spend 15 minutes planning and 40 minutes writing your answer.

In your response, you should do the following.

State a relevant thesis that directly addresses all parts of the question.
Support the thesis or a relevant argument with evidence from all, or all but one, of the documents.
Support the thesis or a relevant argument by accounting for historical complexity, relating diverse historical evidence in a cohesive way.
Focus your analysis of each document on at least one of the following: author's point of view, author's purpose, audience, and/or historical context.
Support your argument with analysis of historical examples outside the documents.
Connect historical phenomena relevant to your argument to broader events or processes.
Synthesize the elements above into a persuasive essay.
Analyze major changes and continuities in the goals of United States foreign policy from the end of World War I (1918) to the end of the Korean War (1953).

Document 1

Source: Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 12, 1919.
Mr. President:
I have never had but one allegiance—I cannot divide it now. I have loved but one flag and I cannot share that devotion and give affection to the mongrel banner invented for a league. Internationalism, illustrated by the Bolshevik ... is to me repulsive ... The United States is the world's best hope, but if you fetter her in the interests and quarrels of other nations, if you tangle her in the intrigues of Europe, you will destroy her power for good and endanger her very existence ... No doubt many excellent and patriotic people see a coming fulfillment of noble ideals in the words "league for peace." We all respect and share© these aspirations and desires, but some of us see no hope, but rather defeat, for them in this murky covenant. For we, too, have our ideals, even if we differ from those who have tried to establish a monopoly of idealism.

Document 2

U.S. Military Spending as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product
A graph showing the American military spending as a percent of the Gross Domestic Product from 1915 to 1955. The graph shows very low spending, just over 1 percent in 1915; there is a spike in spending in 1918 at 15 percent and 1919 at 21 percent. The graph then declines in 1920 to about 5 percent and stays fairly stagnant until 1941 where it begins to climb, going from 5 percent that year to 38 percent in 1944. The highest spending year is 1945 at 41 percent. The graph begins a decline in 1946 at 23 percent and continues to decrease until it reaches 8 percent in 1951. Between 1952 and 1954, there is an increase to 14 percent, and then in 1955 it decreases slightly to 11 percent.
Data Source: Federal Budget, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Document 3

Source: Message from Secretary of State Henry Stimson to the Japanese government after its invasion of Manchuria, January 7, 1932.

[I]n view of the present situation ..., the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments ... which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the ... obligations of the [Kellogg-Briand] Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty ... China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.
Document 4

Source: Senator Gerald P. Nye, speech before the "Keep America Out of War" meeting, New York City, May 27, 1935.
Let us know that it is sales and shipments of munitions and contraband, and the lure of the profits in them, that will get us into another war, and that when the proper time comes and we talk about national honor, let us know that simply means the right to go on making money out of a war ... The experience of the last war includes the lesson that neutral rights are not a matter for national protection unless we are prepared to protect them by force ... I believe ... that the only hope of staying out of war is through our people recognizing and declaring as a matter of ... national policy, that we will not ship munitions to aid combatants and that those of our citizens who ship other materials to belligerent nations must do so at their own risk and without any hope of protection from our Government. If our financiers and industrialists wish to speculate for war profits, let them be warned in advance that they are to be limited to speculation with their own capital and not with the lives of their countrymen and the fabric of their whole nation.

Document 5

Source: Report of a conversation between President Franklin Roosevelt and Marshal Joseph Stalin at the Tehran Conference, 1943.
The President ... said the question of a post war organization to preserve peace had not been fully explained ... There would be a large organization comprised of some 35 members of the United Nations ... The President continued that there would be set up an executive committee composed of the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom and China, with two additional European states, one South American, one Near East, one Far Eastern country and one British Dominion ... The President then turned to the third organization which he termed "The Four Policemen," namely, the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and China. This organization would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace and any sudden emergency which requires this action ... Marshal Stalin said that he did not think the small nations of Europe would like the organization composed of the Four Policemen ... Marshal Stalin pointed out that the world organization suggested by the President, and in particular the Four Policemen, might also require the sending of American troops to Europe. The President pointed out that he had only envisaged the sending of American planes and ships to Europe, and that England and the Soviet Union would have to handle the land armies in the event of any future threat to the peace.

Document 6

Source: Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

Document 7

Source: NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 1950.
Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world ... we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will.