请将“The first of these involves the assumption that the development of markets set in train a dynamic that in due course took hold of all spheres of life, since rational modes of behaviour were increasingly oriented to markets. This suppresses the fact that the way of life of peasant families followed a different rationality - at least so long as these families had not yet become capitalist production units, and were no longer peasants in any meaningful sense of the term. As the Russian agricultural theorist A.V. Chayanov was the first to emphasise,42 peasant families tend despite the attraction of the market to continue to orient their production to their own needs.43 As long as peasants kept some disposal power over their production, narrow limits remained in place to agricultural specialisation and commercialisation. Contrary to Paul Sweezy's contention, exchangevalue does not already ‘by its mere existence as an economic fact change the organization of production'.44 For this reason, the separation of peasant producers from their means of production is not only a structural precondition for capitalist development to the extent that owners of capital resort to wage-labour, but above all because only in this way can agricultural production supply more than previously the needs of others. From a historical perspective, many examples show how it was not mere access to markets that changed agriculture, but only the enforced requirement to pay taxes in monetary form:
This economic logic [of the peasant economy] is so far removed from the economic science that developed from the analysis of industrial production, that economists sought with all their might in vain, for almost a century, to apply their accounting grids to the peasant economy.45
In Max Weber's theoretical construction, the specific rationality of the peasant economy merges without further ado into the historical dynamic of modern market rationality. The same applies with the transition from burghers to bourgeoisie. According to Weber, the struggle of the urban burghers for autonomy from their feudal lords already constituted them as a bearing group of processes of capitalisation. The development of capitalism was then further pursued by the absolutist princes being forced to ally with the burghers on account of their fiscal needs. For Weber, the emergence of the ‘burgher class' was the precondition for the class of the bourgeoisie. His refusal to analyse the different historical forms of what he undifferentiatedly calls 'capital' has far-reaching theoretical consequences. Contrary to Weber's assumption, the appropriation practices of merchants were an integral component of com-mercialised feudal societies, even if they may have created the material preconditions for an escape from direct feudal power relations. On the one hand, long-distance trade was by no means so foreign to ‘feudalism' as Henri Pirenne and, following him, Paul Sweezy maintained, while, on the other - and this is especially important for my argument - the form of appropriation of merchant's capital did not already contain within it that of capitalist commercial capital. For ‘privileges' sanctioned by power (monopolies) limited competition in long-distance trade in such a way that these merchants made fundamentally higher profits than did those made by artisan producers even within guild organisations. This favouring by power is the most important distinction between merchant's capital and (capitalist) commercial capital. It also means - a point made already as an objection to Perry Anderson - that merchants shared in the ‘surplus product' of feudal appropriation. The logic of mercantile appropriation structures did indeed involve efforts to expand commercialisation, but not however the attempt to change production itself. Such an attempt was only provoked by the necessity of competition. But since privileges precisely served to exclude competition, this could only be effected by trade that contravened the rules of appropriation guaranteed by power - and thus in opposition to established merchant's capital. There are no grounds for speaking as Max Weber does of the urban burghers' already displaying in their orientation to ‘economics‘ a character that goes beyond feudalism. Those urban burghers who sought to gain possession of feudal power or noble privileges for themselves were following social patterns that were already inscribed in their appropriation practice. The conditions of reproduction of merchant's capital and the mode of existence of urban oligarchies were certainly historical preconditions for capitalism and bourgeois societies, but they did not already bear these later forms within them as tendencies. Quite the contrary: the bourgeois revolution had to be made against these old urban oligarchies, among others, and the development of capitalism required the abolition of the forms of reproduction characteristic of merchant's capital.

Max Weber does indeed mention processes of this kind. But because they are denied any theoretical relevance in his explanation of the rationalisation process, this is seen as occurring less as the result of the particular result of social struggles, and more as the cause of an already predetermined outcome.
Once set in motion, instrumental rationality, as established with the preva-lence of formal law and the urban burghers' orientation to economics, becomes an autonomous guiding parameter of history. In this way, the state becomes the 'modern state', and capitalism becomes 'modern industrial capitalism'. For Weber, any special explanation for the constitution of a public power is superfluous.
4.	False conclusions from structural analysis
One of the most remarkable results of the comparative study presented here is that particular structures of distribution of power in the age of feudalism gave a different character to the emergence of estates and hence to the structure of the ancien régime, in such a way that fundamentally different structural preconditions subsequently arose for the breakthrough of bourgeois forms of political power. For the distribution of power at that time marked the for-mation of estates and hence the particular structure of the ancien régime, and the general and specific structures of the ancien régime led to the general and specific possibilities for struggles leading to the abolition of personal rule and thus the historical constitution of bourgeois state power. And this is not all. The different preconditions and forms of the 'bourgeois revolution' also prepared specific conditions for the development of economics and politics in the historical phase of the bourgeois state.
Summarised in this way, this all seems to indicate a dreadful structural determinism, and suggest that economic determinism and structuralist ver-sions of Marxism have been criticised here only to make way for a new variety of determinism. Although the initial conditions, i.e. the specific form of dis-tribution of power under feudalism, are introduced as historically contingent results of armed conflicts, the further development of power relations would seem to be ascribed an internal logic. This impression is deceptive, and will be refuted - at least so I hope - in the course of my analysis. For the retrospective recognition of a constraint, the subsequent trace of the continuing effect of 'ori-gins', is analytically limited. In the structural logic of history, it is only those historical developments that have actually been realised that ever appear in the picture. All those other historical alternatives that had also developed on the basis of the concrete preconditions of the time, and were also represented by supporting groups, are removed. In the conduct of historical analysis, it should become clear how at each historical moment the actual development of the structure of power contains more or less pronounced elements of historical contingency; more precisely, the development is determined by the life practice of the people of the time. The conditions of this practice are given by the existing forms of material reproduction and appropriation, the form of political power and the dominant conceptions of God and the world. But these general conditions of action - and it is these that carry the ‘structural logic' of the development from feudalism to the present day - do not completely determine concrete behaviour.
We can dispense here with any general social-theoretical thesis about the ability of people to recognise the conditions of their lives and subsequently change these in a process of self-reflection. For even without claiming to tackle fundamentally the dialectic of freedom and unfreedom in the historical process, it is enough to show in our present context how the concrete historical development came into being by a life practice of individuals and social groups that was only partly determined by the existing structures of power and relations of production. Thus it is easy to understand in retrospect how the limitation of the English kings' autonomous armed force made it harder for them to tax the English peasants. If direct taxation was actually prevented for so long a time, however, this was due to the angry courage of the rebels of 1381, and while this was a possibility in the particular situation, it was in no way a necessity. This state of affairs also applies to everyday life: the late marriages that were typical for the poorer strata of the French population in the eighteenth century appear to us in hindsight as the ‘logical' consequence of their conditions of life. But this ‘logic' only prevailed because many people held the view that marriage was a particular form of coexistence, defined not only by the church but also socially in a specific manner. This meant for exam-ple that marriage was impossible between a man and a woman who were beggars. The fact that such couples then lived not only in poverty but also ‘in sin' reveals generalised and individual struggles with existing conditions.
The ways that people who possessed power dealt with the established structures seem more striking. In our historical comparison, the philosophical question of the significance of the subject in the evolutionary process can be reduced initially to the cautious contention that for the development of
structures of power in the European Middle Ages and the early-modern era, the structural importance of the life practice of individuals increased in rela-tion to their personal power.
This explains, incidentally, why right across estates and classes, women appear relatively rarely in this study. The general demand to pay attention to the role of women in history not uncommonly suppresses the question of the weight of this role in specific evolutionary processes. The everyday life of women was of decisive importance for very many elements of the develop-mental process, as the scope and forms of exercise of power were quite often limited in this way and given a particular shape. But, if we maintain that the struggle for possession of armed force in particular historical epochs was a central moment of the process of evolution of power, and thus also of the conditions for conflicts over appropriation of the social 'surplus' product, this means at the same time that the life practice of the great majority of women was structurally of secondary importance in this respect. This no more makes women into mere victims of history than it does those peasants or day-labour-ers who strove - with more or less awareness - to manage their lives under the conditions of specific forms of power.”翻译为中文