i wrote an essay. the title is 'Why does Immanuel Kant call space a form of intuition? Do you find his position convincing?'. here is my essay so far, i think it is pretty good : In Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, he lays down his philosophy of transcendental idealism. In doing so, he must prove that the world is presented to us as representations, dada… 
One of Kant’s most famous claims ijs that space itself, along with time, is not a concept or neccesarily a concrete, external thing but actually only a precondition for the way we humans experience things in our perceived world. 
In this essay, I will argue that Kant’s position is convincing. By first examining the arguments Kant gives for calling space a form of intuition. I will then prove the solidity of Kant’s argument by utilising empiricist arguments against Kant to show that his claim still holds water regardless of these arguments ? eek this is a bad intro . 

Kant likes definitions. In order to grasp what exactly makes space a form of intuition for Kant, we must first comprehend what he means by the term “form of intuition”. An intuition, to Kant, is ____. Kant denotes formality with things that are a priori, which suggests that a from of intuition is an intuition that does not come to us by experience or empirically. This suggests that it is an innate mental structure that shapes our experiences before and independently of empirical knowledge. Kant classifies space along with time as being the only forms of intuition, which he believes are essential to the cognising human mind. 

Kant provides two arguments for the a priori nature of space. Firstly, he observes that our perceiving of several things as distinct from one another does not give rise to the representation of space. According to him, the very possibility of perceiving objects as distinct and separate from one another presupposes a preexisting representation of space. Therefore, space is necessary as a precondition to experience objects separate from one another, and is a priori.This spatial framework cannot be an empirical acquisition since one must already conceive of space to differentiate between objects.  Secondly, Kant highlights our incapacity to conceive the non-existence of space, though we can picture an empty space devoid of objects.  This suggests that space transcends empirical reality; it is innately intuited by the mind, not inductively aggregated from sensory input. Space, therefore, is not contingent on experience—a tenet fundamental to the Kantian view. Therefore , space is the backdrop for our representations and appearances, and is not dependent on these appearances. Thus, space is not an incidental byproduct of experience but an a priori necessity pivotal to the formation of perception.


A critical aspect of Kant’s philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason is his distinguishing of concepts from intuitions. Whereas intuitions are singular, immediate representations, concepts refer to generalised representations that encompass potentially many things. Kant holds that space is an intutiion. Kant asserts that only one singular space can be represented at a time, which holds in it all other ‘spaces’ as subdivisions. To illustrate this, take a human’s field of view. What you see out of you left eye and what you see out of your right eye are not, speaking ontologically, two separate spaces but they are rather a division of the same space. This segments exist within the space, rather than make it up. By proving that we experience a unified space rather than an amalgamation of discrete segments, Kant fortifies his claim that space, as encompassing singularity, qualifies as an intuition and not a concept.

Furthermore, Kant’s reflections on the infinitude of space also support its intuitiveness. HE argues that concepts are constructed by adding properties together. For example, *** .. IF space was a concept, it would have to be created using this method. However, when adding different ‘spaces’ together, we could only reach a potential infinite, not actual infinite space. “Perhaps a more sensible way of putting this is: we do not add kilometres after kilometres to generate the concept of infinitely large space, for we do not reach infinity in this way, but we already “find” space to be infinite and divisible to as many kilometres as we may wish. That is, infinite space is a not a concept of infinitely many added kilometres but an individual intuition that includes in it infinitely many kilometres.” Tallying up finite spaces serially is an impossibility. instead, we perceive space as inherently infinite, which is something a concept cannot accommodate according to Kant. Finite concepts cannot embody infinite, yet our perception of space does, and so it follows that space is an intuition - an immediate grasp of the infinite. 

The Kantian framework does acknowledge the 'concept of space,’ which may superficially appear to be a contradiction. However, Kant draws a crucial distinction: just as a specific entity like ‘Immanuel Kant’ can be subsumed under broader concepts like ‘philosopher’ or ‘human,’ the concept of space can be employed to reflect on the intuition of space without contradicting its innate singular character. This recognition enables us to engage theoretically with space without compromising our intuitive grasp of it.

Kant’s insights presume a Euclidean view of space, the prevailing understanding in his time. Today, we recognise the validity of non-Euclidean geometries and contemplate spaces with more than three dimensions. While such theoretical explorations extend our conceptual repertoire, Kant’s argument suggests that our basic sensory apprehension of space remains three-dimensional and Euclidean, as these represent the intuitive conditions of human sensibility. Kants isn't investigating either theoretical questions of geometry nor of space & time - he's more concerned about our immediate perception of space & time. He's specifically interested in where consciousness meets space and time.


Research in developmental psychology and neuroscience offer empirical evidence that illustrate that spatial cognition develops and matures in response to the environment. This seems to challenge Kant’s ideas that the spatial framework is a form of intuition - a priori and intuitive. Observations of infants and children show a gradual acquisition of spatial abilities, leading some to conjecture that spatial understanding is learned rather than a priori. Moreover, neuroscientific studies reveal the significant role of brain regions like the hippocampus in spatial navigation and cognition. These brain areas are adaptable and modifiable based on our interactions with the environment, as evidenced by changes seen in the brain structure of individuals like London taxi drivers after extensive navigation experience. The enhancement of spatial skills through practice may be interpreted as supporting the notion that spatial cognition has empirical origins. Further challenging Kant, it’s been shown that individuals can significantly improve their spatial reasoning skills with training and practice, such as architects or engineers. This suggests that spatial cognition is not purely a priori, as skills can be enhanced through empirical interaction, not just ‘unpacked’ from some innate cognitive structure.
If spatial cognition results from learning processes, this could suggest that the concept of space is more plastic than Kant’s framework allows for, and that there is not one unchanging, innate spatial intuition. Instead, one’s understanding and conception of space might be dependent on the empirical content of experience or even on the way the brain develops in response to that experience.

However, I believe that this interpretation does not invalidate Kant’s view. The unfolding of spatial awareness can be seen as the empirical realisation of potentialities afforded by an innate spatial framework. Kant posits that such a priori forms act as the foundation upon which sensory experiences, like spatial learning, are mapped. If our spatial cognition comes from learning and experiment, it naturally implies that our previous knowledge of space was a priori. It seems clear that infants do not arrive at a conception of space through study of advanced geometry or physics. If our intuition of space, and our empirical knowledge of space differ, doesn't this clearly confirm Kant's argument? The fact that knowing how space actually is, requires empirical study doesn't necessarily imply that our first draft concept of space wasn't an intuition. This is perfectly in line with evolutionary theories of how the mind evolved, an approximation of space-like activity is modelled in the brain aiding survival. Each organism develops and uses this synthetic a priori intuition of space. Only when an intelligent enough species comes along to actually experiment with space in strange cases (that didn't apply to the past survival of the species) would the differences between "space" the concept and "space" the reality be known. To synthesise, Kant’s argument withstands empirical scrutiny because it concerns the foundational conditions underpinning experience, not the content of cognition developed through experience. The discoveries of developmental psychology and neuroscience highlight the dynamic scaffolding of knowledge, which is built upon an a priori spatial framework which, I agree with Kant, is inherent in the human mind.

By appraising empirical research from a transcendental vantage point, Kant’s claim remains compelling. It positions the a priori intuition of space as the indispensable matrix that precedes and shapes empirical learning. Consequently, our ability to learn about and navigate through space is not a refutation but a corroboration of Kant’s assertion: space is a pure form of intuition, integral to every facet of cognitive experience.