Abstract
Stock exchange is the ”mirror” of the economy and helps industry (and commerce) to accelerate the development of the country. The prices on the stock exchanges increase or decrease over the particular period and that rate represents stock market volatility. Higher stock price volatility is often associated with higher risk and indicates future fluctuations to investors in order to evaluate them. Predicting future stock price volatility can provide important information to market participants and enable them to make adequate decisions. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the stock price volatility of the Apple Company using the Monte Carlo simulation.

Abstract
This paper expands the available information on the effects of delisting in Russia, and represents a rare empirical analysis of the impact of external events on securities prices in this major global market. We seek to evaluate how stock prices of competing companies fluctuate around the dates of stock market delisting announcements and completion. 
We analyse stock prices as correlated with company delisting events from 2004 to 2019 on 552 companies on the Russian MOEX Exchange. The event study methodology is used to evaluate the abnormal returns of rival companies close to relevant delisting dates. These data were checked for statistical significance using the standardised Patell residual test. 
The results indicate a significant competitive effect on stock prices both on the dates of delisting announcement and on completion, with more significant returns close to announcement dates. These effects were found to influence the prospects not just of individual groups of companies, but of all market participants.
We may conclude from our results that delisting is not an event limited in effect to only one company, but impacts the industry as a whole, temporarily changing its value. As such, it will interest both shareholders and managers of public companies, and any participants of industries in which delisting occurs.

Abstract
Using a difference-in-differences method, this study examines the effect of a competitor’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy on a firm’s risk-taking. The contingent nature of a competitor’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which protects the competitor from creditors’ demands during financial reorganization, may increase uncertainty in the industry. Consequently, the study tests the hypothesis that other firms in the industry respond to a competitor’s bankruptcy by decreasing risky investments in research and development (R&D), capital expenditures and acquisitions. To validate and extend this hypothesis, the study also hypothesizes that a firm’s strong financial standing—low leverage and good performance—and the firm’s diversification reduce the negative effect of the competitor’s bankruptcy on firm risk-taking. Findings from a study of US public firms suggest that, after controlling for industry conditions, firms indeed reduce their risk-taking when a competitor declares bankruptcy and that lower firm leverage, stronger firm performance, and greater firm diversification mitigate this effect. Together, these findings shed light on the literatures on bankruptcy and firm risk-taking. 

ABSTRACT
People are overconfident. Overconfidence affects financial markets. How depends on who in the market is overconfident and on how information is distributed. This paper examines markets in which price-taking traders, a strategic-trading insider, and risk-averse marketmakers are overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume, increases market depth, and decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. Its effect on volatility and price quality depend on who is overconfident. Overconfident traders can cause markets to underreact to the information of rational traders. Markets also underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information, and they overreact to salient, anecdotal, and less relevant information.

a b s t r a c t 
 
We model debt restructurings that could endogenously end in bankruptcy, and study spillovers to competitors’ operating decisions, profits, restructuring outcomes and secu- rity prices. We show that while bankruptcy could cause the firm’s share price to drop, bankruptcy always signals good news about the firm. We identify the conditions under which a bankruptcy also signals good news about competitors. We demonstrate that when a firm’s bankruptcy costs are relatively small, bankruptcy raises its share price while low- ering the prices of competitors’ shares and debt as well as boosting the probability that they will enter bankruptcy. When there is little information asymmetry about the firm’s prospects, or the information asymmetry is about industry prospects, bankruptcy raises competitors’ share and debt prices and lowers their probability of bankruptcy. 


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