[p.123] Asking who won a given war, someone has said, is like asking who won the San Francisco earthquake. That in wars there is no victory but only varying degrees of defeat is a proposition that has gained increasing ac¬ceptance in the twentieth century. But are wars also akin to earthquakes in being natural occurrences whose control or elimination is beyond the wit of man? Few would admit that they are, yet attempts to eliminate war, however nobly inspired and assiduously pursued, have brought little more than fleeting moments of peace among states. There is an apparent disproportion between effort and product, between desire and result. The peace wish, we are told, runs strong and deep among the Russian people; and we are convinced that the same can be said of Americans. [p.124] From these statements there is sonic comfort to be derived, but in the light of history and of current events as well it is difficult to believe that the wish will father the condition desired
Social scientists, realizing from their studies how firmly the present is tied to the past and how intimately the parts of a system depend upon each other, are inclined to be conservative m estimating the possibilities of achieving a radically better world. If one asks whether we can now have peace where in the past there has been war, the answers are most often pessimistic. Perhaps this is the wrong question. And indeed the answers will be somewhat less discouraging if instead the following ques¬tions are put: Are there ways of decreasing the incidence of war, of increasing the chances of peace? Can we have peace more often in the future than in the past?
Peace is one among a number of ends simultaneously entertained. The means by which peace can be sought are many. The end is pursued and the means are applied under varying conditions. Even though one may find it hard to believe that there are ways to peace not yet tried by statesmen or advocated by publicists, the very complexity of the prob¬lem suggests the possibility of combining activities in different ways in the hope that some combination will lead us closer to the goal. Is one then led to conclude that the wisdom of the statesman lies in trying first one policy and then another, in doing what the moment seems to require? An affirmative reply would suggest that the hope for improvement lies in pol¬icy divorced from analysis, in action removed from thought. Yet each at¬tempt to alleviate a condition implies some idea of its causes: to explain how peace can be more readily achieved requires an understanding of the causes of war. It is such an understanding that we shall seek in the fol¬lowing pages.

THE FIRST IMAGE: 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR

There is deceit and cunning and from these wars arise.
CONFUCIUS

According to the first image of international relations, the focus of the im¬portant causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stu¬pidity. Other causes are secondary and have to be interpreted in the light of these factors. If these are the primary causes of war, then the elimination of war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social readjustment. This estimate of causes and cures has been dominant in the writings of many serious students of human affairs from Confucius to present-day pacifists. It is the leitmotif of many modern behavioral scientists as well.
[p.125] Prescriptions associated with first-image analyses need not be identical in content, as a few examples will indicate. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, moved to poetic expression by a visit to the arsenal at Springfield, set down the following thoughts:
Were half the power that fills the world with terror, 
Were half the wealth bestowed on camps and courts, 
Given to redeem the human mind from error, 
There were no need of arsenals or forts.
Implicit in these lines is the idea that the people will insist that the right policies be adopted if only they know what the right policies are. Their instincts are good, though their present gullibility may prompt them to follow false leaders. By attributing present difficulties to a defect in knowledge, education becomes the remedy for war. The idea is wide¬spread. Beverly Nichols, a pacifist writing in the 1930s, thought that if Norman Angell "could be made educational dictator of the world, war would vanish like the morning mist, in a single generation." In 1920, a conference of Friends, unwilling to rely upon intellectual development alone, called upon the people of the world to replace self-seeking with the spirit of sacrifice, cooperation, and trust. Bertrand Russell, at about the same time and in much the same vein, saw a decline in the possessive in¬stincts as a prerequisite to peace. By others, increasing the chances of peace has been said to require not so much a change in "instincts" as a channeling of energies that are presently expended in the destructive folly of war. If there were something that men would rather do than fight, they would cease to fight altogether. Aristophanes saw the point. If the women of Athens would deny themselves to husbands and lovers, their men would have to choose between the pleasures of the couch and the ex¬hilarating experiences of the battlefield. Aristophanes thought he knew the men, and women, of Athens well enough to make the outcome a fore¬gone conclusion. William James was in the same tradition. War, in his view, is rooted in man's bellicose nature, which is the product of cen¬turies-old tradition. His nature cannot be changed or his drives sup-pressed, but they can be diverted. As alternatives to military service, James suggests drafting the youth of the world to mine coal and man ships, to build skyscrapers and roads, to wash dishes and clothes. While his estimate of what diversions would be sufficient is at once less realistic and more seriously intended than that of Aristophanes, his remedy is clearly the same in type.
The prescriptions vary, but common to them all is the thought that in order to achieve a more peaceful world men must be changed, whether in their moral-intellectual outlook or in their psychic-social behavior. One may, however, agree with the first-image analysis of causes without ad¬mitting the possibility of practicable prescriptions for their removal. Among those who accept a first-image explanation of war there are both optimists and pessimists, those who think the possibilities of progress so [p.126] great that wars will end before the next generation is dead and those who think that wars will continue to occur though by them we may all die.

THE SECOND IMAGE: 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF STATES

However conceived in an image of the world, foreign policy is a phase 
of domestic policy, an inescapable phase.
CHARLES BEARD, A Foreign Policy for America

The first image did not exclude the influence of the state, but the role of the state was introduced as a consideration less important than, and to be explained in terms of, human behavior. According to the first image, to say that the state acts is to speak metonymically. We say that the state acts when we mean that the people in it act, just as we say that the pot boils when we mean that the water in it boils. The preceding [section] concentrated on the contents rather than the container; the present [sec¬tion] alters the balance of emphasis in favor of the latter. To continue the figure: Water running out of a faucet is chemically the same as water in a container, but once the water is in a container, it can be made to "behave" in different ways. It can be turned into steam and used to power an en¬gine, or, if the water is sealed in and heated to extreme temperatures, it can become the instrument of a destructive explosion. Wars would not exist were human nature not what it is, but neither would Sunday schools and brothels, philanthropic organizations and criminal gangs. Since everything is related to human nature, to explain anything one must con¬sider more than human nature. The events to be explained are so many and so varied that human nature cannot possibly be the single deter¬minant.
The attempt to explain everything by psychology meant, in the end, that psychology succeeded in explaining nothing. And adding sociology to the analysis simply substitutes the error of sociologism for the error of psychologism. Where Spinoza, for example, erred by leaving out of his personal estimate of cause all reference to the causal role of social struc¬tures, sociologists have, in approaching the problem of war and peace, often erred in omitting all reference to the political framework within which individual and social actions occur. The conclusion is obvious: to understand war and peace political analysis must-be used to supplement and order the findings of psychology and sociology. What kind of politi-cal analysis is needed? For possible explanations of the occurrence or nonoccurrence of war, one can look to international politics (since war occurs among states), or one can look to the states themselves (since it is in the name of the state that the fighting is actually done). The former ap¬proach is postponed [until the next section]; according to the second [p.127] image, the internal organization of states is the key to understanding war and peace.
One explanation of the second-image type is illustrated as follows. War most often promotes the internal unity of each state involved. The slate plagued by internal strife may then; instead of waiting for the acci¬dental attack, seek the war that will bring internal peace. Bodin saw this clearly, for he concludes that "the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause." And he saw historical evi¬dence that the principle had been applied, especially by the Romans, who "could find no better antidote to civil war, nor one more certain in its effects, than to oppose an enemy to the citizens." Secretary of State Wil¬liam Henry Seward followed this reasoning when, in order to promote unity within the country, he urged upon Lincoln a vigorous foreign policy, which included the possibility of declaring war on Spain and France. Mikhail Skobelev, an influential Russian military officer of the third quarter of the nineteenth century, varied the theme but slightly when he argued that the Russian monarchy was doomed unless it could produce major military successes abroad.
The use of internal defects to explain those external acts of the state that bring war can take many forms. Such explanation may be related to a type of government that is thought to be generically bad. For example, it is often thought that the deprivations imposed by despots upon their sub¬jects produce tensions that may find expression in foreign adventure. Or the explanation may be given in terms of defects in a government not it-self considered bad. Thus it has been argued that the restrictions placed upon a government in order to protect the prescribed rights of its citizens act as impediments to the making and executing of foreign policy. These restrictions, laudable in original purpose, may have the unfortunate ef¬fect of making difficult or impossible the effective action of that govern¬ment for the maintenance of peace in the world. And, as a final example, explanation may be made in terms of geographic or economic depriva¬tion or in terms of deprivations too vaguely defined to be labeled at all. Thus a nation may argue that it has not attained its "natural" frontiers, that such frontiers are necessary to its security, that war to extend the state to its deserved compass is justified or even necessary. The possible varia¬tions on this theme have been made familiar by the "have-not" arguments so popular in this century. Such arguments have been used both to ex¬plain why "deprived" countries undertake war and to urge the satiated to make the compensatory adjustments thought necessary if peace is to be perpetuated.
The examples just given illustrate in abundant variety one part of the second image, the idea that defects in states cause wars among them. But in just what ways should the structure of states be changed? What defini¬tion of the "good" state is to serve as a standard? Among those who have [p.128] taken this approach to international relations there is a great variety оf definitions. Karl Marx defines "good" in terms of ownership of the means of production; Immanuel Kant in terms of abstract principles of right; Woodrow Wilson in terms of national self-determination and modern democratic organization. Though each definition singles out different items as crucial, all are united in asserting that if, and only if, substantially all states reform will world peace result. That is, the reform prescribed is considered the sufficient basis for world peace. This, of course, does not exhaust the subject. Marx, for example, believed that states would disap¬pear shortly after they became socialist. The problem of war, if war is defined as violent conflict among states, would then no longer exist. Kant believed that republican states would voluntarily agree to be governed in their dealings by a code of law drawn up by the states themselves. Wilson urged a variety of requisites to peace, such as improved interna¬tional understanding, collective security and disarmament, a world con¬federation of states. But history proved to Wilson that one cannot expect the steadfast cooperation of undemocratic states in any such program for peace.
For each of these men, the reform of states in the ways prescribed is taken to be the sine qua non [непременное условие – О.С.] of world peace. The examples given could be multiplied. Classical economists as well as socialists, aristocrats and monarchists as well as democrats, empiricists and realists as well as transcendental idealists – all can furnish examples of men who have be¬lieved that peace can be had only if a given pattern of internal organiza¬tion becomes widespread. Is it that democracies spell peace, but we have had wars because there have never been enough democracies of the right kind? Or that the socialist form of government contains within it the guarantee of peace, but so far there have never been any true social¬ist governments? If either question were answered in the affirmative, then one would have to assess the merits of different prescriptions and try to decide just which one, or which combination, contains the elusive se¬cret formula for peace. The import of our criticism, however, is that no prescription for international relations written entirely in terms of the second image can be valid, that the approach itself is faulty. Our criti¬cisms of the liberals apply to all theories that would rely on the general¬ization of one pattern of state and society to bring peace to the world.
Bad states lead to war. As previously said, there is a large and impor¬tant sense in which this is true. The obverse of this statement, that good states mean peace in the world, is an extremely doubtful proposition. The difficulty, endemic with the second image of international relations, is the same in kind as the difficulty encountered in the first image. There the statement that men make the societies, including the international society, in which they live was criticized not simply as being wrong but as being incomplete. One must add that the societies they live in make men. And it is the same in international relations. The actions of states, or, more accurately, of men acting for states, make up the substance of international [p.129] relations. But the international political environment has much to do with the ways in which states behave. The influence to be assigned to the internal structure of states in attempting to solve the war-peace equation cannot be determined until the significance of the international environ¬ment has been reconsidered.
Какую исследовательскую задачу ставит перед собой Кеннет Уолтц?
Дайте характеристику «первому образу» К. Уолтца. В чем смысл этих рассуждений?
Если причины войны коренятся в природе человека и его поведении, то каковы возможные «рецепты» излечения этой «болезни»?
Какой вывод в отношении причин «первого образа» делает сам К. Уолтц?
Какую связь усматривает автор  между первым и вторым «образами»? Если все коренится в человеческой природе, то можно ли свести все рассуждения к ней?
В чем состоит суть рассуждений К. Уолтца в рамках «второго образа»?
Если войны развязывают «плохие» государства, то можно считать «лекарством» изменение государств с тем, чтобы они стали «хорошими»? 
Сформулируйте позицию автора в отношении «рецептов» второго «образа».
дай ответы дополняя их цитатами из текста (цитаты не обязательно переводить)