Challenges of national identity in the era of globalization. Essay based on: 
This paper examines Turkish national identity as the critical element in Turkey’s exclusion from the
European Union (EU). My central contention is that the main obstacle to Turkey’s membership in the
EU may not be the reason that European officials formally cite, that is to say, problems related to
democracy, economics, and human rights, but rather, perceptions of Turkey and Turkish national
identity as ‘alien’ and ‘others.’ As Europe reinvents itself along ethnic and to a certain extent, racial
lines with the emergence of the EU, a powerful regional block pursuing a different kind of superpower
whose main domain is the soft power, European perceptions of the Turk constitute serious obstacles to
Turkey’s integration into Europe. Therefore, Turkey’s hopes for full membership in the EU are far
from being materialized at this point due to questions regarding Turkey’s national identity.
Keywords: Turkey, European Union, National Identity, Globalization, Discourse Politics, Islam,
Christendom, Distinction
“Identity” is conceptualized as above all involving the notion of the permanence of a
subject or of an object through time. Schlesinger (1991), for instance, notes that as many
modern societies move away from a class-based industrial capitalist model, the concept of
identity has become increasingly important for a theory of action that explains the formation
and activities of various groups. He also points to the notion of unity which establishes the
limits of a subject or object and which allows it to be distinguished from any other.
However, formerly assumed to possess coherence and order that enabled it to act as the
grounds for the formation of stable identities, “culture” is no longer able to perform this task
adequately. The linkages between “culture” and “identity” are now understood as
increasingly problematic as the variety and number of sources of cultural production and
dissemination rise. Benedict Anderson’s work addresses this problem of national identity by
defining it as imagined political community. It is imagined because the members of even the
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-citizens, nor meet them, nor even hear
of them, yet in the minds of each life an image of their communion is fully realized. It is
imagined as a community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that
may prevail, the nation is always conceptualized as a deep, horizontal comradeship
(Anderson 1983).
This paper thus examines the Turkish national identity in an era of globalization,
especially focused on Turkey’s role in Europe where a question of identity is increasingly
salient in a political and social realm. As Europe reinvents itself along ethnic and to a certain
extent, racial lines with the emergence of the European Union (hereafter, the EU), European
perceptions of the Turk constitute serious obstacles to Turkey’s integration into Europe.
Turkey’s hopes for full membership in the EU are far from being materialized due to
questions regarding Turkey’s national identity. Hence this paper proposes that the main
obstacle to Turkey’s membership in the EU is not the reason that European officials formally
cite – problems related to democracy, economics, and human rights – but rather, perceptions
38 WOONGJAE RYOO
of Turkey as alien. I will focus on Turkish national and cultural identity as the critical
element in Turkey’s exclusion from the EU, though such a focus does not detract from the
importance of other factors.
I mainly adopt an interdisciplinary approach combining political, historical, descriptive
and/or discursive analysis. My methodological objective is to undertake a nuanced analysis
emphasizing broader contextualization, focusing on the logic of contestation, inclusion and
exclusion, and the relationship between the political- or media discourse and the actual
political result. I thus seek to offer a detailed and empirical politico-economic, socio-cultural,
institutional, historical and discursive analysis rather than merely a textual one. For instance,
discourse analysis, although it usually stresses close textual analysis, aims to analyze
language use in its larger social context. It is therefore likely to often “go beyond” the text.
While textual analysis tends to look for only those cues appearing in an actual text, discourse
analysis may develop its argument by reference “outward” to a diagnosis of external social
relations or structure (Tonkiss 1998; Ryoo 2005). Seen another way, discursive structures
constitute society itself as Foucault (1972) argued. Conventions and social practices have
histories, and discourses convey ideas that shape collective understandings of society and its
order. Discourse analysis is therefore social analysis, the assessment of the social and
historical contexts in which discourses circulate (Ryoo 2005).
A study of this problematic notion of national (or cultural) identity should begin by
briefly noting the global, local, and historical context. The history of Turkish-European
relations dates back to the Middle Ages when, according to Rich (1999), “Western
Christendom expanded on the basis of a steady cultural, religious and linguistic penetration
of surrounding lands and found itself in the east confronted by the unreciprocating will of the
unspeakable Turk.” Thus, it is important to begin a discussion of Turkish European history
with the Turkish Republic’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. Turks have been a part of
Europe geographically since their arrival in Asia Minor in the 11th century, economically
since the 16th century as trade routes expanded, and diplomatically since the 19th century,
when the Ottoman empire was officially included in the Concert of Europe.
At the Paris conference of 1856, Europe’s great powers agreed that the territorial integrity
and the independence of the Ottoman empire were vital to Europe’s stability. However, from
the start, some Europeans had reservations that the Turk possibly did not belong to the
progressive races of mankind (Neumann & Welsch 1991). Europe was born and grew with
the Greek-Latin culture, experienced a Renaissance and is Christian. Thus, Europe, as
conceived by its noble elites, focused its hostility on Islam. Military resistance to the
Ottoman empire was intensified by the role of religion (Yapp 1992).
The term “Europe” was increasingly used in relation to the rise of the Ottomans and the
threat they posed to Christianity. Europe as a term has been used from the 13th century
onward, before that, there was no notion of Europe, but rather Christendom. Thus, the
dominant “Other” in the history of the European states system is “the Turk.” In contrast to
the communities of the New World, the military might and physical proximity of the
Ottoman empire, combined with the strength of its religious tradition, made it a particularly
relevant other in the evolution of European identity (Neumann & Welsch 1991). For
Europeans, the threat from the East was substantial, given that the Turks were besieging
Vienna as late as 1683. The Turks represented all that was negated in the European identity:
savage, barbarian, despotic, oppressive, violent, and a threat to European civilization. Lively
(1981) used the Ottoman Empire as the differentiating element of the European identity and
the differentiating factors were its despotism and Islamic values.
PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 39
Thus, the perception of Turks as “the Other” in Europe is deeply embedded in
Europeans’ collective memory and the portrayal of Turks in the manner described above
remains a serious obstacle to Turkey’s inclusion in Europe. Turkey seems to be confronted
with a cultural arrogance and cultural hatred from some quarters in Europe because as the
Other, it is marked by an insurmountable particularity, and consequently can never be
assimilated into the European culture (Robins 1996).
After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans initiated a process of
modernization in order to retain their power, looking west for a model. They began to import
European ideas, lifestyles, and ways of thinking and introduced such concepts as nationalism,
patriotism, and liberty into Ottoman society. Thus, Europe became a mirror through which
the Ottoman elite perceived its own weaknesses, differences, and traits. The Ottoman process
of Europeanization became critical in defining what the Turkish people rejected, namely
non-European elements of their national character (Schulze 1996). Hence, we can assume
that a gap formed between the ruling elite and the masses in their perceptions of Europe and
modernity since the Turkish elite transformed Ottoman society from above.
1. TURKEY AND THE EU
The European Council decided to open accession negotiations with eleven applicant
countries by dividing them into two waves in its 1997 summit in Luxemburg. The first wave,
a preference for earlier consideration for its membership, comprised Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The second wave consisted of Bulgaria,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia (Muftuler-Bac 2000). The decision not to include
Turkey among the candidates for accession calls into question the EU’s objectivity in
evaluating candidate countries, since Turkey has a more developed market economy than
most of these countries and its political problems are no worse than those of many of the
other applicants.
Therefore, Turkish perceptions of the EU as a closed cultural and religious club were
strengthened by the European Council’s failure to produce a credible explanation for not
opening negotiations, given that negotiations do not guarantee accession. The future of
Turkey within the EU is more complicated than that of other candidate countries because of
questions regarding Turkey’s identity. A Muslim country sitting on Europe’s outer banks, it
does not fit into Christian Europe or the Islamic Middle East. Cultural differences and
divergent social norms and attitudes make it easy to label Turkey as non-European,
especially if European identity is based on racial, ethnic and cultural features (Nederveen
1991). However, Turkey has historically seen Europe as a mirror through which it perceived
its identity and has consistently sought recognition and acceptance of its Europeanness.
The European Commission noted Turkey’s eligibility detailed serious economic and
political difficulties that rendered Turkish accession unlikely. These included the limitation
of political pluralism, the state of democracy, the persistence of disputes with a member state
(namely Greece), the lack of a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, relative economic
backwardness, the Kurdish question, and problems related to human rights. However,
continued delays are seen in Turkey as unfair and discriminatory, especially in light of
Turkey’s Cold War inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As Turkish
president Suleyman Demirel remarked bitterly, “When the defense of European civilization
(against communism) was at stake, they didn’t say we were Turks and Muslims” (Muftuler-
40 WOONGJAE RYOO
Bac, 2000). In response to the Luxembourg summit decisions, the Turkish government in
December 1997 decided to suspend all political dialogue with the EU, thereby cutting the
line of communication between Turkey and the EU on all political matters. A breakthrough
came in December 1999, when the European Council decided in its Helsinki summit to grant
Turkey a candidate status. At that time president Suleyman Demirel responded in a saliently
different tone. “Turkish membership would be a concrete contribution to the pluralism of the
EU and enrich it in many ways. Today, at a time when cultivating a culture of harmony
between civilizations has gained great importance, and I believe the meaning of those words
is even more pertinent.” (Turkish Daily News 2004)
European objections to Turkish membership can be grouped under four main headings:
economic factors – Turkey would require substantial financial compensation from the EU in
order to meet the level of Western European economies; the Kurdish problem – the recent
crisis resulting from Abdullah Ocalan’s capture demonstrated that the Kurdish problem has
become a European problem; the Greek veto and the Cyprus problem; and the state of
Turkish democracy and human rights – which are perceived to lag behind EU standards
(Kosebalaban 2002). The EU seems to perceive that Turkey still does not meet the
Copenhagen political criteria although the basic features of democratic system exist in
Turkey. The EU’s claim is that there are serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and
protection of minorities. These factors all legitimately complicate Turkey’s relations with the
EU but one important implicit factor is missing from the EU’s stated objections - perceptions
of Turks as culturally different and, essentially, non-European.
If we consider the EU’s evaluation of political conditions in other applicant countries,
such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, this is clear. These countries were found to satisfy
the Copenhagen criteria, despite the facts that their democracies are no more stable than that
of Turkey and that Turkey is ahead of these countries in its economic capacities and its
ability to adopt the body of Community law, regulations, and directives as demonstrated by
Turkey’s performance in the last decade (Muftuler-Bac 2000). Thus, there must be another
variable, aside from politics and economics, that accounts for Turkey’s perpetual outsider
status. That variable seems its cultural identity.
Turkey’s accession to the EU would be to the EU’s advantage economically and
politically, but it would not be possible to evade the problem of cultural integration. In a
survey conducted among the members of the European parliament, Turks were found to be
the least desirable immigrants in the EU (Lahav 1997). Of course, the leaders of EU
countries will not publicly admit that their reservations are related to Turkey’s Europeanness
or religion, but it is indeed a crucial factor that Turkey’s identity is a serious concern.
The perception of Turkey as “the Other” has indeed been created and strengthened by the
European media and this is well exemplified in Edward Said’s works such as Orientalism
and Covering Islam. Said focuses on how Western politicians, media and academic experts
have created an ideological phantom called “Islam” to cover up their own interests, fears,
prejudices and ignorance. Said contends that the Western media personalities and scholars
tend to have narrow knowledge and focus of analysis corresponding to the transient and
nationalized European or the U.S. strategic, economic and political interests. This
problematic tendency was well exemplified in a series of European leader’s discourse
politics by utilizing a new battle of cultures, to say on the lines of Christian western world
against Islam.
For example, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl announced firmly in 1997:
“Turkish membership in the EU is not possible,” and the Christian Social Union (CSU)
PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 41
leader Edmund Stoiber has said “Turkey’s EU entry would be the end of Europe’s political
union.” In addition, many leading members of Germany’s conservative opposition have
opposed Turkish membership of the EU as well (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2002). Also
remarks by former Greek foreign minister Theodor Pangalos about Turks being allowed to
“to drag their bloodstained boots across the carpet” in EU capitals and his labeling of Turks
as “bandits, murderers, and rapists” reinforced Turkish feelings of discrimination (The
Economist 2002). Also, a former president of France, Giscard d’Estaing told French daily Le
Monde that Turkey was not a European country and its membership would spell an end to
the EU (Xinhua News Agency 2002; BBC Monitoring Int’l Reports 2002). Furthermore,
Nicolas Sarkozy, who won the presidential election in France in 2007, and also known as a
popular Gaullist, has vehemently opposed Turkish membership. Angela Merkel, who is
German chancellor also has opposed Turkish membership in a moderate degree, and above
all only 35 percent of EU citizens support Turkish membership (The Economist 2005).
Within this context, Turkey’s future in the EU is problematic, and hence Said seems to have
produced a timely and powerful critique of the hypocrisy and hidden assumptions of those
European journalists and politicians whose writings have guided our thinking on the Islamic
world down twisted and dangerous paths.
2. TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY
Questions about Turkish national identity are directly related to the concept of a
European identity. One theory of European identity posits that the very idea of what Europe
was from the beginning is defined partly in terms of what it was not. In other words, “the
Other,” that is to say, the non-European barbarian or savage, played a decisive role in the
evolution of the European identity and in the maintenance of order among European states as
argued by some scholars (Schlesinger 1991; Neumann & Welsch 1991). The concepts of
Europeanness and non- Europeanness are thought to be mutually exclusive with the line of
demarcation between ‘civilized’ Europe and ‘barbaric’ non-Europe.
Identities are forged out of shared experiences, memories and myths, in relation to those
of other collective identities. They are in fact often forged through opposition to the identities
of significant others, as the history of paired conflict so often demonstrates (Smith 1992).
Who and what, then are Europe’s significant others? The others of Europe have, of course,
changed over time. But, what is important is that the politics of inclusion in and exclusion
from the EU is the modern day reflection of the concept of paired conflict. As Hall (1996)
suggests, “Throughout their careers, identities can function as points of identification and
attachment only because their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render outside abjected.”
The concept of identity here is therefore not an essentialist, but a strategic and positional one
and this concept of identity does not signal the stable core of the self. Because identities are
constructed within, not outside, discourse, one must understand them as produced in specific
historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices.
In addition to attractive economic advantages, part of Turkey’s desire to join the EU is
grounded in its desire to have its Europeanness legitimated, as is the case for the Central and
Eastern European countries. The identity of the “new Europe” is based on a common cultural
heritage, with foundations in ancient Greece, Christianity, and Europe of the Enlightenment.
If religion is an important variable in determining Europe’s boundaries, then it is an obvious
influence on EU’s perceptions of predominantly Muslim Turkey. According to an article in
42 WOONGJAE RYOO
Washington Times (1999), “Western fears of Islam are making it difficult for Muslims to be
accepted in Europe. That fear is partly the result of a media-driven Islamophobia that links
Islam to terrorism and fundamentalism.” Of course, accepting Turkey as a member may
unleash xenophobic forces (EUObserver.com 2002). But it also will enable Europe to make a
strong statement that there is no place for xenophobia in this continent.
Turkey’s incorporation into Western European security arrangements after World War II
seemed to afford Turkey the European legitimacy it always sought. During the Cold War,
Europe’s identity was reinvented along security lines and the Communist bloc became the
Other, non-Europe. As long as the line of demarcation was the Iron Curtain, real political
interests dictated that Turkey’s Europeanness not be openly questioned. The need for Turkey
as a buffer against Soviet expansion also helped Turkey gain associate membership in the EC
in 1963. But, the disappearance of the Soviet enemy eroded Turkey’s position in the Europe.
It no longer served a clear function, and thus was shunted to the back of the line of
candidates for the EU membership in the 1990s.
3. CHALLENGES FOR THE EU MEMBERSHIP
The end of the Cold War seems to have sent Turkey’s relations with Europe back in time
to 19th century ethno-nationalism. The replacements of the ideological East-West conflict
with ethnic, religious, and historical conflicts emphasized Turkey’s non-Christian, and hence
non-European character (Tunander 1995). The search for Europe’s new other has focused on
the south of Europe, in Islam, and in the foreigners living in Europe, outsiders in race,
religion, ethnicity, and culture. Racism is becoming a major component in European politics,
as evidenced by the 1999 electoral gains of racist right-wing parties in Austria and
Switzerland.
In 1997, the European Commission ordered an opinion survey asking citizens of the 15
member states whether they considered themselves racist; many of the respondents did
(Boyes 1997). Europeans share a growing concern about the Other – the non-European, nonWhite, possible migrant. Thus, racism at the national level reflected in the EU to a certain
degree, therefore, it is a diffuse racism that can speak in the name of both a national identity
and Europeanism (Delanty 1995). This sentiment is publicly expressed by EU politicians that
Turkish membership in the EU might be too much for Europe and that Turkey’s membership
could endanger the identity and political workability of the EU.
The Turkish government perceives these developments as indicators that
ethnonationalism and religion are the real reasons behind Turkey’s exclusion from the EU.
According to a press release from Turkey’s ministry of foreign affairs, “The danger is to
create new lines of division, new discrimination, new compartments, defined explicitly or
implicitly on criteria of ethnicity, religion, region, levels of development, and civilization.
The danger, if it grows freely, will somewhat confirm the prophecy of those who proclaim
‘the clash of civilization’ as the inevitable, imminent fact of the next decades.” (MuftulerBac 2000). It is indeed obvious that Turkey had not taken any serious steps regarding the EU
membership issue up until very recently (Turkish Daily News 2001).
Parallel to Europe’s identity reformulation, Turkey is going through its own identity
crisis, one that began in the 19th century and still lingers. Turkey is split into two camps. One
is based on the modern, secular, Western-oriented discourse, and the other is traditional,
Islamist, and Oriental in its formulations. The new Turkish Republic succeeded in repressing
PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 43
the conservative, reactionary tendencies for some time. However, the undercurrent of
traditionalism was always there and it found fertile ground in the post-Cold War era. In the
past decade, a number of traditional elements, most prominently the Islamists, began to
challenge Turkey’s official secular identity. The Islamic movement in Turkey has always
opposed the process of modernization and Europeanization (Heper 1997). During the Cold
War, Turkey’s inclusion into European security arrangements was perceived to have settled
the identity dispute in favor of the modernizers. The Cold War helped suppress religious
reactionaries and their opposition to Turkey’s European bent. However, the EU’s consistent
refusal to admit Turkey after the Cold War has played well into the hands of religious
conservatives.
Islamist groups in Turkey effectively utilize anti-European tendencies in the Turkish
population for their own political ends. They even claim that the origin of European
civilization is in Islam. For example, Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s former Islamist prime
minister and leader of the Welfare party, capitalized on the argument that Europe is an
expression of imperialism and we need to turn to our true friends, the Islamic brothers in the
Middle East (Muftuler-Bac 2000). Despite their decline in electoral popularity over the past
four years, the Islamists mobilize their supporters around opposition to European culture and
the process of westernization.
In short, Turkey is big, poor and Muslim. Poland, for example, – one of ten that joined in
May, 2004 – is also big and poor, but it is Christian and undoubtedly at Europe’s core,
making its membership a crucial part of uniting the continent. Europe does not shy away
from tough enlargements, but Turkey would be the toughest because nearly all Turks are
Muslims and the country’s current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leads a party with
Islamist roots (The Economist 2004). However, there is no clear rationale why Islam should
be incompatible with EU membership unless the question is begged by defining Europe as
purely and inherently Christian.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Turkey’s ongoing identity crisis has contributed to its marginalization within Europe. The
presence of Turkish migrant workers in Germany, for example, has led many Europeans to
believe that Turks really are Europe’s others. The long history of Turkey’s association with
Europe and a loyal NATO ally did not decrease the differences between Turkey and Europe,
rather it made them more visible. Throughout contemporary history, Turkey’s relations with
Europe have served as an indicator for measuring the success of Turkey’s modernization
efforts, as well as the acceptance of Turkey’s European credentials. Unfortunately, the
redefinition of Europe’s identity along ethnonational and cultural lines may mean that
Turkey will not qualify for EU membership and, therefore, will not be part of European
civilization (Bhabha 1998).
Turkey’s long history of association with the rest of Europe has finally reached a turning
point. The fact that Turkey has fallen behind countries like Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Poland in
the race for EU membership has deepened the divide in Turkey among Western-oriented
modernizers and Islamic-oriented conservatives. As for Europe, the recent emphasis on
ethnicity and culture poses a serious obstacle for a dynamic transformation into a United
Europe.
Turkey today stands at a crossroads since it was not included in the EU’s recent
44 WOONGJAE RYOO
enlargement phase. Furthermore, there is great uncertainty as to whether it ever will be
included due to the EU’s recent decision to review Turkey’s membership bid (The
Economist 2002; The Wall Street Journal 2002). The reason behind Turkey’s exclusion
seems religion and culture. Turkey still faces the prejudice of those who believed in the
Little Europe model that the EU should not expand beyond Christendom.
It is, however, clear that both Europe and Turkey would benefit from the notion of the
nation accepting their dual (or even multiple) national and cultural identities for peaceful
coexistence with their rich cultural and religious heritage they can mutually offer as a
platform for a dialogue of civilizations. Hence, Turkey’s EU membership is no longer just a
Turkish project, but at the same time is a project for transforming the old continent
(Worldpress.org 2005) into an open, multicultural and multi-religious regional block, which
will consequently help to strengthen the EU’s soft power based on the power of persuasion
and international agreements rather than military hardware. Indeed, accepting Turkey as a
member would show the world that the European Union is not a parochial Christian club in
the age of globalization.