请将“Poulantzas has shown this very fittingly for the relation of classes to each other: ‘Power’ means in this relationship the ability of one or more classes to realise their interests. This determines the scope of action of one class in relation to another. ‘The capacity of one class to realise its interests is in opposition to the capacity (and interests) of other classes: the field of power is therefore strictly relational.‘-’’A The power of one class is at first an expression of its objective position within economic, political and ideological relations. This position comprises the unequal relations of domination and subjugation, which are rooted in the social division of labour. The position of every class and thus its power are thus limited, that is, determined and delineated through the positions of the other classes: ‘Power is not then a quality attached to a class “in-itself”, understood as a collection of agents, but depends on, and springs from, a relational system of material places occupied by particular agents'.’’!’’ Political power expresses of course not only a class’s level of organisation and its position in a given conjuncture. The political power of a class, that is, its capacity to realise its political interests, depends accordingly not only on its class position, but also on its position and strategy in relation to the other classes.616 The constituent field of power is thus an unequal rapport of force relationships and points towards a material system of distributing positions. This also explains the primacy of struggles in Poulantzas as well as his strategic orientation towards the stated7 One therefore has to join with Jessop when he demands the development of a ‘strategic-relational’ approach following Poulantzas. After all, it makes a difference whether someone has the structurally mediated capacity to, for example, impose the value form upon a class618 or not.
Any analysis therefore has to make the effort to extract the actors theoretically and empirically from the power tangle - without it ever being certain whether all or even the essential ones have been identified. This is simply the risk of speculation that critical theory cannot escape, if it wants to say something essential about society.619 It is moreover the consequence of a genuine micro-political analysis. The concept of hegemony, as developed by Gramsci and applied by Poulantzas to the state, can represent a meaningful addition to Foucault. It can also be combined with the concept of government to conceive of how different power relations somehow combine into larger formations regulated by hegemonic projects; that government is not an anonymous process regulating a uniform population, but that it follows from the necessity of hegemonising particular interests. The ‘positions’ of the respective individual or collective subjects are the result of the crystallization or material condensation of past strategies620 A strategic-relation approach therefore ‘must refer to real strategies, calculations, and calculating subjects’.62i Of course strategies can fail or their interweaving with other strategies can result in unintended consequences; and of course the actors, because of the power tangle, do not have omnipotent abilities or an all-encompassing knowledge. Their strategies are in this respect exploratory movements.622
When Foucault’s approach is thus completed with the analysis of concrete relationships of forces, and hence with calculating subjects, the question remains whether this is even possible with his concept of the subject. For, as Bröckling rightly notes, Foucault’s subject only exists in the form of the gerund, ‘as to be explored, to be normalised, to be optimised, to be aesthetically shaped, and so on’. It is not the final stable point or an ‘imaginary centre of the person’, but rather ‘the vanishing point of at the same time inevitable and unfinish- able efforts at definition and control; not a submissive addressee, but neither a stubborn point de résistance against interventions of power, but always already their effect’.623 The subject is accordingly an effect of power, but it has a materiality, it is temporarily fixed and acts as such, as a woman, for example, or as the owner of means of production, or both at once. It is an ensemble of subject positions, with over-determinations existing between them, a ‘fundamental nodal point’.624 As such it enacts strategic practices - even if its ‘interests’ do not result as such from its ‘objective position’, as Poulantzas thought, but only develop in political practice as advanced by Foucault.625
2.3.5.3	Extending the Technology of Law
The rather traditional aspect of Foucault’s legal technology stems very much from his fixation on penal law, and hence his guiding distinction between what is permitted and what is forbidden. This has to be corrected with Luhmann’s legal code, which is based upon the dualism of legal and illegal. Foucault’s line of argument can be preserved, but at the same time even the technology of law would reveal itself to be less repressive than theorists of productive power imagine. The production of the modern subject is therefore less determined by the prevention of certain behaviours than it is by the (sanctioned) provision of (hegemonic) ways of subjection.
But a second correction is also necessary. His reduction of law to a tactic of governmentality in his late work fails to convince, as it ultimately reduces law again to something of an instrumental tool of government, thus falling back behind his previous insights. Moreover, legal technology has its own density and functions according to its own ‘logic’, as per Kelsen’s historic insight. Of course Foucault also employs tactics in a repositioned manner, as tactics without tactician. However, as he does not describe any further how this serves the government of the population, what is to be understood by the tactics of the law remains at best a gap.
If one applies Foucault to himself, one would reach the conclusion that law functions through the constitution of the subject of the population itself. Again, this is no pre-existing being, which is always pregiven as an ensemble of biological elements and social practices, and only has to be regulated. It seems altogether fitting to combine Foucault at this point with Poulantzas’ reflections on the state as a factor of cohesion. Foucault himself has noted that the modern state as successor of pastoral power individualises and totalises in the same breath. Poulantzas now attributes precisely this sanctioning of differences with their simultaneous homogenisation to the technique of the law inasmuch as it functions as a formal cohesive framework. Biopolitically regulated and governmentally ruled, the population is constituted as a unity of subjects as people and nation through the law. This also clarifies the connection between ‘population’ and ‘people’ again. The latter is the juridical construction of the subject that is to be politically governed. This could also explain why juridical theories of power limit themselves to this legal construction - because it is this construction that is presented in the official code of power, that is in the law. 
PART 3
Reconstruction: Subjectivation and Cohesion 
Introduction to Part 3
Having described and critiqued central approaches in legal theory in part 2,1 will now attempt to systematically develop elements of an updated materialist socio-legal theory. Here I do not intend to simply dismiss the critiqued theories, but instead to preserve those elements that have led to significant insights into the connection between law and capitalist society throughout my critique.
My argument here is that capitalist conditions produce in combination with modern law a particular technology of power, which on the one hand involves the production of subjects that are isolated in relation to each other (sub- jectivation), but on the other ties together those individuals in a precarious social whole (cohesion). Because this technology represents a specific independent form of social relations, I will call it, following form analysis, the legal form.
Thus I attempt to combine central insights of form analysis and of the Franco-Italian theory strand. However, in order to achieve this, some premises have to be clarified first.
I begin by reviewing the concept of the relationship of forces, so that from the beginning all statements can be traced back in a relational manner to the connections between social individuals. For only if history can be deciphered as one that is made by people, does the potential for its emancipatory change exist, and a resigned attitude with regard to social surplus objectivity can be avoided.
One of the main effects of capitalist conditions is the production of isolated, gendered and racialised subjects who are ruled in a particular manner. This modern subjectivation entails the problem that Habermas deals with under the heading ‘integration’: How are individuals who are subjectivated in relation to each other tied together in a social whole? For this it is necessary to make the power-theoretical concepts of hegemony and government productive for legal theory, in order to free the latter from subject-less mechanistic concepts which always already assume the form’s functioning. In this analytical frame of reference the legal form then emerges as a particular technique of consensus, one which transforms the problem of hegemony in its own way and thus provides crucial support for social synthesis.
How the legal form works - not how it is derived - will then be reviewed with particular attention to its relative autonomy and following Marx’s concept of the commodity form. 
In order for such a theory not to run the risk of form analysis - of remaining at an abstract level and closed off from any empirical investigations of specific historic social formations - I will then conceive of the institutionalisation of the legal form understood as a historically and spatially concrete expression of a power technology.
The crucial question of the law’s emancipatory potential will then be considered in the closing chapter (Part 4). ”翻译为中文