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essay: How should Japan deal with a rising China in Southeast Asia?

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- length: 1200-1500 words
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In the contemporary geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia, the rise of China represents one of the most significant shifts in regional dynamics. For Japan, a nation with profound historical, economic, and strategic interests in the region, this shift necessitates a nuanced and multidimensional strategy. This essay examines how Japan should deal with a rising China in Southeast Asia, considering historical context, economic interdependence, military strategy, and diplomatic engagement. The exploration draws upon various sources to present a comprehensive approach that balances competition and cooperation.

#### Historical Context and Strategic Interests

Historically, Japan and China have experienced periods of both conflict and collaboration. During the early 20th century, Japan’s imperial ambitions led to a confrontation with China, culminating in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Post-World War II, Japan redefined its role in Asia, focusing on economic growth and regional stability. However, the rise of China as a financial and military power has reintroduced a competitive element to this relationship.

In Southeast Asia, Japan has long been a key player. The region is vital due to its strategic maritime routes and economic potential. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its assertive stance in the South China Sea represent a growing challenge to Japan’s influence. According to Tsuneo Watanabe, “Japan’s grand strategy can be said to have been shaped by the pursuit of complex security and economic interests within the Japan-US-China triangle, whose history can be traced back to the 1930s” (Watanabe, 2015). Therefore, Japan’s strategy must navigate these historical and strategic complexities.

#### Economic Interdependence

Economically, both Japan and China are deeply integrated with Southeast Asia. China’s BRI aims to enhance infrastructure connectivity and increase its influence, while Japan has historically provided significant development aid and investment to the region. Given this economic interdependence, Japan should adopt a complementary rather than confrontational economic strategy toward China.

For instance, Japanese companies can collaborate with Southeast Asian nations on infrastructure projects not exclusively tied to Chinese funding. By providing alternatives, Japan can help these nations avoid excessive reliance on China. Stephen R. Nagy notes that Japan’s “reputation became one of being an essential partner to the region and Tokyo began to see itself as having the responsibility to contribute to the region’s development as part of its national interests” (Nagy, 2024).

Moreover, Japan can leverage its technological expertise in sectors such as renewable energy, healthcare, and digital infrastructure. By positioning itself as a leader in these fields, Japan can enhance its soft power and economic influence in Southeast Asia, balancing China’s footprint.

#### Military Strategy and Security Partnerships

In terms of military strategy, Japan faces a delicate balancing act. While it is crucial to deter potential aggression and ensure regional security, overt military expansion could provoke an arms race. Thus, Japan should focus on building robust security partnerships with Southeast Asian nations.

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) can engage in joint exercises, capacity-building initiatives, and disaster relief operations with Southeast Asian militaries. Such cooperation fosters mutual trust and enhances regional stability. According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan will strengthen cooperation in the field of maritime security based on the rule of law and achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific” (MOFA, 2022).

Additionally, Japan can support regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). These platforms enable collective dialogue and collaboration on security issues, providing a counterbalance to China’s unilateral actions in the South China Sea.

#### Diplomatic Engagement and Multilateralism

Diplomatically, Japan’s approach should prioritize multilateralism and adherence to international norms. Promoting a rules-based order in Southeast Asia aligns with Japan’s national interests and resonates with the region’s smaller nations, which often feel vulnerable to larger powers.

According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) emphasizes "the promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade” (MOFA, 2022). By engaging countries through this strategy, Japan can present itself as a reliable and principled partner, contrasting with China’s sometimes coercive diplomacy.

Furthermore, Japan should actively participate in regional economic forums such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). These platforms not only facilitate economic integration but also serve as venues for promoting shared values and norms. 

Michael J. Green underscores that Japan’s FOIP “flows from a strategic worldview in Japan, even if it does not spell out every detail of the national objectives and instruments of power to be employed” (Green, 2018). By adopting this framework, Japan emphasizes “rule-of-law; transparency; openness; high-quality rules for trade, investment and infrastructure; and the prevention of coercive actions against smaller states” (Green, 2018).

#### Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy

Beyond economic and military measures, Japan can harness its soft power to build lasting influence in Southeast Asia. The popularity of Japanese culture, from anime and cuisine to education and technology, provides a significant advantage. Cultural diplomacy initiatives, such as increased scholarships for Southeast Asian students, cultural exchange programs, and language education centers, can deepen people-to-people ties and strengthen Japan’s image as a friendly and culturally rich nation.

Promoting Japanese values of innovation, quality, and environmental sustainability can also resonate with Southeast Asian countries. For example, Japan’s expertise in disaster management and preparedness can be shared through training programs and technology transfers, addressing a common regional challenge and showcasing Japan’s strengths. As noted by JICA, Japan has made “huge strides in providing disaster management techniques” to the region (JICA, 2021).

#### Balancing Competition and Cooperation

In dealing with a rising China, Japan must find a balance between competition and cooperation. While certain areas, such as security and strategic influence, may inevitably involve competition, there are also opportunities for collaboration on global challenges like climate change, public health, and infrastructure development.

Engaging China in multilateral frameworks where both nations have stakes promotes dialogue and reduces the risk of conflict. By advocating for joint initiatives in areas of mutual interest, Japan can demonstrate that cooperation can be mutually beneficial. As Watanabe discusses, “Japanese leaders often note the importance of keeping the Japan-US-China relationship an equidistant one” (Watanabe, 2015).

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Sources

https://japanupclose.web-japan.org/policy/p20240510_1.html


Japan-ASEAN Cooperation as Security Partners

By Hoang Thi Ha
Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
May 10, 2024


Japan played a leading role in pushing through the CPTPP and RCEP in the US absence. Do you foresee a continuation of Japan’s leadership in the coming years?
Absolutely. Japan’s active participation, support, and leadership in various multilateral economic partnership agreements (EPAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) across Asia-Pacific have been crucial in shaping the regional economic architecture, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP). Japan’s role in this respect will remain pivotal, especially as the US is turning away from the global multilateral trading system, amidst a backdrop of rising unilateralism and protectionism worldwide.

To begin with, Japan’s active engagement in shaping the regional economic landscape is driven by its substantial business interests. Japanese corporations have long served as a key driver of regional economic integration because of their expansive cross-border production networks in Asia-Pacific. As underscored in the Japan Revitalization Strategy, EPAs and FTAs serve to “bolster the foundation of the Japanese economy by reducing or eliminating tariffs, addressing trade barriers for services, and establishing rules on trade and investment”. Over the past decade, the proportion of Japan’s trade value with countries having EPAs/FTAs surged from 19% of Japan’s total trade in 2012 to 78% in 2023. Another good example is the benefits of the RCEP, which in effect creates Japan’s free trade agreements with China and South Korea, with a record high number of Japanese businesses applying for RCEP certificates of origin.

Japan’s leadership becomes even more critical in anticipation of the potential re-election of former US President Trump, who will definitely pursue a massively protectionist trade agenda. This would cause severely adverse effects on Japan and Southeast Asian countries, both of whom have substantial trade surpluses with America. This looming scenario underscores the necessity for closer collaboration among Japan and other regional countries to uphold the principles of open and free trade. Moreover, Japan’s leadership in shaping the regional economic order – grounded in the principles of inclusivity, openness and adherence to rules – has historically served as a catalyst for US re-engagement when favourable conditions arise. Given the US’ significance as the largest export market for Southeast Asian countries, where Japanese companies have established deep roots, it is imperative to keep the US engaged economically in the region. Even though trade has become a politically unpalatable topic in Washington, it is still important to keep the door open to US return in the future, one way or another.

Finally, as with many economic integration initiatives previously advocated or supported by Japan, there is a strategic imperative behind Japan’s proactive leadership in shaping the regional economic order. This is particularly evident in terms of rule-making in frontier and emerging domains such as digital trade, AI, or green economy. At the same time, this undertaking will not be easy given that Japan now wields comparatively lesser economic might vis-à-vis China in overall and that China has made significant advancements and actively asserted its influence in setting rules within these new domains. Many Southeast Asian countries are in fact more aligned with China than with Japan in terms of advocating for a more state-driven and localized approach to data governance.

How does Japan’s approach to security cooperation with Southeast Asian nations differ from its economic engagement, and what implications does this have for regional dynamics?
Throughout many decades during and after the Cold War, Japan primarily relied on its economic engagement with Southeast Asia to assert its influence whereas its security cooperation largely prioritized non-traditional security challenges such as bomb and mine clearance, combating illicit drug trafficking, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, health security, counter-piracy, and counter-terrorism. This deliberate strategy of ‘soft engagement’ reflects Japan’s steadfast commitment to adhere to its pacifist principles and to navigate sensitivities surrounding its militaristic past in the region.

Starting from the mid-2010s, Japan has shifted towards strengthening and deepening its ‘hard security’ cooperation with some littoral Southeast Asian countries through high-level and working-level defense exchanges, capacity-building cooperation, and joint exercises. The intensification of Japan’s security engagement with the region is driven by the changing balance of power in Asia with the resurgence of China, Chinese expansive claims and creeping control in the regional waters, and the escalating strategic tensions between the US and China. All these power dynamics have pushed Japan to become a more serious security actor and to work with its allies and partners to enhance their individual and collective deterrence, denial and response capabilities with the aim of preventing opponents from unilateral changes to the status quo by force. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines is emerging as Japan’s closest security partner. Manila is a key beneficiary of Japan’s support of maritime security capabilities, including through the recently launched Official Security Assistance (OSA). Following the Philippines, other Southeast Asian littoral states, who have sovereignty and/or maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, namely Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia, will potentially become OSA recipients.

Compared to Japan’s economic engagement, which involves its active participation in ASEAN-led initiatives alongside bilateral economic exchanges, Japan’s current security strategy is increasingly characterized by a shift towards minilateral arrangements. These arrangements feature flexible composition that may include Japan, select Southeast Asian nations and other powers like the US and/or Australia. This trend is particularly notable in the ‘traditional security’ domain, where there is a clear emphasis on strategic coordination among like-minded partners in ‘balancing’ against China. The most illustrative example is the emerging US-Japan-Philippines triad, marked by their joint maritime exercises, increased strategic coordination and their leaders’ forthcoming first-ever trilateral summit at the White House.

This kind of ‘hard balancing’ security arrangement is hard to multilateralise through ASEAN platforms, given the divergent strategic outlooks among ASEAN members and among its dialogue partners. Japan of course will not abandon ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). But the ASEAN-led regional security architecture has proven inadequate in meeting Japan’s evolving security needs, which increasingly pivots towards a strategy of deterrence and denial by bolstering Japan’s capabilities and collectively with allies and like-minded partners. Japan’s security partnerships nowadays tend to be more exclusive, such as the Quad or the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral, whose members share strategic concerns, particularly over China’s military resurgence and assertive behaviors in Asian waters.

Japan’s current security outreach to Southeast Asian countries is firmly anchored in its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, which was first coined by late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 and is now embraced by other major powers (except China). This strategic framework is maritime-focused and outward-looking, aiming to bolster the enduring presence of the US while also recognizing India’s strategic significance as a counter-balancing force to China and valuing Australia as a like-minded partner in advancing shared interests and values. Today, Japan remains deeply integrated into the East Asian global supply chains and Tokyo continues to embrace multilateral economic agreements inclusive of China, including the RCEP. However, East Asian economic regionalism, which sought to integrate Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia towards the long-term goal of building an East Asian community, has waned in Japan’s strategic thinking. It no longer influenced Japan’s approach to regional order the way it did in the 1990s and 2000s. Japan’s contemporary strategic discourse no longer refers to the region as “Asia”, much less ‘East Asia’.

Map of Southeast Asia

How do you perceive Japan’s relative position in Southeast Asia’s infrastructure development?
Japan has been a longstanding infrastructure development partner in Southeast Asia for many decades not only through its bilateral ODA but also through the Japan-sponsored Asian Development Bank. However, China’s rapid advancements in this domain over the past decade have led it to surpass Japan in total infrastructure development financing to Southeast Asia. According to the Lowy Institute’s Southeast Asia Aid Map, China has emerged as the largest infrastructure development partner in the region, having invested a total of US$31.7 billion between 2015-2021 across 155 projects in five areas: transport & storage; energy; industry, mining & construction; communications; and water & sanitation. In comparison, Japan (including through the ADB) trails behind with US$27.6 billion allocated to 5,550 projects. Japan’s financing is spread across a significantly larger number of small and medium-scale projects whereas Chinese financing is concentrated in a few large-scale projects. Japan holds a strong presence in Vietnam and the Philippines where Tokyo remains the most preferred partner for infrastructure development, given the deep strategic mistrust of Beijing. However, China has notably surpassed Japan in Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, and Malaysia. In Thailand, Japan still maintains a narrow lead over China with 353 projects and a high implementation rate at 88%, but China holds significant future potential with a committed investment of 21 billion.

China’s geographic proximity to Southeast Asia and its long-term goal of establishing the pan-Asia railway to enhance land-based economic connectivity with the region set it apart from Japan. This strategic vision motivates China to commit substantial investments in laying the groundwork for the pan-Asian railway, starting with big-ticket projects in the region such as high-speed rails such as the Vientiane-Kunming and the Singapore-Kuala-Lumpur-Bangkok. The pursuit of Chinese statecraft through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which prioritizes strategic goals over immediate commercial viability where necessary, has resulted in concerns regarding debt burdens for host countries, as well as social and environmental costs associated with China-financed projects. However, this state-driven approach, coupled with the imperative to export China’s excess production capacity in infrastructure building, has also enabled China to proceed swiftly in project delivery, on a large scale and a comparatively lower cost. In contrast, Japan’s infrastructure investments tend to prioritize the commercial viability and social-environmental standards of projects, leading to a more cautious, hence slow-going, approach. Japan’s ‘quality infrastructure’ brand is attractive but in Southeast Asia and across the Global South, it is also important to consider the affordability and political dynamics of host countries. There, the ruling elites often prioritize big infrastructure projects to boost electoral performance, hence their choice of the partner that can deliver it fast and cheap (from a short-term consideration).

From Southeast Asia’s perspective, the approach has been “the more, the merrier”. The region has a massive demand for infrastructure development, estimated at US$210 billion annually until 2040. Meeting this demand necessitates tapping into multiple sources of funding, including from Japan, China, and other potential partners. Therefore, Japan remains highly valued as an infrastructure development partner, especially considering that not all commitments made by China in megaprojects have been fulfilled, as highlighted in a recent Lowy Institute report. Moreover, China’s economic downturn has also led to difficulties in its overseas development financing in recent years, hence a shift in the Chinese approach to “small and beautiful” projects in its BRI, focusing more on digital connectivity and green energy transition. This means that Chinese financing will be more selective going forward and that the Chinese can also potentially deliver “quality infrastructure” – a brand that Japan has long promoted.

What are the key challenges and opportunities for Japan in further deepening its partnership with Southeast Asia while advancing the principles outlined in the ASEAN Charter and the AOIP?
Japan holds a distinctive edge over other major powers in its relationship with the region, rooted in a foundation of strategic trust. Numerous public and elite surveys consistently rank Japan as the most trusted power among Southeast Asians when compared to other major powers. Japan has also been a longstanding bridge and broker between the region and the West. While firmly upholding democratic and liberal values, Japan has demonstrated a deep understanding of and adaptability to the diverse political systems present in Southeast Asia. The region also appreciates Japan’s consistent role as a stabilizing force for Asia, particularly during periods of disengagement, distraction, or neglect from the US, as well as Japan’s crucially constructive role in shaping the regional order through its engagement with and support for ASEAN multilateralism. This strategic trust enables Japan to effectively promote its regional initiatives, ideas, and proposals with a greater level of appreciation and positive perception in Southeast Asia. Whether advocating for “quality infrastructure” or its own vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, Japan’s approach resonates well with many development and security needs of the region.

That being said, there is no room for complacency. Trust alone does not translate into geopolitical clout. In the annual State of Southeast Asian survey conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, while Japan continues to be regarded as the most trusted power, those respondents who harbour distrust towards Japan often express concerns regarding its perceived lack of capacity and political will for global leadership. This concern is particularly relevant given Japan’s lackluster economic growth at home and its aging population, which has constrained Japan’s financial resources to sustain its global leadership. Japan’s significance to Southeast Asia in economic terms has relatively declined in light of the ascent of other competitors, especially China. Even in Vietnam where Japan wields substantial economic influence, South Korea has outpaced Japan in terms of trade volume and foreign direct investment. Of note, China is forging ahead of Japan in making inroads to Southeast Asia in future-defining sectors such as green transition and digital transformation. A 2023 survey by the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia revealed that Japan remains the most trusted power in the region. However, China is perceived as the most crucial partner for ASEAN’s future, primarily due to its extensive economic engagement with the region. This is confirmed by a 2022 survey on the perception of ASEAN businesses towards Japan.

Given that its resources are not infinite and Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy now extends beyond Southeast Asia to encompass South Asia and the Pacific, the question of Japan’s prioritization—both in terms of sectors and regions—is of utmost importance. Southeast Asia’s substantial development and security needs, ranging from poverty reduction to maritime security, green transition to digital transformation, and upgrading of its supply chain value, would benefit greatly from Japan’s support and cooperation. It is also important to note that Japan-Southeast Asia partnership is becoming more balanced and reciprocal. As the region emerges as a center of global growth with a burgeoning middle class, young populations, and a large pool of human talent, dynamism and entrepreneurship, there is increasing potential for co-creation of new values and solutions with Japan.

In the context of ASEAN-Japan relations, Japan has always been a premier dialogue partner of ASEAN and a strong supporter of the AOIP in terms of both principles and practical cooperation, as reflected in their 2020 joint statement. The 2023 Joint Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation and the 2023 Joint Statement on the Establishment of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Strategic Partnership further underscore the alignment between the AOIP and Japan’s FOIP vision in terms of upholding “fundamental principles in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the region”, such as rules-based order, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and rejection of the use of force. However, as Japan seeks to advance these principles, it must navigate challenges arising from a more disunited ASEAN amid an increasingly strategically contested region.

Apart from these normative re-assertions, Japan is shifting its regional security strategy towards bolstering deterrence and striving to become a serious security actor. Southeast Asian perceptions of Japan in this respect can swing to extremes. On one end, this may rekindle historical memories of a militaristic Japan in the past, which could be fueled by the propaganda of Japan’s adversaries like China and Russia. On the other, there are concerns about Japan’s willingness and capability, given the legal constraints imposed by its pacifist constitution, its internal debate on Japan’s new military posture, and its ongoing economic uncertainties. Hence, it is imperative for Japan to enhance its outreach efforts and articulate its strategic intent clearly and consistently. More exchanges, dialogues and joint activities would be beneficial in this regard. And even as Japan is pursuing a multi-pronged approach in its security engagements with different sets of players and is becoming more realist and gravitating towards the balance of power, it remains crucial for Japan to maintain active participation in the ASEAN security architecture, especially the EAS, ADMM-Plus and ADMM plus One with Japan.

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https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100537542.pdf
Section 3: From “Japan and Asia” to “Japan in Asia”: from the mid 1980s to the mid 2000s Globally, the most important development in those years was the end of the Cold War and the advent of American unipolarity. The US grand strategy also underwent a major shift from containment to globalization that is promoting capital movement across national boundaries, free trade and democracy. In Asia, however, the first important change took place in the mid-1980s. In what is now remembered as the Plaza Accord, Japan and West Germany agreed to let their currencies appreciate vis-à-vis US dollar in 1985. In a few years the Japanese yen appreciated enormously from 235 yen a dollar before the Accord to 145 in 1990 and 85 yen a dollar in 1995, before coming back down to 145 a dollar in 1998 at the height of the East Asian economic crisis. By the mid-1980s, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were already well on their path toward industrialization and were called NIEs, newly industrialized economies. ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, enjoyed a measure of political stability and solid economic growth. To remain competitive in the global market with the appreciating yen, Japanese firms once again went into these countries in a massive way, made huge investment, and shifted their production bases there. Japan’s foreign direct investment expanded five times from 1985 to 1990 and led to the formation of regional productions chains in Southeast Asia, especially in the automotive and electronic industries. The Japanese government also expanded its overseas development assistance. Japan emerged as the dominant player in infrastructure development in Southeast Asia. Second, there took place a People’s Power revolution in the Philippines that toppled the Marcos dictatorship in the mid-1980s, followed by democratization in South Korea and Taiwan. Democracy movements also rose in Myanmar in 1988 and China in 1989, but these were violently suppressed. 8 So to put it in a different way, the Cold War ended differently in Asia and Europe. In Europe, the Soviet Union and its client states collapsed, Germanies were unified, and a new geopolitical map of Europe emerged. In East Asia, no socialist state collapsed. It was America’s client states that underwent democratization. The only major geopolitical change in Asia took place in Indochina. With the decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam changed its economic policy in the mid-1980s, decided to withdraw from Cambodia in the early 1990s, and joined the ASEAN in the late 1990s. Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar followed suit, resulting in the expansion of ASEAN. Southeast Asia would no longer be divided along ideological, geopolitical, and economic lines. Japan’s regional vision emerged out of this reality and its future prospects. Japanese believed – like many others – that the region-wide economic development would continue and expand its frontiers, from Asian NIEs to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, to coastal regions of China and to the Philippines and Vietnam and beyond. Furthermore, Japanese believed that this region-wide economic development would underpin political stability in this area. Japan as the economic giant in the region would help spur the regional economic development with its FDIs, its economic and technical assistance and its market, while helping to ensure that the region remains open to the world. Japanese also assumed the US would remain engaged in the region, because the region promised to be crucial for America’s own future and the Japan US alliance would remain the anchor for regional security and stability. A series of developments, however, undermined this vision and forced its revision. Section 4: Changing Regional Vision: From East Asia to Asia Pacific to Indo-Pacific First, there was the financial crisis of 1997-1998. Lulled by their economic success, Korean, Thai, Malaysia, and Indonesian business borrowed short term bank loans for long term, often unproductive investment. Since their currencies were pegged to US dollar, the appreciating dollar after 1995 led to the appreciation of their currencies and the decline of their exports. These problems were exposed in 1997, when Thailand, with its foreign reserve depleted for the defense of its currency, went to the International Monetary Fund for assistance. Soon the crisis spread to Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia, while Taiwan successfully defended its 9 currency. The crisis, initially economic in nature, soon snowballed into a political crisis and led to constitutional revision in Thailand in 1997, the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, and the deepening rift among the ruling elite in Malaysia in 1998. The crisis also bankrupted local Southeast Asian business partners of Japanese firms and threatened the Japan-led supply chains that had developed since the mid-1980s. Americans and Japanese, however, disagreed on how to overcome the crisis. Americans insisted on structural reform, because they believed the root cause of the crisis was crony capitalism. Japanese, on the other hand, argued that it was a liquidity crisis, a kind of bank run, and therefore, providing liquidity was the way to go. Japan proposed for establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund, only to be shot down by the US and China. China also seized this opportunity for its own advantage. China pledged not to devalue the Chinese yuan to exacerbate the crisis, worked with the US to shoot down the Asian Monetary Fund Japan had proposed, and successfully negotiated with the US under the Clinton administration to join the WTO, the world trade organization. Joining the WTO marked the beginning of the era of China’s rise. In 2000, China was a quarter of Japanese economy in size. Ten years later, it surpassed Japan, thus fundamentally changing the distribution of wealth and power in this region. The US agreed to let China join the WTO in the belief that China’s economic development would eventually steer China toward a market economy and democratization. Under these changing circumstances, Japan’s regional vision underwent significant revision. In the wake of the East Asian economic crisis, there was a widespread resentment against the US intervention and the fact that the US seized on the crisis to impose structural reform on Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Now, many countries in the region saw the US as the risk they had to hedge. This was the most important reason ASEAN countries as well as Japan, China and Korea agreed to organize the ASEAN plus 3 summit and supported the idea of an East Asia community. The crucial point of this community building lay in its name, namely East Asia, which by definition does not include the US and hence provides a convenient framework for regional cooperation without the US and if necessary discussing ways to hedge the risk of US intervention. 10 By the late 2000s, however, confident in its rising power and convinced of the realist nature of international politics, China had become really assertive in the South China Sea. It also dawned on many countries in this region that it was only a matter of time before China would surpass Japan as the economic giant in the region and also emerged as a military power. ASEAN took the initiative and invited three more countries, Australia, New Zealand and India, to create another forum, the East Asia summit, along with the ASEAN plus 3, in 2005. Then, in 2011, ASEAN once again took the lead in inviting the US and Russia to the East Asia summit – which practically meant ASEAN plus 8 – and making East Asia almost synonymous with the Asia Pacific. It is because ASEAN wanted and was successful until recently in serving as the hub for regional cooperation and because the framework was calibrated to hedge whatever risk the region, especially ASEAN, confronted. As long as ASEAN was united, Southeast Asia could avoid becoming an arena for greatpower rivalry. Recent events, however, have shown that ASEAN is no longer united. China considers the South China Sea territorial issues as part of its core national interests, and insists on bilateral negotiations with Southeast Asian countries on South China Sea issues. In the process, ASEAN unity has been undermined. China is also putting a lot of money in places that it considers most strategic – in Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, as well as in Indonesia and Malaysia – for building highways, ports, dams, and power grids and developing mines and real estates Confronted with the rising China, the US has also come to the conclusion that China is not likely to make the transition to a market democracy and that it is intent on creating its own sphere of influence. The US therefore decided to rebalance its military power to put more emphasis on the Pacific and strengthen its security cooperation with many countries in the region. Against the new superpower rivalry, ASEAN has not been effective, and has been drifting since the mid-2010s. It is symptomatic that even though it was Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who first used the term “Indo-Pacific” to propose a new framework for regional cooperation and underline the centrality of ASEAN in the region, the Indo-Pacific these days is more often used by four non-ASEAN powers of the US, Japan, Australia and India as the framework for security cooperation. 11 China is not part of this security framework, but it is not an attempt to contain China. All the four countries as well as all the ASEAN countries and many others, I believe, agree that Indo Pacific should be free and open as great commons, even if China successfully builds its own sphere of influence in its continental vicinity. Section 5: Japan’s Role in the Future of Asia It should be clear, then, how important Southeast Asia is strategically for Japan and why it is doing what it is doing. Japanese are aware that China now far surpasses Japan in economic power, that resources available for China’s economic cooperation, military build-up and technology investment are far larger than Japan’s, and that China’s economic and military prowess in due course will be translated into its expanding influence in Southeast Asia. Japanese are also aware that domestic politics matters greatly in any country and that Americans have become too inward-looking and want their government to invest more in their own country than outside, even though the American military remains unrivalled. Japanese are also aware that in this world of formal equality and informal hierarchy among sovereign states, no country in the region wants to be an island in China’s Lake. All the states in the region are engaged in a delicate balancing act between the current super power and the aspiring power. They seek to maintain their freedom of action. Denying agency to small and middle powers in the region would be a huge mistake, even as these small and middle powers find their actions constrained by superpower rivalry. This is the reason that Japan calls for a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. Japan does not have power and resources to prevent China from creating its own sphere of influence in its vicinity, but it wants to ensure that Southeast Asia, which is vital to Japan both geopolitically and economically, remains free, that is, not to be dominated by any one outside power, and open to the world. We should remember that ASEAN has long had a record of negotiating with more than one outside power to expand its own and its member countries’ freedom of action. Japan’s Southeast Asia policy thus remains evolutionary. Two ideas have informed Japan’s foreign policy over many decades. One is to maintain and strengthen its alliance with the US as an anchor for regional peace and stability. The other 12 idea is to provide support to its neighbors’ economic development, which is the key to the long-term stability and prosperity of the region and of course good for Japan too. The instruments Japan has deployed to achieve these twin policy goals also remain evolutionary. Japan is doing its part to transform the US-led hub-and-spokes regional security system into a larger regional security network, promoting security cooperation with Australia and India and supporting the capacity-building of selective ASEAN countries. Japan promotes economic cooperation through its FDIs and concessional loans for infrastructure-building, through the conclusion of FTAs and expansion of trade, and through the provision of technical assistance and investment in human resource development. At the same time, Japan promotes cultural exchanges and seeks to establish relations of trust at all levels, both public and private. What remains to be done – and this is the major challenge in the coming years – is to make cooperation mutual and reciprocal. The days are gone when Japan was the economic giant in the region. In the coming decade, the ASEAN economies will surpass Japan in size, Southeast Asians will hopefully be predominantly middle-class, better-educated and tech-savvy and their business might be more innovative than Japanese. In the coming years, Japan needs to enhance its security cooperation with Southeast Asia. Japan need investment from Southeast Asia. Japan and Southeast Asia should both engage in mutual learning of innovative business models. A free and open Southeast Asia will remain important strategically for Japan, the region, and the world. For this purpose, it is important and imperative for us to understand what the peoples of Southeast Asia and Japan want to achieve and figure out what we can do together and how we can go about working together. Southeast Asia has been central to Japan, both geopolitically and economically
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https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100537542.pdf
Report of the Expert Panel for the 50 th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation February, 2023 Expert Panel for the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation 0. Objective Dialogue between ASEAN and Japan began in 1973, six years after ASEAN was established in August 1967. Additionally, in 1977, in his policy speech in Manila, FUKUDA Takeo, then Prime Minister of Japan, announced a policy toward Southeast Asia that was later called the “Fukuda Doctrine,” in which he called for “equal partnership” and “heart-to-heart dialogue” between ASEAN and Japan as its pillars. Since then, the cooperative relationship between ASEAN and Japan has deepened and expanded. As shown in the Tokyo Declaration issued in 2003, the 30th anniversary year of ASEANJapan, the Joint Declaration for Enhancing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together (Bali Declaration) in 2011, the Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation in 2013. And the Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in 2020, Japan has always expressed its support for ASEAN centrality and reiterated the importance of partnership with ASEAN. Japan has also supported ASEAN integration and community building, while expanding and deepening concrete cooperation in a wide range of fields, including politics and security, economy,society, culture,science and technology. The ASEAN-Japan Partnership and their cooperation under it have contributed to the stability and prosperity of not only Japan and Southeast Asian countries, but also of the region as a whole. However, the political, economic, and social conditionsin Japan and the ASEAN countries are currently undergoing major changes, and the relationship between the two sides is transforming. At the same time, the regional and international order as a whole is also undergoing a period of great upheaval. Against this backdrop, Japan and the ASEAN countries are facing a variety of challenges that are difficult to address with the conventional approaches that they have pursued individually or in cooperation with the other. The purpose of this proposal is to present a new direction for the future ASEAN-Japan partnership in 2023, on the occasion of the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, looking ahead to the next decade (the 2030s) and the next 50 years (the 2070s), with the aim of forming a regional order that enables the realization of a vibrant, inclusive, sustainable, and fair society, enjoying peace, security, prosperity, and freedom, while inheriting the spirit of moving forward with ASEAN that has continued from the “Fukuda Doctrine.” (Provisional Translation) 2 I. Challenges facing ASEAN countries and Japan today 1. Our primary and pressing challenge isto build a comprehensive regional order in maintaining peace and stability. Cooperation between ASEAN and Japan is critical in this urgent task. ① First, the contestation between the major powers is intensifying in Asia and the world. The strategic competition between the U.S. and China, which has a huge impact on the region, became apparent throughout the 2010s and has intensified further in the 2020s. In addition, since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, there are growing concerns over the possibility of unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in Asia. Under these circumstances, ASEAN and Japan must advance efforts in mitigating tensions for lasting stability and peace in the region, utilizing ASEAN-led architectures and coordinating the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). ② Second, the maintenance and strengthening of a free and open, rules-based maritime order is a concrete challenge with very high priority for ASEAN and Japan which relates to stability and peace in the whole region. Therefore, effective multilateral and bilateral efforts between ASEAN and Japan are required. ③ Third, regarding the military coup in Myanmar that occurred in February of 2021, while ASEAN’s effortsto addressthisseriousissue based on the “Five-Point Consensus” should be valued, a path to a solution has not yet been found. Improvement of the situation in Myanmar will have a significant impact on the future regional order, and Japan needs to approach this issue from the perspective of forming a regional order based on peaceful, stable, democratic, and fair societies with the guarantee of human rights. ④ Fourth, “democratic backsliding” have become a regional challenge not only in Myanmar but also in various parts of the ASEAN region. On the other hand, we should pay attention to the fact that civil society is growing, and generational change is taking place among political, economic, and social elites. In other words, politics and societies of each ASEAN country are becoming increasingly pluralistic. Moreover, it is also critical to improve the quality of both democracy and governance under the political and social dynamics in the ASEAN countries. This is the long-term goal which follows the principle of the ASEAN Charter that came into effect in 2008. in order to realize peace and prosperity through the formation of comprehensive order. 2. Our second major challenge is to balance economic growth with sustainability and equity. ① First, economic development of ASEAN have been strong before and after COVID and has become a strong force in changing itssociety. ASEAN is no longer a mere production hub, but also a strong growing consumer market with a population of 670 million people. ASEAN and Japan have the same challenge to overcome the economic fallout caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and reinvigorate the economy and maintain stable economic development. As intra-regional connectivity and interdependence in Asia is strengthening due to globalization and digitalization, (Provisional Translation) 3 it is vital that each stakeholder of ASEAN and Japan work together to explore new policies in balancing economic growth, sustainability, and equity of its societies. ② Second, the economic development of ASEAN and Japan countries has been supported by a free and open multilateral trading system and globalization under this system. With the rise of protectionism around the world, we need to maintain and strengthen a free and fair economic order as well as maintain a free and open trading system by utilizing multilateral frameworks like the Word Trade Organization (WTO), plurilateral frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, and the ASEANJapan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP), and bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements between Japan and individual ASEAN countries. In particular, seven ASEAN countries participate in IPEF, which is a regional rule-making framework forsupply chains, decarbonization, and fair economic order, and ASEAN and Japan are expected to actively engage in it as an opportunity to participate proactively in regional rule-making. ③ Third, in order to create a free and fair economic order in the ASEAN region, improving social capital which enables free flow of people, goods, capital, service, and data is indispensable. It is our task to strengthen connectivity which contributes to the development of the whole ASEAN region, all the while coordinating with ASEAN-led initiatives such as ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025, as well as their successors and action plans, and leveraging Japanese technologies and the experience and knowledge of the public and private sectors. In particular, cooperation on the development of advanced infrastructure, such as information infrastructure, can be the centerpiece of this effort. ④ Fourth, on the other hand, it should be recognized that there is a need to ensure fairness and resilience in cross-border economic activities including trade. From the perspective of ensuring resilience, while avoiding atrophy of trade and investment, we should advance efforts related to economic security,such asstrengthening supply chain resilience, data security and export control systems aimed at preventing leakage ofsensitive technologies. From the perspective of equitable development and fairness, multilateral efforts against the negative impacts of globalization are required. ⑤ Fifth, improving the working environment for personnel from ASEAN residing in Japan and expanding opportunities for them to play an active role contributes to the revitalization of the economies of ASEAN and Japan countries as well as strengthens the mutually beneficial economic relationships between the two. In this connection, the technical intern training program, which has been criticized in various ways, should be urgently put on a thorough review for improvement. This is an important issue from the perspective of balancing economic growth and fairness. ⑥ Sixth, reducing inequalities is one of the most prominent issues for ASEAN. In relation to this, it should be noted that the economic development of ASEAN countries has taken a form of (Provisional Translation) 4 “compressed development”. The compressed social changes (rapid urbanization, declining birthrates and aging populations starting in the middle of development, inequality, and environmental issues) are forcing ASEAN countries to simultaneously address challenges faced by developed countries as well as by developing countries, while their financial foundations are relatively unstable. Therefore, ASEAN’s response to these domestic or intra-regional internal challenges is not sufficient in terms of finance, technology, and personnel, which increases the need forregional integration and strengthening of cooperation with countries outside the region. Furthermore, the economic and social impacts caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has been seriously affecting the economy and society of each country. Although the economy isin recovery, the medium- and long-term effects on vulnerable sectors of society remain. It is also a common challenge for ASEAN and Japan to raise the quality of life of vulnerable sectors or the poor in society, with the aim of enabling the whole society to enjoy affluence. As globalization advances, multilateral efforts must be made with social justice in mind in order to prevent disparities from becoming the norm and to avoid the exclusion of socially vulnerable groups in each country, including transnational workers. ⑦ Seventh, in relation to the above, it is necessary to create a society in ASEAN countries where the middle class, especially the lower middle class and low-income people, who determine the future of the unity and stability of each society, can have expectations for the future, or “middle class dreams.” From now on, more ASEAN countries will enterthe final phase of demographic dividend followed by a period of low growth and stagnation. In the long run, it will become difficult to meet the people’s expectations for growth that have supported the booming economies and the improvement of governance capacity of ASEAN countriesin the past. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable that political distrust among those who have lost hope gradually grows. When society is dominated by nepotism (connections) rather than meritocracy (skills), by fear of failure rather than expectations of growth, or by concerns about fixation of social classes, social bonds will become fragile, and the political rationale for upholding democratic values will decline. In order to prevent such a situation, it is necessary to realize a society in which economic opportunities are open to everyone regardless of origin or class affiliation, where social diversity isrecognized, and direction and agreements within society are determined not by unilateral force but by constant and fair dialogue. Japan shares this challenge as a country that has been in a period of low growth and stagnation for a long time. ASEAN countries and Japan should tackle it together by sharing wisdom. ⑧ Eighth, both ASEAN and Japan countries share common challenges such as future economic revitalization, technological innovation and its implementation in society, digital transformation (DX), countermeasures against infectious diseases, climate change, decarbonization, and energy issues, and ASEAN and Japan need to cooperate in addressing these issues. In particular, it is becoming increasingly important to address environmental issues, including climate change. They should further strengthen cooperation in this area with consideration given to (Provisional Translation) 5 decarbonization and energy security. Also, on a global scale, the 21st century has seen a clear rise in the number of natural disasters compared to the previous century, and ASEAN countries are facing an increase in disaster risks and damage as well. Japan faces a similar situation and has accumulated various technologies and knowledge on disaster response and prevention, which should be utilized to further enhance ASEAN-Japan joint efforts. 3. The third task is to build multilayered people-to-people networks by fostering mutual interaction and understanding between ASEAN countries and Japan in the new era. ① First, a new generation of political and economic elites and civil society leaders is emerging as a result of economic growth, social maturation and diversification, and growth of civil society in ASEAN countries. It is required to make efforts to build multilayered people-to-people networks that incorporate new generations and segments ofsociety in ASEAN and Japan, given the changes in ASEAN-Japan relations. To this end, we should promote initiatives for mutual interaction based on equal footing, bidirectionality, respect for identity, and harmony and integration in diverse environments. ASEAN-Japan cooperation is also required to raise leaders of the next generation who will lead the ASEAN regional society. ② Second, it is necessary to update Japanese’ knowledge and understanding of ASEAN countries to be mutually compassionate which will bring about deep mutual understanding. As mentioned before, ASEAN countries have achieved economic development despite many challenges. ASEAN countries and Japan are no longer in the relationship of a one way support and assist. Rather, they are partners with which Japan can conduct “co-creation” on various common issues. Now that ASEAN is more advanced than Japan in some areas, Japan should learn from them, and this should be emphasized in ASEAN-Japan projects both in public and private sectors (and business sectors). Yet, Japanese society’s understanding on these new realities of ASEAN countries, or Southeast Asia, is not sufficient, and efforts and systems in educational and career development settings to promote this understanding are inadequate. Thus, it is vital to strengthen personnel training and public relations within Japan to renew people’s recognition of ASEAN and promote mutual understanding. II. Three pillars of a new ASEAN-Japan partnership for cooperation To address the above challenges, we recommend that efforts should be focused onto building a new ASEAN-Japan partnership. It consists of the following three pillars. 1. Shaping a regional order which is free, open, rules-based and fair ASEAN and Japan cooperate in establishing a fair regional order based on rules which can improve predictability and reduce uncertainty through the coordination between the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)” and a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),” respecting the principles of ASEAN as presented in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and (Provisional Translation) 6 the ASEAN Charter. ASEAN and Japan maintain and enhance the role of ASEAN architecture with respect for ASEAN centrality and unity. Jointly work to maintain maritime order, jointly work to enhance maritime security in compliance with international rules, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, by the improvement of maritime law enforcement capabilities and domestic legislation as well as efforts within multilateral frameworks. As ASEAN also emphasizes maritime cooperation, including maritime security, through AOIP, ASEAN and Japan can work hand in hand to promote cooperation, which is expected to bring about proper outcomes. 2. Building a society which fulfills economic prosperity, sustainability, and equity Our long-term strategy goal isto develop a society which fulfills prosperity,sustainability and equity simultaneously. Linking AOIP and FOIP would enhance synergy among different cooperation in multiple areas. Foster “co-creation” efforts by ASEAN and Japan with the participation of various stakeholders, including citizens, businesses, NGOs, and citizen groups. Aim to revitalize the economies and societies of ASEAN and Japan and realize the “middle class dreams” with the perspective of “leaving no one behind,” as well as to create a generous society where everyone can have a decent job and life regardless of theirsocial class and have dialogue between different classes. Seek to realize a safe and secure society based on the principle of human security. Jointly address global issues such as climate change, environment, food, energy, pandemics, and DX. Mutually share wisdom on the declining birthrate and aging population as a common challenge for ASEAN and Japan to find a path toward a solution. Realize a society that takes into account the possibility of equal opportunity and correction of disparities for socially vulnerable groups in each country, including transnational workers. 3. Mutual understanding and trust as the platform for a renewed ASEAN-Japan partnership Expand a multilayered people-to-people network that brings new generations across different segments of our society. Taking into account the dynamics in ASEAN countries, such new network is critical to design a new ASEAN-Japan relationship following the economic growth, social maturation/diversification, and the empowered civil society. While organizing and utilizing the existing frameworks for people-to-people exchange, promote initiatives for interaction based on equal footing, two-way, respect for identity, harmony, and integration in diverse environments, and develop next generation leaders who will lead the ASEAN community through ASEAN-Japan cooperation. These efforts also aims to renew the Japanese perception toward ASEAN countries. In addition, ensure trustworthiness in areas such as cyber security and personal information protection, as digital technology will be more widely used in future economic activities and people’s lives, and free flow of data is increasingly required. In conjunction with the further deepening of cybersecurity efforts, ASEAN and Japan promote cooperation toward the realization of DFFT (Data Free Flow with Trust). (Provisional Translation) 7 These three pillars interconnect with each other. The foundation of the new ASEAN-Japan partnership must start with the further promotion and deepening of mutual understanding and trust that have been cultivated between ASEAN and Japan countries, and the formation of multilayered mutual interaction and people-to-people networks that facilitate this process. Such mutual understanding and trust are indispensable elements for ASEAN and Japan to work hand in hand toward the realization of a cohesive society in which economic development, sustainability, and fairness are all fulfilled. The development of such cohesive societies across countries and borders will enable the establishment of a fair regional order based on free and open rules. III. Action items for a new ASEAN-Japan partnership 1. Shaping a regional order which is free, open, rules-based and fair ① Given the recent rising tensions in the regional security situation, jointly promote efforts to ease tensions in the region over the long term, respecting ASEAN centrality and utilizing knowledge and experience that ASEAN has contributed to regional stability through the principles and norms presented in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and the ASEAN Charter ② Strengthen the ASEAN architecture, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN+3, as a platform for security dialogue and cooperation and support the strengthening of the ASEAN Secretariat’s organization and functions ③ Promote security cooperation for peace and stability in the whole region, considering the individual circumstances of each ASEAN country and in line with the direction set out in the Vientiane Vision 2.0 Steadily implement the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) with Indonesia and the Philippines and further promote strategic dialogues, including the expansion to other countries Promote defense equipment and technology cooperation and expansion of agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Further promote bilateral and multilateral capacity-building, focusing on non-traditional challenges Conduct bilateral/multilateral training and exercises between the Self-Defense Forces and the militaries of other countries Contribute to improving interoperability and promoting information sharing, as well as improving governance of the security sector in each country, including ensuring transparency in procurement in ASEAN countries, through security cooperation and exchanges, including defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity-building support, and bilateral/multilateral joint training and exercises ④ Cooperate towards the stability of maritime order and maritime security Cooperate on and support maritime cooperation in AOIP; strengthen coordination in FOIP (Provisional Translation) 8 cooperation to ensure rule of law, freedom of navigation, and peace and security Further cooperate on strengthening maritime law enforcement capacity, including human resource development; strengthen support for training and capacity-building of coast guard personnel in ASEAN countries, including through the Maritime Security Policy Program Promote cooperation on maritime environmental protection Provide support for the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea that takes into account the legitimate rights and interests of all stakeholders; support cooperation among and between ASEAN countries in maritime security, including maritime security cooperation that is being promoted among some ASEAN countries ⑤ Support the development of legal systems for strengthening the rule of law Hold regular ASEAN-Japan judicial consultations to discuss international cooperation and technical assistance to jointly address emerging forms of crime and abuse of power Collaborate on ASEAN-Japan policies regarding competition law ⑥ Promote cooperation to share democratic values and improve the quality of democracy Ensure transparency in the policy making process and data use in digital governance Establish an ASEAN-Japan shared mechanism to strengthen resilience against cyber-attacks, disinformation, etc. ⑦ Respect the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and strengthen cooperation on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation ⑧ Cooperate to restore the rule of law, fair order and democratic political system without making Myanmar an isolated and fragile state, especially through persistent efforts under the ASEANJapan partnership; continue and expand humanitarian assistance; strengthen cooperation with various stakeholders in Myanmar and pushing for dialogue between them and the military “regime” ⑨ Strengthen cooperation and coordinate positions in the United Nations and other international fora on issues related to security and peace in the international community 2. Building a society which fulfills economicprosperity, sustainability, and equity ① Maintain and strengthen a free, open, and fair economic order While maintaining and strengthening the multilateral trade system with WTO at its core, cooperate in the formation of rulesin a wide range of areassuch astrade, intellectual property, and digital technologies, as well as in the formation of loose regional rules to ensure fair aid and investment for all stakeholders (a) Utilize the RCEP Agreement as a platform to ensure transparent implementation of these rules (b) Promote cooperation with ASEAN countries that have signed CPTPP to utilize it in the above rule-making process © Actively engage in IPEF negotiations and jointly work on international rule-making on (Provisional Translation) 9 decarbonization, digitalization, and fair trade Strengthen cooperation in economic security (a) Support ASEAN countries to strengthen their economic security, improve political and economic autonomy (address new challengessuch as economic coercion),strengthen the supply chains of ASEAN countries and Japan, strengthen relations with producing countries of important mineral resources, popularize the use of clean information and communication facilities, advance data protection, sensitive information management, research Integrity and research security, etc. (b) Create a consultative framework similar to the economic version of “2+2” established between the U.S. and Japan for the above cooperation ② Achieve development through economic revitalization and advancement Launch and implement a new action plan with a longer-term perspective, succeeding the contents of the ASEAN-Japan Economic Resilience Action Plan, which facilitates cooperation for a comprehensive economic recovery after COVID-19 Advance open innovation across borders to create new industriestogether to break out of the “middle-income trap” Develop new industrial sectors utilizing digital technology through “co-creation” between ASEAN and Japan Cooperate to contribute to strengthening ASEAN connectivity (a) Support the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan 2025 and the formulation of the new Master Plan (b) Support the development of advanced infrastructure as a basis for strengthening connectivity that will contribute to the development of the whole ASEAN region © Jointly promote the development of regional rules for fair infrastructure assistance (d) Advance efforts to improve the quality of global value chains (GVCs) and supply chains with digital technology Promote Digital transformation (DX) and foster startups as keys to ASEAN and Japan’s respective growth Cooperate on initiatives towards producing tourism-oriented countries (a) Expand the number of tourists (revitalization of two-way tourism), and create attractions and strengthen advertisements in both ASEAN and Japan (b) Support attracting visitors to the countryside, raise average tourism expenditure, and promote eco-tourism both in ASEAN and Japan © Cooperate to foster sustainable management in tourist attractions i. Support increasing profitability and added value through data utilization (tourism DX) ii. Raise added value through facility renovation and tourism services, etc. (d) Foster mutual understanding of each culture (food, historical heritage, traditional (Provisional Translation) 10 performing arts) in ASEAN and Japan Promote businesses and “co-creation” values among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in ASEAN and Japan (a) Expand information and enhance awareness on backing for overseas businesses (b) Support acquiring and training human resources for overseas businesses © Improve environment to accelerate overseas businesses Support collaboration among large companies and small and midsize companies and startups Promote global open innovation in ASEAN and Japan Promote Mekong development cooperation (a) Pursue joint efforts to realize sustainable development in the Mekong region while taking into account the need to ensure fairness, utilizing the framework of the Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting; in particular, jointly work on addressing environmental and food security issues that are becoming increasingly serious in the Mekong region, considering the different positions of participating countries ③ Cooperate for social development and fairness Reduce disparities among and within ASEAN countries (a) Continue to support the ASEAN Integration Initiative (IAI) (b) Ensure access to cyberspace and publicness in cyberspace in order to bridge the digital divide © Share scientific resources to solve public health issues (d) Establish common standards between ASEAN and Japan for AI operations to prevent structural discrimination and ensure transparency in digital governance (e) Jointly develop social security programs for the younger generation (f) Jointly formulate new “human rights” in the digital age between ASEAN and Japan (g) Share knowledge on new social policies and the design of tax and social security systems to address social challenges (e.g., reducing inequality, aging society with fewer children) and encourage new initiatives (h) Promote mutual assistance among NPOs and local communities apart from public assistance as well as information exchange and mutual interaction by the private sector including companies Cooperate to mutually open and deepen integration of labor markets of ASEAN and Japan and to promote labor mobility within ASEAN and between ASEAN and Japan (a) Balance business and human rights protection in ASEAN and Japan, especially the protection of workers’ human rights, including cross-border workers, and the reform of laws and regulations to realize fair working environments (b) Improve the environment for people from ASEAN to play an active role in Japan, e.g., issuance of new work visas for highly skilled human resources to enable job changes as a special measure (Provisional Translation) 11 © Fundamentally review the technical intern training program for improvement (d) Consider career paths for foreign students and technical intern trainees after they return to their home countries and exit strategies that utilize their experiences gained in Japan (e) Support to improve the competitiveness of Japanese personnel actively working in Southeast Asia (f) Facilitate the transition of changes in employment due to digitalization by creating a transnational labor market Respond to declining birthrates and aging population as well as an aging society (a) Jointly explore ways to create soft and hard systems to realize safety and security in an aging society and to revitalize society itself, while also exchanging information and experiences between Japan, as a developed country facing challenges, and some ASEAN countries that are rapidly transforming into aging societies with low birthrates ④ Building a sustainable and resilient society Balancing climate change response and energy security (e.g., realization of the Asian Zero Emissions Community Concept) (a) Accelerate the development of the Asia Energy Transition Initiative (AETI) (roadmap development, financial support, human resource development, etc.) (b) Strengthen ASEAN-Japan collaboration in international frameworks for addressing climate change, such as the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP) © Promote cooperation in line with the ASEAN-Japan Climate Change Action Agenda 2.0 (d) Promote ASEAN-Japan cooperation for the development of clean energy manufacturing and energy-saving industries (e) Implement initiatives to strengthen finance, technology, and governance to realize a stable energy supply mechanism that can meet the growing energy demand associated with geopolitical risks and the digitalization of economy and society (f) Promote cooperation in the development and social implementation of technologies that can contribute to decarbonization, including energy and environmental technologies and related digital technologies Developing a circular society and a smart city (a) Sharing knowledge and experiences and work together to build a circular economy and create cities where people can enjoy a comfortable and safe digital life, including mobility and healthcare (b) Jointly work towards the implementation of ASEAN’s Framework for Circular Economy and establish a Sound Material-Cycle Society by addressing issuessuch as municipal solid waste and e-waste by utilizing Japanese systems, technologies, and know-how related to waste collection, disposal, and recycling Enhancing Response capabilities onto both natural and human disasters (Provisional Translation) 12 (a) Based on the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts implemented under ADMM-Plus, strengthen support for emergency response to disasters in the ASEAN region, utilizing Japan’s expertise i. Support the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Center), especially in capacity-building for damage assessment and rapid humanitarian assistance ii. Support capacity-building of member countries, training of relevant departments, and the development of guidelines, etc. (b) Establish the ASEAN Supporters’ Meeting (tentative name, a mechanism that allows discussion between participating countries, including ASEAN member countries, during peaceful times so that, in the event of a disaster, the provision of assistance to affected countries from within and outside the region will be provided without overlap) Introducing new and advanced disaster prevention and mitigation mechanismsg (a) Support ASEAN’s efforts for disaster prevention and mitigation, drawing on Japan’s knowledge and expertise; cooperate on introduction of technologies and facilities related to earthquakes, tsunami, floods, and storm surges, etc. (b) Introduce a common ASEAN-Japan official monitoring mechanism for environmental risk assessment in urban space Upgrading regional Food Security mechanisms (a) Cooperate to build a resilient and sustainable food supply system through international efforts such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (b) Facilitate the current ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) and the ASEAN Food Security Information System (AFSIS), and strengthen the ASEAN-Japan Midori Cooperation Plan Promoting healthcare service to strengthen prevention, preparedness, and response to future public health crises (a) Promote cooperation for full operationalization and capacity-building of the ASEAN Center for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases (b) Cooperate on healthcare and infectious disease control in the private sector Enhancing comprehensive environmental cooperation to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (a) Strengthen cooperation based on the ASEAN-Japan Environmental Cooperation Initiative, especially in addressing the issue of marine plastic waste (b) Cooperate in sustainable forest management and wood use Sharing best practices and governance methods among local governments between ASEAN and Japan toward the realization of a sustainable and resilient society ⑤ Strengthening Joint research on technological innovation Promote technology development to simultaneously realize various goals such as climate (Provisional Translation) 13 change and energy security, and environmental conservation and a Sound Material-Cycle Society Promoting research and development among ASEAN and Japanese researchers in the fields where high spillover effects can be expected. This could be done through the e-ASIA Joint Research Program (e-ASIA JRP), the International Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development (SATREPS), and other programs ⑥ Establishing a new study group in designing the shape of cooperation. Strengthen activities of the ASEAN-Japan Centre, an international organization Enhance the function of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) as a center for public-private partnership, and utilize it to strengthen the dissemination of joint research and policy recommendations Make further use of the Southeast Asia Regional Programme (SEARP) in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the purpose of domestic reform of ASEAN countries and regional integration, and coordinate with the MOU signed in 2022 between ASEAN and OECD Build a more multilayered network, making use of the AEM-METI Economic and Industrial Cooperation Committee (AMEICC), the Federation of Japanese Chambers of Commerce and Industry in ASEAN (FJCCIA), Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), and the Japan Section of the ASEAN-Japan Business Council Japan Committee (AJBC) Strengthen the network between the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the local government and business community, and enhance its information gathering and analysis functions Establish the Indo-Pacific Business Advisory Committee, which includes industrial sectors of ASEAN, Japan, and other ASEAN dialogue partners, to promote regional economic integration and cooperation with ASEAN and other neighboring countries Establish an AOIP Vision Group to conduct policy studies to materialize cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region in maritime cooperation, SDGs, connectivity, and other economic and social areas related to the AOIP 3. Mutual understanding and trust as the platform for a renewed ASEAN-Japan partnership ① Promote multilayered personnel exchange and intellectual and cultural exchange between ASEAN and Japan Expand two-way exchanges through intellectual, personnel and youth exchange schemes under the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Japan Foundation Foster expansion of scholarship programs offered by private sectors such as corporations, for study abroad at undergraduate and graduate levels Promote inter-company exchanges with mutual transfer of employees between Japanese and (Provisional Translation) 14 ASEAN companies and support the promotion of internships Facilitate interaction between civil societies of ASEAN and Japan on social issues such as gender issues Establish a scheme to allow short and long term stays in Japan to journalists from ASEAN countries Promote interaction between municipalities in Southeast Asian countries and local governments in Japan ② Strengthen the ASEAN-Japan Partnership to enhance intellectual exchange across the Indo-Pacific Expand and strengthen networks among think tanks and universities between ASEAN and Japan countries as a networking hub (a) Implement joint research schemes with resources from the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) (b) Further strengthen the policy research network, including Japanese, ASEAN-ISIS and other think tanks, leveraging the existing network of research institutions between ASEAN and Japan countries ③ Build networks and bring young, highly skilled personnel together in ASEAN and Japan Establish an exchange mechanism among ASEAN and Japanese policy communities and strengthen long, medium and short-term programs for cooperation and exchanges Promote and strengthen long and medium term programs to send Japanese students and young researchers to ASEAN countries Train Japanese experts in Southeast Asia; promote and strengthen long-and medium-term programs that regularly invite ASEAN students and young researchers to Japan and vice versa Invite and support post-doctoral and young professionals from Southeast Asia who graduated in Anglophone countries to work and to further their study in Japan Actively send Japanese researchers to Asian research centers in Western universities to expand and strengthen networks with intellectual communities in Southeast Asia Form networks through the exchange of researchers and international brain circulation in the field of advanced research to solve global social challenges Promote interaction and networking between ASEAN and Japanese business persons including entrepreneurs for innovation creation and business “co-creation” Foster business development and networking by young business leaders from ASEAN and Japan and conduct leadership trainings Establish a common platform and unify operational standards between ASEAN and Japan for educational and professional qualification systems ④ Develop human capital and public relations in Japan to renew people’s perspective onto ASEAN and update our mutual understanding Promote programs for Japanese students to learn and master the language, history, and culture of ASEAN countries and develop human capital for future interaction between ASEAN (Provisional Translation) 15 and Japan Support employment and entrepreneurial activities of Japanese nationals in Southeast Asia and expand opportunities for matching them with Southeast Asian personnel Continue and expand the Japan-ASEAN Student Conference of JENESYS Explore new long-, medium-, and short-term programs of mutual dispatch of young people between ASEAN and Japan in the public and private sectors (including consideration of a new system based on the experience and current needs of the NIHONGO (Japanese) Partners) Foster short-term visits and grassroots exchanges between ASEAN and Japan at the primary and secondary education levels to promote mutual understanding and friendly relations Promote awareness reform of Japanese companies (e.g., expand businesses to ASEAN, transfer delegation of authority from head offices to local offices and promote management in local offices, facilitate acceptance of foreign workers, etc.) Use the Osaka-Kansai Expo to be held in 2025, which will attract a large number of people from overseas, as an opportunity to strengthen relations with ASEAN ⑤ Realize DFFT by ensuring cyber security and institutional trust as the foundation of trust in the digital society Promptly implement DFFT between ASEAN and Japan Support the development of legal systems for the protection of intellectual property and personal information in ASEAN countries Support the development of experts in data security in ASEAN Strengthen support for efforts of private sectors in improving cybersecurity IV. Initiatives to realize the above Over the years, ASEAN and Japan have steadily implemented practical cooperation in a wide range of fields and achieved concrete results. This accumulation developed the recognition that ASEAN and Japan are true partners for regional development. On the occasion of the 40th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation in 2013, the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit adopted the “Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation” and itsimplementation plan, and have advanced concrete cooperation accordingly. For the 50th anniversary, in order to implement the action items as presented above in pillars 1 to 3, the existing cooperation tools for ASEAN,such asthe Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund, Youth Exchange Programs(Japan’s Friendship Ties program: JENESYS, Ship for Southeast Asian and Japanese Youth Program and other programs), and cultural exchange programs of the Japan Foundation (“WA project”), should be utilized, and their successors or new mechanisms should be considered. On the other hand, ASEAN-Japan relations can be no longer bolstered solely by public funds such as ODA. ASEAN and Japan must build a more equal and multilayered partnership that reflect the changing internal and externalsituations. Therefore, it is necessary to deepen cooperation by utilizing the public and private resources of ASEAN countries and Japan, while seeking the best combinations (Provisional Translation) 16 of the use of these resources which are suitable for each cooperation scheme or project