Below is an exerpt from The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism by William L. Rowe. I will ask some questions based on this exerpt. Do not respond yet.
IX. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME
VARIETIES OF ATHEISM
WILLIAM L. ROWE
THIS
paper is concerned with three interrelated
questions. The first is : Is there an argument for
atheism based on the existence of evil that may
rationally justify someone in being an atheist? To
this first question I give an affirmative answer and
try to support that answer by setting forth a strong
argument for atheism based on the existence of evil.1
The second question is: How can the theist best
defend his position against the argument for atheism
based on the existence of evil? In response to this
question I try to describe what may be an adequate
rational defense for theism against any argument for
atheism based on the existence of evil. The final
question is: What position should the informed
atheist take concerning the rationality of theistic
belief? Three different answers an atheist may give
to this question serve to distinguish three varieties of
atheism: unfriendly atheism, indifferent atheism,
and friendly atheism. In the final part of the paper I
discuss and defend the position of friendly atheism.
Before we consider the argument from evil, we
need to distinguish a narrow and a broad sense of the
terms "theist," "atheist," and "agnostic." By a
"theist" in the narrow sense I mean someone who
believes in the existence of an omnipotent, omnis?
cient, eternal, supremely good being who created
the world. By a "theist" in the broad sense I mean
someone who believes in the existence of some sort of
divine being or divine reality. To be a theist in the
narrow sense is also to be a theist in the broad sense,
but one may be a theist in the broad sense?as was
Paul Tillich?without believing that there is a
supremely good, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal
being who created the world. Similar distinctions
must be made between a narrow and a broad sense of
the terms "atheist" and "agnostic." To be an atheist
in the broad sense is to deny the existence of any sort
of divine being or divine reality. Tillich was not an
atheist in the broad sense. But he was an atheist in
the narrow sense, for he denied that there exists a
divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful and
perfectly good. In this paper I will be using the terms
"theism," "theist," "atheism," "atheist," "agnos?
ticism," and "agnostic" in the narrow sense, not in
the broad sense.
I
In developing the argument for atheism based on
the existence of evil, it will be useful to focus on some
particular evil that our world contains in consider?
able abundance. Intense human and animal suffer?
ing, for example, occurs daily and in great plenitude
in our world. Such intense suffering is a clear case of
evil. Of course, if the intense suffering leads to some
greater good, a good we could not have obtained
without undergoing the suffering in question, we
might conclude that the suffering is justified, but it
remains an evil nevertheless. For we must not
confuse the intense suffering in and of itself with the
good things to which it sometimes leads or of which it
may be a necessary part. Intense human or animal
suffering is in itself bad, an evil, even though it may
sometimes be justified by virtue of being a part of, or
leading to, some good which is unobtainable without
it. What is evil in itself may sometimes be good as a
means because it leads to something that is good in
itself. In such a case, while remaining an evil in itself,
the intense human or animal suffering is, neverthe?
less, an evil which someone might be morally
justified in permitting.
Taking human and animal suffering as a clear
instance of evil which occurs with great frequency in
335
1 Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I
think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim. Indeed, granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly compelling argument
for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God. (For a lucid statement of this argument
see Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (New York, 1974), pp. 29-59.) There remains, however, what we may call the evidential
form?as opposed to the logical form?of the problem of evil: the view that the variety and profusion of evil in our world, although
perhaps not logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God, provides, nevertheless, rational support for atheism. In this paper
I shall be concerned solely with the evidential form of the problem, the form of the problem which, I think, presents a rather severe
difficulty for theism.
336 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
our world, the argument for atheism based on evil
can be stated as follows :
i. There exist instances of intense suffering which an
omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented
without thereby losing some greater good or per?
mitting some evil equally bad or worse.2
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the
occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it
could not do so without thereby losing some greater
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient,
wholly good being.
What are we to say about this argument for atheism,
an argument based on the profusion of one sort of
evil in our world? The argument is valid ; therefore,
if we have rational grounds for accepting its
premises, to that extent we have rational grounds for
accepting atheism. Do we, however, have rational
grounds for accepting the premises of this argument?
Let's begin with the second premise. Let
sx
be an
instance of intense human or animal suffering which
an omniscient, wholly good being could prevent. We
will also suppose that things are such that j will
occur unless prevented by the omniscient, wholly
good (OG) being. We might be interested in
determining what would be a sufficient condition of
OG failing to prevent ^. But, for our purpose here,
we need only try to state a necessary condition for OG
failing to prevent sx.
That condition, so it seems to
me, is this:
Either (i) there is some greater good, G, such that
G is obtainable by OG only if OG permits ^3,
or (ii) there is some greater good, G, such that G is
obtainable by OG only if OG permits either s1
or some evil equally bad or worse,
or (iii) s1 is such that it is preventable by OG only
if OG permits some evil equally bad or worse.
It is important to recognize that (iii) is not
included in (i). For losing a good greater than sl is
not the same as permitting an evil greater than s^
And this because the absence of a good state of affairs
need not itself be an evil state of affairs. It is also
important to recognize that sx might be such that it is
preventable by OG without losing G (so condition (i)
is not satisfied) but also such that if OG did prevent
it, G would be loss unless OG permitted some evil
equal to or worse than s?. If this were so, it does not
seem correct to require that OG prevent sx. Thus,
condition (ii) takes into account an important
possibility not encompassed in condition (i).
Is it true that if an omniscient, wholly good being
permits the occurrence of some intense suffering it
could have prevented, then either (i) or (ii) or (iii)
obtains? It seems to me that it is true. But if it is true
then so is premise (2) of the argument for atheism.
For that premise merely states in more compact form
what we have suggested must be true if an omnis?
cient, wholly good being fails to prevent some
intense suffering it could prevent. Premise (2) says
that an omniscient, wholly good being would
prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it
could, unless it could not do so without thereby
losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally bad or worse. This premise (or something
not too distant from it) is, I think, held in common
by many atheists and nontheists. Of course, there
may be disagreement about whether something is
good, and whether, if it is good, one would be
morally justified in permitting some intense suffering
to occur in order to obtain it. Someone might hold,
for example, that no good is great enough to justify
permitting an innocent child to suffer terribly.4
Again, someone might hold that the mere fact that a
given good outweighs some suffering and would be
loss if the suffering were prevented, is not a morally
sufficient reason for permitting the suffering. But to
hold either of these views is not to deny (2). For (2)
claims only that if an omniscient, wholly good being
permits intense suffering then either there is some
greater good that would have been loss, or some
2 If there is some good. G. greater than any evil, ( i ) will be false for the trivial reason that no matter what evil. ?. we pick the conjunctive
good state of affairs consisting of G and E will outweigh E and be such that an omnipotent being could not obtain it without permitting
E. (See Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds [Ithaca, 1967], p. 167.) To avoid this objection we may insert "unreplaceable" into our
premises ( 1 ) and (2) between "some" and "greater." If E isn't required for G, and G is better than G plus E, then the good conjunctive
state of affairs composed of G and E would be replaceable by the greater good of G alone. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will ignore
this complication both in the formulation and discussion of premises (1) and (2).
3 Three clarifying points need to be made in connection with (i). First, by "good" I don't mean to exclude the fulfillment of certain
moral principles. Perhaps preventing s1 would preclude certain actions prescribed by the principles of justice. I shall allow that the
satisfaction of certain principles of justice may be a good that outweighs the evil of s1. Second, even though (i) may suggest it, I don't
mean to limit the good in question to something that would follow in time the occurrence o?s1. And, finally, we should perhaps not fault
OG if the good G, that would be loss were s1 prevented, is not actually greater than sx, but merely such that allowing sx and G, as opposed
to preventing s1 and thereby losing G, would not alter the balance between good and evil. For reasons of simplicity, I have left this point
out in stating (i), with the result that (i) is perhaps a bit stronger than it should be.
4 See Ivan's speech in Book V, Chapter IV of The Brothers Karamazov.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME VARIETIES OF ATHEISM 337
equally bad or worse evil that would have occurred,
had the intense suffering been prevented. (2) does
not purport to describe what might be a sufficient
condition for an omniscient, wholly good being to
permit intense suffering, only what is a necessary
condition. So stated, (2) seems to express a belief
that accords with our basic moral principles, prin?
ciples shared by both theists and nontheists. If we are
to fault the argument for atheism, therefore, it seems
we must find some fault with its first premise.
Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a
dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn
is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible
agony for several days before death relieves its
suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn's intense
suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be
any greater good such that the prevention of the
fawn's suffering would require either the loss ofthat
good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or
worse. Nor does there seem to be any equally bad or
worse evil so connected to the fawn's suffering that it
would have had to occur had the fawn's suffering
been prevented. Could an omnipotent, omniscient
being have prevented the fawn's apparently point?
less suffering? The answer is obvious, as even the
theist will insist. An omnipotent, omniscient being
could have easily prevented the fawn from being
horribly burned, or, given the burning, could have
spared the fawn the intense suffering by quickly
ending its life, rather than allowing the fawn to lie in
terrible agony for several days. Since the fawn's
intense suffering was preventable and, so far as we
can see, pointless, doesn't it appear that premise (1)
of the argument is true, that there do exist instances
of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omnis?
cient being could have prevented without thereby
losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally bad or worse.
It must be acknowledged that the case of the
fawn's apparently pointless suffering does not prove
that (1) is true. For even though we cannot see how
the fawn's suffering is required to obtain some
greater good (or to prevent some equally bad or
worse evil), it hardly follows that it is not so required.
After all, we are often surprised by how things we
thought to be unconnected turn out to be intimately
connected. Perhaps, for all we know, there is some
familiar good outweighing the fawn's suffering to
which that suffering is connected in a way we do not
see. Furthermore, there may well be unfamiliar
goods, goods we haven't dreamed of, to which the
fawn's suffering is inextricably connected. Indeed, it
would seem to require something like omniscience
on our part before we could lay claim to knowing that
there is no greater good connected to the fawn's
suffering in such a manner than an omnipotent,
omniscient being could not have achieved that good
without permitting that suffering or some evil
equally bad or worse. So the case of the fawn's
suffering surely does not enable us to establish the
truth of ( i ).
The truth is that we are not in a position to prove
that (i) is true. We cannot know with certainty that
instances of suffering of the sort described in (i) do
occur in our world. But it is one thing to know or prove
that (i) is true and quite another thing to have
rational grounds for believing (i) to be true. We are
often in the position where in the light of our
experience and knowledge it is rational to believe
that a certain statement is true, even though we are
not in a position to prove
or to know with certainty
that the statement is true. In the light of our past
experience and knowledge it is, for example, very
reasonable to believe that neither Goldwater nor
McGovern will ever be elected President, but we are
scarcely in the position of knowing with certainty
that neither will ever be elected President. So, too,
with (i), although we cannot know with certainty
that it is true, it perhaps can be rationally supported,
shown to be a rational belief.
Consider again the case of the fawn's suffering. Is
it reasonable to believe that there is some greater
good so intimately connected to that suffering that
even an omnipotent, omniscient being could not
have obtained that good without permitting that
suffering or some evil at least as bad? It certainly
does not appear reasonable to believe this. Nor does
it seem reasonable to believe that there is some evil at
least as bad as the fawn's suffering such that an
omnipotent being simply could not have prevented
it without permitting the fawn's suffering. But even if
it should somehow be reasonable to believe either of
these things of the fawn's suffering, we must then ask
whether it is reasonable to believe either of these
things of all the instances of seemingly pointless
human and animal suffering that occur daily in our
world. And surely the answer to this more general
question must be no. It seems quite unlikely that all
the instances of intense suffering occurring daily in
our world are intimately related to the occurrence of
greater goods or the prevention of evils at least as
bad ; and even more unlikely, should they somehow
all be so related, than an omnipotent, omniscient
being could not have achieved at least some of those
goods (or prevented some of those evils) without
permitting the instances of intense suffering that are
338 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
supposedly related to them. In the light of our
experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of
human and animal suffering in our world, the idea
that none of this suffering could have been prevented
by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a
greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad
seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond
our belief. It seems then that although we cannot
prove that (i) is true, it is, nevertheless, altogether
reasonable to believe that (i) is true, that (i) is a
rational belief.5
Returning now to our argument for atheism,
we've seen that the second premise expresses
a basic
belief common to many theists and nontheists.
We've also seen that our experience and knowledge
of the variety and profusion of suffering in our world
provides rational support for the first premise. Seeing
that the conclusion, "There does not exist an
omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being" follows
from these two premises, it does seem that we have
rational support for atheism, that it is reasonable for us
to believe that the theistic God does not exist.
II
Can theism be rationally defended against the
argument for atheism we have just examined? If it
can, how might the theist best respond to that
argument? Since the argument from (i) and (2) to
(3) is valid, and since the theist, no less than the
nontheist, is more than likely committed to (2), it's
clear that the theist can reject this atheistic argu?
ment only by rejecting its first premise, the premise
that states that there are instances of intense
suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being
could have prevented without thereby losing some
greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or
worse. How, then, can the theist best respond to this
premise and the considerations advanced in its
support?
There are basically three responses
a theist can
make. First, he might argue not that ( 1 ) is false or
probably false, but only that the reasoning given in
support of it is in some way defective. He may do this
either by arguing that the reasons given in support of
(i) are in themselves insufficient to justify accepting
(i), or by arguing that there are other things we
know which, when taken in conjunction with these
reasons, do not justify us in accepting (i). I suppose
some theists would be content with this rather
modest response to the basic argument for atheism.
But given the validity of the basic argument and the
theist's likely acceptance of (2), he is thereby
committed to the view that ( 1 ) is false, not just that
we have no good reasons for accepting (1) as true.
The second two responses
are aimed at showing that
it is reasonable to believe that ( 1 ) is false. Since the
theist is committed to this view I shall focus the
discussion on these two attempts, attempts which we
can distinguish as "the direct attack" and "the
indirect attack."
By a direct attack, I mean an attempt to reject ( 1 )
by pointing out goods, for example, to which
suffering may well be connected, goods which an
omnipotent, omniscient being could not achieve
without permitting suffering. It is doubtful, how?
ever, that the direct attack can succeed. The theist
may point out that some suffering leads to moral and
spiritual development impossible without suffering.
But it's reasonably clear that suffering often occurs in
a degree far beyond what is required for character
development. The theist may say that some suffering
results from free choices of human beings and might
be preventable only by preventing some measure of
human freedom. But, again, it's clear that much
intense suffering occurs not as a result of human free
choices. The general difficulty with this direct attack
on premise ( 1 ) is twofold. First, it cannot succeed, for
the theist does not know what greater goods might be
served, or evils prevented, by each instance of
intense human or animal suffering. Second, the
theist's own religious tradition usually maintains
that in this life it is not given to us to know God's
5 One might object that the conclusion of this paragraph is stronger than the reasons given warrant. For it is one thing to argue that it
is unreasonable to think that ( i ) is false and another thing to conclude that we are therefore justified in accepting ( i ) as true. There are
propositions such that believing them is much more reasonable than disbelieving them, and yet are such that withholding judgment about
them is more reasonable than believing them. To take an example of Chisholm's : it is more reasonable to believe that the Pope will be in
Rome (on some arbitrarily picked future date) than to believe that he won't ; but it is perhaps more reasonable to suspend judgment on
the question of the Pope's whereabouts on that particular date, than to believe that he will be in Rome. Thus, it might be objected, that
while we've shown that believing (i) is more reasonable than disbelieving (i), we haven't shown that believing (i) is more reasonable
than withholding belief. My answer to this objection is that there are things we know which render ( i ) probable to the degree that it is
more reasonable to believe ( i ) than to suspend judgment on ( i ). What are these things we know? First, I think, is the fact that there is an
enormous variety and profusion of intense human and animal suffering in our world. Second, is the fact that much of this suffering seems
quite unrelated to any greater goods (or the absence of equal or greater evils) that might justify it. And, finally, there is the fact that such
suffering as is related to greater goods (or the absence of equal or greater evils) does not, in many cases, seem so intimately related as to
require its permission by an omnipotent being bent on securing those goods (the absence of those evils). These facts, I am claiming,
make it more reasonable to accept (i) than to withhold judgment on (i).
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME VARIETIES OF ATHEISM 339
purpose in allowing particular instances of suffering.
Hence, the direct attack against premise (i) cannot
succeed and violates basic beliefs associated with
theism.
The best procedure for the theist to follow in
rejecting premise ( i ) is the indirect procedure. This
procedure I shall call "the G. E. Moore shift," so
called in honor of the twentieth century philosopher,
G. E. Moore, who used it to great effect in dealing
with the arguments of the skeptics. Skeptical philo?
sophers such as David Hume have advanced inge?
nious arguments to prove that no one can know of
the existence of any material object. The premises of
their arguments employ plausible principles, prin?
ciples which many philosophers have tried to reject
directly, but only with questionable success.
Moore's procedure was altogether different. Instead
of arguing directly against the premises of the
skeptic's arguments, he simply noted that the pre?
mises implied, for example, that he (Moore) did not
know of the existence of a pencil. Moore then
proceeded indirectly against the skeptic's premises
by arguing:
I do know that this pencil exists.
If the skeptic's principles are correct I cannot know of
the existence of this pencil.
.'. The skeptic's principles (at least one) must be
incorrect.
Moore then noted that his argument is just as valid
as the skeptic's, that both of their arguments contain
the premise "If the skeptic's principles are correct
Moore cannot know of the existence of this pencil,"
and concluded that the only way to choose between
the two arguments (Moore's and the skeptic's) is by
deciding which of the first premises it is more
rational to believe?Moore's premise "I do know
that this pencil exists" or the skeptic's premise
asserting that his skeptical principles are correct.
Moore concluded that his own first premise was the
more rational of the two.6
Before we see how the theist may apply the G. E.
Moore shift to the basic argument for atheism, we
should note the general strategy of the shift. We're
given an argument: p, q, therefore, r. Instead of
arguing directly against p, another argument is
constructed?not-r, q, therefore, noi-p?which be?
gins with the denial of the conclusion of the first
argument, keeps its second premise, and ends with
the denial of the first premise as its conclusion.
Compare, for example, these two:
I. p II. not-r
q q
r not-p
It is a truth of logic that If I is valid II must be valid
as well. Since the arguments are the same so far as
the second premise is concerned, any choice between
them must concern their respective first premises. To
argue against the first premise (p) by constructing
the counter argument II is to employ the G. E.
Moore shift.
Applying the G. E. Moore shift against the first
premise of the basic argument for atheism, the theist
can
argue
as follows :
not-3. There exists an omnipotent, omniscient,
wholly good being.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would pre?
vent the occurrence of any intense suffering it
could, unless it could not do so without thereby
losing some greater good or permitting some
evil equally bad or worse,
therefore,
not-1. It is not the case that there exist instances
of intense suffering which an omnipotent,
omniscient being could have prevented with?
out thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
We now have two arguments: the basic argument
for atheism from (1) and (2) to (3), and the theist's
best response, the argument from (not-3) an<^ (2) to
(not-1 ). What the theist then says about ( 1 ) is that he
has rational grounds for believing in the existence of
the theistic God (not-3), accepts (2) as true, and sees
that (not-i) follows from (not-3) anc^ (2)- He
concludes, therefore, that he has rational grounds
for rejecting ( 1 ). Having rational grounds for reject?
ing (1), the theist concludes that the basic argument
for atheism is mistaken.
Ill
We've had a look at a forceful argument for
atheism and what seems to be the theist's best
response to that argument. If one is persuaded by the
argument for atheism, as I find myself to be, how
might one best view the position of the theist. Of
course, he will view the theist as having a false belief,
6
See, for example, the two chapters on Hume in G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London, 1953).
340 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
just as the theist will view the atheist as having a false
belief. But what position should the atheist take
concerning the rationality of the theist's belief? There
are three major positions an atheist might take,
positions which we may think of as some varieties of
atheism. First, the atheist may believe that no one is
rationally justified in believing that the theistic God
exists. Let us call this position "unfriendly atheism."
Second, the atheist may hold no belief concerning
whether any theist is or isn't rationally justified in
believing that the theistic God exists. Let us call this
view "indifferent atheism." Finally, the atheist may
believe that some theists are rationally justified in
believing that the theistic God exists. This view we
shall call "friendly atheism." In this final part of the
paper I propose to discuss and defend the position of
friendly atheism.
If no one can be rationally justified in believing a
false proposition then friendly atheism is a paradoxi?
cal, if not incoherent position. But surely the truth of
a belief is not a necessary condition of someone's
being rationally justified in having that belief. So in
holding that someone is rationally justified in believ?
ing that the theistic God exists, the friendly atheist is
not committed to thinking that the theist has a true
belief. What he is committed to is that the theist has
rational grounds for his belief, a belief the atheist
rejects and is convinced he is rationally justified in
rejecting. But is this possible? Can someone, like our
friendly atheist, hold a belief, be convinced that he is
rationally justified in holding that belief, and yet
believe that someone else is equally justified in be?
lieving the opposite? Surely this is possible. Suppose
your friends see you off on a flight to Hawaii. Hours
after take-off they learn that your plane has gone
down at sea. After a twenty-four hour search, no
survivors have been found. Under these circum?
stances they are rationally justified in believing that
you have perished. But it is hardly rational for you to
believe this, as you bob up and down in your life vest,
wondering why the search planes have failed to spot
you. Indeed, to amuse yourself while awaiting your
fate, you might very well reflect on the fact that your
friends are rationally justified in believing that you
are now dead, a proposition you disbelieve and are
rationally justified in disbelieving. So, too, perhaps
an atheist may be rationally justified in his atheistic
belief and yet hold that some theists are rationally
justified in believing just the opposite of what he
believes.
What sort of grounds might a theist have for
believing that God exists. Well, he might endeavor
to justify his belief by appealing to one or more of the
traditional arguments: Ontological, Cosmological,
Teleological, Moral, etc. Second, he might appeal to
certain aspects of religious experience, perhaps even
his own religious experience. Third, he might try to
justify theism as a plausible theory in terms of which
we can account for a variety of phenomena.
Although an atheist must hold that the theistic God
does not exist, can he not also believe, and be
justified in so believing, that some of these "justifi?
cations of theism" do actually rationally justify some
theists in their belief that there exists a supremely
good, omnipotent, omniscient being? It seems to me
that he can.
If we think of the long history of theistic belief and
the special situations in which people are sometimes
placed, it is perhaps as absurd to think that no one
was ever rationally justified in believing that the
theistic God exists as it is to think that no one was
ever justified in believing that human being would
never walk on the moon. But in suggesting that
friendly atheism is preferable to unfriendly atheism,
I don't mean to rest the case on what some human
beings might reasonably have believed in the elev?
enth or thirteenth century. The more interesting
question is whether some people in modern society,
people who are aware of the usual grounds for belief
and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree
with modern science, are yet rationally justified in
accepting theism. Friendly atheism is a significant
position only if it answers this question in the
affirmative.
It is not difficult for an atheist to be friendly when
he has reason to believe that the theist could not
reasonably be expected to be acquainted with the
grounds for disbelief that he (the atheist) possesses.
For then the atheist may take the view that some
theists are rationally justified in holding to theism,
but would not be so were they to be acquainted with
the grounds for disbelief?those grounds being suf?
ficient to tip the scale in favor of atheism when
balanced against the reasons the theist has in support
of his belief.
Friendly atheism becomes paradoxical, however,
when the atheist contemplates believing that the
theist has all the grounds for atheism that he, the
atheist, has, and yet is rationally justified in main?
taining his theistic belief. But even so excessively
friendly a view as this perhaps can be held by the
atheist if he also has some reason to think that the
grounds for theism are not as telling as the theist is
justified in taking them to be.7
7
Suppose that I add a long sum of numbers three times and get result x. I inform you of this so that you have pretty much the same
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME VARIETIES OF ATHEISM 34-1
In this paper I've presented what I take to be a
strong argument for atheism, pointed out what I
think is the theist's best response to that argument,
distinguished three positions an atheist might take
concerning the rationality of theistic belief, and
made some remarks in defense of the position called
"friendly atheism." I'm aware that the central
points of the paper are not likely to be warmly
received by many philosophers. Philosophers who
are atheists tend to be tough minded?holding that
there are no good reasons for supposing that theism is
true. And theists tend either to reject the view that
the existence of evil provides rational grounds for
atheism or to hold that religious belief has nothing to
do with reason and evidence at all. But such is the
way of philosophy.8
Purdue University Received July 13, igy8
evidence I have for the claim that the sum of the numbers is x. You then use your calculator twice over and arrive at result^. You, then,
are justified in believing that the sum of the numbers is not x. However, knowing that your calculator has been damaged and is therefore
unreliable, and that you have no reason to think that it is damaged, /may reasonably believe not only that the sum of the numbers is x,
but also that you are justified in believing that the sum is not x. Here is a case, then, where you have all of my evidence for p, and yet I can
reasonably believe that you are justified in believing not-/)?for I have reason to believe that your grounds for not-/? are not as telling as
you are justified in taking them to be.
81 am indebted to my colleagues at Purdue University, particularly to Ted Ulrich and Lilly Russow, and to philosophers at The
University of Nebraska, Indiana State University, and The University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee for helpful criticisms of earlier
versions of this paper.