این فصل را با ذکر تمام تیترهایش(ذکر تمام تیترهای مربوطه ی اصلی و فرعی) با حفظ ساختار و ماهیت به انگلیسی روان خلاصه کن :     CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO 

Public Service Broadcasting in Egypt
Strategies for Media Reform
RASHA ABDULL A , The American University in Cairo, Egypt




MEDIA REFORM STRATEGY 
The Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) functions as a state broad- caster. To transform ERTU into a public broadcaster, Egypt should carry out major media reforms. An independent regulatory council of media experts and professionals should be established to devise policies and regulate the media accord- ing to universal standards. ERTU’s Board of Trustees would need to be restruc- tured to include reputed professionals with a vision to transform ERTU into a public broadcaster. The board should abolish the current ERTU charter and set up a new one that guarantees ERTU independence and focuses on noncommercial political, social, and cultural content that caters to all sectors of society. The new charter should abolish the designation of ERTU as the sole broadcaster in the country, and allow for the establishment of private terrestrial channels. A new code of ethics should be formulated based on a commitment to professionalism, objectivity, inclusiveness, and diversity. ERTU should become ﬁnancially indepen- dent from the state, with the public providing funding through subscriptions or taxes. The number of channels operated by ERTU should be decreased to one or two, and the staﬀ provided with training and an eﬃcient media strategy to follow. Research should be constantly utilized to study audiences and viewership habits. These changes require political will or political change.

Egypt to date does not have a public service broadcasting system. The closest thing it has to public service broadcasting is the state-funded and state-controlled

 
Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU). As a country that has histori- cally been known as a leader in media content and production in the Arab world, and a country trying to make its rough transition into democracy in the wake of several waves of a revolution, this situation is not acceptable today. This chapter suggests ways in which the state broadcaster in Egypt could be turned into a proper public broadcaster. In doing so, it ﬁrst examines the current media structure in Egypt, focusing on ERTU, and the legal framework in which the media operates. It points out the strengths and weaknesses in the system, and makes concrete suggestions as to how to reform the media sector and establish a proper public broadcaster that functions with the best interest of the public, rather than the regime, in mind.

IS EGYPT STILL A MEDIA LEADER ?
Historically, Egypt has developed a reputation for being a media leader in the Arab world. Egyptian content, particularly drama, is a major export to the region, which is the reason why the Egyptian dialect of Arabic is the most widely understood all over the Arab world. Egypt was the ﬁrst country to have radio broadcasting, with amateur service starting in the 1920s and formal ser- vice in the early 1950s. The country also was also a pioneer in television broad- casting, with transmission starting in 1961. Cairo is widely called the “Hollywood of the Middle East”; and actors and singers do not consider themselves popular before they have made their mark on the Egyptian market (Abdulla 2006, 2013c; Boyd 1999).
The political regimes that have controlled the country since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1952 realized early on that the media was a way to control the masses as well as to bring about development. The media at that time were nationalized and placed under the control of the government. Gamal Abdel Nasser used it to position the country and himself personally as leader of the Arab world. In doing so, he invested in media development to make sure the infrastructure and the quality of content would be unmatched in the region. Special attention was given to entertainment content, in which Nasser embed- ded his political messages. Radio stations like Voice of the Arabs and Middle East Broadcasting became extremely popular, and television drama transcended political boundaries with the aid of high-quality content and powerful transmit- ters. Television was used strategically to hook people to the screen, and the mere presence of a television set became a status symbol, sometimes even before transmission was introduced to the area. Today, over 98 percent of urban homes and 90 percent of rural ones own one or more of the eighteen million television sets in Egypt (ITU 2011).
Egypt was also the ﬁrst country in the Arab world to possess a satellite chan- nel in 1990. In 2001, it started allowing private channels onto the market. However, obtaining a license was restricted to businessmen with close ties to
 
the regime and continues to have no clear criteria to this day. A lack of diversity of content and threats to media freedom are still major problems, and public broadcasting in the sense of a broadcaster that serves the public before the ruler is yet to be found.
There are now also several countries with programming that competes with Egyptian media. In recent years, historical drama productions out of Syria (before the political unrest started), as well as romantic Turkish soap operas dubbed into Arabic became very popular in the Arab world, and with the stagnant standard in Egyptian production, began to rock the “media leader” status of Egypt. The credibility of news programs on Egyptian television amidst the current political upheaval is another threat facing the country’s own media outlets.

ERTU’S INDEP ENDENCE AND LEGAL FRAME W ORK 
Generally speaking, Arab broadcast media are still mostly government-owned, and so are Egypt’s media. The government-controlled channels of ERTU rely on the state for their ﬁnancial survival, and it is not unusual therefore to receive direct or indirect directives or guidelines on what to say or what to cover. Since these channels are the closest Egypt has to a public service broad- caster, the outcome is an environment that to this day cannot be called free or independent; it is a media apparatus that is primarily at the service of the regime or the government rather than the people (Abdulla 2010).
ERTU is governed by its initiating charter, Law 13 of 1979, last modiﬁed by Law 223 of 1989. The entity started operating in 1971 and is the sole authority responsible for broadcasting in Egypt both in terms of radio and television. ERTU has diﬀerent sectors: radio, television, specialized channels, local chan- nels, news, sound engineering, production, economic and ﬁnancial aﬀairs, general Secretariat, and a Radio and Television magazine. Other sectors may be established according to the needs of the business, based on a decision of the ERTU board of trustees. However, the charter is outdated and problematic on many fronts and modiﬁcations made in 1989 had the sole purpose of giving absolute power over the media to the Minister of Information.
Historically, Egyptian constitutions have, in theory, guaranteed freedom of expression. However, the government as well as security forces regularly inter- fere in media freedom. For many years, this has taken place through emergency laws as well as articles from the penal code. Despite marginal freedom, which has been earned by the private TV channels, the state maintained a way of monitoring and controlling content through unspoken, yet well-known red lines for broadcasters.
As per its charter, ERTU is the sole entity allowed to own a radio or televi- sion broadcasting station in Egypt. However, in the early 2000s, the govern- ment decided to allow a few private satellite and radio broadcasters into the
 
market. In order to circumvent that legal obstacle, Egypt set up a Media Pro- duction City (MPC) on the outskirts of Cairo, and turned it into a “free zone.” What that meant was that private broadcasters could operate from within this free zone without having to adhere to the laws making ERTU the sole broad- caster. However, what this also meant was that the entity in charge of approv- ing broadcasters would be the General Authority for Investments and Free Zones, an entity with no media expertise or functions whatsoever. There are no known criteria as to how broadcasting entities are approved for licensing, although interviews with ERTU oﬃcials indicated that a good deal of the process is political in nature and requires the approval of state security (Abdulla 2013b, 2013c).
By virtue of the ERTU charter, the mission of ERTU is spelled out as follows:
The Union aims to fulﬁll the mission of broadcast media, both audio and visual, in terms of policy, planning, and execution within the framework of public policy of the society and its media requirements. In doing this, it will utilize state of the art technology and the latest applications and develop- ments in the ﬁelds of using audio-visual media to serve the community and the attainment of its objectives (ERTU 1979, Article 2).
In order to fulﬁll this broad mission, and in the spirit of a public broadcaster, the charter lists thirteen objectives that ERTU aims to achieve, including the following:
(1) Providing an eﬃcient service of radio and television broadcasting and en- suring that the service is directed at serving the people and the national inter- est within the framework of values and traditions inherent to the Egyptian people and in accordance with the general principles of the Constitution.
. . .
(3) Disseminating culture, and including aspects of educational, cultural, and humanitarian nature within programs in accordance with the high stan- dards of the Egyptian, Arab and international vision, to serve all sectors of society, and to devote special programs for children, youth, women, workers and peasants, a contribution to the Building of the human culturally and pursuant to the cohesion of the family.
. . .
(5)	Contributing to expressing the demands and the daily problems of the people and raising issues of public concern while giving the opportunity to express the diﬀerent viewpoints, including those of political parties, and presenting the eﬀorts to objectively deal with topics of concern.
(6)	Publicizing the discussions of the Parliament and local councils and com- mitting to broadcast whatever oﬃcial communication the government asks
 
to broadcast, as well as all that relates to the state’s public policies, principles and national interest.
(7)	Committing to allocate radio and television broadcasting time for po- litical parties on election days to explain their programs to the people as well as allocating time on a regular basis to reﬂect the main focal points of public opinion. (ERTU 1979, Article 2)
As these articles demonstrate, on paper, the ERTU charter clearly spells out many of the rights and responsibilities that public service broadcasters enjoy in other parts of the world. In fact, the charter was modeled after the BBC, and therefore does so quite eloquently. It emphasizes important duties that include serving the people, disseminating culture, serving all sectors of society, provid- ing educational, cultural, and humanitarian content, providing content for children, youth, women, workers and peasants, raising issues of public con- cern, and expressing diversity of opinions. Unfortunately, the reality of imple- mentation is quite a diﬀerent matter.
These seemingly well-written public broadcasting articles aside, state con- trol and centralization of the media dominates the ERTU charter, starting with Article 1, which states that ERTU is the sole responsible entity for radio and television broadcasting in Egypt, and is located in the capital, Cairo. The article also speciﬁes that ERTU is the only entity that has the right to establish radio and television stations, and that the Union has the right to monitor and censor its productions. Article 2 states that ERTU “is committed to broad- casting whatever the government oﬃcially asks the Union to broadcast” which legally skews the Union toward the government, and is a signiﬁcant indicator of state control over the media apparatus.
To complement the charter, ERTU has a code of ethics (ERTU 1989). However, this still does not safeguard its independence. Furthermore, there is no independent body to monitor media performance and compliance with such codes. The sole entity for communication regulation in Egypt, the National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (NTRA), is only con- cerned with telecommunications, and does not regulate broadcasting. The Ministry of Information was the only body to deal with issues of concern in the national media, which made it unlikely that the ministry would have allowed any content that would be deemed oﬀensive to the regime. While there is no written regulation to this eﬀect, there is a culture of self- censorship that has developed over the years and has deep roots within the media sector.
Unlike the usual concerns covered in a code of ethics, the ERTU code of ethics is not concerned with issues of professionalism, objectivity, equal time, and other universal standards of broadcasting. Rather, the code limits freedom of speech in an unprecedented manner. Listing thirty-three vaguely worded prohibitions, the code bans criticism of state oﬃcials or the “state national system”
 
and outlaws material that “creates social confusion” or contains any “conﬁden- tial information.”
The ERTU charter was amended once in 1989 with the aim of giving abso- lute powers to the minister of information to control the media. According to the charter, the minister supervised ERTU and made sure its objectives are implemented and its services to the public properly oﬀered. The charter also gave much power to the minister over the board of trustees of ERTU, which does not have much autonomy. Basically, no decision by the board could come into eﬀect before it was approved by the minister. Moreover, the president of the ERTU board of trustees is appointed by the president of Egypt upon the recommendation of the prime minister. The president of the Republic also determines the president of the board’s salary and terms of compensation, as well as the duration of the board presidency. Interestingly, even though the Ministry of Information was abolished in June 2014, the charter has not yet been changed.
The charter also details the criteria of the membership of the ERTU board of trustees. The board is comprised of active public ﬁgures, including intellectu- als, religious leaders, artists, scientists, journalists, economists, as well as engi- neering, ﬁnancial, and legal experts. Their appointment, salary, compensation, and the term of membership are determined by the prime minister. The heads of the diﬀerent ERTU sectors, who are appointed by the minister of informa- tion, are ex-oﬃcio members of the board, together with the head of the State Information Service.
The charter details the speciﬁc responsibilities of the board of trustees. Theoretically, the board is responsible for developing the general policies of ERTU, adopting the principal strategies and plans needed to implement these policies, as well as monitoring and evaluating the functions of ERTU. The board is also responsible for approving the administrative and ﬁnancial regula- tions and the annual budget planning and preparation; approving the general scheme of content programming, including foreign content; bringing in for- eign broadcasting experts for training or consultations; adoption of the rules that govern the commercial activities of ERTU; expressing opinions on broadcasting legislation; and approving the establishment of music and theat- rical troupes that provide content to ERTU. In reality though, interviews with members of the board showed that it does very little. The meetings are a mere formality, and no serious discussions take place. The main function of the board was to serve as a body that approved the ministry’s policies and actions, so that it would seem that these policies come from a board rather than one person, the minister of information (Abdulla 2013b, 2013c). So there has always been a potential symbiotic relationship of pleasing the government to stay on the board.
Funding remains a major problem. ERTU is currently about $2.9 billion in debt. ERTU is therefore dependent on the government for funding, which is a
 
major obstacle to its editorial independence. The ERTU charter states that ERTU shall have an independent annual budget, issued by a decree from the president of Egypt. The charter stipulates that ERTU’s income consists of “Proceeds from fees prescribed by law for the beneﬁt of radio and television broadcasting; Proceeds from the commercial activities of ERTU sectors and its services; Funds allocated by the State for ERTU; Subsidies and grants; Loans within the limits and rules established by the prime minister and leaving a surplus income for each ﬁnancial year to the next year; Union’s share of sur- plus/proﬁts for the companies it owns.” The charter also stipulates that “the government shall decide annually upon the subsidy amount that it grants the Union and deposit it in the Union’s account at the Central Bank of Egypt” (ERTU 1979).
In other words, the Egyptian government is in full control of ERTU ﬁnances on several fronts. The government decides ERTU’s annual funding, as well as on the salaries and compensations of all those with any authority over the Union, namely the board of trustees, the chair of the board, and, until recently, the minister of information. Financial autonomy is therefore nonexistent. Moreover, the compensation of those in charge is directly related to the govern- ment’s satisfaction with the performance of ERTU. The Union thus acts as a tool to serve the government, rather than the people.
The 2014 Egyptian constitution states that an independent regulatory body is to take charge of the media in Egypt. However, such a body has not yet been established. Under the current political circumstances in the country, there are no signs that such a body would be truly independent. Most likely, it will be a replacement for the Ministry of Information, with all the rights and responsi- bilities that the ministry had carried out for decades.

ERTU’S EDIT ORIAL POLICIES 
In terms of editorial policies, the charter does not guarantee the basic compo- nents that make for an eﬃcient public broadcaster. There is a mention of ERTU responsibility toward political parties in Article 2 of the charter, which states that ERTU commits to “giving the opportunity to express the diﬀerent viewpoints, including those of political parties”; and “Committing to allocate radio and television broadcasting time for political parties on election days to explain their programs to the people as well as allocating time on a regular basis to reﬂect the main focal points of public opinion” (ERTU 1979, Article 2). However, these articles were never strictly observed. There is also no men- tion of inclusiveness or cultural diversity in terms of content or of the agents featured on ERTU. There is no commitment on behalf of ERTU to represent the diﬀerent sectors of the Egyptian society, or to represent the diﬀerent groups of minorities, including religious, socioeconomic, age, ethnic, special needs, cultural, or ideological minorities.
 
The lack of commitment to inclusiveness also applies to the representation of gender on Egyptian television. The ERTU charter does not make reference to what percentage of programming should be directed to women (or to any other group). It only refers to having “special programs” for children, youth, women, workers, and peasants. A recent study of diversity on diﬀerent Egyp- tian newspapers and television channels examined the content of the main talk show on ERTU. The lack of diversity was staggering. Out of eighteen episodes of the evening talk show that were analyzed featuring 120 individuals, only 8 were females (6.7 percent), while 112 were male (93.3 percent). This means that for every woman that appears on the main talk show of Egypt’s public televi- sion, 14 men appear. Religious minorities were also severely under-represented, as were all other minority groups (Abdulla 2013a).

ERTU’S CODE OF ETHICS 
ERTU does have a code of ethics (ERTU 1989). The document is comprised of thirty-one statements, all of which begin with the phrase “It is prohibited to broadcast      ” In contrast to most codes of ethics, which generally put forth
some moral obligations which are not legally binding, ERTU’s code presents a set of prohibitions that is not very practical. While a few statements do protect human rights—such as “It is prohibited to broadcast any program that encour- ages discrimination on the basis of color, race, religion, or social status,” and “It is prohibited to broadcast any program that may hurt the feelings of the handicapped or the developmentally challenged”—the code mainly presents a series of what not to do rather than presenting guidelines on what is morally correct or encouraging the inclusion of minorities. If ERTU was to actually abide by all the prohibitions on the code of ethics, it would literally broadcast nothing at all. Some of the prohibitions of the code represent a clear violation of freedom of speech and expression. These include vague statements such as:
It is prohibited to broadcast any program that criticizes the state national system.
It is prohibited to broadcast any program that criticizes national heroism.
It is prohibited to broadcast any program that criticizes Arab nationalism and its struggle, values, and national traditions.
It is prohibited to broadcast any program that criticizes oﬃcers
of the courts, military oﬃcers, or security oﬃcers as well as religious leaders.
It is prohibited to broadcast any program that criticizes state oﬃcials because of their performance.
It is prohibited to broadcast any program that favors divorce as a means to solve family problems.
 
It is prohibited to broadcast any program that contains materials that may cause depression or spread the spirit of defeat among individuals or communities.
It is prohibited to broadcast any program that creates social confusion or criticizes the principles and traditions of Arab society.
It is prohibited to broadcast any pictures of horror.
It is prohibited to broadcast any conﬁdential information.
It is prohibited to broadcast any scientiﬁc, technical, professional, or reli- gious advice or commentary unless it has been reviewed or is broadcast by experts in the ﬁeld.
It is prohibited to broadcast any program that criticizes other broadcast programs. (ERTU 1989)

TRANSITIONING TO DIGITAL TERRESTRIAL TELE VISION ?

Is ERTU Ready for the Switch to Digital Broadcasting? The short answer is: No! The recent Mapping Digital Media report for Egypt indicates that ERTU is far from being ready for the transition to digital terrestrial television (DTT) broadcasting. The transition to digital broadcasting requires advanced equip- ment, and much training of human resources in the technicalities of DTT, steps that ERTU does not seem to be very concerned about. As the report states, “It appears that no serious steps have been taken along the road to make
this transition (to digital broadcasting) happen” (Abdulla 2013b).
The one step that Egypt has taken in 2009 was to commission the German Fraunhofer Institute to do a feasibility study to design a “road map” for the transition to digital terrestrial broadcasting in the country. The study indicates that the transition is a process that requires long-term planning, and advises Egypt to carry out the following steps to be able to make the transition in 2014:

Set up a joint coordination group Digital Transition Decide on a regional strategy
Decide on a business model for network build-up Decide on set-top boxes
Decide on programs and channel line-up
Decide on spectrum use, including the Digital Dividend. (Fraunhofer 2009)

Egypt has not committed to meet the 2015 deadline set internationally by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for the transition to DTT,
 
although there have been press statements in 2008 and 2009 whereby the executive president of the National Telecommnunications Regulatory Author- ity indicated Egypt would meet the deadline. Amr Badawi emphasized that the success of the project requires cooperation between the parties concerned, including ERTU, the Ministry of Information, Telecom Egypt, and content producers, as well as telecom operators, equipment manufacturers, and dis- tributors of television sets (Al Hayat 2008, 2009). However, to date, and par- ticularly with the political instability in the country, there has not been any public discussion of the transition and there is no evidence that it is a priority for the country.

MAIN CHALLENGES F A CING ERTU AND MEDIA REFORM 
Currently, the main reason for the absence of media reform in Egypt, is the lack of political will to do so. The political instability in the country, which brought about four regimes in four years, makes it easier for each incoming regime to try to control ERTU and use it to its own advantage. The media scene is currently extremely monotone, and ERTU is playing its usual part of serving as the mouthpiece of the regime. It is not in the best interest of the regime to change this picture, and so any change will have to come from the few dissident voices inside ERTU and be supported by the huge masses outside ERTU.
However, the main problem with ERTU itself is the mentality of being there to serve the regime rather than the public. ERTU employees and media per- sonnel think of themselves as working for the state media, and as such, their ﬁrst priority is the state which employs them. Many of them actually believe that there is nothing wrong with ERTU being the mouthpiece of the state because it constitutes the state media. The problem, therefore, is one of approach and a way of thinking on behalf of not only the regime but the entire ERTU as well. This is not going to be rectiﬁed overnight, but it is one of the main challenges facing ERTU, and one that needs to be changed as soon as possible.
The sheer numbers of those who work at ERTU is another major challenge. There are currently between forty-two thousand and forty-six thousand indi- viduals working at ERTU, many of whom constitute what is known as dis- guised unemployment. ERTU could easily and eﬃciently function with fewer than ten thousand professionals. Many of these currently employed by ERTU are friends and/or relatives of two main ministers of information who belonged to the Mubarak regime (Abdulla 2013c).
In terms of the legal framework governing ERTU, the initiating charter and code of ethics are severely problematic. There are no speciﬁcations as to the exact duties of ERTU as a public service broadcaster. Both documents were
 
clearly written with the aim of serving the regime rather than the public, and therefore they make it legally binding for ERTU personnel to abide by the directives of the state. On the other hand, the documents lack guidelines on media inclusiveness, objectivity, or diversity. There is also no requirement for ERTU to cover the issues that commercial media may not cover, such as cul- ture, science, and technology, women’s and children’s programs, and so on, nor does the charter stipulate that content should be dedicated to minorities such as people with disabilities, the educationally unprivileged, religious minorities, and others. As explained earlier, the code of ethics is but a long list of what not to broadcast, and does not refer to any universal standards of ethical broadcasting.
Funding is another major problem. As long as ERTU is directly dependent on the state for its ﬁnancial well-being, as well as for the compensation pack- ages of its main staﬀ and board of trustees, the Union cannot achieve editorial independence.

SUGGESTED STRATEGIES FOR ERTU REFORM 
There are several recommendations that need to be carried out for media reform in Egypt and for ERTU to start functioning as a proper public service broad- caster. Most importantly, these strategies need political change or the political will to bring them about. In the absence of political will or change, it will be extremely diﬃcult to turn ERTU into a proper public broadcaster, since the main problem now is that it is used to serve the regime rather than the public.
Abolishing the Ministry of Information is a good step. This entity only exists in repressive countries, with the purpose of keeping the media under state control. All over the Arab world, the ministers of information are the main players who control the media and make sure the whole media apparatus is loyal to the regime. Ministries of Information believe that it is their prerogative that government messages be delivered to the public through state-controlled media. In Egypt, the ministry should now be replaced by a truly independent regulatory council of media experts and professionals, which could devise media policies as well as monitor and regulate the media. Such monitoring should take place in accordance with universal ethical and professional stan- dards, adapted to Egyptian culture. The standards would ensure there are enough guarantees in place to safeguard diversity of content and diversity of agents featured. However, if the new regulatory body is independent only on paper, not much change will occur.
It is of utmost importance to make sure that the role of the regulatory coun- cil would be to monitor the media with the aim of ensuring professionalism rather than controlling content, as is usually the case in the Arab world. In addition, the council would be responsible for devising criteria for satellite (and eventually terrestrial) channel ownership in Egypt, as well as for receiving
 
and approving applications, and for assigning spectrum frequency, which is currently handled by the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. There have been attempts to establish such a council in Egypt following the revolution of January 25, 2011. I was involved in one such attempt by the Egyptian Initiative for Media Development, in which thirty prominent media experts and professionals participated. However, the problem was agreeing on a structure for the formation of the board that would enable the council to be truly independent. I believe the formation of the council is what could make or break the eﬀort. It is therefore unacceptable to have a large percentage of the council board members selected by the president or the prime minister. The selection is equally problematic if made by parliament members if the parliament does not reﬂect a true representation of Egyptian society. The majority of the council members should be comprised of independent media experts and reputed media ﬁgures with signiﬁcant experience in the ﬁeld and a reputation for objectivity and impartiality. It would be ideal for Egypt to establish such a council only after taking some steps toward the transition to democracy, so that the council could be set up under a democratically elected president and parliament. Otherwise, the council risks becoming just a seem- ingly more independent body that carries out the responsibilities of the Min-
istry of Information.
The ﬁrst task for such a regulatory council should be to restructure ERTU’s board of trustees so that its members have the interest and experience needed to reform ERTU. Although the board has been changed post January 25, 2011, most of the old faces remain. The changes need to be signiﬁcant, and the new faces need to have professional credentials, a scientiﬁc mentality to utilize research, and a vision to transform public service broadcasting in Egypt.
The board’s most important and most primary task should be to abolish the ERTU initiating charter and code of ethics, and establish a new law to govern the structure, content, and activities of ERTU, along with a new code of ethics. This should happen with the broad objective of transforming ERTU into a real public service broadcaster. This will entail a paradigm shift in the way ERTU functions so that it operates primarily with the interests of the people in mind rather than with the interests of the regime or the government. As such, the new charter should designate ERTU as the oﬃcial public service broadcaster of Egypt. It should cancel the stipulation that currently exists by which ERTU is obliged to broadcast any material provided to it by the government since this represents an oﬃcial and automatic aﬃliation of ERTU to the government, rather than to the people. The new charter should also formulate a clear idea of the functions and responsibilities of the public service broadcaster. As such, it should stipulate that the main content provided by ERTU be focused on the noncommercial political, social, and cultural buildup of the nation and its people. ERTU should become a voice for all strata of the society rather than a
 
voice for the government or the regime. This should take place according to set criteria and minimum percentages of media coverage that match the demo- graphic, cultural, and political structure of Egypt. All these criteria are currently nonexistent. The new charter should abolish the designation of ERTU as the sole broadcaster in the country, and instead should allow for the establishment of private terrestrial channels, a change which will be inevitable in the age of digital broadcasting.
A new code of ethics should be formulated, largely by those working at ERTU, to develop a sense of ownership in relation to the new document, thus encouraging them to strive to follow its guidelines. The new code should omit the inhibitions on broadcasting present in the current code, and instead focus on universal ethical guidelines, including issues of professionalism and objec- tivity as well as inclusiveness and diversity.
The ﬁnancial aspects of ERTU need to be settled in order for the Union to achieve ﬁnancial independence from the state. As a public service broadcaster, the basic funding of ERTU should come from the public either through sub- scriptions or through using some of the taxes already collected by the govern- ment, which would be dedicated to the ERTU budget, including ERTU board of trustees salaries. Examining other models of ﬁnancing of public service broadcasters worldwide would help determine if a particular model would be best suited for Egypt. As part of dealing with the current ﬁnancial problems associated with the ERTU budget, a new compensation system needs to be worked out, whereby the huge gap in income between ERTU staﬀ would be decreased. While there will always be media professionals who are more expen- sive than others, there should be clearly established criteria for compensation that are publicly disclosed in a transparent manner, and that are based on merit rather than nepotism and loyalty to the regime.
One of the main reform tasks will be to deal with the forty-two thousand to forty-six thousand individuals currently working at ERTU. These should be ﬁltered by committees of media experts, with the aim of retaining those who are eﬃcient professionals in their ﬁelds. The remaining work force, as well as anyone appointed through nepotism, should be provided with a fair, early retirement plan and asked to submit their resignations. This will not happen overnight, but rather over several years. The number of channels operated by ERTU should be decreased to one or two, and those constituting the new work force should be provided with suﬃcient state-of-the-art training and an eﬃ- cient media strategy to follow. Training should be conducted by public service broadcasting experts, covering all aspects of the broadcasting process, be it managerial, editorial, or technical in nature.
Finally, throughout the process, the use of research cannot be ignored or underestimated. Egypt in general lacks proper, independent, scientiﬁc ratings research. ERTU should either establish an in-house independent research center
 
or enlist the services of one that uses the latest technologies to conduct audience and viewership studies.

CONCL USION 
The current political leadership in Egypt seems to lack the political will to carry out much media reform in the country. The current media system allows the regime to control key media institutions and use them to its own advan- tage. The media scene lacks diversity and ERTU continues to play its usual part of serving as the mouthpiece of the regime. Under the circumstances, it seems that any real media reforms might have to come from the few dissident voices inside ERTU and be supported by the masses outside ERTU.