请将“Subjectivation
However, starting from subjects and their practices does not mean to always already presuppose them as the elementary units of a legal theory, as Pashukanis does.1 Rather, the social conditions first constitute those entities, which then appear as independent essentials. This is particularly valid for individuals, who are neither an origin, nor a unity, nor transparent for themselves as rational actors, but who are an ‘ensemble of social relations’ for materialist theory, as Marx already wrote in the sixth of his Theses on Feuerbach,2 or in the language of Laclau and Mouffe, an ‘ensemble of positions’.3
Foucault has shown that the different power relations do not only inscribe themselves in the institutions, but that they create in particular subjectivity - that the essential effect of power has to be situated in those procedures which transform people into subjects. Subjectivation is the process, in which plural relationships of forces culminate with serious consequences. The social totality’s plurality thus corresponds to the diversity of subjectivation processes. The ensemble of subject positions is on closer inspection an ensemble of socially created and hierarchically organised differences.
The concept of difference serves on the one hand to take social construction into account, as distinct from any kind of pre-social ‘natural’ character, but on the other to consider that ‘categorisations carry fundamental social consequences’.4 Stressing difference is not intended to refer back to a ‘multicultural coexistence’,5 but to the social hierarchisation of subject positions. Not all processes of differentiation develop in relations of oppression,6 and thus in antagonistic contexts - but some crucial ones do.
The best known difference in the materialist tradition, namely that between classes, already makes this apparent: Classes constitute through the ‘struggle over the surplus product’ according to their structural position in the reproduction process,7 that is, as owners of the means of production or on the other side as owners of labour power alone. 
The second, long-since debated difference (and in the Marxist tradition often reductively only as a ‘side contradiction’) is the gender binary within a hierarchised gender order.8 This gender order is at the same time constituted in the framework of the ‘heterosexual matrix’, that is in a grid that naturalises bodies, gender identities and desire.9 A further hierarchised difference is therefore the one which is produced and regulated by heteronormativity.
Finally, national communitarisation produces racialisation as a further dif-ference.10 This can be understood as a process whereby people are constructed as a homogenous group and hierarchised according to ethnic characteristics.11 Those racialised attributions combine with antisemitic and colonial elements in (neo)racist discourses?2
Myriad differences are thus articulated in individual and collective subjects. Those relations of domination permeate each other; they ‘intersect, as first described by feminist legal theorists in the concept of ‘intersectionality’.13 No category can, however, be thought of independently of others, because it is co-constituted by them. Rather than adding them up, the multiple differences therefore have to be identified within the respective others?4
Between capitalism and sexuality, for example, a connection that mobilises heteronormativity can be observed. Heterosexuality is inscribed as a foundation in patriarchy, because it creates and enforces a gender binary and a hierarchical, binary order of sex and desire. This binary, hierarchical gender system secures in turn the reproduction of labour power in capitalism, with the naturalisation of sex and desire within the heterosexual matrix supporting the gendered division of labour?5
To consider subjectivation in the context of a materialist legal theory appears all the more necessary to me, because as I have shown most previous approaches have contented themselves with one structuring principle and therefore also with only one form of domination. However, when the process of subject production - subjectivation - comes into view, this leads to the question of how diverse relations create the modern subject, which is so central for law. 
On closer inspection, the modern subjectivation regime’s various technologies of power culminate in isolated monads (1) with gendered, racialised, individualised bodies and differentiated identities (2). Those monads are politically regulated in their isolation (3), as they are conducted in their technologies of the self as formally equal and free legal subjects, endowed with subjective rights (4):
(1)	Commodity owners: Balbus and Pashukanis already suggest the subjectiv- ation effect created by the commodity form in showing that individuals cannot act as social ones under the capitalist division of labour, but only as competing commodity owners. They are opposed to society and remain structurally indifferent to the needs of others. Every other individual is not the condition of their own freedom, but its limit. They are seemingly isolated as individuals from the very social context that turns them into ‘isolated monads’, as Poulantzas writes, and have to be reconnected with each other first, associated16 in their ‘windowless isolation’.17
(2)	Differentiated Bodies and Identities: Those isolated monads are bound to their identity by normalising practices and bodily disciplined through drilling, the production of behavioural skills and habits as automatic abilities - and thus also the ability to self-manage. This ‘individuality’ is then imprinted into their very corporeality in the form of hierarchised differences. It is thus not any originary and resistant core of subjectivity, but their ‘flattering confidence in the subject’s autarky’ is itself already the result of the process of insulating individuals from the encompassing contexts?8
(3)	Political Isolation: This isolated subject is politically regulated and ruled through its identity, down to the smallest gestures, and develops in its technologies of the self a relationship to this identity. Poulantzas speaks in this context of the ‘isolation effect’, which sanctions the socially drilled monads politically and juridically and institutionalises them.19
(4)	Abstract Legal Subjects: Juridical subjectivation plays in this context a special role. It produces legal subjectivity in the regulated process of repetition and thus precisely that Robinsonade of the modern subject as isolated, rational, transparent for themselves, gender-neutral, classless and uniform that is seemingly presupposed in law. Peter Niesen aptly describes this process from the perspective of Habermas and Maus: 
Sovereign individuals ‘are not “natural” individuals like moral persons, they are legally constituted actors, equipped with fundamental claims and separated from each other through the structure of law’.20 Legal technology thus participates in producing individualised monads. At the same time this process of subjectivation is also the source of a second moment: Pashukanis and Balbus have pointed out that in the same way that products become commodities, individuals are transformed in law to legal subjects. Just as commodity-producing labour becomes abstract labour, ‘labor sans phrase’, concrete individuals become legal subjects. In the legal subject ‘all concrete particularities which distinguish one representative of the genus homo sapiens from another dissolve into the abstraction of man in general’?1 The subject, which is constituted as an ensemble of differences, becomes in law its opposite - equal.
Although the subjects are thus individuated and hierarchised with respect to each other, both in the process of reproduction, and through discipline and politically and juridically sanctioned isolation, they are at the same time homogenised through legal subjectivity. This process is very much decisive for the effects of the legal form. I will therefore come back to it below in the context of the legal form’s effect of cohesion. 
Hegemony
1 Hegemonic Government
It would, however, be wrong to assume that the subjects, which are thus socially produced, are in any way also docile addressees, because they are socially con-structed. Quite the opposite: modern subjects as historical forms of human beings, as ‘autonomous’ individuals and as such endowed with subjective rights, have the particular characteristic that they cannot be ruled directly.
The existence of stable relations of power in bourgeois society can, as Gramsci and Foucault insist, no longer be explained by a juridical model of power, or strictly speaking by the state. Liberal government rules through the consumption of freedom1 and requires the consent, the active agreement, of the ruled. Hegemony is here, however, always also ‘armoured with coercion’, for purely hegemonic government is unlikely under conditions of a society permeated by multiple antagonisms. For this reason Foucault also points out that security dispositifs become central at the very moment bourgeois freedoms are established.
Habermas’ social theory also focuses substantially on the production of social consensus. The difference appears, however, precisely in that Habermas does not conceive of social relations as relationships of forces, but as horizontal ones. Accordingly, his explanations on communicative action lack structural conflictuality from the outset.2 Instead, this is added as a second element to action. While the danger of dissent is omnipresent, it is however only rooted in the possibility of different world views and not in structural asymmetries.
Systems theory as well as state theory, with its form analytical line of argument, always presuppose the ‘functioning’ of subjects, so that they do not have to deal with the reasons for this functioning. Although it already has all the necessary elements to do so, even Foucault’s theory does not actually start any genuinely relational theory of power that has to foreground practice, because of its structuralist bent. And finally, the same problem in relation to systems is also evident in Habermas. All those approaches, because they are blind to practice, use subjects in a mechanistic way. I consider this one of the main limitations of 
their legal concept and will therefore extend it with the concept of hegemonic governmental practice.”翻译为中文