请将“Nonetheless Bukharin examines not only the international dimensions of imperialism but also its economic and political implications at home. He argues that state capitalism represents the historical and logical completion of finance capitalism. The state is no longer the simple guarantor of the general conditions of economic exploitation but has itself become directly involved in such exploitation on behalf of finance capital. The main forms of this development are state monopolies in production and trade, mixed enterprises based on public and private capital, and state control of credit. In all these cases the state acts as the highest organisational embodiment of finance capital and also coordinates the activities of lesser organisations (1917, pp. 108, 129, 149-150, 158; 1920, pp. 37-38). This transformation in the economic role of the state is reflected in the decline of parliamentarism and the concentration of political power (1917, pp. 124-128). Moreover, not only does the state reorganise the relations between enterprises, it must also reorganise the relations among classes. Thus, in addition to its expansion of the military and police apparatus and the absorption of institutions such as the church, the press, and education, the state also integrates trade unions and working-class parties and turns them into agencies of social control (1916, pp. 105-106; 1920, pp. 40-41). This ‘leviathan state’ thus fuses economic and political power into one colossal state-capitalist trust which carries on capitalist competition in the form of imperialist wars and colonial annexations. The growth of state capitalism shows that the time is ripe for a transition to socialism; and the impulse towards war creates the conditions for successful revolution as well as further accumulation (1917, pp. 144-160, 167; 1920, pp. 30-32, 162-173). In this context a transition to socialism demands not only the nationalisation of capitalist trusts but also the creation of new forms of proletarian economic and political domination (1916; 1920, pp. 114-132 and 150-152).

Despite his many insights into state capitalism, Bukharin’s views also involve several theoretical problems. Thus he implies that state capitalism can eliminate capitalist anarchy within a society and also externalise competition and contradictions in the form of imperialist rivalry and war. Bukharin thus moves close to social democratic ideas of ‘organised capitalism’ and still retains a catastrophist analysis of the causes of revolution. Conversely he ignores the real limits to state intervention and the various forms of class struggle within the nation-state. This neglect is related to Bukharin’s tendency to absolutism state power and treat the state as an all-embracing, omnipotent organisation which embodies the collective will of capital (e.g., 1917, p. 129; cf. Cohen, 1975, pp. 31-34 and 39). But this is inexact even in a total war economy and it is still less adequate as an account of the state in other conditions. Despite these difficulties, however, Bukharin’s work more clearly and more fully anticipates recent studies of stamocap than does that of Engels, Hilferding, or Lenin.

After these early contributions to the approach, ‘state monopoly capitalism’ largely disappeared from theoretical view in the interwar period in favour of more general discussions of imperialism (although, as Roberts, 1977, has shown, even the latter concept remained undeveloped). This disappearance could be linked to the prevailing political priorities of the Comintern as well as to the partial economic disengagement of the state after the First World War. Thus, although ‘war-time state monopoly capitalism’ figures to a certain extent in Comintern theses during the earlier years of the postwar revolutionary crisis (dated 19171923), the ensuing period of so-called ‘relative stabilisation’ (dated 1924-1928) saw less concern with direct economic intervention by the imperialist state. Moreover, since Russia was now committed to building ‘socialism in one country’ and its leaders were still convinced that capitalism was in its deaththroes as a result of the ‘general crisis of capitalism’, the Comintern was less concerned to wage an open revolution against moribund western imperialism than to contest the succession with social democracy. Hence the Comintern focused less on the ties between monopoly capital and its state than on the role of social democracy as the principal economic and political support of capital as a whole. Thus, although there are certainly frequent references to the subordination of the imperialist state to the financial oligarchy and to its use of extra-economic force as well as occasional references to state capitalist tendencies, there is no attempt to distinguish a separate stamocap stage in the terminal years of capitalism. Much more emphasis was given to the alleged fusion of social democracy (or at least its leaders) with the capitalist state than to any fusion of monopoly capital and the state into a single mechanism. This concern with social democracy as a prop of capitalism was already evident before the Bolshevik Revolution, intensified thereafter, and culminated in the charge of ‘social fascism’ levelled during the so-called ‘third period’ (1928-1935) against all social democratic movements in the West (for documentation, see Degras, 1956-1965, three vols., passim; for useful commentaries, see Borkenau, 1938; Braunthal, 1967; and Claudin, 1975). Admittedly, there was renewed interest in issues of state intervention with the development of the international economic crisis in the ‘thirties. But, although there was increasing mention of state capitalist and/or state monopoly capitalist tendencies, there is still no attempt to distinguish between simple and state monopoly capitalism as stages within imperialism. Instead the growth of state intervention is typically understood as a final, abortive attempt to overcome the general crisis of capitalism and its economic effects (for a magisterial review of Soviet attitudes to western capitalism in the interwar period, which unfortunately appeared too late to be considered in any detail here, see Day, 1981, passim).

Thus Varga, the influential but maverick Hungarian economist, suggested that monopoly capitalism was turning into ‘state war-monopoly capitalism’ as preparations for the next imperialist war came to dominate efforts to resolve the economic crisis (1934, p. 68). This was reflected in the growth of the state budget, state control of foreign trade, state regulation of credit, state intervention in the labour market, and state determination of prices (1934, pp. 68-70). Measures to overcome the crisis artificially were associated with a growing struggle among different strata of the ruling class to influence state policy but its overall effect was to redistribute the national income in favour of monopoly capital (1934, pp. 63-70). The bourgeois response was also overdetermined by the rapid maturation of the general crisis - leading to the collapse of mass support for the capitalist system and political splits in the dominant classes. This accelerates the tendential fascisation of the capitalist state under the aegis of social democracy (‘social fascism’) and/or pure fascism based on the petit bourgeois and peasant masses (1934, pp. 139-162). But, since the fascist dictatorship is the final form of bourgeois rule and is itself crisis-ridden and self-contradictory, Varga concludes that a united front against fascism could soon win in the struggle for socialism (1934, pp. 163-173).

Indeed, once we turn from the analysis of stamocap as such to the Comintern’s views on fascism after the close of its ‘third period’, certain themes that anticipate postwar stamocap studies become clear. Thus the new definition of fascism as ‘the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capitalism’ (Dimitroff, 1935, p. 10) presages the later stress on the exclusive appropriation of state power by monopoly capital to the detriment of other bourgeois fractions as well as the dominated classes. This analysis led to the strategy of a popular front against the fascist dictatorship - embracing non-monopoly capital as well as the subordinate classes, having at its heart a united front of social democratic as well as communist forces, and committed to a bourgeois-democratic restoration rather than an immediate transition to socialism. This strategy clearly anticipates the anti-monopoly alliance committed to ‘advanced democracy’ proposed in postwar stamocap theories. Conversely, after the adoption of these theories, fascism itself has been redefined as a specific form of state monopoly capitalism (e.g., Eicholz and Gossweiler, 1968, pp. 210-227; Hemberger et al., 1965, pp. 60-72; Reinhold et al., 1972, pp. 48-58).

POSTWAR ‘STAMOCAP’ THEORIES

Stamocap theories were first seriously and widely developed in the mid-1950s in an effort to account for the continued expansion of capitalism during the so-called ‘second stage of the general crisis’. Initially these theories treated stamocap as a last-ditch attempt to shore up capitalism during its general crisis through the direct, personal subordination of the state to the financial oligarchy resulting in specific policies favouring monopoly capital and in a general militarisation of the economy in the interests of monopoly profit maximisation. Moreover, since this entailed ruin for the peasant and artisan classes as well as impoverishment for the proletariat and since palliative measures and self-contradictory attempts at capitalist ‘planning’ could not indefinitely prevent economic collapse, socialist revolution would be achieved through an anti-monopoly alliance under communist leadership in conditions of peaceful coexistence between the two world systems. Subsequent theoretical developments shifted attention towards state monopoly capitalism as a new stage of capitalism compatible with continued accumulation, allowed for the relative autonomy of the state to secure the collective interests of (monopoly) capital against those of particular capitals, considered the new forms of state intervention in the expansion of capitalism, and discussed the contribution of science and technology to postwar growth within the framework of capitalist relations of production. Increasing attention was also paid to the fiscal exploitation of precapitalist classes and the prefigurative character of capitalist planning for the transition to socialism. But, despite this remarkable sophistication and specification of stamocap theory, little change is evident in its political conclusions until the growth of ‘Right Eurocommunism’ induced a reappraisal of the Soviet Union as a model of advanced socialism and as the ‘world-historical’ representative of the working class (for a brief contrast between right and left variants of Eurocommunism, see p. 14 above).”翻译为中文