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PhysicalismFirst published Tue Feb 13, 2001; substantive revision Tue May 25, 2021Physicalism is, in slogan form, the thesis that everything is physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don’t deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don’t seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social, or mathematical nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are physical, or at least bear an important relation to the physical.1. Preliminaries1.1 Terminology1.2 Historical Issues1.3 A Framework for Discussion2. The Completeness Question2.1 Supervenience and Necessity Physicalism2.2 Identity Physicalism2.2.1 Token Physicalism2.2.1 Type Physicalism  2.2.1类型物理主义2.3 Realization Physicalism2.3实现物理主义2.3.1 Second-order Physicalism2.3.1二阶物理主义2.3.2 Subset Physicalism2.3.2子集物理主义2.4 Grounding Physicalism2.4基础物理主义2.5 Fundamentality Physicalism2.5基本物理主义3. Varieties of Physicalism3.物理主义的变种3.1 Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism3.1还原与非还原物理主义3.2 A Priori and A Posteriori Physicalism3.2先验物理主义与后验物理主义4. The Condition Question4.条件问题4.1 The Theory and Object Conceptions of the Physical4.1物理学的理论和对象概念4.2 Circularity  4.2圆度4.3 Hempel’s dilemma  4.3亨佩尔难题4.4 The Panpsychism Problem4.4泛心论问题4.5 The Via Negativa4.5关于Via Negativa4.6 Structuralist Approaches4.6结构主义方法4.7 Physicalism as an Attitude4.7物理主义作为一种态度5. The Case Against Physicalism5.反对物理主义的理由5.1 Qualia and Consciousness5.1质与意识5.2 Meaning and Intentionality5.2意义与意向5.3 Numbers and Abstracta5.3数字和摘要a5.4 Methodological Issues5.4方法学问题6. The Case for Physicalism6.物理主义的理由BibliographyAcademic ToolsOther Internet Resources其他互联网资源Related Entries  相关条目1. Preliminaries1.1 TerminologyPhysicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Indeed, on one strand to contemporary usage, the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are interchangeable. But the two terms have very different histories. The word ‘materialism’ appears in English towards the end of the 17th century, but the word ‘physicalism’ was introduced into philosophy only in the 1930s by Otto Neurath (1931) and Rudolf Carnap (1959/1932), both of whom were key members of the Vienna Circle, a group of philosophers, scientists and mathematicians active in Vienna prior to World War II. While it is not clear that Neurath and Carnap understood physicalism in the same way, one thesis often attributed to them (e.g. in Hempel 1949) is the linguistic thesis that every statement is synonymous with (i.e. is equivalent in meaning with) some physical statement. But materialism as traditionally construed is not a linguistic thesis at all; rather it is a metaphysical thesis in the sense that it tells us about the nature of the world. At least for the positivists, therefore, there was a clear reason for distinguishing physicalism (a linguistic thesis) from materialism (a metaphysical thesis). Moreover, this reason was compounded by the fact that, according to official positivist doctrine, metaphysics is nonsense. Since the 1930s, however, the positivist philosophy that under-girded this distinction has for the most part been rejected—for example, physicalism is not a linguistic thesis for contemporary philosophers—and this is one reason why the words ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’ are now often interpreted as interchangeable.Some philosophers suggest that ‘physicalism’ is distinct from ‘materialism’ for a reason quite unrelated to the one emphasized by Neurath and Carnap. As the name suggests, materialists historically held that everything was matter — where matter was conceived as “an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist” (Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, par. 9). But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense; for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense (Lange 1865, Dijksterhuis 1961, Yolton 1983). So it is tempting to use ‘physicalism’ to distance oneself from what seems a historically important but no longer scientifically relevant thesis of materialism, and related to this, to emphasize a connection to physics and the physical sciences. However, while physicalism is certainly unusual among metaphysical doctrines in being associated with a commitment both to the sciences and to a particular branch of science, namely physics, it is not clear that this is a good reason for calling it ‘physicalism’ rather than ‘materialism.’ For one thing, many contemporary physicalists do in fact use the word ‘materialism’ to describe their doctrine (e.g. Smart 1963). Moreover, while ‘physicalism’ is no doubt related to ‘physics’ it is also related to ‘physical object’ and this in turn is very closely connected with ‘material object’, and via that, with ‘matter.’In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both terms interchangeably, though I will typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’. It is important to note, though, that physicalism (aka materialism) is often associated with a number of further doctrines distinct from the one we will focus on; for a discussion of some of these, see the supplement on:Physicalism and Associated Doctrines1.2 Historical IssuesSetting aside what it is properly called, the thesis of physicalism is often described as an extremely old, even ancient, thesis. The first sentence of Friedrich Lange’s The History of Materialism, which was the standard work on the subject in the 19th century is: “Materialism is as old as philosophy, but not older” (1925, 3). What Lange has in mind is the pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus, who is usually thought of defending a kind of physicalism or materialism when he said or allegedly said, “all is atoms and the void.” This view casts a long shadow over subsequent formulations of physicalism. A position like that of Democritus was revived in the early modern period just prior to Newton, by philosophers and scientists such as Hobbes or Gassendi. In the eighteenth century, French philosophers like D’Holbach and La Mettrie thought of themselves as materialists (and would be now classified as physicalists) somewhat in the same way since they held that each human being is a complicated sort of machine. In the nineteenth century, while Karl Marx’s ‘dialectical materialism’ is something different from the metaphysical thesis we will focus on, he nevertheless developed his social philosophy against the background of what we would call physicalism; in fact, Marx’s doctoral dissertation was a comparison of Democritus and Epicurus. And in the twentieth century, analytic philosophers such as Smart and Lewis self-consciously defended their views in a way that acknowledges, as Lewis put it, “our intellectual ancestors” (1994, 293).However, while there is certainly something in common here, the underlying historical issues are extremely complicated, since they involve subtle questions of scientific and philosophical change. We won’t discuss them in detail in this entry. It is worth emphasis, though, that we should be careful in lumping different people in different epochs together. The precise views they held are often different from one another. As we noted above, and as Lange himself emphasises, Newton did not think that, even in the physical world, all is atoms and the void, since for him there are also forces such as gravity. It follows that any post-Newtonian philosophers who think of themselves as physicalists must have a different thesis in mind from Democritus.1.3 A Framework for DiscussionIn approaching the topic of physicalism, one may distinguish what I will call the interpretation question from the truth question. The interpretation question asks:What does it mean to say that everything is physical?The truth question asks:Is it true to say that everything is physical?There is obviously a sense in which the second question presupposes an answer to the first — you need to know what a statement means before you can ask whether it’s true — and so we will begin with the interpretation question.The interpretation question itself divides into two sub-questions, which I will call the condition question and the completeness question. The condition question asks:What does it mean to for something to be physical?The condition question holds fixed the issue of what it means for everything to satisfy some condition, or to bear a relation to something that satisfies that condition, and asks instead what is the condition, being physical, that everything satisfies or bears a relation to. Notice that a parallel question could be asked of Thales: what is the condition, being water, that according to Thales, everything satisfies?The completeness question asks:What relation or relations must obtain between everything and the physical if physicalism is to be true?In other words, the completeness question holds fixed the issue of what it means for something to be physical, and asks instead what relation or relations obtain between everything and the physical if physicalism is true; in what sense, in other words, is physicalism a complete thesis, a thesis that applies to everything whatsoever. Notice again that a parallel question could be asked of Thales: assuming we know what condition you have to satisfy to be water, what does it mean to say that everything satisfies that condition?Once again there is a sense in which the second question here presupposes an answer to the first — you need to know what it is for something to be physical in order to assess different proposals about the relation everything bears to the physical. Nevertheless, it is easier from a presentational point of view to discuss the completeness question first, leaving our answer to the condition question for the moment impressionistic, and that will be our procedure.2. The Completeness QuestionHow should we approach the completeness question? In the history of attempts to answer this question, people have tended to adopt one of two strategies. One appeals to (what philosophers call) modal notions, where a modal notion here means a notion connected to possibility and necessity, to what might or must be the case. Another appeals to non-modal notions, that is, notions distinct from ideas about possibility and necessity. There is a wide variety of such notions, though perhaps the most obvious one is identity in the logical sense, according to which if x is identical to y, then every property of x is a property of y. This notion has consequences for possibility and necessity, but it is not itself modal. Other non-modal notions include realization, or grounding, which we will consider below.In practice, most formulations of physicalism include both modal and non-modal elements at some level. Proponents of modal formulations often end up appealing to something non-modal in the course of elaborating and defending their view. Non-modal versions are usually interpreted so that they have the same modal consequences as modal versions. Nevertheless, the issue of whether to answer the completeness question by appealing to modal or non-modal ideas has proved as controversial as any in the literature on what physicalism is (for overviews, see Rabin 2020, Elpidorou 2018a, Tiehen 2018). In what follows, we will first look at an influential modal answer to the completeness question, which appeals to supervenience, and then turn to several non-modal alternatives.2.1 Supervenience and Necessity PhysicalismThe idea of supervenience has its origins in meta-ethics but was imported into philosophy of mind mainly by Davidson 1970; for a survey, see supervenience. For our purposes, the general idea might be introduced via an example due to David Lewis of a dot-matrix picture:A dot-matrix picture has global properties — it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, and whatnot — and yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there isn’t a dot (1986, p. 14).This gives us one way to think about the basic idea of physicalism. The basic idea is that the physical features of the world are like the dots in the picture, and the psychological or biological or social features of the world are like the global properties of the picture. Just as the global features of the picture supervene on the dots, so too everything supervenes on the physical, if physicalism is true.It is desirable to have a more explicit statement of physicalism, and here too Lewis’s example gives us direction. He says that, in the case of the picture, supervenience means that “no two pictures can be identical in the arrangement of dots but different in their global properties”. Similarly, one might say that, in the case of physicalism, no two possible worlds can be identical in their physical properties but differ, somewhere, in their mental, social or biological properties. To weaken this slightly, we might say that if physicalism is the case at our world – that is, is true of our universe and everything in it – then no other world can be physically identical to our world without being identical to it in all respects. This suggests the following general account of what physicalism is (in the following formulation and in subsequent ones, we use “iff” to abbreviate “if and only if”):(1)Physicalism is true at a possible world w iff any world which is a physical duplicate of w is a duplicate of w simpliciter.If physicalism is construed along the lines suggested in (1), we have an answer to the completeness question. The completeness question asks: what relation does everything bear to the physical if physicalism is true? According to (1), the answer is that everything must supervene on the physical; or, to put it more technically, there is no possible world which is identical to our world in every physical respect but which is not identical to it in a biological or social or psychological respect. It will be useful to have a name for physicalism so defined, so let us call it supervenience physicalism.Supervenience offers one modal formulation of physicalism, but it is worth taking note of a second modal formulation too. Suppose we say that a property G is necessitated by a property F just in case, in all possible worlds, if something is F then it is G; in this sense, for example, being red necessitates being colored, and being square necessitates having some extension in space. This suggests a formulation of physicalism along the following lines:(2)Physicalism is true at a possible world w iff every property instantiated at w is necessitated by a physical property.What is the relation between physicalism so defined, which we might call necessity physicalism, and supervenience physicalism? At least if necessitation is understood as a sort of entailment, then these are not equivalent; for discussion of this point, see supervenience. However, (1) and (2) are clearly similar, in particular they are modal formulations of physicalism. In what follows we will concentrate on supervenience physicalism, but what we will say will apply also to necessity physicalism.Supervenience physicalism was for many years the dominant version of physicalism; perhaps because of this, many different problems have been raised for it; some of these problems are discussed in the supplement on:Supervenience Physicalism: Further IssuesBut the most influential objection to supervenience physicalism (and to modal formulations generally) is what might be called the sufficiency problem. This alleges that, while (1) articulates a necessary condition for physicalism it does not provide a sufficient condition. The underlying rationale is that, intuitively one thing can supervene on another and yet be of a completely different nature. To use Fine’s famous (1994) example, consider the difference between Socrates and his singleton set, the set that contains only Socrates as a member. The facts about the set supervene on the facts about Socrates; any world that is like ours in respect of the existence of Socrates is like ours in respect of the existence of his singleton set. And yet the set is quite different from Socrates. This in turn raises the possibility that something might be of a completely different nature from the physical and nevertheless supervene on it.One may bring out this objection further by considering positions in philosophy which entail supervenience and yet deny physicalism. A good example is necessitation dualism, which is an approach that weaves together elements of both physicalism and its traditional rival, dualism. On the one hand, the necessitation dualist wants to say that mental facts and physical facts are metaphysically distinct—just as a standard dualist does. On the other hand, the necessitation dualist wants to agree with the physicalist that mental facts are necessitated by, and supervene on, the physical facts. If this sort of position is coherent, (1) does not articulate a sufficient condition for physicalism. For if necessitation dualism is true, any physical duplicate of the actual world is a duplicate simpliciter. And yet, if dualism of any sort is true, including necessitation dualism, physicalism is false.How to respond to the sufficiency problem? Some respond by denying the coherence of the position that causes the problem. Necessitation dualism as we have just described it violates (what is known as) Hume’s dictum that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. According to necessitation dualism, mental and physical properties are metaphysically distinct, and yet are necessarily connected. However, Hume’s dictum is itself a matter of controversy (see Jackson 1993, Stalnaker 1996, Stoljar 2010, and Wilson 2005, 2010). Another approach appeals to a priori physicalism which will examine below (see Jackson 2006). But by far the most common response has been to concede that the sufficiency problem shows that supervenience formulation of physicalism is too weak (e.g. Kim 1998), and to look for an alternative.2.2 Identity PhysicalismSuppose then that (1) provides a necessary condition for physicalism but not a sufficient condition; how might we strengthen it to make it more plausible? The most obvious thing to do is to appeal to identity. Indeed, in the history of attempts to answer the completeness question, the appeal to identity predates the appeal to supervenience. Nevertheless, this version of physicalism— identity physicalism as we may call it—runs into serious problems.2.2.1. Token PhysicalismIn fact there are two different versions of identity physicalism, type physicalism and token physicalism. Token physicalism is the view that every particular thing in the world is a physical particular. So the token physicalist says that physicalism should be formulated in the following way:(3)Physicalism is true at a possible world w iff for every particular (object, event or process) x that exists at w, there is some physical particular y such that x = yBut (3) offers neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for physicalism. To see that it is not sufficient, consider the variety of dualism usually called property dualism. Property dualism says that (a) every particular is a physical particular but (b) some particulars (e.g. human beings) have psychological properties wholly distinct from any physical properties. The contrast here is with substance dualism. The substance dualist agrees with the property dualist that some particulars have psychological properties wholly distinct from any physical properties, but they will add that such particulars are themselves non-physical.Token physicalism – physicalism according to (3) – is certainly inconsistent with substance dualism. Substance dualism entails that some particulars are non-physical, token physicalism denies it. But token physicalism is compatible with property dualism; indeed property dualism entails that token physicalism is true. On the other hand, property dualism is usually understood as being inconsistent with physicalism in any form. Hence token physicalism is not sufficient for physicalism.The problem that property dualism presents for token physicalism is noteworthy in several respects. For one thing, it is similar to the problem necessitarian dualism presents for supervenience physicalism, though necessitarian dualism can itself be developed either as a sort of property dualism or as a sort of substance dualism. For another thing, it brings out the important role properties rather than particulars play in the contemporary discussion of physicalism. If one ignores properties, the dispute between physicalism and dualism may easily be understood as the dispute between token physicalism and substance dualism; but once properties are factored in, things look very different.Not only does (3) not provide a sufficient condition for physicalism, it does not provide a necessary condition either. Consider a social or legal object such as the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. According to (3), if physicalism is true, there must be some physical object or particular for the court to be identical with. But intuitively, there is no such physical object. Nevertheless, physicalism might still be true. If so, token physicalism is not necessary for physicalism. (Notice here that there is no parallel problem for supervenience physicalism. It entails that the facts about court supervene on physical facts but not that there is any physical object that the court is identical with. For the classic presentation of this point, see Haugeland 1983).2.2.2. Type PhysicalismTurning now to type physicalism, this holds that every property (or at least every property instantiated in the actual world) is identical with some physical property. So the type physicalist supposes that physicalism should be formulated in the following way:(4)Physicalism is true at a possible world w iff every property instantiated at w is identical to a physical property.Unlike both token physicalism and supervenience physicalism, type physicalism is sufficient for physicalism: if every property instantiated in the actual world is identical with some physical property, then dualism will be false in any of the versions we have consideredHowever, while (4) provides a sufficient condition for physicalism, it does not provide a necessary condition. Consider again the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. If type physicalism is true, then every property that the court has (for example, having a legal power over lower courts) must be identical with some physical property. But on the face of it, that is unlikely. Nevertheless, physicalism might still be true. If so, type physicalism is not necessary for physicalism. (Notice again that there is no parallel problem for supervenience physicalism. It entails that the property having a legal power over lower courts supervenes on physical properties, not that it is identical with a physical property.)Another way to bring out the sense in which type physicalism is too strong for physicalism is to focus on the possibility of multiple realizability, as philosophers call it. This is roughly the idea that physically very different creatures can nevertheless share psychological properties; see multiple realizability. A major benefit of supervenience physicalism is that, as usually understood, it is consistent with this possibility. But type physicalism is often thought of as not consistent with it, at least if we focus on instantiated psychological properties. If so, type physicalism may be false while supervenience physicalism may be true.We have been assuming that supervenience physicalism is distinct from type physicalism. But it is worth noting that, there are ways to understand supervenience according to which this difference is less obvious. The reason for this has to do with questions concerning the logical (or Boolean) closure of the set of physical properties — if P, Q and R are physical properties, which of the various logical permutations of P, Q and R are likewise physical properties? On some assumptions concerning closure and supervenience, supervenience physicalism (construed as a necessary truth) entails type physicalism; on other assumptions, it doesn’t. But the problem is that the assumptions themselves are difficult to interpret and evaluate, and so the issue remains a difficult one. It is not necessary for our purposes to settle the question concerning closure here. (For further discussion of these issues see Kim 1993, Bacon 1990, Van Cleve 1990, Stalnaker 1996.)2.3 Realization PhysicalismOur discussion of the completeness question has so far yielded negative results: supervenience physicalism is too weak, type physicalism is too strong, and token physicalism is both too weak and too strong. What seems to be required is an approach that, like the modal formulations we started with, entails the supervenience of everything on the physical, but unlike them avoids the sufficiency problem. One prominent idea along these lines appeals to a relation between properties distinct from both identity and supervenience, usually called realization. As in the case of identity physicalism, there are two different versions of realization physicalism as we may call it; we will consider them in turn.2.3.1 Second-order PhysicalismThe first realization definition has been explored and defended in most detail by Andrew Melnyk (see Melnyk 2003 and the references therein). For Melnyk, a property F realizes a property G if and only if (a) G is identical to a second-order property, the property of having some property that has a certain causal or theoretical role; and (b) F is the property that plays the causal or theoretical role in question. We may call this notion ‘second-order realization’ to distinguish it from a different notion of realization to be considered in a moment. This suggests:(5)Physicalism is true at a possible world w iff every property instantiated at w is either a physical property or is second-order realized in a physical property.Suppose we call physicalism so defined second-order realization physicalism or second-order physicalism for short; what is the relation between it and supervenience physicalism? Supervenience physicalism does not entail second-order physicalism since the fact that a property F supervenes on a property G does not entail that F is a second-order property.Does second-order physicalism entail supervenience physicalism? The usual assumption is that it does, but, as Melnyk himself notes at one point (2003, p. 23), there is an issue here having to do with the definition of a second-order property, the property of having some property that has a certain causal or theoretical role. What are the properties involved in spelling out these causal or theoretical roles? If physicalism is true at all, it must be true of these properties as much as any other properties. But then by second-order physicalism, these properties themselves will be either physical or realized by physical properties. If the first option is taken, the second-order physicalist will stand revealed as holding a version of identity physicalism (one level up, as it were), and thus will face the multiple realization objection. If the second option is taken, the second-order physicalist looks committed to an infinite regress, since now we have further properties realized by physical properties and, correlatively, further causal or theoretical roles. To avoid the regress, the second-order physicalist might say that these properties supervene on or are identical to physical properties. But now it hard to see the difference between the realization physicalist and these other doctrines. (For some further discussion of this issue, see Elpidorou 2018a.)2.3.2 Subset PhysicalismThe second realization definition of physicalism has been developed by Wilson 1999, 2011 and Shoemaker 2007. On this view, a property F realizes a property G if and only if (a) G has some set of causal powers or features S; (b) F has some set of causal powers or features S*; and (c) S is a subset of S*. (We may call this notion ‘subset realization’ to distinguish it from the different notion of realization just considered.) This suggests:(6)Physicalism is true at a possible world w iff every property instantiated at w is either a physical property or is subset realized in a physical property.Suppose we call physicalism so defined subset realization physicalism or subset physicalism for short; what is the relation between it and supervenience physicalism? Supervenience physicalism does not entail subset physicalism since the fact that a property G supervenes on a property F does not entail anything about their causal powers. For example, if causation is a macro-phenomenon as some philosophers have held it to be, it may be that F has no causal powers at all, while G does.Does subset realization physicalism entail supervenience physicalism? Well, there is a problem here too having to do with (what is sometimes called) a causal theory of properties, that is, a theory according to which the causal powers or features that a property bestows on the things that have it are exhaustive of the nature of that property. Suppose that a causal theory is false. Then, in principle, one property might subset realize another and yet be quite different from it in nature. And this in turn suggests that subset physicalism does not by itself entail supervenience physicalism. Of course, one might respond by asserting that the causal theory is true. But to do that is controversial; indeed, even those philosophers who hold both a subset model and a causal theory want to separate out these two commitments (e.g. Shoemaker 2007; see also Wilson 2011). Alternatively, one might respond by denying that physicalism entails supervenience in the first place, by saying that “lack of … supervenience is compatible with physicalism” (Wilson 2014, 255, see also Wilson 2011). But this too is controversial; as we saw above, most philosophers assume that supervenience is necessary for physicalism. Hence the status of the subset approach remains controversial.