请将“The abolition of guild privileges meant the privatisation of labour relations. Conflicts were no longer now between the holders of various rights, but rather between owners and non-owners of means of production and manufacturing permits; they were no longer the affair of a corporation, but a private labour relationship. The courts in this connection, too, were no longer places where holders of various rights encountered each other formally. After the Revolution, therefore, the number of such court cases fell dramatically. The Revolution, as Michael Sonenscher writes,115 changed the institutional context in which labour relations were based and developed. From now on, there were no longer set wages that had to be adhered to by all masters of a guild, no rights to definite meal breaks and to certain forms of mutual respect between guild members. Or, rather, wherever claims of this kind still persisted after the Revolution, they had to be made by journeymen and apprentices outside of the corporate context. As William M. Reddy has shown, the ‘rights' of workers in the productive process had still not been completely abolished in practice even at the end of the nineteenth century, and capitalists still had to struggle to assert their power of command over the production process;116 but, already in 1791, the conditions for such disputes fundamentally altered. This change was expressed in linguistic usage. Before the Revolution, there had been much talk of freedom and the refusal to be treated as slaves, but after the Revolution, the discourse of solidarity spread. For, after the dissolution of the forms of property of the ancien régime, it was workers' solidarity that formed the basis for their pursuit of common interests. For this reason, the combinations of the nineteenth century - which had been made illegal already by the loi Le Chapelier of 1791 - were not just a continuation of those of the eighteenth century, but were combinations of interests in opposition to the similar combinations of masters (also illegal under the same law). The so-called rixes, battles among workers that the police reports of the first decades of the new century are full of, make clear how even competition between workers had been ‘deregulated'. When Agricol Perdiquer, known as Avignonais Le Vertu, called on his fellow workers to leave off such battles - which had become an obligatory ritual - and instead struggle together for work and bread,117 he still found little response. Only after the mid-century, in changed economic conditions, did modern forms of representation of interest replace the cudgels and fists that workers had wielded against one another.
Many authors equate the abolition of seigneurie with the abolition of collec-tive peasant usufruct.118 But collective peasant usufruct was a major exception from the principle of absolute private property, with long-term structural effects, being certainly a property in the form of privilege. There were indeed landowners who sought the abolition of collective rights. A decree of 5-12 June 1791 claimed - wrongly in terms of legal theory, but instructive precisely for that reason - that the territory of France was as free as the individuals who inhabited it.119 It was in this way that the revolutionaries founded their commitment to the ‘emancipation' of land from the ‘un-freedoms' imposed on it under the ancien régime, so that the freed land could be transferred to the free disposal of free individuals. In fact, however, there were even many deputies in the National Assembly who hesitated about making such a radical intervention in the rural social structure. The law of 1791 (28 September/ 6 October) also retained the rights of vaine pâture and parcours. Although it was not just landowners, but also peasants who mainly cultivated their own land, who were opposed to general pasturage and droving rights, these collective peasant rights remained protected by law for a further hundred years. In 1791, the free power of disposal over property in land was only established by law in so far as owners were allowed to enclose their land (and in this way restrict peasant usufruct by an additional investment), have their own cattle graze separately from the common herd, and depart from the locally established rotation of crops. None of these freedoms, however, was implemented in practice right away.
The question of common land was particularly contested. In principle, there were to be no more mixed property rights, and former common land was thus to be privatised. It was initially decided in 1792 that common land which seigneurs had appropriated should be returned to the community. The Constituent Assembly could not agree however on the appropriate way to make this 'partition'. In many places, peasants undertook the partition them-selves. Finally, in June 1793, the Assembly decided that common land should be divided up if at least a third of the villagers were in favour. For a long time, this law was seen by historians as the origin of the reinforcement of small peasant agriculture. In actual fact, however, as P.M. Jones sums up more recent research,120 only a small part of common land was divided. The partage was left incomplete, writes Jones, because it was really in nobody's interest. The better-off peasants feared losing cheap labour-power if poor peasant families received enough land for them to reproduce themselves without wagelabour. Poor peasants, for their part, found that a small and isolated parcel of land was little use to them, and finally the partage presupposed that there were alternative grazing opportunities. The end result, according to Jones, was that, after the Revolution, even more peasants enjoyed collective usufruct rights than before.121
One key part of the appropriation structure of the ancien régime thus remained in place. It enabled even those peasants who had not received any 'national goods' to continue reproducing themselves as peasants. In many regions of France, the social structures of peasant society remained intact from the late eighteenth century until the Great War;122 everywhere, practices of self-sufficiency only gradually declined in the course of the nineteenth century. By defending their collective rights, both those formally guaranteed and those formally annulled, peasants set limits to strategies of agricultural mod-ernisation. To this extent they played a part in the emergence of the social type of the landowning notable (often noble) of the early nineteenth century. By making strategies of capitalisation more difficult, they confirmed in their own way the self-consciousness of the notables that they were eminent lords - in the traditional sense - and that income from landownership was still something quite other than income from other kinds of business.
The Revolution established the private character of property and the objec-tive structure of economic relations between persons, but only in principle and not completely. Taken as a whole, however, a separation of economics and politics can be maintained. The reduction of rule to politics and to paid activity separated the state from society.
d.	Emperor, king and notables:
the French constitution of the bourgeois state
When Napoleon became emperor, he surrounded himself with a court, and his court ceremonial included the ruler's traditional lever. There was also a new stratum of nobles. When the Allies sent Napoleon off to Elba, and appointed Louis XVI's brother as king (the dauphin having died in childhood), this Louis XVIII had the palace of Versailles restored and proclaimed he was king by the grace of God. William Crawford, the American ambassador in Paris, saw all this as ridiculous pretence.123 But, even after the hiatus in his reign caused by Napoleon's temporary return to power, Louis XVIII continued to present himself as a king of the ancien régime. He had scrofula patients brought before him to lay hands on as befitted a French king.124 But no more than Napoleon restored personal rule125 did the Allies restore the monarchical rule of the Bourbons after Napoleon's final defeat.
No king of the ancien régime, not even Louis XIV, had anything like as much power as Napoleon. Napoleon was in a position - for a time - to command the public power of ‘the nation' and make use of a state apparatus that had been formed by the Revolution as an instrument of government. The structure of the centralised administrative state arose from the revolutionary destruction of all intermediate powers, and from the prevailing practice, since the Directory, of using the administration as an instrument for the regulation of the political public. This political instrumentalisation of the administrative apparatus made it possible for senior state officials to construct a position for themselves that protected them against political changes. When Napoleon fell, the administration remained. Since the politically influential strata of society long tried to prevent the practice of state power being subject to the control of a broad public, state officials were able to appropriate considerable competence of definition over their own practice in office. The roots of the French nomenklatura, as Alexander Wickham and Sophie Coignard describe the present-day stratum of top administrators,126 grew out of the French form of bourgeois revolution.”翻译为中文