请将“Although the king still individually possessed the means of centralised power, he was now far more clearly than before appealed to as the represen-tative of generalised estate interests. This however signalled, unnoticed by most politically active contemporaries, new conditions for the development of monarchical rule.
It was something else that was more immediately apparent: the enthusiastic acceptance of what a contemporary critic called ‘the bells and tinsel, the outward pomp and gilding' of monarchy.280 The court formed once more the centre of politics, a source of wealth and, above all, of status. Charles II promoted the arts, and both post-revolutionary Stuart kings promoted their courtiers. It is true that the loss of feudal revenues, in particular wardships, removed a considerable part of their power of patronage, but this was made up for by pensions and the granting of newly created offices, not least in the army. The material participation of a section of the dominant estates (albeit a small section) in centralised appropriation rose after the Revolution by way of pensions, offices, and (high) interest on loans which was now paid more regularly than previously.281
This material - and thus, at the same time, the political - consolidation of the Res-toration was finally stabilised by the profits of foreign trade in the 1680s. After the Revolution and the Interregnum, taxes had remained high. The ‘hearth tax' affected everyone with the exception of the very poor. The same held for the excise, granted for special expenses. Since, however, such duties were chiefly extracted from town-dwellers, the politically dominant landed nobility were to a large extent dispensed from financing the monarchy. For many among the less well-off noble families, indeed, taxes reached a critical level. Typical however is the profit that others drew from the increased financial opportunities of the crown. In 1692, an agricultural tax was introduced that, according to Clay, temporarily abolished (!) the structural privileging of the landed nobility in the system of financing the centralised power.282 This situ-ation, however, already happened under the new conditions of the English crown's power politics in foreign affairs, to which we shall return.
Charles II, by renouncing wars, and still more so James II, had built up the financial strength of the crown in a way that only Henry VIII had previously managed by appropriation of the church. This made possible, for the first time, the creation of a standing army. Dedicated to ensuring the king's independence at home, Charles II established his standing army already in 1661 in place of the dissolved army of the Interregnum. In part, soldiers and officers of the New Model Army were re-engaged, but the king's army was composed above all of those officers and rank and file who had served him in exile and fought against Spain in Flanders, as well as royalists who had remained in England during the Interregnum. There were initially nine regiments, and even in 1684 the army counted only 6,000 men - according to John Childs.283 But, by 1688, i.e. after the Monmouth rebellion, Angus McInnes assesses its strength as 40,000.284 Further regiments were raised for special purposes, for deployment in the colonies and in foreign wars, these being paid not from the crown's regular income but from special financial provisions granted by Parliament. During Charles Il's reign, three such expansions were decided, each time without any conflict with Parliament.285 It was not royal command of military force that aroused opposition, but simply the maintenance of a standing army in time of peace.286
On closer examination, however, the standing army of the later Stuarts proves to have been only a small policing force that was not very impressive in military terms. Such experience in the field as its officers and men had had was either in Flanders during the exile of the subsequent Charles II, or as mercenaries in foreign armies.287 In comparison with the New Model Army, the possible military efficiency of the king's regiments was limited not only by the low level of discipline of the soldiers and their lack of training, but above all by the fact that the army had to satisfy demands of patronage. Gentlemen could expect in it not only a career, but also considerable income from the provision of recruits and the sale of subordinate positions. For many of them, their sole qualification for these posts was their social origin.
The army of the late Stuarts was a poorly disciplined ‘instrument' of royal power with a weak professional structure. In combination with the militia units, however, it was sufficient to combat disturbances across the country. We should also note however that the military resources of the late Stuarts bore no comparison with those of other contemporary European rulers; even those of Charles I had been far superior.
There was also an extension and above all an improvement in royal admin-istration. Offices still remained the personal possession of their incumbents, and although there were no formal rules of inheritance in England for the transmission of offices, de facto dynasties of office-holders did develop none the less. Since, under the Restoration, the highest government offices were extraordinarily well endowed, they were also highly prized by the nobility. A systematic development of techniques of administration and control is none the less apparent - above all for the Treasury. In assessing the crown's means of domination, these must be given considerable weight. For, with the aid of the new machinery of government, it became possible to more than balance the loss of income that the crown had suffered with the ending of feudal dues. It was above all the new tax administration and the practice of direct levying of customs duties that helped raise the income of the late Stuart kings to unprecedented levels. The most important power-political foundations of monarchical strength - military resources and financial endowment - were thus considerably increased in the first decades of the Restoration against those of the pre-Revolutionary period.
In other areas, however, the crown had to accept permanent concessions, even if these were in no way decisive. Thus the highest church court, the court of High Commission, was abolished, and in the counties rule over church matters devolved largely on the local nobility (cf. Chapter 3, section b). James II did indeed call the court of High Commission back to life. Yet this revision of a decision that was generally regarded as a lasting achievement of the 1640s signalled a royal coup d'état in religious affairs, an injury to those limitations of personal rule that had been implemented after the Revolution. Though James could enforce this, it strengthened ill-feeling towards him.
The Restoration monarchs did accept a limitation of the Privy Council's penal powers. But this did not fundamentally curtail their personal judicial authority. It was not just that the Privy Council used the prerogative to order imprisonment on the basis of a very broad interpretation of high treason.288 Helped by their right to appoint and dismiss judges, the kings also intervened directly in ongoing legal cases. Thus in 1686 James II dismissed no less than six judges in a single case (Godden versus Hales), in order to reach the verdict he wanted.289 Since officials continued to be direct servants of the king, and only continued in office ‘during his pleasure', the king still had the ‘state apparatus' at his disposal.
From 1660 to 1688, the English kings had more power at their command than did their predecessors. This was materially assured because both 
Charles II and James II at the start of their respective reigns were granted crown income for their lifetime. In this way, Parliament surrendered its most important political leverage. Politically, the restored and expanded royal supremacy was founded on a fear of renewed unrest and the endangering of estate domination. Within the public sphere, there was indeed criticism of certain forms of rule, but political discourse was dominated by the view that the crown's prerogative was the most important guarantee of a hierarchically well-ordered society and the protection of property. This secular foundation was embedded in a conception of divine right which joined providence with legal succession. Since strict maintenance of succession ruled out any idea of a choice of authority by the people or its representatives, the champions of this view - in the logic of their political self-conception - were held in obedience to their king even when James II proved to be a member of the Catholic church and responded to the demands of Parliament by dissolving it.
The events of 1688-9 shook the pillars of this political discourse. They poured scorn on the combination of estate domination and divine right. The unconditional - at least passive - obedience to the king that was claimed as the basis of political stability came to an end when the Whigs ‘invited' William of Orange to defend the Church of England and the freedom of the English people. When William landed with an army and James fled the country, the Tories saw themselves forced for the sake of political stability to come to terms with a king who ruled de facto, but not by right. Many of them saw this as a circumstance that could only be given temporary approval, and even outside the ‘political nation' restricted by estate, many women and men still retained their allegiance to the departed king and later to the house of Stuart. Conversely, there was neither enthusiasm for the new foreign monarch nor any hope for the dawn of a new age. The events of 1688-9 did not take place in the context of a revolutionary public. There was no revolutionary drama, but rather - initially - nothing more than a political break, which the politically active members of the ruling estates largely sought to master within their own ranks.
Even those who had pursued this break were concerned to conceal its scope. They stressed the continuity of the ‘old constitution', and collaborated in maintaining the fiction of legal succession, in so far as the royal rule was conveyed jointly on William III (from the house of Orange) and Mary II (from the house of Stuart). 
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