write some discussion questions to ask the professor in class, appointing the below reading:

JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS 
Politics of Great Powers and Great Power Politics 
........................................................................................................ 
MING WAN 
IT is almost a truism for students of Asian international relations that Japan's relation
ship with China is a critical shaping force for the region and the world. The topic has 
rightly attracted much attention from scholars and policy analysts. We have learned 
much about this relationship, but as in all relationships, there are always new develop
ments, so updated analysis is needed. New events and trends may also make one aware 
of potential weaknesses in previous analyses. As those who have followed a bilateral 
relationship for a long period of time know, there is yet another way to write a new piece 
about the topic, which is to look at it from a different angle. 
EXPLAINING JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS 
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 
This chapter advances a central thesis about Japan's China policy: Japan's current China 
policy is a crucial part of an evolving political process of reasserting its autonomy under 
fast-changing circumstances at home and abroad. Politics dominates the Japan-China 
relationship, as much now as in the past, and this chapter focuses on the politics of the 
Japan-China relationship, specifically the dynamic between the domestic politics of 
these two great powers. To narrow the topic down even further, the chapter focuses pri
marily on Japan's domestic politics: China's domestic politics will come into the picture 
mainly as perceived in Japan. 
Governments have to manage on both the domestic and international fronts. A rivalry, 
by definition, is about power and status. Japan has reasserted itself and adopted a realist 
grand strategy (Pyle 2007; Samuels 2007; Smith 2019; Katada 2020), but the great 
power balance continues to tilt toward China, which surpassed Japan as the world's 
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MING WAN 
second-largest economy in 2010. China has become even more assertive since the 
Great Recession, particularly since President Xi Jinping came to power. While some 
Japanese are willing to accept a comfortable coexistence, many do feel that Japan 
should reassert itself as a great power and stand up to China. No more apologies and no 
more concessions. 
Those who are familiar with Japanese politics emphasize shifting public sentiment in 
Japan to explain its shifting China policy. The negative Japanese view of China began 
with the Tiananmen incident in 1989, and it has continued to decline, as shown in polls 
repeatedly and consistently. Japanese sentiment toward China has now sunk to the bottom. 
The Japanese public and media that are negative about China closely scrutinize their 
government's handling of China policy, thus constraining how much it can cooperate 
with Beijing, and some nationalist politicians have also stoked Japanese emotions 
toward China to advance their political agendas. 
There used to be detailed studies of the so-called "pipes;' or influential go-betweens 
shuttling between Tokyo and Beijing. The old pipes typically had extensive experience 
living and working in the partner country and had a strong sense of cultural affinity. 
Informal actors continue to matter, but a generational change and a societal shift against 
China have diminished their influence. In their place arose bureaucratic players like 
Shotaro Yachi, who have assisted political leaders like Shinz6 Abe and helped orchestrate a 
hard-nosed realist strategy dealing with China (Pugliese 2017). 
I have argued previously (Wan 2016a, 3-22) that while structural features such as 
balance of power and political regime gaps are important, foreign policy management 
better explains the twists and turns in Japan-China relations. Put simply, how the 
Japanese and Chinese governments 
their relationship, whether to emphasize 
the negative or the positive, is important. Rather than simply attributing everything to 
structure, however, we can turn that argument on its head and see how some major 
events can transform the structure of a bilateral relationship (Wan 2016b). My argument 
has been partly influenced by what I have observed in Japan, particularly regarding the 
Chinese fishing boat collision incident in 2010. 
That incident was about territorial disputes that had direct security implications for 
both countries. Like the other lasting issues of contention between Beijing and Tokyo, 
the territorial disputes were not new (Pugliese and Insisa 2017, 43-56). What was new, 
however, was how the two sides so badly managed the accident and turned it into a crisis 
because of changing domestic' politics and the international environment. On the 
Japanese side, the fact that the Democratic Party of Japan (OPJ) was inexperienced as a 
ruling party and the Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) was inexperienced as an opposi
tion party (and the fact the recent reforms had weakened bureaucracy vis-a-vis political 
leaders) meant that the Naoto Kan government chose to try the Chinese captain in a 
Japanese court as a domestic law and order issue, diverging from past diplomatic practice 
(Wan 2016a, 23-48). 
By contrast, Beijing viewed the issue very much as involving its claim to the disputed 
islands near which the incident took place. They chose to force Tokyo to release the 
JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS 
835 
Chinese captain by using strong countermeasures. He was released, which humiliated 
the Japanese and confirmed their feared reassertion of Chinese arrogance and efforts to 
dominate Japan. The OPJ government worsened the situation by nationalizing Oiaoyu/ 
Senkakus in September 2012. In response, the Chinese government sent in government 
patrol boats to establish an official presence in the disputed area. The risk of military 
conflict grew sharply, and the Japan-China relationship deteriorated to its worst position 
since 1952. 
POLITICS OF JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS 
................................................. " ............................................................................................................................... .. 
In a maturing and welcome trend, students of Japan-China relations are often turning 
to more focused studies (e.g., Lai 2014; Mitter 2013). This makes sense, because Japan
China ties have expanded so much and in such complex ways that one has to look at 
specific time periods, aspects, and cases. At the same time, broader studies continue to 
be published, situating current narrow issues and problems within the larger context 
(Oreyer 2016; Fogel 2009; Vogel 2019; Yang et a1. 2012). Ezra Vogel and June Teufel 
Oreyer, in particular, have provided comprehensive coverage of Japan-China interac
tions over the past millenniums, recognizing the autonomous Chinese and Japanese 
identities forged over such a long time. But they differ in their assessment of historical 
Japan-China relations. Oreyer argues that current Japan-China disputes reflect an 
underlying rivalry stretching back a thousand years. By contrast, Vogel maintains that 
peace and cooperation were the norms in Japan-China relations for the past 1,500 years. 
I am closer to Vogel in this basic historical assessment. At the very least, China and 
Japan, for much of their bilateral history, were neither intimate partners nor rivals, 
borroWing Sheila Smith's words in her book title Intimate Rivals (2015). 
China's main security concern in ancient history was conSistently the challenge from 
the nomads or semi-nomads from the north and northwest. The Chinese have learned 
from that long experience that there are forces that they simply cannot control and just 
have to live with (Wan 2012). Japan has also learned a bitter lesson from its imperial 
adventure just seventy-five years ago. Moreover, disputes also redefine the nature of a 
bilateral relationship. Even in the modern era, there has been both cooperation and con
tention (Iriye 1992). Kokubun et a1. (2017) and Takahara and Hattori (2012) have also 
demonstrated a complex relationship between the two since 1952. 
Studies of Japan-China relations often reflect the saliency of the main issues and 
trends in the real word. Akira Iriye (1992) divided the modern Japan-China relationship 
into three periods. The first period lasted from the 1880s to World War I, defined by a 
struggle for power. The second period occurred between the two world wars and was 
characterized by cultural exchange and internationalism. The third period, which began 
after the end of World War 11, was dominated by economic issues. Iriye added that the 
economic nature of their relationship in the third period was also connected to cultural 
r 
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MINGWAN 
JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS 
I 
interdependence, which may shape the future of their relationship. Power, culture, and 
economics, needless to say, were present in all three periods and interacted with each 
other, as also recognized by lriye. At the same time, the "spirit of the time" dictates 
research agenda. 
If one sees history in a cyclical fashion, one could suggest that a struggle for power 
should be the logical next stage of the relationship, beginning a new cycle. But history is 
not that simple, and the fact is that a power struggle and security concerns have indeed 
resurfaced to dominate the discourse on Japan-China relations. 
What has stood out for the past decade is the prominence of security-centric studies, 
a sharp departure from mainstream analysis in the 1990S, which focused on diplomacy, 
economics, culture, and history. Most academic works at the time barely mentioned 
security, despite the fact that it was an issue in the real world. Chinese thinkers were 
worried about Japan becoming a military power throughout this period, particularly 
after Japan began adopting stronger security measures because of American pressure 
after the First Persian Gulf War. Some Japanese authors also began writing alarming 
stories about an emerging Chinese security threat. One can be excused for not focusing 
on bilateral security issues at the time, however, because there were few official 
exchanges or disputes between the two countries in the security arena. In some way, 
Japan's security posture was obscured, sometimes deliberately, by the US-Japan alliance. 
On the Japanese side, there was also an academic aversion to all things related to national 
security because ofjapan's past aggression. 
Geopolitics and security now dominate the Japanese discourse about China, how
ever, in light of China's dramatic rise. As a close neighbor acutely interested in China's 
development, Japan (including mainstream media, the policy community, business 
groups, and the public) arguably came to realize the significance of China's rise earlier 
than the United States, which was reflected in academic writing. While I focus on 
English-language studies ofJapanese thinking at that time, one should be aware of the 
far larger number ofjapanese publications about China and Japan-China relations. 
It is now common to see books about Japan-China relations alluding to China's rise. 
For example, Lam Peng Er sought to organize the contributing chapters in his edited 
volume Japans Relations with China: Pacing a Rising Power (Lam 2006) around a common 
theme of "a rising China versus a stagnating Japan:' Some observers have suggested that 
a Japan-China rivalry arose from the basic fact that a mountain cannot sustain two tigers. 
However, a power struggle does not automatically translate into hostility. Indeed, the 
chapters in Lam's volume advanced multiple themes, as befitting a complex relationship 
between two ancient nations. 
Chinese government not raising diplomatic issues over history, a "deep reconciliation" 
was clearly not achieved. Yinan He (2009, 17) defined the term as combining "shared 
expectation of no war;' "full national recognition;' "comprehensive and smooth 
economic interaction:' and "harmonious mutual feeling:' 
There have been domestic and international reasons for this lack of a deep reconcilia
tion compared to more positive cases such as Germany and Poland, as He discussed. 
With a postwar generation now in charge, many Japanese have become fatigued with 
history issues. They criticize China and South Korea, which are not innocent them
selves, for playing the history card to put Japan in its place. All along, there have been 
powerful revisionist social and political forces reSisting official apologies and compen
sations for victims oOapan's past aggression (Cheung 2017). Prime Minister Abe, for 
example, came from the Nobusuke Kishi lineage ideologically and organizationally, 
with a strong revisionist perspective. The Kishi line wanted to end what they viewed as 
the humiliating "post-war regime:' revise the American-written constitution, reverse 
the verdict ofthe Tokyo Tribunal, introduce patriotic education against what right-wing 
nationalists view as masochistic behavior among the Japanese, and restore Japan as a 
normal great power (Hughes 2015, 8-27). What is different now in Japan is that revision
ist views have gained much ground, and a revisionist politician like Abe became the 
longest-serving Japanese prime minister (Abe resigned in August 2020 because of 
health issues). 
China played a role in Abe's electoral success. Standing up to China scores political 
points in Japan, and Abe was viewed as Japan's best option on that score. Japan's attitudes 
toward China have hardened as Japan has shifted from a position of strength to that of 
While power competition is important, Japan-China relations have their own logic 
and rhythms. Heightened tensions during the years of Prime Minister Koizumi over 
historical issues paved the way for greater tensions in later years, despite the few years of 
improved ties from 2007 to 2010. While there appeared to be an unspoken 
shared interest in having a diplomatic truce over the disputes over history-Japanese 
prime ministers refraining from visiting Yasukuni Shinto Shrine in exchange for the 
weakness and dependence on China. In fact, China's influence is growing across East 
Asia. The package for deep reconciliation He argued for includes comprehensive eco
nomic interaction and harmonious ties, but that can also cause resentment. Familiarity 
breeds contempt. As Sheila Smith (201S) has shown, the Japanese view China largely 
through their lived daily experiences rather than as an abstract theory of great powers 
rising and falling. Chinese actions and influence have profoundly affected Japanese 
domestic politicS, which in turn has helped shape its China policy. For those with little 
prior knowledge of the history of the Japan-China relationship, the two countries may 
seem to be integrating economically and culturally. But those familiar with the history 
will see that both countries want to maintain their own national identities, and that a 
backlash is emerging. 
A rivalry had already emerged by the mid-2000s between the second- and third
largest economies in the world, which was bound to have a profound and unpredictable 
impact on the Asia Pacific region and the world (Yahuda 2013). Thus, another feature in 
academic studies, besides the current centrality of security issues discussed previously, 
is the growing centralityofjapan-China relations in sophisticated analyses of East Asian 
international relations (e.g., Chan 2012; Sun 2012). This chapter focuses on narrower 
academic studies ofjapan-China relations to avoid overlaps with some other chapters in 
this handbook. 
838 
MING WAN 
The Japan-China relationship has been on a slow, steady upswing since mid-2017, 
when Prime Minister Abe sent his number two figure in the LDP, Toshihiro Nikai, to 
attend the Belt and Road Forum on International Cooperation in Beijing in May. Abe 
asked Nikai, known to be friendly toward China, to hand a personal letter to President 
Xi. The Japanese government expressed its cautious willingness to cooperate with 
China related to the BRI, and that positive visit laid the foundation for a meeting 
between Abe and Xi on the sidelines of the G20 summit held in Argentina in 
November 2017. Abe himself traced the start of improvement in relations to that meet
ing. Taking another step toward stabilizing relations, Premier Li Keqiang paid a suc
cessful visit to Japan in May 2018. The improvement is reflected in resumed mutual 
high-level exchanges and positive comments from political leaders and officials in 
both countries, which are typical indicators of the status of their diplomatic relation
ship. Abe visited Beijing in October 2018, the first official visit from a Japanese prime 
minister in seven years, and he visited again for the Japan-China-Korea summit in 
December 2019. This improvement in relations was recognized in Japan, China, and 
the United States. The two sides have also been preparing for a state visit by Xi to Japan 
in spring 2020. It was reported in early January 2020 that a fifth political document
following the Japan-China Joint Statement of 1972, the Japan-China Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship of 1978, the Japan-China Joint Statement of 1998, and a joint statement 
advancing relations in 2008-would be signed during Xi's visit, and that the drafting 
process would begin later in the month. That visit was postponed, however, due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
The improvement in relations is a change from the worsening relationship from late 
2011 to 2017. This bilateral relationship has its own dynamic and rhythm: it has been 
cyclical since 1972, with upswings getting shorter and shallower and downswings longer 
and deeper (Wan 2006, 11-44). The bilateral relationship should experience a rebound 
after high tensions from 2011 to 2017. Japan's recent and upcoming agenda-its hosting 
of the G-20 summit in Osaka in June 2019, Japanese Emperor Naruhito's enthronement 
in October 2019, Xi's state visit to Japan in Spring 2020, and Tokyo's hosting of the Olympics 
in July-August 2020 (postponed in March 2020 for a year due to the COVID-19 
pandemic)-seems to reflect at the very least a superficially calm relationship between 
Tokyo and Beijing. 
Similar to ups and downs in other bilateral relationships, however, each upswing or 
downswing in Japan-China ties' has distinct features and driving forces. Improved 
Japan-China relations at the present stand out both from a historical and comparative 
perspective. From a historical perspective, the improvement has been modest and 
unspectacular. This is to be expected, because the downswing before this modest 
improvement was about national security, which made it different from previous peri
ods of tensions, and therefore much more consequential. But what appears peculiar is 
the emot.ional calm exhibited by the Japanese public and elites, a sharp departure from 
recent Japanese attitudes. None of the thorny bilateral issues-history, territorial disputes, 
and competition for regional influence-have been resolved. Thus, recent improvements 
are based on a fragile foundation. 
JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS 
The recent improvement in relations between Tokyo and Beijing also stands out in 
comparison with the sharp decline in US-China relations and heightened tensions 
between Japan and South Korea. It is difficult to chart precisely the shape ofTapan-China 
relations vis-a-vis other bilateral relationships, but it is reasonable to see a sort of rever
sal of China's relationships with Japan and the United States, with the former a lot worse 
than the latter until 2017. With Donald Trump in the White House, the U.S.-China rela
tionship deteriorated sharply, particularly following the trade war that started in March 
2018. With other hardline measures adopted by the United States, and the Chinese 
government's refusal to concede on fundamental issues related to its sovereignty and 
political economy system, the relationship began falling off a cliff. In contrast to the 
American government's bipartisan hardening line on China, Prime Minister Abe (2019) 
gave his own version of the State of the Union speech on January 28, 2019, striking a 
positive and optimistic tone for Japan's relations with China. 
"With my visit to China in autumn last year, Japan-China relations were fully returned 
to their normal path. We will elevate the relationship between Japan and China to a new 
stage, deepening mutual exchanges between the people of the two countries, in every 
field such as politics, the economy, culture, sports and youth exchanges, based on the 
principle with three following points, which I confirmed with President Xi Jinping as a 
guiding post: from competition to collaboration under the international standards; not 
being threats to each other; developing together a free and fair trade system:' 
It would be difficult to imagine a leading political leader in the United States making 
such remarks about China in the current political atmosphere. This book has a separate 
chapter on Japan-South Korean relations, so there is no need to address the disputes in 
that relationship. But they are clearly not driven by balance-of-power considerations. 
One immediate cause often cited for improved relations between China and Japan is 
the presence of strong leaders in both countries. Xi became CCP general secretary on 
November 15, 2012, and China's president on March 14, 2013. He now arguably ranks 
among the strongest leaders of the People's Republic of China, along with Mao Zedong 
and Deng Xiaoping. Abe became prime minister for the second time on December 26, 
2012, and he was the longest-serving Japanese prime minister at the time he resigned. 
Abe's second stint as prime minister resulted partly from a public desire for a stable 
leader in Japan, because there was a great deal of concern about indecisive leaders. 
The end of the Cold War led to a chain reaction in Japanese domestic politics, including 
a more powerful role for the prime minister. As RobertPekkanen and Ellis S. Krauss (2005, 
444) have argued, "the end of the Cold War diminished domestic party cleavages, making 
possible the coalition governmentthat passed the electoral reform, which in turn strength
ened and expanded the role of the prime minister, allowing for the further diminution of 
the '55-system cleavages:' Under Abe, the influence of the Prime Minister's Office (the 
Kantei) has risen. He has also strengthened the prime minister's hand by engaging in polit
icized personnel appointments and demotions in the bureaucracy (Shinoda 2017). 
Both politically strong, Abe and Xi had a mutual interest in avoiding a worsening 
bilateral relationship that would damage their domestic and foreign policy agendas. We 
readily recall how the strong leaders Mao Zedong and Kakuei Tanaka normalized 
, 
840 
MINGWAN 
JAPAN -CHINA RELATIONS 
diplomatic relations during one visit in '972. Xi faces a domestic challenge of economic 
slowdown, growing opposition abroad to his signature project, the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), and the COVID-19 pandemic. Abe also had to achieve economic per
formance at home and deal with the North Korean nuclear threat and kidnapping issue, 
which required Beijing's cooperation. 
I am not suggesting that strong leadership is a sufficient condition for a stable rela
tionship with another country. As a case in point, Xi's strong leadership is viewed as a 
key reason why hardIiners in the United States are pushing back on Beijing.1 Why the 
difference? One explanation is the different identities held by average japanese and 
Americans. For most japanese, China is China, and the nature of its political regime is 
secondary even though the Abe government used the language of "open, free and rule
based" for his vision of international relations to differentiate japan from China for 
leverage in the international community. When China replaced japan as the number 
two economy in the world in 2010, it caused much concern in japan, but not nearly as 
much as the current fear in the American policy community of being overtaken by 
China. But I do argue, based on the evidence from japan-China relations in recent 
decades, that strong leadership is a necessary condition for a stable relationship between 
the two Asian great powers. 
The current stability between the two countries, albeit at a lower level, also has much 
to do with the kind ofleadership that exists in japan and China. Abe and Xi are both 
from established political families, and both are conservative when viewed in their 
respective national contexts. Unlike Trump, there was a desire by Abe and Xi to expand 
their political influence in the region, but not as disrupters. 
Abe was arguably as worried about China as before, but he apparently wanted to keep 
more options open for japan, which is a wise diplomatic choice under any circumstance. He 
therefore continued his cautious and pragmatic approach toward strengthening japan's 
defense ability. In fact, a key ruling coalition committee approved japan's new defense strat
egy on December 11, 2018, which included a plan to purchase 40-50 American B-type F-35 
fighter jets over the next five years, using them in conjunction with refitted Izumo-dass 
"multipurpose escort ships:' Abe was constrained by domestic politics, caught between 
criticism from both left and right, as well as criticism from China. He was able to strengthen 
japan's independent deterrence while fending off President Trump's criticism about japan's 
trade surplus and the cost of American defense ofjapan. 
Abe is a seasoned, confident ·player in great power politics. The day Abe returned 
from his visit to China in October 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to 
japan. Thus, a dear message was sent to Beijing. The japanese government knew that 
China could not react, and it didn't, because China cannot dictate who japanese leaders 
can see, or vice versa. 
Bank (ADB) issued a highly cited study of the huge need for infrastructure in the Asia 
Pacific, which prOvided a factual basis for China's creation of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), although China is not expected to provide sufficient funding 
to fill the large gap between needs and resources. 
The Abe government, which used exports of infrastructure projects as part of its 
growth strategy, emphasized "high quality" in its approach to differentiate itself from 
the cost-effective approach of Chinese funding. But there should be room for coopera
tion to spread the risk and encourage acceptance from the recipient countries. Abe 
shifted his approach from criticism of the BRI to one of both competition and coopera
tion, because the japanese business community did not want to lose out. Abe announced 
a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" in August 2016 to counter China's influence, 
and japan has now shifted to a softer "vision" rather than a "strategy" to avoid provoking 
China, and to make its plan easier to accept for the Southeast Asian countries that do not 
want to be caught in the crossfire. Tokyo has not joined the BR!, but it has committed 
itself to cooperation with Beijing in infrastructure projects in "third countries:' The 
japanese government and japanese companies are focused on individual BR! projects to 
assess their costs and benefits. 
With his longeVity in office and greater confidence, Abe sought to counter China's rise 
with his own vision of regional integration and enhanced defense capability. Despite 
Trump's decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), 
after some hesitation, the Abe government took the lead in making the now eleven
nation TPP (renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, or CPTPP) a reality, effective on December 30, 2018. 
Abe also supported competing regional economic initiatives rivaling Beijing's own, and 
conduded an economic partnership agreement with the European Union that became 
effective on February 1, 2019. He also agreed in 2017 to join Indian prime minister Modi's 
Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), designed to counter Beijing's BR! and port
building around the Indian Ocean (Brinza 2018). japan also participated in the ongoing 
negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that indudes 
China but not the United States, which was successfullyconduded in November 2020. 
Abo's successor Yoshihide Suga, who served as Abe's chief cabinet secretary in 
2012-2020, was expected to continue Abe's policy and so far has done so. Suga has 
maintained a cautious China policy although japanese view of China remains harsh. 
GREAT POWER POLITICS OF 
JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS 
The japanese business community, which was largely silent during the previous 
period of tension between japan and China, is again a driving force for improving 
with Beijing, even though they also have much to complain about and fear in 
terms of China's industrial policy. As a trading nation, japan cannot afford to alienate a 
principal trading partner and a large market. Unlike the United States, japan is interested 
in investing in infrastructure projects. After all, the japan-led Asian Development 
japan and China are seeking a more stable bilateral relationship also out of great power 
politics considerations. China and japan came to need each other even more given the 
predictably unpredictable Trump administration. Did the Trump presidency represent a 
new norm or a temporary phenomenon? While japan wished the Obama administration 
r 
842 
MINGWAN 
JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS 
had taken stronger measures against China on Japan's behalf, the Trump administra
tion's unpredictability and strong tendency to pressure America's traditional allies like 
Japan concerned them. The fundamentals in Japan-China relations and East Asian 
international relations have not changed. Japan still needs American security protection 
against a rising China, for example, but Japan's security interests do not entirely trump 
its economic interests, which will continue to be a factor when it comes to Japan-China 
and regional relations. 
The US factor in the Sino-Japanese relationship has been important and well studied 
(see, e.g., McGregor 2017). Before the 2016 presidential election that put Donald Trump 
in the White House, the US-Japan alliance was strengthened, partly due to a perceived 
common threat from China and North Korea. Trump advocated a transactional 
America First strategy, treating allies almost the same way as foes. Thus, some Japanese 
saw an improved relationship with China as a hedge against the uncertainties the Trump 
administration introduced into international relations. China had an even stronger rea
son to avoid fighting on two fronts. The underlying theoretical framework can be traced 
to the triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. 
Unlike that triangle in the 1970s, Japan and the United States are allies. At the same time, 
a triangular tendency between China, Japan and ilie United States does exist (Wan 2019). 
The United States has become overextended since the Trump administration began 
taking on several strategic competitors at the same time. While the Obama administra
tion sought to pivot to the Asia Pacific at some point, that change took place mostly on 
Trump's watch. Presidential leadership matters. While US involvement in the Middle 
East has diverted its energy and attention from other regions, China has risen. For the 
past few years, the US government has belm seeking to refocus on the Asia Pacific, but it 
cannot simply walk away from ilie Middle East, particularly from its self-inflicted 
wounds. After Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reintroduced sanctions, 
for example, the possibility of military conflict with Iran increased. 
There is some sense in Japan that China's aggressive push overseas has suffered set
backs, which are welcome developments for ilie Japanese, and Beijing seems less threat
ening for the moment. Japan also recognized Beijing's greater willingness to take a softer 
stance against Tokyo when the United States began putting full-court pressure on China. 
Indeed, after the Trump administration launched high trade tariffs on Chinese imports 
starting in March 2018, China sought to improve relations with Japan to avoid confront
ing too many foes at the same tilne. Facing similar tariff threats from the Trump admin
istration' Japan also wanted to hedge its bets by improving economic ties with China 
billion) worili of parts from Japan in 2019 Uapan Times 2019b). Unlike most Western 
allies of the United States, Japan, along with Australia and New Zealand, sided with ilie 
United States, but Tokyo avoided an open confrontation with Beijing. Falling back on its 
postwar faith in technology and innovation, Japan's Rakuten, a technology company, 
launched an open-standards, "virtualized" mobile network based on general-purpose 
hardware and software on April 8, 2020, promising an alternative to a specialized hard
ware system in which Huawei has excelled (Economist 2020). 
The Japanese media has also noticed a warming Chinese view ofJapan, partly thanks 
to the millions of Chinese tourists visiting Japan. This is reinforcing an assessment in 
Japan that ilie problem in relations with China lies on the Chinese side, and they are now 
coming back. Japan should not reject Chinese overtures, but it must engage with its eyes 
wide open. This trend has been reinforced by the COVID-19 pandemic, which began in 
China. Differing from the United States, the Japanese government and public voiced 
moral support and donated supplies and funding at the height of the outbreak in China. 
China later returned the favor. Japan has also provided support for other countries. US 
leadership has been absent in Asia during the pandemic. The pandemic may well worsen 
US-China relations, but that is not the case in Japan-China relations, which may actually 
improve thanks to the bilateral cooperation and goodwill during the crisis. We can 
hardly predict how overall Japan-China relations will evolve, but we can safely forecast, 
for the foreseeable future, that Tokyo's relationship with Beijing would be better than 
that between Washington and Beijing, even if the Japan-China relationship worsens in 
an absolute sense. 
Now that a Cold Peace (some even fear a new Cold War) looms over Asia and the 
and other countries Uapan Times 2018; Wong 2018; Yoshida 2018). Tariffs on China hurt 
Japanese commercial interests as well, because much of what is made in China comes 
from Japanese suppliers in global value chains. Japan's leading business groups told the 
media at the time that the US-China trade war was hurting the global economy Uapan 
Times 2019a). 
The US government has also aimed at blocking Chinese technology firms from the 
global economy, which would also negatively affect Japanese companies. Huawei, for 
example, reported by end of 2019 that the company had purchased ¥1.1 trillion (US$10 
world, how will that affect Japan's party politics and foreign policy? Just as the Cold War 
between the United States and the former Soviet Union shaped a domestic Cold War in 
Japan and influenced Japan's party politics-boosting the dominance of the LDP, which 
was viewed as stalwart for a strong alliance with the United States and for domestic sta
bility-the emergent Cold Peace may also enhance the LDP's longevity. During the Cold 
War era, Japan experienced an economic miracle, but its economy now grows at a slow 
pace, and society feels stagnant-factors that will arguably be the dominant drivers for 
Japanese domestic politics. But great power relations will also surely factor in. One 
major difference between now and the Cold War era, for example, is Japan's growing 
autonomy. Japan was not able to improve relations with China until the United States 
made the first move during the Cold War, but Japan now proceeds with its own approach 
to Beijing, even though it needs to be cautious not to upset the United States too much 
or call into question Tokyo's reliability as a US ally. The Japanese government's improved 
relations with China have sofar not alienated the United States, partly because it has not 
moved too far, and partly because none of the thorny issues have been resolved between 
China and Japan, as understood in the United States. Abe framed his more conciliatory 
approach toward Russia and Iran in the same vein. In fact, even Japan's efforts to 
strengthen the alliance with the United States can be viewed as a sign of autonomy railier 
than subservience, because Japan is determining its own foreign policy, less constrained 
by US pressure, priorities, and interests. 
I 
844 MING WAN 
Japanese-style democracy plays a role in Japan-China relations. Some Japanese offi
cials explained to this author in the early 2000S that as long as the Japanese elites were in 
control, Japan's relations with China would be manageable. Then the LOP's loss of power 
and shifting Japanese politics coincided with high tensions in Japan-China relations. 
One may argue, as I do, that a single-party domination model is not ideal for democracy, 
and that a competitive election typically gives voters more choices. From that perspec
tive, Japan's tensions with China played a role in rolling back political reform in Japan 
because Japanese voters wanted a steady hand. Japanese elites now do not have to pay as 
much attention to popular demands as, say, in the United States. The Japanese govern
ment can certainly play the democracy card to some extent by differentiating Japan from 
an authoritarian China. At the same time, it is also possible that some Japanese now 
yearn for a return to a strong state associated with economic prosperity, effectiveness, 
and respect, which would have a negative impact on Japanese democracy.