write a conclusion for this essay : 'In Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, he lays down his philosophy of transcendental idealism. In doing so, he must prove that the world is presented to us as representations, dada… 
One of Kant’s most famous claims is that space itself, along with time, is not what he calls a  concept or experienced by us empirically, but actually only a precondition for the way we humans experience things in our perceived world. 
In this essay, I will argue that Kant’s position is convincing. By first examining the arguments Kant gives for calling space a form of intuition. I will then prove the solidity of Kant’s position by putting it against empiricist arguments. These arguments will use modern developmental psychology which seem to undermine Kant’s centuries old claim. However, I will argue that they only reinforce and actually dd to Kant’s philosophy.

In order to grasp what exactly makes space a form of intuition for Kant, we must first comprehend what he means by the term “form of intuition”. An intuition, to Kant, is an immediate representation of an object, which is  Kant denotes formality with things that are a priori, which suggests that a from of intuition is an intuition that does not come to us by experience or empirically. This suggests that it is an innate mental structure that shapes our experiences before and independently of empirical knowledge. Kant classifies space along with time as being the only forms of intuition, which he believes are essential to the cognising human mind. 

Kant provides two arguments for the a priori nature of space. First, he observes that our perceiving of several things as distinct from one another does not give rise to the representation of space. According to him, the very possibility of perceiving objects as distinct and separate from one another presupposes a preexisting representation of space. Therefore, space is necessary as a precondition to experience objects separate from one another, and is a priori.This spatial framework cannot be an empirical acquisition since one must already conceive of space to differentiate between objects.  Secondly, Kant highlights our incapacity to conceive the non-existence of space, though we can picture an empty space devoid of objects.  This suggests that space transcends empirical reality; it is innately intuited by the mind, not inductively aggregated from sensory input. Space, therefore, is not contingent on experience - a tenet fundamental to the Kantian view. Therefore , space is the backdrop for our representations and appearances, and is not dependent on these appearances. Thus, space is not an incidental byproduct of experience but an a priori necessity pivotal to the formation of perception. 

A critical aspect of Kant’s philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason is his distinguishing of concepts from intuitions. Whereas intuitions are singular, immediate representations, concepts refer to generalised representations that encompass potentially many things. Kant holds that space is an intuition. Kant asserts that only one singular space can be represented at a time, which holds in it all other ‘spaces’ as subdivisions. To illustrate this, take a human’s field of view. What you see out of you left eye and what you see out of your right eye are, speaking ontologically, not two separate spaces but rather a division of the same space. These segments exist within the space, rather than make it up. By proving that we experience a unified space rather than an amalgamation of discrete segments, Kant fortifies his claim that space, as encompassing singularity, qualifies as an intuition and not a concept.

Furthermore, Kant’s reflections on the infinitude of space also support its intuitiveness. He argues that concepts are constructed by adding properties together. If space was a concept, it would have to be created using this method. However, when adding different ‘spaces’ together, we could only reach a potential infinite, not an actual infinite space. Tallying up finite spaces serially is an impossibility. Instead, we perceive space as inherently infinite, which is something a concept cannot accommodate. Finite concepts cannot embody infinity, yet our perception of space does, and so it follows that space is an intuition. 

The Kantian framework does acknowledge the 'concept of space’, which may superficially appear to be a contradiction. However, Kant draws a crucial distinction: just as a specific entity like ‘Immanuel Kant’ can be subsumed under broader concepts like ‘philosopher’ or ‘human,’ the concept of space can be employed to reflect on the intuition of space without contradicting its innate singular character. This recognition enables us to engage theoretically with space without compromising our intuitive grasp of it.

Kant’s insights presume a Euclidean view of space, the prevailing understanding in his time. Today, we recognise the validity of non-Euclidean geometries and contemplate spaces with more than three dimensions. While such theoretical explorations extend our conceptual repertoire, Kant’s argument suggests that our basic sensory apprehension of space remains three-dimensional and Euclidean, as these represent the intuitive conditions of human sensibility. Kant isn't investigating either theoretical questions of geometry nor of space & time - he's more concerned about our immediate perception of space & time. He's specifically interested in where consciousness meets space and time.

To further illustrate the convincing nature of Kant’s claim, I will examine a possible modern empiricist argument against it. Research in developmental psychology and neuroscience offer empirical evidence that illustrate that spatial cognition develops and matures in response to the environment. This seems to challenge Kant’s ideas that the spatial framework is a form of intuition - a priori and intuitive. Observations of infants and children show a gradual acquisition of spatial abilities, leading some to conjecture that spatial understanding is learned rather than a priori. For example, the work of Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget on the cognitive development of children suggests that children actually pass through stages of empirical reasoning in order to gain understanding of space. Essentially, his work provides evidence that shows that infants develop their understand of space through experimentation within it over the course of years. This stage-based development appears, at first glance, to undermine Kant’s notion of space as a pre-existing framework with the mind. Furthermore, individuals such as engineers and architects can enhance their spatial understanding through training and practice. This suggests that the notion of our spatial perception and conception can be more plastic than Kant’s model allows for. 

However, I believe that this interpretation does not invalidate the convincingness of Kant’s theory, and that empirical evidence can actually be synthesised to strengthen Kant’s position. Kant posits that the basic structure of human cognition includes the a priori intuition of space, which is a necessary condition for organising sensory experiences. The fact that spatial order can be learned from environmental engagements actually presupposes a pre-existing spatial framework. Without it, they would have nothing to build their empirical and conceptual understanding of it on. Infants are able to perceive the world spatially only because they have the a priori, innate intuition of space engrained in them as a foundation. This foundation allows for empirical experience to act as building blocks, which can enhance their spatial cognition. From this perspective, we can see Kant’s idea of space working … As an infants brain develops, the inherent spatial framework is honed through interaction with the environment. The progression in spatial intelligence seen in Piaget’s work - such as grasping the notion of object permanence, developing navigational skills with their surroundings, or understanding how physical objects interact with one another - implies not the creation of the concept of space but instead the refinement and exposition of the child’s capacity to perceive space. It’s as if Kant’s space provides a kind of lens through which raw sensory data are filtered through, and as the child gets older, the lens gets clearer and more focused. Finally, the skills acquired by engineers and architects in their spatial understanding does not change the a priori, intuitive nature of space; it also shows, in the same way as described with the mind of the infant, that we can improve our skills and knowledge within the framework of spatial perception. 


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