1_ Translate the following legal text into colloquial Farsi 2_ Place the Persian and English text side by side in the table 3_ From the beginning to the end of the text, there should be an English sentence on the left side and a Persian sentence on the right side.
       4- Using legal language for Persian translation

          .By the end of the fifteenth century the Chancellor had set up a separate court which dealt with petitions for relief. The Chancellor was not bound by the writ system or the technical and formal rules of the common law, and considered petitions on the basis of conscience and right.
At first the Chancellor used to consult the Council and sometimes the common law judges, but eventually it became customary to summon the parties to the dispute to appear before the Chancellor alone to answer 'inter- rogatories' (specific questions relevant to the issue) and to unburden their consciences so that the truth could be ascertained and justice done.
The Court of Chancery proved popular with litigants and this caused friction with the common law courts. Jurisdiction was lost to the Chancery Court. Sometimes the courts of common law and the Chancery Court issued contradictory verdicts, and relations between the courts became difficult. The dispute came to a head under James I (1603-25) in the Earl of Oxford's case (1616). The common law courts, headed by Chief Justice Coke, gave a judgment which was alleged to have been obtained by fraud. The Chancellor, Lord Ellesmere, issued an injunction preventing the successful party from proceeding to enforce the judgment, whereupon the dispute was referred to the King for decision. The King sought the views of Sir Francis Bacon (Attorney-General) who advised that where common law and equity conflicted, equity should prevail. Although competition between the courts of common law and equity continued, the right of the Chancellor to grant injunctions thereafter was not seriously challenged. Matters were finally resolved by the passing of the Judicature Acts, 1873-5 (see p. 20).
Despite its early popularity, equity as administered in the Chancery was subject to criticism. Its initial flexibility led to uncertainty in the seventeenth century, and the jurist John Selden observed that 'Equity varies with the length of the Chancellor's foot'. Whatever the demerits of the common law, it was possible to estimate a probable verdict by considering similar cases already decided and the statutes enforced. Equity, which was dispensed as a matter of conscience, was unpredictable and the relief granted by one Chancellor might be refused by his successor. Between flexibility and cer- tainty there is much tension. Flexibility was advantageous because it gave relief from the rigidity of law, but could be disadvantageous if it led to uncer- tainty and hardship.
Eventually equity emerged from vagueness and conscience and became formalized. Lord Nottingham (Lord Chancellor in 1673-82) held that equity should be administered where possible in accordance with known principles and not by arbitrary discretion. Only where there was no prece- dent or where there was conflict in the rules or principles should conscience determine the matter.
Nottingham's work was carried on by others, in particular Lord Hardwicke (Lord Chancellor in 1736-56) who held that a judge exercising equity jurisdiction should follow existing principles. With the adoption of the system of precedent, equity became predictable and intelligible.
Lord Eldon (Lord Chancellor in 1801-6 and 1807-27) further developed equity, establishing a system of case law, so that by the beginning of the nine- teenth century equity became nearly as rigid as the common law.