请将“Finally Poulantzas analyses the limits to state intervention in the economic region. He locates these in three areas: the separation between the economic and political regions in the CMP, the institutional form of the state, and the effects of class struggle. He argues that, although the state cannot avoid intervening in the economy, it is also excluded from the productive core of the circuit of capital: it is therefore reduced to a predominantly reactive role - coping with the effects of capitalism without being able to act decisively on their causes. This exclusion also means that the availability of resources to the state depends on the fluctuating profitability of capital and this, in turn, makes it difficult to plan revenues and can precipitate fiscal crises. The incoherence of its policies is also attributed to the administrative inertia, ‘muddling through’, bureaucratic ponderousness, and countervailing veto powers of the state apparatus itself. These factors are reinforced by the class struggles within the power bloc and between the power bloc and the dominated classes that are necessarily reproduced on the terrain of the state (1974, pp. 168-174; 1978, pp. 190-194).

ON THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM

The views of Nicos Poulantzas on political strategy have changed pari passu with his changing views on the nature of the capitalist type of state. Initially he advocated a Leninist strategy in which the working class should be mobilised in a counter-state organisation external to the capitalist state and under the leadership of a revolutionary vanguard political party. Since the capitalist state was the unambiguous and unequivocal institutional expression of bourgeois political domination, it would be impossible for the working class to utilise this state form to effect a transition to socialism. Indeed Poulantzas stresses that the working class cannot, pace Gramsci, attain hegemony before it has seized state power (1968, pp. 108, 204, 275, 287-288, 299). These views were elaborated somewhat in Poulantzas’s reflections on Comintern strategy and tactics towards fascism and their residues in contemporary communist theories of state monopoly capitalism and the anti-monopoly alliance. In criticising the errors of the Comintern Poulantzas suggests that a successful communist revolution (or, indeed, defense of working-class gains in capitalist societies) requires the primacy of political class struggle over economic class struggle, the consistent pursuit of a mass line, and a commitment to proletarian internationalism. In turn this would involve the development of workers’ councils as the site of mass struggle (with economic demands subordinated to political class struggle), the development of a united front of the working class at the rank-and-file level, and the development of a popular front with the poor peasantry and petit bourgeoisie. Poulantzas also argues that contemporary communist parties tend to separate economic and political class struggles, to neglect a mass line and rely on electoral pacts to mobilise intermediate classes through their own organisations, to give priority to the popular front (wrongly defined to embrace non-monopoly capital as well as the intermediate classes) over the development of a united front, and to overemphasise the national side of the communist programme (1970, pp. 18, 40, 44, 46, 140, 143, 164-165, 214-216, 223, 225, 228-23 1).

This commitment to a mass line involving alliances with intermediate classes is also central to Poulantzas’s thoughts on classes in contemporary capitalism. He argues that the communist party must seek to polarise the petit bourgeoisie around the working class and unify the ‘people’ under the leadership of the working class against the power bloc. This will not occur simply because the petit bourgeoisie is becoming proletarians through its objective place in relations of production - it depends on winning the petit bourgeois fractions away from support for bourgeois organisations to support for working-class organisations through active and protracted representation of their specific interests. This involves more than short- term, mechanical ‘compromises’ and ‘concessions’ to the petit bourg- eoisie - it requires a long-term strategy that recognises the differences among the classes and fractions in the alliance, that attempts gradually to resolve the ‘contradictions among the people’ and to unify them, and that attempts to modify the class positions (or demands) of potential allies so that they come to share the objectives of the working class in the transition to socialism (1974, pp. 9-10, 24, 155, 331-335).

These arguments are significantly altered in Poulantzas’s later work under the impact of his continuing reflections on the military dictatorship in his native Greece and the changing nature of the state in advanced capitalism. In particular he denied the continuing validity of the Leninist dual power strategy to the extent that it was premised on a rupture between the capitalist state as a monolithic apparatus and a centralised popular power parallel and external to this official state. There appear to be three main reasons for this change of argument: first, the reorganisation and expansion of the state so that it now penetrates all areas of social life; second, the condensation of class contradictions inside the state so that it is possible for any rupture(s) to pass through the state, and, third, the historical fact that the military dictatorships collapsed without the development of such a dual power situation.

Accordingly Poulantzas concluded that a new strategy is required in the current stage of capitalism. This involves the close articulation and coordination of class struggle within the official state apparatus aimed at intensifying its internal contradictions, polarising significant sections of its personnel around a transition to socialism, and provoking ruptures among the various power centres, branches, and apparatuses of the integral state; and class struggle at a distance from the official state apparatus aimed at changing the balance of forces within the state, building organs of direct rank-and-file democracy, and unifying the popular masses in opposition to the power bloc. The collapse of the military dictatorships had occurred largely because of internal contradictions within the power bloc that were intensified through popular struggles at a distance from the core of the state; the failure of a revolutionary mass party to coordinate and centralise these popular struggles under working-class hegemony was the chief reason why the dictatorships were replaced by bourgeois democratic regimes. In this context Poulantzas emphasises that the state is not a mere instrument to be captured by the working class in a frontal assault or through infiltration and encirclement - it has an institutional form that circumscribes changes in the balance of forces and enables the bourgeoisie to recuperate state power if the working class does not establish the institutional conditions for the exercise of its own power. It is for this reason that a successful transition towards democratic socialism requires action within the state, action to transform the state, and action at a distance from the state (1976b, pp. 76, 86-87, 142, 144-149, 151— 152;	1977, pp. 3—5; cf. his preliminary reflections on the Greek military dictatorships, 1967b, passim).

The necessity for a close articulation of popular struggles within and without the state is reaffirmed in Poulantzas’s final remarks about the capitalist state and the transition to socialism. But certain new elements are also introduced. Firstly he emphasises the need to preserve and extend the institutions and liberties of representative democracy alongside the developing organs of direct rank-and-file democracy. For not only does historical experience suggest that the abolition of supposedly ‘bourgeois’ parliamentary democracy inevitably leads to the suppression of direct democracy by the vanguard party due to the elimination of so-called ‘formal’ liberties and a plural party system, but there is also a clear danger that direct democracy would soon degenerate into a disunified, economic- corporate system unless there was a parliamentary forum in which different interests could be organised and unified around the socialist project (1977, pp. 68; 1978, pp. 256-263). Secondly Poulantzas appears to reject the need for a single mass revolutionary party to act as the vanguard in the transition to socialism. This rejection is linked to the view that representative democracy involves a plurality of parties and to a reappraisal of the vanguard party itself. In this context Poulantzas suggests that communist parties are in crisis because of their commitments to the primacy of the working class and to the primacy of struggles in the enterprise; this means that they have underestimated new social movements (such as feminism, regionalism, ecological movements, student unrest, etc.) that are ‘pluriclassiste’ and/or located outside the place of production. He concludes that parties must be actively present in the new social movements without becoming merely populist and that these movements must find a place in the parties without losing their own (non-class) specificity. In turn this implies that a certain irreducible tension between working-class parties and social movements is a necessary condition of the dynamic of transition to democratic socialism (1978, pp. 263-264; 1979b, pp. 181-183; 1979c, pp. 200-201). Finally, in apparent contrast to his early commitment to so-called proletarian internationalism and his criticism of an overemphasis on the national side of communist policy, Poulantzas adopted a commitment to national roads to socialism and argued that attempts to short-circuit national realities would be insane (1976d, p. 6; 1978, pp. 97, 115, 118-119).

A CRITIQUE OF POULANTZAS

The starting point for Poulantzas’s analysis is the institutional separation of juridico-political region from the economy in the CMP and the theoretical opportunity this offers for a separate account of this region in capitalist societies. Indeed Poulantzas argues that, charactrised as it is by hegemonic class leathership and the representation of the political interests of the dominant class(es), it is through appropriate political concepts that the capitalist state must be investigated (1968, p. 190; 1978, pp.51-52). Moreover, even though Poulantzas later paid more attention to the economic role of the state, his analyses of the limitation of such intervention still focus largely on political factors. This approach obviously poses problems about the role of economic determination in his account of the juridico-political region - especially as he originally suggested that the economic region of the CMP was not only determinant but also dominant. Indeed, as Poulantzas himself once argued in his review of Althusser’s For Marx, structuralist views on ‘economic determination in the last instance’ combined with an insistence on the ‘relative autonomy’ of different regions can easily lead to an ‘overpoliticisation’ of the class struggle and an ‘overdominance’ of the political level in general (1966b, pp. 1074-1097). In Poulantzas’s theoretical system, moreover, this ‘politicist’ tendency is reinforced by two other elements. For Poulantzas also argues that the constitutive function of state is to maintain the global cohesion if a class-divided social formation and that the capitalist state is the first to specialise in this function through its structurally-determined capacity to secure hegemonic class leadership. In short the attempt to combine Althusserian and Gramscian Perspectives within the context of a general theory of the state as an organ of political domination has aggravated the ‘politicist’ potential inherent in each perspective considered in isolation.”翻译为中文