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Soft and Hard Balancing
Japan's response to China's rise has included various soft balancing measures, such as economic partnerships and diplomatic initiatives. However, these efforts have yielded mixed results. Japan's attempts at "soft containment" have had limited success in impeding China's regional dominance. Consequently, Japan has also explored more robust hard balancing options. This shift is evident in the establishment of the National Security Council in 2013 and the subsequent decision to enable the exercise of collective self-defense. This development marks a significant departure from Japan's post-war pacifism, reflecting a more assertive security posture in response to China's maritime activities and regional ambitions​


source: https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/9/2/109/1745011



‘Soft’ Containment and Balancing
Japanese ‘soft balancing’ of China is apparent in newly vigorous diplomacy campaigns that
seek to complicate and where possible check growing Chinese influence in East Asia and
other regions. Under the leadership of the Revisionists, Japan has attempted to augment its
international reputation, often in deliberate contradistinction to China, thus to hinder its
rival’s potential hegemonic rise. Abe and Aso have in their respective terms in office sought 
to articulate a new ‘values-oriented diplomacy’, stressing Japan’s internationalism and promotion of democracy, liberal market economy, human rights, and rule of law, in implicit
contrast to the authoritarianism of China. Abe enunciated during his first administration
the concept of the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ stretching from Northeast Asia through
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Central Europe, and the Baltic states, whose
alleged cohesion is attributable to the promotion among these states of ‘universal values’.103 In his 2012 campaign to recover the LDP leadership and premiership, Abe then
switched to the similar concept of a ‘Democratic Security Diamond’, including Japan, the
USA, Australia, and India, again formulated in apparent opposition to China’s refusal,
demonstrated in its behaviour, to abide by international conventions and norms.104
Abe has in his latest stint in office endorsed these values-oriented type concepts through
diplomatic visits to states on China’s periphery, many of which share common cause with
Japan in their anxiety over China’s rise and its territorial intentions. By the end of his first
102 Office of the Press Secretary White House, ‘Joint Press Conference with President Obama
and Prime Minister Abe of Japan’, 24 April, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of
fice/2014/04/24/joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan.
103 Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Response to China’s Rise: Regional Engagement, Global
Containment, Dangers of Collision’, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (2008), pp. 837–54.
104 Abe, ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’.
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year in office, Abe had visited all 10 of the ASEAN states. Abe’s visit to Myanmar in May
2013 was the first in 36 years by a Japanese prime minister to this strategically important
country previously closer to China in diplomatic orientation, and Japan and Myanmar
have indeed pledged enhanced security dialogue and defence exchanges. Throughout all
these visits, Abe again asserted a range of shared values and hopes for enhanced cooperation that were raised in implicit opposition to China’s rising presence in the region. Abe
has reinforced security cooperation with economic assistance: Japan pledged at the Japan–
ASEAN Commemorative Summit in Tokyo in December 2013 close to US$20 billion in
ODA to ASEAN Member States. In addition, to counter China’s AIIB proposal, in May
2015 Abe announced US$110 billion in aid for Asian infrastructure projects via the ADB
and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, its disbursement speeded up by a one
year rather than three-year decision-making turnaround.105
Japanese leaders have sought, in particular, to join hands with ASEAN Member States in
emphasizing the importance of international norms and laws covering the freedom of maritime navigation and handling of territorial disputes in the South China Sea and beyond.106
Japan has supported ASEAN, bilaterally and collectively, in calling for all states to adhere to
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, so attempting to create a unified legal front to
counter China’s so-called ‘law-fare’ campaign in the region, and to isolate it over its ADIZ
declaration. Japan has agreed to further develop ‘strategic partnerships’ with Vietnam,
Thailand, and Indonesia, and to strengthen dialogue on security issues. Japan, Malaysia,
Vietnam, and the Philippines have focused especially on maritime security cooperation in the
South China Sea, Japan having agreed to provide the Philippine coast guard with 10 patrol
boats and to survey their provision also to Vietnam.107
Japan demonstrated its potential maritime presence in the South China Sea through its
dispatch of more than 1000 JSDF personnel and three MSDF vessels for relief operations
around the Leyte Gulf after the 2013 Haiyan cyclone disaster in the Philippines. President
Benigno Aquino, during his visit to Japan in June 2015, also stated that his government
would initiate talks with Japan on a Visiting Forces Agreement that would allow the JSDF
to use Philippine bases.108 Abe expressed support for US Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in November 2015 during the US–Japan summit at the Philippines APEC, saying
that as the South China Sea, ‘influenced Japan’s own security, continued attention would
be devoted to it and investigation of JSDF activities’, so hinting that Japan could join FON
in line with interpretations of collective self-defence.109
105 Anthony Fensom, ‘Japan Ups the Ante on AIIB’, The Diplomat, 23 May, 2015, http://thediplo
mat.com/2015/05/japan-ups-ante-on-aiib/.
106 Shinzo Abe, ‘The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese diplomacy’,
Jakarta, 18 January 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe_0118e.html.
107 Corey J. Wallace, ‘Japan’s Strategic Pivot South: Diversifying the Dual Hedge’, International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2013), pp. 488–95; Paul Midford, ‘Japan’s Approach
to Maritime Security in the South China Sea’, Asian Survey, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2015), pp. 541–42.
108 ‘Philippines Wants Defence Pact for Japanese Troops’, Asahi Shimbun, 5 June, 2015,
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201506050092.
109 ‘Minamishinakai de Katsudo, Kento: Shusho “Josei o Chushi Suru” ’ (‘Investigation,
Activities in the South China Sea: The Prime Minister “Will Consider Intently the
Situation” ’), Asahi Shimbun, 20 November, 2015, p. 3.
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Japan has furthermore pursued in recent years a new round of resource and energy diplomacy to counter China’s rising influence in these areas, and especially to obviate its dependency on the rare earth supplies that China threatened to embargo in 2010. Abe
remarked in 2012 that, ‘India’s government has shown its political savvy by forging an
agreement to provide Japan with rare earth materials—a vital component in many manufacturing processes—after China chose to use its supplies of rare earths as a diplomatic
stick.’110 Japan has attempted to reengage with the resource-rich Central Asian republics
often thought to form China’s ‘backyard’ through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
process. It was Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutar  o’s 1988 Silk Road Action Plan that first 
led to Japan becoming the region’s largest ODA donor. Foreign Minister Kawaguchi
Yuriko made the first visit by a high-ranking Japanese minister to Central Asia in 2004;
Koizumi then visited the region in 2006, and METI minister Amari Akira in April 2007.
Abe visited Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan in October
2015, becoming the first Japanese prime minister to visit all five central Asian republics,
and pledged close to ¥26 billion in grants and loans for state-building and democracy consolidation and for developing gas and nuclear energy in the region. Abe’s visits to Mongolia
in 2013 and 2015 were similarly aimed at expanding Japan’s resource supplies. Overall,
Japan has in recent years attempted to demonstrate a presence in Central Asia that precludes China’s monopolization of the region through its own Silk Road Initiatives.
In the Middle East, Japan has looked to counter China’s potential hold on energy resources by forging closer bilateral ties. Abe made visits in April 2007 to Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, and Egypt: the first by a Japanese premier to
Saudi Arabia for four years, the first to the UAE and Qatar for 29 years, and the first-ever
to Kuwait. Abe sought promises from these states of stable and sustained supplies of oil and
gas. In addition, in 2006 Japan launched Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Upon returning to power, in the space of
just over one year Abe paid visits to all of the GCC states—Saudi Arabia and the UAE in
May, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar in August 2013, and Oman in January 2014—again prospecting for economic and energy cooperation deals.
Meanwhile, China’s growing influence in Africa has led to a corresponding resurgence
of Japanese interest in the continent. Japan pledged in 2008 to double ODA to African
states by 2012 via the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)
process. Japan has reinvigorated TICAD as a counter to the China–Africa Summit, and elaborated a concept of development that provides a so-called middle course between the
West’s emphasis on economic conditionality and governance reform and China’s authoritarianism and mercantilist search for resources. Abe paid visits in January 2014 to Cote
d’Ivoire, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, the first to Africa by a Japanese prime minister since
2006 and thus to a select group of states on the African continent with potential energy resources and considerable political influence. In addition, since 2012 the JSDF has maintained a small peacekeeping operation (PKO) commitment in South Sudan, the size and
scope of which it may enlarge in view of the passage in 2015 of the new security legislation.
It is in part an attempt to establish a Japanese presence that matches China’s burgeoning
PKO role and which wields influence in this resource-rich new state.
Finally, Japan has sought to counter China’s rising influence across the East Asia region
through its support, largely in opposition to perceived favour of China’s regional
110 Abe, ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’.
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integration project—the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which excludes the USA, for the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Japanese leaders
envisage the benefits of the TPP as helping to create a US and Japanese-oriented set of economic rules that reinforce liberal values among regional participants. Abe remarked in regard to the TPP in his address to a joint meeting of the US Congress in April 2015 that,
‘Involving countries in the Asia-Pacific region whose backgrounds vary, the US and Japan
must take the lead. We must take the lead in building a market that is fair, dynamic, sustainable, and also free from the arbitrary intentions of any nation,’ thus referring to, without explicitly stating, the need to counter China via the TPP.111
Japan’s ‘soft-balancing’ of China—which the Japanese media have often dubbed an ‘encirclement’ or ‘siege’ strategy—has achieved certain benefits in impeding Chinese influence,
but the pay-offs have been limited.112 Japanese ‘values-oriented’ diplomacy has often failed
either to convince or gain much influence, given Japan’s own history of colonial expansion
and its past tendency to tolerate authoritarian regimes in the interests of economic development. Upon succeeding Abe, Prime Minister Fukuda quietly dropped the concept of the Arc
of Freedom and Prosperity, and the DPJ proved reluctant to give play to the concept of values-oriented diplomacy. The maritime ASEAN states are clearly receptive to Japanese engagement in the South China Sea, but remain wary of alienating China, and have no
intention of becoming pawns in a wider Japan–China power struggle in the region. For instance, it is notable that there was no explicit condemnation of China’s ADIZ in the Joint
Statement of the Japan–ASEAN Commemorative Summit; and that ASEAN representatives
at the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting in November 2015, faced with contending pressures from Japan and the USA on one side and China on the other, failed to raise any stressing concerns about China’s activities in the South China Sea.113
Japan’s Hard Military Balancing and a Sino–Japanese Arms Race?
Japan’s sense that its attempts at ‘soft containment’ have only limited traction as regards
slowing the rise of the Chinese juggernaut has thus obliged it to consider more robust ‘hard
balancing’ options, both internally and externally. Japanese Revisionists’ initiation of various processes to clear the decks domestically for the exercise of military power is one indication of a new potential for balancing behaviour.
Japan under Abe for the first time established in 2013 an NSS and National Security
Council to facilitate faster decision-making among key leaders and more effective military
crisis management. Abe’s government subsequently issued in July 2014 a Cabinet Decision
enabling Japan to breach its post-war ban on the exercise of ‘limited’ collective self-defence,
and thus to use armed force in the defence of another state, even when Japan itself is not
under direct attack. In September 2014, Abe’s government completed the passage through
111 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to a Joint
Meeting of the US Congress: “Toward an Alliance of Hope” ’, 29 April, 2015, http://www.
mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_000241.html.
112 ‘Abe, Aso Ryoshi ‘Chugoku Hoiami’ Ninin Sankyaku Shuhen Gaikokyu’(Abe, Aso, Both
Depart on Foreign Trips in Three-Legged Race for ‘China’s Encirclement’) Asahi Shimbun, 3
May, 2013, http://digital.asahi.com/articles/TKY201305030003.html.
113 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Joint Statement of the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative
Summit: “Hand in Hand Facing Regional and Global Challenges” ’, 14 December, 2013,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000022451.pdf.
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the National Diet of a raft of security-related bills, the most prominent of which are: the
Law on Response to Contingencies, enabling Japan’s exercise of the right of collective selfdefence in scenarios where an attack on another state in a close relationship with Japan
poses a clear danger of overturning the Japanese people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, where there is no other appropriate means to repel the attack, and where
the use of force is restricted to the minimum necessary to repel the attack; the Law to
Ensure Security in Contingencies Significantly Affecting Japan, replacing the 1999 Regional
Contingencies Law, and designed to bolster Japanese non-combat logistical support for the
USA, and also other states, regionally and globally; the International Peace Support Law,
which removes the need for Japan to enact separate laws for each JSDF dispatch providing
logistical support to multinational forces; and revisions to the International Peace
Cooperation Law, enabling the JSDF to use force during UN PKO in the pursuit of certain
duties rather than solely in the defence of JSDF personnel.
The move to exercise the right of collective self-defence signifies a major development in
Japan’s overturning of its post-war security course, and augmentation of its ability to respond militarily to the rise of China. The LDP and New Komeit  o presented a number of 
scenarios to justify the security legislation which were the subject of National Diet deliberations, and envisaged to enhance US–Japan cooperation and deterrence of North Korea
and China, including: the protection of US ships carrying Japanese nationals; defending US
warships under attack close to Japan; defending the US military against ballistic missile attacks; forceful interdiction of shipping; protecting critical sea lanes; and ‘grey zone’ contingencies around Japan’s far-flung islands.
In regard to military doctrines and capabilities, there has been a similar attempt, driven
by China’s rise, to upgrade Japan’s ability to implement an incipient balancing strategy.
Japan’s National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) set out the national doctrine, and
the military capabilities necessary for its achievement. The 1995 NDPG omitted any direct
reference to China, but the revised 2004 NDPG noted China’s modernization of its nuclear
and ballistic missile forces and increasing ambitions for out-of-area operations, and that
Japan should ‘remain attentive to its future actions’.114 The NDPG went on to state that
the JSDF would increasingly reorient its capabilities to respond to scenarios such as ballistic
missile attacks, invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, and violations of Japanese sea and air
space—all indirect references to China’s military activities. The 2010 NDPG stepped up the
rhetoric, emphasizing China’s rapid military modernization and development of power projection, stressing that all this constituted a ‘concern for the regional and global
community’—again Japanese oblique language signifying China’s growth as a significant
threat.115 The revisions of the NDPG in 2013 under Abe reemphasized that China’s
114 ‘Heisei 8 Nendo Iko ni Kakawaru Boei Keikaku no Taiko’ (‘National Defence Programme
Outline 1995 Fiscal Year’), Tokyo, 28 November, 1995, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/
agenda/guideline/1996_taikou/dp96j.html; ‘Heisei 17 Nendo Iko ni Kakawaru Boei Keikaku
no Taiko ni Tsuite’, Tokyo (‘National Defence Programme Guidelines 2005 Fiscal Year’), 10
December, 2004, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2005/taikou.html.
115 ‘Heisei 23 nendo iko ni kakawaru Boei Keikaku no Taiko ni Tsuite’ (‘National Defence
Programme Guidelines 2011 Fiscal Year’), Tokyo, 17 December, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/
j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/taikou.html.
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intensification of its air and maritime activities remained ‘concerns for regional and global
security’.116
The 2010 NDPG reacted to China’s rising threat by implying a step change in Japanese
defence doctrine through its adoption of the new concept of a Dynamic Defence Force
(DDF), characterized by lighter, more technologically advanced forces with power projection capabilities in regional contingencies for the defence of Japan’s periphery, rather than
just the static defence of Japan itself, and thus geared to respond to China’s security challenge. In addition, the 2010 NDPG continued the trend of Japan moving its key military
assets southwards for the defence of its islands against China’s growing maritime power,
including the doubling of F-15J squadrons at Naha in Okinawa. The 2013 revisions to the
NDPG modified the DDF to produce the concept of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force
(DJDF), this time emphasizing the need for improved joint GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF
operations.
In terms of the development of specific military capabilities, the 2010 and 2013
NDPGs and their accompanying Midterm Defence Program (MTDP) have largely sought
to counter China’s modernization through a symmetrical build-up of JSDF assets. The
2013 NDPG was particularly notable in designating that the GSDF would for the first
time acquire a full amphibious capability for the retaking of remote islands. The force
will comprise around 3000 personnel, equipped with 52 of the GSDF’s first amphibious
armed personnel carriers. Japan will further procure seventeen MV-22 Osprey transports
as used by the USMC.
The ASDF has sought to slow any adverse change in the balance of air defence power by
investing in fifth-generation fighters to trump China’s fourth-generation inventory. Japan
in December 2011 thus plumped for the procurement of 42 F-35As. Japan’s attachment of
importance to the stealth capabilities of the F-35A with its greater associated strengths as
an air defence penetration fighter rather than air superiority fighter, suggests a future interest in developing for the ASDF an offensive counter-air (OCA) doctrine. This type of
Japanese capability might be used in a contingency to strike against the Chinese mainland
and missile launch sites, and so mark a radical departure in Japan’s defence-oriented posture. The ASDF is furthermore now set on procuring Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) to help patrol Japan’s air space, long coastline and distant islands.
Japan’s reaction to China’s missile forces has again been largely symmetric, evident in
attempts to neutralize these capabilities through the deployment of Ballistic Missile
Defence (BMD). The 2010 and 2013 NDPGs mandate the ASDF to maintain six anti-aircraft groups equipped with PAC-3 batteries, and the MSDF eight Aegis destroyers equipped
with BMD SM-3 interceptors. The JSDF now deploys, after the US, the most sophisticated
BMD capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. It is thus attempting deterrence through denial of
China’s ballistic missile threat, backed up by the F-15J and in future the F-35A, to counter
cruise missiles.117
The MSDF matches Japan’s recent primary maritime security concerns about China,
having embarked on the most significant build-up of capabilities under the 2010 and previous NDPGs, many of which are designed to negate both the PLAN’s access-denial and blue
116 ‘National Defence Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond’, Tokyo, 17 December, 2014,
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e.pdf, p. 2.
117 Boeisho Boeikenkyusho, Higashi Ajia Senryaku Gainen 2012 (East Asia Strategic Review
2012)(Tokyo: Zaimusho Insatsukyoku, 2012), p. 240.
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water naval strategies. The MSDF was provided under the 2010 NDPG and MTDP with an
increase in its submarine fleet of more than one third, from 15 to 22 boats, including the
introduction of the Sory  u-class submarine platform that provides leading-edge technologies
in air-independent and fuel-cell propulsion and operation. The 2010 NDPG and MTDP
specified that the destroyer force be maintained at 48 ships, but the 2013 NDPG and
MTDP increased this number to 54. As part of this maritime build-up, Japan continues to
introduce Destroyer-Helicopter warships (DDH). The MSDF has taken delivery of two
7000 ton Hyuga  -class 16 DDHs, with a regular complement of four helicopters capable of
carrying up to 11. It has now procured a further two 19000-ton Izumo-class 22DDs,
launched in August 2013 and August 2015, capable of carrying up to 14 helicopters. The
MSDF DDHs are the largest vessels built for the service in the post-war period, and are in
all but name light helicopter carriers. The prime function of these assets is to provide
powerful anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, clearly aimed against China’s accessdenial strategy. But Japan’s venturing back into carrier technology is resonate of a possible
Sino–Japanese carrier arms race, and the suspicion of analysts is that the MSDF might eventually attempt to operate fixed-wing aircraft from the DDH-22s such as the maritime variant of the F-35. Japan’s maritime air and ASW capability is to be further strengthened
through procurement of a replacement for its P-3Cs with the introduction of an indigenous
P-1 patrol surveillance aircraft with the ability to sweep over an 8000 kilometer range and
thus deep into the South China Sea.
Japan under Abe also appears resolved to allocate more funds to its build-up of national
military capabilities. Shortly after taking power, Abe initiated the first, albeit modest, rise
in Japanese defence spending in over a decade. The JMOD’s defence expenditure has
increased at rates of 1–2% over the last three years, and it has requested another 2.2% rise
for 2015–2016 which signifies the largest defence budget in the post-war period.118
Japanese policymakers have argued that these defence budget increases are still modest in
the context of its stagnating budgets for almost two decades and of the rapid rise in China’s
military expenditure. But Japan’s desire to raise defence spending is clearly driven by a
growing impulse to balance China militarily (Figure 3).
US–Japan Alliance and other Balancing Partners
Japan’s military modernization programme has undoubtedly enhanced its ability to internally balance China, but it has at the same time redoubled efforts to strengthen external balancing alongside the USA, and to obviate any risks of abandonment. Although US–Japan
alliance relations under the DPJ initially suffered tensions due to the Hatoyama administration’s decision to withdraw the MSDF from refueling operations to support the international coalition’s efforts in Afghanistan, and to its reconsideration of and subsequent
relenting on plans to relocate the USMC Futenma Air Station within Okinawa Prefecture,
the DPJ nonetheless continued to strengthen the long-term military foundations of the
alliance.
In regard to BMD, perhaps the most important long-term driver of US–Japan military
integration, cooperation under the DPJ has rolled forward. Japan and the USA continued
the joint development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor missile, and agreed in June 2011
118 Boeisho, ‘Waga Kuni no Boei to Yosan: Heisei 28nendo Gaisan Yokyu no Gaiyo’(National
Defence and Budget: Outline of Request for 2016), August 2015, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/
yosan/2016/gaisan.pdf.
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that Japan would make an exemption in the arms export ban to permit export of the missile
to third countries.119 In April 2012, Japan and the USA completed plans for collocation of
the ASDF Air Defence Command with that of the USAF at Yokota air base, near Tokyo,
thus to improve information-sharing in response to missile attacks.120
The 2010 NDPG was devised with close linkages to the USA’s own Quadrennial
Defence Review (QDR) that year, and coincided in general with the USA’s ‘rebalance’ towards the Asia-Pacific, announced in January 2011. The DPJ actually overtook previous
LDP administrations by updating in the 2011 Security Consultative Committee (the main
policy coordinating mechanism of the alliance) the 2005 and 2007 ‘Common Strategic
Objectives’ of the bilateral alliance to include functions such as enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), maritime security, and cyber security, so laying the
groundwork for the later revision in 2015 under the Abe administration of the US–Japan
Guidelines for Defence Cooperation.121 US–Japan alliance interoperability was then tested
and strengthened in the wake of the 3.11 disasters.122 The USA launched Operation
Tomodachi to support the JSDF’s own mobilization of 100000 troops for disaster relief by
44,500
45,000
45,500
46,000
46,500
47,000
47,500
48,000
48,500
49,000
49,500
50,000
¥100 millions
Fig. 3 Japan Defense Expenditure Trends 1997–2015 and Defense Budget Request for 2016.
Source: Ministry of Defence Japan
119 ‘Joint statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Toward a Deeper and Broader
Alliance Building on Fifty Years of Partnership’, 21 June, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/re
gion/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf, p. 9.
120 ‘ASDF Command Now at Yokota’, The Japan Times Online, 27 March, 2012, http://www.
japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120327a2.html.
121 Boei Kenkyusho, Higashi Ajia Senryaku Gaiyo 2012  , pp. 224-225; Department of Defence,
Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the Twenty First Century, January 2012,
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, p. 2.
122 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2013).
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utilizing the full panoply of its military assets in Japan itself and the Pacific, including 20
USN vessels, 140 aircraft, and 20 000 USMC personnel.
The return to power of the LDP in 2012 opened the way towards further initiatives to
strengthen the US–Japan alliance. The Abe administration’s revised 2013 NDPG was
clearly geared to strengthening security cooperation with the USA. The next stage in reinforcing the alliance was the April 2015 revision of the US–Japan Defence Guidelines, the
first since 1997. The 2015 Defence Guidelines revisions expand the range of Japanese support for the USA in contingencies to include: ISR; BMD; maritime security; asset protection;
joint use of facilities; PKO; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and defence activities in cyber space and outer space. The revised Guidelines stress the concept of ‘seamless
cooperation’ and a ‘whole-of-government approach’, so removing the previous rigid separation of bilateral cooperation into ‘peacetime’, ‘Japan’ and ‘regional’ contingencies. The intention is for military cooperation to operate more smoothly across all potential scenarios
and levels of conflict escalation.
Moreover, the revised Defence Guidelines emphasize that bilateral cooperation should
now be global, and not necessarily geographically restricted, as in past formulations, to
Japan itself or the surrounding region. Even more significantly, and designed to interlink
with Japan’s breach of the ban on the exercise of collective self-defence in July 2014, the
revised Defence Guidelines outline the areas wherein the JSDF can now exercise force to defend US forces, such as the protection of US shipping, interdiction of other shipping, BMD,
and providing logistical support during conflicts.123 The same year Japan followed up the
revised Defence Guidelines with its new security legislation to create the framework for the
exercise of collective self-defence, comprising the Law on Response to Contingencies, and
the Law to Ensure Security in Contingencies Significantly Affecting Japan, so replacing the
1999 Regional Contingencies Law.
In addition, Japan has expanded its scope of military cooperation, in conjunction with
US regional security strategy, and begun to incorporate a wider range of US allies and partners to support its incipient balancing strategy. Japan and Australia security ties have
advanced relatively steadily since the ‘Joint Declaration on Security’ in 2003, and the DPJ
administration concluded in 2010 an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
with Australia on the sharing of military logistical support in peacetime and UN operations.
Modelled on Japan’s ACSA with the USA, signed in 1996 and revised in 1999, it clearly
provides a template compatible with the future possible trilateral logistical cooperation
among Japan, the USA, and Australia. Japan and Australia signed an Information Security
Agreement in May 2012, again modelled on that between Japan and the USA, thus serving
to further enhance the potential for trilateral cooperation; and in April 2014 both sides concluded a new EPA and pledged further cooperation on cyber-security and defence technology exchanges.124 The NSC, in line with the new Three Principles on the Transfer of
Defence Technology and Equipment, approved in April 2015 Japan’s participation in the
competitive tender to provide new submarines for Australia. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Ltd. are moreover seeking to export technology from its Sory  u-
class attack submarines.
123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘The Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation’, 27
April, 2015, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000078188.pdf.
124 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Joint Press Release on Japan-Australia Summit
Meeting’, 7 April, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000034801.pdf.
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Japanese security ties with India, as compared with those with Australia, have proceeded more slowly since the initial ‘Joint Declaration on Security and Cooperation’ in
2008. The DPJ administration did, though, step up cooperation with this emerging US partner, having conducted in December 2011 the first-ever foreign ministry director-level security talks trilaterally with the USA and India, and reached agreement in 2012 to hold joint
naval maritime security exercises. Similarly, Japan and the DPJ government have been
more willing to explore meaningful ties with South Korea as another important US partner.
The MSDF officers first observed US–South Korea military exercises, as a demonstration of
trilateral unity in the wake of the Cheonan sinking incident, in July 2010. South Korean
navy officers first participated as observers in US–Japan large-scale military exercises in
December of that year, this time following North Korea’s bombardment of Yeonpyeong
Island. Japan and South Korea had been considering since early 2011, and in April 2012
were reportedly close to signing, an ACSA and General Security of Military Information
Agreement (GSOMIA) on the exchange of BMD early warning intelligence. The South
Korean government shied away from finally concluding the agreements in May 2012, due
to domestic political sensitivities over military cooperation with Japan, further compounded by Abe’s visit to Yasukuni in December 2013; but following North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests in February 2016, Japan and South Korea have resumed discussions
on implementing the agreement.125 Meanwhile, Japan has under the first and second Abe
administrations shown interest in establishing cooperation with NATO, and signed defence
cooperation memoranda with the UK and France in 2012 and 2013 as regards cooperation
on defence production and intelligence sharing



essay from where the paragraph is from (to rewrite):
In the contemporary geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia, the rise of China represents one of the most significant shifts in regional dynamics. For Japan, a nation with profound historical, economic, and strategic interests in the region, this shift necessitates a nuanced and multidimensional strategy. This essay examines how Japan should deal with a rising China in Southeast Asia, considering historical context, economic interdependence, military strategy, and diplomatic engagement. The exploration draws upon various sources to present a comprehensive approach that balances competition and cooperation.

#### Historical Context and Strategic Interests

Historically, Japan and China have experienced periods of both conflict and collaboration. During the early 20th century, Japan’s imperial ambitions led to a confrontation with China, culminating in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Post-World War II, Japan redefined its role in Asia, focusing on economic growth and regional stability. However, the rise of China as a financial and military power has reintroduced a competitive element to this relationship.

In Southeast Asia, Japan has long been a key player. The region is vital due to its strategic maritime routes and economic potential. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its assertive stance in the South China Sea represent a growing challenge to Japan’s influence. According to Tsuneo Watanabe, “Japan’s grand strategy can be said to have been shaped by the pursuit of complex security and economic interests within the Japan-US-China triangle, whose history can be traced back to the 1930s” (Watanabe, 2015). Therefore, Japan’s strategy must navigate these historical and strategic complexities.

Indeed, the comprehensive historical context shapes Japan’s perspective and possible responses to China’s rise. As noted in “Report of the Expert Panel for the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation,” Japan’s historical engagement in Southeast Asia dates back to several decades and includes considerable contributions to the region’s political and economic landscape. The relationship is multifaceted involving deep strategic commitments such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy which aims to ensure a rules-based order in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023).

#### Economic Interdependence

Economically, both Japan and China are deeply integrated with Southeast Asia. China’s BRI aims to enhance infrastructure connectivity and increase its influence, while Japan has historically provided significant development aid and investment to the region. Given this economic interdependence, Japan should adopt a complementary rather than confrontational economic strategy toward China.

For instance, Japanese companies can collaborate with Southeast Asian nations on infrastructure projects not exclusively tied to Chinese funding. By providing alternatives, Japan can help these nations avoid excessive reliance on China. Stephen R. Nagy notes that Japan’s “reputation became one of being an essential partner to the region and Tokyo began to see itself as having the responsibility to contribute to the region’s development as part of its national interests” (Nagy, 2024).

Moreover, Japan can leverage its technological expertise in sectors such as renewable energy, healthcare, and digital infrastructure. By positioning itself as a leader in these fields, Japan can enhance its soft power and economic influence in Southeast Asia, balancing China’s footprint. As Hoang Thi Ha states, “Japan’s active participation, support, and leadership in various multilateral economic partnership agreements…will remain pivotal, especially as the US is turning away from the global multilateral trading system, amidst a backdrop of rising unilateralism and protectionism worldwide” (Hoang, 2024).

In exploring how economic strategies play out in the South China Sea, Hidetaka Yoshimatsu explains, “While China has employed economic means as ‘carrot and stick’ to influence the position of Southeast Asian states, Japan has intensified economic aid, even revising the basic principles of its development assistance policy” (Yoshimatsu, 2017, p. 295). This strategic use of economic measures is crucial for understanding Japan’s approach to balancing economic interdependence with strategic interests.

#### Military Strategy and Security Partnerships

In terms of military strategy, Japan faces a delicate balancing act. While it is crucial to deter potential aggression and ensure regional security, overt military expansion could provoke an arms race. Thus, Japan should focus on building robust security partnerships with Southeast Asian nations.

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) can engage in joint exercises, capacity-building initiatives, and disaster relief operations with Southeast Asian militaries. Such cooperation fosters mutual trust and enhances regional stability. According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan will strengthen cooperation in the field of maritime security based on the rule of law and achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific” (MOFA, 2022).

Additionally, Japan can support regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). These platforms enable collective dialogue and collaboration on security issues, providing a counterbalance to China’s unilateral actions in the South China Sea. Hoang Thi Ha emphasizes that "Japan’s steadfast commitment to adhere to its pacifist principles” underlines its approach to security cooperation, prioritizing non-traditional security challenges (Hoang, 2024).

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu highlights Japan’s strategic use of economic aid to fortify its defense relationships: “Japan has utilized foreign economic aid for strategic objectives, even revising the basic principles of its development assistance policy” (Yoshimatsu, 2017, p. 295). This underscores how economic and security strategies intersect in Japan’s approach to regional stability.

#### Diplomatic Engagement and Multilateralism

Diplomatically, Japan’s approach should prioritize multilateralism and adherence to international norms. Promoting a rules-based order in Southeast Asia aligns with Japan’s national interests and resonates with the region’s smaller nations, which often feel vulnerable to larger powers.

According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) emphasizes "the promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade” (MOFA, 2022). By engaging countries through this strategy, Japan can present itself as a reliable and principled partner, contrasting with China’s sometimes coercive diplomacy.

Furthermore, Japan should actively participate in regional economic forums such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). These platforms not only facilitate economic integration but also serve as venues for promoting shared values and norms.

Michael J. Green underscores that Japan’s FOIP “flows from a strategic worldview in Japan, even if it does not spell out every detail of the national objectives and instruments of power to be employed” (Green, 2018). By adopting this framework, Japan emphasizes “rule-of-law; transparency; openness; high-quality rules for trade, investment and infrastructure; and the prevention of coercive actions against smaller states” (Green, 2018).

According to Yoshimatsu, Japan’s strategy in multilateral settings includes expanding the scope from “maritime safety to maritime security targeting China” (Yoshimatsu, 2017, p. 295). This shift in focus demonstrates Japan’s commitment to a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to regional security.