请将“1.1	The Intersection of Different Structural Principles
Social forms are structural principles specific to capitalism. They in no way explain the entire institutional system of those societies. If one wants to do justice to the diversity of modern technologies of domination, one has to acknowledge that modern societies ‘were not constructed on a political tabula rasa but on the historically variable foundations of past social forms and discourses’.8 Thus, for example, ‘an inherited patriarchal context’9 exists which is reconfigured within capitalism. In the institutions the legal form links up with other structural principles, that is, with other social forms, power technologies and ways of subjectivation, which also inscribe themselves in the apparatuses. Therefore it is no accident that Pashukanis addresses the close connection of law and commodity production. Civil law contracts are always a combination of the legal and the commodity form. At the same time the legal form is institutionally entangled with the political form in a particular manner. But also the gender binary and heteronormativity articulate themselves through legal practice. It is only in bourgeois society that nature and society are to such an extent - and with such subtlety - subjected to a binary gen-dering and at the same time naturalised; and as such it is only here that the traces of social construction are entirely eliminated.10 The hierarchical gender binary is thus the way in which patriarchal and heterosexist relations of dom- 
ination are inscribed in modern institutions and systematically interlink in them with the legal form. This connection could mainly emerge in a process of searching, because the legal form operates simultaneously in an individualising and a totalising manner. On the one hand it sanctions existing social ways of subjectivation, on the other it brings them together into a hegemonic whole through the very abstraction it performs, and thus also processes its antagonistic position. Broadening the perspective to not only examine the materialisation of the legal form in the institutions, but also in the totality of socially dispersed legal practices, one can speak of legal dispositifs. Those encompass more than the condensation of the legal form in the institutions alone; they also articulate discourses about law that are not yet institutionalised, attempts to make a certain discourse hegemonic, and everyday practices.
The totality of social dispositifs forms a historical block, that is, a coherent ensemble of techniques of coercive force and consensus that reproduces itself over a longer period of time. The perspective of analysis depends on which phenomena one seeks to investigate. All that matters is to reflect carefully on which level of abstraction to argue at; on that of the legal form, the historical block, the dispositif or the institution.
1.2	Institutions and Everyday Behaviour
The further structural principles can extend across institutions in space and time, the more resistant they can become to attempts to change them.11 For institutions gradually develop a ‘longue durée’, which both pre-exists the lives of individuals born into a particular society and also outlasts them?2 We are, as John Holloway put it, born into a world that is always already pre-shaped ‘before we begin to reflect critically’?3 As they are institutionalised, structural principles are therefore immanent to everyday actions in a way that marks its ‘immediate perceptions and behavioural orientation’ (Hirsch). Angelika Wet- terer accordingly also speaks in the context of the construction of gender of a ‘relationship of concealment44 whereby the construction remains systematically hidden from those who develop it. For in routine everyday behaviour, relevant knowledge for activities, practical consciousness, is immune to the institutionalising structural principles that are already given from the outset?5 Due to the longue durée those become plausible in the world of everyday life. Here the connection of the overall ‘spectrality’ of social conditions and their continual recreation in everyday behaviour - until they are ‘unburdened’ through their sedimentation in institutions - becomes clear.
1.3	Apparatuses
In addition to social forms and other technologies of power, there still remains to be examined materiality. The concept of the ‘apparatus’ allows both Poulantzas and Foucault, following Althusser, to describe the materiality and the external unity of certain practices. It appears therefore appropriate to follow Foucault and separate institutions analytically into apparatuses on the one hand and power technologies on the other. Here power technologies thus describe the respective effects of power (subjectivation, discipline, social cohesion, etc.), while the apparatuses represent the mechanisms of the internal momentum required. Ultimately institutions are also nothing other than social practices, but they temporarily fix those practices. For example, as the processes of the legal form reproduce and thus institutionalise themselves permanently through routinised practices, as they develop a differentiated court system, specialised jurists, a plurality of codified legal norms, a specific practice of legal argumentation and of filtering non-juridical ‘reality’, norm projections, legality and illegality etc., a legal world of its own emerges and gives rise to an interest in its own perpetuation, which is then articulated in the social practices of the legal actors, and most notably in bureaucracy.
That historically and spatially diverse legal apparatuses can come into conflict with each other and are marked by social contradictions, is plausibly described by Poulantzas. An interconnected ensemble of diverse apparatuses can only be created through a hegemonic project; it then shapes a specific social formation. It is, however, always possible to act in opposition to institutions, because their materiality is neither eternal nor insurmountable. There always remains ‘scope for actions to overflow or circumvent structural con- straints’.16 Their success is nonetheless less likely and significantly harder, in particular for those who are disadvantaged by strategic selectivity. Moreover strategic and even routinised action can fail: ‘[b]ecause subjects are never unitary, never fully aware of the conditions of strategic action, never fully equipped to realise their preferred strategies, and always face possible opposition from actors pursuing other strategies or tactics’?7
On the Relationship of Law and State
The legal form is not only relationally autonomous with regard to the economic, but also to the political form. As can be seen especially in Blanke et. al., law’s own density is recognised in the first, but not in the second case. It is therefore nothing but the medium through which the state can act upon society. Poulantzas’ theory is similarly characterised by something of a ‘statesurplus’. The reason is easy to see: modern, rational law and the modern nation state are deeply interwoven. Thus all legal institutions are organised by the state and the necessary enforceability of the law, the repressive side of legal technology, is tied to an extra-economic coercive force. At the same time the legal form limits the immediate coercive force of the state.18 Luhmann holds that it is the obvious mutual dependence of the two systems, politics and law, that makes it difficult to discover their functional differentiation?9 It is this institutional symbiosis that also leads to a legal-theoretical dilemma for materialist theory, namely to the inadequate analysis of the legal form. The impression is created that law is always implicitly included in the context of state-theoretical reflections. However, this actually negates its own materiality, which cannot be reduced to that of the state.
In order to make this ‘differentiation’ visible, I propose to distinguish between the necessary articulation of political form and legal form on the most abstract analytical level, that of structural principles, on the one hand, and the historically and spatially specific institutional form of law and nation state on the other. Those levels of analysis must not be mixed with each other, because then historical forms would be taken for structural principles.
Already on the level of the structural principles of capitalist societies it must be noted that both forms function independently, but at the same time refer to each other. The legal form is always also a process of reflection, in which every practice develops a relationship to itself. In specialist legal literature and comments or in court decisions, for example, questions of the attribution of actions to subject artefacts or collisions of social norms are discussed. Law is here a specific technology for reflection, which captures and legally encloses concrete social practices in the autonomous procedures of legal arguments. Law thus brings those practices together in a hegemonic order, and formalises them. It thus allows one to define a position that can then be again politically contested.20 In terms of its content, the political form processes the art of behaviour management and of governing the population. As Pashukanis shows, its formal democratic procedures reflect legal norms publicly. While the legal form thus codifies social practices and the norms arising from them juridically and brings them into a certain operationalisable form, the political form confronts in its processes the norms thus developed, with hegemonic struggles taking place in relation to the modalities of governance. Hegemony is inherent in different ways in both of the two forms.”翻译为中文