请将“The army of the late Stuarts was a poorly disciplined ‘instrument' of royal power with a weak professional structure. In combination with the militia units, however, it was sufficient to combat disturbances across the country. We should also note however that the military resources of the late Stuarts bore no comparison with those of other contemporary European rulers; even those of Charles I had been far superior.
There was also an extension and above all an improvement in royal admin-istration. Offices still remained the personal possession of their incumbents, and although there were no formal rules of inheritance in England for the transmission of offices, de facto dynasties of office-holders did develop none the less. Since, under the Restoration, the highest government offices were extraordinarily well endowed, they were also highly prized by the nobility. A systematic development of techniques of administration and control is none the less apparent - above all for the Treasury. In assessing the crown's means of domination, these must be given considerable weight. For, with the aid of the new machinery of government, it became possible to more than balance the loss of income that the crown had suffered with the ending of feudal dues. It was above all the new tax administration and the practice of direct levying of customs duties that helped raise the income of the late Stuart kings to unprecedented levels. The most important power-political foundations of monarchical strength - military resources and financial endowment - were thus considerably increased in the first decades of the Restoration against those of the pre-Revolutionary period.
In other areas, however, the crown had to accept permanent concessions, even if these were in no way decisive. Thus the highest church court, the court of High Commission, was abolished, and in the counties rule over church matters devolved largely on the local nobility (cf. Chapter 3, section b). James II did indeed call the court of High Commission back to life. Yet this revision of a decision that was generally regarded as a lasting achievement of the 1640s signalled a royal coup d'état in religious affairs, an injury to those limitations of personal rule that had been implemented after the Revolution. Though James could enforce this, it strengthened ill-feeling towards him.
The Restoration monarchs did accept a limitation of the Privy Council's penal powers. But this did not fundamentally curtail their personal judicial authority. It was not just that the Privy Council used the prerogative to order imprisonment on the basis of a very broad interpretation of high treason.288 Helped by their right to appoint and dismiss judges, the kings also intervened directly in ongoing legal cases. Thus in 1686 James II dismissed no less than six judges in a single case (Godden versus Hales), in order to reach the verdict he wanted.289 Since officials continued to be direct servants of the king, and only continued in office ‘during his pleasure', the king still had the ‘state apparatus' at his disposal.
From 1660 to 1688, the English kings had more power at their command than did their predecessors. This was materially assured because both Charles II and James II at the start of their respective reigns were granted crown income for their lifetime. In this way, Parliament surrendered its most important political leverage. Politically, the restored and expanded royal supremacy was founded on a fear of renewed unrest and the endangering of estate domination. Within the public sphere, there was indeed criticism of certain forms of rule, but political discourse was dominated by the view that the crown's prerogative was the most important guarantee of a hierarchically well-ordered society and the protection of property. This secular foundation was embedded in a conception of divine right which joined providence with legal succession. Since strict maintenance of succession ruled out any idea of a choice of authority by the people or its representatives, the champions of this view - in the logic of their political self-conception - were held in obedience to their king even when James II proved to be a member of the Catholic church and responded to the demands of Parliament by dissolving it.
The events of 1688-9 shook the pillars of this political discourse. They poured scorn on the combination of estate domination and divine right. The unconditional - at least passive - obedience to the king that was claimed as the basis of political stability came to an end when the Whigs ‘invited' William of Orange to defend the Church of England and the freedom of the English people. When William landed with an army and James fled the country, the Tories saw themselves forced for the sake of political stability to come to terms with a king who ruled de facto, but not by right. Many of them saw this as a circumstance that could only be given temporary approval, and even outside the ‘political nation' restricted by estate, many women and men still retained their allegiance to the departed king and later to the house of Stuart. Conversely, there was neither enthusiasm for the new foreign monarch nor any hope for the dawn of a new age. The events of 1688-9 did not take place in the context of a revolutionary public. There was no revolutionary drama, but rather - initially - nothing more than a political break, which the politically active members of the ruling estates largely sought to master within their own ranks.
Even those who had pursued this break were concerned to conceal its scope. They stressed the continuity of the ‘old constitution', and collaborated in maintaining the fiction of legal succession, in so far as the royal rule was conveyed jointly on William III (from the house of Orange) and Mary II (from the house of Stuart). 
In fact, what came to an end in 1688 was not just the specific form of mon-archy that had been introduced in 1660 out of fear of a new revolution, but also (in Christopher Hill's formulation) the ‘monarchy in the traditional sense of the term'.290 This can be read from the formulation of the Declaration of Rights. William III had to agree to grant titles and lands only with the agreement of Parliament. This narrowed the basis of the courtier economy and changed the structure of court intrigues. The making of foreign policy and the decision over peace and war remained a prerogative of the king; he could still appoint and dismiss ministers and officials, and had the power to veto decisions of Parliament. Yet since 1690 there has not been a year when parliament has not met, and the royal right of veto, which was never formally surrendered, fell into disuse after it was last used by Queen Anne in 1708. From 1689, or, more accurately, 1690, sovereignty no longer lay with the crown, but rather with the crown and the two Houses of Parliament. It is only since this time that Parliament in the singular has existed rather than the various parliaments of English kings. This change was brought about in the first instance by the decision of a majority in Parliament to grant the new king only half of the customary revenues for his lifetime. The remaining half was initially granted only for a period of four years, and it was, moreover, so curtailed that it did not suffice to meet the regular costs of the crown in time of peace, not to mention interest and repayment on credits earlier taken. When these legislative proposals became known, William III is said to have considered renouncing the throne. For it was clear to anyone that a regular deficit on the part of the crown had necessarily to make it pliable to demands of Parliament. It was not so much the Triennial Act of 1694, but rather the financial settlement of 1690, that set future limits to royal prerogative, and also guaranteed the regular summoning of Parliament. As Clayton Roberts has shown, it was not only convinced Whigs who brought about this financial supremacy of Parliament, but also the bulk of the Tories. It may have been that they sought in this way to restrict the power of a king whom they intended to tolerate only until their legitimate lord had returned. In actual fact, they took part in a permanent shift in the system of government. The effect of this shift, however, went even beyond the intentions of the Whigs. With only few exceptions, the representatives of this strategy at the end of the seventeenth century did not aim at a permanent involvement of Parliament in the government of England. They sought a lever to compel the king to dismiss unpopular ministers and agree laws that seemed necessary to them. The summoning of Parliament for a three-year term seemed to them sufficient for this. Scarcely one of the Members of Parliament imagined that advice over policy would be transformed into a seasonally practised professional activity. But this was indeed the result of Parliament's financial supremacy. For after the outbreak of war in 1690, there was a session of Parliament every year. Parliament was also increasingly influential, so that government now required the agreement of its dominant faction. Retrospectively, the change of government of 1688 appears as the catalyst for a change in the centralised power, which now became public. Monarchical power became state power.
Two specific developments allow this structural change to be traced espe-cially well: the decision of 1708 to remove the king's power over the duration of office of judges, so that justice became a state power, and the foundation of the Bank of England in 1694.
The nationalisation of the state debt separated the material basis of cen-tralised power from the person of the king. Already under James II, a reform of the financial administration had been started, which served as precondition for the subsequent development. The aim at this time was to regulate administrative practice by criteria of efficiency. To this end, both procedures and personnel were taken over from the previous tax farmers.291 In future, promotion was to be subordinated to the goal of administrative rationality, and only allowed on grounds of competence and service. Quite independent of the extent of its actual application, a decision of this kind meant the abolition of the traditional system of handing out offices.
On the basis of these changes, it was no longer necessary to use the indi-vidual creditworthiness of office-holders to fix up loans. This dispensed also with the immediate profit that these had drawn from the indebtedness of the crown. From now on, the Treasury would guarantee the security of loans. As a result of this, Parliament for the first time in 1685 - in connection with gathering resources for the defeat of the Monmouth rebellion - gave future tax receipts as security for a public loan. In the war years of subsequent gov-ernments, this practice rapidly mushroomed. It formed the basis for the foun-dation of the national bank, and extended the material basis for the power politics of the state. This now lay no longer in taxes (along with duties), but rather in the creditworthiness of the state, which guaranteed that a part of the tax receipts could be paid out in the form of interest to its creditors. The nationalisation of the state debt, however, made possible a broader regional - and hence also social - distribution of loans, making the crown in this way independent of the particular financiers whose privileged interest conditions it had previously had to meet.292 The costs of state credit accordingly fell. At the same time, this change in financial technique meant the dissolution of traditional structures of private participation in the appropriation proceeds of centralised power. By de-privatising centralised appropriation, this could more easily be integrated into the increasingly depersonalised central power.
At the turn from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century, the exercise of personal royal power became dependent on the agreement of Parliament. Kings and queens still possessed a great deal of power, but they could wield this power only within the limits that were agreed by Parliament.”翻译为中文