Below is the latest written statement further updated with recommended improvements in defending the partition suit. Could you throughly check whether in any form or share, explicitly or impliedly in any place in the written statement defendant no. 1 accepted or indication of acceptance of coparcenary rights of the plaintiff or acceptance of Hindu Undivided Joint Family, Joint Family, or joint family properties even though in the context of denying plaintiff's claims case law and legal defence put forward by discussing about the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, and how daughters were granted equal coparcenary rights in joint family property and case law about Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma case. As judicial officer can you throughly double check whether inadvertently any ambiguity is placed in any argument or reply to plaint averments or allegations or in any other section of the written statement with respect to key allegations of plaintiff i.e. coparcenary rights of the plaintiff, acceptance of Hindu Undivided Joint Family, Joint Family, or joint family properties?  

IN THE COURT OF THE HONOURABLE CIVIL JUDGE (JUNIOR DIVISION) AT MYLAVARAM
O.S. No. 143/2024

BETWEEN:
Alavala Vijaya Kumari                                    		... Plaintiff

AND

1. Thummuru Bose Reddy
2. Thummuru Ravindra Reddy                               	... Defendants

WRITTEN STATEMENT UNDER ORDER VIII RULE 1 OF CPC BY DEFENDANT NO. 1

1.	I humbly submit that, at the outset, the suit filed by the Plaintiff is prima facie not maintainable, either in law or on the facts of the case. Therefore, it is liable to be dismissed in limine.
2.	I humbly submit that I deny the allegations and averments in the plaint and the contentions of the Plaintiff as false and frivolous. My lack of specific denial, whether line by line or sentence by sentence, shall not be construed as an admission. The Plaintiff has suppressed material facts and made false assertions. The Partition Suit is liable to be dismissed for suppression of facts and for misleading this Hon’ble Court. The Plaintiff has approached this Hon’ble Court with unclean hands, intending to harass me, her aged father, who is 78 years old, at a time of increased vulnerability, following the death of my wife, after which I have been living alone. Despite residing in the same locality, the Plaintiff has failed to provide any support, instead, exploiting my circumstances to pursue her baseless claims. Her actions reveal an ulterior motive to unsettle settled property rights and evade her legal and ethical responsibilities. 
3.	I humbly submit that, the Plaintiff is put to strict proof of all the allegations made in the partition suit, except, which are specifically admitted by me in this written statement.
The Plaintiff is put to strict proof of her claims regarding the ancestral nature of the properties, her alleged rights to partition, and her assertions of joint family status. It is submitted that the plaint-scheduled properties were partitioned before 1980 among the Class I heirs of my father, Late Krishna Reddy, including his three sons, conclusively severing any joint family or ancestral nature of these properties. As established in the Supreme Court judgments of Bhagwat Sharan (Dead Through LRS.) v. Purushottam & Ors. (2020) and Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ram Chandra Ravagowda Sankh (1969), the burden of proving that a property is part of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) lies squarely on the person asserting such a claim. It is insufficient to merely allege joint family status; the Plaintiff must substantiate her claims with credible evidence of a joint family nucleus from which the properties in question could have been acquired. The Plaintiff’s current claims are further undermined by the principle established in Basang Singh v. Janaki Singh (1967), which holds that prior admissions in judicial pleadings are admissible evidence and carry strong probative value. Her contradictory claims in this suit not only lack credibility but also undermine the integrity of the judicial process. While putting the Plaintiff to strict proof of her allegations, I am fully prepared to present documentary evidence, including registered partition deeds, sale deeds, gift deeds, revenue records, and witness testimony, to refute any false or misleading claims made in the plaint.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that documentary evidence, such as registered deeds and public records, carries more weight than oral testimony, particularly in property disputes. In Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (2012), it was affirmed that registered documents are of high probative value and should be prioritized over oral claims.
4.	I, Defendant No.1, son of Late Thummuru Krishna Reddy, aged 78 years, do hereby file this written statement in response to the plaint filed by the Plaintiff in the above-mentioned case. I am the father of the Plaintiff, Alavala Vijaya Kumari (aged 52 years), and Defendant No.2, Thummuru Ravindra Reddy (aged 50 years). I respectfully state that I received Item Nos. 2 and 4 of the plaint-scheduled properties as my share in a physical partition conducted before 1980 among the Class I heirs of my father, Late Krishna Reddy, namely his three sons, including me. This partition conclusively severed any coparcenary or ancestral nature of these properties, rendering them my self-acquired properties. I have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of these properties since the partition, until they were legally transferred to Defendant No.2. Furthermore, I purchased Item Nos. 1 and 3 during the minority of my children, using my self-earned funds, income derived from my share of the partitioned properties (Item Nos. 2 and 4), borrowed funds in my personal capacity, and earnings as a tenant farmer. I have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of these properties since their purchase, until they were legally transferred to Defendant No.2.
The Plaintiff was married at the age of 17 in 1989, approximately 35 years ago, and has resided in her matrimonial home ever since. At the time of her marriage, she was given Ac. 2.05 cents of land—constituting 1/3 of my properties at that time—along with cash and gold as a final settlement, formalized through a registered gift deed in 2006 described as Pasupukunkuma. This provision ensured her financial security and independence. For over three decades, the Plaintiff has exclusively enjoyed the benefits of this property while having no involvement in the management or upkeep of my other properties, which were partitioned among my brothers and me before 1980 or acquired by me as self-earned assets. The Plaintiff is estopped from claiming rights in the plaint-scheduled properties under the Doctrine of Election. During her marriage in 1989, the Plaintiff accepted Ac. 2.05 cents of land as a gift, constituting a significant portion of my self-acquired properties at the time. This gift was intended to ensure her financial security and independence, as evidenced by its formalization through a registered deed. Having accepted this benefit, the Plaintiff cannot now challenge the arrangement or assert further claims over the remaining properties without first returning the benefit she received. Her actions amount to approbating and reprobating, which is contrary to well-established principles of equity and the Doctrine of Election, as upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam (2020) and similar precedents. Accordingly, her claim is untenable and deserves to be dismissed.
The properties in question, specifically Item Nos. 2 and 4, were conclusively partitioned among the Class I heirs of my father before 1980 through a valid oral partition (physical partition with boundaries setup and secured by respective owners), which was followed by continuous possession and later formalized through registered documents. This partition severed any joint family status, making these properties my exclusive share. The severance of the coparcenary occurred decades before the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which introduced coparcenary rights for daughters. Therefore, the Plaintiff, as a granddaughter, did not have any rights in her grandfather’s property prior to the amendment, nor does she have any valid claim now. Despite this, she now seeks a share in the remaining properties, disregarding her substantial past benefits, the self-acquired and partitioned nature of the properties, and the settled legal arrangements. This demand is inequitable, unjustifiable, and ignores the contributions and rights of her brother, Defendant No. 2, as well as my advanced age and needs as a senior citizen.
Under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, daughters were granted equal coparcenary rights in joint family property. However, this amendment does not apply retroactively to coparcenaries that were severed before the amendment. In this case, the coparcenary was conclusively severed through an oral partition before 1980, as evidenced by continuous possession and later formalization in registered documents such as the 2018 partition deed for Item No. 2 and the 2006 gift deed for Item No. 4. Once a coparcenary is severed, the properties cease to hold ancestral or joint family character, becoming self-acquired properties of the individuals who hold them.
As a granddaughter, the Plaintiff did not have rights in her grandfather’s property before the amendment. Additionally, she has never been in possession or management of the properties in question, further undermining her claim. The Plaintiff’s demand now to disrupt settled family arrangements is legally untenable and contrary to well-established principles of Hindu law.
My late wife, who passed away in 2018, did not contribute any stridhana or funds to the acquisition of these properties. I have independently managed and controlled the plaint-scheduled properties without any involvement or assistance from the Plaintiff, until they were legally transferred to Defendant No.2. The Plaintiff herself admitted in her voluntarily initiated Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023, registered on 28.03.2023, before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi, filed 18 months prior to instituting this partition suit, that I alone owned and was in possession and management of these properties. This admission aligns with the truth and explicitly confirms that I alone owned and was in exclusive possession and management of the plaint-scheduled properties up to the point of their respective legal transfers to Defendant No.2.
This clarification is important because the stance I submitted in my defense during the Writ Petition was specific to the fact that all the properties I owned had already been transferred to my children (Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2) by that time, except for Item No. 4, which was explicitly adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, and restored to me as my self-acquired property. These properties represent not only my self-acquired assets but also decades of settled rights and uninterrupted possession. For over 35 years, I have independently managed, maintained, and improved these properties without any involvement, contribution, or claim from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s current contradictory stance in this suit is baseless and fabricated. I submit that these facts unequivocally establish that the plaint-scheduled properties are not ancestral, joint family, or coparcenary properties, as alleged by the Plaintiff, but rather my self-acquired/self-earned and self-managed assets.
The long-standing possession and consistent entries in revenue records further corroborate my ownership claims, as recognized in Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander & Ors (1968), where such records were given significant weight.
5.	I humbly submit that the Plaintiff is my daughter, and Defendant No.2 is my son. I got both of them married, and since their marriages, they have been living on their own. My wife passed away in 2018, and I am residing alone in Kothreddygudem Village, Reddygudem Mandal, NTR District. I worked hard and brought up my children, providing full care and support to each of them. Approximately 35 years ago, at the time of my daughter’s marriage in 1989, I gave her Ac. 2.05 cents of my land, in addition to cash and gold. My son currently resides in London, U.K., and I have also given him my self-acquired lands.
6.	I submit that now, I am aged about 78 years and I am not having good health condition.  Soon after my wife passed away on 19.06.2018, my son and daughter stopped taking care of me. My daughter/Plaintiff and her husband harassed me for money and property in my possession, forcing me to file a police complaint and seek protection from the local police. Furthermore, they did not provide any financial support for my medical expenses and money necessary for my normal living. Hence, I approached the Maintenance Tribunal, Tiruvuru Division, NTR District under provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and filed O.P. No. 1 of 2022, seeking an order directing my son/Defendant No. 2 and daughter/Plaintiff to pay me maintenance of ₹10,000 each. I also requested the cancellation of the Gift Deed to revert the land rights in my name over land (Item No. 4) in S.No. 615/1, measuring an extent of Ac. 1.86 cents in Kunaparajuparva village.  Accordingly, the Maintenance Tribunal was pleased to pass orders vide Procs. Re. No. OP/01/2022 dated 08.08.2022 by directing my son to pay ₹.10,000/- and directing me to reside with my daughter and her family at their matrimonial residence and enjoy the income from the land Ac. 1.86 cents.  Questioning the said orders, I filed an Appeal before the Appellate Authority, i.e. the Appellate Tribunal of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, NTR District.  In that, I requested the Appellate Authority to direct my daughter to pay ₹.10,000/- in addition to ₹.10,000/- from my son as maintenance and also asked to revert the land (Item No. 4) Ac. 1.86 cents rights in my name.  Taking into consideration of the contentions raised by all of us, the Appellate Authority was pleased to pass orders vide Procs.Rc.No. A/19/2021 dated 04.03.2023 by directing my daughter/Plaintiff to pay monthly maintenance of an amount of ₹.10,000/- in addition to the amount of ₹.10,000/- of maintenance paid by my son.  Liberty was given to me to cancel the Gift Deed and revert the land (Item No. 4) admeasuring Ac.1.86 cents in Sy. No.615/1 into my name.  Questioning the said orders, my daughter/Plaintiff filed the Writ Petition W.P. No.7925 of 2023, registered on 28.03.2023 before the Hon'ble High Court.  But however, no stay was granted by the Hon'ble High Court, thereby keeping the Appellate Tribunal’s order in effect and the Writ Petition is pending for adjudication.  I received notices in the Writ Petition and I filed Counter Affidavit and the said Writ Petition is pending for adjudication.
7.	I humbly submit that I am aged about 78 years and I am a senior citizen and I am entitled to the protections guaranteed under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The Act was enacted to ensure that elderly individuals are not subjected to neglect, harassment, or financial deprivation by their children or relatives. Despite the Appellate Tribunal’s clear order directing payment of maintenance and restoration of property rights, my daughter (the Writ Petitioner therein and Plaintiff herein) has deliberately disregarded her statutory obligations, thereby violated Orders. This non-compliance has caused severe financial hardship, emotional distress and compromised my dignity and well-being. The delay in enforcement by the Maintenance Tribunal further exacerbated the issue, undermining the legislative intent of providing swift and effective remedies to me/senior citizens. Judicial consideration by this Hon’ble Court and the Hon’ble High Court is essential to uphold the constitutional right to live with dignity and the statutory protections under the Senior Citizens Act. 
The Plaintiff's actions are contrary to the objectives of the Senior Citizens Act, which aims to protect elders from harassment and ensure their welfare, as emphasized in Sunny Paul & Anr vs. State NCT of Delhi & Ors (2017).
This abuse is particularly egregious as it targets me, a senior citizen who has already obtained protection under the Act, 2007. The attempt to relitigate settled matters through a partition suit causes unnecessary harassment, precisely what the Act aims to prevent. In Mahesh Kumar (Dead) By Lrs. v. Vinod Kumar And Others [2012 (4) SCC 387], the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the rights of parents to deny property shares to negligent children who do not take care of them in old age, recognizing that such decisions are neither unnatural nor unusual.
8.	I humbly submit that delays in senior citizens' matters cause exponentially more harm due to their limited time. As emphasized by the Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Shweta Shetty v. State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition (L) No.9374 of 2020): 
“The one thing that Senior Citizens do not have the benefit or luxury is of time. It is not on their side, and every day's delay before a Tribunal like this hurts Senior Citizens exponentially more than the younger generation.” 
Furthermore, the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India has emphasized expeditious resolution of cases concerning older persons, as reiterated by the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, vide letter F. No. 20-76/99-SD dated 03.11.1999. In view of this directive and my age, frailty, and financial distress, it is imperative that this Hon'ble Court ensures the prompt adjudication of this matter.
9.	I humbly submit that the Appellate Tribunal's reasoned decision to grant maintenance and property rights was based on comprehensive evaluation of the financial capacity of both my children and the nature of the disputed property (Item No.4). The Tribunal directed total monthly maintenance of Rs. 20,000 (Rs. 10,000 each from son and daughter) after examining the Tahsildar's report which established my daughter's/Plaintiff’s substantial financial means, including ownership of 3.59 cents of agricultural land and a Maruti Brezza car, thereby rejecting her plea of financial inability. Regarding property rights, the Tribunal recognized the land (Item No. 4) in Survey No. 615/1 measuring 1.86 cents as my self-acquired property and consequent to my wife's demise, granted me authority to cancel the Gift Deed and revert land rights to my name, restoring my absolute ownership over the property. The Appellate Tribunal's order was further fortified by incorporating enforcement mechanisms under Section XI(2) of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, mandating payment by the 5th of each month.
10.	I humbly submit that in W.P. No. 7925 of 2023, Counter Affidavits were filed (WPUSR 40688/2023 dated 18.04.2023) by me, the Defendant No.1 (6th Respondent therein) and (WPUSR 69788/2023 dated 19.07.2023) by the  Defendant No.2 (7th Respondent therein), and they were ACCEPTED by the Hon’ble High Court. However, the Reply Affidavit (WPUSR 128073/2023 dated 07.12.2023) and Additional Affidavit (IASR 58808/2024 dated 03.09.2024) filed by the Plaintiff, the Writ Petitioner therein, were RETURNED at the time of this written statement and have been RETURNED twice so far.  Furthermore, the Plaintiff (Writ Petitioner therein) has not complied with the maintenance order, which remains in effect, resulting in severe financial and emotional distress for me.  I humbly submit that the courts have clarified that the mere filing of a writ petition does not suspend the enforceability of a maintenance order under the Senior Citizens Act unless a stay is explicitly granted by the High Court. The Courts also emphasized that tribunals and enforcement authorities are legally obligated to ensure compliance with maintenance orders unless explicitly restrained. This principle safeguards senior citizens from procedural delays and ensures uninterrupted access to financial support. Instead of fulfilling her legal obligations, she filed this partition suit, involving the same property, Item No. 4, already adjudicated by the Maintenance Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal.  She has deliberately suppressed material facts to this Hon’ble Court about the previous judicial proceedings and orders passed by the Maintenance Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal, and the pending Writ Petition (W.P. No. 7925 of 2023) before the Hon'ble High Court.
The Plaintiff's filing of this suit while W.P. No. 7925 of 2023 remains pending before the Hon'ble High Court constitutes forum shopping. This attempt to bypass the orders of the Maintenance Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal is unjust and violates the principle of res judicata. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cheerful Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Urbashi Mitra [(2008) 2 SCC 221], such forum shopping and filing of successive proceedings on the same cause of action amounts to abuse of the process of the court and deserves to be rejected at the threshold.
11.	I submit that the Plaintiff has taken a contrary position in the present partition suit regarding the nature of the properties and their ownership. While she categorically admitted in her Writ Petition (W.P. No. 7925 of 2023) on 28.03.2023 that she does not have any title rights over the properties, she now falsely asserts ownership in this partition suit. This reveals her intent to frustrate the enforcement of the maintenance order, create artificial hurdles, and harass me, a senior citizen aged 78 years. Such conduct constitutes a grave abuse of the judicial process, undermining the principles of fairness and transparency in litigation.
In Arunima Baruah vs. Union of India [(2007) 6 SCC 120], the Supreme Court emphasized:
"The doctrine of clean hands is a fundamental principle that a person who seeks equity must come with clean hands and make a full and fair disclosure of material facts. Suppression of material facts itself is a ground to dismiss the suit at the threshold."
The Plaintiff's previous admissions in W.P. No. 7925 of 2023 should estop her from claiming otherwise now. The principle established in Nagubai Ammal & Ors vs. B. Shama Rao & Ors (1956) dictates that a party is bound by its prior statements made in judicial proceedings. 
Any new witnesses presented by the Plaintiff, who have not previously been involved in this matter, should be viewed with skepticism. As established in Kalyan Singh Chouhan vs. C.P. Joshi (2011), belated production of evidence raises questions about its authenticity.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P. [2007 (4) SCC 221] held that fraud or suppression of material facts vitiates all judicial proceedings. The Plaintiff's actions not only amount to suppression but also constitute abuse by introducing baseless claims aimed at prolonging litigation and inflicting financial and emotional strain upon me, a senior citizen. Furthermore, as per Ashok Gurprasad Todi v. Nandlal Agarwal & Ors. [(2009) 14 SCC 501], the principle of judicial estoppel bars a party from taking inconsistent positions in different judicial proceedings concerning the same subject matter and parties.
12.	I humbly submit that the Plaintiff’s actions constitute an abuse of the judicial process and forum shopping. By filing this partition suit in the Civil Court while the Writ Petition (W.P. No. 7925 of 2023) is pending before the Hon'ble High Court, the Plaintiff is attempting to circumvent the orders of the Maintenance Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal. This conduct violates the principle of res judicata and demonstrates a lack of respect for judicial hierarchy. Such practices amount to abuse of the process of the court and should not be permitted.
This partition suit contravenes the principle of res judicata, as issues already adjudicated by the Tribunals should not be re-litigated, per Forward Construction Co. vs. Prabhat Mandal (1986).
The possibility of undue influence on potential witnesses must be considered, as discussed in Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya vs. Anil Panjwani (2003), where factors such as bias or influence were critical in evaluating witness credibility.
I humbly submit that this partition suit, filed after the Plaintiff failed to secure favorable relief in W.P. No. 7925/2023, is an attempt to re-litigate settled issues, create unnecessary hurdles, and frustrate the purpose of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi [(1998) 3 SCC 573] held that the court has the power to stop vexatious proceedings when they are a clear abuse of the process of law. Additionally, in Amar Singh v. Union of India [(2011) 7 SCC 69], the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that judicial proceedings cannot be used to advance inconsistent positions to achieve oblique purposes. Such actions undermine judicial integrity and represent an abuse of process.
13.	I submit that I am a senior citizen, aged about 78 years, who was granted a maintenance order under the Act, 2007. The Appellate Tribunal, vide Procs. Rc. No. A/19/2021 dated 04.03.2023, directed the Plaintiff (my daughter) to provide me with monthly maintenance of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) to meet my needs as a senior citizen. Despite this clear orders, no payments were made by my daughter (Plaintiff) since the maintenance order, March 2023, resulting in undue financial hardship and distress.
14.	I submit that, to date, the orders of the Appellate Tribunal have not been complied with by my daughter/the Plaintiff, and I am facing severe financial hardships. Due to persistent inaction by the Maintenance Tribunal,             I approached the Hon’ble Lokayukta and filed a complaint, but the Hon’ble Lokayukta was pleased to reject my complaint dated 23.04.2024, vide Orders, PROCEEDINGS.NO.944/2024/B1/LOK/5830/2024, dated 29.04.2024, stating that I need to seek recourse under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007.  Hence, I approached the Appellate Tribunal and submitted detailed representations on 27.02.2024 and 27.08.2024, requesting necessary action in this matter. Based on my representation, the Appellate Tribunal sent a letter dated 30.08.2024 to the Maintenance Tribunal, directing them to take action to ensure I receive my monthly maintenance payments and recover the defaulted amounts. The Appellate Tribunal also sent a letter dated 30.08.2024 to my daughter/the Plaintiff, directing her to be in compliance with the maintenance orders. However, there was no response from the Maintenance Tribunal as well as from my daughter/the Plaintiff.
15.	I submit that I approached the Maintenance Tribunal again and submitted a representation on 18.10.2024 requesting immediate enforcement and detailing the outstanding amount (₹1,90,000 with interest, totaling approximately ₹2,00,088).  In response, the Maintenance Tribunal issued an endorsement order dated 28.10.2024, stating that W.P. No. 7925 of 2023 is pending before the High Court and that directions will be issued based on the final orders in the said Writ Petition. Hence, questioning the said endorsement order, I am considering filing a Writ Petition or moving an application in the Hon’ble High Court.
16.	I humbly submit that The Senior Citizens Act 2007 was promulgated with a view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior citizens who are in distress, by summary enquiry. This law protecting the interest of senior citizens is  intended to ensure that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. The provisions have to be liberally construed as the primary object is to give social justice to the parents and senior citizens. It is settled law that the Tribunals/Courts cannot leave them helpless but shall assist the senior citizens whose rights are protected under the Act, 2007. Unless the consequential relief of maintenance is granted, enforced and property rights are protected, the purpose of the Act, 2007 would not be achieved. The Preamble of the Act, 2007 states: 
"An Act to provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
I humbly submit that in Dr. Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India [2019 (2) SCC 636], the Supreme Court emphasized the state's duty to protect the rights of senior citizens by ensuring prompt and effective enforcement of maintenance orders. The Court held that delays in enforcement violate the rights of elderly persons to live with dignity and security under Article 21 of the Constitution. The judgment underscores that enforcement authorities must act without delay, as financial and emotional hardship caused by non-compliance undermines the purpose of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
17.	I humbly submit that The Andhra Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2011 (G.O.Ms.No. 49), Dated 28-12- 2011,  
CHAPTER - V, 20. Duties and Powers of the District Magistrate states:
“(1) The District Magistrate shall ensure that the provisions of this Act are properly carried out and the District Magistrate may specify the officer, subordinate to him, who shall exercise all or any of the powers, and perform all or any of the duties, so conferred or imposed and the local limits within which such powers or duties shall be carried out by the officer as may be prescribed.

(2) It shall be the duty of the District Magistrate to:
	(i) ensure that life and property of senior citizens of the district are protected and they are able to live with security and dignity;
	ii) oversee and monitor the work of Registration authority Maintenance Tribunals and Maintenance Officers of the district with a view to ensuring timely and fair disposal of applications for maintenance, and execution of Tribunal’s orders and implementation of rules herein.
	...
	...”
Hence, the failure to take action by the authorities under the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, thereby allowing the Plaintiff to continue evading my daughter/her legal obligations, is nothing but violation of the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
18.	I humbly submit that the Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 explicitly bars civil court jurisdiction in matters covered under the Act. The provision reads:
"No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter to which any provision of this Act applies and no injunction shall be granted by any Civil Court in respect of anything which is done or intended to be done by or under this Act."

But still the Plaintiff got included the subject property as Item No.4 in this Partition suit i.e, land admeasuring an extent of Ac. 1-86 cents, situated in R.S. No. 615/1 of Kunaparajuparva Village of Reddigudem Mandal which was already adjudicated and restored to me under the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 which was later transferred to my son/Defendant No. 2 vide conditional Gift Deed for additional needs of large amounts of money borrowed for my eye surgeries recently and to repay debts I incurred since maintenance case instituted and non-compliance in payment of maintenance by my daughter/Plaintiff.
19.	I humbly submit that I regained ownership of (Item No. 4) Ac. 1.86 cents in Survey No. 615/1 through a Cancellation Deed (Reg. Doc. No. 2082/2023, dated 18.03.2023). The title was duly updated in the Webland records, Adangal, and ROR-1B and was further confirmed by the issuance of a PPB and TD on 12.04.2023. However, due to my advanced age, declining health, and my inability to cultivate the land effectively, coupled with financial strain caused by my daughter's/Plaintiff’s non-compliance with maintenance orders and the legal expenses incurred in pursuing the Writ Petition, I faced significant hardship. My son, the Defendant No. 2, has complied with his maintenance obligations as directed by Procs. Rc. No. A/19/2021 dated 04.03.2023. He also extended substantial financial support, including covering over ₹2,00,000 in medical expenses for critical surgeries on both my eyes and arranging domestic assistance during my recovery and other needed times. In view of these circumstances and to ensure my long-term welfare and financial stability in my later years, I executed a conditional Gift Deed (Doc. Reg. No. 6714/2023, dated 15.09.2023), transferring the said land (Item No. 4) to my son, who now possesses and enjoys the property.
I humbly submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha vs. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban and District and Others [(2021) 15 SCC 730] has elaborated on the scope of the Act, 2007 and emphasized its overriding effect under Section 3 of the Act.
“3. Act to have overriding effect. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.”
20.	I humbly submit that the timing and circumstances of this partition suit reveal it as a calculated attempt to frustrate the implementation of maintenance orders under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The sequence of events clearly demonstrates that this partition suit is a tactical manoeuvre to evade compliance with lawful maintenance obligations, create artificial hurdles in the enforcement of the maintenance order, and harass me, a father aged 78 years. This partition suit represents a deliberate misuse of judicial forums to evade compliance and constitutes a grave abuse of the judicial process.  Furthermore, during the more than two years of maintenance and property rights proceedings and multiple appeals, she never asserted any property rights over these lands (Item Nos. 1 to 3) except for the property (Item No.4) explicitly adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal and restored to me as my self-acquired property. Even in her Writ Petition (W.P. No. 7925 of 2023), filed on 28.03.2023, she admitted to having no title rights over the properties except for the property (Item No. 4) explicitly adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal. This partition suit, filed after the Plaintiff (Writ Petitioner therein) failed to secure favorable relief in W.P. No. 7925/2023, is a clear attempt to relitigate settled issues, create unnecessary hurdles, and frustrate the purpose of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
21.	I humbly submit that there is no stay in the said W.P. No.7925 of 2023.  The maintenance orders granted by the Appellate Tribunal were not complied by the Plaintiff and I am facing huge financial crisis.  I am a senior citizen and aged about 78 years and I am living alone needing regular maintenance amount, as ordered by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal, from my daughter to lead normal life.  Only with a view to harass me in one way or other my daughter/Plaintiff has not only defaulted on all maintenance payments but also instituted this partition suit.
22.	I humbly submit that mere filing of a writ petition does not suspend the enforceability of the Appellate Tribunal order under the Senior Citizens Act unless a stay is explicitly granted by the High Court. Tribunals and enforcement authorities are legally obligated to ensure compliance with Orders under the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 unless explicitly restrained.   I submit that I am aged about 78 years and my son is residing in England,  U.K and my daughter, though residing in the same locality, she has failed taking care of me and not in compliance with the orders passed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal.  My son is paying ₹.10,000/- maintenance to me in compliance to the orders passed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal and my daughter is not at all taking care of my welfare by non-compliance with the maintenance orders. The outstanding maintenance amount is coming to  ₹ 2,00,088/-.  But the Maintenance Tribunal has not looked into these aspects and passed the orders on 28.10.2024.  The orders passed by the Maintenance Tribunal are illegal, arbitrary, violation of Principles of Natural Justice and violation of Articles 14, and 21 of the Constitution of India.  Hence, without any other alternative, I am considering filing the Writ Petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Hon’ble High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to secure enforcement of the Tribunal’s order and ensure my right to live with dignity, as intended by the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
23.	I submit that the present Partition Suit filed by the Plaintiff is not at all maintainable either in Law or in facts and hence, the same needs to be dismissed with costs.
24.	I humbly submit that the present Partition Suit filed by the Plaintiff lacks jurisdiction and maintainability. The suit is not maintainable as it is expressly barred by Section 27 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters covered under the Act. The specialized tribunals constituted under the Act have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes, and any interference by this Hon'ble Court would contravene the statutory framework. Furthermore, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as it is barred by law. This suit directly challenges orders passed under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which is a special enactment, thereby rendering this Hon'ble Court incompetent to entertain the matter. Accordingly, the suit deserves to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and maintainability.
25.	I humbly submit that the suit filed by the Plaintiff is liable to be dismissed due to the deliberate suppression of material facts and abuse of the judicial process. The plaint fails to disclose a cause of action under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as it fundamentally omits reference to the Maintenance Tribunal order dated 08.08.2022, the Appellate Tribunal order dated 04.03.2023, and the Plaintiff’s prior judicial admissions in Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023, which are crucial to the dispute. By withholding these material facts and concealing the existence of prior and pending legal proceedings, the Plaintiff has approached this Hon'ble Court with unclean hands, violating the principles of “suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.” The Plaint fails to disclose any cause of action since it lacked material facts and instead relies on clever drafting to create an illusion of a cause of action, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam vs T.V. Satyapal (1977 AIR 2421). Additionally, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam & Ors. [(2012) 6 SCC 430] emphasized the duty of courts to prevent abuse of process by fraudulent or dishonest litigants who attempt to derive benefits by deviating from material facts. It was observed:
“39. Our courts are usually short of time because of huge pendency of cases and at times the courts arrive at an erroneous conclusion because of false pleas, claims, defences and irrelevant facts. A litigant could deviate from the facts which are liable for all the conclusions. In the journey of discovering the truth, at times, this Court, at a later stage, but once discovered, it is the duty of the court to take appropriate remedial and preventive steps so that no one should derive benefits or advantages by abusing the process of law. The court must effectively discourage fraudulent and dishonest litigants.”

The suit is vexatious and frivolous, designed to harass me/the Defendant, a senior citizen, in contravention of the spirit and intent of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Such conduct amounts to an abuse of the judicial process. Therefore, solely on this basis, the instant Partition Suit is liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs.
26.	I humbly submit that the suit filed by the Plaintiff is barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issues concerning the ownership and rights over the plaint-scheduled properties have already been conclusively adjudicated by the Maintenance Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Furthermore, the Plaintiff is estopped from instituting this suit due to judicial estoppel (estoppel by record) under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, as she explicitly admitted the ownership rights of Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023, pending before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh. These prior admissions negate her current claims and establish that she lacks locus standi to maintain this suit. Consequently, the present suit amounts to an abuse of the judicial process and deserves to be dismissed in limine.
The Plaintiff’s claims concerning Item No. 4 are barred under Section 27 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters adjudicated under the Act. In addition, the Plaintiff’s inclusion of this property in the partition suit amounts to forum shopping, a tactic to relitigate issues already decided under the Act and currently pending in the Hon’ble High Court.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors. [(1976) 3 SCC 119] emphasized that family partitions, particularly those accepted by all parties for decades, should be respected to avoid unnecessary disputes and maintain harmony. By her long-standing acquiescence, the Plaintiff is estopped from disputing the settled arrangements regarding Item No. 4, as recognized by the Appellate Tribunal and supported by continuous possession and mutation in my name.
27.	I humbly submit that the suit filed by the Plaintiff is barred by the principle of lis pendens, as the matter concerning the plaint-scheduled properties is currently under judicial review in Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023, pending before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The pendency of these proceedings directly impacts the subject matter of the present suit, rendering it untenable. Entertaining this suit would result in parallel litigation and potentially conflicting decisions, contrary to established legal principles. Accordingly, the suit deserves to be dismissed to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and ensure judicial propriety.
28.	I humbly submit that the suit filed by the Plaintiff is barred by limitation, as the Plaintiff's alleged right to partition, if any, arose decades ago when the plaint-scheduled properties were either physically partitioned or acquired by the Defendant. The Plaintiff has failed to institute the suit within the prescribed period under the Limitation Act, 1963, and has not provided any justification for this inordinate delay. Consequently, the suit is time-barred and deserves to be dismissed at the threshold.
29.	I humbly submit that the Plaintiff’s claim for partition is unequivocally barred under Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a 12-year limitation period from the date when the Plaintiff’s alleged right to partition accrued. In the instant case, Item Nos. 2 and 4 of the plaint-scheduled properties were conclusively partitioned among (the Class I heirs of my father) Defendant No. 1 and his brothers prior to 1980, as evidenced by a physical partition and subsequent actions reflecting individual ownership. The registered partition deed (Document No. 4222/2018, dated 07.08.2018) merely formalized the pre-existing division of Item No. 2, reaffirming the severance of joint family status. Similarly, Item No. 4, which was initially partitioned among the brothers before 1980, became the self-acquired property of Defendant No. 1. In 2006, Defendant No. 1, in his capacity as the absolute owner, transferred Item No. 4 to his wife through a registered gift deed (Document No. 3843/2006, dated 11.09.2006). The property was thus entirely removed from the ambit of joint family or coparcenary property over 17 years ago. 
The Plaintiff’s alleged right to partition, if any, arose decades ago, either at the time of the original physical partition before 1980 or, at the latest, in 2006 when Item No. 4 was lawfully gifted to Defendant No. 1’s wife. Her failure to assert any claim within the prescribed limitation period of 12 years under Article 110 renders the present suit time-barred. The Plaintiff’s inaction for over four decades, coupled with her constructive and actual knowledge of the facts, including the 2006 gift deed, reinforces the legal bar to her claim. Accordingly, her suit is legally untenable and barred by limitation.
I further submit that Defendant No. 1’s long-standing, continuous, and exclusive possession of the plaint-scheduled properties extinguishes any rights the Plaintiff may have had under the principle of adverse possession, as outlined in Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The possession of all the properties by Defendant No. 1 has been open, hostile, and adverse to the Plaintiff’s interests since the partition of Item Nos. 2 and 4 prior to 1980, and since the acquisition of Item Nos. 1 and 3 in 1986. The Plaintiff’s failure to assert her alleged rights, despite being aware of these facts, bars her claim.
As held in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi [(1998) 3 SCC 573], adverse possession supported by acts of ouster and exclusive management for a period exceeding the limitation period conclusively extinguishes any purported rights of other claimants. Defendant No. 1’s possession and subsequent transfers of the properties are acts of complete ouster, precluding any claim from the Plaintiff.
30.	I humbly submit that the suit filed by the Plaintiff constitutes an abuse of the court’s process, as it seeks to relitigate matters that have already been conclusively settled by specialized tribunals constituted under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, a special enactment. The suit violates the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, as it improperly attempts to invoke general civil law to override the provisions and objectives of a special enactment designed for the protection and welfare of senior citizens. Furthermore, the suit is a deliberate attempt to circumvent and nullify the lawful orders of the Maintenance Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal, which is impermissible in law. Accordingly, the suit is untenable and deserves to be dismissed in its entirety.
Reliance is placed on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977 AIR 2421), which held that suits manifestly barred by limitation and devoid of a cause of action must be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. Similarly, in Prakash v. Phulavati [(2016) 2 SCC 36], the Court emphasized that concluded partitions prior to 20th December 2004 cannot be reopened under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. These precedents squarely apply to the present case, where the Plaintiff’s stale claims seek to unsettle long-settled property rights.
31.	I humbly submit that the plaint fails to disclose a prima facie case for partition, as the plaint-scheduled properties are either self-acquired/self-earned by me/the Defendant No.1 or were already subject to partition among (the Class I heirs of my father) myself/the Defendant No.1 and my brothers prior to the Plaintiff’s claim. The Plaintiff has not provided any material evidence or legal basis to substantiate her alleged right to partition. Consequently, the suit is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed at the threshold.
32.	I humbly submit that the Plaintiff has falsely claimed joint and constructive possession of the suit properties in Paragraph 13 of her plaint to evade payment of the appropriate court fee. Her own admissions in Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023, filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, confirm that she is neither in actual nor constructive possession of the properties. This deliberate misrepresentation constitutes “suppressio veri and suggestio falsi” and results in a lack of cause of action under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Under Section 34(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, the proper court fee must be calculated based on the market value of her claimed share when possession is absent. This violation also warrants rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(b) and (c) CPC. Furthermore, under Section 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees Act, this Hon'ble Court is empowered to examine the adequacy of the court fee and direct the Plaintiff to comply or face dismissal of her suit for non-payment of the requisite fee.
33.	I submit that the Plaintiff lacks the necessary locus standi to file the present Partition Suit due to her deliberate suppression of material facts and intentional failure to disclose relevant details. The Plaintiff has omitted essential documents and failed to provide a truthful account to substantiate the claims made in the Plaint. Notably, in Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023, filed on 28.03.2023 before the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravathi, the Plaintiff submitted certified copies of all registered documents pertaining to the plaint-scheduled properties (Item Nos. 1 to 4). However, these material facts and documents have been deliberately excluded from the present proceedings, underscoring the Plaintiff’s intent to mislead this Hon’ble Court. Consequently, the Partition Suit is not entertainable and is liable to be dismissed.
34.	I submit that I specifically deny all the allegations and averments made by the Plaintiff in the Partition Suit, except those that are specifically admitted hereunder.
35.	I, Defendant No. 1, respectfully submit that I have lawfully transferred all plaint-scheduled properties to Defendant No. 2 and no longer hold ownership or possession of the originals. In support of my defense, I rely on certified copies of registered Gift Deeds, Partition Deeds, and public revenue records obtained from the Sub-Registrar’s Office. 
36.	In light of the above, I humbly submit that the Plaintiff’s claim is barred under Articles 110 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and contradicted by her own admissions, documentary evidence, and long-standing acquiescence. The plaint-scheduled properties, being either self-acquired or conclusively partitioned and lawfully transferred, are not subject to partition. I respectfully pray that this Hon’ble Court reject the Plaintiff’s suit as time-barred and devoid of any legal or factual basis under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and dismiss it under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

PARAGRAPH-WISE REPLY
37.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para Nos. 1 and 2 of the Plaint, these paragraphs pertain to formal identification and require no response. 

38.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 3 and 6 of the Plaint, it is categorically denied that the Plaintiff, Defendant No. 1 (myself), and Defendant No. 2 constitute a Hindu Undivided Joint Family (HUF) or a Hindu joint family, as alleged. Following the marriages of the Plaintiff in 1989 and Defendant No. 2 in 2002, no joint family or jointness in possession existed between us. The Plaintiff has been residing at her matrimonial home, located approximately three kilometers away, with her husband and his family. This is substantiated by official records, including her ration card and voter registration, which list her address as her matrimonial home. Defendant No. 2 has resided abroad in the United Kingdom since 2001 for employment, along with his wife and children. His long-term residence and employment are evidenced by his passport records, visas, and employment documents.
From 2002 to 2005, Defendant No. 2 contributed financially from his NRI earnings to the construction and improvement of the family home and to the enhancement of certain properties owned by me. These contributions were made out of his care and concern for the family, whereas the Plaintiff, being a homemaker and married to a farmer, never contributed financially to the family or to any property improvements. My wife and I actively managed farming operations for our livelihood until advancing age limited our ability to do so effectively. As caring parents, we provided discretionary gifts to both children post-marriage, ensuring their financial security.
By 2021, both my children began neglecting me, failing to provide the care and financial support necessary for my sustenance, despite my deteriorating health and advanced age. After my wife's passing in 2018, the burden of maintaining the only property left to me became increasingly challenging. I had no choice but to seek relief under the Maintenance Tribunal to address my financial needs and to protect the property from any adverse actions.
My household, until my wife's demise, consisted solely of her and myself. Official documents, such as the family ration card and electoral rolls, corroborate that we were the only residents of our home. Furthermore, there has been no shared residence, common mess, or other indicators of joint family life between myself and my children since their respective marriages. The properties listed in the plaint have been managed, possessed, and enjoyed exclusively by me without any contribution, involvement, or claim from the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim of joint family existence and rights over my self-acquired properties is baseless and unsupported by facts.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s own admissions in her Writ Petition (Annexure C) clearly state that the properties in question were under the sole ownership, possession, and control of Defendant No. 1. This claim was countered by Defendant No. 2 through his Counter Affidavit dated 19.07.2023, submitted to the Hon’ble High Court, affirming that he, at the time of the Writ Petition, was the owner, in possession, and enjoyment of scheduled properties, Item Nos. 1 to 3. 
Item No. 4 was restored to me (Defendant No. 1) by the Appellate Tribunal’s order dated 04.03.2024. Upon my mutation application to the Tahsildar, the mutation records were updated in my name, and the PPB/TD and ROR-1B, Adangal were issued in my favor. I possessed and enjoyed this property until I transferred it to Defendant No. 2 through a conditional registered gift deed. These admissions invalidate the Plaintiff's claim of a joint family or joint possession.
As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basang Singh v. Janaki Singh (1967), admissions made in prior pleadings, while not conclusive, are admissible as evidence and carry significant evidentiary weight when they are against the declarant’s interest. The Plaintiff’s attempt to disown these admissions lacks credibility and undermines her claims in the present suit. These prior statements further align with the documentary evidence of self-acquisition, partition, and lawful transfers, conclusively establishing that the plaint-scheduled properties are not joint family properties but self-acquired/self-earned assets of Defendant No. 1.
It is reiterated that the properties in question, as listed in the plaint schedule, are neither joint family properties nor part of any Hindu Undivided Joint Family. These properties have been self-acquired, managed, and possessed solely by me. The Plaintiff, having established her independent matrimonial household decades ago, cannot now assert rights over properties that are neither ancestral nor jointly owned. Similarly, Defendant No. 2, due to his residence abroad and lack of direct involvement, has no claim of joint possession or management over the properties. Any assertion of joint family existence or joint possession is refuted outright and contradicted by documentary evidence, including partition records, revenue documents, and the Plaintiff’s own admissions in prior legal proceedings.
39.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 4 of the Plaint, it is denied that Defendant No. 1 is the Kartha of a joint family with respect to the plaint-scheduled properties or that any alleged joint family properties exist. The properties listed as Item Nos. 1 to 4 in the plaint schedule are self-acquired by me/Defendant No. 1, either through specific physical partitions and partition deeds among (the Class I heirs of my father) my/Defendant No. 1’s brothers or I purchased individually:
a)	Item No. 2 was originally the self-acquired property of my/Defendant No. 1’s father until I acquired it through a physical partition with my brothers before approximately 1978. Subsequently, in 2018, Item No. 2, the land measuring Ac. 1.43 cents in R.S. No. 305/1, situated at Reddigudem Village and Mandal, NTR District, was formally registered through a Partition Deed, vide registered document No. 4222/2018, dated 07.08.2018. The Partition Deed registered in 2018 merely formalized the earlier physical partition, which had conclusively vested ownership in Defendant No. 1 decades earlier. 
Thereafter, Defendant No. 2 acquired the right and title to this land through a registered Gift Deed (document No. 2510/2021, dated 09.06.2021) and has since been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land measuring Ac. 1.43 cents in R.S. No. 305/1, Reddigudem Village and Mandal, NTR District. Furthermore, Defendant No. 2’s mutation application to the Tahsildar, Reddigudem Mandal, was approved on 12th July 2021, completing the transfer mutation in his favor. Accordingly, the ROR 1B and Adangal were updated, and the Pattadar Passbook under Account No. 1959 was issued. It is therefore submitted that Defendant No. 2 holds title and possession of Item No. 2, the land measuring Ac. 1.43 cents in R.S. No. 305/1.
b)	Item No. 4 was originally purchased/self-acquired by my late father from a third party vide Purchase Deed (Reg. Doc. No. 2264/1960 of SRO 620). Subsequently, Item No. 4 was self-acquired by me, Defendant No. 1, through a physical partition with my brothers before 1980, and I maintained continuous possession and enjoyment of the property until it was transferred to Defendant No. 2, who is currently in possession and enjoyment.
The land measuring Ac. 1.86 cents in R.S. No. 615/1 at Konjapparajuparva Village, Reddygudem Mandal, NTR District, became my self-acquired property as my share in the partition among (the Class I heirs of my father) my brothers. I subsequently gifted this land to my wife, Venkata Narayanamma, through a registered Gift Deed for her welfare. However, following her passing, I resumed possession and enjoyment of the property.
Furthermore, the Appellate Tribunal’s order dated 04.03.2023 restored property rights to me, Defendant No. 1, under the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. I regained ownership of Item No. 4, the Ac. 1.86 cents in R.S. No. 615/1, through a Cancellation Deed (Reg. Doc. No. 2082/2023, dated 18.03.2023). Upon submitting a mutation application to the Tahsildar, Reddigudem Mandal, my title rights were duly updated in the Webland records, Adangal, and ROR-1B, and further confirmed by the issuance of a PPB and TD on 12.04.2023.
In view of my circumstances and to ensure my long-term welfare and financial stability in my later years, I subsequently transferred this property to Defendant No. 2 vide a registered conditional Gift Deed (Reg. Doc. No. 6714/2023, dated 15.09.2023), who now possesses and enjoys the property.
c)	Item Nos. 1 and 3 were individually purchased by me, Defendant No. 1, in the year 1986.
i.	Item No. 1, the land measuring Ac. 1.24 cents in R.S. No. 636/2B, situated at Konaparajuparva Village, Reddigudem Mandal, NTR District, was my self-acquired property. I/Defendant No. 1 purchased this property vide Sale Deed (Reg. Document No. 1367/1986, dated 20.06.1986). Defendant No. 2 is currently in possession and enjoyment of this property, having received it through a registered Gift Deed (Document No. 5826/2019, dated 19.11.2019).
ii.	Item No. 3, the house site measuring 11 cents, was my/Defendant No. 1’s self-acquired property. I/Defendant No. 1 purchased this property vide Sale Deed (Reg. Document No. 1365/1986, dated 20.06.1986). The house on this site was constructed with my own funds and primarily with funds contributed by Defendant No. 2, who invested ₹14,00,000 (Rupees fourteen lakhs only) as an NRI for house construction from 2001 to 2004. My son, Defendant No. 2, was the primary financial contributor to our family home. My old Union Bank passbook shows substantial deposits from Defendant No. 2’s NRI account between 2001 and 2005. In accordance with my free will, I/Defendant No. 1 subsequently transferred this property to my son/Defendant No. 2. He now holds Item No. 3, the house property bearing Door No. 2-49, admeasuring 532.4 sq. yards in R.S. No. 377/1, situated at Reddigudem Village and Mandal, NTR District, having received this property through a registered Gift Deed (Document No. 5827/2019, dated 19.11.2019).
Since my acquisition, the properties have been solely owned, possessed, and managed by me/the 1st Defendant until I transferred them to my son/the  Defendant No.2 in 2019, 2021 and 2023. No joint family or joint management involving the Plaintiff or Defendant No. 2 ever existed, as confirmed by the Plaintiff’s (Writ Petitioner’s) own admissions in the Writ Affidavit (Annexure C) submitted to the Hon’ble High Court. These admissions unequivocally identify the properties as being under her father’s (Defendant No. 1’s) control until their lawful transfer to Defendant No. 2.
The Plaintiff’s claims regarding Item Nos. 2 and 4 are legally and factually untenable. Item No. 2, measuring Ac. 1.43 cents, was allocated to me through an oral partition with my brothers before 1980, which has been followed by continuous possession and enjoyment ever since. The 2018 Partition Deed merely formalized the pre-existing division. Similarly, Item No. 4, measuring Ac. 1.86 cents, was allocated to me under the same partition, later transferred to my late wife through a Gift Deed in 2006, and subsequently restored to me under the Senior Citizens Act.
The Plaintiff has provided no evidence to refute these facts or justify her delayed claims. In M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal [(2020) 4 SCC 650], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that long-standing partitions should not be disturbed, emphasizing the need for legal finality to maintain certainty in family arrangements. Furthermore, in Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors. [(1976) 3 SCC 119], the Court underscored that parties who acquiesce to family settlements or partitions for extended periods cannot later challenge them. The Plaintiff’s silence for over 40 years and her failure to assert any rights until now constitute clear acquiescence, estopping her from reopening settled family arrangements.
40.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 5 of the Plaint, it is denied that the Plaintiff, Defendant No. 2, or any other family members constitute a coparcenary or that Defendant No. 1 holds any ancestral property, as alleged. The properties enumerated in the plaint are the self-acquired assets of Defendant No. 1, who retained complete ownership, possession, and control over them without any involvement from the Plaintiff until they were legally transferred to Defendant No. 2 through registered Gift Deeds. Further details regarding Item No. 3 are provided in the previous paragraph (Para 35(c)(ii)).
I further submit that, the self-acquired status of Item Nos. 1 and 3 is indisputable, having been purchased by Defendant No. 1 through registered sale deeds in 1986. Item No. 2 was partitioned prior to 1980 and formalized in 2018, while Item No. 4 was initially partitioned and later restored to Defendant No. 1 under the order of the Appellate Tribunal (dated 04.03.2023) pursuant to the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Defendant No. 1 subsequently transferred these properties to Defendant No. 2 via valid, registered gift deeds. The Plaintiff’s failure to challenge these registered transactions or assert her rights within the prescribed limitation periods under Articles 65 and 113 of the Limitation Act is fatal to her case.

41.	That, in reply to Para No. 6 of the Plaint, it is categorically denied that the Plaintiff or the Defendants have been in joint or constructive possession of the plaint-scheduled properties or that any income was distributed among the family members. The properties have been solely managed and enjoyed by me, Defendant No. 1, who has exercised exclusive ownership rights without any assistance from the Plaintiff or Defendant No. 2. This is corroborated by the Plaintiff’s statements in her Writ Petition (Annexure C), wherein she acknowledges Defendant No. 1’s exclusive possession and control of the properties. However, this was countered in my/Respondent No. 6’s Counter Affidavit (Annexure D) submitted to the Hon’ble High Court, which clarified that Item Nos. 1 to 3 of the plaint-scheduled properties had already been transferred to Defendant No. 2 several years prior to the filing of the Writ Petition on 28.03.2023 by the Plaintiff. The Writ Petition covered all the plaint-scheduled properties (Item Nos. 1 to 4), and the nature and ownership of the properties, as detailed therein (Annexure C), were supported by certified copies of the latest registration documents submitted by the Plaintiff/Writ Petitioner to the Hon’ble High Court.

42.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 7 of the Plaint, the Plaintiff’s assertion regarding her alleged entitlement to a share in her mother’s property (Item No. 4) is categorically denied. Item No. 4 was the self-acquired property of Defendant No. 1, which was transferred to his wife (now deceased) through a registered Gift Deed in 2006. The property remained under the possession and control of Defendant No. 1 after her passing and did not acquire an undivided or ancestral character, as it was originally self-acquired through a physical partition among (the Class I heirs of my father) my brothers before 1980.
This property, Item No. 4, was the subject of the Appellate Tribunal’s order dated 04.03.2023 and was restored to me, Defendant No. 1, under the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Subsequently, this property was transferred to Defendant No. 2 through a registered conditional Gift Deed. The Plaintiff’s claim to a 1/3 share is, therefore, unfounded.
The Plaintiff’s assertion that, “It is further stated that no partition took place at any point of time pertaining to the ancestral properties of the Plaintiff i.e., plaint-scheduled properties and also the property of the deceased mother of the Plaintiff. As such all the plaint-scheduled properties have to be partitioned among the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the Plaintiff” is false, frivolous, and vexatious and is vehemently denied.
See replies to plaint paragraph Nos. 3, 4(b) and 7. Accordingly, all the averments in Plaint Para No. 7 have been addressed. Moreover, the Writ Petition covered all the plaint-scheduled properties (Item Nos. 1 to 4), and the nature and ownership of these properties, as detailed therein (Annexure C), were supported by certified copies of the latest registration documents submitted by the Plaintiff/Writ Petitioner to the Hon’ble High Court.

43.	I humbly submit that the allegations and averments in Para Nos. 3, 5 and 7 of the Plaint are false, fabricated, manipulative, frivolous, and vexatious, and are therefore vehemently denied. I deny these allegations in toto. The plaint-scheduled properties, Item Nos. 1 to 4, are unequivocally my self-acquired properties, independently owned and managed by me without any joint family, ancestral, or coparcenary character. Items Nos. 2 and 4 were received as my exclusive share in a physical partition conducted prior to 1980 among (the Class I heirs of my father) my brothers. This partition severed any notional joint family status over these properties, rendering them my self-acquired assets from the moment of partition. Specifically, Item No. 4 was acquired by me through this partition and has been under my exclusive possession and control ever since. Although I transferred Item No. 4 to my wife (now deceased) via a registered Gift Deed in 2006, it remained self-acquired in nature and did not acquire any undivided or ancestral character. After my wife’s passing in 2018, the property reverted to me by virtue of a cancellation deed, as per the Appellate Tribunal order dated 04.03.2023 under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Subsequently, I transferred this property to Defendant No. 2 through a registered conditional Gift Deed. The Plaintiff’s claim to a share in Item No. 4 is, therefore, legally untenable and factually incorrect.
The Plaintiff’s claims regarding Item Nos. 2 and 4 are legally and factually untenable. Item No. 2, measuring Ac. 1.43 cents, was allocated to me through an oral partition with my brothers before 1980, which has been followed by continuous possession and enjoyment ever since. The 2018 Partition Deed merely formalized the pre-existing division. Similarly, Item No. 4, measuring Ac. 1.86 cents, was allocated to me under the same partition, later transferred to my late wife through a Gift Deed in 2006, and subsequently restored to me under the Senior Citizens Act.
The Plaintiff has provided no evidence to refute these facts or justify her delayed claims. In M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal [(2020) 4 SCC 650], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that long-standing partitions should not be disturbed, emphasizing the need for legal finality to maintain certainty in family arrangements. Furthermore, in Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors. [(1976) 3 SCC 119], the Court underscored that parties who acquiesce to family settlements or partitions for extended periods cannot later challenge them. The Plaintiff’s silence for over 40 years and her failure to assert any rights until now constitute clear acquiescence, estopping her from reopening settled family arrangements.
Items Nos. 1 and 3 were acquired by me using my self-generated income and the proceeds derived from the partitioned properties (Items Nos. 2 and 4) during the minority of my children. These properties, too, are entirely self-acquired and have been exclusively possessed and enjoyed by me since their acquisition until their legal transfer to Defendant No. 2. The Plaintiff, my daughter, was married approximately 35 years ago at the age of 17 and has resided in her matrimonial home since. She was never in possession of the plaint-scheduled properties and has no involvement in their management or upkeep. At the time of her marriage in 1989, I gave her Ac. 2.05 cents of land, along with cash and gold, as a generous settlement.
Additionally, in her Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023 filed on 28.03.2023 before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the Plaintiff explicitly admitted that she had no title rights over these properties, save for Item No. 4, which was restored to me by the Appellate Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. This unequivocal admission reinforces that she has no legitimate claim over any of the other properties.
The Plaintiff’s assertion that these properties are ancestral, coparcenary, or part of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) is entirely unfounded. I categorically deny that the Plaintiff, Defendant No. 2, and I ever constituted a joint family or HUF. The plaint-scheduled properties were at no point held in a joint family nucleus and were acquired or possessed solely through my individual efforts. My late wife, who passed away in 2018, did not contribute any stridhana or funds to the acquisition of these properties.
The Plaintiff’s claims are fabricated, contradictory, and an attempt to reframe self-acquired/self-earned properties as ancestral for unjust enrichment. All the plaint-scheduled properties are, and always have been, my self-acquired assets, managed and controlled exclusively by me, including Item No. 4, which was restored to me under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, as my self-acquired property and subsequently transferred via a conditional Gift Deed. These facts decisively demonstrate that the Plaintiff has no legal or equitable rights over these properties, and her suit is without merit.
44.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para Nos. 3 to 7 of the Plaint, the Plaintiff’s claim of joint family status over the plaint-scheduled properties is untenable under Hindu law, as clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma [(2020) 9 SCC 1]. The Court emphasized that:
"The Explanation to Section 6(5) was introduced to avoid sham or bogus transactions under the guise of oral partitions. Genuine transactions, whether by registered deed or court decree, must be preserved, ensuring finality in property arrangements." (Para 37, Vineeta Sharma).
It is a settled principle under Hindu law that once ancestral properties are partitioned, they cease to retain their ancestral character and become self-acquired. In this case, the oral partition conducted before 1980, followed by decades of exclusive possession and formalization through a registered partition deed in 2018, conclusively severed any coparcenary interest in Item Nos. 2 and 4. Furthermore, Item Nos. 1 and 3, being self-acquired from the outset, were never part of any joint family property. Thus, the Defendant No. 1 exercised full ownership rights over all the plaint-scheduled properties, which have ceased to hold any ancestral or coparcenary character.
45.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 8 of the Plaint, the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding a promised partition and alleged alienation attempts by Defendant No. 1 to exclude her from the properties are false. The properties in question were lawfully transferred to Defendant No. 2 as per my (Defendant No. 1’s) wishes, without any promise of future division or entitlement to the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff’s claim that the properties are joint or ancestral is contradicted by her own statements in the Writ Petition (Annexure C), where she acknowledged Defendant No. 1’s exclusive control and ownership before the properties were legally transferred to Defendant No. 2, well before the filing of the Writ Petition.

46.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 9 of the Plaint, it is denied that the Plaintiff is a co-sharer with a 1/3 share or that any alienation by the Defendants would be null and void. The Plaintiff has no share in the properties, as they were solely owned by me, Defendant No. 1, and later lawfully transferred to Defendant No. 2. The Plaintiff’s claims are entirely unsubstantiated and are contradicted by her own admissions of non-ownership and non-possession in the Writ Affidavit (Annexure C).

47.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 10 of the Plaint, it is denied that the Defendants’ actions are adverse to the Plaintiff’s interests or that she has any legitimate claim to partition. The Plaintiff’s statements in her Writ Affidavit (Annexure C) confirm that the properties were never jointly owned or managed. The 1st Defendant has had full control and possession over the properties, which were self-acquired/ self-earned and subsequently transferred legally to the 2nd Defendant.

48.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 11 of the Plaint, the alleged cause of action lacks validity, as no joint family ownership, joint possession, or legitimate partition claim exists. The Plaintiff’s assertion of a Hindu joint family, joint ownership, and a right to a 1/3 share is entirely fabricated and legally unsustainable. It is well-established that once ancestral property is partitioned, it ceases to be ancestral and becomes self-acquired property, over which the owner has absolute rights, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Katama Natchiar v. Srimat Rajah Moottoo Vijaya Raganadha Bodha Gooroo Swamy Periya Odaya Taver (1863). The properties Item Nos. 2 and 4 were conclusively partitioned decades ago, rendering them self-acquired assets of the Defendant No. 1, with no coparcenary or joint family status attached to them.
Further, only a coparcener has the legal right to demand partition under Hindu law. As clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020), a coparcenary remains undivided until an actual partition takes place. Here, the Plaintiff’s claim relies on a fabricated notion of joint family ownership that is contradicted by her own admissions in the Writ Petition (Annexure C), which acknowledge Defendant No. 1’s exclusive ownership and management of the properties until their legal transfer to Defendant No. 2.
Moreover, the Plaintiff’s attempt to reclassify these self-acquired properties as joint family assets is untenable, as ancestral property, once partitioned, cannot regain its ancestral character. By her own admissions and the documentary evidence presented, there is no valid cause of action for partition. The suit is therefore frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of judicial process.

49.	I humbly submit that the allegations and averments in Para Nos. 3 to 11 and 13 of the Plaint are false, fabricated, manipulative, frivolous, and vexatious, and are therefore vehemently denied. I deny these allegations in toto.  
i.	Pre-2004 Partition and Continuous Possession: I submit that Item Nos. 2 (Ac. 1.43 cents in R.S. No. 305/1) and 4 (Ac. 1.86 cents in R.S. No. 615/1) of the plaint-scheduled properties were conclusively partitioned prior to 20th December 2004 through a valid physical partition among the three sons of the late Thummuru Krishna Reddy, including me, Defendant No. 1. This oral partition, conducted before 1980, was acknowledged and acted upon by all parties, as evidenced by our separate possession and enjoyment of our respective shares. The partition severed any coparcenary or joint family status over these properties, rendering them my self-acquired assets. The division of Item No. 2 is reaffirmed by the registered partition deed (Document No. 4222/2018, dated 07.08.2018), which formalized the earlier physical partition and serves as documentary evidence of ownership and continuous possession. Similarly, the division of Item No. 4 is reaffirmed by the registered gift deed (Document No. 3843/2006, dated 11.09.2006), which formalized the earlier partition and also serves as documentary evidence of ownership and continuous possession.
ii.	Self-Acquired Nature of the Properties: The properties in question were the self-acquired assets of late Thummuru Krishna Reddy, partitioned during his lifetime, and are no longer ancestral or coparcenary in character. After the partition, I, Defendant No. 1, have exclusively exercised independent ownership, possession, and control over my share, as substantiated by revenue records, mutation entries, and uninterrupted enjoyment of the properties. Consequently, these properties became the absolute self-acquired properties of the respective brothers post-partition, losing any joint family nature.
iii.	Bar Under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005: The Plaintiff’s claim for partition is legally unsustainable under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, as clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma [(2020) 9 SCC 1]. The Court held that:
“The conferment of rights under Section 6(1) applies prospectively from the date of the amendment (September 9, 2005). Transactions effected prior to December 20, 2004, remain unassailable, preserving the rights crystallized through valid partitions or transfers.” (Para 74, Vineeta Sharma).
The Court held that any partition or alienation completed before 20th December 2004 remains unaffected by the 2005 amendment. Additionally, as noted in the arguments of amicus curiae in the Vineeta Sharma case, the Act does not reopen oral partitions or family settlements conducted prior to the cutoff date, provided these partitions can be evidenced. Additionally, oral partitions or family settlements conducted before the cutoff date, provided they can be evidenced, are upheld. Since the oral partition was completed decades before this cutoff date, and the properties have been independently possessed ever since, the Plaintiff cannot assert rights under the amended coparcenary provisions.
iv.	Valid Gift and Transfer of Properties: I, Defendant No. 1, as the absolute owner of my share post-partition, and having restored my self-acquired right after my wife’s passing in 2018, lawfully transferred Item No. 4 to Defendant No. 2 through a registered conditional gift deed (Document No. 6714/2023, dated 15.09.2023). This transfer was executed within my legal rights and is binding. Similarly, Item No. 2 was independently transferred to Defendant No. 2 through another valid gift deed (Document No. 2510/2021, dated 09.06.2021). The Plaintiff has no claim over these properties, as they were self-acquired and lawfully alienated by me, Defendant No. 1.
v.	Judicial Precedents Supporting the Defense: The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prakash v. Phulavati [(2016) 2 SCC 36] and Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) emphasized that concluded partitions prior to 20th December 2004 cannot be reopened under the 2005 amendment. Moreover, it has been repeatedly held that interests in coparcenary property cease upon absolute partition. The principle established by the Court requires that any claim of partition or oral settlement must be supported by reliable evidence, which in this case is fulfilled by the registered documents evidencing continuous possession.
vi.	Senior Citizens’ Privileges and Legislative Intent: I submit that under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which is a welfare-oriented legislation, senior citizens are entitled to protection of their property rights and independent ownership. Emphasizing the Act’s objective to protect senior citizens, it is imperative to uphold the finality of pre-2004 partitions and the exclusive property rights conferred on me as a senior citizen. Allowing baseless claims would undermine the legislative intent of ensuring security and dignity for senior citizens.
	In light of the above, I respectfully pray that this Hon’ble Court dismiss the Plaintiff’s partition suit as barred by law and devoid of legal foundation, considering the pre-2004 partition and the self-acquired nature of Item Nos. 2 and 4, and the Plaintiff’s inability to substantiate any claim over the properties in question.
50.	I humbly submit that, the averments in paragraphs 3 to 11 of the plaint are incomplete and insufficient in establishing any ancestral nature of the properties in question. The Plaintiff has failed to disclose essential material facts, including the dates of birth, death, and lineage details of alleged ancestors, such as the Plaintiff’s grandfather or great-grandfather, from whom the Plaintiff claims derivation of ancestral property rights. Under Hindu law, to establish property as ancestral, it must be demonstrated that the property was inherited up to four generations back, without any severance of status or partition among coparceners. The Plaintiff has neglected to provide such a genealogy or historical record, rendering her claim unsupported and as legally deficient.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of India in M. Arumugham v. Sundarambal (1999) held that a valid claim to ancestral property requires clear evidence tracing the property through male lineage up to the Plaintiff’s great-grandfather, ensuring no severance of joint family status. In the absence of such factual foundation, the claim cannot stand. Here, the Plaintiff’s omission of these critical dates and lineage history serves to bypass the law of limitation and the exact cause of action, amounting to an abuse of process.
Moreover, under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a person seeking declaratory relief, such as partition and claim over alleged ancestral property, must provide clear proof of their right or title. The Plaintiff’s vague assertions without concrete factual support undermine her cause and mislead the court into entertaining a speculative claim, contrary to law.
In light of these deficiencies, it is submitted that the Plaintiff’s non-disclosure of crucial facts such as lineage, the dates of inheritance, and ancestral continuity renders her claim incomplete, an abuse of the court’s process, and unsustainable under the limitation law and principles of Hindu succession. Without disclosing these material facts the Plaintiff intends to circumvent the law of limitation and avoid disclosing the exact cause of action, which constitutes an abuse of the process of the court.
That if that being the case of the plaintiff then the present suit under the CPC provisions cannot be maintainable as it is barred by law and discloses no cause of action to sue the defendant under the provision of the code of civil procedure.

51.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 12 of the Plaint, the valuation of the properties in Paragraph 14 is acknowledged. However, the Plaintiff has deliberately avoided paying the correct court fee by falsely claiming joint possession, despite admitting in her Writ Petition (Annexure C) that she has no actual or constructive possession of the properties. This constitutes a clear attempt to evade the requisite court fee under Section 34(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, and the plaint should be rejected on this ground.

52.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 13 of the Plaint, the Plaintiff’s claim of joint possession and payment of a fixed court fee of ₹200 under Section 34(2) is fraudulent. Since she lacks joint possession and has admitted to such in her Writ Affidavit (Annexure C) and Defendant No.2’s exclusive possession (Annexure L) of all Plaint-scheduled properties, Item Nos. 1 to 4, the correct court fee should be based on the market value of her claimed share under Section 34(1). Her attempt to avoid the appropriate court fee are grounds for rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(b) and (c).

53.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 14 of the Plaint, while the Plaintiff’s valuation under Section 50(1) may be accurate, the choice of jurisdiction is improper. Given that the Plaintiff’s claimed share exceeds ₹3,00,000, the case should have been filed in the Senior Civil Judge’s Court, not the Junior Civil Judge’s Court at Mylavaram. This further invalidates her plaint.

54.	I humbly submit that, in reply to Para No. 15 of the Plaint, the Plaintiff’s prayer for partition and separate possession lacks any legal basis and is denied vehemently. I/The  Defendant No.1 holds exclusive ownership over the plaint schedule properties, which were self-acquired/ self-earned before they were legally transferred to Defendant No.2 vide registered gift deeds (Annexure F and L) several years before Plaintiff’s filing of Writ Petition in Hon’ble High Court on 28.03.2023. The Plaintiff’s attempt to misrepresent the properties as joint family assets is contradicted by her own admissions in the Writ Affidavit (Annexure C).
55.	I humbly submit that the allegations and averments in Para Nos. 3 to 11, 13, and 15 of the Plaint are false, fabricated, manipulative, frivolous, and vexatious, and are therefore vehemently denied. I deny these allegations in toto. In light of the chronology of events and proceedings prior to the institution of this suit, along with my humble submissions in the PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS and PARAGRAPH-WISE REPLY, I pray that this Hon’ble Court considers the judicial precedent established in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, reported in 1977 (4) SCC 467.
In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed the issue of re-litigation. In that case, the father of the appellant had challenged eviction proceedings, lost them, appealed again, and lost again. Subsequently, he filed a revision petition before the High Court, which was also dismissed. Thereafter, the son filed a fresh suit regarding the same property, seeking protection from dispossession. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
“The pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious cases.

5.We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentently resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the Judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit  now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful _ not formal _ reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C., taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10, C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The Trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such  men, (Cr.XI) and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.”

6.The Trial Court in this case will remind itself of Section 35-A, C.P.C., and take
deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives 
and altogether groundless. In any view, that suit has no survival value and should be 
disposed of forthwith after giving an immediate hearing to the parties concerned.”

56.	I humbly submit that the allegations and averments in Para Nos. 3 to 11, 13, and 15 of the Plaint are frivolous and vexatious, and are therefore vehemently denied. It is an established principle of law that, while considering the question of rejection of a plaint, the court needs to peruse only the plaint and the documents annexed to it. Upon a bare perusal and a meaningful reading, it becomes clear that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action or is barred by law. Inspection of records in Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023, dated 28.03.2023, before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravathi, or Defendant No. 1 submitted certified copies (Annexure C, D and E) of the Plaintiff’s Writ Petition under the court’s inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC, would suffice in light of the Plaintiff’s clever drafting, deliberate concealment of Tribunal orders (Annexure A & B), and the pending writ petition (Annexure C) covering the same scheduled properties, Item Nos. 1 to 4, and between the same parties under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. In such a case, the court need not consider any other document, and the suit should be nipped in the bud.
That while considering this aspect the court should be careful to look beyond the clever drafting and see on the root of the case as to whether the plaintiff has any cause of action or not. The provision of rejection of plaint has been enacted to discourage the litigants from flooding the courts with frivolous and vexatious claims. Whenever the court even on its own motion finds a suit to be deficient in having a cause of action, such suit should be rejected so that there is no more any abuse of the process of the court.
That it is well settled that the court can reject a plaint at any stage of proceeding if it is satisfied that the conditions of the provision are satisfied. Clever drafting creating an illusion of cause of action are not permitted in law and a clear right to sue must be shown in the plaint. Moreover, the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is not exhaustive and the court has got inherent powers to see that the vexatious litigations are not allowed to take or consume the time of the court. It is needless to submit that the provision for rejection of plaint is mandatory and the court is bound to act if the plaint is found to be lacking in cause of action or barred from proceeding by any provision of law.
That the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a) on the following grounds:
i.	As per Hon'ble Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam vs T.V. Satyapal:
"If on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the court should exercise its power under Order VII rule 11 C.P.C."
ii.	Present plaint fails to establish basic elements: no proof of joint family status, no evidence of ancestral property, no documentation of joint possession, and no proof of inheritance rights
iii.	Plaint relies on clever drafting rather than substantive rights: uses legal terminology without substance, makes broad claims without specific evidence, creates appearance of right through language rather than facts, and suppresses material documents and facts
iv.	No clear cause of action established: basic claims unsupported by documents, essential elements of partition suit missing, rights claimed without legal foundation, and material facts suppressed

57.	I humbly submit that the allegations and averments in Para Nos. 3 to 11 and 13 of the Plaint are frivolous and vexatious, and are therefore vehemently denied. I humbly submit that the Plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(b) and (c) of the CPC on the following grounds:
i.	Improper Court Fee Payment due to false claim of joint possession. The Plaintiff has deliberately claimed joint and constructive possession in paragraph 13 of her plaint to avoid paying the appropriate court fee. However, based on her own admissions in Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023, filed on 28.03.2023 before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravathi, it is evident that the Plaintiff is not in actual or constructive possession of the suit properties. This misrepresentation is an attempt to evade the correct court fee, which should be calculated under Section 34(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, applicable when the plaintiff is not in possession.
ii.	Non-Compliance with Order VII Rule 11(b) and (c) CPC. Under Order VII Rule 11(b) and (c) of the CPC, a plaint must be rejected if the plaintiff fails to pay the required court fee. The Plaintiff’s avoidance of the proper court fee through a false claim of possession (Annexure C) violates these provisions and warrants rejection of the plaint. The correct fee calculation should be based on the market value of her claimed share in the property, as she is not in joint possession with the Defendants.
iii.	As per Section 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, this Hon'ble Court has the authority to examine the adequacy of the court fee paid by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s attempt to underpay the court fee not only constitutes a legal deficiency but also undermines the court's jurisdiction in this matter. The Defendant No.1, therefore, respectfully requests this Hon'ble Court to direct the Plaintiff to pay the correct court fee or reject the plaint on grounds of improper fee payment.
In light of the above, the Defendant No.1 prays that this Hon'ble Court reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(b) and (c) of the CPC due to non-payment of the requisite court fee, and further invoke Section 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees Act as well to ensure compliance with proper fee requirements, as the Plaintiff’s possession claim is false and intended solely to evade the correct fee payment.

58.	I humbly submit that the allegations and averments in Para No. 11 of the Plaint are frivolous and vexatious, and are therefore vehemently denied. That the Plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) on the following grounds:
i.	This Hon’ble Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to entertain matters already decided by the Appellate Tribunal (Annexure A).
ii.	The claim regarding Ac. 1.86 cents (Item No. 4) is barred by res judicata as it has been adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal (Annexure A) under the Senior Citizens Act, which has jurisdiction under Section 3 of the Act, 2007.
iii.	The suit is barred by the principle of judicial estoppel as the Plaintiff is taking contradictory stands regarding ownership of properties in different proceedings (Annexure C).
iv.	The Plaintiff's previous admissions in W.P. No. 7925 of 2023 (Annexure C) regarding ownership of properties constitute "estoppel by record" under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, precluding her from denying those admissions.
v.	The suit is an abuse of the process of court as it seeks to re-litigate settled matters through contradictory pleadings.
vi.	The Plaintiff has deliberately made false statements regarding possession to avoid payment of appropriate court fee, as evidenced by her contradictory judicial admissions in the Writ Petition (Annexure C) where she clearly admitted to not being in possession of the properties.
vii.	The suit is frivolous and vexatious, seeking to reagitate matters already settled through registered documents (Annexure F), while attempting to evade proper court fee by making false claims about possession.
viii.	The suit is barred by the Plaintiff's own judicial admissions (Annexure C) under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, as she explicitly acknowledged the ownership rights of the Defendants in her Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court.
ix.	The Plaintiff's attempt to contradict her own judicial admissions (Annexure C) without any explanation constitutes an abuse of the process of court and warrants rejection of the plaint at the threshold.
x.	The suit constitutes forum shopping and abuse of process as it attempts to reagitate matters already settled through:
i.	Judicial admissions in writ proceedings
ii.	Protection granted under the Act, 2007
iii.	Valid registered documents
xi.	Allowing such vexatious litigation would cause undue harassment to Defendant No. 1, a senior citizen, undermining the protective intent of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
xii.	The suit is a mala fide attempt to defeat maintenance obligations, evidenced by:
i.	Its timing immediately after enforcement measures
ii.	Consistent pattern of non-compliance with maintenance orders
iii.	Absence of any stay order from the High Court
xiii.	Entertaining such a suit would defeat the purpose of the Senior Citizens Act by:
i.	Enabling evasion of maintenance obligations
ii.	Causing further delay in enforcement of maintenance orders and property rights declared under the special provisions of the Act, 2007
iii.	Subjecting a senior citizen/Defendant No. 1 to prolonged litigation, which defeats the purpose of the special enactment. 
xiv.	The plaint is vitiated by deliberate suppression of material facts including:
i.	Pending proceedings before various forums
ii.	Judicial admissions made in other proceedings
iii.	Existence of maintenance order and obligations
xv.	The Plaintiff has approached the court with unclean hands by:
i.	Concealing material facts and proceedings
ii.	Making contradictory statements in different forums
iii.	Attempting to mislead the court through selective disclosure
xvi.	The Suit is barred for non disclosure of exact cause of action. Suit is barred for non disclosure of material facts. Suit is barred for improper court fee paid. The Plaintiff is guilty of “suppressio vari and suggesstio falsi". Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
xvii.	The purported legal notice dated 09.09.2024 and its use as cause of action is tainted by:
i.	Deliberate suppression of material facts and pending proceedings
ii.	Mala fide intent to create parallel proceedings
iii.	Pattern of harassment against a senior citizen
iv.	Attempt to defeat maintenance obligations
Hence, non-response to such a mala fide notice cannot constitute a valid cause of action.

59.	I humbly submit that the allegations and averments in Para Nos. 3 to 11 and 13 of the Plaint are frivolous and vexatious, and are therefore vehemently denied. The Courts have often emphasized the importance of Section 151 CPC to prevent misuse of the judicial system:
i.	In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [1994 SCC (1) 1], the Supreme Court held that any attempt to obtain a favorable order through suppression or fraud is an abuse of process, and courts can use their inherent powers to deny relief.
ii.	In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, the Supreme Court explained that Section 151 CPC should be used to prevent litigants from filing multiple or vexatious suits when the primary aim is harassment or forum-shopping.

INCONSISTENT PLEADINGS AND ADMISSIONS
60.	I humbly submit that the following explicit admissions were made by the Plaintiff in her Writ Petition. No. 7925 of 2023 (Annexure C):
i.	In Para 7 of the Writ Affidavit, the Plaintiff admitted that Defendant No. 2 (her brother) got the house property (Item No. 3 in the Plaint Schedule properties) bearing Door No. 2-49 through registered Gift Deed Doc. No. 5827/2019 dated 19.11.2019.
ii.	In Para 8 of the Writ Affidavit, the Plaintiff admitted that Defendant No. 2 got the land (Item No. 1 in the Plaint Schedule properties) in Ac. 1.24 cents in R.S. No. 636/2B through registered Gift Deed Doc. No. 5826/2019 dated 19.11.2019.
iii.	In Para 6 of the Writ Affidavit, the Plaintiff admitted that Defendant No. 1 (her father) got the land (Item No. 2 in the Plaint Schedule properties) in Ac. 1.43 cents in R.S. No. 305/1 through Partition Deed Doc. No. 4222/2018 dated 07.08.2018.
iv.	In Para 3 of the Writ Affidavit, the Plaintiff explicitly admitted that since her marriage, she was living in her matrimonial home taking care of her husband, children and in-laws, clearly establishing her separate residence and non-participation in the joint family.
v.	In Para 11 of the Writ Affidavit, the Plaintiff unequivocally alleged that Respondent No. 6 [Defendant No. 1 herein] is the only person who is in possession and taking care of all the above said properties and that he has "good earnings and profits from the above said properties." These allegations were corrected/challenged by me/ Defendant No. 1  and Defendant No. 2 in the Counter Affidavits (Annexure D and E) submitted to the Hon’ble High Court. 
vi.	In Para 12 of the Writ Affidavit, the Plaintiff admitted to already having received Ac. 2.05 cents in R.S. No. 306/3 vide registered Gift Deed (Doc. No. 3844/2006 dated 11.09.2006) from me/Defendant No. 1.
61.	I humbly submit that, in stark contrast to her judicial admissions in the Writ Petition, the Plaintiff has taken a completely contradictory position in the present suit by:
i.	Claiming these properties as joint family properties in Para 4 of the plaint
ii.	Asserting her 1/3rd share in these properties in Para 6 of the plaint
iii.	Denying the independent title of Defendants which she had explicitly admitted in the Writ Petition
iv.	Falsely claiming in Para 6 of the plaint that she has been in "joint and constructive possession" of the schedule properties, directly contradicting her own admission in the Writ Petition about living in her matrimonial home and Defendant No.1 and  Defendant No.2 being the sole persons in possession and enjoyment of the same properties.
v.	Making a self-contradictory claim about joint family status despite her earlier admissions about separate residence, living in her matrimonial home since marriage and receipt of gifted property from Plaintiff’s father/Defendant No.1

CURRENT POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP STATUS OF PLAINT-SCHEDULED PROPERTIES
62.	I humbly submit that, in light of my submissions in response to the Plaintiff's averments, I, Defendant No. 1, provide the following summary regarding the current possession and ownership of the plaint-scheduled properties, underscoring the factual and legal basis for rejecting/dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims:
i.	I, Defendant No. 1, have at all times owned the plaint-scheduled properties, Item Nos. 1 to 4, either through self-acquisition or as a result of specific family partitions that occurred decades ago. Each property listed in the plaint schedule has come to me through lawful means, with no grounds for it to be considered ancestral or joint family property.
ii.	In several years ago, I transferred each of these properties to Defendant No. 2 (my son) through registered gift deeds. These transfers were executed in accordance with the law, formally recorded, and updated in the relevant land records, further confirming Defendant No. 2’s exclusive ownership of these properties.
iii.	As of today, Defendant No. 2 is in exclusive possession and enjoyment of each plaint-scheduled property, exercising full ownership rights over them. I, Defendant No. 1, retain no ownership, control, or claim to these properties. Consequently, the Plaintiff’s assertion of joint ownership or undivided family interest in the properties is entirely baseless, frivolous, and vexatious.
iv.	Therefore, any claim by the Plaintiff that these properties constitute joint family assets is without merit, as they are solely and exclusively owned by Defendant No. 2. For these reasons, the Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, baseless, and legally untenable.

STATUTORY BAR ON CIVIL COURT JURISDICTION
63.	I humbly submit that the Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 explicitly bars civil court jurisdiction in matters covered under the Act. The provision reads:
"No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter to which any provision of this Act applies and no injunction shall be granted by any Civil Court in respect of anything which is done or intended to be done by or under this Act."

I humbly submit that the Plaint schedule property, Item No.4: An extent of Ac. 1-86 cents which is situated in R.S. No. 615/1 of Kunaparajuparva Village of Reddigudem Mandal has been adjudicated and restored (Annexure A) to me/Senior Citizen/Defendant No.1 under the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
64.	I humbly submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha vs. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban and District and Others [(2021) 15 SCC 730] has elaborated on the scope of the Act, 2007 and emphasized its overriding effect under Section 3 of the Act.
“3. Act to have overriding effect. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.”

65.	I humbly submit that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was enacted principally to ameliorate the deprivation caused to the parents by the children. The object of this Act is to provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidentally thereto; Pranav Singh v. Mahendra Prasad Singh, 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 4132, See also Ganesh v. Indu Bai, 2022 SCC OnLine MP 786.
66.	I humbly submit that the Object and intent of The Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is to provide for institutionalization of suitable mechanism for the protection of life and property of senior citizens. Simple, inexpensive and speedy procedure for the protection of life and property of the senior citizens, Pachamma v. State of Karnataka, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 8418 : ILR 2017 KAR 1217.

67.	I humbly submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, established that tribunals created under special laws function as courts of first instance with exclusive jurisdiction over matters within their scope, with High Courts retaining supervisory powers through judicial review. The Senior Citizens Act, 2007, constitutes such a specialized framework, with its Maintenance and Appellate Tribunals serving as primary adjudicative bodies for maintenance and property disputes involving senior citizens. Accordingly, this partition suit, which seeks to re-litigate property issues already decided by the Appellate Tribunal and currently under High Court review in Writ Petition (W.P. No. 7925 of 2023), falls outside the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Civil Court. Allowing such parallel proceedings not only undermines the purpose of the tribunal system but also constitutes an abuse of judicial process.
I humbly submit that this Hon’ble Court is precluded from entertaining the present suit under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which categorically bars civil court jurisdiction over matters governed by the Act. All plaint-scheduled properties, including Items Nos. 1 to 3, were the subject of adjudication and admissions in proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act, and their nature and ownership are already under judicial review in a pending writ petition. This makes the jurisdiction of the Maintenance and Appellate Tribunals and the Hon’ble High Court exclusive under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Any overlapping claims before this Hon’ble Court constitute a collateral attack on these tribunal decisions and the Hon’ble High Court's authority in reviewing them, thereby violating the statutory framework and undermining the authority of both the tribunals and the Hon’ble High Court. Allowing this suit would contravene settled principles of law, including L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261], which affirms the exclusive jurisdiction of specialized tribunals and the supervisory authority of the Hon’ble High Court in such matters.

SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS AND DOCTRINE OF CLEAN HANDS
68.	I humbly submit that the Plaintiff has deliberately suppressed material facts in her plaint, including:
i.	The existence of maintenance and property rights proceedings (Annexure A) under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The final order dated 04.03.2023, passed by the Appellate Tribunal, NTR District, under the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, has restored property rights to Item No. 4 of the plaint-scheduled property to Father/Defendant No. 1.
ii.	Her pending Writ Petition (Annexure C) in Hon’ble High Court challenging the Appellate Tribunal order (Annexure A)
iii.	Her judicial admissions made in the said Writ Petition (Annexure C) covering all the plaint-scheduled properties, Item Nos. 1 to 4.

69.	I humbly submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.D. Sharma vs SAIL [(2008) 12 SCC 481] has held:
"If the plaintiff does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts, he is not entitled to any relief and his plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold."

70.	I humbly submit that in Arunima Baruah vs. Union of India [(2007) 6 SCC 120], the Supreme Court emphasized:
"The doctrine of clean hands is a fundamental principle that a person who seeks equity must come with clean hands and make a full and fair disclosure of material facts. Suppression of material facts itself is a ground to dismiss the suit at the threshold."

71.	I humbly submit that the deliberate suppression of pending proceedings (Annexure C) and contradictory judicial admissions (Annexure C) violates the fundamental principles that:
i.	A litigant must approach the court with clean hands
ii.	There must be full and fair disclosure of material facts
iii.	Suppression of material facts amounts to abuse of process

72.	I humbly submit that the purported legal notice dated 09.09.2024 referred to in Para 10 of the plaint represents a calculated attempt to create artificial cause of action while suppressing material facts:
i.	The Plaintiff deliberately omitted from the notice:
i.	The pending maintenance enforcement proceedings
ii.	Her judicial admissions in W.P. No. 7925 of 2023 (Annexure C)
iii.	The existing maintenance arrears of ₹2,00,088 (Annexure J)
iv.	The enforcement proceedings before various authorities
ii.	The timing of the notice is significant:
i.	Sent immediately after intensified enforcement measures
ii.	Due to the Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the maintenance order, Defendant No.1 has taken all reasonable steps to secure enforcement. On 29 April 2024, Defendant No.1 approached the Hon’ble Lokayukta (Annexure G), who instructed me to pursue the enforcement processes available through the Maintenance Tribunal. Following this directive, Defendant No.1 submitted a representation to the Appellate Tribunal, requesting immediate enforcement of the order.
iii.	On 27 August 2024, Defendant No.1 lodged another grievance with the Appellate Tribunal (Grievance No. NTR20240827151), after which the Appellate Tribunal issued specific instructions/letter (Annexure H) on 30 August 2024 to the RDO, Maintenance Tribunal in Tiruvuru, to enforce the maintenance order. On the same day, the Appellate Tribunal’s office also formally directed the Plaintiff to comply with the order/letter (Annexure I). However, despite these repeated instructions and my/ Defendant No.1’s efforts, the Plaintiff has continued to ignore her obligations.
iv.	Used as a pretext to file partition suit while maintenance remains unpaid
v.	This continued inaction by the Plaintiff and the failure of the Maintenance Tribunal (Annexure H, I, K) and other authorities to enforce the Appellate Tribunal’s order have caused me significant financial and emotional distress. The Plaintiff, despite her legal obligation, has disregarded her duty under the Act, 2007 and has simultaneously initiated this partition suit while actively defaulting (Annexure H & I) on her maintenance responsibilities.
iii.	Defendant No. 1, being aware of:
i.	The Plaintiff's judicial admissions regarding property ownership (Annexure C)
ii.	The pending proceedings under Senior Citizens Act
iii.	The pattern of harassment through multiple proceedings
Hence, it was justified in not responding to this mala fide notice
iv.		The notice and subsequent suit constitute:
i.	An attempt to create parallel proceedings
ii.	A strategy to delay maintenance enforcement
iii.	Harassment of a senior citizen through vexatious litigation

73.	I humbly submit that the Plaintiff has not approached this Hon'ble court with clean hands and are guilty of fraud, suppression of facts and misrepresentation and as such they are not entitled for any relief. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, carelessly whether it be true or false. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. A "fraud" is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage as has been held by the Apex Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decisions in State of A.P. and Anr. Vs. T. Suryachandra Rao. In view of the settled legal position in law, the case of the plaintiff has to be thrown out at the threshold and in this case, it is the duty of the court to reject the Plaint. 

74.	I humbly submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P., reported in 2007 (4) SCC 221, held that fraud and suppression of material facts undermine the judicial process, and a litigant who fails to approach the court with clean hands has no right to seek relief. A case based on concealment, such as the present one, warrants rejection at the threshold.

75.	I humbly submit that in A.V. Papayya Sastry, the Supreme Court highlighted that fraud or concealment of material facts vitiates all judicial proceedings. Even if such concealment is revealed later, the court can exercise its discretion to rectify its earlier orders.

76.	I humbly submit that the principle of judicial estoppel/estoppel by record bars a party from taking inconsistent positions in different judicial proceedings concerning the same subject matter and parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Gurprasad Todi vs. Nandlal Agarwal & Ors. [(2009) 14 SCC 501] held that a party is precluded from taking inconsistent pleas in different proceedings to gain unfair advantage.

77.	I humbly submit that the tribunal's decisions under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, including the restoration of rights over Item No. 4 to Defendant No. 1, are final and binding unless set aside by a competent authority. The plaintiff's attempt to re-litigate issues already adjudicated by the Maintenance and Appellate Tribunals, particularly regarding the ownership and possession of plaint-scheduled properties, undermines the statutory authority of these specialized forums. Additionally, the pending writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court concerning the same properties further affirms the exclusive supervisory role of the High Court over tribunal decisions. This partition suit constitutes a collateral attack on the tribunal's authority and is therefore barred by law.

EVASION OF MAINTENANCE OBLIGATIONS AND TIMING OF SUIT
78.	I humbly submit that the timing and circumstances of the present partition suit reveal it as a calculated attempt to frustrate the implementation of maintenance orders under the Senior Citizens Act:
i.	The Appellate Tribunal passed the maintenance order in Procs. Rc. No. A/19/2021 dated 04.03.2023 (Annexure A)
ii.	The Plaintiff has consistently failed to pay any maintenance since March 2023, despite there being:
i.	The absence of a  stay order from the High Court 
ii.	Direct intervention by the Lokayukta on 29.04.2024
iii.	Enforcement orders from the Appellate Tribunal
iv.	Formal notices for compliance
iii.	The total maintenance arrears amount to ₹2,00,088 (Annexure J)
iv.	The present partition suit was filed only following escalation of enforcement measures, including:
i.	The Appellate Tribunal's directive to the Maintenance Tribunal
ii.	Lokayukta's order for enforcement (Annexure G)
iii.	Formal notices to Plantiff for non-compliance

79.	I humbly submit that these sequence of events clearly demonstrates that this partition suit is a tactical maneuver to:
i.	Evade compliance with lawful maintenance obligations
ii.	To create artificial hurdles in the enforcement of the maintenance order
iii.	Harass Defendant No.1, senior citizen aged 78 years (Annexure H & I)

ABUSE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS AND FORUM SHOPPING
80.	I humbly submit that the present suit represents a calculated attempt at forum shopping and constitutes a grave abuse of the judicial process. The Plaintiff's conduct exhibits a pattern of:
i.	First acknowledging Defendant No. 1’s and Defendant No.2's ownership rights in W.P. No. 7925 of 2023 (Annexure C)
ii.	Then filing this partition suit claiming contrary rights after failing to receive favorable results in the writ proceedings
iii.	Attempting to circumvent the protection (Annexure A) granted to Defendant No. 1 under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007

81.	I humbly submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cheerful Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Urbashi Mitra [(2008) 2 SCC 221] has held that forum shopping and filing of successive proceedings on the same cause of action amounts to abuse of process of the court and deserves to be dismissed at the threshold.

82.	I humbly submit that this abuse is particularly egregious as it targets Defendant No. 1, a senior citizen who has already obtained protection under the Act, 2007. The attempt to relitigate settled matters through a partition suit causes unnecessary harassment to a senior citizen, precisely what the Act, 2007 aims to prevent.

83.	I humbly submit that this pattern of conduct exemplifies a grave abuse of judicial process through:
i.	Non-compliance with maintenance orders despite no stay
ii.	Filing contradictory claims in different forums
iii.	Using civil litigation as a shield against maintenance obligations and to re-litigate one of the Plaint’s scheduled properties, Item 4, which has been adjudicated and restored to Defendant No. 1 by the Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of Senior Citizens Act, 2007
iv.	Attempting to circumvent the protective provisions of the Senior Citizens Act

84.	I humbly submit that it is clear that in the case of re-litigation, the court should strike off the plaint at the earliest instance and the filing of subsequent suit is a clear abuse of process of court, which should not be encouraged. (N. Babu Vs. S. Shanmugam and others, 2013-1-L.W. 491, Para 10)

85.	I humbly submit that as stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P. the judicial system cannot be a tool for dishonest litigants who suppress material facts to gain undue advantage. The Plaintiff’s contradictory claims and selective omissions indicate an intent to mislead the court, thus warranting suit dismissal under the inherent powers of the court to prevent abuse.

86.	I humbly submit that the court has the power to stop the vexatious proceedings when it is a clear abuse of the process of the court. (K. K. Modi Vs. K. N. Modi (1998)3 SCC 573)

87.	I humbly submit that the court is expected to filter out and throw all unwanted and vexatious litigation which would be an obstruction to the decree holder in their journey to get justice (Palanisamy Gounder Vs. Sankara Ramanathan and Ors (1999(3) LW. 897, para 59)

88.	I humbly submit that judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the court (Dalpat Kumar Vs. Prahlad Singh, 1992(1) SCC 719)

BINDING NATURE OF JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
89.	I humbly submit that the Plaintiff's admissions in W.P. No. 7925 of 2023 (Annexure C) constitute binding judicial admissions under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami [AIR 1997 SC 1053] has held that admissions made in pleadings or judicial proceedings operate as an estoppel and the party making them cannot be allowed to resile from such admissions unless there is a satisfactory explanation for the withdrawal of the admission.

90.	I humbly submit that the by explicitly acknowledging in the Writ Petition (Annexure C) that:
i.	Defendant No. 2 acquired properties through valid Gift Deeds
ii.	I/Defendant No. 1 obtained the properties through physical partitions and Partition Deed and Gift Deed
iii.	Plaintiff herself received property through Gift Deed
The Plaintiff has made clear judicial admissions (Annexure C) regarding the ownership status of these properties.

91.	I humbly submit that these judicial admissions directly contradict her current claims of:
i.	Joint family status of the properties and
ii.	Her alleged 1/3rd share in all properties
iii.	Invalidity of the registered documents

Under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, these admissions (Annexure C) are binding on the Plaintiff and constitute sufficient ground for dismissal of the suit. As held in Basant Singh v. Janki Singh [AIR 1967 SC 341], a party cannot be permitted to resile from its admissions made in judicial proceedings without any legally valid explanation.

RELEVANT PRECEDENTS
92.	The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dahiben Vs. Arvinbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali [(2020) SCC Online, 563] has held that:
a)	Regarding the lack of cause of action: The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that, if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or if the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. 
b)	The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, or conduct a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. (Para 11)
c)	The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. (Para 12.10)
d)	In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. (Para 12.5)

93.	The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable Vs. Asstt. Charity Commr., [(2004) 3 SCC 137] has held that:
i.	The real object of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits. Therefore, the Order X of the Code is a tool in the hands of the Courts by resorting to which and by searching examination of the party in case the Court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the court in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised.
ii.	Rule 11 of Order VII lays down an independent remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits.

94.	I humbly submit that, the maintainability of the suit being barred by law is a pure question of law that may be decided at the threshold without trial, as held in T.P. Karunakaran v. Shaji P. Chaly [(2007) 6 SCC 345].

95.	I humbly submit that, in Welcome Hotel and Others vs. State of A.P. [(2015) 16 SCC 39], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that suppression of material facts is a serious matter and constitutes abuse of process of court warranting dismissal of proceedings at the threshold.
96.	I humbly submit that, in Prestige Estates Projects Ltd. vs. MCGM [(2015) 11 SCC 381], it was held that a person who seeks relief in equity must come to court with clean hands and must make a full and fair disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge, failing which the court would be justified in refusing to entertain the case.
97.	I humbly submit that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joint Family of Udayan Chinubhai etc. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1967) 63 ITR 416 SC] has held that a party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate by taking inconsistent positions at different times to suit their convenience. Similarly, in Union of India and others v. N. Murugesan and others [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the Hon'ble Court emphasized that the doctrine of approbate and reprobate precludes a party from accepting and rejecting the same instrument or transaction based on convenience. It was observed that this principle, which is a species of estoppel, ensures fairness by disallowing parties from deriving benefits from an instrument while simultaneously challenging its validity. In the present case, the Plaintiff has approbated by admitting the ownership and exclusive possession of the Defendant No. 1 over the plaint-scheduled properties in prior proceedings (Annexture B and C) but now seeks to reprobate by claiming rights over the same properties, contrary to her earlier admissions. Such conduct is not only inconsistent but also violates the principles of equity, fair play, and estoppel, rendering her claims unsustainable.
98.	I humbly submit that, in Mahesh Kumar (Dead) By Lrs. v. Vinod Kumar And Others [2012 (4) SCC 387], the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the rights of parents to deny property shares to negligent children who do not take care of them in old age, recognizing that such decisions are neither unnatural nor unusual.
99.	I humbly submit that, the Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Shweta Shetty v. State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition (L) No.9374 of 2020) has emphasized that delays in senior citizens' matters cause exponentially more harm due to their limited time, stating:
"The one thing that Senior Citizens do not have the benefit or luxury is of time. It is not on their side, and every day's delay before a Tribunal like this hurts Senior Citizens exponentially more than the younger generation."
100.	Furthermore, in Amar Singh v. Union of India [(2011) 7 SCC 69], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that judicial proceedings cannot be used to advance inconsistent positions to achieve oblique purposes.
101.	I humbly submit that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kum. Geetha v. Nanjundaswamy & Ors. (2023) 9 SCC 229 clarified that under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, a plaint must be rejected in its entirety or not at all, and partial rejection is not permissible in partition suits.
102.	It is humbly submitted that, Suit is barred for non disclosure of exact cause of action. Suit is barred for improper court fee paid. Suit is barred for non disclosure of material facts. The Plaintiff is guilty of “suppressio vari and suggesstio falsi". Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
103.	It is humbly submitted that, Without prejudice to the above contentions, this Defendant humbly submits, that, the Plaintiff have deliberately made certain false averments to suit their case against this Defendant. This Defendant further submits, that, the averments which are not specifically denied or traversed hereby are deemed to be denied as false and Plaintiff will be put to the strict proof of the same.
104.	It is humbly submitted that, this Defendant craves for kind indulgence of this Hon'ble Court and this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to allow this Defendant to raise additional grounds, if any, at the time of hearing the suit.
105.	I humbly submit that, the additional certified documents have been requested through RTI applications (India Post consignment numbers EN514816818IN and EN514816795IN, both dated 25.11.2024) filed with the Maintenance Tribunal, Tiruvuru Division and Appellate Tribunal, NTR District under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. These documents include certified copies of statements, records, and reports submitted during the proceedings. While these documents are not yet available, they are expected to be received soon. The Defendant reserves the right to submit these documents as additional evidence to this Hon’ble Court as and when they are received.
106.	It is humbly submitted that, This Defendant would be prejudiced if the baseless claims in the suit are allowed to proceed. For the ends of justice, the Plaintiff’s claims deserve to be dismissed.
107.	It is humbly submitted that the contentions raised herein are bona fide and in the interest of justice.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to:
a.	Reject the plaint in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11(a), (c), and (d) read with Section 151 of the CPC, as it:
i.	Fails to disclose a cause of action due to the Plaintiff’s suppression of material facts, including the Maintenance Tribunal order dated 08.08.2022, the Appellate Tribunal order dated 04.03.2023, and the pending Writ Petition (WP No. 7925 of 2023) before the Hon'ble High Court.
ii.	Is barred by Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters governed by the Act.
iii.	Relies on a jurisdictionally improper filing under Section 50(1) of the CPC, as the Plaintiff's claimed share exceeds ₹3,00,000 and falls within the jurisdiction of the Senior Civil Judge's Court, not the Junior Civil Judge's Court at Mylavaram.
iv.	Constitutes an abuse of the court's process, given the Plaintiff’s contradictory claims and deliberate omissions.
v.	Is barred by the principles of res judicata and judicial estoppel, as the issues regarding the plaint-scheduled properties have already been adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, and are currently under judicial review in WP No. 7925 of 2023 before the Hon'ble High Court.
b.	Dismiss the suit filed by the Plaintiff against this Defendant as being devoid of merit, lacking a cause of action, an abuse of process, and barred by law, particularly under:
vi.	Section 27 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which ousts civil court jurisdiction in matters covered by the Act; and
vii.	Articles 65 and 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the claims are 
time-barred.
c.	Declare that the plaint-scheduled properties, specifically Item Nos. 1 to 4, are the self-acquired properties of Defendant No. 1 and do not constitute part of any joint family or ancestral property, as alleged by the Plaintiff.
d.	Declare the transfers of Item Nos. 1 to 4 of the plaint-scheduled properties through validly executed and registered deeds to Defendant No. 2 as lawful and binding, thereby extinguishing any claim of the Plaintiff over these properties.
e.	Award exemplary costs under Section 35A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the Plaintiff’s frivolous, vexatious, and abusive litigation, which is an abuse of the court's process.
f.	Take judicial notice of the orders passed by the Maintenance Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, and the admissions made by the Plaintiff in Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023, pending before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which negate her claims in the present suit.
g.	Direct the Plaintiff to comply with the Appellate Tribunal’s order for maintenance, including payment of all outstanding dues with interest, to Defendant No. 1, her 78-year-old father.
h.	In the alternative, if this Hon'ble Court does not reject or dismiss the suit outright, stay the present proceedings pending the outcome of Writ Petition No. 7925 of 2023 before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
i.	Pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice and equity.


DEFENDANT NO. 1

Solemnly and sincerely affirm this                
the _____ day of  December, 2024
and signed his name in my presence.
			
								     	ADVOCATE

VERIFICATION STATEMENT
     
I, Thummuru Bosu Reddy, S/o. Late Krishna Reddy, Aged about 78 years, Occ: Nil, R/o. Kothareddigudem Village, Reddygudem Mandal, NTR District, being the Defendant No.1 in the present Partition Suit and person acquainted with the facts do hereby verify and state that the contents of the above paras of the Application are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. The above contents are typed under my instructions and same are read over and explained to me in vernacular language. Hence verified at Mylavaram on this the _____ day of December, 2024.



COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT NO.1
DEPONENT