请将“After attempts at a partial legal reform had been defeated for a while along with the Revolution, influential demands for the universal application and actual upholding of the law were directed above all against royal prerogative power and the private possession of office - this last bearing on members of the ruling estates. The character of law as domination was not denied in this way, and certainly not abolished. At most, it was subjected to religious and moralistic interpretations. The same went for the practice of legislation.
What is particularly relevant for our purpose here is the unconcealed char-acter of strategies of estate rule in relation to the economically and socially advancing urban population. Under the Restoration, the crown could always count on the support of Parliament (especially the House of Lords) for politi-cally controlling the town authorities. In 1661, the decision was made to dis-arm some towns and demolish their walls.271 The most important instrument of this policy of control, however, was the enforcement of religious conformity. As early as 1661 - i.e. several years before the general Test Act - it was inscribed in the Corporation Act that all urban office-holders had to publicly disavow the Covenant (and with it any Presbyterian tendencies of faith) and take an oath to renounce political opposition under all circumstances.272 Along with the re-establishment of the old structures of suffrage and parliamentary constituencies, as well as the changes to town administrations that the crown implemented in the following years, this meant a comprehensive attack on any urban radicalism, whether real or simply feared. As Western has shown,273 the success of this strategy was considerable but not total. Although known radical office-holders were removed from their positions in many towns (fourteen of them for example in Reading), this did not guarantee that replacements could always be found. It was in the towns above all that the practice arose in the following decades of 'occasional conformity', by which - with the tacit support of influential citizens - the religious provisions of the government could be met without disturbing the interest of local rule and security.274 As Western rightly points out, all the disciplinary measures taken against the towns could finally not prevent - in the ‘exclusion crisis' of the 1680s - the victory of the Whigs in three successive elections that were held under heavy political influence. This electoral success however did not prevent the complete political triumph of the king over the Whigs. He managed this because for those members of the politically dominant estates who first of all demanded the exclusion of a Catholic from succession to the throne, then requested this and eventually even almost prayed for it, the stability of the system of domination overrode any other consideration, no matter how important this might be. The stability of estate rule is shown once again, therefore, in the political defeat of the Whigs. It was this stability that was then ‘preserved' in the revolution of 1688 - in the view of the Whigs who participated in this.275
Partial depersonalisation of the crown
In 1649 the King of England, Charles I, was beheaded. It is likely, therefore, that both his successors in the house of Stuart occasionally felt an unpleasant feeling in the back of the neck. But this did not make them well-disposed towards Parliament; quite the contrary. The reigns of the later Stuarts were marked by a political offensive of the crown, which was to a large extent suc-cessful. Since Charles II did not want to go on his travels a second time, he struggled to raise a standing army, to control the militia, to politically control town governments and to improve the royal administration. His successor took over all this, developed it further, and - above all after the Monmouth rebellion of 1685 - sought to build up the forcible means of royal rule in such a way as to make the power of the English crown comparable for the first time with that of France.
A policy of this kind became possible because very many members of the ruling estates had come round to support the politics of order after their expe-riences in the two previous decades, so that for them royal authority was beyond question. They denied any right of resistance, and demanded passive obedience even if royal decrees went against divine commandments.276 The Anglican clergy played an influential role in the theoretical justification of divine right. The linkage of crown and church, which in the 1640s had acceler-ated the developing crisis, was restored in its full scope in 1660.
The extent of personal power is shown by the way that Charles II was able to triumph over the dominant political and religious tendencies in the so- called ‘exclusion crisis'. The crisis arose because leading politicians sought to limit the king's personal power by a religious control. Though they laid no claim to any extensive parliamentary participation in government, and rejected the right of resistance, they did seek guarantees for the ‘lawful' practice of royal arbitrariness. In the prevailing conception, these lay in the king's confession of the correct - i.e. Anglican - faith. It was feared therefore that the king's pro-Catholic brother James, if he succeeded to the throne, would follow the instructions of the Catholic church and not those of an Anglican-formed conscience. A considerable part of the ‘political nation' thus demanded that the king should exclude his brother from the throne, precisely because they did not consider it possible, in the words of Sir William Pulteney, ‘to divide the person of the king from the power of kingship'.277 Lord Russell's view was exemplary of the champions of ‘exclusion'. He was against allowing the accession to the throne and demanding as compensation particular limitations of the prerogative in order to secure an Anglican practice of government: for ‘it is very much better for the inner order of the kingdom to have a king with prerogative powers than to have a king deprived of these powers, as in this way lasting resentment and unavoidable conflict will arise'.278 Parliament demanded that Charles II should change the succession to the throne - an immense encroachment on the dynastic structure of personal rule. This shows that, in the second half of the seventeenth century, a considerable part of the ruling estates (and, in this case, as is also evident in the popular support for the Monmouth rebellion, not only the ruling ones), deemed certain preconditions for the practice of personal sovereignty to be necessary and even indispensable, whether or not they were achievable. To counter this, Charles II first of all tried three times to get a Parliament elected that was favourable to him. He then governed without Parliament, and achieved the succession of his brother. In the first years of his reign, James II was, in many respects, more 
powerful than any English king before him. The 'resolution' of the exclusion crisis meant the victory of the king over the majority in Parliament. Those who upheld the king's position during the crisis described the champions of the majority position insultingly as Whigs.
Political influence, however, is not necessarily a zero-sum game. The expan-sion of royal prerogative power in the second half of the seventeenth century did not mean a fundamental disempowerment of Parliament. Even the parlia-ment of the first Restoration decade, which was not accidentally described as the 'Cavalier' Parliament, on many particular questions set limits to the per-sonal rule of the king that was basically recognised and seen as necessary. A decisive precondition for such a policy arose from the generalisation of politi-cal debate that had arisen in the Revolution years, and which, despite the restoration of generalised estate (and thus in the main locally organised) rule, had still not been suppressed. Even if this was not readily apparent in the first years of the stabilisation policy, nor in the decade after 1689, by the mid-seventeenth century English politics came to be characterised by a system of factions. This development provided a structural precondition - independent of the concrete possession of power by the king - for the de-personalisation of monarchical power. What was specifically involved here was the formation of political conflicts that were characterised by representatives of a particular viewpoint struggling with those of another viewpoint over the policy to be carried out. This had, of course, been the case - occasionally and embryoni- cally - long before the Revolution. But, whereas previous political conflicts had been inevitably structured by competition for influence over the king, after the Revolution this condition was partly dissolved. It is precisely here that we can see the constitution of a political public sphere, and, to this extent, the development of forms of political communication in which interests can only hope to win agreement if they can represent themselves in at least some sense as 'general'. This emergence of structures of a public sphere is both the social precondition for the rise of political ideologies and the result of it. (Which is why the critique of ideologies - understood as the critique of social-political programmes - finds its first real historical basis with the critique of personal forms of rule.) The fact that, despite the far-reaching restoration of royal prerogative power, this formation of a political public which had been the precondition for the Revolution and had structured its course (at least in so far as it affected the ruling and ascendant estates) could not be completely 
abolished, is shown by a further contradiction characteristic of the structure of power at this time: the Whigs and the Tories, as supporters of the different political viewpoints first pejoratively labelled each other, before the labels were adopted by the parties themselves, contended in the ‘exclusion crisis' over the modalities of collaboration (!) between royal personal power and generalised estate rule.
The crown took account of these altered structures. During the reigns of the last two Stuart kings, attempts to influence the composition and decisions of Parliament very largely took the place of earlier constitutional conflicts. The increased importance of Parliament was noticeable in the systematic political distribution of pensions and offices. Parliament now actually represented an (estate-limited) public. It had become the institutional expression of a notion of ‘good rule', which integrated royal personal rule with generalised estate rule and sought to subject it to this.
That the personal rule of the king, though restored after the Revolution, was at the same time redefined, is shown among other things by the revision of the penalties for high treason. As early as 1640, Chief Justice Finch was con-demned for ‘treason against the king as well as against the kingdom' (author's emphasis), and moreover with the argument that everything ‘whatever is against the whole, is undoubtedly against the head'.279 An offence of state treason that had not been previously defined was thus reinterpreted as an injury to personal obligations towards the king. Eight years later, Charles I was condemned for high treason ‘in the name of the people of England', and under the Restoration, a broad - state-oriented - interpretation of treasonable behaviour remained with the introduction of ‘rebellious speech'.”翻译为中文