1_ Translate the following legal text into colloquial Farsi 2_ Place the Persian and English text side by side in the table 3_ From the beginning to the end of the text, there should be an English sentence on the left side and a Persian sentence on the right side.
       4- Using legal language for Persian translation

          .The first is that "consideration must be valuable but it need not be adequate". This means that provided something of value is given, in the absence of fraud or improper pressure, then it will be enough. In Thomas v. Thomas (1842) £1 each year towards the ground rent of a house was held to be enough to bind a promise to allow a woman to live in her late husband's house. It was not a market price, but it had value. His natural love and affection for her was not enough. It has no commercial value. But £1 would do.
Consideration, however, cannot exist in doing what you are already bound to do in a contract with the same other party (called existing contractual duty) although if you do more you could expect extra payment. In Stilk v. Myrick (1809) a sailor could not recover extra pay he was promised (the promise was not binding) for working on a voyage to cover for two deserters out of a crew of eleven. On the other hand, in Hartley v. Ponsonby (1857), on similar facts, the sailor did get his extra pay because the desertion was nineteen of thirty-six, leaving only four or five able seamen. He had done more than his existing contractual duty. He had "bought" the promise of extra pay.
Another aspect of this just rule concerns the part payment of debts. It is of no extra value to be paid less than you are owed. So it was that in D & C Builders v. Rees (1965) the builders' promise to accept £300 in full settlement of a debt of £482 was not binding on them, and they could successfully sue for the balance. It Iwould not be the same, of course, if part payment were to be made early or in a different form (e.g. £300's worth of bricks) or with a chattel (£300 and a bucket) or by a third party (A owes B but B accepts less from C) - all with the agreement of the creditor because none of these is "straight" part payment. They all contain a little extra. If a little extra is paid the promise is binding but straight part payment will not discharge a debt. It has no value. Consideration must be valuable.
The second of these so-called rules is that "consideration must not be past". The rule sounds strange, but it is not difficult. Suppose I sell you a horse. After we have agreed the price and I have the cash and you have the horse you ask me about its temperament. I say that the horse is "sound and free from vice". This turns out to be less than accurate. You want to enforce my promise against me. You cannot. Al the time I made my promise about the horse the deal was over. You can only sue me for a broken binding promise (part of a contract). This promise was not binding. At the time I made it the only possible consideration from you (the money for the horse) was already in the past used up. The rule is sometimes stated as "past consideration is no consideration", and the facts of the story happened in Roscorla v. Thomas (1842).
Similarly, in Re McArdle (1951) a man left his house to his widow in his will, for her life, and then to his children. There were improvements made to the house, for which the children subsequently promised to pay a contribution. Thisthey neglected to do. Nothing could be done. When the promise was made the improvements had already been done. It was a gratuitous promise.
On the other hand, suppose I ask you to work for my company. You do so for a while. Later I promise to pay you. Since (a) I asked you to do it, and (b) it is the kind of thing that would normally be paid for, then despite the fact that I promised after you worked I have to pay. In a sense my request carried an implied promise of payment. These were the circumstances of Stewart v. Casey (1892) (which is sometimes called Re Casey's Patents (1892). It followed a very old case called Lampleigh v. Braithwait (1615) in which a man asked another to travel to the king and beg a reprieve from hanging for him. It was successful. The man promised to pay £100. He failed to do so, but he was held bound by his promise to pay for the act since it had been performed at his request.
The final rule has an even stranger name: "consideration must move from the promisee". It is part of a doctrine of contract law called privity. Only the parties to a contract have rights under it, and only they have obligations. There are very few exceptions to this. In Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861), for example, a couple were engaged. Their parents promised each other that they would each pay some money to the couple when they married. One set of parents paid, the other did not; the father died before he had had a chance to. The couple sued his estate. The action failed, because the only appropriate plaintiffs were the other set of parents. The couple had provided no consideration. They were not parties to the contract. They could not, therefore, sue on it.
A brief reference must be made here to equity. In essence, it is composed of a number of principles developed over the years in the interests of justice and fairness between the parties when a strict observance of the common law rules would lead to unfairness and injustice. In Central London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd (1947), commonly called High Trees, such a principle emerged when the argument concerned consideration. A landlord had gratuitously promised to halve the rent he could legally have demanded from a company renting the whole of a block of flats from him. It was wartime and it was proving difficult for the company to let the flats and pay the full rent. After the emergency the landlord wanted to restore the position and claim the full rent. He also questioned his ability to claim the back rent. Strictly, he had a right to the money, but the court said that they would not have allowed it if formally asked. This on the basis of the unfairness to the company who had relied on the promise, which had been made knowing it would be relied upon (they cut the rents to fill the block). This rare and very limited principle of equity is called estoppel. Where it is recognised, it can make a gratuitous promise binding provided, generally, that it was relied on and acted upon by the promisce.