请将“Despite numerous residues of the ancien régime, which can be seen according to one's political conception as either picturesque or stupid, British society has in the meantime become a bourgeois society, and the form of organisation of generalised power in Great Britain is that of a bourgeois state. The question as to when this change took place has for a long while loomed large in English historiography. With varying degrees of success, it has been ascribed to the ‘revolution of 1649', the ‘Glorious Revolution' of 1688, the ‘great reform' of 1832, and sometimes to the third round of electoral reform of 1884-5. All events have been highlighted by scholars over the years, but while each of them certainly abolished some of the structures of the ancien régime, none marked a final end to estate rule. The attempt to set a fixed point in time that is somehow equivalent to the French Revolution has time and again provoked vehement opposition. This is particularly clear with the example of the Reform Bill of 1832. If this was long celebrated as decisive for the political rise of the ‘middle classes', i.e. those social groups that English historians locate as above the manual workers and below the aristocracy, and that in other languages are usually referred to as the bourgeoisie, certain scholars have recently begun to consider whether this was not simply a deliberate strategy designed to stabilise estate rule. It is at least the consensus today that the changed composition of Parliament after 1832 in no way ended the political hegemony of the land-owning class.
Historical interpretations that have taken for granted that industrialisation leads to bourgeois society and a bourgeoisified state power, have been con-fronted in the last two decades with a view of English history which revolves around the persistence of aristocratic hegemony in politics:4 a connection established in the late nineteenth century between the interests of the aristocracy and finance capital,5 and a cultural ‘gentrification' of the middle class.6 These factors have been presented as long-term causes of the structural crisis of the English economy in the twentieth century.7 This analysis serves above all to explain the fact that particular forms of appearance of England's (and Great Britain's) political and social development do not agree with the constructed model of a capitalist society. Argument thus remains on the theoretical terrain that both Whig interpretation and Marxist analysis in turn staked out. If it was previously assumed that capitalists necessarily developed an interest not only in railways, but also in universal suffrage, a modern state bureaucracy, and an end to the personal dominance of the aristocracy in key positions of political power, today's view is that the frequent presence of politicians with noble titles is evidence of the persistence of the ancien régime, while industrialists with a penchant to the neo-Gothic are comparatively less inclined to invest than those of their thoroughly modern class colleagues.
There are several reasons why the search for a precise transition date in England from the ancien régime to bourgeois state power is misleading. The most important of these can be summarised as follows.
First of all, beginnings of a separation of politics and economics in England already go back several centuries. It is true that some guilds and corporations managed to defend their state-sanctioned privileges through to the late nineteenth century, while certain officials, such as coroners, retained much of their traditional character of a private exploitation of centralised power. But as a whole, the development of capitalist relations of production under the English ancien régime was scarcely hindered by traditional forms of rule.
The further that capitalist relations of production expanded in England, the more clearly were forms of appropriation through power integrated into and subordinated to structures of market competition. The surviving structures of the ancien régime thereby became structures of political power. Personal rule no longer structured the entire social system, but only an increasingly distinct realm of politics. With the far-reaching dissolution of personal royal power, there arose a public state power that opened up within estate limitations. Exclusion from the ‘political nation' was to a certain degree legally founded, but above all it was socially sanctioned. Access to participation in the institu-tionalised forms of the political public sphere was achieved first and foremost by material success and social ascent - i.e. in an individualised form.
Only when those who lived from the work of their hands managed to develop and organise their shared hopes for improvement in their conditions of life by a different kind of politics, did a fundamental criticism of the struc-tures of the limited political sphere and the individualised forms of rising into it indispensably arise. Members of those middle-class groups whose strategies of ascent to high office came into conflict with the persistence of privilege also adhered to the political radicalism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Temporarily, even factory-owners, bankers and industrialists saw the realisation of the demands of political radicalism as indispensable, in order to put an end to the state favouring of agricultural interests. But as soon as limited reforms were carried through, and the economic (!) hegemony of agricultural capital began to decline, the supporting groups of the industrialisation process came round to accept a certain restriction on rights of participation: traditional practices of handling social conflicts, and aristocratic representation of national interests, appeared largely reconcilable with their own interests of appropriation. They abandoned the project of abolishing every remnant of the ancien régime and establishing 'genuine' bourgeois institutions in its place. They have subsequently been reproached for undermining in the long run the dynamic opportunities of English capitalism. But this argument appeals to purely theoretical (!) notions of a bourgeois society, and neglects to analyse the application of traditional ways of dealing with capitalistically produced crisis as particular forms of a bourgeois society. This theoretical neglect is also characteristic of all those approaches that work with the concept of 'disguise', assuming as they do not simply a strategic position of the 'middle classes' outside the hegemonial political discourse, but a model of 'proper' bourgeois forms.8
Secondly, the specific form of capitalisation tells against setting a definite date for the end of the ancien régime in England. In this country, capitalist rela-tions of production initially arose above all in the agricultural sector. In the course of this - uncontested - structural change, the prospects for small peas-ants were to a large extent destroyed, but those for their former lords were certainly not. The latter generally became in the course of time agricultural capitalists. The richest of their number frequently went on to invest in other 
branches of production, notably mining. This means, however, that in England the aristocracy, i.e. the leading strata of the ruling estates of the ancien régime, were the leading representatives of the dominant capitalist fraction at the beginning of capitalist development. Given the persistence of the forms of rule of the ancien régime, the landed nobility as members of a capitalist class enjoyed special advantages of status and preferential involvement in political decision-making. They may sometimes have worn knee breeches and court shoes, but they could still be just as 'bourgeois' as the Labour prime minister who later emulated them.
The fact that the first economically hegemonic fraction of capital was repre-sented by individuals who chiefly hailed from and still belonged to the privi-leged estates, was the material precondition for the development of a bourgeois nationalism with an aristocratic veneer. But it is not outward appearance that indicates the social character of state power, rather its relationship to society. If a political public abolishes the estate restriction of generalised state power - whether in legalised forms, or in a structural change simply accomplished de facto -, neither aristocratic pomp nor the number of nobles in a government changes anything in the bourgeois character of this state power.
The third objection against a fixed date relates to the political form of this structural revolution. The transformation of the public power from an estate one to that of a bourgeois society made the abolition of structures of possession of office indispensable even in England. But since the actual government of the country was effected far less by an 'apparatus' of the central government than by representatives who were in the main locally appointed from locally dominant families (later on, dominant strata), the process of transformation did not take the form of constitutional controversies, but rather of social conflicts fought out at a local level. The two results of these conflicts were the gradual separation of the role of Justice of the Peace from a privilege of the landed nobility, and the development of additional institutions in which the new needs of regulation could be elaborated. Such new institutions, especially the commissions handling special problems of urban administration, emerged principally as a supplement to earlier institutions of rule, rather as their replacement. The overlaying of government authority, therefore, despite an increasing process of centralisation, proceeded variously and at varying pace at the local level. Similar lack of synchrony is also found in the various realms of centralised power. Particular examples of this will be 
shown in the following section. Their local and sectoral dissynchronies mean that they are not obvious as fundamental alterations in the organisation of political power. The final abolition of personal rule in England occurred only around the First World War. But well before this, the monarchy, the culturally hegemonic idealisation of the landed nobility, and the practice of negotiating social conflicts rather than fighting them out, had been redefined by the struc-tures of a capitalist society.”翻译为中文