America recreates a warfighting command in
Japan
The threat from China hastens the biggest military transformation in the
Pacific in decades

KADENA AIR BASE in Japan (pictured), America’s largest in the Pacific, is roughly
650km from the coast of China as the missile flies. Jets roar constantly over
children’s playgrounds on their way to and from patrols. But American
forces there have been on a peacetime footing since the end of the Vietnam
war. That changed on July 28th, when Lloyd Austin, America’s defence
secretary, announced the creation of a new warfighting command to oversee
all American forces in Japan.
The “historic” shift, as Mr Austin calls it, is a sign of the alarm with which
America and Japan regard the threat from China, which is rapidly building
up its armed forces. The new headquarters will help strengthen the defence
of Japan—once a seen as a rear base for operations but increasingly likely to
be on the front line of any conflict with China. It will also mirror Japan’s
own plans to create an American-style joint command to fuse air, sea, land
and other forces early next year.
“This is finally the transformation of US-Japan relations from what used to be
mainly a basing agreement, to project US military power, into a true military
alliance,” argues Christopher Johnstone of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, a think-tank in Washington. The move may deepen
China’s worries about encirclement and intensify complaints that America is
building an “Asian NATO”.

That is a long way from reality. America’s allies in Asia have no mutual
obligation to defend each other, as do members of NATO. Right now US Forces
Japan (USFJ) is mainly an administrative headquarters for units based in the
country, and to liaise with the Japanese government. The real warfighting
commander, Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of Indo-Pacific Command, is
based 7,500km to the east, above Pearl Harbour in Hawaii.
That set-up, dating from when Admiral Chester Nimitz masterminded many
of the naval battles and island-hopping campaigns against Japan in the
second world war from Hawaii, has looked increasingly implausible. Jeff
Hornung of the RAND Corporation, another American think-tank, says that in
any war with China communications with front-line forces in Japan and
elsewhere in the western Pacific are likely to be heavily disrupted, whether
by cyber-attacks, sabotage of undersea cables or strikes in space against
satellites.
Thus the creation of a forward-deployed operational command, well within
the range of China’s missiles, brings memories of Douglas MacArthur, who
fought many of the battles against Japan—in the Philippines and Papua New
Guinea—much closer to the action than Nimitz (sometimes dangerously so).
He later ruled Japan after its surrender.
The revamped USFJ will be run by a three-star general, who will answer to
Admiral Paparo. The Japanese had pushed for a four-star officer, akin to
General Paul LaCamera, who commands American forces in South Korea.
American officials note, however, that in wartime the general would take
over command of both American and South Korean forces. In Japan the two
armed forces take orders from their separate chains of command, even in a
crisis.

Nevertheless, the aim is to integrate exercises, planning and ultimately
fighting more closely. “When this transition is complete, USFJ will have a
direct leadership role in planning and leading US forces, in both peacetime
and potential crises,” says a senior American official. “They will be doing
that side by side with Japanese forces like never before.”
Mr Austin was joined in Tokyo by Antony Blinken, the American secretary
of state, for a meeting of the “2+2”—ie, of American and Japanese foreign
and defence ministers. They warned of the “increasingly severe security
environment” created by North Korea, Russia and above all China, not least
through their nuclear threats and build-up. Against that, they hailed their
alliance as “stronger than ever”. Beyond building the joint commands, they
agreed to boost production of scarce air-defence and long-range strike
missiles, and to increase deployments around Japan’s south-western islands
close to Taiwan. America reaffirmed its “ironclad” commitment to defend
Japan with its full might, including nuclear weapons.
In 2022 Japan announced it would sharply increase defence spending by
more than 60%, to 2% of GDP, by 2027, and would acquire long-range missiles
able to reach mainland China. For the foreseeable future it would be able to
launch such long-distance strikes only with intelligence and other support
from America.
Building blocks
The new American headquarters will be built in a phased process, about
which there are many unanswered questions: the size of the command, its
powers, location and area of responsibility, and the scope for other allies in
the Indo-Pacific to be incorporated into operations. Many of these issues are
sensitive, whether because of American inter-service rivalries or Japan’s
struggles to shed its pacifism. “Both left and right would prefer Japanese
forces to retain greater sovereignty,” notes Watanabe Tsuneo, of the
Sasakawa Peace Foundation, a Japanese think-tank.

One question involves American politics. President Joe Biden’s
administration is seeking to strengthen the growing “latticework” of new
security arrangements on top of its old alliances in Asia before the American
elections in November. This involves institutionalising such things as the
burgeoning three-way military co-operation with Japan and South Korea.
And it means beefing up other parts of the “island chain” that girdles China,
from Japan to Malaysia. At another 2+2 meeting in Manila on July 30th,
America announced a big push to modernise the Philippines’ armed forces
and coastguard, which have faced intense harassment by China around
disputed parts of the South China Sea. The tension has eased somewhat in
recent days, after a still-undisclosed deal allowed the Philippines to resupply
its garrison on a rusting ship grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal. But the
truce may not hold for long. America’s “once in a generation” package
includes $500m in military aid.
With a further 2+2 with Australia due to be held in Annapolis on August 6th,
American officials speak of “the ten most consequential days” for the Biden
administration’s defence policy in the Indo-Pacific. But how much can really
be established before its term runs out is unclear. The new American
headquarters in Japan will probably not be running when the Japan Joint
Operations Command (J-JOC) begins work in March 2025. Congress, which
must authorise the headquarters and appropriate the funds for it, is largely
paralysed.
A further uncertainty is what all these efforts would mean in a crisis over
Taiwan, a self-governing island which China is determined to retake, by
force if necessary. How far would the new command be involved if
American forces decided to defend Taiwan? Conventionally, America has
seen its role as the “spear” that would take on Chinese forces, with Japan as
the “shield” to defend its territory and American bases. Whether such a
distinction can be maintained in a war is doubtful.

That said, Japan is fast shedding its coyness about Taiwan, which it ruled for
half a century, until 1945. The late prime minister, Abe Shinzo, declared that
“a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency”. It was telling that earlier
this month Japanese and Taiwanese coastguard vessels held joint sea-rescue
exercises. Japan is donating coastguard vessels and maritime radars to the
Philippines. Japan has also signed “reciprocal access agreements” with both
Australia and the Philippines to host each other’s forces.
If successful, the joint-forces model could spread. America last month set up
a joint headquarters (under a two-star commander) to improve the defence of
Guam, an American island territory. Some talk of doing something similar in
Australia, where American forces are building up their presence. Having
several headquarters across the Pacific and expanding when needed would
strengthen America’s resilience. MacArthur knew all about command under
fire. But the headquarters back in Pearl Harbour will still prove vital—just
as it was to Nimitz and America’s success in winning the Pacific war.

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