The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion refers to (относится к) the 
April 20, 2010 explosion and subsequent (последующий) fire on the Deepwater Horizon semi-submersible Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU), about 
40 miles (60 km) southeast of the Louisiana coast. The explosion killed 11 
workers and injured 16 others; another 99 people survived without serious physical injury. It caused the Deepwater Horizon to burn and sink, and started a 
massive offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. This environmental disaster
(катастрофа) is now considered the second largest in U.S. history, behind the 
Dust Bowl.
The Deepwater Horizon was a floating semi-submersible drilling unit
(полупогружная буровая платформа). The platform was 396 feet (121 m) 
long and 256 feet (78 m) wide and could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet 
(2,400 m) deep, to a maximum drill depth of 30,000 feet (9,100 m). The platform commenced drilling in February 2010 at a water depth of approximately 
5,000 feet (1,500 m). At the time of the explosion the rig was drilling an exploratory well. The planned well was to be drilled to 18,360 feet (5,600 m) below 
sea level, and was to be plugged (быть закупоренным) and suspended for
(быть приостановленным) subsequent completion as a subsea producer. Production casing was being run and cemented at the time of the accident
(несчастный случай). Once the cementing was complete, it was due to (ввиду, 
вследствие) be tested for integrity and a cement plug set to temporarily abandon the well for later completion as a subsea producer. The rig owner, Transocean, had safety record with no major incidents (авария, техногенная катастрофа) for 7 years. 
The BP wellhead had been fitted with a blowout preventer (BOP), but it 
was not fitted with remote-control or acoustically activated triggers (детонатор) for use in case of an emergency requiring a platform to be evacuated. It 
did have a dead man's (анкерная свая) switch designed to automatically cut 
the pipe and seal (герметизировать) the well if communication from the platform is lost, but it was unknown whether the switch was activated. Documents 
discussed on June 17, 2010 indicated that Transocean previously made modifications to the BOP which increased the risk of BOP failure, in spite of warnings 
from the contractor (подрядчик) to that effect.
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There had been previous spills (утечка, разлив) and fires on the Deepwater Horizon; the US Coast Guard had issued pollution citations 18 times between 2000 and 2010, and had investigated 16 fires and other incidents. The 
previous fires, spills, and incidents were not considered unusual for a Gulf platform and have not been connected to the April, 2010 explosion and spill. The 
Deepwater Horizon did, however, have other serious incidents, including one in 
2008 in which 77 people were evacuated from the platform when it listed and 
began to sink after a section of pipe was accidentally removed from the platform's ballast system. By April 20, 2010 the Deepwater Horizon well operation 
was already running five weeks late. Internal BP documents (документы
компании) show that BP engineers had concerns as early as 2009 that the metal 
casing BP wanted to use might collapse under high pressure. In March 2010, the 
rig experienced problems (столкнулась с проблемами) that included drilling 
mud falling into the undersea oil formation, sudden gas releases, a pipe falling 
into the well, and at least three occasions of the blowout preventer leaking fluid. 
The rig's mechanic stated that the well had problems for months and that the 
drill repeatedly kicked (выброшен) due to high gas pressure providing resistance.
On the day the rig exploded, 79 of the 126 people on the rig were Transocean employees.
According to an official report the blowout preventer was damaged in a 
previously unreported accident (незарегистрированный несчастный
случай) in late March 2010. Workers had been performing standard routines
(повседневные работы) and had no indication of any problems prior to (до, 
перед) the explosion. Equipment readings indicated gas bubbling (пузырящийся) into the well, which could signal an impending blowout. The heavy drilling 
mud in the pipes initially held down the gas of the leaking well. A BP official
(официальный представитель ВР) onboard the rig directed the crew to replace the drilling mud, which is used to keep the well's pressure down, with 
lighter seawater even though the rig's chief driller protested. According to a 
number of rig workers, it was understood that workers could get fired for raising safety concerns (повышение мер безопасности) that might delay drilling. 
On March 10, 2010, a BP executive (исполнительный директор ВР) said 
that there was a stuck pipe (прихваченная труба) and well control situation at 
the drilling site, and that BP would have to plugback the well. A draft of a BP 
memo (выписка из директивы) in April 2010 warned that the cementing of 
the casing was unlikely to be successful. BP officials have said that they had 
finished cementing 20 hours before the fire, but had not yet set the final cement 
plug. A special nitrogen-foamed cement (азотно-пенный цемент) was used 
which is more difficult to handle than standard cement.
On July 23, 2010 The New York Times reported that crew members had 
appeared before a federal panel of investigators (федеральная комиссия
по расследованию), saying that power failures (прекращение электроснабжения), computer crashes (отказ электроники) and emergency equipment 
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leaks (протекание аварийного оборудования) had occurred within a few 
weeks of the explosion.
The fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon reportedly (по сообщениям) started at 9:56 p.m. on April 20, 2010. At the time, there were 126 crew on board: 
seven employees of BP, 79 of Transocean, as well as employees of various other companies involved in the operation of the rig.
Transocean employees on the vessel state (утверждать, констатировать) that the lights flickered, followed by two strong vibrations. After the explosion, Transocean executive stated that abnormal pressure had accumulated 
inside the marine riser (водоотделяющая колонна) and as it came up it «expanded rapidly and ignited». According to interviews with platform workers 
conducted during BP's internal investigation, a bubble of methane gas escaped 
from the well and shot up (подниматься, выталкивать, разрушать) the drill 
column, expanding quickly as it burst through several seals and barriers before 
exploding. The event was basically a blowout. Survivors described the incident 
as a sudden explosion which gave them less than five minutes to escape as the 
alarm went off.
The explosion was followed by a fire that engulfed the platform. After 
burning for more than a day, Deepwater Horizon sank on April 22, 2010. The 
Coast Guard stated to CNN on April 22, 2010 that they received word of the 
sinking (получить сообщение о затоплении) at approximately 10:21 am.
According to officials, 126 individuals were on board, of whom 79 were 
Transocean employees, six were from BP, and 41 were contracted; of these, 
115 individuals were evacuated. Most of the workers evacuated the rig and took 
a workboat (рабочий катер) that BP had hired to service the rig. Seventeen 
others were then evacuated from the workboat by helicopter. Most survivors 
were brought to Port Fourchon for a medical check-up and to meet their families. Although 94 workers were taken to shore with no major injuries, four were 
transported to another vessel, and 17 were sent to trauma centers. Most were 
soon released. When the blowout occurred, 4 BP and Transocean executives 
were on board the platform for a tour of the rig (осмотр платформы); they 
were injured but survived. They were then driven to a hotel under escort, questioned by company consultants and investigators and then given a form to sign 
before being released.
Initial reports indicated that between 12 to (от … до …) 15 workers were 
missing; reports soon narrowed the number (уменьшить количество) of 
missing to nine crew members on the platform floor and two engineers. The 
United States Coast Guard (береговая охрана) immediately launched a massive rescue operation (массовая спасательная операция). On April 23, the 
Coast Guard called off the search (прекратить поиски) for the 11 missing 
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persons, concluding that «reasonable expectations of survival» had passed. Officials concluded that the missing workers may have been near the blast (взрыв, 
уничтожение) and unable to escape the sudden explosion.
On April 22, 2010, BP announced that it was deploying (разворачивать, 
размещать) a remotely operated (на дистанционном управлении) underwater vehicle to the site to assess whether oil was flowing from the well. That day 
the oil was leaking from the rig at the rate of about 8,000 barrels (340,000 US 
gallons; 1,300,000 litres) of crude per day. Two remotely operated underwater 
vehicles (ROVs) had been sent down to attempt to cap the well, but were unsuccessful.
At an April 30, 2010 press conference, BP said that it did not know the 
cause of the explosion. 
In June, officials said BP should have tested cement at the well, which 
would have cost $128,000 and taken 8–12 hours.
On September 8, 2010, BP released a 193-page report on its web site. The 
report says BP employees and those of Transocean did not correctly interpret 
a pressure test.
On November 8, 2010, the inquiry by the Oil Spill Commission revealed its 
findings that BP had not sacrificed safety in attempts to make money, but that 
some decisions had increased risks on the rig. 
A slide briefly appeared on the Oil Spill Commission’s website which enumerated eight «risky» and «unnecessary» steps that BP was deemed to have taken (считалось, что ВР следовало предпринять). The New York Times newspaper has published a screenshot (цифровое изображение) of the slide

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