请将“This problem applies no less to law: If the law is one of the most important techniques of cohesion, then its relative autonomy plays a central part in this. The law cannot only be the simple expression of the relationship of forces, but it has to be ‘relatively’ removed from those immediate struggles, to be able to organise compromises, concessions and submissions. Jessop also believes that Poulantzas fails to clarify the concept of relative autonomy in the course of his work. Class struggles were meant to introduce an element of contingency, but also to argue that in the long run the capitalist state always only preserves class domination - even if this is the result of numerous and diverse micropolicies.304
Nowhere did Poulantzas satisfactorily explain how the state’s relative autonomy guarantees bourgeois political domination, despite the contin-gencies of the class struggle ... This suggests that the concept of relative autonomy is at fault and Poulantzas should have abandoned it along with other Althusserian notions. He rightly insisted on the institutional separation of the political and economic reigns in capitalist societies ... But he erred in assuming that somewhere in the state there is something which can somehow guarantee bourgeois class domination. Instead he should have taken seriously his own idea that the state is a social relation. For this clearly points towards a detailed, conjunctural analysis of the contingent necessity of political class domination (or its absence) as the complex resultant of state forms and class forces.305
In contrast to Jessop, however, I do not believe that the concept as such has to be abandoned. For relative autonomy does not have to guarantee a certain form of domination a priori; it can just as well be the unintended product of reified social relations, and thus gain a certain density or materiality. How can Poulantzas otherwise explain the ‘material condensation’ of the relationship of forces? Instead, what is needed is an explanation of the conditions that enable its development. In order to do this, one would actually have to start from the concepts of the form-analysis tradition. Poulantzas, however, expli- 
citly distances himself from them.306 At this point it becomes clear that the two seemingly so very different theoretical strands could actually become fruitful for each other.307
2.2.4.3	The Hegemonic Production of Unity
Poulantzas assumes that besides a certain measure of autonomy, the institutional unity of the state apparatuses is the basis for exacting short-term economic sacrifices from the dominant classes, in order to secure their political domination in the long-term. The specific institutional structure of the state makes the unity of the power bloc actually possible.308 Unity in a more narrow sense means preserving the state system itself as a form of political domination, and thus above all its capacity to use constitutionalised force and to reproduce its own institutional system in order to ensure compliance with its policies. This has in other contexts been described as the state’s interest in self-preservation (Offe), or as the material self-interest of the state apparatus.309 Unity in a wider sense implies, however, that its political function is performed successfully: that social cohesion is made possible3W Poulantzas is here obviously influenced by Neumann’s analysis of National Socialism, where Neumann describes the non-state as the competition between state apparatuses up to the decay of the nation state itself311
But what ensures the state’s unity, when social contradictions are after all inscribed in its apparatuses and the latter come into conflict with each other? While Poulantzas assumes in his earlier writings that this is made possible by the ‘specific cohesion of an autonomised legal-political superstructure’^2 he subsequently distanced himself from this notion. Not the organisational matrix of the state, but the factual power of certain apparatuses should now secure unity, with the dominant branch organising the hegemony of the subordinated apparatuses. However, also this later version of unity remains unconvincing. The plausible presentation of the contradictory micro-policies of the enmeshed apparatuses makes it hard to grasp how the state is meant to be unified through the domination of one apparatus. Here Poulantzas rather appears to fall back on Althusser’s concept of instances, where one of the instances is always the dominant one. It is moreover striking that Poulantzas also fails to explain what is meant to ensure that the ‘managers of the state’ (that is the civil servants and politicians) do not, because of the materiality of the apparatuses themselves and the externality of the political (to the economic), pursue their own corporative interest or simply the state’s interest in self-preservation at the cost of its global role.313
The question of the unity must, however, be resolved, because, whether they are organised on the level of the nation state or supra-nationally, the legal apparatuses are also part of a contradictory ensemble, a ‘flexible institutional totality’,314 and their relation to the totality of the regulatory instances as well as their contribution to the production of cohesion has to be clarified.
Firstly, it must be noted that the state does not exist as a completely constituted, internally coherent, organisationally pure and operationally closed system, ‘but as an emergent, contradictory, hybrid and relatively open system’.'!’ Therefore no inherent substantial unity qua institutional ensemble (that is qua formal unity) can existé6 but it can only - thus Jessop’s proposal - be mediated through a hegemonic project. Hegemonic projects are political projects which succeed in presenting themselves as solutions to pressing social problems. Within them, material interests, strategic orientations, discursive and cultural meanings, ideological convictions and feelings converge.317 Also the state’s managers have to be successfully integrated though this political ‘cement’.3i8 For the nation state, Jessop speaks of national-popular political projects'!” or of state projects. Those projects are made possible institutionally through specific coordinating procedures and of course ultimately only against the background of a corresponding social base 320 This means that the substantive unity of the state is just like the unity of the power bloc not given as such, but that it has to be produced from the outset through a hegemonic practice. This can of course also fail, as particularly visible when the state’s personnel or that of one particular branch becomes alienated from it.
The autonomous legal structure, which was Poulantzas’s first attempt at an explanation in the context of the ‘internal-external-dialectic’, cannot be completely abandoned. If relative autonomy can be ‘saved’, the law’s relative autonomy certainly offers alongside and together with hegemonic projects a second set of explanations, which establish in particular how this unity can gain a certain stability despite constant challenges.
2.2.4.4	Overestimating the State
Alongside the functionalist concept of state and law, another parallel to form analysis is obvious in his methodological overestimating of the state. Alex Demirovic rightly argues that in Poulantzas the state becomes the only guarantor for the reproduction of society as a whole.321 Bob Jessop also speaks in this context of Poulantzas’ ‘enduring politicism with its one-sided concern with the state system’.322 For Gramsci’s theory of the extended state remains ignored,323 and with this his insight that ‘bourgeois society (società civile) reproduces itself in the manifold private initiatives as the dominant order, thus contributing to social reproduction and in doing so extending the state by adding the consensual and voluntary dimension'.'^4 Gramsci’s thesis stresses that there is no privileged location for the reproduction of a social formation^5 This historical overestimation of the state leads to law now only being considered of secondary importance. Here too it canalways only be seen as a technique of the state apparatus. By thinking with Poulantzas against Poulantzas, this narrowing could be overcome by an expanded field of vision that can include other techniques of cohesion. Here law would be an excellent candidate.
2.3	Michel Foucault
Calling on Michel Foucault for a materialist legal theory might seem surprising, as he has a problematic relationship both to Marx and Marxism as well as to law. But precisely this constellation makes him interesting for dealing with central problems in Marxist theory. In particular because he rejects several of its premisses, he reveals potential alternative solutions for the problems encountered thus far. However, this does not mean that I am following the dominant tendency here and consider Foucault’s concept of power a successful way to overcome Marxist social theories by way of a poly-form, multi-centred concept of power,326 but to the contrary: as a critical continuation of a contribution to the critique of political economy under the conditions of the crisis of marxism.327 In order to make the theories accessible to each other, Foucault’s analysis of power, however, has to be first reconstructed independently of his remarks on law. It will therefore have to be examined in greater detail than the preceding approaches, as Foucault’s reflections have to be shown to be compatible with those of Marxist theories in that they conceive of the same phenomena in a relatively parallel manner, although both start from different premisses.
Foucault’s reference to Marxian theory is very clearly shaped by the historical context, that is both by the development of the French Communist Party and by his acquaintance with Louis Althusser as well as more particularly by the political struggles of the years around 1968.328 His notorious critique of Marxism took place in The Order of Things and was fiercely attacked by Marxists. In contrast to Althusser, whose Reading Capital he, however, did not know at the time,329 he claimed that Marxism had not really made a break from the depths of occidental knowledge, but had rather been a tempest in a teapot: ‘Marxism exists in nineteenth-century thought like a fish in water: that is, it is unable to breathe anywhere else’.33°
The reactions against Foucault’s position over time were of course no less polemical. Criticism was in particular directed at Foucault’s alleged wilful mangling of Marxist theory: ‘What Foucault does is to “use” Marx to set up a negative pole against which to elaborate his alternative. The Marx that emerges is somewhat one-dimensional: rigid, determinist, economist, with a narrow conception of power as repression, and viewing the state as a unitary agent and the instrumental bearer of the interests of the ruling class'.'3-31 Poulantzas’ critique took the same path: Foucault ‘directs his fire either against his peculiar caricature of Marxism or against the Marxism of the Third International and the Stalinist conception that a number of us have been criticising for a long time now’.332 He could thus present his own findings as overcoming Marxism, something that Poulantzas comments on almost bitterly: ‘Some of us did not wait for Foucault before proposing analyses of power with which his own investigations now concur in certain respects - although we cannot but rejoice at this development’.333”翻译为中文