Australia and ASEAN: Together for the Sake of a New Multipolar World Order
Author(s): Huong Le Thu
Source: Security Challenges , 2018, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2018), pp. 26-32
Published by: Institute for Regional Security
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26488488
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Security Challenges
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Australia and ASEAN: Together for the
Sake of a New Multipolar World Order
Huong Le Thu
The Australian Foreign Policy White Paper released by the Turnbull
government in November 2017 was refreshing in the way it reprioritised
Southeast Asia as a key focal point. Southeast Asia is an important region
for Australia due to its proximity and economic potential, among other
reasons. However, Australia’s recent enthusiasm over Southeast Asia
needs to be accompanied by a more nuanced and patient understanding of
the region, as well as its defining institution the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). While imperfect and often perceived as ineffective,
ASEAN remains an important actor in the evolving multipolar world order
and it is in Australia’s best interests to support this multilateral institution.
The Special Summit: Late but Substantive
The Australia-ASEAN Special Summit that took place in mid-March is one of
the flagship initiatives of the Turnbull government and an early realisation of
a Foreign Policy White Paper prescription.36 A diplomatic success, the
Summit showcased the current government’s unusually high sensitivity to
the feelings of Southeast Asia’s leaders. The high-profile and substantive
week-long activities associated with the Summit stood out from other
summits held between ASEAN and its dialogue partners—including the highprofile US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit under President Obama in February
2016, the Sochi Summit with Russia in May 2016, the India-ASEAN Summit
in Delhi in January 2018 and numerous ASEAN-China summits—in the way
it included various interests and issue-specific discussions. As a result, the
Sydney Declaration37 was accompanied by a number of separate meetings
on counter-terrorism, cyber security, maritime security, infrastructure and
business that discussed concrete cooperation frameworks.
The Special Summit happened at a potentially pivotal moment when regional
developments cast doubt not only around power and stability, but also upon
the broader direction of the region. In March 2018 the People’s Republic of
China’s thirteenth National People’s Congress amended its constitution

36 See Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, ‘About the Special Summit’,
<aseanaustralia.pmc.gov.au/special-summit/about> [Accessed 16 June 2018]. 37 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, ‘Joint Statement of the ASEAN-Australia
Special Summit: The Sydney Declaration, Sydney Australia, 18 March 2018’,
<aseanaustralia.pmc.gov.au/Declaration> [Accessed 16 June 2018].
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Security Challenges
Volume 14 Number 1 - 27 -
erasing presidential term limits.38 As a result, President Xi Jinping has
consolidated power domestically and signalled a more ambitious role for
China in global affairs. Meanwhile, the United States introduced a confusing
mix of policies, such as retreat from free trade and a withdrawal from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, but a more confrontational approach towards
China in asserting their ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, as detailed in the
National Security Strategy and the National Defence Strategy.39 The IndoPacific concept, while still yet to be clarified by the Trump administration, has
already raised questions among actors in the region over how the omission
of “Asia” in the title may impact regional arrangements. Australia is a
supporter and a promoter of the Indo-Pacific concept and by reaching out to
ASEAN through the Summit it effectively responds to existing concerns in
Southeast Asia.40 The Turnbull government successfully reassured ASEAN
leaders that the Southeast Asian multilateral organisation plays a central role
in its understanding of the Indo-Pacific concept. The Summit clearly
demonstrated that Australia’s approach to ASEAN has evolved since former
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s proposal to establish an Asia-Pacific
Community. Bearing in mind that the idea was rejected by the region
because it was perceived to be a step towards sidelining ASEAN, the
Turnbull government recognised in the Foreign Policy White Paper ASEAN’s
centrality in the region’s economic and security institutions.41
Why Now?
The Summit symbolises Australia’s fresh approach to the region and its
institutions. As of 1974 Australia became ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner,
which, in fact, makes Australia’s history of formal engagement with ASEAN
even longer than half of its members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam only joined ASEAN in the 1990s).42 Whilst Australia has been a
strong supporter of the East Asia Summit it seems Canberra is only recently
waking up to the importance of Southeast Asia and the benefits of partnering
with it. In the view of many in the region this awakening has been triggered
by a growing sense of instability and lessening of certainty in the reliability of
its great and powerful but distant friends. Under President Trump, American

38 ‘Xi Jinping Unanimously Elected Chinese President, CMC Chairman’, People’s Daily Online,
17 March 2018, <en.people.cn/n3/2018/0317/c90000-9438338.html> [Accessed 16 June 2018]. 39 President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, December 2017, <www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-
18-2017-0905.pdf>; US Secretary of Defense, Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America, January 2018, <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-
National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf> [Accessed 16 June 2018]. 40 Rory Medcalf, ‘In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia's New Strategic Map’, Australian
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 4 (2014), pp. 470-83. 41 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra:
Commonwealth of Australia, 2017)
42 Huong Le Thu, ‘Should Australia Join ASEAN? Lessons from Vietnam’, East Asia Forum, 10
May 2018, <www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/05/10/should-australia-join-asean-lessons-fromvietnam/> [Accessed 16 June 2018].
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Security Challenges
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foreign policy is increasingly unpredictable. Indeed, Donald Trump’s
comments and actions have framed traditional US allies and partners as a
burden,43 making Australia, arguably the United States’ most loyal ally, quite
insecure as China’s increasing assertiveness manifests itself nearer and
nearer Australian shores.
Australia’s relationship with China has deteriorated significantly over the past
eighteen months, largely due to the debate around China’s influence in
Australian politics, media and universities.44 As such, the growing sense of
loneliness is a pressing driver for Canberra to seek a ‘Plan B’ in its foreign
policy.45 ASEAN, being at the centre of regional architecture and
geographically half-way between China and Australia, subsequently gains
more of Canberra’s attention.
Opening ASEAN to Australia: A Diversion from Reason
Leading into the Special Summit, Indonesian President Joko Widodo
(Jokowi) suggested, in comments to the media that attracted more attention
than they deserved, that Australia could become a member of ASEAN.46
These comments triggered a considerable amount of consternation and
discussion, such as cultural notions of Javanese politeness to explain
Jokowi’s utterances.47 This discussion did not address the core question of
why Australia would desire membership and what it would do differently if it
were to become an ASEAN state. These are questions Australia would
have to answer before support for membership was sought.48 There is little,
if any, consideration among ASEAN member states regards Australia’s
membership in the organisation and the actual mention of it displays how
out-of-tune some current leaders of ASEAN are. Jokowi, who in the early
days of his presidency disregarded ASEAN’s importance to Indonesia,49 has
become the target of ridicule for his rather uninformed quotes, as has

43 ‘Lexington’, ‘Donald Trump Seems to See Allies as a Burden’, The Economist, 4 February
2017, <www.economist.com/united-states/2017/02/04/donald-trump-seems-to-see-allies-as-aburden> [Accessed 16 June 2018].
44 See ‘China’s influence in Australia: Maintaining the Debate’ Policy Forum, Asia & the Pacific
Policy Forum, 27 March 2018, <www.policyforum.net/chinas-influence-australia-maintainingdebate/> [Accessed 16 June 2018].
45 Anthony Milner and Sally Percival Wood (eds), Our Place in the Asian Century: Southeast
Asia as the ‘Third Way’ (Melbourne: Asialink, University of Melbourne, 2012). 46 James Massola and Peter Hartcher, ‘Indonesian President Widodo Says Australia Should Be
in ASEAN’, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 March 2018, <www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indonesianpresident-widodo-says-australia-should-be-in-asean-20180315-p4z4ha.html> [Accessed 16
June 2018].
47 Dedi Dinarto, ‘Deciphering Jokowi’s Javanese Card in ASEAN-Australia Relations’, The
Conversation, 27 March 2018, <theconversation.com/deciphering-jokowis-javanese-card-inasean-australia-relations-93750> [Accessed 16 June 2018]. 48 Le Thu, ‘Should Australia Join ASEAN?’. 49 Felix Utama Kosasih, ‘Indonesia and ASEAN: Where Are We Going?’, Global Indonesian
Voices, 30 July 2015, <www.globalindonesianvoices.com/21846/indonesia-and-asean-whereare-we-going/> [Accessed 16 June 2018].
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Security Challenges
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President Rodrigo Duterte for advocating Mongolia and Turkey’s
membership in the organisation.50 Rather than showing ASEAN’s openmindedness, these comments reveal that the intergenerational
communication of ASEAN’s collective interests, visions and values have not
been effective.51 It is indeed an indictment on the new generation of
Southeast Asian leaders that some in their rank lack the knowledge of what
ASEAN is, what it stands for and what it is lacking. This is a worrying trend
and it has already challenged ASEAN’s coherence and is likely to continue
doing so.
ASEAN Matters But Only for What It Is, Not What Others
Want It to Be
When considering engagement with Southeast Asia, it is necessary to bear
in mind that Southeast Asia does not equal ASEAN, as Graham, Le Thu,
and Cook recently reminded Australian audiences.52 Southeast Asia has
many strengths, which include its relatively youthful workforce, its expanding
middle class and its GDP growth rates. Challenges also exist in the region,
some traditional, such as territorial disputes, and some non-traditional such
as extremism. Proximity and inter-connectedness mean that Australia and
Southeast Asia share these challenges. Australia must engage its
neighbours to seek security with, rather than from, Asia. Closer ties with
both Southeast Asia and individual Southeast Asian states should become a
constant priority, uncontested by any change of governments.
ASEAN, as an organisation, on the other hand, is less dynamic. It is an
intra-governmental institution that has a diplomatic function. And while
renewed enthusiasm for ASEAN is necessary for Australia’s strategic
outlook, as well as for ASEAN’s own fragile institutional confidence,
Canberra needs to embrace the organisation for what it is, not for what
Canberra wants it to be.53 ASEAN is an important regional body, with flaws
and imperfections, that accommodates a very diverse set of members.
Given that there is no equivalent in Northeast Asia—indeed, the only

50 ‘Philippines' Duterte Says Turkey, Mongolia Could Join Asean’, The Straits Times, 16 May
2017, <www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/philippines-duterte-says-turkey-mongolia-could-joinasean> [Accessed 16 June 2018]. 51 Huong Le Thu, ‘Vietnam and Singapore: Working Together to Keep ASEAN Relevant’, The
Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 1 September 2016, <www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/vietnamand-singapore-working-together-keep-asean-relevant> [Accessed 16 June 2018]. 52 Euan Graham, ‘Is ASEAN Still Central to Australia?’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 5
February 2018, <www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/asean-centrality#debatResponse
_344521>; Huong Le Thu, ASEAN: Different Strokes for Different Folks, But Future Should Be
in Sync’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 8 February 2018, <www.lowyinstitute.org/theinterpreter/debate/asean-centrality#debatResponse_344641>; Malcolm Cook, ‘ASEAN Is Not
South East Asia, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 13 March 2018, <www.lowyinstitute.org/theinterpreter/asean-not-south-east-asia> [Accessed 16 June 2018]. 53 Huong Le Thu, ‘China's Dual Strategy of Coercion and Inducement Towards ASEAN’, The
Pacific Review (2018), DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2017.1417325.
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Security Challenges
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analogue is the ASEAN-Plus Three mechanism54—ASEAN remains the only
regional architecture available. The ASEAN debate in Australia needs to be
informative, frank and unorthodox. The region has been overlooked for a
long time and the current juncture presents a golden opportunity for Australia
to embrace it.55 But we need to remember that just because we are now
interested in ASEAN, it has not miraculously evolved into what we want it to
be just because it has gained Canberra’s attention.
Arguments that espouse ASEAN’s role in regional security can be
misleading; crediting ASEAN with the delivery of regional peace needs to be
done with caution and rigorous testing.56 Take, for example, the popular
argument that the lack of major war in the region is a result of ASEAN. This
theory is problematic on numerous levels. First, it is difficult to demonstrate
any causal relationship between ASEAN’s existence and the ‘long-peace’ in
Southeast Asia. Second, the occasions where ASEAN has undertaken
meaningful preventative diplomacy are few in number. Sure, ASEAN’s
facilitation of dialogue may have had an ameliorating effect on otherwise
hostile situations, but that outcome is an indirect result of dialogue and a
general recognition that peace is in everybody’s best interest. Third, even if
ASEAN has displayed a capacity to ensure peace in the region the question
is raised as to why it is unable to quell the recently flaring disputes over
territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.
ASEAN’s role in providing for regional security requires clarification. ASEAN
is, and will remain, a forum for expressing concerns, and even that has been
frequently challenged. ASEAN is not a vehicle to solve security related
problems, nor is it a collective security mechanism. Australia would face
bitter disappointment if it were to work under an assumption that ASEAN
might serve as an anti-China bulwark.57 Seeing any nation, let alone
Southeast Asian nations in a binary ‘with us, or against us’ lens is
counterproductive. While there are some indicators that suggest smaller
Southeast Asian states are either in pro-China or pro-US camps, as many
studies frame the situation, what motivates this outcome is usually
misunderstood.58 All nations will always prioritise self-interest and national
policies that lean towards either power are just a means to satisfy that
priority. To expect Southeast Asians to display a similar level of allegiance

54 ASEAN, ‘ASEAN Plus Three’, <asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-3/> [Accessed 16
June 2018].
55 Huong Le Thu, ‘Australia’s Ever-Changing Perspectives on ASEAN: Time to Get It Right’, The
Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 1 March 2018, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/
australias-ever-changing-perspectives-asean-time-get-right/> [Accessed 16 June 2018]. 56 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, ‘Success Ensures ASEAN’s Long-Term Importance to the United
States’, East Asia Forum, 27 March 2018, <www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/03/27/successensures-aseans-long-term-importance-to-the-united-states/> [Accessed 16 June 2018]. 57 Ibid. 58 Max Fisher and Audrey Carlsen, ‘How China Is Challenging American Dominance in Asia’,
The New York Times, 9 March 2018, <www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/09/world/asia/
china-us-asia-rivalry.html?mtrref=t.co> [Accessed 16 June 2018].
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Security Challenges
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to the United States as Australia does, especially considering the security
the United States provides Australia, is rather unrealistic. So even if there is
a pressing need to balance China’s power in the region—better understood
only among a few of ASEAN’s leaders—hoping for a concerted and
collective approach to China, which would inevitably elicit a retaliation from
Beijing, is highly problematic. National interest as opposed to ‘ASEAN
interest’ has been, and is arguably becoming more, divergent. Canberra
needs to take account these nuances in order to not commit policy
overstretch. Bilateral relations with strategically like-minded states, such as
Vietnam, will hold the most value for both sides of the partnership. In fact,
the strategic partnership agreement signed on the eve of the Special Summit
is so far the most concrete and meaningful outcome of the recent embrace
between Australia and its Southeast Asian neighbours.59
Australia’s interests regarding ASEAN are best served by reinforcing the
meaning of multilateralism. Multilateral fora, even when facing challenges
as they do today, maintain a relevant role in international and security affairs
and it is more critical now than ever that the international community support
these organisations. Australia and ASEAN can play important roles, both
together and separately, in providing such support. Australian enthusiasm
helps prevent ASEAN from falling into obsolescence. Moreover, Australian
support for ASEAN communicates a view on the emerging multipolar world
order, that a functional regional architecture in Southeast Asia that enjoys
international support could operate as a pole of global power. Australia’s
Foreign Policy White Paper articulated such a view, but stronger policy
communication and justification must follow, reinforce and complement the
document.
Conclusion
There are many pressing priorities on the Australian strategic plate. Recent
global power shifts have created space for consideration beyond the known
and the comfortable. The question that will linger, even after a photogenic
summit, is: Can Australia sustain its interests in ASEAN or will it return to its
natural tendency of preoccupation with the Great Powers?
Careful thinking around long-term mutual interests and the potential of
creating lasting engagement is needed. To do so, a clear understanding of
the relevant policy approaches is essential. Canberra needs an ability to
translate the nuances between ‘ASEAN language—whereby declarations,
plans and initiatives outline visions of harmonious, prosperous and functional
community—and ‘ASEAN practices’—where the constraints on true
integration remain formidable. Inaccurate expectations and assessments of

59 Huong Le Thu, ‘Shared Vision Behind Australia's New Strategic Friendship with Vietnam’,
Australian Financial Review, 12 March 2018, <www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/shared-visionbehind-our-new-strategic-friendship-with-vietnam-20180312-h0xcbn> [Accessed 16 June 2018].
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Security Challenges
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ASEAN have caused disillusionment and, perhaps needlessly, reduced
confidence in what the partnership with the regional body can achieve.
Expectations must be tailored to fit reality by accepting what ASEAN is and
what it is not.60 Canberra would also be best advised to ponder over
ASEAN’s needs and expectations surrounding a partnership with Australia,
rather than solely communicating good intent and expectations in a one-way
dialogue.
Australia needs a comprehensive, lasting and coordinated Southeast Asia
policy. A policy that includes but does not rest on hosting special summits.
The Foreign Policy White Paper started a conversation in the right direction,
but a turn towards Southeast Asia needs to be a continued effort, rather than
just a one-off summit.
Dr Huong Le Thu is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

60 Le Thu, ‘ASEAN: Different Strokes for Different Folks’.
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