请将“No state activity, however, contributed more to the institutionalisation of the 'nation' than the development of the social state. This took place in nationally varying forms and at different points in time, but everywhere the traditional forms of provision for the poor were replaced by new forms of state provision of material subsistence. The social state was not based on an idea of general welfare, even if those who demanded it had this in mind; it was based, rather, on the fear of political unrest. In place of solidarity in the social neighbourhood, which could scarcely function any longer in the period of industrialisation, the state organised solidarity among strangers.49 This new model of inclusion, justice and control was especially pronounced in states where the right to existential security could be effected in the form of compulsory membership in social insurance funds. But, even in social states that were organised and financed differently from this, the state correction of the distributive results of the market was and still is bound up with methods of control designed to ensure that the supply of labour on the market is maintained at a sufficient level. Initially, the material benefits were very limited. But, from the very beginning, this social right meant a new form of constitution of political unity. The development of the social state based the concept of nation in material interests, the interests of those who had to pro-vide the financial means, and the interests of those who had claims on these. In this way, the social state also promoted a tendency to demarcation, i.e. nationalism.
In the course of time, the instruments of state intervention in market affairs were steadily extended. The high point of this development was reached in the practice of monetary policy, fiscal policy, employment policy and the reg-ulation of capital movements, which became dominant in the United States after the world economic crisis of the late 1920s, and in other states after the Second World War. State activity of this kind gave the appearance that the free operation of the market no longer obtained. The economy could instead be directed by regulation. Subsequent political acceptance of this has been far more dependent on the economic conjuncture than on democratic procedure. Political unity, however, has not been endangered by the rejection of a par-ticular government. For it has since come to be based on a very far-reaching modelling of society by the state. In the course of development of bourgeois states, the relationship of society and state that was aimed at by bourgeois revolutions - and was subsequently laid down in the constitutions of bourgeois states - has, in a certain sense, been reversed. The legitimisation of the state is based constitutionally on the self-determination of the state's people, but, in historical reality, this sovereign has, in a sense, come to be a product of the state's own activity. Ever more spheres of life, even the reproduction of life itself, are today regulated and administered by the state. State activity - Michel Foucault spoke of ‘governmentality' - has anchored the stability of the political system in the life activities of the citizens. These developments set relatively narrow limits to the openness of the political process in states with democratic constitutions. They also reduce, in this way, the demand for legitimacy. It is remarkable that the procedures of democratic legitimisation no longer play any particular role in a theory of the ‘political system' that has become particularly prominent.50
Yet despite all this, the contradiction between fundamental inequality and democracy has not been abolished. Two fundamental elements of bourgeois statehood, moreover, continue to exist: compulsion and additional legitimisa-tion. Compulsion replaces the unreliability of political inclusion. For no sys-tem of governmentality, no matter how differentiated, can prevent capitalism from time and again creating ‘surplus' people, who are of no economic use and therefore pressed to the margin of society. No more can any such system prevent the promise of bourgeois revolutions from remaining alive, the expectation of a democracy that is not reduced to mere formality, the expec-tation that it must be possible in future to argue about reasonable goals and put these into practice. Since bourgeois state power does not and cannot let this promise come true, it regularly needs additional legitimisation. In the second half of the twentieth century, this was supplied in a double sense by the conflict between the two great political blocs. So long as the Soviet Union remained standing, it was used as an enemy against which the existing order had to be defended. For many who were dissatisfied with this order, this was also a constant devalorisation of the hoped-for possibility of a better social order.
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought a further precondition for the accelerated globalisation of capitalism at the end of the century. In the states that have developed out of bourgeois states, a new figure of legitimisation has arisen: the pressure of competitiveness. This has not reversed the liberation of the market from power, and though the free disposal of private property remains the basis of market activity, state activity is now expected to support the particular compulsion of the market. Legitimisation of the existing order thus merges into the functional principle of the market, i.e. mere competition. This is very threadbare. 
The first bourgeois revolutions set in motion a world history of national sovereignty. In 1791, the slaves of Santo Domingo demanded the rights of man, and launched a struggle for their freedom and political independence from France. In 1804, they founded the state of Haiti, thereby claiming sovereignty and the recognition of all other sovereign states. Through struggles for independence and autonomy, the political form of ‘national sovereignty' has since spread across the whole world. With the exceptions of Antarctica, the Spratley and Paracels archipelago, and a tiny zone between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, every speck on the map belongs to one national state or another. It is universally supposed today that state sovereignty is the property of a sovereign people, located in a particular territory. Independent of the particular form of government, therefore, the conception of a public power and the social institution of public office, i.e. achievements of the bourgeois revolution, have been globalised. Not only this. By conquest (starting with the Napoleonic wars), by colonisation, and by the orientation of ruling élites to successful prototypes, systems of law, structures of administration, education systems and forms of hegemonic capitalist culture have been diffused. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the almost worldwide spread of capitalist production and market relations, differences in the formal organisa-tion of statehood between capitalistically producing societies have become smaller. Yet fundamental differences still remain - despite the change in the nature of the state even in those states that developed out of bourgeois revo-lutions. Much as the particular national development of bourgeois states dif-fered from one another, which suggests a theory that rejects generalisation in favour of a large number of different national roads, it becomes clear, in comparison with modern statehood that has been differently established in capitalistically producing societies, that the origin in theoretical and practical criticism of the ancien régime that is common to bourgeois states produced long-enduring conditions for further political struggles, modes of stabilisation and concepts of legitimisation of the existing order. In all capitalistically producing societies, there have been more-or-less pronounced processes of individualisation, but, under the ancien régime, individuality arose not from the destruction of social connections, rather from the struggle for a legally established room for manoeuvre that could be used to give sense to one's own life. In these societies, there arose the concept and practice of a constitution of 
interests, as common goals of people who did not know each other personally. The critique of traditional rule, the critique of church rule and the beginnings of a privatisation of religious practice, all preceded bourgeois revolutions, just as did the Enlightenment and with it the start of the institutionalising of science as an instance of legitimisation. Not all these developments, or the corre-sponding patterns of socialisation and cultural practices, were adopted along with the institutions, legal systems and administrative organisation that have spread across the world, forcibly and otherwise. The many national capitalist states that exist on the planet today are therefore not more or less well-func-tioning bourgeois states, they are capitalist states of a different kind. These differences are differently composed, and cannot be discussed in detail here. We may just indicate the fact that in many postcolonial states the market has not been freed from power. The foreign observer sees the political practice of such states as marked by corruption. In actual fact, it is simply that in many ways the state in these countries - just as in Europe under the ancien régime - is a mediating instance for private appropriation, and solidarity continues to be almost exclusively restricted to the social neighbourhood. For the states of sub-Saharan Africa, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz51 propose to interpret the concrete development of modern statehood not as a 'deviation', but rather a historical development in which the horizontal connection between individualised state citizens has not replaced the traditional vertical connections. In the states that were previously marked by the one-party rule of actually existing socialism, the introduction of free elections and parties has not automatically meant the adoption of the tradition of constitution of inter-ests from the bourgeois states. As a consequence, the personal connections that prevailed under one-party rule still mark the political culture.”翻译为中文