请将“It is important to stress that while state and capital interact universally, one capi-talist state is not the same as another. Each state develops uniquely in relation to combined and uneven development within a national territory: nature of pre- and non-capitalist class relations, the balance between formal and real subsumption of labour by capital, and social (racial/gender) oppression and its relation to capitalism, and the degree to which and ways in which one country, including its various regions, is linked to other countries and to the world market. States are also different one from another because their territorial jurisdictions are different in terms of the balance among productive and non-productive forms of capital, balance among capitals in different sectors, the level of economic development, the level of cultural development (e.g. literacy), the previous history of state-capital interaction, history of common people’s struggle, and the extent to which there is a relationship between capitalists and state personnel, that needs a lot of time to develop and is not geographically portable.
With the emergence of a world capitalist system along with transnational capitalist operations, the nation-state has not gone away, but some of its functions are scaled up or scaled down. This means that some of its tasks are performed more by sub-national institutions of the state, and other tasks are performed more by state or state-like institutions at the global scale constituting what Picciotto and Radice call a new state.6
The ‘increasing scalarization’ of state power — the fact that this power is increasingly exercised at extra-local scales — does not mean that state-society relation at a local scale has lost all its importance. The multiplicity of what can be called state-scales represents tendencies towards scalar decentralization and scalar concentration:
Although the making of the national scale thus played a pivotal role in the early evolution of capitalism, it is not unique in proffering territorial solu-tions to the political economic contradictions between competition and cooperation, differentiation and equalisation, in capitalist societies. Parallel processes operate at other scales, equally if differently embedded in and transformed by the needs of capital accumulation. Across history, the urban scale has provided various social functions, centralising not just economic but military, religious, cultural and political power.
(Smith, 2006: 191)
The urbanization of capital makes the urban scale, which may be defined in terms of an urban labour market (or what Harvey calls ‘structured coherence’), an important scale (Harvey, 1985). Closely related to the urban scale is what I would call the city-region which includes a city and its surrounding rural or semi-rural areas. This scale, which is an important subnational scale, is where most of the everyday interaction happens in dominantly urban or even urbanizing societies. This represents the gradual expansion of urban capitalist accumulation into non-urban or semi-urban areas not only through real-estate development on the basis of the conversation of farm-land, but also what Lenin (1899) calls ‘the transplantation of large-scale capitalist industry to the rural districts’. The city-region (or the urban scale) scale is where capitalist accumulation happens and labour power is reproduced. This is also where the exercise of state power is effected and experienced by people, as the state shapes both accumulation of capitalist wealth and reproduction of labour power. This is also the scale where labour resistance to capital and the state begins to form and tends to be concentrated. Not surprisingly, apart from the national borders, the city-region is where the coercive powers of the state are concentrated, as seen in its landscape. Indeed, specific parts of the city-region are devoted to the police and military apparatus of the state to protect the seats of capital and of state power against not only the urban working class, including recent ruralurban migrants, but also a potentially angry bloc of rural small-scale producers and workers waiting at the city border and beyond, a bloc which can be part of a politically explosive alliance with the urban working class.
There is a scale division of labour within the nation-state. This is indicated by the division of responsibilities between central/national organs and more regional/local branches (Cox, 2002: 250—1) which operate within a nested hierarchy.7 Legislators commonly represent territorially defined populations (ibid.). More local branches (e.g. provincial and sub-provincial branches) can be more accessible to common people than the central branch. Some capitalist states are unitary states and other states are federal: Unitary states (e.g. the UK) and federal states (e.g. the US, India) are different in terms of the scale division of labour, although there is growing concentration of power in the central branches of the state and in the hands of the ‘chief executive’.8 At a given scale, state policies (e.g. minimum wage policy, or unemployment insurance policy) can geographically vary in part because of the specificity of state institutions in different city-regions/provinces. Such variation creates a geography of business climate and thus an important reason for capital mobility within the jurisdiction of, say, the national state.
Given that common people put pressure on the state and on capitalists for concessions and given that the state (as well as) capitalism operates at the local scale (as well as higher scales), it is important that we do not lose sight of the localness of social relations and class struggle. However, a distinction is to be made between ‘spaces of dependence’ and ‘spaces of engagement’ (Cox, 1998): ‘[I]n evaluating the strategies of individual agents and their organizations, as they construct the networks through which they hope to accomplish their ends, the spatial structure of the state, its scale division of labor, is an important consideration’ (p. 15). The scales at which class struggle happens does not necessarily match the scales at which the state power is exercised. Locally dependent workers (workers living in a city) can make use of provincial and national-level political resources in their local struggles against the state and capital.
Capital does not just lobby for specific state policies but policies that benefit capitalist interests in particular places/cities, regions, and nations. Locally dependent or nationally dependent businesses may want protection from com-petition from capitalists located elsewhere. A given law may disadvantage or favour (some) businesses in region x as opposed to region y. If some firms are relocating from high-wage to low-wage areas, the more locally dependent firms (retailers, banks, utility companies, and so on) may want some intervention: they may want a more uniform national-scale law in support of workers (e.g. minimum wage law) rather than the laws according to which support for workers comes from the revenues from local jurisdictions. Sometimes fractions of labour and of capital of a given area come together for state support, and they do so in opposition to other such regionally based cross-class coalitions (Harvey, 1985; Cox, 1998).
State policies at a given scale (policies of the local state or provincial state) have territorial impacts (Duncan and Goodwin, 1987). For example, the state divides an area into various land use zones. It also establishes various geographically delimited, or territorialized, use-values for collective consumption such as national and local parks. Capitalism is known to produce uneven development at all scales (for example, uneven development between cities/ city-regions and between provinces) in part due to the dialectic of geographical concentration of investment in some areas at the expense of other areas (causing differentiation) and the opposite process of equalization (movement of investment across areas) (Das, 2017b; Smith, 2008; Harvey, 2009). Under capitalism, at a given point in time, some areas become more developed than other areas; some areas are more profitable than other areas. Given the role of the state in assisting capitalist accumulation, state institutions at a given scale seek to attract businesses into their jurisdictions. The state provides special benefits to relatively less developed areas to attract capital — for example, ‘opportunity zones’ in the US, discussed earlier. The state also seeks to attract investment to special economic zones, which suggests that not all laws apply equally to all the areas inside the jurisdiction of the state. Consider the offshore centres: their existence suggests that ‘a sovereign state offers foreign investors the ability to act economically on its territory under legal conditions that differ from those that apply to its own citizens’, an offer that ‘consists in a renun-ciation of the universality of law in the state territory’ (Gerstenberger, 2009: 684). And ‘in terms of state theory, it has made a fiction of the principle that the laws of a particular country apply to its territory [equally]. This has sideeffects on the prospects for labour struggles’ (ibid.: 684). In fact, the usual laws protecting trade unions rights do not apply in these offshore centres or special enterprise zones, which have ‘greatly accelerated the international dynamic of deregulation’ of businesses.
Capitalism is known for uneven and combined development (discussed in Chapter 11). Often uneven development gives rise to what is known as internal colonialism: areas and peoples (wage workers and small-scale producers) are politically prevented from being able to sell their labour power and other commodities at the market rate and are thus subjected to above-average exploi-tation. This happens in the interests of specific fractions of the capitalist class that control state power, often justified on the basis of its ethnicity, and so on.
2	Bureaucratic state form and political domination
by the state
When Lenin (1919a) talks about a ‘technically weak state apparatus’ that operates ‘within relatively narrow boundaries and with a narrow range of action’, he appears to hint at what Michael Mann (2012: 13)) would call infrastructural power which is to be distinguished from despotic power:
Despotic power is the ability of state elites to make arbitrary decisions without consultation with the representatives of major civil society groups. Infrastructural power is the capacity of a state (whether despotic or democratic) to actually penetrate society and implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm. . . . ‘Infrastructural power’ enables states to diffuse their power through or penetrate their societies (‘power through’); while the exercise of ‘despotic power’ is by a state which has a degree of authoritative ‘power over’ society.
The implication of this is that ‘states may be “strong” in either of two quite different ways’. That is, ‘states can command anything they like of their citizens (despotic power) or they can actually get decisions implemented across their territories (infrastructural power)’ (Mann, 2012: 13).”翻译为中文