请将“For Abensour, the distinction is significant enough to reflect a change of paradigms. In 1843, true democracy is a dialectic in which “the disappearance of the State” stands at the pinnacle of an almost cumulative process of mediations. In 1871, a more temporal, agonistic and immediately political dynamic of democracy is outlined, with the emphasis falling on “action that consists in smashing modern State power” (pp. 87 and 96). In .ways analogous to Pierre Clastres’ anthropology of society against the State, Marx’s writings on the Commune indeed detail a “collection of mechanisms whose function is to impede the sudden rise of a separate power, and whose aim is to block, at the site of the political, the advent of a division between power and society.”36 Rather than pointing to the millenarian disappearance of the State, Marx therefore reveals the working existence of the Commune as actively engaging, from within its own political bounds, an opposition between non-coercive and coercive modalities of power. True democracy, far from representing a quixotic escape from the universality of political power, would provide a new figure of emancipation by proving that the conflict between democracy and the State can be given body and meaning in the invention of an unprecedented political relation.
Marx’s specification in 1871 that the “State-machine” is not to be appropriated but smashed is all the more suggestive as this action now forms the “rational medium” for class struggle. It is as though the fight against exploitation would henceforth gain its rational structure from the fight against domination, rather than vice versa. The emphasis on the struggle against the State as the “rational medium” for class struggle establishes again - as with the 1843 Critique, and as against the 1859 Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy - the formal and practical primacy of the political over the economic: or better, it highlights the nuance of the analysis of the State that now makes the primacy explicit. Rather than designating an essentially neutral mechanism, a form of governmental institution that owes its liberating or oppressive character to the class that gives it its stamp, the State signifies as ever an irreducible relation of domination. If the bourgeois State is mediated by the economic base, by the progress of industry and the national power of capital over labor, and is in this sense the clearinghouse of bourgeois interests, its internal logic is nonetheless consistent with the “State-machine” of every epoch. Social domination is the embryonic structure of the State. As such, far from representing the “main booty” of proletarian revolution, the “temporary” appropriation of this structure toward revolutionary ends is seen as only delivering that revolution’s death sentence. Every revolution that sets out to annihilate class differences, while centralizing power in the hands of the State, only serves to bring out the autonomy of the “State machine” in broad relief at the same time as it fetters the emancipation of the working classes anew. The State, therefore, can only constitute for Marx “the great and single object of attack to the revolution.”37 The emblematic breakthrough of the 1871 Commune, Marx writes, is “revolution against the State itself,” revolution against the very movement of power’s separation from society, which is now identified with the “machinery of class domination itself.”38
The primacy of smashing modern State power - as the primacy of creating a political liberty that would provide the “rational medium” for class struggles - is thereby made coextensive with the primacy of neutralizing the force of domination through the force of democratic action. And again, the question of domination does indeed become central as the failure to confront politically the self-separation of social power appears, in Marx’s view, to condemn every revolution in advance of emancipation turning into its opposite. The historical breakthrough of the Commune is to have turned self-government into a living critique of social domination - domination as something radical, as socially diffuse and ubiquitous - and to have thus established the “rational medium” for multiplying the fields of class struggle in the ongoing test of a people to initiate themselves to “social revolution.” Thus, smashing the State refers less to the particular locus of negation - as if the power of domination and the power of its centralization/formalization were not consubstantial - than to the double-edged movement of negation itself. The Commune brings into view a struggle of the people to “form their own force instead of the organized force of their suppression.”39 Or more explicitly, the smashing of the State now signals for Marx the eruption of a “rational medium” which awakens a people’s vigilance and force against “their own force opposed to and organized against them.”40
Without pushing matters too far, we can nonetheless see how, beyond Machiavelli, Marx glimpses in the Commune an attempt to grapple with the difficult truth stressed by Etienne de La Boétie: “no real or empirical foundation, that is, nothing positive is capable of accounting for servitude.”41 It is as though the enigma of democracy were entirely contained in the enigma of servitude, and the Machiavellian division between the powerful and the weak, the dominating few and the dominated many, were for Marx revealed in the ineradicable division of a people’s power itself. To the non-localizable dynamic of the State would thus correspond the interminable movement of true democracy. Rather than “resolve” social division, democratic society in its “truth” would constitute itself reflexively. As Abensour has suggested by reference to Etienne de la Boétie, such a political society would establish itself in an “incessant self-return that would tend toward a continuous self-institution, recognizing in the political realm, which would have become the nodal-point of contention, the very space of an. inextinguishable questioning of its social being.”42
For this reason, we may agree with Alain Badiou when he makes the Commune of Paris the emblem of an “unknown capacity, a power without precedence ... a subversion of the rules of political appearance.”43 In effect, the world of politics is confronted with that which does not, in this world, count as politics: a government (the “Communal Constitution”) based not on the laws of State power, but on those formulated by the direct initiative of workers (precisely, the uncounted of politics). The members of the Communal government are directly elected and revocable; the separation of representative powers is terminated and replaced by delegations that are directly deliberative and executive; the professional army is banned in favor of the direct arming of the people - coincidentally, a move not far from the aims of civic humanism according to Pocock44 - and so on.
Yet we may also go beyond Badiou by recognizing how the logic of dual power, as an embryonic power contesting the property of the old, is immediately radicalized, internalized, and as it were self-consciously redoubled. Starting with the proclamation distributed over the entire city on 19 March - “the proletarians of the capital, in the midst of the weakness and treason of the governing classes, have understood that the moment has come to save the situation by taking the direction of public affairs in their own hands” (Comité central de la garde nationale} - representational treason ceases to index the regrettable, but unavoidable, everyday state of political affairs. Instead, such treason is the turn of events the Communards struggle actively to prevent by instituting popular accountability over their own political powers. In Abensour’s reading of Marx, the Communards constitute, from within the Commune’s own political terrain, a methodic intensification of dual power. That is, the Communal form institutes itself and perseveres in time as “an agonistic relation that aims to forestall the State’s return [. . .] thus mobilizing a critical knowledge and a thumos where desire for liberty and hate of servitude are mixed indistinctly” (p. 88). Or more precisely, the revolutionary situation of the Commune is played out in “a multifaceted arena of conflict at the heart of which the struggle for democracy is confronted by at least two adversaries: it rises against not only the State of the ‘Old Regime,’ but also against the one that is in statu nascendi during the course of the revolution itself” (p. 96).
The problem, then, becomes how to read Marx when he presents the Commune as the “political form at last discovered” of emancipation.45 Is the enigma of emancipation resolved? Is it to be found in the regime of the Commune? Or is true democracy instead revealed in the political movement of the Commune, which succeeded for a time in destabilizing the very idea of the “good regime”? Is it really possible to locate this moment and body: “When the Paris Commune took the management of the revolution in its own hands”?46 Or is the fluidity of the verbal adjunct the whole point, as though Marx were connecting the “hands” of revolution to the rise of an anomalous managing body - the Commune as the self-government of the popular masses - in order to emphasize how the count of the uncounted reinvents the political realm as a permanent object of dispute?
If we maintain the perspective of “reflective judgment,” the Commune in effect has an exemplary, as opposed to determinant, signification for true democracy. Indeed, could any political “model” incorporate the body of the people as a power, or configure the utopian body of true democracy?”翻译为中文