请将“In the works succeeding The Order of Things, Foucault attempted to partially soften his critique and quite clearly came close in many places to the Marxian approach. The parallels are in part so obvious that Poulantzas, despite his polemics, attempted to overcome the crisis of Marxism by integrating Foucault.334 He thus writes: ‘On this precise question, then, Foucault’s elaboration has considerable value, since it furnishes a materialist analysis of certain institutions of power. Not only does it sometimes concur with Marxist analyses - a point which Foucault is careful not to see, or state - but in a number of respects it may even enrich them’.335 Poulantzas notes entirely accurately that Foucault can very much be considered as belonging to the materialist tradition. For he starts like Marx from the materiality of practices and attempts to dissolve reified social ontologies again in social relations. From this perspective many of his critiques, for example that of the idealist concept of law, are very much parallel to the Marxian critique. Works like Discipline and Punish, but also his later lectures or his lectures at the Collège de France on the history of governmentality, could easily have the heading or at least the subtitle History of Political Economy. All he cares about here is to avoid a subprocess of society being singled out and removed from its connections with the other processes. Forms of knowledge, ways of subjectivation, discourse and bodily practices are just as much ‘rooted’ in the relations of production, as is the manner in which commodities are produced.336
When looking at his statements towards the end of the 1970s, it is noticeable that Foucault rebelled first and foremost against a particular historical development of Marxism. For Marxism was no longer an oppositional theory, but a ‘manifestation of power'.'3-37 It thus presents itself in a traditional manner as a ‘science’, which considers its declarations to be true and intends them to exert force. Moreover it cannot exist without a political party or without a state, whose philosophy it has become^8 and finally it plays a part in the ‘imaginary historical eschatology’.339 He was particularly opposed to the Communist Party, of which he was briefly a member:340 as an ‘impoverishment of political imagination’ through the monolithic bureaucratic will of a ruling elite, which constitutes a class as its subject. This Party has come to determine the history of Western Marxism: a hierarchical organisation, reminiscent of a monastic order.341
In sum one can take up Balibar’s view that ‘...in ways which were constantly changing, the whole of Foucault’s work can be seen in terms of a genuine struggle with Marx, and that this can be viewed as one of the driving forces of his productiveness’.342 Furthermore the entirely accurate argument has been made recently that a ‘secret dialogue’ between Foucault and Poulantzas took place in their late works on state theory.343 This politics of secrecy came from Foucault, even though his engagement with Poulantzas is obvious. The similarity between the concept of the state as a ‘material condensation of relationships of forces’ and the ‘governmentalisation of the state’ are striking: both are a microphysics of the state.
What holds for his approach to Marx applies similarly to Foucault’s treatment of law. To begin with he, much like Poulantzas, did not produce a legal theory.344 This had, however, a methodological reason, as his analysis of power aimed above all to attack the so-called ‘juridical concept of power’. Some authors therefore reached the conclusion that Foucault theoretically removed law from modernity and could offer at best a critical perspective, a ‘negative utopia’ on modern law.345
As will be shown below, although he did not offer a systematic theory of law346 (a phenomenon one encounters more often than not in the context of materialist legal theory), Foucault can nonetheless make a contribution to the line of questioning developed here. This consists on the one hand in his attention to the limited character of law as only one technology of power, and on the other hand in that he exposes the role of legal practice in the constitution of the modern subject. Thus a gap in form analysis can be filled. This rather indirect relation to law, however, makes it necessary to first present Foucault’s general theory of power before addressing law. For only in this way can it be shown that the charge of legal nihilism stems from a misunderstanding of his social theory.
2.3.1	‘The Moving Substrate of Force Relations’ - The Problem of Power That Foucault situated law in the context of his analysis of society is already apparent in that it is one technology of power amongst others. What does power mean in this context? It is noticeable that Foucault speaks of ‘THE power’ so often that it seems as though the very theorist who opposed all ontologies supported a substantialist analytics of power. But upon closer inspection this thesis cannot be maintained: ‘the power’ turns out to be rather something of a short-hand for a much more complex idea, which is very similar to the concept as we find it in Poulantzas, Gramsci and Marx.
2.3.1.1	Power Comesfrom Below
‘I am well aware that there are those who say that in talking about power all we do is develop an internal and circular ontology of power ...’ Thus Foucault countered criticisms of his analysis of power,347 while throwing back the accusation of ontology at his critics. For it was they who derived all power from universals like the state, instead of recognising and analysing power as an independent phenomenon^8 He refused to derive power from the ‘economic infrastructures’ or institutions just like ‘anecdotal’ histories about generals or kings, namely about people in power^9 and that is the labyrinthine question: Who has power?350 Power should be analysed as an independent phenomenon where it unfolds in its practices. The subject of analysis is thus power relations and not power itself^51 the multitude of relations of force as well as the interplay that transforms those relations of force in continual struggles.352 Thus he could rightly sum up his premise in his 1978-9 lecture on the history of govern- mentality:
... I repeat it once again, that power can in no way be considered either as a principle in itself, or as having explanatory value which functions from the outset. The term itself, power, does no more than designate a [domain]* of relations which are entirely still to be analysed .353
The condition for the possibility of power lies accordingly not in a place of origin, ‘not in a unique source of sovereignty’, from which all relations would have 
to be derived, but in ‘the moving substrate of force relations’.354 If Foucault speaks nonetheless of POWER, then it is only to express the overall effect of all those contested force relations, their concatenation to systems and finally their institutional crystallisation, such as in the state apparatuses and in ‘social hege-monies’. POWER is thus the name for a complex strategic situation.355 Major dominations are the ‘hegemonic effects’ or ‘terminal forms’ that are based on those confrontations and are by no means given entities.356 One can see here that the distinction of power and domination, even if the French language includes both power and domination in the term pouvoir, does not significantly differ from the sociological definition in Max Weber. The latter had described power as the more general process, as the ‘possibility of imposing one’s own will upon the behaviour of other persons can emerge in the most diverse forms’. Domination, however, designates the successful, actual power to issue commands^7
The foundational location of power in power relations (in the machinery of production, in families, etc.) also makes clear that neither ‘the caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power that functions in a society ...'35-s A strictly relational concept of power^9 one that Poulantzas quite obviously followed in his late work,360 makes it impossible to consider power something that can be possessed. The ‘ruling class’ appear rather as managers of relations than as in power. Power exists only in relational practices, which articulate themselves to power formations and draw all their effectiveness from the material conditions361 This polymorph process only takes on the contours of a multiform and anonymous power when it reaches a certain level of dissemination.362 It can thus be noted that by power Foucault always means ‘a general matrix of force relations at a given time, in a given society’,363 and thus the opposite of an a-historical ontological essentialism of power. 
2-3-1-2	Power Comesfrom Everywhere
The similarities of Foucault’s analysis of power to the analyses of Marx, Gramsci and Poulantzas are obvious, including even the deliberate use of the term hegemony. Moreover, the idea of a concatenation of power relations is very close to Poulantzas’ ‘material condensation’ and differs at the same time from the systems concepts of Luhmann and Habermas: with Foucault ‘systems’ have to be analysed as effects of hegemony, which are based on relationships of forces.
A crucial distinction from Marxist concepts consists, however, in Foucault’s attempt to overcome the narrow concept of the ‘force relation’, which in the other three authors remains limited to the relations of production (although in a wider sense). In The Will to Knowledge Foucault starts at exactly this point a dialogue with the Marxists of his time. Power relations do not form the ‘superstructure’, but the base, as they are the immediate effects of the inequalities arising in social relations. Those inequalities in turn constitute the internal conditions for those differentiations. They are thus not external to economic processes, knowledge relationships or sexual relations.364 Power is everywhere and produced at every point, not because - as Foucault stresses - it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. It is rooted in the ‘system of social networks’,365 that is, in the ‘power relations that exist between the sexes ... between adults and children, in the family, in the office, between the sick and the healthy, between the normal and the anormal ...’366 As has been shown, the relations of production were for Poulantzas also more than only economic relations. They were co-original political, ideological and economic relations and also present in each other. He could, however, conceive of the power relationship this led to only as one of the rights and powers of classes as they result from their positions. Other power relations were ultimately determined by them. Foucault’s at first seemingly conspiratorial assumption that power comes from everywhere, ultimately constitutes an attempt at correcting this classism.
2.3.1.3	Power is Productive
Similarly to Gramsci, Foucault assumes that power in bourgeois capitalist societies cannot rest solely on prohibition and violence. What he termed, to great confusion in the literature, the ‘juridical notion of power’,367 was coupled with 
the existence of a feudal absolutist society and was no longer a sufficient explanation for modern forms of power. It is rather the rise of a new type of power, one which no longer traverses social relations from top to bottom.368 Juridical notion, because it is based upon the model of the law with the licit and the illicit, which constitutes the subject as a subject by ‘subjecting’ it, as someone who obeys.369 This notion, according to which power is only repressive and coercive, is only a minuscule part of the spectrum of possible effects of power and reduces the most diverse forms of domination to the imperative of obedience, without making the fact of obedience itself the subject of analysis370 This so-called ‘repressive hypothesis’ is an insufficiently complex concept, a ‘simple little machinery’ based upon the idea of a rebellious energy which only has to be throttled. Power, however, is always already present, where desire exists, not only in a subsequently exerted repression.371”翻译为中文