374
13. The ASEAN–Australia strategic
partnership: Australia as an
awkward partner
Karolina Gawron-Tabor
13.1 INTRODUCTION
In 1974, when Australia came to be the first Dialogue Partner of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the then Australian
Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam (1974, after Merrifield, 2013) said that
‘[o]f all (regional arrangements and associations) in this region, ASEAN is
unquestionably the most important, the most relevant, the most natural’.
Australia engaged in creating the ‘architecture’ of the Association as it
was the founding state of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East
Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus
(ADMM1). The development and strengthening of ASEAN as well
as a new outlook on Asia in Australia’s foreign policy (Patience, 2017)
tightened the connections between the partners. In 2007 the parties formed
a comprehensive partnership (Joint Declaration on ASEAN–Australia
Comprehensive Partnership [JD], 2007), and in 2014 a strategic partnership
(Joint ASEAN–Australia Leaders’ Statement on the 40th Anniversary of
ASEAN–Australia Dialogue Relations. Towards a Strategic Partnership for
Mutual Benefit [JS], 2014).
The aim of this chapter is to present and assess selected aspects of the
strategic partnership (cooperation willingness, strategic goals and roles
convergence, trust and cooperation sustainability) between Australia and
ASEAN. It can be observed that the partnership is indeed focused on
developing and strengthening cooperation, but still the parties wish to use
it in order to achieve their own particular interest. The research was based
on mixed methods research (MMR) – an approach adopting integrated
use of quantitative and qualitative methods. It involved quantitative and
qualitative content analysis, strategic narrative analysis as well as statistical
analysis.
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The ASEAN–Australia strategic partnership 375
13.2 COOPERATION WILLINGNESS
As noted in the introduction, in 2007 Australia and ASEAN formed a
comprehensive partnership. At that time the parties issued a joint declaration and an action plan (Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration
on ASEAN–Australia Comprehensive Partnership [POA], 2007). In 2014, 40
years after establishing the dialogue, the parties decided to enter into strategic partnership. This decision was represented in a joint statement and an
action plan (Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN–Australia Strategic
Partnership (2015–2019), [POA], 2014). In this chapter, the analysed time
span of the effective partnership is 2007–2015.
Considering the quantity and scope of domains covered by the cooperation, its political basis should be regarded as broad. The structures of the
2007 joint declaration and action plan suggest that the partners determined
four main domains of cooperation (over 20 disciplines in total): (1) political and security cooperation; (2) economic cooperation; (3) socio-cultural
cooperation; (4) cooperation for development. The documents upgrading
the partnership to a strategic one (JS, 2014; POA, 2014) indicate five
domains of cooperation. The ‘political and security’ and ‘economic and
socio-cultural’ areas were maintained, and two other domains were added:
building connectivity and institutional strengthening of ASEAN. The
analysis of domain salience showed that the partners prioritize political
and security issues, and pay slightly less attention to socio-cultural aspects.
During the analysed period 2007–2015, the parties issued 12 documents
in total (see Annex 13.1), which gives 1.5 documents per year (SPG, 2018a).
The parties also signed joint documents within the free trade area between
ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand (ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand
Free Trade Area, AANZFTA), which were not included in the scope of this
project. If the bilateral documents are followed exclusively, the legal basis
of the cooperation should be regarded as narrow.
It can be said that the ASEAN–Australia partnership is characterized by
a high level of cooperation willingness. The parties took actions to upgrade
the status of the relationship and formally name it as strategic partnership.
The effective time span of the partnership is short (2007–2015), and the
scope of determined cooperation areas is broad; however, the number of
bilateral documents signed by the parties is small.
13.2.1 Strategic Roles Convergence
The analysis of strategic goals convergence was carried out on the basis
of four bilateral strategic documents, 11 documents by ASEAN and
six Australian documents (their list can be found in Annex 13.1). The
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376 States, international organizations and strategic partnerships
aggregated value of convergence in the research case study is low (0.039)
(SPG, 2018d).
When analysing the partners’ strategic goals convergence, it should be
borne in mind that the time span is short (eight years). Moreover, in the
case of Australia, as Coral Bell (1997) notes: ‘Since Australians are on
the whole a pragmatic and empiricist people [. . .] political objectives are
often candidly presented and justified in terms of economic and security
objectives’ (p. 56).
Among the actors’ 13 most salient goals, four can be recognized as
overlapping, five complementary, and four compatible or competitive (see
Table 13.1). The overlapping goals include: multi-lateral solutions in international relations; peace and security in the world; cooperation between
Australia and ASEAN; development of agriculture. Both ASEAN and
Australia stress the importance of engaging in the activity of the United
Nations (UN). By 2015 Australia had been a non-permanent member
of the United Nations Security Council five times. The state actively
participates in UN peacekeeping missions, provides substantial financial
aid and is engaged in the works of individual UN bodies, particularly those
concerning human rights protection (Markovic, 2010). The importance
of cooperation with the UN for ASEAN is proved by the establishing
of strategic partnership in 2011 (United Nations Asia-Pacific Regional
Coordination Mechanism, 2015). The development of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) is also important for the Association as well as
for Canberra. The development of agriculture relates mainly to the
production of healthy food, on the one hand contributing to the economic
development of Australia, and on the other, to countering famine in the
Southeast Asian states.
The partners’ complementary goals are as follows: security and prosperity in the region; cooperation with China; cooperation with the EU;
strengthening Australian cooperation with Asia; peace, stability and
security in the South China Sea. It should be noticed that both Australia
and ASEAN treat China as an important partner to cooperate with in
numerous domains. China has been ASEAN’s strategic partner since 2003,
and Australia’s since 2014.
Compatible or competitive goals include: ASEAN community; cooperation with third countries; alliance with the US; development of the Indian
Ocean region. It should be emphasized that despite Australia’s declared
goal – ASEAN community, which is the most salient one for ASEAN –
Canberra’s priority concerns those forums of ASEAN cooperation which
engage the most prominent global and regional players, including the US,
China, Japan and Indonesia.
Within the analysis of the partners’ issues convergence, there were 13
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Table 13.1 The convergence of strategic goals and salient foreign-political issues in Australian and ASEAN manifestos,
2007–2015
Australian foreign-political manifestos ASEAN foreign-political manifestos
Rank
no.
Manifested goal/issue Salience
(%)
Rank
no.
Manifested goal/issue Salience
(%)
strategic goals 1 strengthening cooperation with
Asia
34.63 1 ASEAN Community 20.31
2 peace and security in the world 14.57 2 bilateral relations with parties not
being the dialogue partners of
ASEAN
18.72
3 security and prosperity in the
region
14.33 3 multi-lateral solutions in
international relations
13.61
4 multi-lateral solutions in
international relations
9.88 4 security and prosperity in the
region
11.84
5 alliance with the US 6.05 5 peace and security in the world 8.13
6 development of agriculture 5.68 6 peace, stability and security on the
South China Sea
7.47
7 cooperation with the third
countries
4.60 7 cooperation with Australia 6.82
8 ASEAN Community 4.22 8 cooperation with China 6.45
9 development of the Indian
Ocean Region
2.79 9 cooperation with the EU 6.20
10 cooperation with China 2.68 10 cooperation with South Korea 5.90
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378
Table 13.1 (continued)
Australian foreign-political manifestos ASEAN foreign-political manifestos
Rank
no.
Manifested goal/issue Salience
(%)
Rank
no.
Manifested goal/issue Salience
(%)
salient foreignpolitical issues
1 security issues 23.09 1 transport and connectivity 19.57
2 terrorism and extremism 11.97 2 market, trade and investments 13.84
3 national security 9.35 3 security issues 10.65
4 climate, environment protection
and natural resources
8.43 4 nuclear security 10.42
5 maritime issues 8.21 5 sustainable development 9.26
6 market, trade, and investments 7.82 6 crisis management 7.20
7 crisis management 6.53 7 terrorism and extremism 6.17
8 sustainable development 5.94 8 education and science 5.46
9 disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons 5.61 9 food safety 5.00
10 democracy and good
governance
5.09 10 maritime issues 4.61
Note: The data presented in the table are an output of Atlas.ti-supported content analysis of Australia’s (N = 6, t = 2007–2015) and ASEAN’s (N
= 11, t = 2007–2015) foreign-political manifestos as listed in Annex 13.1. The percentages shown are relative counts for the most salient items on
the content-analysis output list (i.e. 100%-rescaled, with the least salient items deduced from the final count). The full version of data obtained from
unilateral and bilateral manifesto analysis is available online (SPG, 2018d).
Source: Author’s own analysis and presentation.
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The ASEAN–Australia strategic partnership 379
most salient issues for ASEAN and Australia (SPG, 2018d). Three issues
were classified as overlapping, seven as complementary and three as compatible or competitive. The overlapping issues include: sustainable development; terrorism and extremism; disarmament and non-proliferation of
weapons. It can be observed that these issues constitute an important area
of the ASEAN–Australia cooperation. Particularly important here is the
issue of Jihadi terrorism, which is a threat to the Southeast Asian states
and societies, but also – which was observed after the 2002 Bali attacks – to
Australia (Ramakrishna and Tan, 2003). Complementary issues include:
market, trade, and investments; security issues; education; food safety;
maritime issues; climate, environment protection and natural resources;
democracy and good governance. Compatible or competitive issues are as
follows: transport and connectivity; nuclear security; and national security,
which clearly have more importance for one of the sides.
13.2.2 Strategic Roles Convergence
Strategic roles convergence between Australia and ASEAN is low (0.611)
(SPG, 2018d). All the elements of the PIPR analytical model, which makes
it possible to assess the symmetry of the actors’ international roles, demonstrate that ASEAN dominates in power and influence whereas Australia
dominates in presence and strategic relevance. Australia’s strategic role
seems to be higher than ASEAN’s.
According to the theoretical assumptions of the project, both ASEAN
and Australia have been categorized as major regional international actors.
Considering various mechanisms of international cooperation initiated
by the Association which engage not only the most important regional
players but also the global ones (first of all EAS, ARF, ASEAN13, the
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime
Forum (EAMF)), ASEAN should be recognized as a structural power.
As Evelyne Goh (2014) says, ASEAN is ‘[a] structural power because
these large regional institutions are difficult to “re-programme”: subsequent regionalist developments must adapt to, or be grafted onto, these
ASEAN-led institutions already entrenched at the heart of the strategic
architecture’ (pp. 203–4). In turn, Australia is an actor that uses both the
elements of hard power and numerous soft power tools. Using hard power is
visible mainly in Australia’s engagement in almost all global military conflicts after 1901 (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003). Australia provided military
assistance to the US in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as supported the UN’s
military intervention in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands (Bellamy, 2010)
and is militarily involved in the UN’s peacekeeping missions (Londey,
2016). At the same time, in 2015 Australia had a high sixth place in the
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380 States, international organizations and strategic partnerships
ranking of soft power states (The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of
Soft Power, 2015). The important factors here include development aid
provided by the government agency Australian Aid as well as numerous
government programmes such as the New Colombo Plan (NCP); the
Australian NGO Cooperation Program (ANCP); the Direct Aid Program
(DAP), cooperation on sport, tourism and education, and also initiatives
such as Koala diplomacy (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2016).
The values of individual elements of influence show ASEAN’s dominance over Australia. What mattered here was the growth in the number
of ASEAN member states as well as their substantial economic and
demographic development. It should be noted, however, that it is Australia
which is a member of influential international groupings that associate
only the richest countries in the world, such as G20 and the Paris Club.
According to the UN’s classification, Southeast Asia and Oceania are
neighbouring regions (United Nation Statistics Division, 2013). However,
the specificity of Australia should be remembered here. The discussion
about Australia’s position in the world has continued at least since the
1980s (Knight and Heazle, 2011). As Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley
(2003) say:
it is hard to pinpoint Australia’s “place in the world” with any precision. Its
strategic environments are Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Its major
strategic ally, however, is in North America, 12,000 kilometres away. Its major
trading partners lie in Northeast Asia, 8,000 kilometres as the Boeing flies. The
historical and cultural roots of the largest proportion of its population lie in
Europe, on the other side of the globe. (p. 10)
Australia understands and emphasizes that Southeast Asia is an important
neighbour, which was expressed by Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Julie Bishop (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2015): ‘This is our region, this is
where we live, this is where our future lies’.
In the context of Australian diplomatic presence in ASEAN, Australia
has an ambassador accredited to the ASEAN Secretariat, who resides
in Jakarta (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2013).1 Moreover, its economic
presence (Australia is among ten major trade partners of ASEAN)
(ASEAN, 2015) and socio-cultural presence (implementation of the NCP)
is visible. During the period in question, ASEAN’s presence in Australia is
characterized by lower intensity and scope. What can be pointed out here is
diplomatic presence (the ASEAN Canberra Committee, ACC, functioning
since 1979) and socio-cultural presence. Considering economic presence,
out of ASEAN member states only Thailand is in the top ten of Australia’s
partners (occupying the ninth position while ASEAN as an association
was not included in the statistics (DFAT, 2018)).
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The ASEAN–Australia strategic partnership 381
Strategic narratives convergence of ASEAN and Australia can be
described as low. ASEAN perceives itself mainly as a leading subject
in the region, playing an important role in this part of the globe. This
conviction is represented in the term ASEAN Centrality, coined and
used by the organization itself (Domachowska, 2016). It is true that
Australia believes that strengthening ASEAN centrality is of great
importance for the developing regional architecture (JS, 2014), and
it actively participates in all mechanisms of regional cooperation.
However, as See Seng Tan (2014) notes: ‘Australia continues to participate actively in Asian regionalism. But it does so principally with great
power engagement in mind and a diminished faith in ASEAN’s regional
leadership’ (p. 34). Australia has twice suggested creating new forms of
institutional cooperation in the region.2 Moreover, the country refrained
from signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which in the
opinion of the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, was only a relic
of the Cold War (Dobell, 2015; Renshaw, 2018). Australia prioritizes
over ASEAN such associations as EAS and Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), in which the US – the most important strategic
partner of Canberra – is one of the member states (Poole, 2014).
Australian policy and strategic narrative are strongly connected to and
dependent on the US. According to Allan Patience (2017), the fact that
Australia is a dependent middle power makes the country an awkward
and often troublesome partner for the Asian states. Such a partner
concentrates its activities more on cooperation outside the region, with
important international players.
13.3 TRUST
The partners are engaged in the process of building trust. The parties –
particularly Australia, opening itself to relations with Asia – are trying to
build mutual trust and show due respect.
Until 2015, the parties did not appoint any joint institution serving
mutual promotion of the partner’s culture and tradition as well as providing information about each other. However, it can be observed that such an
institution was established following an individual initiative of Australia.
What should be mentioned here is the Australia–ASEAN Council, established by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and activated in
2015. Its goal is to promote Australia’s interests in Southeast Asia through
initiating and strengthening activities focused on tightening connections
and promoting mutual understanding between people and institutions in
Australia and the ASEAN member states (DFAT, 2017).
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382 States, international organizations and strategic partnerships
Australia and ASEAN are active in launching initiatives aimed at
ensuring mutual trust. Examples of such initiatives include the participation of artists from the ASEAN member states in the Biennale of Sydney,
which is financed by the Australian–ASEAN Council (DFAT, 2015), and
the ASEAN–Australia Youth Summit, the meeting of Australian and
ASEAN students as well as leaders of government institutions, private
sectors and civil society, organized since 2012. Additionally, during subsequent anniversaries of Australia becoming the ASEAN Dialogue Partner,
there were one-time cultural events.
The Australia–ASEAN relations had no faux pas which would have led
to issuing an official protest note. However, the situation which should
be mentioned here is the one from 2003, when John Howard described
Australia as ‘America’s deputy sheriff’ in the Asia-Pacific region, which
sparked a protest among the leaders of ASEAN member states. ASEAN
members recognized the words of the Australian Prime Minister as a
manifestation of ignorance and accused him of incomprehension and lack
of respect for the regional identity of Southeast Asia, in which Australia
has no leading role (Tow, 2006).
In the declaration establishing comprehensive partnership, the parties
acknowledged that it is important for partnership relations to maintain
mutual ‘respect [for] each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial
integrity, the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states, renunciation of threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, mutual respect and mutual benefit as enshrined in the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’ (JD, 2007). In the statement on
upgrading the cooperation to the level of strategic partnership, the parties
said that it is crucial for them to ‘encourage cooperation in interfaith and
inter-civilisation dialogue and the promotion of moderation’ (JS, 2014,
p.2). Thus it can be assumed that there is mutual acceptance of differences
stemming from disparate values and civilizational achievements. Bilateral
manifestos do not include any indications of the partners’ unequal say in
the decision-making process.
Neither of the parties issued any protest note towards the partner’s
practices in the international arena. However, what can be disputable is
the aforementioned project of establishing the Asia-Pacific community.
The initiative was criticized by ASEAN states, which accused Australia of
undermining the Association’s importance and community nature (Koh,
2009).
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The ASEAN–Australia strategic partnership 383
13.4 COOPERATION SUSTAINABILITY
The sustainability of cooperation between ASEAN and Australia is
fostered by its open character, institutional commitment and challenge
resistance.
The partners did not set a time limit on the partnership. Both ASEAN
and Australia perceive the partnership as a cooperation not limited in time
and continuously declare willingness to strengthen it; furthermore, they
point to long-term goals such as supporting the implementation of the
vision of the ASEAN community after 2015 (JS, 2014).
Institutional commitment is present on both sides. Australia has not
established a separate coordinator for contacts with the Association. In
2013 within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) eight
regional divisions operated; four of them were dedicated to Asia, and
two of those – directly to Southeast Asia (DFAT, 2016a). There is also
the Australian Mission to ASEAN with an ambassador accredited to the
ASEAN Secretariat. The Mission also has its regional bureau in Bangkok.
Australia has institutions dealing with the said partnership at both
governmental and non-governmental levels. An example is the advisory organ of the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the
Australia–ASEAN Council (AAC). The Council realizes its aims by
providing financial support in the form of grants (DFAT, 2016b). A body
operating independently from DFAT is the Australia–ASEAN Business
Council (AABC). Substantial commitment of Australia is noticeable in
the financial-economic context. Australia provided financial support to
the ASEAN states as early as 1974, when it became a Dialogue Partner
and established the ASEAN–Australia Economic Cooperation Program
(AAECP). When new member states (Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia)
acceded to ASEAN, and it became necessary to keep up with the economic
progress in Southeast Asia and the development of ASEAN–Australia
relations, the Australian government created a new financial programme:
the ASEAN–Australian Development Cooperation Program (AADCP).
The time frame of the programme was six years (2002–8) and its aim was
to promote balanced economy and social development as well as regional
integration within ASEAN. In July 2009 Australia signed with ASEAN the
Memorandum of Understanding between the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and the Government of Australia on the Second Phase of
the ASEAN Australia Development Cooperation Program (AADCP II)
(MOU, 2009). This programme is to be implemented over seven years, and
its goal is to help less advanced ASEAN states in the realization of the UN
Millennium Development Goals and thus foster regional development.
ASEAN’s unilateral commitment is visible in the diplomatic aspect.
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384 States, international organizations and strategic partnerships
ASEAN established a Committee in the Australian capital, the ASEAN
Committee Canberra, consisting of the heads of member states’ diplomatic missions accredited to Canberra3 (ASEAN Committees in Third
Countries and International Organisations [ACTC], 2014). Social-cultural
commitment is also visible (cooperation of ASEAN’s Committee on
Culture and Information (ASEAN-COCI) with a network of Australian
organizations working with cultural heritage, co-financed by the Canberra
government – AusHeritage) (Cook and Taylor, 2013). There is no institutional and financial commitment on the Association’s side.
ASEAN and Australia cooperate in over 20 different domains. Based
on the POA (2014), they include for example good governance and human
rights, maritime cooperation, transport, finances, information technologies, energy, tourism, forestry, crisis management, culture, science, public
health, environment, investments, connectivity, development of human
resources, security, and combating terrorism. The analysis of annual
reports of the Australian DFAT for 2007–15 found among other such
initiatives of ASEAN and Australia:
● Cooperation among the Australian Human Rights Commission,
the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights
(AICHR) and the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) on the
issue of gender inequality.
● The Australia–ASEAN Emerging Leaders Program (A2ELP), realized since 2010 by the Australia–Malaysia Institute and since 2015 by
the Australia–ASEAN Council; it offers 20–25 young leaders from
Australia and ASEAN a possibility to discuss the challenges and
chances for the region.
● The Australia–ASEAN BRIDGE School Partnership, implemented
since 2015 by the AAC; its goal is inter-school cooperation.
The ASEAN–Australia Development Cooperation Program Phase II
(AADCP II) plays a particular role in implementing joint projects. In 2016
it financed 64 projects (AADCP II, 2015). It should be noted that these
projects mostly focus on creating analyses, research, feasibility studies,
training and promotion.
The analysis of the state’s loyalty towards the international organization leads to the conclusion that Australia remains loyal to the partner
and its member states. This can be confirmed by the support provided
by Australia to the ASEAN states during the financial crisis of 1997–98.
However, it should be remembered that this help had a predominantly
bilateral character (Frost, 2016).
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The ASEAN–Australia strategic partnership 385
Australia was also involved in supporting the ASEAN states during the
SARS crisis, assigning in 2009–10 over 13 million Australian dollars to
regional preparations against the potential pandemics (AusAID, 2010).
Australia expressed its understanding for ASEAN with regard to the situation in the South China Sea. In the statement from May 2014 Australia
claimed that it does not take a stand concerning competing claims;
however, it is in its interest to maintain peace and stability, respect towards
international law, and undisturbed trade and freedom of navigation, and
it also shares the serious concern expressed by ASEAN on this matter
(DFAT, 2014).
However, if we analyse the question of the international organization’s
loyalty in the face of challenges encountered by the partner state, it should
be noted that ASEAN had a chance to show its loyalty by supporting
Australia in the border dispute with Timor-Leste on the placement of the
sea boundary and in consequence on the ownership of oil and gas fields
(Leach and Wood, 2014). ASEAN could have done it by refusing TimorLeste’s application for ASEAN membership. However, the official motion
put forward by Dili in 2011 was supported by the majority of ASEAN
member states (ASEAN, 2011).
In Australia’s relationships with ASEAN member states, there have
been numerous challenges that the partners have been able to overcome.
In the past, such relation-disrupting issues included Australia’s refusal to
sign the TAC – which it officially signed in 2005 – and Australia creating
in December 2005 the Maritime Information Zone. As Craig A. Snyder
(2006) states: ‘Both of these issues are of relatively minor importance in
regard to the overall positive nature of the relations between Australia and
the ASEAN members’ (p. 330). During the period in question, in the years
2007–15, the cooperation could have been influenced by Prime Minister
Rudd’s initiative to create the Asia Pacific community, in competition
to ASEAN (Grabowski, 2010). Ultimately, this did not encumber the
cooperation between Canberra and ASEAN.
13.4.1 Unique Bonds
In the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership (JD, 2007)
Australia and ASEAN clearly stated that they share ‘common values
of justice, democracy, social equality, good governance, human rights
and caring societies that are the foundation for lasting peace, stability,
progress, and prosperity according to the Charter of the United Nations’.
In the document establishing the strategic partnership, they also list ‘the
rule of law, democracy, good governance, human rights, including gender
equality’ (JS, 2014).
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386 States, international organizations and strategic partnerships
Common experiences of Australia and ASEAN began only after the
Second World War. In the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth
century Australia did not have independent foreign policy but was bound
by that of Great Britain. As Peter Wicks (2000) states: ‘Australia used to
view the Asian continent as distant and obscure, exotic and mysterious,
somehow a world apart’ (p. 483). Regional commitment of Australia
began during the Second World War and just after, when it joined the fight
against communism in Asia.
The parties do not recognize a common or analogous past as a foundation of their relation. The main bilateral documents lack any mention of
those. Research did not uncover any significant personal relation between
the partners’ representatives.
13.4.2 Regularized Bilateral Strategic Interactionism
As regards RBSI, the relations between Australia and ASEAN are developed
to a moderate degree. The parties have one joint body and several formats of
regular meetings. The ASEAN–Australia talks – both within the framework
of joint bodies and other regular formats – are held systematically, with
the frequency of approximately eight or nine meetings per year (SPG,
2018b). The interaction frequency is higher than in the control case (India).
However, it should be noted that in Australia’s relations with ASEAN, the
state attaches more importance to multi-lateral meetings in a broader group
as well as in various formats (EAS, APEC, ARF, ADMM1, EAMF).
During over 40 years of cooperation, ASEAN and Australia developed
one joint body, that is, the Joint Planning and Review Committee (JPRC).
Worth noting is that it is a decision-making body which coordinates the
ASEAN Australia Development Cooperation Program. The committee
consists of the representatives of ASEAN member states, the ASEAN
Secretariat and Australia’s representatives. In accordance with the MOU,
the meetings are organized up to two times per year. The most important
bilateral consultations held at regular intervals in a fixed formula include:
● The ASEAN–Australia Forum. Since April 1974, the officials from
the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and their counterparts from ASEAN member states meet under the leadership of the
state that is the coordinator at that time, as well as representatives of
the ASEAN Secretariat. The meetings are held every 12–18 months.
● The ASEAN–Australia Summit of the leaders of Australia and ten
ASEAN states. This took place twice, in 2010 and 2014. According
to the provisions of the 2014 document on establishing the strategic
partnership, the summits are to be held bi-annually.
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The ASEAN–Australia strategic partnership 387
Standardized meetings also include the annual meetings of the ASEAN–
Australia Joint Cooperation Committee (AA-JCC), the  ASEAN Post
Ministerial Conferences  (PMC11), and the meeting of higher rank
executives dedicated to the issue of transnational crime (SOMTC) and
consultation with Australia.
During the researched period (2007–15) the partners held bilateral
meetings at three levels: higher rank executives, lower rank executives and
specialists. The most frequent meetings were those of specialists, followed
by higher rank executives (SPG, 2018b).
There are also informal interactions between the partners, fostered by
the establishment of AADCP II, which finances training courses, seminars
and studies at the specialist and ministerial levels. A tourism project that
can serve here as an example is ‘Training of ASEAN Master Trainers and
Master Assessor for Front Office, Food and Beverage Services and Food
Production Divisions’, whose participants involved the officials dealing
with tourism in Australia and ASEAN member states (AADCP II, 2015).
As Australia is a party in TAC, the partnership uses a mechanism of
peaceful dispute settling. According to the treaty provisions, all differences
of opinion that might threaten peace and harmony in the region should be
settled through friendly negotiations, and if this fails by the High Council,
a body consisting of the ministerial-level representatives of the parties in
question, which has at its disposal good services, mediation, investigations
and conciliation procedure (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005, pp. 8–9).
13.5 SUMMARY
In 2014 the partnership between Australia and ASEAN was defined as
strategic by the parties. In the analysed period 2007–15 both partners were
characterized by significant cooperation willingness. The parties upgraded
the relation status and delineated broad scope of cooperation. What limits
their cooperation is weak convergence of goals and international roles.
Although it is noticeable that Australia’s most salient goal is ‘strengthening
relations with Asia’, this signifies the largest actors in the region – China,
Japan, South Korea and India – rather than ASEAN and its member
states. In Canberra’s foreign policy the most important strategic partner is
the US, and this relation shapes Australia’s cooperation with ASEAN and
its support of EAS and APEC activities.
There are no unique bonds between ASEAN and Australia. Considering
its culture, language and history, Australia is closer to the so-called
Western states (Great Britain, Canada, the United States) than to ASEAN
member states. Yet it should be highlighted that both parties attempt to
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388 States, international organizations and strategic partnerships
build mutual trust. This process strengthens institutional commitment of
both parties as well as the RBSI between them. Both actors have developed
specific formats of regular meetings that most frequently take place at the
specialists’ level, which fosters strategic interactionism.
NOTES
1. The office of an ambassador dedicated to ASEAN has existed since 2008; however, in
2008–2013, the ambassador resided in Canberra, the capital of Australia (Australian
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008).
2. What should be mentioned in this context is the initiative of establishing by 2020 the
Asia-Pacific community announced by the Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2008).
3. Comprising six out of ten Association member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.