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642 P.2d 1178 (1982) 56 Or.App. 478 STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Kenneth Owen TROW, Appellant. No. 79-06-31954; CA 19840. Court of Appeals of Oregon. Argued and Submitted June 17, 1981. Decided March 22, 1982. Reconsideration Denied April 27, 1982. *1179 Charles J. Merten, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Merten & Saltveit, Portland. Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and William F. Gary, Deputy Sol. Gen., Salem. Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARDEN and WARREN, JJ. WARREN, Judge. Defendant appeals his conviction after jury trial for unlawful use of a vehicle. ORS 164.135. We affirm. Defendant was indicted by secret indictment in June, 1979: "The above-named defendant is accused by the Grand Jury of Multnomah County, State of Oregon, by this indictment of the crime of UNAUTHORIZED USE OF VEHICLE committed as follows: "The said defendant, between February 20, 1979 and March 24, 1979, in the County of Multnomah, State of Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally use a vehicle, to-wit: a 1966 Chrysler, Oregon License No. CFD 158, owned by Leonard Mohler and Michael I. Luce, the said defendant having custody of the said vehicle pursuant to an agreement between the said defendant and Leonard Mohler and Michael I. Luce whereby the said defendant was to perform for compensation *1180 a specific service for Leonard Mohler and Michael I. Luce involving the repair of said vehicle, said use being without the consent of Leonard Mohler and Michael I. Luce, and for the said defendant's own purpose in a manner constituting a gross deviation from the agreed purpose, contrary to the Statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon. "* * *." Defendant moved to dismiss and, alternatively, for a hearing equivalent to a preliminary hearing before trial. Those motions were denied. In September, 1979, defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the circuit court either to dismiss the indictment or to grant defendant a hearing equivalent to a preliminary hearing or to show cause why it had not done so. Defendant then demurred to the indictment. In October, the Supreme Court issued an alternative writ of mandamus, ordering the circuit court to show cause why it had not granted defendant's motion. The circuit court overruled the demurrer in November. Defendant next moved in the Supreme Court for an order staying the trial in the circuit court until further order of the Supreme Court on the petition for mandamus. On December 11, 1979, the Supreme Court granted the stay "pending the issuance of [its] decision." An opinion dismissing the petition was handed down on June 3, 1980, 289 Or. 265, 611 P.2d 1169 (1980), and an opinion denying defendant's petition for rehearing was filed September 23, 289 Or. 673, 616 P.2d 496 (1980). However, the mandate dissolving the stay was not issued by