请将“Poulantzas argues that the juridico-political region has a crucial effect on the field of class struggle. For it interpellates the agents of production as individual juridical subjects rather than as members of antagonistic classes (on the meaning of interpellation, see above p. 131). Thus economic agents do not experience capitalist relations as relations between social classes but as relations of competition among mutually isolated individuals and/or fragmented groups of workers and capitalists. This ‘isolation effect’ extends to the entire field of economic relations in capitalist societies and permeates classes belonging to other modes of production located therein (1968, pp. 130-13 1, 213-214, 275276, 310; 1978, pp. 63-67, 69-70, 86-88). The same effect is evident in the field of political class struggle. For law and juridico-political ideology duplicate the ‘fracturing’ of the ‘private’ sphere in the interpellation of the people as mutually isolated, individual ‘citizens’ and/or political categories. But Poulantzas also argues that the ‘isolation effect’ in the private sphere and the realm of citizenship is coupled with something we might term the ‘unifying effect’ of the capitalist state. For this presents itself as the strictly political (i.e., non-economic), public unity of the people-nation considered as the abstract sum of formally free and equal legal subjects. Moreover, not only does the state embody the public unity of private individuals through the operation of its various representative institutions (suffrage, parties, legislative assemblies, etc.), through its distinctive centralising bureaucratic-hierarchical framework it also organises and regulates the relations among diverse individual subjects and social categories in order to maintain cohesion (1968, pp. 125, 133-134, 188-189, 215-216, 276-277, 279, 288, 291, 348, 349-350; 1978, pp. 49, 58, 63-65, 86-88).

This means that the capitalist state is related to socio-economic relations as refracted through the ‘isolation effect’, i.e., class relations are constitutively absent from the organisation of the capitalist state and its actions aim to secure cohesion and unity among individuated citizens (1968, pp. 133, 188, 213, 223, 279, 310). In turn this means that the organisation and internal functioning of the state can assume the form of a rational-legal administration. Thus the bureaucracy can appear as an impersonal, neutral institution embodying the general interest and can operate according to a hierarchically structured, centrally coordinated system of formal, general, universal, and codified rational-legal norms. Indeed the very possibility of a formally rational administration depends not only on the economically grounded monopoly of force enjoyed by the state but also on the absence of open political class domination from its organisation (1968, pp. 216, 226-227, 332, 347-350; 1974, p. 186; 1978, pp. 59, 65, 76-77, 80-82, 88-89, 91).

Nonetheless, although the individuals of civil society are formally free and equal and the state is the formally sovereign and ‘class-less’ embodiment of their unity, the manner in which this cohesion and unity are realised is necessarily overdetermined by the need to reproduce class domination. Thus Poulantzas argues that, while the capitalist state must prevent any political organisation of the dominated classes that would threaten to bring an end to their economic isolation and/or social fracturing, it has to work continually on the dominant class fractions and/or classes to cancel their economic isolation and secure the unity of the power bloc and its hegemony over the dominated classes (1968, pp. 136-137, 140-141, 188-189, 284-285, 287-289; 1974, pp. 97-98, 157-158; 1978, pp. 127, 140141).

This dual political task is achieved through the organisation of a unified power bloc under the leadership of a specific class (fraction) and the successful presentation of its global political interests as those of the people-nation as a whole. In turn this involves the continual negotiation of interests in an ‘unstable equilibrium of compromise’ and requires real (albeit limited) material concessions to the economic-corporate interests of the dominated classes (1968, pp. 137, 190191; 1970, pp. 71-72, 313; 1974, pp. 91-93, 97-98, 163-164; 1976b, pp. 47-48, 79-81, 83, 102-103; 1976c, p. 37; 1978, pp. 30-31, 133, 140-141, 184-185).

In discussing the dual constitution of hegemony Poulantzas refers to a wide range of institutional effects and political and ideological practices. Among its basic conditions of possibility are the separation of the political region from the economic (endowing the state with the relative autonomy it requires to mediate the management of contradictions and secure cohesion) and the ‘isolation effect’ (enabling the hegemonic class or class fraction to articulate its interests with those of an individuated, fractured people-nation). Within this context Poulantzas then focuses on the effects of the specific institutional structures and their so-called ‘structural selectivity’ in securing the unity of the dominant classes and fractions in the power bloc under the hegemony of a specific class (fraction). Thus, whereas his early studies focused on the differential presence of competing dominant class or fractional forces in the various branches and power centres of the state and their unification through the dominance of the legislative branch (typical of competitive capitalism) or of the executive branch as organised in turn under the dominance of a specific power centre (typical of monopoly capitalism), his subsequent work extends this analysis of the unity of the power bloc and the concomitant unity of state power to include the differential presence of class forces in the so-called ideological state apparatuses (or ISAs) as well as the branches of the state apparatus proper (also referred to as the ‘repressive state apparatus’ or ‘RSA’) and to give far greater weight to the ‘polycentrism’ of the executive branch itself as a terrain of class and fractional struggles that is ultimately unified through the central role of one power centre within a complex hierarchy of power centres (cf. 1968, pp. 303-307; 1969, pp. 74-77; 1970, pp.299-309, 311-312, 318, 325, 327; 1974, pp. 98, 163-164, 186-187; 1976a, p. 75; 1976b, pp. 49-50, 82, 100-101, 103; 1976c, pp. 39-42; 1978, pp. 132-137).

In this context Poulantzas stresses that the mediation of the contradictions within the power bloc depends not only on the formal institutional structure of the state (e.g., the centralism and/or hierarchical organisation of the RSA and its regimentation of the ISAs) but also on specific political practices (classified, paradoxically, as a process of ‘structural selectivity’) such as short-circuiting decision-making processes, selective filtering of policy implementation, partial ‘non-decision-making’, displacing functions between power centers, and reversing the predominant repressive or ideological roles of different state apparatuses (1970, pp. 329-330, 334; 1974, p. 164; 1976a, p. 75; 1976c, p.40; 1978, p. 134). He also notes that these practices involve not only members of the dominant classes and fractions themselves but also their representatives on the ‘political scene’ (the field of party competition and parliamentary politics), their ‘ideological watchdogs’ and ‘organic intellectuals’, and the heads of the state apparatus whose function as formally impartial representatives of the public or national interest is necessarily qualified by their de facto polarisation around different class and fractional interests within the power bloc (1968, pp. 216, 246252, 315, 320-321, 336-340, 336n; 1969, pp. 73-74; 1970, pp. 73-75, 77-78, 102-103, 125-127; 1974, pp. 183-189; 1976b, pp. 33, 50, 102-103, 120; 1976c, pp. 46-47; 1978, pp. 61, 135-136, 154, 156, 159).

Somewhat different considerations are advanced in relation to the constitution of hegemony over the dominated classes and popular masses. Poulantzas has consistently emphasised the importance of genuine class alliances extending beyond the power bloc in the economic, political, or ideological fields and has also stressed the role of support from subordinate classes based on ideological illusions concerning the nature of state power rather than on real political sacrifices on the part of the power bloc and its allies (1968, pp. 216, 240245, 285-286, 288, 297; 1970, pp. 112, 243, 327, 330; 1974, pp. 78-79, 290-294, 296-298, 333-335; 1976b, p. 103; 1976c, P. 43; 1978, p. 142). Conversely Poulantzas has also argued that state power (at least in the theoretically typical forms of capitalist state) corresponds unequivocally to the interests of the power bloc and that the working class cannot advance its fundamental interests (presumably in a transition to socialism) and/or secure its own hegemony through the capitalist state (1968, pp. 100, 256-257, 288; 1974, p. 164; 1976a, p. 72; 1976b, p. 103; 1978, p. 143). This said, while the dominated classes cannot establish their own state power simply through the capture of the existing state apparatus and must develop their own class unity in and through the struggle for a new form of state, they are present in the capitalist state in a disunified, fragmented manner and can advance their particular, isolated, ‘economic-corporate’ interests through this state to the extent that such advances also sustain bourgeois hegemony. Indeed Poulantzas notes that the bourgeoisie typically deploys several ideological state apparatuses specially designed to inculcate bourgeois ideology into the working class and through which, in certain cases, working-class struggle is channelled with pertinent effects on state policy. In this context he cites trade unions and social democratic parties and argues that they must pursue workingclass interests as a condition of reproducing bourgeois hegemony (1970, pp. 101, 127n, 144, 151-155, 172, 196, 308; 1974, p. 277; 1976a, p. 69; 1976b, pp. 55-56, 83; 1978, pp. 142, 144; see also, 1968, pp. 251, 285).”翻译为中文