请将“The hypothesis that the dynamics of anti-Jewish policy was to a large extent shaped by reports on opinions and behavior has been convincingly developed.6 I 
will take this very haunting hypothesis as a starting point and try to supplement it by proposing an analytical concept which might help to explain the relationship between the nonofficial public sphere and anti-Jewish policy, without falling into the trap of postulating that modern antisemitism in Germany had always aimed at the physical destruction of the Jews.7 In doing so I refer myself to theoretical and historical research in the function of the public sphere8 in modern societies.9 Let me sum up where I think we stand.
One after another, the legends regarding the relative immunity to National Socialism of the inhabitants of certain towns, for example the Hansa-towns, of certain social groups, especially the workers,10 or of certain leading individuals,11 have been destroyed by closer scrutiny.12 Today we are aware ofmany of the reasons for the wide acceptance of the regime. One is the populism of the Gauleiters, their Sozialismus der Tat (practical socialism),13 which sometimes fulfilled longstanding demands, such as for example the equal distribution of working hours among the harbor workers of Hamburg.14 Many of these workers were glad to once more find employment, others were delighted that for the first time in their lives they could take a vacation. Many were content that the regime pledged to do away with the humiliation of the Versailles peace treaty.15 Many Germans experienced or could hope to experience social advancement. We have come to realize that neither spontaneous nor coordinated endeavors to defend old traditions, religious practices, preferences of cultural expressions,16 or economic interests should be assembled under the term Resistenz? because this suggests that any diversion from the principles upheld by Nazi propaganda expressed reservation about the regime as such. Instead, we have slowly come to accept that Nazism existed in a German 
society that in many respects was less strictly dominated than we used to think.18 The latest blow to the cornerstone of any interpretation that considers Nazism as a system totally alien to the German society has come from the research into the functioning of observation and terror. Mann, Gellately, Mallmann and Paul have shown that the Gestapo and the other institutions involved in observation and persecution were much less overpowering than had been assumed, that they had to and could rely on denunciations. All of these authors have demonstrated that the institutions of persecution were made use of to resolve conflicts of everyday life. We have to conclude that to a considerable extent control of the German population was exercised by itself.19
Persecution and Secondary Public Spheres
In addition, I would now propose the hypothesis that it was not only Nazi propaganda nor the endeavors to lead a more or less undisturbed private life20 which furthered what German historians have called die Hinnahme, the acquiescence with Nazi anti-Jewish policy,21 but that the secondary public sphere, in other 
words all the scattered and restricted publics of everyday life, had their part in furthering this acceptance. Widespread antisemitism was a precondition for the persecution of individuals who either conceived of themselves as being Jewish, or by the criteria of the new regime were declared as belonging (fully or in half), to a Jewish race. It does not explain the development from antisemitism to state- organized mass murder. Any such explanation, unsatisfactory as it will always remain, must take into account what we have come to learn about the functioning of western societies in the twentieth century.
There were social, and in particular professional groups whose members were convinced that Jews endangered or prevented them from becoming economically and socially successful. Since this is well known we usually do not seek further explanation for the fact that individuals belonging to these groups made use of the advantages that were offered to them through the persecution ofJews. However, one of the results of the current international debate on analytical concepts in social history is the insight that individuals do not simply function according to their economic or social positions,22 and that interests and attitudes, therefore, should not be considered simple reflexes of social positions. Instead, interests are always the result of an interpretation of these positions. Individuals interpret their position in life, their hopes and their needs by taking into consideration what they know or assume to be thought legitimate by “everybody.” This “everybody” can be the anonymous authority of the general public, be it officially regulated or not. Most often, however, the most important body of reference is one or other of the public spheres in which we lead our daily lives, ranging from school class to church congregation, to the workplace.23 In fact, sociologists have told us that the professional group is the most important reference group for modern man.24 
Public opinion, in other words, is not only to be conceived of as the legitimating body for government, but also as the legitimating authority that is relevant in the process of constituting one’s interests. It is, therefore, one of the main preconditions for behavior.
The possible relevance of this for research into the dynamics of anti-Jewish policy might be illustrated by reference to an event at the University of Göttingen. On 12 April 1933, almost immediately after the law of the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service had been enacted, the local paper printed the announcement that every university teacher would receive a questionnaire to be completed and returned as soon as possible in order to enable the minister to solve die.Judenfrage before the commencement of the next term. Everyone seems to have complied. Twenty-eight of the professors at this university were removed from their posts in 1933, six by telegram already on 25 April. No traces of any protest have been found. On 17 April, Prof. James Franck, winner of the Nobel prize in physics, asked the responsible Prussian minister to relieve him of his duties. Newspapers all over Germany made this move known, and the local newspaper in Göttingen printed Franck’s statement that he did not want to make use of the privilege accorded to those Jewish public servants who had fought for Germany in the war. There was only one action of solidarity from a university colleague. It came from Prof. Ewald in Stuttgart. In Göttingen, forty-two members of the faculty hastened to publish a statement declaring Franck ’s resignation to be an act of sabotage. After the death of Prof. Franck in 1954, many letters that he had received from individuals all over Germany who had wanted to let him know their esteem and their solidarity were found. It is because of these letters that I choose the “removal” ofJames Franck from a German university as an example. He might have valued them for their consoling virtue. Many others have reported that any sign of pity, solidarity or esteem helped them through some of their days or weeks.25 For historians they prove that although we do not know if this was always prompted by an attitude devoid of traces of antisemitism,26 there were in 
fact individuals who disagreed with this specific measure.27 But the university as a body, including all the colleagues not approving of the new law, remained silent. Victor Klemperer, professor in Dresden until April 1935, again and again noted in his diary that he found it simply incomprehensible when close acquaintances abruptly ended any contact with him after his dismissal.28 Franck must have had similar experiences.
In 1933 the SA was terrorizing the German population. Although its gangs most often tormented individuals who were known to be “left”, among them numerous Jews, it is possible that many others were afraid. At Göttingen, as in most other universities, the percentage of students who openly declared their favor for the new regime was high. Whatever the motivations of those who acquiesced in the first official anti-Jewish measures in 1933, the university public, by not insisting on humanity, on professional standards, or on its traditional autonomy, had already missed its opportunity to set limits to government strategies. Even more important is the impact this behavior must have had for the possible development of the nonofficial public sphere. In matters of anti-Jewish policy it had its back broken before it even had a chance to develop as a “secondary public” in the sense of Mallmann and Paul. After having experienced the rejoicing of some and the acquiescence of others, after having noticed that those who became professors because leftist and Jewish colleagues were forced to leave without arousing the disapprobation of their colleagues, who would in the years to come have felt it necessary to think twice before unreservedly bending to any official request? The loss of humanity might sometimes be an individual affair. Most often it is a social process.29 ”翻译为中文