"The Cooperative Game Theory of the Firm" (1984) was a first attempt to synthesize and unify various theories of the firm, such as neoclassical, worker controlled, and stakeholder society views, as special cases of corporate governance with varied weights of bargaining power attributed to the members of the firm. Aoki's interests then moved into comparisons of various internal information structures of the firm (hierarchical, horizontal and modular), and its applications to international varieties of corporate firms across Anglo-American, Japanese, German, Silicon Valley, and Chinese systems, as well as to a comparative assessment of nuclear power disasters (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima). These two viewpoints on corporate firms: a game-theoretic approach to corporate governance and information systemic approach to the internal structure of corporate firms are synthesized in Aoki's 2008 Clarendon Lectures, "Corporations in Evolving Diversity". Relying on a recent development of potential game theory, he also showed that sufficient and necessary conditions for corporate stakeholders with different payoff functions to behave as if they have a common objective is that they share a common distributive value (technically represented as Shapley value). This insight places the economic theory of the firm in a broader frame of institutional analysis.