By re-establishing a continuous front on Army Group South's left flank, the 4th Panzer Army and the 8th Army had, for the moment, blunted the Soviet thrust, but to the north and southeast fresh blows had already been dealt or were in the making. Employing the rippling effect that marked their offensives, the Red Army, thwarted in one place, had shifted to others. For the first time in the war they had the full strategic initiative, and they used it well. The failure of the German offensive in the Battle of Kursk meant the Germans permanently lost the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front, although Hitler refused to acknowledge it. The large manpower losses of the Wehrmacht in July and August 1943 severely restricted Army Groups South and Centre to react to future thrusts during the winter and 1944. Operations Polkovodets Rumyantsev, along with the concurrent Operation Kutuzov marked the first time in the war that the Germans were not able to defeat a major Soviet offensive during the summer and regain their lost ground and the strategic initiative.