Shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan began, Canadian officials noticed an uptick in American intelligence reports that paid close attention to Iraq. After it became evident that the US administration was targeting Iraq, the IAS produced an assessment in February 2002 on the likely policy direction the Americans would pursue with Iraq; having assessed that there was a high probability the US would ultimately invade Iraq. In April, the IAS built upon this assessment, evaluating how the US administration would justify an invasion. In the assessment, they concluded that the US would most likely attempt to link Iraq to the September 11th attacks or al-Qaida, as it provides grounds for self-defence; although it also noted that in the event that failed, they would seek to justify military actions on the grounds that Iraq had continued to develop WMDs. Within the following months, the IAS produced a number of assessments on how the US would conduct a military campaign in Iraq. By mid-2002, as the US administration failed to convince the public of Iraqi links to the September 11th attacks, it had become obvious to IAS analysts that the second option would be pursued by the US, justifying an intervention on the grounds that Iraq's WMD program was active.