Germany never achieved the industrial capacity needed to keep its military vehicles running efficiently: when the Russian campaign got underway, the deficiencies of the armaments industry and the organisation of maintenance depots became obvious. The German armed forces suffered from continual shortages of spare parts for tanks and half-tracks until the end of the war. When the first Tiger I tanks arrived in Russia in autumn 1942, there was only one spare engine and one transmission for every 10 tanks. A critical lack of spare parts meant that most of them were out of commission within a short period, sometimes for weeks on end. Despite various attempts at re-organisation, friction between the distribution systems of the German Army ("das Heer") and the civilian Ministry of Armaments (and from 1944 the 'Rüstungsstab') often led to confrontation and inefficiency. Some of this can be blamed on Karl-Otto Saur of the Ministry of Armaments, whose ruthless drive for greater overall production figures tended to override the need for testing and durability concerns, and the manufacture of enough spare parts.