The international context of Francoism changed dramatically in 1942–1944. In the early 1940s the Allies were chiefly concerned with preventing Spain from joining the Axis; though unhappy about fascistoid nature of the regime, they could have not afforded ruining their relations with Madrid by challenging Franco's internal policy. The war developments of 1942–1943, especially the Anglo-American landing in North-Western Africa, German military disasters at Stalingrad and in Tunisia and the fall of Mussolini made Spain's entry into war a non-issue. In 1943 the official propaganda of the Allies already marketed a hostile vision of Spain; an American newsreel presented it as a fascist country and anti-Francoist tones in BBC broadcasts elicited protest even from a British press attaché in Madrid. However, the mounting Allied pressure was directed at preventing Spanish supplies to Germany rather than at toppling the regime. In late 1943 the Allied demands regarding termination of shipments to the Nazis became ultimative and spelled the threat of total fuel embargo, which indeed early next year would prove its effectiveness by bringing the Spanish economy to its knees in just two months. The public opinion and politicians in Britain and the United States were turning firmly against Franco. In late 1943 the dictator started to consider an Allied invasion a more likely threat than a German one and soon ordered re-grouping of the Spanish army accordingly.