Considering its inexperience, Savige's 17th Infantry Brigade was given a complicated role in the Battle of Bardia. While the &lt;a href="2/6th%20Battalion%20%28Australia%29"&gt;2/6th Infantry Battalion&lt;/a&gt; made a demonstration on the right, the &lt;a href="2/5th%20Battalion%20%28Australia%29"&gt;2/5th Infantry Battalion&lt;/a&gt;, reinforced by part of the &lt;a href="2/7th%20Battalion%20%28Australia%29"&gt;2/7th Infantry Battalion&lt;/a&gt;, attempted to follow up the 16th Infantry Brigade's attack, with the remainder of the 2/7th in reserve. The brigade had to move in four directions at once. The plan soon went wrong, as the 2/5th in particular suffered a series of mishaps. By nightfall, Colonel Frank Berryman, the divisional chief of staff, had reached the conclusion that the 17th Infantry Brigade had become too tired and disorganised for further effort. This was only partly due to enemy action; the rest was attributable to Berryman's own plan, which had dispersed the brigade and provided it with inadequate armoured and, in the final stages, artillery support. Savige also bore some of the blame, for failing to ensure that his subordinates understood and carried out the plan.