When employed by the U.S. NRC, Eccleston charged that to minimize public concern and opposition, NRC management had intentionally mislead the public by dismissing significant nuclear safety and environmental issues. Specifically, Eccleston claimed that NRC assessments on risk posed by a nuclear accident, such as a full-scale meltdown, was so small that the agency could dismiss the issue from its EIS analysis. Using the "Risk-Uncertainty Test". Eccleston concluded that such a sweeping assertion was scientifically irresponsible, particularly given the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima accidents. He further concluded that NRC management concealed the actual risk posed to the nation, at large, by disregarding one of the basic EIS requirements to assess the cumulative risk of a major nuclear accident; specifically, he charged that NRC management had intentionally underestimated the actual the risk posed from over 100 operating nuclear reactors by approximately two orders of magnitude (100 times). A special Washington State Legislature Nuclear Power Task corroborated his findings in a section of their final report titled, "Doesn’t NRC address consequences of severe accident in EIS for relicensing?" (September 24, 2014).