Using their previous experience had provided the personnel of the unit with excellent training that enabled them to become rapidly skilled in this new types of work. The intercept company was not engaged in cryptanalysis but solely on the basis of D/F reports and evaluation of traffic intercepts handled by the numerous stations, the staff were able to deduce that a large number of units were in the area, but had no way to determine their organisational structure or Order of Battle. All that could be determined was whether the units belonged to the army, air force, or the NKVD, whose radio intercepts were distinguished by a different call sign, than that used by the regular armed forces. For several months during the period of regrouping, everything was in a state of flux. The soviet radio traffic was considered well organised and efficiently handled. Then the company intercepted messages from areas which were not actually assigned to it. When the USSR occupied the Baltic states of occupied Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Occupation of the Baltic states) and when they subsequently attacked Finland, their Shortwave radio transmissions from those areas were very well received by FAK 610 in southern Galicia, even better in areas further north. This was considered a discovery of great technical importance for the German intercept service. It could not have been arrived at by simple calculation, since it resulted from physical conditions.