Karnataka High Court Mrs. Mangalabai vs The Sangli Bank Ltd. And Ors. on 13 August, 2002 Equivalent citations: AIR 2003 KARNATAKA 76, 2004 CRI LJ (NOC) 37, 2003 AIR KANT. H. C. R. 52, (2003) 2 ALLINDCAS 841 (KAR), (2002) ILR (KANT) (3) 4601, (2003) 4 KCCR 2888, (2003) 2 CIVILCOURTC 20, (2002) 6 KANT LJ 362, (2002) 3 BANKCAS 701, (2003) 1 ICC 71, (2003) 1 BANKJ 215, (2003) 1 CIVLJ 299, (2003) 115 COMCAS 764, (2003) 2 BANKCLR 311 ORDER H. Rangavittalachar, J. 1. The 6th defendant to the suit O.S. No. 182/1986 has filed this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of theConstitution of India, challenging the order of the Additional Civil Judge, Bijapur passed on LA. No. 21. 2. Briefly staled, the facts are as under: The Sangli Bankrespondent No. 1 herein has filed a suit in O.S. No. 182/1986 against the respondents 2 to 6 herein and also the petitioner for recovery of Rs. 18,05,562.88. The suit came to be decreed by judgment and decree dated 31st January, 1995 against the respondents herein. So far as the petitioner is concerned, the same came to be dismissed. After the judgment and decree was pronounced, the Bank made an application I. A. No. 21 under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recalling the entire proceedings subsequent to 30.11.1994 including the judgment and decree in view of the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 ('Act', for short). This application came to be contested. By an order dated 12th February, 1997, the Trial Court recalled the judgment and decree and ordered the suit papers to be transferred before the Debts Recovery Tribunal constituted under the said Act. 3. This order is under challenge. Mr. Suresh S. Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, while assailing the said order firstly contended that in a situation where the facts as stated by the first respondent in LA. No. 21 existed, the first respondent could have only filed review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure and no application under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure was maintainable; elaborating the said contention learned Counsel submitted by relying on the following decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court that if the specific provision is made under the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Courts cannot invoke the inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure and pass order; like the one on hand. The decisions cited are, (1) Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. and Anr., II (1999) SLT 69(1999) 3 SCC 300; (2) Nansingh v. Koonwarajee and Ors., ; (3) R. Rathinavel Chettiar and Anr. v. V. Sivaraman and Ors., ; and M. Narajenappa v. Hemavathi, ILR 1987 Kar. 713. 4. In answer to the said contentions, learned Counsel for the first respondent Mr. G.N. Jayaraju submitted that when the Trial Court passed judgment and decree by mistake, without taking note of the existence of the provisions of the Act, on and from the appointed date the Civil Courts totally lacked any jurisdiction to deal with cases covered under the Act and the orders are passed overlooking the said provisions. Such orders can only be corrected by exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Learned Counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in Palghar Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. v. Visveswarayuya Iron and Steel Ltd., . He also submitted that whenever Civil Courts pass orders in exercise of the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, the aggrieved party can only resort to remedies available under the Code of Civil Procedure which is a complete and exhaustive Code and powers under Article 226 cannot be invoked. 5. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Act and the admitted facts in this case. 6. The admitted facts being, that the first respondent herein Sangli Bank, is a Scheduled Bank within the meaning of the provisions of the Act; that a suit for recovery of monies advanced by the Bank was filed in the year 1986 in O.S. No. 182/1986 against the respondents and the petitioner herein and the suit came to be decreed on 31st January, 1995. 7. During the pendency of the suit, Act 51 of 1993, i.e., Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 was enacted by the Parliament which came into force with effect from 24th June, 1993. The main purpose or object of establishing the Tribunals was for an expeditious adjudication in the matter of recovery of debts due to Banks and financial institutions as the experience showed that public money was not properly safeguarded on account of delay caused in civil litigation. Under Section 3 of the Act "Debts Recovery Tribunal" was constituted on and from the appointed day; Section 18 of the Act which is relevant reads as under : "18. Bar of jurisdictionOn and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled