Allahabad High Court M/S Standard Niwar Mills vs Government Of India Ministry Of Home ... on 30 July, 2024 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. 2024:AHC:121656DB Chief Justice's Court Case : APPEAL UNDER SECTION 37 OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 DEFECTIVE No. 146 of 2024 Appellant : M/S Standard Niwar Mills Respondent : Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs Procurement Wing Jaisalmer House Counsel for Appellant : Sudeep Harkauli Counsel for Respondent : A.S.G.I.,Vivek Kumar Singh Hon'ble Arun Bhansali,Chief Justice Hon'ble Vikas Budhwar,J. Order on C.M. Delay Condonation Application No.02 of 2024 1. After hearing counsel for the parties on the delay application seeking condonation of delay, for the reasons indicated in the application supported by an affidavit, the same is allowed. 2. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. Order on Appeal 1. Heard Sri Sudeep Harkauli, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Vivek Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent. 2. This appeal is directed against order dated 01.02.2024 passed by Commercial Court, Kanpur Nagar, whereby the petition filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') against the award dated 16.07.2015, signed on 09.09.2015, passed by the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Facilitation Council (for short 'the Council'), has been dismissed. 3. The appellant had approached the Council by raising claim on 14.05.2012, claiming a sum of Rs.40,17,889/ as principal and Rs.3,25,59,035/ as interest under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for short 'the Act of 2006'). Before the Council, objections were raised pertaining to the claim being barred by limitation, wherein the respondent indicated that the petition has been filed after about 14 years from 2001 and the delay in filing the claim cannot be condoned and the same deserves to be dismissed. 4. The Council, by its award dated 16.07.2015 on the issue whether the Reference was barred by the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963, came to the conclusion that admittedly the matter related to payment during the period of year 1998 to the year 2001 and the Reference has been made on 26.12.2012 and apparently, the same was barred by limitation and consequently, dismissed the Reference. 5. Feeling aggrieved, application under Section 34 of the Act was filed before the Commercial Court. Before the Commercial Court, the respondent raised objections pertaining to maintainability of the Reference before the Council and reiterated the objections that the claim was barred by limitation. A rejoinder was filed, inter alia, indicating that the Council had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and that as the respondent had acknowledged the liability of payment of claim from 05.09.2010 onwards upto 17.01.2014 in writing, the claim was within limitation. 6. The Commercial Court, by its impugned order, raised three issues for determination pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Council to hear the matter, whether the claim was barred by limitation and whether the award was liable to be set aside. 7. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Commercial Court came to the conclusion that the agreement was entered into in the year 1998 and the appellant got registered as MSME on 18.12.2010 and at the time when the supply under the contract was over, it was not registered under the Act of 2006 and as such, it could not have taken the benefit of the Act of 2006. On the issue of limitation, it was found that the supply was made in the year 1998, 1999 and the last supply was made on 14.01.2000 and the claim was filed with the Council in the year 2012, based on which it was found that the claim was barred by limitation and consequently, dismissed the application filed under Section 34 of the Act. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant made submissions that the Commercial Court was not justified in holding that the Council had no jurisdiction to deal with the issues on account of the fact that the supply was made prior to the registration of appellant under the Act of 2006. Further submissions were made that specific plea pertaining to acknowledgement was raised before the court on the aspect of limitation. However, the same has not at all been considered, resulting in rendering an incorrect finding and, therefore, the order impugned deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. Learned counsel emphasized that the appellant was registered as a small scale industry under the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (for short 'the Act of 1993'), which is reflected from the certificate produced in the paper book and in terms of Section 32 of the Act of 2006, the appellant was entitled to take benefit of its registration under t