标题：孟娟娟
个人履历
教育背景2010 加州大学圣迭戈分校 经济学 博士
2005 北京大学 金融学 学士[1]职业经历2010~至今
北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系、金融系助理教授[1]。
所授课程
1. 管理经济学
2. 高级微观经济学[1]
研究领域
研究专长包括行为经济学，行为金融学，劳动经济学，发展经济学等[1]。
学术成果
Publications:
With Vincent P. Crawford, “New York City Cabdrivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Utility with Targets for Hours and Income”, American Economic Review 101 (August 2011), 1912-1932
Abstract: This paper proposes a model of cabdrivers’ labor supply, building on Henry S. Farber’s (2005, 2008) empirical analyses and BotondK?szegi and Matthew Rabin’s (2006; henceforth “KR”) theory or reference-dependent preferences. Following KR, our model has targets for hours as well as income, both determined by rational expectations. Estimated with Farber’s data, our model reconciles his finding that stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with Colin Camerer et al.’s (1997) negative wage elasticity of hours; and avoids his criticism that estimates of drivers’ income targets are too unstable to yield a useful model of labor supply.
Working Papers:
“The Disposition Effect and Expectations as Reference Point.” revise and resubmit to Journal of Finance
Abstract: The disposition effect refers to the tendency for investors to sell winning stocks too early and hold losing stocks for too long. This paper shows that investors’ psychological aversion to losses relative to a reference point predicts the disposition effect when the reference point is defined by expected wealth but not the status quo wealth. Estimates from individual trading records suggest that investors’ reference level of gains is higher than risk-free rate, and it is closely tied to their past average realized gains. Infrequent traders are also shown to have higher reference level and stronger disposition effect than frequent traders. Expectations as reference point provide a simple explanation to these regularities. This theory also has the potential to link expectations to the magnitude of the disposition effect hence market movement. 
With Wanchuan Lin and Yiming Liu, "Will Formal Risk Sharing Arrangements Crowd Out Informal Mechanisms: An Experimental Study" 2011
Abstract: An important issue with promoting formal insurance in the rural areas of developing countries is the interaction between formal insurance and preexisting informal risk sharing arrangements. Will the introduction of formal insurance crowd out private transfer? What are the welfare consequences? This paper presents the first laboratory study investigating these issues. We show that the introduction of formal insurance crowds out informal risk sharing arrangements. This effect is strengthened by ex-ante income inequality and weakened by path dependence of the existing informal mechanisms. We further show that the introduction of formal insurance provides better risk coverage when income is equal, but when ex-ante inequality exists, there is no significant risk reduction due to the large crowding-out effect. 
"Social Distance, Interpersonal Interaction and Impersonal Exchange", 2010
Abstract: Personal relationships and anonymous market have been previously modeled in ways that prevent them from coexisting in equilibrium as contract enforcement mechanisms. Empirical evidence nonetheless suggests that they sometimes coexist. This paper introduces social utility into preferences, which is determined by social distance and specific to personal relationships but not to impersonal anonymous market exchange. This preference-based approach allows the two modes of exchange to coexist in equilibrium and further characterizes how their market shares depend on the degree of social heterogeneity. The possibility of impersonal exchange improves welfare and equality among buyers in general. But there also exist cases where competition between the two forms of exchange makes welfare and equality deteriorate.
Research in Progress:
"Social Distance and the Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing"
"Social Learning or Social Conformity? The Case of Stock Market Participation Decision"[1]
获奖情况
2007-2008Excellence in Referee Rewards, The American Economics Review,2001-2004北大明德奖学金。[1]