标题：《老兵不死》
简介
这篇演讲稿是道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟(Douglas MacArthur)在1951年4月19日被解职后在国会大厦发表的题为《老兵不死》的著名演讲。  道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟提起这句话：“老兵永远不死，只会慢慢凋零”。又译为：“老兵不会死，只是悄然隐去”。（Old soldiers never die, they just fade away），就不由得想起那个叼着玉米斗的麦克阿瑟——美国陆军五星上将。后来这句话被作曲家录制了5种唱片：“老兵不会死/不会死，不会死/他们只是悄然隐去。”出生于阿肯色州小石城的军人世家。1899年中学毕业后考入西点军校，1903年以名列第一的优异成绩毕业，到工程兵部队任职，并赴菲律宾执勤。麦克阿瑟有过50年的军事实践经验，被美国国民称之为“一代老兵”，而其自身的又曾是“美国最年轻的准将、西点军校最年轻的校长、美国陆军历史上最年轻的陆军参谋长”，凭借精妙的军事谋略和敢战敢胜的胆略，麦克阿瑟堪称美国战争史上的奇才。
英文原版
  麦克阿瑟在国会演讲时的照片Old soldiers never die -----------Douglas MacArthur
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Distinguished Members of the Congress:
I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride -- humility in the weight of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this home of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.
I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country. The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You can not appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.
Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration in the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.
Mustering half of the earth's population, and 60 percent of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started.
In this situation, it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support -- not imperious direction -- the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. Their pre-war standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.
Of more direct and immediately bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the literal line of the Americas, with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack.
The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us and our free allies. From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore -- with sea and air power every port, as I said, from Vladivostok to Singapore -- and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.
Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort.* No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed to failure.
Under such conditions, the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained, would be an invincible defense against aggression. The holding of this literal defense line in the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof; for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment.
This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. For that reason, I have strongly recommended in the past, as a matter of military urgency, that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of California, Oregon and Washington.
To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China, up to 50 years ago, was completely non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost non-existent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant, aggressive tendencies.
Through these past 50 years the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers, with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes, is allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism.
There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and eager to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies.
I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists' support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are, at present, parallel with those of the Soviet. But I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but also in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.
The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice. 
Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside and checked communism within their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race.
Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them -- as in our hour of need, they did not fail us. A Christian nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited. 
On Formosa, the government of the Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland. The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government, and politically, economically, and socially they appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.
With this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.
This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.
Such decisions have not been forthcoming.
While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.
Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: first the intensification of our economic blockade against China; two the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; three removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.
For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
I called for reinforcements but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.
We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.
Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the second day of September, nineteen hundred and forty-five, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:
"Men since the beginning of time have
sought peace. Various methods through the
ages have been attempted to devise an
international process to prevent or settle
disputes between nations. From the very
start workable methods were found in so
far as individual citizens were concerned,
but the mechanics of an instrumentality of
larger international scope have never
been successful. Military alliances,
balances of power, Leagues of Nations,
all in turn failed, leaving the only path to
be by way of the crucible of war. The
utter destructiveness of war now blocks
out this alternative. We have had our last
chance. If we will not devise some
greater and more equitable system,
Armageddon will be at our door. The
problem basically is theological and
involves a spiritual recrudescence and
improvement of human character that will
synchronize with our almost matchless
advances in science, art, literature, and all
material and cultural developments of
the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit
if we are to save the flesh." 
But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.
War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.
In war there is no substitute for victory.
There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.
"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?" I could not answer.
Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.
The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.
Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. 
They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific!"
I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.
It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. 
Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.
I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away."
And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.
Good Bye.
中文翻译：
总统先生、议长先生和尊敬的国会议员们：  
我怀着十分谦卑而又骄傲的心情站在这演讲台上。 我谦卑，是因为在我之前，许多美国历史上伟大的建设者们都曾经在这里发过言；我骄傲，是因为今天我们的立法辩论代表了经深思的人类解放最纯粹形式。这是整个人类进程中的希望、热情和信仰的集中体现。我并不是作为任何一个党派的拥护者站在这里讲话的，因为这些问题太重要，以至都超越了党派的界线。如果要证实我们的动机是正确的，如果要保障我们的将来，制定关于国家利益的最高纲领时就必须考虑到它们。我相信，当我说完我仅仅是为了陈述经深思熟虑而得出的一个普通美国公民的观点之后，你们会公平地接受它。在我生命将逝之年做这个告别演说，无仇无怨。在我心中只有一个目的：为我的祖国服务。 
这些问题是全球性的，而且环环相扣，任何的顾此失彼做法都会使整体造成灾难。亚洲被普遍认为是通往欧洲的门户，同样的，欧洲也是通往亚洲的大门，二者是息息相关的。有人认为我们的力量不足以同时保住两个阵地，因为我们不能分散我们的力量。我想，这是我听到的最悲观的失败主义论调了。如果我们潜在的敌人能够把他的力量分在两条线上，那我们就必须与之抗衡…… 
除了指出这些一般常识外，我将把讨论集中在亚洲地区。在客观地估计那里的现状之前，我们必须了解亚洲的过去，了解导致她上升到今天这种局势的革命性的变化。长期遭受殖民主义势力的剥削而使亚洲人民没有机会获取任何程度的社会平等、个人尊严，也无法提高生活水平，就像被我们的菲律宾贵族政府所统治的那样。亚洲人民在战争中找到了机会，得以摆脱殖民主义的枷锁，而且现在有更多的新的契机摆在他们面前：政治独立带来的以前从未感受过的尊严和自重。亚洲有占世界一半的人口和百分之六十的自然资源，她的人民正迅速地加强一个新兴的力量，包括精神和物质两方面，藉此提高他们的生活水平，协调现代化的进步和他们特有的文化环境。不管你是不是坚持殖民主义的观点，这是亚洲前进的方向，她不会停步。这一点是世界经济防线转移、国际事务中心回归原点的必然结果。在这种情况下，我们国家在政治上必须与基本的革命形势一致，而不能无视殖民时代已经过时，且亚洲人民渴望开创自己的自由生活的现实，这一点十分重要。他们现在需要的是友好的指引、理解和支持，而不是专制的指挥。 
我坚持保全他们，并希望能用最少的时间、最小的牺牲体面地结束这场野蛮的冲突。越来越多的流血让我感到深深的痛苦和焦虑。那些勇敢的人的形象在我的脑海中挥之不去，我将永远为他们祈祷。 
我将结束我五十二年的军旅生涯。我在世纪之交之前就已加入军队，它满足了我孩童时所有的希望和梦想。自从我在西点的草坪上宣读誓言以来，这个世界已经经历了多次转变，童年的希望和梦想早已消失得无影无踪。但我依然记得当年那首流行的军歌中骄傲的叠句：一个老兵永不死亡，他只是淡出舞台。就像歌中的老兵一样，我结束我的军旅生涯，只是淡出了人生舞台。一个力图像上帝指引的那样完成他的责任的老兵。再见
其他相关
注：有很多人把麦帅的 “责任-荣誉-国家”（就是以“今天早晨，当我走出旅馆时，看门人问道："将军，您上哪去?"”开头的那篇演讲） 与这篇著名的“老兵不死”相混淆。其实，那篇“责任-荣誉-国家”是麦帅在作了 “老兵不死”演讲后，重归西点时作出的演讲，与本篇演讲无关。
同名歌曲
老兵不死词曲:阿强
编曲:阿强
演唱:砰砰乐团
砰砰乐团-老兵不死
老兵不死老兵不死
只是凋零只是凋零
俺经过了年轻的岁月的风霜
英雄不再提当年勇却红了眼眶
孙女问我会不会玩"天堂"
我心想不久就要到那儿去闯一闯
俺最大的官也只有士官长
却常常有一堆黑锅可以扛
只要是不枪毙的俺都没话讲
但要记得十个包子和一罐高梁
俺南征北讨没吃过一顿饱
俺还真的看过那个人参貂皮乌拉草
可惜俺的福气只有美而美的汉堡
还好不用起个大早也吃得到
俺老了但不会假清高
穷就穷也不怕您笑
俺有一些您想买还买不到
俺还真的挨过那个日本鬼子的炮
从大陆来台湾也有她妈的几十年
几个讲义气的弟兄挂的挂闲的闲
他奶奶的俺一张帅帅的脸
如今七老八十已住在老人安养院
老芋仔七老八老
没人照顾身苦病痛
老芋仔旧鞋破杉
伊没按怎只是凋零
老芋仔是非看破
孤身影只人死留名